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Dramatization and Poeticization Deleuze and the Poeticity of Metaphysics

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Abstract: In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze evokes *dramatization* when he suggests that intensities must dramatize the Ideas to condition their actualization. This allusion to an artistic category, in the midst of his metaphysical inquiry, has remained obscure. It is not clear, despite its cruciality, why he employs dramatization to explain *any* actualization and not solely artistic actualization. This essay elucidates this ambiguity, while foregrounding a zone of *torsional continuity*, wherein intensity encounters the Idea and expresses it through dramatization. This process is at play in the actualization of the organic field, social field, and aesthetic field, where an intensive larval subject—embryo, free individual, artist—encounters the biological, social, or artistic Idea. While unraveling the structure of artistic experience, it is shown how dramatization is indispensable to actualize every Idea. Finally, through Tarkovsky and Blanchot, the notion of *poeticization* is formulated that, while complementing dramatization, unveils some of its tacit nuances.

Key words: Deleuze, Blanchot, Tarkovsky, Idea, intensity, dramatization, poeticization, art, literature

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze characterizes every actual entity by two heterogeneous yet inseparable domains, the Ideas and intensities. Intensities are embryonic individuals that incarnate the Ideas. Ideas are ontological *problems* that are solved through actualization. Deleuze claims that to solve or actualize the Ideas intensities must *dramatize* the Ideas. Deleuze's allusion to an artistic category like dramatization, in the middle of his metaphysical descriptions, has remained ambiguous. Deleuze does not engage with this inquiry in *Difference and Repetition*. Also, in his lecture, "The Method of Dramatization," when Deleuze is asked by Maurice de Gandillac (his PhD supervisor) about his use of dramatization—"why this term dramatization?" (DI: 107)—Deleuze offers a short response and exposes certain psychoanalytical connotations of this term rather than its artistic implications. In the literature as well, despite the intriguing engagements with this concept, the reason for evoking an artistic category has not been explicitly and adequately articulated. Iain Mackenzie and Robert Porter

explore the implications of dramatization for political theory and suggest “a methodological link between drama and political theory” since dramatization might be “used as a way of engaging with the texts and the tasks of political philosophy.” (Mackenzie and Porter 2011: 482, 497) Leonard Lawlor examines the relation between drama and ethics while connecting *Difference and Repetition* to *A Thousand Plateaus*, wherein one finds the imperative of becoming a body without organs (Lawlor 2014). Janae Scholtz discusses how dramatization is related to both *actualization*, in *Difference and Repetition*, and *counter-actualization*, in *Logic of Sense*. Dramatization is not explicitly evoked, in *Logic of Sense*, but drawing on the personae of actor and dancer in this text, Scholtz aptly connects dramatization to counter-actualization, while examining its ethico-political consequences (Sholtz 2016).

Laura Cull situates dramatization in the framework of performance philosophy. She conceives philosophy *as* drama and while regarding the philosopher as director (Cull 2013: 507), interrogates Deleuze’s usage of the vocabulary of dramatization. She suggests that the relationship between *page* and *stage* in theatre somehow echoes the relationship between the virtual and the actual (514), and accordingly attempts to describe Deleuze’s appeal to dramatization. However, this might not be an adequate solution since the page or written play cannot stand for the virtual, as it is an *actualization* of a virtual *sense*. The stage also folds a virtuality in itself, this time as an *event* (in *Logic of Sense*, the expressed sense of propositions coincides with the incorporeal *events* in states of affairs). Hence, page and stage both incarnate and actualize a virtuality (sense/event), and, thereby, one cannot stand for the virtual and the other actual. Besides, the problem of passage from page to stage is the problem of tunneling, excavating, and extracting the virtual sense in the former and turning it into a virtual event in the latter. Moreover, Cull seems to be equating dramatization with actualization (513). As will be discussed, dramatization has a subtle distinction from actualization, since intensities condition the actualization of Ideas by dramatizing them. Indeed, actualization is the horizontal movement of the virtual to the actual but dramatization is a vertical relation between intensity and Idea. Dramatization is the way intensity *operates* the Idea, which conditions an actualization (a movement from virtual to actual) and individuation (from intensity to extensity/quality).

Consequently, it is not foregrounded why dramatization is essential for the actualization of Ideas. Gandillac’s question subsists: Why dramatization? What is involved in the artistic dramatization that makes it apt to characterize every actualization? This essay engages with this question in three steps. First, it navigates the structure of artistic experience and how it resonates with the expression of Ideas by intensities. The second part examines the role of dramatization in this artistic encounter,

showing its necessity for expressing-actualizing all Ideas, and not merely the Idea of art. The third part traces a kind of *poeticization*, through Tarkovsky and Blanchot, involved in the encounter of the Idea. While not explicitly conceptualized by Deleuze, poeticization can be introduced as a Deleuzian concept, considering his references to repetition, poetry, and literature, in *Difference and Repetition*.

Encountering the Idea of Art

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze portrays a recurrent theme. Intensity is the agent, or rather patient, a peculiar larval subjectivity, that encounters *something (aliquid)* heterogeneous, a virtual Idea. Intensity is the “who” of expression, the expressor, and the Idea is the expressed. Every actualization or “torsion” of expression occurs by a fold between these two heterogeneous orders (DR: 260), enacted by an uncanny *torsional continuity* that makes the Ideal and intensive inseparable without negotiating their ontological distinction. In Kant also, there is a fundamental fissure between the faculties of understanding and intuition. This heterogeneity is traversed by another faculty, *imagination*, and its mysterious art, *schematization*. The schema, being non-formal, conforms to both the concept and space-time, despite their disparity. Deleuze’s motif of dramatization (and dream) echoes a neo-Kantian schematization and imagination.

This theme is also invoked in the differentiation of the organic domain, where the intensive embryo is in circuit with an Idea and through spatio-temporal dynamisms (dramatization) gives rise to extensities (organs) and qualities (species). Only an embryo can afford to encounter the Idea, live the unlivable in the course of individuation, and bear its forced movements. Encountering the Idea is always *torsional*; it involves a subject torn by forced movements and the torsion of expression which folds the expressed-Idea in the expressor-intensity.

