

BUDDHISM AND THE DAO IN TANG CHINA:
THE IMPACT OF CONFUCIANISM AND DAOISM
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHENGGUAN*

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Chengguan 澄觀 (738–839), the fourth patriarch of the Huayan school of Chinese Buddhism, declared the primacy of Buddhism over Confucianism and Daoism and criticised these philosophies from a Buddhist stance. In his subcommentary to the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*, he defines ten differences between Buddhism and indigenous philosophies, which are discussed in this paper. However, he also often quoted from Chinese Classics to clarify the meaning of a Buddhist tenet. On these occasions he sometimes adds that he only borrows the words but not their meaning. We investigate how he places these words into a new, Buddhist context.

Key-words: Buddhism, Daoist philosophy, Huayan, Chengguan

Throughout its history in China it has remained a dominant issue how Buddhism fits into Chinese thinking, culture and society. As Arthur Wright argues, the success of the Buddhist conquest can be attributed to the weakness of Confucianism as a result of the collapse of the Han with which it was entwined.¹ In the beginning translators used terms associated with traditional Chinese philosophy to convey the meaning of Buddhist expressions. This method was called matching the meaning (*geyi* 格義). With the appearance of the *prajñāpāramitā* sūtras in the third and fourth centuries the literati engendered great interest in these works since they found similarities with the concepts of Dark Learning (*xuanxue* 玄學). Erik Zürcher designates this era as gentry Buddhism, referring to those men of letters at that time engaged in Buddhist-Daoist metaphysical speculations.² These metaphysical speculations, even though not correct from the aspect of the original, Indian Buddhism, promoted the spread of Buddhism in high society to a great extent. With the advent of Daoan and Kumārajīva, a new era began. Chinese Buddhist adepts attempted to understand the Buddhist scriptures in their original, correct sense. However, due to the Chinese way of thinking, the Chinese understanding of Buddhism could not be the same as that of the Indian adepts.

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¹ See Wright (1959, pp. 4–20).

² See Zürcher (1959, pp. 4–6).

The Sui and Tang is a very creative epoch of the history of Chinese Buddhism, which is called “new Buddhism” by Yūki Reimon.³ The new Chinese schools of Buddhism such as Huayan, Tiantai, Chan, Jingtu based their doctrines on their own understanding and realisation of Buddhist teaching. Even if these schools represent the genuine Chinese version of Buddhism, different from the Indian one in many respects, they had to create their own Buddhist identity to avoid being swallowed by the indigenous Chinese religions. To reach it, they had to prove their differences from them, their superiority over them. In the following analysis of the impact of traditional Chinese philosophy on Chengguan, two aspects will be considered. On the one hand, how he criticised the indigenous religions in order to prove the superiority of Buddhism, and on the other hand how he adapted Chinese philosophy to accommodate the Buddhist teaching to his compatriots.

The Huayan masters’ attitude toward indigenous religions

The classical Huayan philosophy was established by the third patriarch, Fazang 法藏 (643–712), who, being on good terms with Empress Wu 武, often preached the dharma in the palace, explaining the abstruse doctrines of the Huayan philosophy. Under the auspices of the court, he was not obliged to take the trouble to dispute the tenets of Confucianism or Daoism. As Buddhism provided the ideology that Empress Wu used to legitimise her power against the Confucian officials who severely criticised her usurpation, Fazang was not compelled to prove the superiority of Buddhism among Chinese religions. After Fazang’s death this favourable condition for Buddhism ended.

Xuanzong 玄宗 (713–756) brought Daoism into prominence. Fazang’s main disciple, Huiyuan 慧苑 (673–743) had to deal with the teachings of rival religions. He argued that in regard to the creation of Heaven, Earth and the rest of creation three Chinese books deserved attention: the *Yijing*, the *Daodejing* and the *Zhuangzi*. He related the doctrine of Buddhism to that of Daoism. According to Daoism, the nonbeing originated the myriad things, and this was in accord with the Buddhist teaching of the dependent origination of the tathāgatagarbha, which explained the evolution of the phenomenal world from the absolute pure Buddhahood.⁴

Chengguan lived in a Buddhist monastery from his childhood, therefore he first became versed in Buddhist literature. The following thought led him to realise the importance of the secular works. “On the fifth level the sage learns worldly methods, realises the Tathatā and his mind rests on the realm of Buddha. He receives wisdom after his enlightenment, and the thought to benefit the world arises. I am on the level of learning, how could I forget about it?” This passage sheds light on Chengguan’s motivation for studying secular literature. He intended to draw on the Chinese non-Buddhist works to assist the understanding of Buddhist teaching. In his lifetime the adepts of Buddhism and Daoism often debated fiercely with each other, for this

³ See Gregory (1991, p. 3).

