This examination considers the influence of the seventeenth century Cambridge Platonist Cudworth upon the thought of the late eighteenth century German thinker Herder. It focuses upon Herder’s use of Cudworth’s philosophy to create a revised version of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Both Cudworth and Herder were concerned with the problem of determinism. Cudworth outlined a number of difficulties relating to this problem in the thought of Spinoza and proposed amendments, particularly the introduction of the middle principle of plastik, which would mediate between the Ideas of transcendent reason and mechanical materialism. We find these amendments to Spinoza’s philosophy also employed in Herder’s contribution to the Pantheism Controversy, in which he too offers a revised Spinozism and introduces his own middle principle of Kraft. This demonstrates an important but under-explored English contribution to a key development in German intellectual history. The Pantheism Controversy was an epoch-making event, helping to bring an end to the German Enlightenment and to inaugurate the Romantic movement. Herder’s version of Spinoza’s thought revived the philosopher’s fortunes, and Herder’s notion of Kraft became central to Romantic aesthetics. Finally, Herder’s use of Cudworth demonstrates the important but overlooked source of Platonic realism in German Romantic thought.

The philosophy of Spinoza has been, since it was first written, a source of controversy.1 It prompted a herem (excommunication) that excluded him from the Dutch Sephardic community and earned his inclusion on the Inquisition’s Index Librorum Prohibitorum. Christian thinkers alternately used his work for theological target practice or as a rallying point for religious dissent. His ideas have been characterised as God-intoxicated or atheistic and nihilistic, and while some have seen him as the champion of a democratic vision, still others have accused him of a moribund fatalism. One of the greatest reversals of fate in the history of Spinoza reception came during the period that gave birth to Early German Romanticism, the Frühromantik. In 1780 the German dramaturge and philosopher Lessing described him as the ‘dead dog’ of philosophy, yet in 1799 Schleiermacher called him the ‘holy Spinoza’, and by 1835 the poet-essayist Heine maintained that Spinozism was ‘the clandestine religion of Germany’ (Jacobi, I.1.23; Schleiermacher, 31; Heine, 58–9). The great reversal in Spinoza’s fortune was brought about by the Pantheism Controversy (Pantheismusstreit), which saw the philosopher and theologian Johann Gottfried von Herder rise to Spinoza’s defence, but in doing so amend some of Spinoza’s key ideas. The Controversy helped to bring about the close of the German Enlightenment (Aufklärung) and usher in the age of Romanticism. From its German beginnings in Jena

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and Berlin, the Romantic spirit would spread to affect similar movements across Europe and beyond. Whilst the story of the Pantheism Controversy and the development of Romanticism are well known, what has been left unmentioned is the essential part played by the thought of the seventeenth century English philosopher Ralph Cudworth. This examination will demonstrate how the Cambridge Platonist Cudworth played an unexpected yet central role in one of the founding movements of modern German literature.

This examination considers Cudworth’s influence upon the thought of Herder in the context of his contribution to the Pantheism Controversy. It focuses upon Herder’s use of Cudworth’s philosophy to create a revised version of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Both Cudworth and Herder were concerned with the problem of determinism: Cudworth in relation to materialistic mechanism in early modern philosophy, and Herder in the context of the Pantheism Controversy and the critique of the limits of reason. Cudworth outlined a number of difficulties relating to determinism in the thought of major early modern philosophers, including Spinoza. He also suggested ways in which their philosophies might be amended, particularly through the introduction of the middle principle of plastik nature, which would mediate between rational truths and mechanical materialism. We find these amendments to Spinoza’s philosophy employed in Herder’s contribution to the Pantheism Controversy, specifically in the development of his own middle principle of Kraft.

This in itself demonstrates an unexplored example of the reception of the English philosopher Cudworth on the Continent. However, the importance of Herder’s Cudworthian version of Spinoza extends far beyond this. The Pantheism Controversy was an epoch-making event in the intellectual life of Germany. The notion of Kraft became central to the aesthetics of Early German Romanticism, both through Herder directly and through those who mediated his thought to the Romantics. It revived the fortunes of Spinoza’s philosophy, which up to Herder’s time had been a target of popular attack. With Herder’s version, Spinoza’s philosophy became a vehicle for the reinvigoration of religious thought in response to the atheism of the philosophes and the desiccated theism of the deists. Finally, it demonstrates the important, but often underappreciated role of Platonism in Romantic thought, which scholarship has, until quite recently, largely overlooked. In this way it brings to light an important but under explored English contribution to the development of German Romanticism.

This examination will first introduce the major players in this drama of ideas, Cudworth, Herder, and the thought of Spinoza as it appeared in the context of the Pantheism Controversy. Having first introduced these characters, it is possible then to focus on the direct evidence of Cudworth’s influence upon Herder’s development of a revised Spinozism and how he used the thought of the Cambridge Platonist to overcome the seeming problem of determinism in Spinoza’s philosophy. The final section of this examination will then briefly consider the wide-ranging intellectual impact of this revised Spinozism.