The same scenario is staged in the differentiation of social domain. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze stresses that it is only at the moment of revolution that a social Idea can be grasped: “Take the social multiplicity: it determines sociability as a faculty, but also the transcendent object of sociability [Idea] which cannot be lived within actual societies in which the multiplicity is incarnated, but must be and can be lived only in the element of social upheaval” (DR: 193). The social *undifferentiation* experienced in revolutions is a pure *passage (durée)*, an evasive between-ness, irreducible to any past or future state, reflecting the undifferentiation of the social Idea and its problematic structure. At the moment of revolution, the problem is determined, as it holds an impossibility and a

must, a problem *par excellence*. Thus, it is solely in this evasive (non)-present of revolution, this vanishing time, torn between the impossibility of past and future, that the Idea of society is disclosed, grasped, and lived. In such a torsional continuity, encountering the Idea is conditioned, as the individuals are disentangled from the prior social formation without being re-entangled within another social figuration, a *rare moment of freedom*. In other non-revolutionary times, what is experienced is a solution, a particular social actualization, wherein the problem remains veiled. But when the social world is disintegrated, the problem-Idea of society is encountered as a field of virtual relations. This harks back to Marx's passage from *fetishism* to *revolution* (Read 2009). Fetishism turns social *relations* into the quality of things, or indeed things, characterized by identity. And, the Marxian movement from fetishism to revolution can be mapped into Deleuze's project, which is also a passage from the dogmatic image of thought (identity, fetishism) to the thought of difference (revolution). Consequently, revolution as an undoing of fetishism, involves a fundamental unmasking of society as a field of relations, an encounter with the virtual Idea of society.

Now, we can turn to the actualization of the domain of art. Can't we claim that a comparable process is also at play in the artistic experience? Isn't the artist also subject to the encounter of a problem-Idea and its coincident moments of revolution and novelty? Doesn't the work also involve a revolutionary passage, wherein a problem is disclosed and lived, through which a solution as artwork erupts? The artists tremble with profound *problems*, threatening opacities, and their artistic endeavor often serves as a treatment or *solution* to recuperate a minimum degree of consistency. Living the problem is experienced as torment, agony, and impasse. As Deleuze and Guattari write in *What is Philosophy?*, "they have seen something in life that is too much for anyone, . . . that has put on them the quiet mark of death" (WP: 172).¹ This unbearable problem sounds to be tamed in part only by being *expressed* in the work. "Literature is a health" (ECC: lv).

Stéphan Mallarmé speaks about a remedy or cure while working on his tale of *Igitur*, in a letter to Cazalis: "it's a tale, by which I hope to bring down the old monster of Impotence, which is, moreover, its subject, so as to enclose myself in my great labor to which I have already returned. If it is done (the tale) I am healed; *simila similibus*" (Mallarmé 1994: 452; Norman 2014: 38). The poet is healed by expressing a Nietzschean "great health."² In the same vein, Ingmar Bergman describes his *Seventh Seal* as a kind of "medicine" for his crippling obsession with death.³

When the *problem-Idea* is determined, its most violent force is lived, where the current actuality and its implied Ideal problem is no longer livable (like the moment of social revolution), for it is

impossible to continue in a convergent fashion within the existing order; a radical disruption, an impasse, a dreadful unlivability. Thus, “the novelist or painter returns breathless and with bloodshed eyes,” from this “affective Athleticism” (WP: 172). This is the artist’s inexorable traumatic experience: the artist cannot live. The problem is an unlivable life. In *The Space of Literature*, Blanchot refers to Rilke: “In one of Rilke’s letters, . . . we find this answer: “Works of art are always the products of a danger incurred, of an experience pursued to the end, to the point where man can no longer continue.” The work of art is linked to a risk; it is the affirmation of an extreme experience” (SL: 236). The extreme experience that is obsessively pursued and affirmed by the artist, despite its danger, is the horrific impossibility of continuing convergently with the actual order while the Idea is encountered.

But, then, the question is how is the problem solved through the eruption of the work? How does art achieve a solution or cure? Perhaps because every actualization or solution entails a “genuine creation” and novelty (DR: 212), wherein, as it were, a *new dimension* is injected to reality. Every artwork is a new actualization that augments reality with something new. Art is not solely an aesthetic practice but a para-ontological one, insofar as it multiplies and creates. When reality is charged, thickened, with this new dimension the prior problematic impossibility is digested and integrated into the new augmented space.¹ Curiously, Bergman also alludes to such a new dimension:

Bergman: sometimes there is a miracle happening in front of the camera, sometimes. Not very often, but sometimes . . . something happens in front of the camera, and that is the most beautiful thing that exists. And to wait for that miracle and to hope for it is the best thing in the world.

Melvyn Bragg: And what happens is that something new is created?

Bergman: It’s something with some third dimension suddenly is present. Something that you can’t calculate, or find out or rehearse. There is something that happens. I don’t know, I can’t explain that; but it’s magic.

The work casts this new dimension, a genuine novelty. It cannot be calculated or rehearsed because the solution has no pre-determination, and its figuration coincides with the co-birth of the artist alongside the work, implying why the Idea does not reside in the artist’s consciousness. The *I* is not the creator of the Idea, it is not even its receiver: “The imperatives . . . do not emanate from the *I*: it is not even there to hear them” (DR: 199). This magical unrehearsed and incalculable moment

¹ The addition of a new dimension is not proposed by Deleuze, and it might not be an appropriate explanation, since it could evoke the metaphors of homogeneous space.

echoes the *event* through which the problem is encountered in its obscurity, lived in its unlivability, and solved in its instigated new order, i.e., the revolutionary moment in the Idea of art. It is ironical to say that the problem is lived, because it is precisely the limit experience of unlivability, a twisted co-implication of life and death in the vanishing time of revolution. The only way to continue, submerged in life's unlivability, is to continue in a *torsional* way and *express* the Idea, to accompany the eruption of the work that magically loads the real with a new dimension. This revolutionary moment of the Idea of art denotes, once more, a *rare moment of freedom*, where the artists are worthy of the event while confronting the Idea, where, being exposed to its imperative, they are compelled to enact a new actualization. Otherwise this would lead to the "annihilation" of the artist. But, Proust, "the model for all becomings," has shown that "another outcome" is also possible, the work.⁴ Thus, as Lawlor writes, becoming is only possible if a work (*oeuvre*) is produced," and "a becoming is successful only if writing results" (Lawlor 2020: 170).

For Deleuze, the problem-Idea is born of an imperative. Every "work is a problem born of the imperative" (work, regarded in its virtual state, is a problem), and the author is nothing but the "operator of the Idea" (DR: 199) The only role of the artist, when exposed to the imperative, to the brute decree of the problem, is to *operate* the Idea.