⁴ XZJ 5.24b14–25a17.

reason he was not inclined to formulate a synthesis of the three teachings, but rather he attempted to claim the primacy of Buddhism over Confucianism and Daoism. He stated that even the most superficial Buddhist tenet overshadows the most profound non-Buddhist one.⁵

The question of origination in Chinese philosophy

Chengguan, like his predecessor, Huiyuan, examined the concepts of Chinese philosophies through the *Yijing*, *Daodejing* and *Zhuangzi*. He called these three works “the three mystical books (*sanxuan* 三玄): the first of them represented the mystery of truth (*zhenxuan* 真玄), the second explained the mystery of nothingness (*xuxuan* 虛玄), and the third presented a discourse upon mystery (*tanxuan* 談玄)”.⁶ In contrast to Huiyuan, he did not correlate the Daoist concept of nonbeing with the Buddhist notion of *tathāgatagarbha*, supposedly, in order to avoid the impression of confusing the identity of the two rival religions. He regarded the five constant virtues (*wuchang* 五常, i.e. benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge and sincerity), spontaneity (*ziran* 自然) and causality (*yinyuan* 因緣) as the cardinal principle of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, respectively.⁷

Investigating the causality propounded by the *Daodejing*, he cited the chapter 41: “Tao produced the One. The One produced the two. The two produced the three. And the three produced the ten thousand things.”⁸ He argued that Laozi established a pseudo causality (*siyou yinyuan* 似有因緣), and not a correct causality (*feizheng yinyuan* 非正因緣), for the Dao is voidness and spontaneity (*xuwu ziran* 虛無自然).

Chengguan in his introduction to his commentary and subcommentary to the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* discusses nonbuddhist teachings. First, he quotes from the *Yijing*, *Daodejing* and *Zhuangzi* and the commentaries written to them, then he interprets them from a Buddhist standpoint. He concludes that the *Daodejing*, which claims that the Dao originates the One, proposes an erroneous causality (*xieyin* 邪因), while the *Zhuangzi*, stating that all things are engendered spontaneously, commits the fault of acausality (*wuyin* 無因). If *Zhuangzi*'s views were right then anything could be white like a crane, or black like a crow. According to the *Yijing* the transformation of yin and yang creates the myriad things, which is the fallacy of erroneous causality. The commentaries explicate One as nonbeing, and it is the error of acausality. Chengguan denounces the acausality morally and because on a soteriological level it leads to a consequence which is unfavourable for Buddhist, and any other religious, praxis. Acausality implies that the bodhi of living beings, the enlightened mind is engendered spontaneously and not by assiduous cultivation.

⁵ Song gaoseng zhuan 宋高僧傳 T 50.737a20–23.

⁶ T 36.103c4–5.

⁷ T 36.513a17–18.

⁸ See Chan (1963, p. 160).

Ten critiques against Confucianism and Daoism

Chengguan levels ten critiques against Confucianism and Daoism, in which the influence of the *Ten Differences and Nine Fallacies* (*Shiyi jiumi lun* 十異九迷論) written by Li Zhongqing 李仲卿 can be detected.

1. Beginning or lack of beginning. According to Buddhism the process of birth and death and the causality have no beginning. In contrast, the nonbuddhist teachings suppose that there is a beginning antecedent to the existence of the myriad things which is called *taichu* 太初 or *taishi* 太始.

