Dancing with Clio: History, Cultural Studies, Foucault, Phenomenology, and the Emergence of Dance Studies as a Disciplinary Practice

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This chapter is particularly concerned with the status of history, dance history especially, within Dance Studies. ‘History’ to quote dance scholar Janet O’Shea, ‘like dance analysis, offered Dance Studies a tangible object for interpretation and thus served as a means to validate an otherwise ephemeral art’ (O’Shea 2010: 11). O’Shea, then, understands history as functioning as epistemological support. Dance history aided the emergence of dance as a disciplinary subject, at an early, critical stage in its development. Yet what has befallen the more recent status of history within Dance Studies, now that Dance Studies is better established, relatively speaking, within the academy? Having been strategically co-opted in this way; to shore up dance in its infancy as a legitimate subject worthy of study and research, is dance history’s own future as secure? What, then, becomes of (dance) history? If history is not actually discarded, is it at least demoted? Indeed, is history, having fulfilled its purpose in enabling the disciplinary plant to take root, so much scaffolding waiting to be dismantled? The University of California/Riverside Dance Doctoral Programme, founded in 1993, previously awarded PhDs in Dance History and Theory. It now confers PhDs in Critical Dance Studies. Following their relatively recent merger in 2017, the Society for Dance History Scholars (SDHS) and Council on Research in Dance (CORD), the two main, USA-based research or learned societies for dance, operate under the umbrella title of the Dance Studies Association (DSA), with the previous historical designation similarly discarded. The new title, in closely echoing that of the Cultural Studies Association (CSA) established in the USA in 2008, might also be said to point, neatly, to Dance Studies’ methodological indebtedness to, and alliance with, Cultural Studies. This recent excision of history from key Dance Studies nomenclature might indicate the demotion of history by Dance Studies, as does the somewhat beleaguered status of dance history within British HE, as described by dance historian Alexandra Carter (see Carter 2007).

Some of this apparent antipathy towards history might reasonably be ascribed to the oedipal desire of the younger discipline to extinguish or retire its disciplinary parent in the ways implied by the changes in
nomenclature described above. Yet if Dance Studies does indeed betray an anti-historical bias, what additional underlying disciplinary rationale(s), beyond this oedipal impulse, might have triggered this antipathy towards history? Three factors will be identified and proposed as having particular significance in this connection, imbuing this chapter with a tri-partite structure. The first concerns the already noted strong imprint of Cultural Studies on Dance Studies and the possible bearing of this imprint on dance history’s status within Dance Studies. For the particular manner in which Dance Studies has construed Cultural Studies may, this chapter will suggest, have impacted upon dance history’s standing within communities of dance scholarship. The second factor has to do with the implications, for dance history, of a particular critique based in a branch of dance scholarship, that perceives phenomenology, which it deems a good fit for dance inquiry, as inherently antithetical to history. In particular, this critique takes the work of philosopher Michel Foucault – which it identifies closely with, and as, historical practice – as incompatible with dance enquiry. Incompatibility is staked on the twin grounds of Foucault’s break with, and supposed resulting and enduring antipathy towards, phenomenology; and his perceived embrace of history which is, itself, also understood to result from such a break. In effect, then, this critique questions the very suitability, for dance research, of approaches based in history-focused inquiry. The ability to call this critique into question, in the ways that the present discussion, in seeking to rehabilitate Foucault, and so history, needs to demonstrate, constitutes the third factor. This final factor makes two particular, further demands of this chapter. Namely that the interrelated questions of Foucault, phenomenology, and dance; and of the position which phenomenology has itself adopted in relation to history, be re-visited and re-evaluated to the extent that space reasonably allows. Fortunately, these interrelated questions are ones which have – relatively recently – preoccupied scholarship on Foucault, and on phenomenology, respectively. This preoccupation may in and of itself be one possible indicator that there is indeed more at stake, and so to consider, regarding both questions, than the lines drawn by the aforementioned critique might suggest. Attention turns first, however, to the long-standing and enduring identification of Dance Studies with Cultural Studies. It is with the already commented upon and potentially quite far-reaching implications – for the status of (dance) history as part of dance-based research – of Dance Studies’ indebtedness to Cultural Studies, that this chapter begins its analysis.
The Trouble with History for Dance Studies
i): Cultural Studies/Dance Studies and History