I. CUDWORTH, THE PANTHEISM CONTROVERSY, HERDER AND DETERMINISM

Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) was one of the key members of a group of seventeenth-century thinkers known as the Cambridge Platonists. Associated with the university, this group included Henry More, Benjamin Whichcote, and John Smith. The designation of ‘Platonist’ is fitting as Cudworth and the other members of the group held the realist contention that the created world was a reflection of divine wisdom, perfection, and beauty. Furthermore, he held that humans possess ideas that were inaccessible to sensation alone (Cudworth, 636; 732–3). This realist theism was reflected in his belief in and defence of the existence of God, the eternal existence of
moral principles, the immortality of the soul, and, perhaps most importantly, the freedom of the will. With his fellow Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth supported the post-Galilean mechanistic understanding of the universe as it had been developed in early modern philosophy (Hutton, 2001). He advocated Cartesian dualism and welcomed the renewed atomistic understanding of the universe, which, in fact, he argued could trace its roots to none other than Moses (Cudworth, 12). Instead, he sought to bring his theological principles into dialogue with the outstanding issues of contemporary philosophy, particularly with the problem of determinism arising from a purely material understanding of nature. The end of his philosophical system, therefore, seeks to combine mechanistic atomism with Platonic metaphysics through a third spiritual middle principle.

During his lifetime Cudworth published only one major work, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678), upon which this examination focuses. Though his published writing was largely restricted to this volume, it is a substantive work, running to eight hundred and ninety five folio pages. Cudworth explains that the aim of his system is to offer a discourse on ‘Liberty and Necessity’ (Cudworth, i). In particular, his aim is to point out the philosophical errors that lead to determinism and atheism. Cudworth did not consider this problem to be a recent development. Displaying his wide erudition, and proceeding in the manner of Marsilio Ficino and the Florentine School’s notion of ‘perennial philosophy’ (*philosophia perennis*), Cudworth developed a taxonomy of materialist atheisms. The most important of these are ‘Atomick Atheism’ and ‘Hylozoick Atheism’ (derived from ὑλή matter, and ζωή life). Cudworth writes:

One main difference betwixt these two Forms of Atheism is this, that the Atomical supposes all Life whatsoever to be Accidental, Generable and Corruptible: But the Hylozoick admits of a certain Natural or Plastick Life, Essential and Substantial, Ingenerable and Incorruptible, though attributing the same only to Matter, as supposing no other Substance in the World besides it (Cudworth, 105).

Cudworth associates both of these philosophical orientations with antique originators, respectively the pre-Socratic atomist Democritus and the Peripatetic Strato of Lampscacus. Atomical atheism is purely materialistic. It admits of no incorporeal substance, and attempts to reduce everything to mechanistic theory alone. Alternatively, hylozoic atheism constitutes something of a way station between atheism and theism by conflating incorporeal substance with material substance and refusing the possibility of any substance beyond it. For Cudworth, these two atheistic errors had their contemporary equivalents in the materialism of Hobbes and in the substance monism of Spinoza. Though Cudworth never names either modern thinker directly, it is apparent throughout the text that he has these philosophers in mind. Indeed, Cudworth writes that ‘Strato’s Ghost had begun to walk of late’, a reference most certainly directed at Spinoza (Cudworth, 145; ix; cf. Passmore, 6). For Cudworth, both atheistic errors pointed toward the necessity of incorporeal substances, distinct from matter, namely God and his concept of ‘Plastik Nature’. This latter concept, taken from the Platonic tradition, could constitute the middle principle between the divine and creation without the need for God to constantly intervene at every moment; the solution of the occasionalists led by Nicolas Malebranche. In so doing, plastik nature both imprinted the wisdom of the divine mind upon creation and maintained the mundane physical operations of nature. Through ‘Plastik Nature’ God’s goodness and wisdom were made manifest, both in the regular functioning of nature and in the teleological end of creation.

The Pantheism Controversy began just a little over a century after Cudworth published his *magnum opus*. It had its origins in July of 1780, when the philosopher and public intellectual Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi visited the ducal library at Wolfenbüttel, where Gotthold Ephraim
Lessing was the librarian. During his visit, in an exchange that Jacobi later recorded, Lessing confided to Jacobi that he espoused the philosophy of Spinoza, a philosophy that was synonymous with atheism and fatalism (Jacobi, I.1, 183-195). As a leading figure of the Aufklärung, Lessing’s support of Spinoza’s thought had significant implications. Sometime after this, in 1783, Jacobi learned that Moses Mendelssohn, another prominent figure of the Berlin Aufklärung, intended to write a book in memory of Lessing, who had died in 1781. Jacobi wrote to Mendelssohn asking whether he knew of the famous figure’s Spinozism. The two decided to enter into a debate concerning the matter; Jacobi’s correspondence, however, was delayed by ill health and the deaths of his wife and a child. Jacobi learned that Mendelssohn intended to publish the first volume of his book on Lessing without resolving the debate, and in a pre-emptive act Jacobi published the hastily assembled Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (1785), or what he later called his Spinozabüchlein.

The intellectual storm that followed the publication of this book came to be known as the Pantheism Controversy, which was something of a misnomer given the matter of debate. The fundamental concern of Jacobi’s Briefen was to demonstrate, through the philosophy of Spinoza, that all discursive rational and thoroughgoing demonstration was ultimately nihilistic. Spinoza’s monism, Jacobi argued, was the consequence of the unqualified application of the principle of sufficient reason, which required that there must be a self-explanatory reason, or a first cause, within an explanatory series. He writes that the first cause cannot have relations to properties, as this would require something prior to it (Jacobi, I.1, 59-64). Equally, he continues, it cannot come from nothing, since nothing can come from nothing. Consequently, the first cause, the philosophical ens realissimum, must therefore be the sum totality of the series of conditions of which all realities are then modifications (Jacobi, I.1, 93-99; Franks, 95–116). This, according to Jacobi, was the reasoning behind Spinoza’s substance monism.