2. The recognition or non-recognition of the vital force. The Daoists believe that the spirit (*shen* 神) is engendered through the transformation of the vital force (*qi* 氣) without action, spontaneously. We might recall the *Zhuangzi* on transformation: “Little by little he’ll borrow my left arm to transform it into a cock, and it will be why I am listening to a cock-crow at dawn. Little by little he’ll borrow my right arm to transform it into a crossbow, and it will be why I am waiting for a roasted owl for my dinner. Little by little he’ll borrow and transform my buttocks into wheels, my daemon into a horse, and they’ll be there for me to ride, I’ll never have to harness a team again.”⁹ The natural consequence of the teaching of spontaneous transformation is to “abandon sageliness and discard wisdom”¹⁰ (*Laozi* 19). Buddhism, however, teaches that every dharma is rooted in the mind, all activities depend on causes, therefore living beings are responsible for their deeds. He stresses that the law of causality is the prerequisite for religious cultivation.

3. The existence or nonexistence of the three worlds. Buddhism regards the mind (*xinling* 心靈) as uninterrupted, dependent on conditions it evolves in the three worlds (desire, forms and formless). The Confucianists and Daoists believe that the concentration of vital force is birth and the dispersal of it is death. After death the vital force returns to Heaven and Earth, therefore they do not acknowledge the continuation of the causality.

4. Deeds either have influence or have not. By using the word *xi* 習 Chengguan here refers to *xunxi* 熏習 (*vāsanā*), a central concept of the Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy, which means that the impressions of the external manifestations, deeds constantly “perfume” or influence the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). During this process of “perfuming” the karmic seeds become planted in the storehouse consciousness, waiting for the appropriate condition to be activated. It depends on the karma accumulated whether one becomes wise or dull, being so, everybody has the opportunity for the religious cultivation through the kalpas to alter his or her characteristics. The Confucianists and Daoists think that both good and evil nature originate from Heaven, therefore it gives (*fen* 分) wisdom or stupidity. If somebody receives pure and harmonical (*chunhe* 純和) things from Heaven, then he or she will be endowed with the most spiritual nature and sagely wisdom; but if what is received is turbid and impure (*hunzhuo* 渾濁), he or she will be stupid.

⁹ See Chuang-tsu (1981, p. 88).

¹⁰ See Chan p. 149.

5. The acceptance of causality or the vital force. According to Buddhism all phenomena depend on conditions, while the Confucianists and Daoists believe that prosperity, happiness and unhappiness are determined by the vital force and the rules of Heaven (*qi ming* 氣命). Consequently, we cannot change the vital force obtained from Heaven, but we can change the conditions, and in doing so praxis can be carried out.

6. Origination from inside or from outside. Chengguan from the Yogācāra standpoint argues that the outer world, the Heaven, the Earth and the myriad things originate through the transformation of the inner consciousness (*neishi biansheng* 內識變生), the ancient Chinese religions, on the contrary, regard man as being originated through the transformation of Heaven and Earth. It depends on this transformation whether a man is pure or impure.

7. Phenomena do or do not depend on conditions. In Buddhist epistemology, the four features of phenomena (origin, existence, change, and cessation) depend on conditions and they are not engendered spontaneously. In Confucianism and Daoism things are such by their own effort and their being or nonbeing is independent of the mind.

8. Fortune does or does not originate from Heaven. The Confucianists and Daoists divide fortune and misfortune into two parts: those which the Earth brings about can be avoided, and those which are provoked by Heaven cannot be escaped. In the Buddhist view, the deeds either increase suffering or abolish it. Those who act in order to put an end to suffering get rid of the misconception of nihilism and eternity, surmount the false discrimination of being and not being, and overcome the re-occurrence of birth and death, the *saṃsāra*. Those who increase their suffering evolve karma from their mind, wander in the six realms of living being (*liuqu* 六趣), and remain fettered in the three worlds (*sanyou* 三有). Chengguan remarks that the differences between Buddhist and nonbuddhist teachings are very obvious.

9. Activity is defiled or not defiled. *Laozi* refuses all kinds of activities, and deems any cultivation superfluous. Only in the epoch of upheaval are ceremonies (*li* 禮) needed. Therefore if we discard ceremonies, confusion terminates by itself without any intervention. In addition, the principle (*li* 理) originates from the Dao, so if the Dao is present, the principle becomes manifest, and the sagely instructions become redundant. If you do not seek, you will find; if you do not act, you can do anything. However, if you act, you fail; if you seek, you find nothing. According to Buddhism, meritorious deeds bring advantageous birth as man or god, while evil deeds result in disadvantageous birth. Desire is the root of the *saṃsāra*, hence with the removal of it, birth and death come to an end. In accordance with the traditional Chinese search for longevity, Chengguan states that a man of benevolent deeds will enjoy a long life. In contrast to Daoism, he emphasises the role of activity and cultivation to reach the soteriological aim of Buddhism. He concludes that Buddhism takes the opposite course to Daoism. They are as contradictory as cold and heat.