Dance historian and critic Gay Morris, as part of her nuanced and considered investigation into the ‘greater alliance between dance scholarship and Cultural Studies’, draws what she perceives as the critical distinction in Dance Studies between Cultural Studies-inflected dance scholarship and the rest: ‘Although [writes Morris] there are a number of researchers within the dance field who continue to employ old models, reflecting the spectrum of work that exists in all fields, the most influential research incorporates elements that cultural studies pioneered.’ (Morris 2009: 82; 93). This methodological weighting of Dance Studies heavily in favour of Cultural Studies begs an ancillary question, concerning the implications of privileging Cultural Studies like this. To put it another way, is building the foundations of Dance Studies on any one disciplinary support potentially almost as problematic as hanging on to tired and outmoded orthodoxies; as ‘continu[ing to] employ old models’, to quote Morris? And is the adoption of the stance which Morris describes especially misguided, running, as it does, counter to Cultural Studies’ own avowed and in part, Gramsci-inspired, project to dismantle hegemonic positions? In other words, is there not an inescapable tension; an ironic contradiction even, between the very *methodological plurality* advocated by Cultural Studies and Dance Studies’ own tight-hold embrace of Cultural Studies? As Morris points out, ‘cultural studies was initially meant as a political and social intervention that purposefully avoided creating theories of its own’ (Morris 2009: 82). This resulted in Cultural Studies, in comparison with other academic fields, being ‘[markedly] less concerned with disciplinary identity’ (LaCapra 2004: 117). Viewed in this light, does not Dance Studies, by virtue of its strong identification with Cultural Studies as a singular methodological lodestar to be prioritised above all others, in the way Morris describes, actually start to move out of kilter with Cultural Studies? For, in its very privileging of Cultural Studies, Dance Studies seems unaware of Cultural Studies’ own purposeful dismantling of inter- and intra-disciplinary hierarchies and deliberate disregard for its own claims to disciplinary status. The point here is certainly not to deride Cultural Studies: the significance of its legacy for Dance Studies is hard to over-estimate bringing, as it does, ‘dance into contact with other fields that have intersected with literary studies for some time, particularly gender and women’s studies, but also American studies, film studies, African American studies, and ethnic studies’ (Goellner and Shea Murphy 1995: 3).

Yet this prioritising of Cultural Studies, as the *singular* methodological
driver of Dance Studies, to be privileged above all other disciplinary tools, not only seems insufficiently attentive to Cultural Studies’ foundational scepticism where hegemonies and disciplinarity are concerned. It also arguably betrays some of the same and, so it would seem, enduring anxiety felt on behalf of dance, over its institutional status and need to shore up its disciplinary credentials, with which this chapter began. For according to cultural historian and theorist Dominick LaCapra:

A sign of excessive professionalization of a discipline is the unwillingness to take seriously and try to come to terms with the views of commentators or critics not within one’s own guild, and such a tendency may mark both epistemologically conservative scholars and those who take themselves to be radical or avant-garde. (LaCapra 2004: 79).

Issues concerning the governing orthodoxies that have come to mark Dance Studies are significant and deserving of scrutiny because, as Eniko Jakab and Jasmina Lukic note in their 2005 comparative study of disciplinization in European universities, ‘processes of disciplinization are directly related to issues of power in academia’ (Jakab and Lukic 2005: 5). To put it another way, as gender studies theorists Gabriele Griffin et al observe, ‘in order to be rewarded it is best to work within the canon of the given discipline’ (Griffin et al. quoted in Jakab and Lukic 2005: 9). Griffin et al. have the UK national and universities-focused research assessment framework expressly in mind. But beyond the immediate career prospects of individual researchers, or rankings – in terms of relative research status, with consequences for research funding – of particular university departments, the consequences of establishing new disciplinary hegemonies, however inadvertently or unintentionally, have far-reaching implications. For at what point does the intellectual bifurcation of a discipline – in this case, Dance Studies – into what are, in effect, new orthodoxies and ‘the rest’, in the way Morris describes, stand in the way of its very maturation and so, paradoxically, itself become an obstacle to innovation in dance-based research? Much therefore is at stake for Dance Studies, in the consigning of (dance) history as an outlier of its disciplinary canon. Consequently, it is worth investigating – historicising, if you will – the circumstances underlying the allocation of this status to history by Dance Studies, in the ways in which this chapter proposes.