Under monism, Jacobi argued, the actions of both God and individuals, which should be based upon the freedom of the will, were instead determinate modes of a single substance to which everything belonged (Jacobi, I.1, 93-100). This eliminated both the independent existence of entities and their freedom. Furthermore, Jacobi argued that in the place of a transcendent first cause, one of the primary arguments for the existence of God, the God Spinoza posited was ‘only immanent’ (Jacobi, I.1, 18). Hence, this God was neither personal nor able to initiate a finite series of conditions. Such a God, writes Jacobi, ‘does not admit of any kind of religion’ (Jacobi, I.1, 120, n. 1) and is tantamount to atheism (Jacobi, I.1, 120). Based upon these conclusions, which are reached through some rather tortuous argumentation, Jacobi maintained that Spinoza’s philosophy, and all thoroughgoing rational explanation, was ultimately fatalistic, atheistic, and nihilistic.

Jacobi’s choice of Spinoza as the representative for modern rational philosophy was one of convenience more than anything else. At the time when the Pantheism Controversy broke, Spinoza already had a notorious reputation, as established by the work of a number of prominent thinkers throughout the eighteenth century. In his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), Pierre Bayle wrote an influential article characterising Spinoza as a consummate atheist. Bayle’s work ran to five editions in the eighteenth century, and was translated into German in 1744 (Bell, 3-4, 40; Bayle, V, 199). The major thinkers of the German Aufklärung—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Christian Wolff, and Christian Thomasius—ensured the continued negative reception of Spinoza with their own denunciations of his philosophy (Bell, 6–10; Beiser, 49). This guaranteed that Spinoza’s works would not fade into obscurity. Rather, an attack upon Spinoza became a means to demonstrate one’s allegiance to the religious and political status quo. Alternatively, Spinoza’s philosophy also constituted the rallying point for all manner of dissenting voices, from mystical Protestants to free thinking political radicals (Israel, 159-174;
Jacobi’s use of Spinoza would make him more popular than ever in ways, as we shall see, that Jacobi could not have anticipated or intended.

Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) had already cultivated an interest in Spinoza when the Pantheism Controversy broke. Herder was an established figure, already playing an important role in the development of German national literature and in shaping its post-Enlightenment philosophical landscape. He was a student of Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann, both of whom equally formed his philosophical outlook. From the former he cultivated a powerful vision of reason, which was nevertheless limited through one’s own self-legislative capacity. From the latter, he developed an appreciation for feeling, imagination, and the value of ethnic culture. Consequently, under the influence of both, Herder supported certain aspects of the Enlightenment and criticised others. He championed an empirical understanding of human consciousness; an opposition to philosophical and theological dogmatism; and a defence of the unique nature of the individual and the cultural values they held. Alternatively, he rejected what he called a Cartesian-influenced ‘century of doubting’ (Herder, 1985, IV, 41) that sought a priori certainty, undermining the value of the historical and experiential world and legitimising abstraction as a form of clear and distinct thought (Norton, 656).

As a pastor in the Lutheran Church, theological reflection and the defence of theism played a central role in Herder’s thought, and not unlike Cudworth this theistic position had a realist core (Herder, I, 23–24). He maintained that absolute Being was the foundation in which all reality necessarily participated, the ground of predication, and the prerequisite of all concepts (Herder, 1985, I, 15). Based upon this he rejected the idea of a continuously intervening God, instead proffering a concept of ‘creating Providence’ wherein human beings were endowed with a set of capacities and faculties realised at different points of time by the ‘facilitating fate’ of history (Herder, 1985, IV, 11). This led Herder to defend the particularity of cultures and to maintain the incommensurability of epochs (Herder, 1985, IV, 38). It also led him to encourage the development of German letters through the Sturm und Drang movement. The divine was, for Herder, not something to be understood through abstract superlatives, arrived at through a priori speculation, but to be understood through experience that perceived the participation of the divine in creation (Herder, 1985, I, 9).

Herder’s belief that the divine must be understood as it is encountered in creation naturally led him, over time, to develop a sympathy for Spinoza’s monism (Bell, 38–70; Dreike, 7–17). This was encouraged by Goethe, who, along with Charlotte von Stein, formed a lively reading group for the consideration of Spinoza’s philosophy. Goethe referred to Herder as the leader of this group, the ‘true hierophant of the little Spinoza church’ (Goethe, IV, 231). Yet Spinoza still did not occupy the core of Herder’s interests. Rather he felt that Shaftesbury was better suited to expressing his notion of finding the divine in creation.8 Indeed, prior to the Pantheism Controversy, he intended to author a book that would have given equal attention to Spinoza, Shaftesbury, and Leibniz (Herder, 1977, V, 27-9). However, this sympathy for Spinoza turned into a defence when Jacobi published his Spinozabüchlein. It was in this context that he felt compelled to write a singular defence of the much-maligned philosopher. Yet in offering his rebuttal, he put forward a revised version of Spinozism that would become central to the Romantic appropriation of Spinoza’s thought.