10. Returning or not returning. Buddhism teaches that all suffering of *saṃsāra* is due to false concepts (*wangxiang* 妄想). This ignorance gives rise to covetousness, desire and defilement. Therefore, with the removal of the prime cause, ignorance, the whole process of suffering can be stopped. By being aware of the confu-

sion of essence (*tiwang* 體妄) a Buddhist adept can annihilate the false concepts and achieve *nirvāṇa*; and by understanding the deficient nature (*xingjia* 性假) he or she can discard the deficiency and return to the quiescence (*gui jimie* 歸寂滅). It is the way to cross the sea of suffering of birth and death, to coexist with the emptiness peacefully and happily forever.

Laozi, however, deems that birth and death are ordered by the Dao, that Heaven decides whether a man becomes wise or stupid, and the will of the Heaven cannot be ignored. Man can do nothing but accept his or her fate passively, and thus live and die in peace. At the same time, the Daoist adept should strive to keep his or her nature intact (*shouquan xingqing* 守全性情). If his or her nature remains unchanged, Heaven is not spoiled; if he or she follows the course of birth and death, the Dao is not lost. Consequently, if the Dao is not lost, then the happy and unhappy states of mind cease; and if Heaven is not spoiled, then the feelings of pleasure and anger end. The Daoist adept leaves this dusty world behind, and wanders in the realm of Dao and De. In the state of nonactivity vicious forces (*xieqi* 邪氣) cannot exert any influence upon him or her, therefore he or she can reach longevity. We see that Buddhism inspires its followers to carry out active cultivation, since someone's own deeds are to change one's future, to bring about future happiness or unhappiness. Daoism, however, stresses the importance of the maintenance of the original, ideal state, the nonintervention into the state of affairs.

A few observations should be made here concerning the ten points discussed above. Chengguan sees that the doctrines of Buddhism differ from original Chinese religious concepts in two aspects: ontological and soteriological. On the ontological level, Buddhism does not set a beginning in time and regards the mind as the source of all phenomena, while Confucianism and Daoism suppose that there is a beginning in time (1, 6).

Their tenets on the rules which influence or determine the future of beings originated are divergent as well (7). Buddhism teaches that the law of causality regulates the life of living beings while other religions argue that they change spontaneously, and that their fate is decided by Heaven.

As a consequence of the different views on ontological questions, disparities can be found on the soteriological level as well. Confucianism and Daoism assert that the existence of human beings depend on an external power, i.e. Heaven (4, 8) or *qi* (2, 3, 5). In the last two points Chengguan compares religious cultivation, the praxis propounded by Buddhism and Daoism. He contrasts the Daoist nonactivity and free wandering with the Buddhist moral behaviour and assiduous cultivation. Of course, he does not take Confucianism into consideration in this aspect, since Confucianism could not offer a religious, not-worldly practice in order to liberate humans from the chains and sufferings of this world in the hope of a transcendental existence.

In elaborating the differences between Buddhist and nonbuddhist religions, Chengguan points out that these differences are essential, and thereby the three teachings cannot be regarded as one system of doctrines. Elsewhere, in connection with Cheng Xuanying's application of Buddhist, especially Madhyamaka, terminology to

explain Daoist philosophy in his commentaries to *Laozi*, and *Zhuangzi*, Chengguan warns against mixing the ideas of the three teachings, since it leads to birth in hell and it is the source of ignorance which blocks the mystical way of wisdom.¹¹

It is noteworthy that Chengguan lumped Confucianism and Daoism together in his account of differences, though they held different views on several questions. Chengguan's main disciple, the fifth patriarch of the Huayan school, Zongmi took over his master's critiques against the indigenous religions and elaborated further in his *Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity* (*Yuanren lun* 原人論).¹² He also discussed Confucianism and Daoism together under the rubric of two teachings.¹³ Peter N. Gregory argues that the reason behind it was that Zongmi presumed familiarity with Confucianism and Daoism, as the audience was the literati.¹⁴ Chengguan had a very good relationship with the literati, hence even if he preached the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* to the monks, there must have been literati in the audience, from which arose the need for references to Confucianism and Daoism.