Art, as suggested by Deleuze, is supposed to discover its Idea (DR: 195). But, the *I* cannot be conscious of the Ideas, it is not there to hear them, absent in the encounter and substituted by the *aleatory point*. The absent artist, unaware of the Idea, can only live it as an obscure tension or torsion without any form or figuration, an undifferentiated problem, a virtual affect, without any face or representation for consciousness; a problem that is only lived when the artist resides in the aleatory point, *worthy* of capturing the imperative and encountering the problem-Idea of art. The modern novelists, Deleuze affirms, as the operators of the Idea, "install themselves in this *aleatory point*" (DR: 199). It is in this locus that the problem emerges. This point is aleatory, as it is non-localizable (in any subject) and contingent, without belonging to any *I* or consciousness: "this creation or throw which makes us descendant from the gods [because actualization is a genuine creation], is nevertheless not our own. . . . The imperatives and questions with which we are infused do not emanate from the *I*: it is not even there to hear them" (DR: 199). In this subjectless juncture, "The imperatives are those of being" (DR: 199).

The imperatives that form the Idea or the *cogitanda* of pure thought are "that which cannot be thought" and simultaneously "*must* be thought" from the viewpoint of the transcendent exercise, that

is, the impossible task of thinking the unthinkable. What is thought is always something unthinkable from the empirical viewpoint. Berkeley insisted that an object outside or independent of our mind is impossible because any such speculation would still involve a thought of that thing, and will make that thing a thinkable thing, or a thing in thought. Thus, the transcendent element of thought is the pure unthinkable or unthought. But this unthought is precisely that which commands and forces thought to think, the point where our greatest powerlessness transforms into the greatest power. Deleuze appeals to Blanchot: “that blind, acephalic, aphasic and aleatory original point which designates ‘the impossibility of thinking that is thought’, that point at which ‘powerlessness’ is transmuted into power, that point which develops in the work in the form of a problem” (DR: 199). Thus, the aleatory point, wherein the artists install themselves is also the point where the faculty of thought is born in a problematic field.

Erewhon: The Non-Localizable Locus of the Artist

We saw that the proper locus of the Idea is an aleatory point, where the artist resides while receiving the imperative. This schema might also elucidate Deleuze’s appropriation of *Erewhon* in the Introduction of *Difference and Repetition*. The non-localizable aleatory point, which does not belong to any *I* or consciousness, can be regarded as an *Erewhon*. It is in Samuel Butler’s novel, entitled *Erewhon*, that this name is christened (reversing the letters and switching “w” and “h” gives “nowhere”). The artist’s position while confronting the Idea is precisely a *no-where*, a very peculiar *now-here*, “from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, differently distributed ‘heres’ and ‘nows’” (DR, xv). But, why does the inexhaustibly ever new emerge from this *Erewhon* or non-location? Because it is on this spot that the Idea is encountered and then another actualization, qua novelty, is conditioned. While describing *Erewhon*, Deleuze says, this is where the concepts (or rather Ideas) are encountered like things, but “things in their free and wild state, beyond their ‘anthropological predicates’” (DR: xv–xxi); that is, beyond their conscious propositions. Then, he continues that this making and remaking of concepts occur “along a moving horizon,” and thus, not caught in the identical horizon of a subject. If in Heidegger Dasein is the horizon of the manifestation of being, here the horizon is in movement, always displaced and decentered. The moving horizon, as will be discussed, is a *decentered larval subject* in its field of individuation.

In “Concepts as Continuous Variations,” Daniel W. Smith also considers the *Erewhon* as an orientation toward a Deleuzian utopia: “their notion of utopia is connected less to a kind of teleology or ideal, even if only a regulative ideal towards which one might aim, and more toward the schema of the production of the new, that is, the conditions under the new (deterritorialization) is made possible (now-here), even though one cannot say in advance, of course, what the ‘new’ is going to be (no-where)” (Smith and Litaker 2010: 67).

Indeed, Deleuze’s project in *Difference and Repetition* might be read as an *ethics*⁵ with the imperative to discover the Idea, to install oneself in the zone of *Erewhon*, the zone of torsional continuity where the subject is torn, to become worthy of the *event*, of encountering the Idea, in the result of which inexhaustibly ever new can emerge; an imperative to *become-artist* or *become-larval* while inhabiting *Erewhon*. It is here that one might hope for a miracle, as Bergman noted. The creative acts of the artist and philosopher happen on a border, on a frontier between *representative consciousness* and the *absolute dark unconscious of ignorance*. It is by swarming on this border that thinking or writing is rendered possible. Deleuze expresses this elegantly:

How else can one write but of those things which one doesn’t know, or knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to say. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in this manner are we resolved to write Perhaps writing has a relation to silence altogether more threatening than that which it is supposed to entertain with death.” (DR: xxi)

The only way to write is to write about something that we don’t know or know badly; there is no need to write about something we actually know. We happen to write at the border of our knowledge. And, this is a frontier *par excellence*. It is *unconscious*, as the *I* is not the creator or receiver of the Idea, but it is not also pure ignorance because that would imply that the Idea is not encountered at all. This frontier, we might suggest, is precisely the aleatory point, where the Idea is met, a point or border that is neither localizable in the *I*, nor plunged into a dark ignorance. This is the “finality of writing:” “becoming-imperceptible” (D: 45), which coincides with dwelling in no-where or *Erewhon*. Being an artist or philosopher is all about knowing how to affirm and afford to reside and become-imperceptible in this disruptive frontier of encounter, border of writing or literature. As Ronald Bogue hints succinctly, “To write is to flee, to make flee, to be delirious, to leave the track, to betray, to become, to conjoin flows, to form assemblages, to deterritorialize—but above all, to trace a line of flight, for the line of flight is the line of creation and ‘experimentation-life’” (D: 59, 47; Bogue 2003: 155–56)

Mallarmé also strives to become-imperceptible in an absolute impersonality, the dissolution of the poet. He writes in a letter, “This is to tell you that I am now impersonal, and not the Stéphane you knew.” (Norman 2014: 40; Mallarmé 1994: 343) The poet qua person must die; it is in the poet’s absence, in its depersonalization, that the “pure work” can be accomplished (Norman 2014: 40). This pertains to a frontier, *Midnight*. It is striking that Mallarmé’s tale of *Igitur*, takes place on this border, at Midnight. Barnaby Norman characterizes the Midnight as “a strange time because it escapes time,” a “non-temporal time,” and then interestingly describes it as a “point of inflection,” (in a different context, without intimating Deleuze or Leibniz) “being both the end of one day and the beginning of another” (Norman 2014: 40–41). Even *Igitur* himself is confounded with this Midnight that makes him imperceptible. We read in *Igitur*, “I was the hour that must make me pure;” or, “It is the pure dream of a Midnight, disappeared into itself” (Norman 2014: 41, 435). The midnight, in which the artist dies, is the frontier of encounter, the *Erewhon* or no-where of the Idea.