In late 1783 Jacobi wrote to Herder to elicit his support for his upcoming attack on Mendelssohn and Spinoza. Herder’s reply, however, was to begin with the provocative salutation ἐν καὶ Πᾶν’ and an accusation that Jacobi was, in fact, falling into the very trap of a priori philosophical abstraction that he accused Spinoza of being ensnared by:

The πρωταν ψευδός [first deception], dear Jacobi, in you and all anti-spinozistic systems is that God, as the great ens entium [being of beings], the eternal acting cause in all phenomena,
is considered to be a 0, an abstract concept, as we form it for ourselves. However, according to
Spinoza, that is not what God is, but rather the most real, the most active One, that which
alone speaks to itself: I am who I am and will […] be what I will be (Herder, 1977, V, 28).

Herder casts Spinoza not as a radical but as part of a perennial tradition that sought to avoid this
abstract God, and he places himself within this tradition as well. He writes: ‘I would never call
my system Spinozistic, because the seeds of it lie almost pure in the most ancient of all enlight-
ened nations’ (Herder, 1977, V, 27). Herder goes on to make the point that Spinoza ‘is only the
first who had the heart to combine our way into a system, and thus had the misfortune to place
at the fore its sharp angles, and thereby first discredit it among the Jews, Christians and pagans’
(Herder, 1977, V, 27).

II. HERDER’S CUDWORTHIAN REVISION OF SPINOZA

Herder had a long and sustained interest in Cudworth. He was familiar with his magnum opus,
The True Intellectual System of the Universe, and was in possession of the 1733 translation of
the text into Latin by Johann Lorenz Mosheim (Bibliotheca Herderiana, entry 2906). One can
find the influence of Cudworth, both explicit and implicit, throughout Herder’s published works
in relation to religion, literature, linguistics, and the fine arts. As early as 1766 Herder mentions
Cudworth in his Über die verschiedenen Religionen, and soon after in Über die neuere deutsche
Literatur (1767) (Herder, 1877, XXXII, 145-148; Herder, 1985, I, 203-203). In 1770
Cudworth’s thought would play a role in Herder’s career-establishing Abhandlung über den
Ursprung der Sprache, and again we find him mentioned in correspondence to Hamann (Herder,

In Gott Herder’s aim was to amend Spinoza’s philosophy so that he might save his thought
from Jacobi’s negative characterisation and in doing so overcome the problem of determinism
which arises from his substance monism. For Herder, in some instances this meant correcting
what he saw as the misunderstanding of certain problematic terms; in others, this meant more
substantive revision, critiquing Spinoza’s attribution of extension to God and adding the middle
principle of Kraft. These amendments, as we shall see, closely mirror those which Cudworth
makes to hylozoic atheism, demonstrating a close and direct influence. At the same time, it
must be stated that there are undoubtedly other influences at work in the text beyond Cudworth.
Herder was an omnivorous reader, and the roles of Shaftesbury, Leibniz, and others also figure
in the dialogue. Herder makes some allowance for this, providing himself with a degree of lati-
tude in his interpretation and re-working of Spinoza’s philosophy. He does so by setting out
three rules for reading Spinoza. First, he maintains that it is important to take account of the fact
that Descartes is the source for much of Spinoza’s thought, and in particular for his most
difficult expressions. Second, he tells his readers that limited attention should be paid to Spinoza’s geometric method, especially where it misled Spinoza. Finally, he argues that developments in modern philosophy and science should be used to overcome the objectionable and paradoxical aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy (Herder, 1877, XVI, 432-33). This interpretative licence allows Herder to modify Spinoza’s thought, with the influence of Cudworth strongly manifesting itself.

One of the first instances where we find Herder turning to Cudworth is in the defence of Spinoza from the charge of atheism. Whilst Cudworth maintained that hylozicism led to atheism, it was unlike atomical atheism because it was not purely materialistic: ‘every Hylozoist be not therefore necessarily an Atheist, yet whosoever is an Hylozoist and Corporealist both together [holding] that there is no other Substance in the World besides Body and Matter, cannot be excused from the Imputation of Atheism’ (Cudworth, 106). To its credit, wrote Cudworth, the hylozoic position appreciated that the world cannot be understood in purely mechanistic terms. While all atheism is by necessity corporealist, Cudworth explains, hylozoic thinkers are simply confused, putting forward ‘an Hypothesis so Prodigiously Paradoxical, and so Outragesly Wild, as that very few men ever could have Atheistick Faith enough, to swallow it down and digest it’ (Cudworth, 145). According to Cudworth, whereas atomical atheists claim that matter is the only substance, and that its essence consists of extension, the hylozoic position, whilst also claiming that matter is the only substance, includes both extension and ‘life’, or self-active power, in that one substance (Cudworth, 105). Cudworth argues that this constitutes an impossible imputation of the qualities of immaterial substance to material substance. Consequently, while the hylozoic position may not make sense, it is not by necessity atheistic.

According to Herder, that Spinoza is not an atheist is apparent to anyone who cares to look at the importance placed upon God throughout his philosophy:

That he was not an atheist is apparent on every page. For him the idea of God is the first and the last, one might even say the only idea of all. On it he bases knowledge of the world and of nature, the consciousness of himself and all other things, and his ethics and his politics (Herder, 1877, XVI, 438; 495).