Adaptation of classical Chinese philosophy

Above it was shown that Chengguan was very critical with Daoism and Confucianism, and did not intend to harmonise the three teachings, but rather asserted the primacy of the Buddhist viewpoint. However, to a certain extent he was indebted to classical philosophy. Its thought and way of expression infiltrated into his writings.

Chengguan's erudition on Chinese classical works is proven by the ample quotations from them in his subcommentary to the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*. He cites the following books: *Book of Odes*, *Book of Documents*, *Book of Change*, *Zuo zhuan*, *Erya*, *Rites of Zhou*, *Book of Filial Piety*, *Daodejing*, *Zhuangzi*, *Liezi*, *Annalects*, *Guanzi*, *Records of the Historian*, *Chronicle of the Han Dynasty*, *Guangya*, *Shuowen Jiezi* to illustrate the meaning of some passages of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*. While quoting these books he keeps his distance by saying: "I only borrow the words but do not adopt their meaning."¹⁵

The next passage, which reveals the impact of the *Book of Change* and Wang Bi's commentary to it,¹⁶ shows the way how Chengguan endowed the terms of indigenous philosophies with new meaning.

"Going and returning are limitless, motion and quiescence [originate] from the same source. It contains all subtleties (*zhongmiao* 衆妙), yet has surplus; it is beyond speech and thought. It is called *dharma-dhātu*."¹⁷

¹¹ T 36.107a11–13.

¹² For an annotated translation of this text along with the Chinese text, see Gregory (1995).

¹³ See Gregory (1991, pp. 255–294); Jan (1980).

¹⁴ See Gregory (1995, p. 80).

¹⁵ T 36.2b9 or 3b13.

¹⁶ See Kojima (1998).

¹⁷ T. 35.503a7–8. One of Chengguan's most important teachings is the four *dharma-dhātus*. On his theory see my article.

To clarify the meaning of “all subtleties” he cites the Daodejing (1):
 The Tao (Way) that can be told of is not the eternal Tao;
 The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
 The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth;
 The Named is the mother of all things.
 Therefore let there always be non-being so we may see their subtlety,
 And let there always be being so we may see their outcome.
 The two are the same,
 But after they are produced, they have different names.
 Deeper and more profound,
 The door of all subtleties.¹⁸

Chengguan defines one real *dharma-dhātu* (*yizhen fajie* 一真法界) as the essence of the subtleties (*xuanmiao ti* 玄妙體) and all subtleties as the feature of this essence.¹⁹ In the *Daodejing* the term, “all subtleties” is a direct reference to the ontological basis of existence, the Dao. Chengguan, in contrast, attributes a lower rank to it by identifying it with a feature which can be conceived through the senses. Thereby he upgrades the central concept of Huayan philosophy.

Sometimes the expressions of Chinese philosophies are organically embedded in the Buddhist context, and the origin of them is not mentioned in the text. The second chapter of *Zhuangzi*, *The Equality of Things* reads: “heaven and earth were born together with me, and the myriad things and I are one.”²⁰

Chengguan rewrote Sengzhao’s allusion to this passage:²¹ “The mystical Dao lies in the wonderful enlightenment. The wonderful enlightenment lies in establishing the truth (*jizhen* 即真). Establishing the truth is the discernment of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* as identical (*shengmie qiguan* 生滅齊觀). The discernment of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* as identical means that they are not two. Therefore the *Tathatā* and I sprang from the same root, and the dharma-nature (*faxing* 法性) and I form one body.”²² Chengguan substituted the terms being and nonbeing for *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, Heaven and Earth for *Tathatā*, and myriad things for dharma-nature. This modification can be attributed to his Yogācāra and Huayan standpoint which prompted him to illustrate the all inclusive nature of the absolute, or *Tathatā*. In addition, this passage sheds light on the difference between Sengzhao’s and Chengguan’s application of Daoist works. First of all, Sengzhao avails himself of Daoist allusions for substantiating the arguments of Madhyamaka philosophy introduced to China by Kumārajīva, unlike in Chengguan’s case where the Huayan standpoint is obvious. Moreover, in *Zhaolun*, which is a masterpiece of the synthesis of Daoist and Buddhist philosophy,

¹⁸ Chan (1963, p. 139).