Dramatizing the Obscure Ideas

Now we are in a position to return to the problem of dramatization. For Deleuze, the individual and the world are co-constituted in an immanent field. This co-birth or *co-naissance* implies the constitution of a space-time that accompanies the co-actualization of every individual and its world. Every actualization involves a spatio-temporal constitution of qualities and extensities. These *spatio-temporal dynamisms* constitute a particular space-time that is immanent in every Idea. To explain these dynamisms Deleuze appeals to Embryology. An embryonic field is characterized by such spatio-temporal dynamisms that give rise to extensities (organs) and qualities (species). It is a field of individuation, in which the Idea is folded and implicated. It is capable of individuating because “there are ‘things’ that only an embryo can do” (DR: 215), because it can live the *unlivable* (like the artist): “The destiny and achievement of the embryo is to live the unlivable, to sustain forced movements of a scope which would break any skeleton or tear ligaments” (DR: 215). The embryo affirms “forced movements” that would destroy any adult organism, and it is individuating, insofar as it can bear the exposure to spatio-temporal dynamisms. Deleuze calls this embryonic individual the *larval subject* (DR: 215), a larval subjectivity in the course of autopoiesis. Indeed, Deleuze, following Ruyer, substitutes the perspective of consciousness with that of the embryo, endowed with primary consciousness. The embryo, being in circuit with an Idea, has to solve an Ideal problem. This field of individuation,

entailing a larval subjectivity, is where once more the Idea, this time the biological Idea, is encountered. Thus, the larval subject and aleatory point go hand in hand; the aleatory point is Ideal, whereas the larval subject is intensive. The embryo, echoing the artist, individuates for it can live the *unlivable problem of life* and *operate the Idea*.

But, how does the embryonic individual operate (or actualize) an Idea? Deleuze's answer is striking: by *dramas* or *dramatization*. He stresses that spatio-temporal dynamisms actualize the Ideas by virtue of dramas, "they dramatize the Idea" (DR: 216). The Idea must be dramatized to condition its actualization. Spatio-temporal dynamisms are "dramas of Ideas" instead of "schemata of concepts" (as in Kant) (DR: 218). Then, he notes, "The world is an egg, but the egg itself is a theatre" (DR: 216). The world is an egg, an embryonic field, affording and affirming the unlivable shocks of the Idea, which is only resolved by conditioning the eruption of the new. The world is an egg and the egg is a theatre. In this theatre, the Idea is dramatized. But, in what sense dramatization, as a theatrical category, is an exigence for Idea's actualization? Why is dramatization, as an artistic practice, requisite for the actualization of *every* Idea, and not merely the Idea of art?

As a rudimentary step to explain this, we might evoke a simple and common example. Suppose you are watching a film, and you're entirely immersed in the story; you live its events and are moved by its forceful affects. Then, the film ends with a self-narration of the main character, serving as the film's apotheosis, its epitomizing and conclusive point that leaves a profound influence on you. This decisive moment might even remain with you for some time. Now, suppose without having seen the whole film, you stumble upon the same narration in an article or a TV program; this time, evidently, you will not be touched. Even it might appear as an insipid or commonplace statement; you would pass over it without receiving any trace of the work. The question is, why the same statement, with identical linguistic elements and meaning, seems to have two different faces. One, so unoriginal, tasteless, hackneyed, bereft of any force or affect; the other so stimulating, potent, and rich. It seems what is decisive in differentiating these two scenarios is *dramatization*. In one case, the actual self-narration, the statement, is weaved into a dramatized nexus, whereas in the other, it is dissociated from its dramatized body. In the former, the movie stages a drama that is then inherited and enveloped in the final self-narration; in the latter, the same actual elements and meaning, being sequestered from dramatization, do not carry the essence of the film and inscribe nothing in our soul. It seems that mere signification is not adequate in the case of artwork, it must be enriched with dramatization.

Dramatization is a method that turns an Idea into a theatrical or cinematic expression. It folds an Idea in the artwork, *something* that confers an artistic essence or sense to words and scenes. It is an Idea, an artistic Idea, that crafts an artistic world through words and images, and dramatization enables its expression and incarnation in the work. The Idea is *something (aliquid)* and *nothing ((non)-being)* before the theatre is born; something insofar as it drives the formation of theatre, and nothing insofar as it lacks existence outside the accomplished performance. Without dramatization, the Idea is not communicable; this is why a signification, bereft of dramatization, can turn into a platitude. The Idea cannot be simply *said* in a proposition without this artistic maneuver; it can only be expressed and conveyed through a newly constituted artistic reality, born through the dramatization of the Idea. Only, via dramatization the work can *move the souls* since like a *modulative* method, it can fold the Idea in the work and then incite a *real movement* in the souls, which can grasp the Idea, passing through this newly constituted theatrical/cinematic world. That is why the directors cannot simply say the Idea, and often their attempts to say anything about their Idea fail, without activating any movement in the souls. Dramatization is a method by which the obscure Idea of art can be folded and implicated in the actual work and conveyed. It is by dint of drama that the Idea can earn a body without ceding its virtuality, essence, or force, earning a body without being reduced to the body. While being dramatized, the Idea does not become identical with actual words and scenes; otherwise it would lose its artistic essence. There is no access to the Idea when it is not tainted and modulated by dramatization.