We can infer from this that any atheistic conclusions that follow from Spinoza’s thought arise out of confusion and errors that may be inherent in Spinoza’s philosophy. With this Herder embarks upon a programme of revising Spinoza.

This leads directly to the issue of the nature of substance in Spinoza’s thought. At the centre of Spinoza’s monism is the contention that ‘There is only one substance, and that is God. All things are but modifications of it’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 439; Spinoza, E1p14, 15). According to Herder, Spinoza’s monism holds that ‘In the strictest understanding, nothing in the world is a substance because everything depends upon everything else, and finally on God, who therefore is the highest and only substance’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 440). Following Herder’s interpretation, nowhere does Spinoza consider this self-dependent substance to be matter alone; rather all matter depends upon God as substance. This would squarely place Spinoza in that category which Cudworth sets out of ‘Prodigiously Paradoxical’ hylozoic thinkers who are not corporealists.

Jacobi’s chief accusations against Spinoza focus upon his position that there is but one substance and that this substance is both God and nature (Cf. Spinoza, E1p14; E1p15, E1p29). Yet Herder points out that Spinoza’s position is not that God is nature. Rather the Ethics describes substance famously as ‘Deus sive natura [God or nature]’; that is, God can be conceived in the human mind in two separate ways, through the rational contemplation of either the divine mind or of the nature of the physical world. In collapsing these, Jacobi has failed to account for the
According to the *Ethics*, however, substance cannot be a part of the world. God is the eternal self-sufficient substance in which all nature exists (Herder, 1877, XVI, 444-45). Jacobi, seeing substance as nature alone, makes it seem that the divine was without reason or will, indistinct from corporeal reality, leading to his accusations of fatalism and atheism; essentially, making Spinoza out to be a corporalist hylozoic thinker. Whilst Spinoza’s position may therefore be confused and in need of remedy, nowhere, according to Herder, does the Dutch philosopher consider substance to be matter alone.

Despite this, Jacobi’s accusation is not dismissed so easily, for there remains Spinoza’s troubling attribution of extension to God. In this case, no matter how much one clarifies terms, Spinoza’s position seems to be problematic, and Herder acknowledges precisely this. Herder called it the ‘weakest point in an otherwise well-reasoned system’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 449). Accordingly, it is here where Herder carries out his most substantive Cudworthian renovation of the Spinoza’s position.

Herder turns to Spinoza’s own argument against the attribution of limitless time to the eternal God in order to demonstrate the philosopher’s own ill-advised attribution of extension. Spinoza argued that even a limitless duration carries at every point a measure of transitoriness. Consequently, the eternity of God cannot be defined in terms of limitless time. Equally, the existence of all created things depends upon a temporal sequence. Even if that sequence is extended indefinitely, the created will never become eternal (Herder, 1877, XVI, 445-46). According to Herder, however, Spinoza failed to extend his own argument concerning time to space, despite the fact that, as Herder pointed out, the same logic applies. What Spinoza did not recognise was that just as time is not commensurate with eternity, space is not commensurate with the idea of a ‘simple substance’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 446). Spinoza consequently committed a ‘Cartesian error’, writes Herder. Descartes had assigned one attribute to each of the two forms of substance he recognised, thought to mind and extension to body (Herder, 1877, XVI, 446; Descartes, *Principles*, Part I, art. 53). Spinoza, recognising only the single substance of God, erroneously attributed extension to the divine. Herder explains that ‘He [Spinoza] was not satisfied with his teacher’s [Descartes] sharp distinction between matter and spirit, but, since he lacked a unifying intermediate conception, what could he do?’ (Herder, 448).

Herder comments that while thought and extension are necessary respectively for minds and bodies bound by space and time, they are not, he argues, part of the essence of a simple eternal substance (Herder, 1877, XVI, 447). In the context of a single eternal substance, a focus upon just the two attributes, thought and extension, made no sense. Herder asks: ‘How can just these two, out of an infinity of other attributes whose totality is supposed to express a supreme reality, be the only two attributes through which the infinite has revealed himself?’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 448). Furthermore, extension is unable to account for the regular activity of nature and the forms that constitute it. Herder writes, ‘Without essence, without active forces, extension is empty’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 448).

In referring to the absence of essence and active force in extension, Herder was again repeating one of Cudworth’s criticisms of the hylozoic position, and, again in Cudworth, he would find a model for the ‘unifying intermediate conception’ that was missing from Spinoza’s philosophy. Critiquing the hylozoic attribution of active power and life to a single substance, Cudworth writes:

*Life, Cognition and Understanding* are *Entities really distinct from Local Motion and Mechanism*, and that therefore they cannot be *Generated out of Dead and Stupid Matter*, but must needs be somewhere in the World, *Originally, Essentially, and Fundamentally* (Cudworth, 144).
Without an active intermediate power, Cudworth explains that it is not possible to account for the order and regularity of the universe, the teleological nature of creation, or the manifestation of the human capacities of sense and understanding (Cudworth, 106; 132; 144; 172–3). ‘The Hylzoists Nature’, he writes, ‘is a piece of very Mysterious Non-sense, a thing perfectly Wise, without any Knowledge or Consciousness of it self; Whereas a Deity, according to the true Notion of it, is such a Perfect Understanding Being, as with full Consciousness’ (Cudworth, 106).