One dividend of this weddedness of Dance Studies to Cultural Studies has been a willingness to question and reject conservative historical practices; to problematise history as disciplinarily moribund. Cultural Studies imparted to Dance Studies – at least in its Anglo-American configuration – a healthy scepticism about history as master discourse. To quote cultural theorist Stuart Hall, ‘histories and touchstones of the
national culture, transmitted to a select number of people [...] in their keeping, the keeping of a particular literary [or other] elite’ (Hall 1990: 13; 14). Cultural Studies, therefore, arguably offered Dance Studies an escape from some of the limitations of history as practised more conventionally. English scholar Amy Koritz’s comments of 1996, expressing a sense of frustration over the perceived limitations of paradigms which she regards as, at that stage, dominant in dance history, would seem to indicate this:

Dance historians of all persuasions would benefit from an ability to understand and to position themselves in relation to the larger intellectual communities of scholarship in the arts and humanities, and for this reason alone it is important to think through the possible relationship of dance history to cultural studies (Koritz 1996: 79).

Art historian Norman Bryson understands the aforementioned California/Riverside ‘Choreographing History’ conference of 1992 (see endnote 1), which he attended, as potentially having served such a role, for it ‘reconnect[ed] that beleaguered underground [of dance historians] with those lucky enough to be working in fields better established in terms of grants, jobs, journals, and university recognition.’ (Bryson 1997: 57). It seems Bryson especially had in mind the exposure which the conference enabled to ‘colleagues in comparative literature or art history’, given that dance historians were ‘surreptitiously absorbing the same intellectual influences that were having such an impact’ on these fields (Bryson 1997: 57).

But this chapter intervenes to ask whether Dance Studies has too often been overly hasty and unnecessarily harsh in its condemnation of history? Has dance (as) history therefore paid too high a price for Cultural Studies’ instrumentality in the genesis of Dance Studies? Has a guilty by association argument too often led to the confusion or equation of history-as-master-narrative with history more generally, and so to Dance Studies’ rejection of, or at least scepticism towards, historical method, per se, as contaminated and altogether too compromised? Or, more prosaically but equally damagingly, has history come to be regarded by Dance Studies as outmoded and so with relatively little to offer to a comparatively young discipline?

One way to begin addressing these questions might be by directing attention to the seriousness with which Cultural Studies has itself taken history, as a way of encouraging Dance Studies to follow Cultural Studies’ lead in taking history seriously. In other words, if Dance Studies’ relegation of history is actually a misreading of Cultural Studies’ own position vis-à-vis history, it would follow that the responsibility for this relegation lies with Dance Studies rather than Cultural Studies. As Morris points
out, Richard Hoggart; Raymond Williams; and E.P. Thompson, as key foundational thinkers for Cultural Studies, advocated historical method. Morris stresses ‘[how] [f]or Hoggart […] specificity of time and place became other important elements for cultural studies’; ‘[how] Thompson stressed what would become important concepts in Cultural Studies. These included historical and geographical specificity.’ (Morris 2009: 85; 86). This is even if E.P. Thompson would eventually break with Cultural Studies. Might the responsibility for Dance Studies’ misinterpretation, and at least partial dismissal, of history therefore lie with Dance Studies’ misconstrual of Cultural Studies; in Dance Studies’ misreading – as overly hostile – of Cultural Studies’ relationship with history? There are enough salient indicators, pointing to the worth, or – to use a Cultural Studies term – cultural value, actually vested in history by Cultural Studies, to suggest that this may indeed be the case. The position which Hall himself adopted in relation to history, as set out in his own writing, might indicate this. Hall’s critical role in the establishment of Cultural Studies as a vibrant strand of British intellectual and artistic life makes his own stated position in relation to history a doubly good place to start, in this regard.