Every artwork envelops an Idea; this Idea is the encountered *problem* in the artistic experience, and the work is an actuality that holds a folded virtual problem-Idea in itself. Encountering the problem-Idea of art, as discussed, is a torment, an unlivability, which might only be tackled in part by being *expressed* in the work. Dramatization makes this expression possible. And, the artists have no awareness of this encountered Idea as it is virtual; they only live an obscure tension and vibrate with the force of a problem, which lacks any figuration. It is only after dramatization that the artist, simultaneous with the audience, faces the Idea actualized in a body; thus, the artists dramatize the problem, first and foremost, to disclose it for themselves, rather than others, since the Idea qua virtuality has to be enfolded onto an actuality to pass into existence, and this is conditioned by dramatization. The artists do not know, in advance, what is the problem, they only live a horrifying unlivability, a theatre of “cruelty,”⁶ and have to bestow it an expression to pass through it. This virtual Idea is folded in the actual work in a “strange theatre,” and dramatization is the method that enacts

such folding. Dramatization folds the Idea and confers it a body without reducing it to the actual. Through dramatization the virtual Idea becomes *expressible* in an actual work, without surrendering its heterogenous nature or yielding its force.

In *Letters to Milena*, Kafka writes: “I keep trying to convey something which cannot be conveyed, to explain something which cannot be explained, something in my bones, which can only be experienced in these same bones” (Kafka 1990: 219). This is the Idea *par excellence*, incommunicable, inexplicable, without any form or differentiation, only felt in the bones as a virtual problem. The Idea is obscure by nature and inaccessible in the order of light—in the sphere of subject/representation/concept—it has no content for consciousness that deals with the actualities. The artist, when haunted by the unformed unconscious Idea, is a *larval* embryonic subject, and its endeavor to communicate something incommunicable is only activated by dramatizing and expressing the Idea. It is the expression of the inexpressible that will solve the problem-Idea while crafting the new, the work.

Curiously, dramatization in theatre and cinema also implies the constitution of a particular space-time, which forges the world of the work, the space-time of a novel or film. The history of cinema has been inseparable from unprecedented manners of *sculpting in time and space*, borrowing a term from Andrei Tarkovsky. For Deleuze also, as noted, dramatization is inseparable from the embryo’s spatio-temporal dynamisms that actualize a space-time, immanent in the Idea, developed within qualities and extensities. Every actualization involves the constitution of a space-time and a consciousness, that is, the co-constitution of the subject and the world: “Every spatio-temporal dynamism is accompanied by the emergence of an elementary consciousness” (DR: 220). This co-constitution occurs in the frontier of encounter, the surface of individuation-actualization where the divergent series meet (problem) and then give rise to a world-consciousness. Each world, with its peculiar space-time and its associated consciousness, are actualized simultaneously on this frontier by means of dramatization. The artist resides on this edge.

Deleuze subtly declares that even when we are constituted as subjects, still “every Idea turns us into larvae,” putting aside the identity of our *I* and the resemblance of our self (DR: 219) It seems the subject is not like most of our organs that lose most of their embryonic character or equipotentiality when they are fully developed and individuated; by contrast, the subject remains embryonic and equipotential (like a brain⁷) even after differentiation. Hence, every Idea, as Deleuze claims, can turn a constituted subject into larvae; this is why the artist, when attacked and enchanted

by an Idea, transforms into larvae. This moment is a point of fixation. We are always, “fixed by an Idea as though in the glimmer of a look;” we are always patients with respect to Ideas (DR: 219). The artists are fixated on the imperative of the Idea, possessed by its ethereal invisible look and dark radiance, such that the only thing they can afford is to bestow an expression to it while becoming-larvae. This is the embryonic domain that the artists know how to inhabit: An awake dream (Deleuze sometimes uses *dream* and *drama* interchangeably), the frontier between consciousness and the profound unconscious of ignorance, that Deleuze hinted as the locus of writing; a border in which the divergence of the Idea is affirmed, and its problematicity is lived. Being an artist or a philosopher is all about becoming-larval and learning to affirm this problematic unlivability. “Even the philosopher is a larval subject of his own system” (DR: 119).

Philosophers also encounter an obscure force which demands a philosophical endeavor to turn them into thoughts. As it is famously described by Heidegger, Kant could not stand what he was seeing vaguely with respect to the genetic power of transcendental syntheses and then he “shrank back from this unknown root” (Heidegger 1997: 112). But there are few thinkers, as Deleuze notes, who dramatize the Idea of philosophy, who affirm and dramatize their “tonality of the soul,” and it is this dramatized tonality that enchants and incites movement in the souls. As Klossowski describes Nietzsche’s thought of eternal return, this thought “came to Nietzsche as an abrupt awakening in the midst of a *Stimmung*, a certain tonality of the soul. Initially confused with this *Stimmung*, it gradually emerged as a thought” (Klossowski 1997: 44).

Now it is clear, why while talking about the *theatre of repetition*, in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and its involved real movement, Deleuze invokes the experience of pure forces which act directly on spirits. The language before words, as he puts it, gestures before organized bodies, phantoms before characters, all refer to this monstrous unformed Idea, which has no face, no word, no body, but is their something-nothing, their ?-being in need of dramatization. This ?-being is the problem of the artist: how to turn this terrifying monster, this virtual ?-being into an actual artistic being.

Aren’t also the characters staged in *Mrs. Dalloway*’s associated movie, *The Hours*, captivated by an obscure Idea? In *The Hours*, Laura Brown says that Woolf’s novel is about a woman who seems confident but ruined from inside. Laura herself is also ruined but for no particular visible reason. She belongs to a calm, sweet, and adorable family with a caring husband, nevertheless, she attempts to take her life without any specific reason. What is profoundly devastating is this ungrounded suffering; she cries secretly and desperately tries to commit suicide escaping from the disturbing gaze of his son.

She is haunted, as though, by an ambiguous force. Isn't this precisely the cruel encounter of an *Idea*? Something hurts profoundly, without showing itself, a monstrous pressure without any face. And, this problematic state is *repeated* in all three parallel stories and their associated larval subjects—i.e., Virginia Woolf, Laura Brown, Clarissa Vaughan, and Richard Brown—who are all possessed and torn by the *Idea* of Mrs. Dalloway. This is the eternity or aternality of the Idea that can traverse spaces and times and demand expression in various incarnations. However, this is not just a *dramatic* encounter, it is also *poetic*.

Poeticization: The Poeticity of Ideas

Andrei Tarkovsky declares that “[t]here are two basic categories of film directors. One consists of those who seek to imitate the world in which they live, the other are those who seek to create their own world. The second category contains the poets of the cinema” (Tarkovsky and Gianvito 2006: 76). There are directors-poets who create their own world; they express a new world and make something inexpressible expressible. There is an inexplicable, as Kafka hinted, which needs to find its particular means of expression, an inexpressible in search for a body. The director must be a poet to make this incarnation possible.