Central to Cudworth’s philosophical position was the dualism of passive corporeal and active incorporeal substances (Passmore, 27). Material substance had no active power unto itself, nor was it able to direct itself (Cudworth, 163; 668; 831). Instead, this was bestowed upon it through active incorporeal substance, which was possessed of its own internal active energy (Cudworth, 27, 159). Cudworth then divided incorporeal substance into that which is conscious, God, and that which acts unconsciously, ‘Plastik Nature’ (Cudworth, 159). It is this latter plastik nature that constitutes the missing intermediary which Herder sought in order to repair Spinoza’s position.

According to Cudworth, plastik nature allows divine wisdom to manifest itself in material substance, displaying ‘its Stamps and Signatures every where throughout the World; so that God, as Plato (after Orpheus) speaks, will be not only the Beginning and End, but also the Middle of all things’ (Cudworth, 150). Without the notion of plastik, Cudworth writes, there are only two possibilities:

For unless there be such a thing admitted as a Plastick Nature […] it seems that one or other of these Two Things must be concluded, That Either in the Efformation and Organization of the Bodies of Animals, as well as the other Phenomena, every thing comes to pass Fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the Guidance and Direction of any Mind or Understanding; Or else, that God himself doth all Immediately, and as it were with his own Hands, Form the Body of every Gnat and Fly, Insect and Mite, as of other Animals in Generations […] I say, upon supposition of no Plastick Nature, one or other of these Two things must be concluded (Cudworth, 147).

The first of these offers only a mechanistic determinism (e.g. Hobbes), where all in nature comes to pass fortuitously, and the second requires that God be immanently and immediately engaged in all activity (e.g. Malebranche).

Plastik nature offers a middle alternative between these two extremes, as the intermediary between the divine mind and creation. It is not a demiurge, nor does it even possess consciousness. Instead it is the intermediate active force which imprints God’s wisdom upon corporeal reality:

*Plastick Nature […] is a certain Lower Life than the Animal, which acts Regularly and Artificially, according to the Direction of Mind and Understanding, Reason and Wisdom, for Ends, or in Order to Good, though it self do not know the Reason of what it does, nor is Master of that Wisdom according to which it acts, but only a Servant to it, and Drudging Executioner of the same; it operating Fatally and Sympathetically, according to Laws and Commands, prescribed to it by a Perfect Intellect, and impresst upon it; and which is either a Lower Faculty of some Conscious Soul, or else an Inferiour kind of Life or Soul by it self; but essentially depending upon an Higher Intellect* (Cudworth, 172).

Plastik nature is therefore an immaterial substance, not independent of God, but wholly depended upon divine direction. Nor does it manifest itself singularly. Rather it is manifest throughout corporeal substance, in the inferior life of nature, in animals, plants and the regular
operations of the cosmos, and in the conscious soul of individuals. It is in these various forms that material substance takes its direction and form. The atheistic philosophical errors of the hylozoic position that Cudworth outlines in his True Intellectual System arise when the plastik nature is taken nonsensically to be one with material substance.

Again, following Cudworth’s example, Herder puts forward his own middle principle in the form of ‘divine force [göttliche Kraft]’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 451). This allows him to substitute the attribution of extension to God with an immaterial force, providing the Spinozistic system, according to Herder, with ‘a more beautiful unity’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 451). This unity is reflective of that which Cudworth sets out. God is understood as ‘the primal force of all force, the Soul of all souls’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 453), existing immaterially beyond. The force of God ‘stands highest’, as the self-dependent, and active source of ‘millions of other forces’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 452-53). ‘Without him [God]’, writes Herder, ‘none of them [forces] came into being, without him none are active, and all in their innermost connection express in every limitation, form, and appearance, his self-dependent nature, through which they all exist and work’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 453). This allowed Herder to claim that the deity ‘reveals himself in an infinite number of forces, in an infinite number of ways’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 451).

The conceptual world occupied by Cudworth when he wrote his Intellectual System, and that which Herder inhabited when he produced Gott, is separated by a century; not an unsubstantial historical and intellectual gulf. Consequently, Herder was exposed to scientific thinking about physical forces which Cudworth could not have been. At the same time, the idea of a middle principle, between finite and infinite, immanent and transcendent, is a perennial one, having precedents in medieval anima mundi and further back in Johannine Logos. At each stage in the history of thought this concept has been changed and adapted, but it has continued to play a similar role. The story of Cudworth and Herder is another iteration of this employment and adaptation of a middle principle. Justifying the interpolation of force into Spinoza’s philosophy, Herder explains that had Spinoza not lived in ‘the childhood of natural science’, but rather seen its late eighteenth century advances (Herder, 1877, XVI, 561), he would have seen the discovery of forces, such as magnetism and electricity, proven to be present in bodies and in the atmosphere, thereby making force a legitimate alternative to extension (Herder, 1877, XVI, 453–54; cf. Gaukroger, 355–83). But this also extends, as in Cudworth, beyond the mechanistic regularity observed in nature, to the form and end found in material substance. To account for essence and end beyond mechanism he added the decidedly Platonic characteristics of harmony (Herder, 1877, XVI, 561), beauty (Herder, 1877, XVI, 454), and goodness (Herder, 1877, XVI, 492, 542), all of which display the wisdom of God (Herder, 1877, XVI, 492, 542).