Redeeming History for Dance Studies

i) Hall and History

Although Hall was at pains to point out that he was not a historian, he was quick to identify with historical projects: ‘Not being a historian I was not directly involved in the founding of History Workshop Journal, but remained engaged with its wider project – including the recovery of neglected, hidden and subaltern histories’, Hall wrote in the 2006 edition of that journal, as part of an article in which he also described his ‘approach’ as ‘historical’ (Hall 2006: 1-2; 3). ‘Or since I have already confessed to not being a historian, I had better settle for “genealogical”. I want to begin to construct an outline “genealogy” of the post-war Black British diaspora arts’, Hall proposed in the Raphael Samuel Memorial Lecture which he gave in 2004 (Hall 2006: 3). According to Hallian cultural theorist Angela McRobbie, this lecture, subsequently published in History Workshop Journal, was one of Hall’s ‘most succinct accounts of his engagement with black and Asian British artists’ (McRobbie Ms. undated with npn but: 14). In this article Hall ‘offers a wider and more historical account’ of what McRobbie terms the ‘conditions of emergence’ for those Black British diaspora artists whom Hall considers (McRobbie Ms undated with npn but: 14). For all of Hall’s modesty where thinking historically is concerned, his lecture/article conceives of its subjects in terms that are very much attuned to history: ‘Cultural identities come
from somewhere, have histories’, wrote Hall, at the start of an extended quotation from ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, his earlier, seminal essay. ‘Like everything which is historical’ continues Hall:

they [identities] undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in a mere ‘recovery’ of the past which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, would secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned and position ourselves within the narratives of the past. (Hall 2006: 19).

The seriousness with which Hall takes history in this quotation – one that will be returned to later – is in keeping with the artists whose genealogy his lecture and article set out to map; (film) artists such as John Akomfah and Isaac Julien who would themselves in turn seek to engage historically with Hall’s legacy. In what McRobbie, following Hall, terms the ‘third space of black cultural production’:

Akomfrah and Julien, echoing Stuart’s own pedagogic style, announced a presence which was other than modernity, staking a distance from the avant-garde while also refusing the playful shiny surfaces of the postmodern. History here was reduced neither to pastiche nor to ‘costume drama’, instead it was urgently disputatious, a matter of non-chronological questions about temporality, confronting what Bhabha called the ‘time lag’ of modernity. With original footage Isaac Julien had Langston Hughes dance forward with his poetry-rap of the Harlem Renaissance interrupting the slower and carefully composed images of black gay desire as played out in the spaces of contemporary club scenes (McRobbie Ms undated with npn, but: 11-12).

Akomfrah, a co-founder of the Black Audio Film Collective, a ‘cinecultural collective project’ (Korossi, in Fisher et al., nd but 2013/2014: 7), produces work that is highly invested in the archive and what Akomfrah terms the ‘ballast of [the] historical’ (Akomfrah, 2015: n.p.). Akomfrah’s The Stuart Hall Project (2013), a ninety-minute film which uses material drawn from over 800 hours of archival footage to document the life and work of Stuart Hall, and its companion piece, the shorter, three-screen gallery installation The Unfinished Conversation (2014), are cases in point. ‘Even though it runs for twice the length, The Stuart Hall Project must be seen as a contraction of Akomfrah’s astonishing installation’ writes cultural theorist Mark Fisher of The Unfinished Conversation (Fisher in Fisher et al., nd but 2013/2014: 1). This triple-screen installation, displayed over an extended period at the Tanks, the space given over to
live art, performance, film and video at London’s Tate Modern, where it was viewed by the present writer, is set to a bricolage score of Miles Davis standards. According to Fisher, the music provides ‘a parallel narrative – a different, yet intersecting route through the same historical period that the film tracks’ (Fisher in Fisher et al., nd but 2013/2014: 3). Akomfrah describes how his installation triptych is based on Hall’s ‘writings about identity, formed as an intersection with history’ and Africana and feminist scholar Tina Campt similarly identifies historicism as the denominator Akomfrah shares with Hall. Speaking at MoMA in New York, as part of a panel on Hall to mark the display of The Unfinished Conversation, included in a MoMA exhibition devoted to Akomfrah’s work in 2017, Campt had a particular quote from Hall especially in mind, in this regard. ‘In a lot of ways it’s what I think of as the bookend, or spine, between The Stuart Hall Project and The Unfinished Conversation’, Campt commented, by way of introducing the same extended passage from Hall’s ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’ essay, quoted by Hall in his History Workshop Journal article, and already reproduced above (Campt speaking as part of Akomfrah et al 2017). In reading this quotation aloud, Campt placed special vocal emphasis on ‘history’, separating it from the words that immediately follow. This stress on history is borne out by Akomfrah’s close identification with what, for him, is Hall’s same ‘insistence on the historical; on questions of temporality; his foregrounding of temporality, of time, and the registrations of time’. ‘I want to hang on to his [Hall’s] understandings of the ways in which moments in the now are shaped by vectors and events from elsewhere, basically from the past’, Akomfrah stressed (Akomfrah in conversation with Cameron Bailey in Akomfrah et al. 2017). At the time of writing, three London gallery/museum spaces feature Akomfrah works that attest to his enduring historicism. These include Mimesis: African Soldier (2018), an Imperial War Museum-housed ‘three-screen installation’ commissioned for the World War One centenary. Termed ‘vintage Akomfrah’, Mimesis fuses ‘highly wrought historical documentary and cryptic evocations of lived experience, using actors (always silent), archive film and photographs, ethnographic sound recordings, new filmed material...’ (Harding 2018: 19).