Tarkovsky, *The Sacrifice* (1986), *Nostalgia* (1983), *Ivan's Childhood* (1962)

In *Sculpting in Time*, Tarkovsky finds “the logic of poetry . . . perfectly appropriate to the potential of cinema as the most truthful and poetic of art forms” (Tarkovsky 1989: 18). The poet-artist creates a new world while expressing an inexpressible. And, as is well known, Tarkovsky is a poet of cinema, absorbed in the poetical articulation of a new world that expresses something incommunicable. This world, however, is not the world *of* the poet, the poet is rather the poet *of* this world. Hence, perhaps rather than creating a world, the artists-poets are the patients of a world, an Ideal world, in the face of which they can only express. The work with its actual world is an expression of this virtual-Ideal world. Thus, the new world of the poet-director, rather than denoting the actual space-time of the work, refers to a virtual world that is folded and enveloped in the work. The work is an expression no less than a face. And, the face must equally be a poet in order to express, the poet of the expressed. In the

eventual encounter, we can only be *the poet of the Idea, the poet of the world*. Tarkovsky maintains that poetry is a “way of relating to reality” (Tarkovsky 1989: 21). It might be added that every work, being a genuine creation, introduces something new to reality, insofar as it solves a problem. And, every new world has its own temporality and spatiality (Tarkovsky also talks about different temporalities of directors, having various rhythms, speeds, etc.).

It is curious that cinema which is supposed to have a structural kinship with dramatization is instead, for Tarkovsky, tied to poetry: “poetic reasoning is closer to the laws by which thought develops, and thus to life itself, than is the logic of traditional drama” (Tarkovsky 1989: 20). Now, the question is if there can be a relationship between dramatization and poetry, implicitly operative in *Difference and Repetition*. There is a clue in the fourth chapter of *Difference and Repetition* that might be instructive to explore this relationship. There, Deleuze connects the becoming-embryo to the *pure movement of repetition*. He writes: “When we remain or again become embryos [the Idea can turn the subject into larvae], it is rather because of this pure movement of repetition” (DR: 219). According to Deleuze, becoming-larvae or remaining in the intensive field, which involves dramatization, is the consequence of a pure movement of repetition. This appeal to repetition might allow us to trace a conceptual link between dramatization and poetry, since repetition is present in both. But this is not the only occasion where Deleuze connects dramatization, as a theatrical moment, to repetition. Also, in the Introduction, he ties repetition to theatre and movement in theatre. In his analysis of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Deleuze shows how these two philosophers deal with the “highest theatrical problem, the problem of a movement which would directly touch the soul, which would be that of the soul” (DR: 9). This echoes our earlier discussion; these theatrical-dramatized philosophies *directly touch the soul* since they envelop an Idea through dramatization. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard’s philosophies are fundamentally theatrical; they invent an incredible equivalent of theatre within philosophy, wherein everything is for the stage, visualized, “put in motion and made to walk or dance” (DR: 9). Deleuze stresses that “Theatre is real movement,” opposing it to the Hegelian movement which is merely the movement of concepts, and then ties movement to repetition: “repetition is the essence and interiority of movement.” (DR, 10) He adds, “The theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which refers it back to the concept. In the theatre of repetition, we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized bodies, with

masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters” (DR: 10). When the real movement is opposed to the movement of concepts, the theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation. Real movement is provoked by the Idea, pure forces of the Idea which act directly on the spirit, with a language before words, spectres before characters. This is a theatre of repetition because we *represent* things through concepts but *repeat* singularities through events. Deleuze is replacing the schematization of concept with the dramatization of Ideas. Dramatization, with its theatricality, replaces representation, and Ideas substitute concepts. This theatrical philosophy is a “philosophy of the future” (DR: 5). Philosophy must dramatize its philosophical Idea to invoke real movements, and the philosopher must become larval, like the artist, “a larval subject of his own system” (DR: 119).

Hence, theatre and dramatization are inseparable from repetition. Now the question is how repetition might be linked to poetry. How can one identify a poem? Perhaps one way to distinguish a poem is to disclose its essential kinship with repetition: a poem is what *must* be repeated, that which necessitates repetition. We do not merely read a poem, we repeat it inevitably; poetry is that which commands you to repeat. The poetic also, like the Idea, intimates a glimmering of an eye, a point of fixation that arrests you and commands you to repeat. This is why Deleuze asserts in the Introduction to *Difference and Repetition*: “a poem must be learned by heart. The head is the organ of exchange, but the heart is the amorous organ of repetition” (DR: 2). The heart is the amorous organ of repetition, firstly, as it exists by virtue of repeating and, secondly, because we learn the poems by heart. Deleuze alludes to Pius Servien and distinguishes two languages: “the language of science which is dominated by substitution which is marked by its symbol of equality; and the lyrical language in which every term is irreplaceable and can only be repeated” (DR: 2). Science is characterized by substitution and exchange, and poetry by irreplaceability and repetition.

Evidently, the reader is not the only one who repeats. The poet also repeats. Indeed, the poet and the reader both participate in the inherent repetition of the poetical. In *The Space of Literature*, Blanchot portrays this repetition as a *recommencement*; the writer pertains to a temporality that is ruled by such a repetition:

he himself belongs to a time ruled by the indecisiveness inherent in beginning over again [*recommencement*]. The obsession which ties him to a privileged theme, which obliges him to say over again what he has already said . . . illustrates the necessity, which apparently determines his efforts, that he always come back to the same point, pass again over the same paths, persevere in starting over what for him never starts, and that he belong to the

shadow of events, not their reality, to the image, not the object, to what allows words themselves to become images, appearances – not signs, values, the power of truth. (SL: 24)

The shadow of the events is the events in its virtuality; this shadow is what the poet is obliged to explore, which then makes them entangled with its necessary and incessant repetition. This is why writers have no mastery over their hands that are submerged in this time of repetition and are condemned to write interminably; “the ‘sick’ hand that never lets the pencil go,” because “what it holds belongs to the realm of shadows, and it is itself a shade;” the mastery, Blanchot notes, belongs instead to the other hand that does not write, that can intervene and stop writing. So, if the writer has any mastery, it is not in writing but in not writing, in “the power to stop writing,” to “interrupt what is being written” (SL: 25).