¹⁹ T 36.2b10–11.

²⁰ Chuang-tsu (1981, p. 56).

²¹ T 45.159b26–29. Liebhenthal rendition of this passage: “The Inscrutable is found in an intuitive experience which opens insight into the Middle Path. The Middle Path is insight into the sameness of existence and non-existence. (to one who has this insight) subject and object are not two. It follows that heaven-earth and he (the Sage) sprang from the same root, that all single things and he form one body.” See Chao Lun (1968, p. 117).

²² T 35.884c12–14. For the explanation of this in the Subcommentary, see T 36.634a5–12.

the Daoist environment in which the Buddhist doctrines are embedded is far more accentuated than in Chengguan's works. With these remarks we can agree with Kamata Shigeo who aligns Chengguan with Sengzhao.²³

The influence of Daoism on the following definition of *dharma-dhātu* is undoubted.

"The *dharma-dhātu* is not *dhātu* and not non-*dhātu*, not *dharma* and not non-*dharma*. It is unnameable so it was given forcibly the name 'non-obstructed *dharma-dhātu*'. It is quiescent, void and vast. It reaches deepness and includes all forms of existence (*wanyou* 萬有). It is the essence of one-mind (*yixin ti* 一心體), surpasses the features (*xiang* 相) of existence and non-existence. It is not born and it does not perish. If the beginning and the end of it cannot be found, how could the middle and the side of it be found?"²⁴

The sentence "If the beginning and the end of it cannot be found, how could the middle and the side of it be found" is parallel with "Meet it and you will not see its head. Follow it and you will not see its back."²⁵ (*Daodejing* 14)

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In our analysis of Chengguan's attitude toward indigenous religions, it was shown that his standpoint was characterised by ambivalence. During a time when a keen contest for primacy among the various religions was the part of the religious and cultural life of China he, as a prominent leader of Buddhism, had to proclaim the superiority of Buddhism. Therefore he condemned those who attempted to mix the three teachings by correlating their doctrines. He even attacked his own predecessor Huiyuan to whose teaching in fact he was indebted in many aspects, since he deviated from Fazang's classification of doctrines (*panjiao* 判教) by taking up the outer teachings in his own system. It was these arguments that gave a reason for later generations to exclude Huiyuan from the patriarchal lineage of the Huayan school. Chengguan based his arguments against Confucianism and Daoism on moral grounds which had implication for soteriology.

The Buddhist acknowledgement of the law of karma, the retribution in future lives emphasised the role of the individual responsibility for deeds, an idea quite different from social-oriented Confucianism or cosmology-centred Daoism. As a consequence, Buddhism presented the opportunity for an individual intervention into the current state of affairs through one's own religious cultivation to attain liberation from the fetters of society and cosmos which was impossible in the view of the indigenous religions.

On the other hand, Chengguan was aware of the importance of the acknowledgement and appreciation of Buddhist teaching to the literati strata, as the spread of Buddhism in China was always connected to the generous support of the emperor, the aristocrat and literati. In the case of Buddhist schools with highly sophisticated

²³ See Kamata (1959, p. 90). For Sengzhao's influence on Chengguan, see Kamata (1965, pp. 338–357).

²⁴ XZJ 7: 498a11–14.

²⁵ Chan (1963, p. 146).

system of doctrines, such as Tiantai or Huayan, it was even more compelling since their abstruse teachings were addressed to the elite of Buddhist and nonbuddhist circles and thereby incomprehensible to the masses. Actually they even could play a role in the ideology of those rulers, who wished to declare the uniqueness of their power by adherence to a school different from the one supported by the previous ruler.²⁶ To attract the attention of the literati toward Buddhist philosophy Chengguan had to make some concession to indigenous philosophies and religions, and sometimes had to express the Buddhist ideas in terms with which the literati was familiar. Nonetheless, the Buddhist meaning that his words conveyed remained dominant.

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²⁶ See Weinstein (1973).