Herder’s theory of divine force recapitulates his belief that the divine is encountered not in a priori speculation, but rather is perceived in the participation of the divine in creation (Herder, 1985, I, 9). He writes that God, as existence, ‘is before all and all exists in him. The whole world is an expression, an appearance of his eternally-living, eternally-active forces’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 517). As such, the proof of God is, for Herder, reducible to the ‘is’ that exists between the subject and predicate (Herder, 1877, XVI, 517). According to Herder this has the great advantage of integrating science and theological inquiry, a position that would appeal to the Romantics. The scientist ‘seeming to forget the divine purposes […] seeks and finds in every object and point of creation, God complete. That is to say, he finds in everything an intrinsic truth, harmony and beauty’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, 491). Most importantly, in the context for which the Gespräch was produced, this addressed the problem of determinism. In Herder’s revised version of Spinoza the universe was not a deterministic mechanism that threatened morality and fatalism, but an ordered organism in which both the laws of nature and human freedom had their
foundation as separate manifestations of force. Nor were the forces with which the universe was increasingly understood to operate a threat to freedom but were instead the patterns that gave freedom structure.

After Herder’s revision the question naturally arises as to whether what is left can indeed be called Spinoza’s philosophy. In the end, the thought of Spinoza is fundamentally monist, whilst that of Cudworth is fundamentally dualist. The question is whether the introduction of Kraft, and the separation it seems to offer between an immaterial deity and material nature, as Herder describes it, retains Spinoza’s monism. Herder declines to develop his position in a systematic manner, and the nature of his writing intentionally militates against anyone who would wish to develop it in such a way. Whilst this complicated question cannot be answered here, we do know that Herder’s book, regardless of what it presented, marked a dramatic reversal in Spinoza’s fortunes. In the preface to the second edition of Gespräch (1800), Herder made note of this change in the public opinion of Spinoza, which had progressed from ‘horror and loathing’ to admiration, and the placing of his thought in the esteemed company of Leibniz and other greats of the Western philosophical tradition (Herder, 1877, XVI, 403).

III. THE LEGACY OF HERDER’S REVISED SPINOZISM

In Gott Herder summed up the level which anti-Spinoza opprobrium had reached by the time of the Pantheism Controversy in the ill-informed comments of one of the text’s interlocutors:

No, I have not read him. And who would want to read every obscure book a madman might write? But I have heard from many who have read him, that he was an atheist and pantheist, a teacher of blind necessity, an enemy of revelation, a mocker of religion, and withal, a destroyer of the state and of all civil society. In short, he was an enemy of the human race, and as such he died. He therefore deserves the hatred and aversion of all friends of humanity and of true philosophers (Herder, 1877, XVI, 412).

Given this reputation, it is all the more remarkable that by the turn of the nineteenth century Spinoza’s philosophy would be portrayed by the Romantics as a guarantor of the unity between subject and object, freedom and necessity, and a way back to the consideration of the Absolute through aesthetics after the Kantian prohibition on speculative metaphysics. Such was the unintended outcome of Jacobi’s original accusation that by the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century, Heine would call Spinozism the ‘open secret of Germany’ (Heine, 59).

Herder, through the employment of Cudworth’s suggestions, removed those objectionable ‘sharp angles’ which, as he had explained to Jacobi, were the cause of so much hostile reception (Herder, 1977, V, 27). With Herder’s version, Spinoza’s thought became a vehicle for the reinvigoration of speculative religious thought. The notion of a monist substance and the idea of Kraft offered an exciting alternative to the mechanistic and deterministic atheism of the philosophes and the desiccated deism of the Aufklärung. Yet the appropriation of Spinoza that began with Herder cannot be dismantled in an analytical manner. Rather, it is better characterised as a poetic appropriation than as a philosophical application of his ideas. We see this first exemplified by Goethe, to whom Herder sent the manuscript of his Gott text. Goethe, at Rome, found the text germane to his search to seek out the Urpflanze that would demonstrate the unity present in the vegetative world. Later Herder’s ideas would manifest themselves elsewhere in Goethe’s work, in poems such as ‘Gott und die Welt’ and in his magnum opus, Faust.

Goethe also shared Herder’s work with the largely forgotten but influential aesthetic theorist and author Karl Phillip Moritz, who was with him in Rome. Moritz had been working to
develop a new theory of mimesis, and Herder’s notion of force was, Goethe reported, precisely the idea he had been searching for (Goethe, 1989, 314). Moritz published a series of works on art, which explained that art was not the imitation of nature’s products but was instead the representation of, and creative participation in, the productive forces (Kräfte) of nature. In this way, Moritz maintained, the artistic object represented totality, because it both illustrated and constituted something that was forever becoming. Moritz later expanded this to a theory of mythology, giving aesthetic creation religious overtones, as the individual artist participated in divine creation, thereby revealing the divine (Hampton, 2014, 175-91). Like art, myth is possessed of a heightened meaning, communicating more that it can ever express. Schelling would later indicate the importance of Moritz’s aesthetic theory for Romanticism with the comment that ‘It is a great credit to Moritz that he was the first, both among the Germans and in general, to represent mythology with the characteristic of poetic Absoluteness that is peculiar to it’ (Schelling, V, 412). Similarly, in his own aesthetic lectures, August Wilhelm Schlegel maintained that Moritz’s aesthetics understood the nature of art better than Kant (Schlegel, I, 258-59).