We saw how Deleuze weaves repetition into the texture of theatre and dramatization, and how the larval subject and its dramatization result from a pure movement of repetition. Now, as repetition is also inseparable from the poetical it might be suggested that *repetition* characterizes both *poetries* and *dramas*. Drama and poetry go hand in hand because repetition characterizes dramatization and simultaneously covers a poetical moment. Dramatization of Ideas results from a pure movement of repetition and, thereby, has a poetical character. This repetition is evidently a vertical repetition. That is, the *aternal* part of the event that eternally returns and repeats for it is not exhausted in the horizontal actualities, *l'incessant*, *l'interminable*, as Blanchot insists (SL: 26).

Consequently, along with dramatization, we can also suggest *poeticization*, which enacts the actualization. But in what sense is poeticization necessary for the incarnation of Ideas? Why must be the Idea poeticized? Poetry occurs in the sphere of language, yet it seems to be, at the same time, its limit and impossibility. This is why Jean Paul Sartre, in *What is Literature?*, aligns poetry more closely with painting, sculpture, and music, rather than prose, because poetry like painting and music does not attempt to designate. Sartre claims that poets “refuse to *utilize* language;” they don’t strive to discern the true, and don’t “dream of *naming* the world,” indeed, “they name nothing at all” (Sartre 1988: 29). Poets are in a peculiar zone; “They do not speak, neither do they keep silent; it is something different;” they regard “words as things and not as signs” (Sartre 1988: 29). In language, words are “domesticated,” and “useful conventions,” but in poetry, words are in the “wild state” like “natural things” (Sartre 1988: 29). The poet discovers in words “a slight luminosity of their own and particular affinities with the earth, the sky, the water” (Sartre 1988: 30). This flesh-becoming of the word implies that poetry is “outside language” (Sartre 1988: 30). The words in poetry, Sartre holds, are in the wild

state and are closer to natural things rather than signs. It is interesting to note that Deleuze also employs the similar terms, in *Difference and Repetition*, to describe *Erewhon* and his superior empiricism: “Empiricism . . . treats the concepts as object of an encounter, . . . as an *Erewhon* from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new . . . Only an empiricist could say: concepts are indeed things, but things in their free and wild state, beyond ‘anthropological predicates’” (DR: xx–xxi).

Indeed, poetry performs an annulment of language, but from within language. It does not speak, as it ceases to designate, and simultaneously is not silent as it still occurs within language being immanent to it. The words yearn to *become* things rather than to designate them. Poetry endeavors to express something inexpressible and takes language to its borders of impossibility. Poetry is the impossibility, or rather problematicity, of language. As Blanchot repeats, in poetry, the word ceases to signify but instead *appears*, it *is*. Poetry breaks the bond of language with the world: “To write is, moreover, to withdraw language from the world, to detach it from what makes it a power according to which, when I speak, it is the world that declares itself, the clear light of day that develops through tasks undertaken, through action and time” (SL: 26). Poetry is this withdrawal from the world, and then the “space” of the poets is where “being speaks [*Là où il est, seul parle l'être*],” which amounts to saying that “language doesn’t speak any more, but is. It devotes itself to the pure passivity of being [*la parole ne parle plus, mais est, mais se voue à la pure passivité de l'être*]” (SL: 27; EL: 21). This is why perhaps, as Smith remarks, the “logic of literature,” for Deleuze, is also a “logic of Life,” an “impersonal and nonorganic power . . . beyond any lived experience” (ECC: xiii, xiv). Poetry engages with this “shadow of the word,” that can neither be “mastered” nor “grasped,” the “ungraspable,” from which the poet cannot be released: “the indecisive moment of fascination” (SL: 25). The *shadow of the word* must be construed in parallel to the *shadow of the events*; these shadow-words do not denote, but become an “image;” they manifest themselves and cease to be (linguistic) signs or “powers of truth” (SL: 24). This is an undoing of language, what perhaps Blanchot sometimes calls *désouvrement*, unworking.

It seems poetry strives to silence language, while it does not cease to speak; a problematic and paradoxical endeavor to silence language through speaking. Hence, as Blanchot puts it aptly, “In the work that has disappeared the work wants to speak,” the work speaks through its disappearance (SL: 232). Poetry is face-to-face with a double impossibility: not only must it say the unsayable, but it must do so without shifting its essence. The first impossibility is to *say the unsayable*; the second is to *not reduce this said unsayable to the sphere of the sayable, while they have become indiscernible*. Poetry opens a new *space* in language, where the ineffable can be folded in the said without being reduced to the sphere of the

said, while it has become indiscernible-inseparable from the said. Three paradoxical moments of continuity are present in poeticization: the unsayable is enveloped in the sayable, becoming indiscernible from it, yet without being reduced to the sayable.

We might suggest that this is precisely what is at play in the expression of *Ideas*: Expressing or actualizing a virtuality without reducing its distinct nature, expressing the virtual in the actual without sacrificing its heterogeneity. This is where an inevitable *poeticization* can be traced in the actualization of all Ideas. The Idea must be poeticized as it must be folded in intensity (and, then, the actual), forming a torsional continuity with it, without negotiating its ontological distinction, without becoming assimilated with the intensive expressor. The intensive expressor-poet-thinker can express the virtual inexpressible-ineffable-unthinkable by dint of poeticization.

Poetry is inseparable from the torment of a desire to stare at the obscure Idea, a gaze⁸ at this profound opacity, before being actualized in the light of expression. Poetry, or Blanchot's *la littérature*, involves such an impossibility, which is also accompanied with a radical affirmation: "a region where impossibility is no longer deprivation, but affirmation" (SL: 223). Where, as Rilke said, we can no longer continue, nevertheless, this extreme experience must be affirmed. This is the ambiguous status of a *torsional continuity*, in which the larval poet-thinker-embryo is torn while catching sight of an insurmountable impossibility or unlivability, where the Idea must hold a torsional relation by being enveloped in intensity, as its virtual expressed; this problematic torsion of expression is rendered possible by dramatization-poeticization. Hence, the virtual Ideas are inseparable from a *vertical-poetical repetition*, they return and repeat like poetry. When we are turned into larva and afford staring at the vertical Ideality we are in the realm of poetics. This place, or rather non-place, is a *space*, an *Erewhon*, a no-where, Blanchot's *espace*, the peculiar domain of *literature*, which withdraws from being a place, like the anonymous non-localizability of the event of death (Blanchot), or the event as such (Deleuze). In this space, we are, more than ever, poets and dramatizers.

It is curious that the poeticity of Ideas is also latent in the calculus, which characterizes the Ideal field. Can't we regard calculus as the poeticization of mathematics? Isn't the fictional dx the unsayable of mathematics, the culmination of its impossibility and problematization? Mathematics had the intricate and paradoxical task of expressing dx in a coherent and rigorous manner. dx always entertained a problematic status in mathematics, being at once a non-zero and a non-finite quantity, the ineffable of mathematics, the unmathematical moment of math, its *outside*. dx has been the "fiction" of mathematics, as Leibniz repeated incessantly, and it bears witness to the fact that calculus

is the *dream* or *drama* of mathematics, or perhaps its *poetry*, when it affirmed dx as its limit or impossibility, and infinity as its disrupting dream or “nightmare,” when it dreamed dx and imagined infinity. Expressing these problematic creatures are conditioned by a method of dramatization or a poetical movement that struggles to say the ineffable of mathematics without reducing its heterogeneity. Math’s impossibility is solved by a dream, a drama. The problem must be dramatized and poeticized. The infinitesimal with its paradoxical and unmathematical status, this unavoidable useful fiction, *unmaths mathematics while mathing*, like the poetical that silences language while speaking; it discloses a dream-like insistence to calculate when precisely the calculation has become impossible, it functions like the dream, drama, or poetry of mathematics; it *unmaths (démathématise)* math from within qua its condition, not so different from Blanchot’s unworking (*désouvrement*).

Finally, we must note that dramatization-poeticization involves a political tenor. When we are face-to-face with a socio-historical “unspeakable,” a method of poeticization seems necessary to speak the unspeakable. That is perhaps why a poetical tone pervades the works of Black thinkers like Frantz Fanon, Édouard Glissant, Fred Moten, and Saidiya Hartman, who stage, in their work, an uncanny concurrence of beauty and pain. Poeticity enables them to say the unsayable and condition new modes of resistance and existence. As Erin Manning puts forward, Hartman had to deal with “the unspeakable violences of colonialism” (Manning 2019: 8). Hartman says, “How does one write about history that is the encounter with nothing, or write about a past that has been obliterated so that even traces aren’t left?” (Hartman 2008: 4). Manning describes Hartman’s gesture, in *Lose Your Mother*, which answers this question:

to fashion modes of encounter, through writing, that restage the conditions of experience from the perspective of a future-presenting. Instead of working from an academic distance only with the archives of colonialism, Hartman chooses to write history into existence. Moving away from the work of academic critique, she opts for a poetics toward “a revolutionary imagination that wants to discover, institute, initiate a new way of telling” (Hartman 2008: 6). Instead of being the mediator of the narrative of history, she writes from the fabulating middle, discovering a voice that is both hers and not hers in the writing. (Manning 2019: 8)

This “encounter with nothing” or writing about an obliterated past is activated by poeticity. Speaking the unspeakable of the social, the problem-Idea of society, is inherently poetical and spurred by poeticization.

Hence, in Deleuze's metaphysics, the Ideas of biology, art, language, and society must be dramatized-poeticized to enact the actualization of the biological, artistic, linguistic, and social fields. And, as every being, for Deleuze, expresses or thinks the Idea, there must be a dramatizer-poet of the Idea-world in beings. What is at play in the artistic experience is embedded in the fabric of the real. Every being expresses an Idea by virtue of a poetry or theatre. There is a dramatizer or poet in every being, the poet of the Idea-world. Deleuze famously said that every eye is a solution to the problem of light; now we might add, every eye is the *poetical theatre* or the *theatrical poetry* of light. As Édouard Glissant splendidly observed, in *Poetics of Relation*:

The world's poetic force (its energy), kept alive within us, fastens itself by fleeting, delicate shivers, onto the rambling prescience of poetry in the depths of our being.
(Glissant 1997: 159)

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Abbreviations

D *Dialogues* (Deleuze and Parnet 1987)
DI *Desert Islands* (Deleuze 2004)
DR *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze 1994)
ECC *Essays Critical and Clinical* (Deleuze 1997) SL *The Space of Literature* (Blanchot 1982);
EL, *L'Espace littéraire*, (Blanchot 1955)
WP *What is Philosophy?* (Deleuze and Guattari 2015)

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Notes

¹ See Smith's discussion of this theme in his introduction to *Essays Critical and Clinical* (ECC: xv).

² Treatment and health must be construed in light of Deleuze's critical position toward the psychoanalytical accounts of the artworks, either as a disclosure of "the unresolved conflict of childhood," or a "progressive" instance of "sublimation" (ECC: xvii–xviii). See Smith's elaboration of Deleuze's criticism of this "symptomatological" approach to literature in his preface to *Essays Critical and Clinical* (ECC: xviii). Also, see the second chapter of Ann Sauvagnargues' *Deleuze and Art* (Sauvagnargues 2013: 23–36).

³ Bergman says in an interview: "I'm very afraid of most of things that exist in this world, and especially I was very afraid of death. And, then I . . . wrote this *Seventh Seal*. . . . after that picture, of course, I still think very much about death, but after that picture, it's not an obsession anymore. . . . So, the picture was a good medicine." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLVLKQ8Nh_A

⁴ See Lawlor's footnote and his reference to *A Thousand Plateaus* (ATP: 272; Lawlor 2008: 185)

⁵ See Lawlor, "The Categorical Impertative and Not Being Unworthy of the Event," wherein he extracts an ethics from *Difference and Repetition* drawing on Deleuze's ethics of intensive quantities, his "not being unworthy of the event," and the empty form of time (Lawlor 2020).

⁶ Deleuze writes: "This is a strange theatre comprised of pure determinations, agitating time and space, directly affecting the soul, whose actors are larva—Artaud's name for this theatre was 'cruelty'" (DI: 98).

⁷ In *Neofinalism*, Ruyer holds that the brain is the only organ that remains embryonic, or retains its *equipotentiality*, even after its complete development. Here, Deleuze notes that the subject also enjoys such an equipotentiality and, consequently, turns into larvae when it meets the Idea.

⁸ This might be linked to Blanchot's discussion of the gaze of Orpheus, a gaze at an opaque night.

⁹ Deleuze sometimes employs "nightmare" alongside "dream" (DI: 99).