August Wilhelm Schlegel’s comment also indicates the importance of Platonism for Romantic thought in general. For much of its reception history the Frühromantik has often been considered a literary extension of post-Kantian idealism. This had its origins in the early characterisation of the movement by influential figures such as Hegel, Heine, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, and was repeated in some of the most important early works on the reception of Romanticism. Whilst some scholarship has maintained the importance of Platonism throughout, a number of scholars working with materials that have only become widely available in the latter half of the twentieth century have recently stressed the important role of Platonism in the formation of the Romantic movement. In illustrating the role of Cudworth, this examination builds upon and strengthens this recent work.

Moritz’s aesthetic and mythological theory directly influenced the work of Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, Schelling, Tieck, Wackenroder, Jean Paul, and later even Emerson (Walzel, 1914, 38-62; Hubert; Frank and Mueller-Vollmer, 308-318). For example, Friedrich Schlegel expands Moritz’s thesis, subsuming both philosophy and literature under the mythological idiom. Fichte, Spinoza, Shakespeare and Cervantes are all seen by Schlegel as engaged in the mytho-philosophical-poetic task of representing totality. As such each of these figures represents an example of divine aesthetic activity, taking the place of systematic philosophy or doctrinal theology as the genre for considering the Absolute. Similarly, Wackenroder and Tieck offer similar claims concerning fine art and music in Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders and in the Phantasien über die Kunst, für Freunde der Kunst (Furst, 269-85; Klussmann, 69-90).

For the Romantics working in the post-Kantian milieu, the aesthetic, and the mythological in particular, constituted the new idiom for religious consideration, taking the place of rational metaphysical speculation. Furthermore, after the rise of historical and higher criticism, it allowed for continual revelation through creative poesis. Thanks to a poeticised Spinozism, aesthetics was capable of suspending the predicate of inexpressibility. The story of Romanticism, as we in the English world encounter it, is often one of Germanic origins. Famously, Wordsworth and Coleridge made their journey to Germany, and there, Coleridge became enamoured with the nation’s intellectual life, whilst Wordsworth began what would come to be The Prelude. In the case of Herder and Spinoza, we find the Cambridge Platonist Cudworth, whose ideas would make that same journey some one hundred and twenty years before the two English Romantics would meet at the very same university where Cudworth wrote his True Intellectual System.
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Notes

1 This paper benefited from the comments of Jeffery Cronheim, Stephen Mossman, Friedrich Uehlein, and Evan King.

2 For a consideration of the designation see Rogers, pp. x-xi, and Hutton, 1996, pp. xxiii-xxv.

3 The two other forms which Cudworth outlines, Hylopathian and Cosmo-plastic atheism, need not be taken up in this study.

4 Only a brief historical consideration of the controversy is provided here. See Beiser, pp. 44–108; Christ, passim; Bell, p. 71–96; Vallée, passim.

5 Translations are those of the author. Where possible existing translations have been consulted.

6 Jacobi’s first published use of the term is in Jacobi an Fichte (1799). Cf. Franks, p. 111, n. 9; Süß, p. 50–64.
There was a veritable industry of Spinoza denunciation, the Jewish philosopher’s work providing an easy target for individuals to prove their orthodoxy. Such was this industry, that in 1710 a *Catalogus scriptorum Anti-Spinozanorum* was compiled in Leipzig, whilst in 1795 the *Freydenker-Lexicon* listed no less than one hundred and twenty-nine refutations of Spinoza (Beiser, p. 49; Trinius; Schröder).

In a 1798 letter Herder wrote to his son: ‘Spinoza is not for you. His works are a precious stone buried deep in poor rock, and you cannot possibly master them. On the other hand, Shaftesbury’s writings are the best that I can recommend to you. His *Rhapsody* and *Theocles* contains the Spinozist-Leibnizian philosophy in the most beautiful and exquisite summary form’ (Herder, 1977, VII, p. 362; Bell, p. 38).

Cudworth expresses the position that all corporeal substances are extended, however he does not explicitly state that incorporeal substance are necessarily unextended, instead leaving the judgement open, but his proclivity is relatively obvious (Cudworth, pp. xiv, 771–833; Allen, pp. 342).

Cf. ‘substantial forces’ (Herder, 1877, XVI, pp. 441). Herder’s employment of the term *Kraft*, rather than using the word *Plastik*, can be traced to his use of Mosheim’s Latin translation, whose often liberal rendering of Cudworth’s work sometimes omits the word entirely, but most often renders it as *vis geneitrix*, or generative force. When the Latin *vis* is translated into the German it is rendered, most obviously, into *Kraft*, a word that would have been made all the more meaningful in Herder’s mind given developments in the natural sciences (Cudworth, 1773). For a now dated, but still helpful background on *Kraft* in Herder’s thought, see Robert T. Clark, *Herder’s Conception of ‘Kraft’*, *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 57.3 (1942), pp. 737–752.


For a consideration of Moritz’s influence on Schlegel see Enders, pp. 38–40, 80-108; Zeydel, pp. 300-304.