Cultural Studies’ commitment to history, so palpable, then, both in Hall’s writing and in the historicism he seeded in those who follow him – artists and scholars alike – is in marked contrast to Dance Studies’ relative antipathy towards history. And so it would seem that this enduring disregard, where history is concerned, is in spite – and not because – of Dance Studies’ emergence as a disciplinary child of Cultural Studies. Commenting over a decade ago now, Carter, for instance, lamented how:
[f]or many [dance] students entering higher education, therefore, ‘dance history’ is an alien field of knowledge and, compared with practice-based work, it is not initially an enticing one. To compound this situation, university curricula are increasingly prescribed, pressurised and packaged, to the extent that dance history as a core or compulsory module might seem to be something of a luxury.

And even when wholly written [BA] theses are submitted they tend not to be on history per se. Furthermore [...], even accepting the difficulties of getting any dance book published, British [dance] scholars are not producing [dance] history books (Carter 2007: 123; 124).

And writing a decade after Carter, fellow British dance historian Michael Huxley describes an unchanged climate where publishing is concerned: ‘A few accounts detail modern [early to mid-twentieth-century] dance as a transatlantic phenomenon and there are very few that consider the modern dance in the United Kingdom. Much of the literature is focused on individual artists [...]’ (Huxley 2015: 43, note 4).

How else, then, to account for the relative antipathy towards history that seems regularly to characterise Dance Studies? What other factors could help explain this attitude, beyond a disciplinary inattentiveness, on the part of Dance Studies, to the seriousness with which Cultural Studies takes history, that has been the focus of discussion so far? One such additional factor to consider might be the critique, based in a certain reading of phenomenology in relation to dance and its study, that questions the very suitability of history-driven analysis for dance inquiry. It is to this critique that attention now turns. Stuart Hall’s conceptualisation of how identities are constituted, given its apparent acknowledgement of Foucault, arcs neatly to consideration of this critique. For nominating Foucault as a scholar whose work it considers as synonymous with historical practice, this critique understands Foucault’s historicist disposition as resulting directly from what it construes as his break from, and subsequent enduring antipathy towards, phenomenology. If Hall’s ‘[self-]confess[ed]... genealogical [method]’ acknowledges Foucault, Hall’s conceptualisation of identities formed under the effects of history, again demonstrates an indebtedness to Foucauldian histories: identities, in Hall’s understanding, are ‘far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous play of history, culture, and power’, just as Foucault’s genealogies were conceived with the intention, to quote philosopher Pascal Michon, of ‘showing the historical construction of what we take for [or, to be] natural and transcendental’ (Michon 2002: 175). And if Hall’s genealogies borrow from Foucault, Foucault neatly echoed Hall’s
‘confess[jion] to not being a historian’, declaring of himself ‘I’m not a professional historian; [but] nobody is perfect.’ (Foucault quoted in Megill 1987: 117). This last comment, in keeping with Foucault’s attempt ‘in his histories (as well as in his less easily labelled historical works) to break with the conventions of the discipline, to push out its boundaries’ (O’Brien 1989: 32), is something that will be returned to later.

The Trouble with History for Dance Studies

ii): Phenomenology, Foucault, Dance, and History

One such phenomenological approach to ‘dance inquiry’ is presented by dance anthropologist Sally Ann Ness in her critique of the work of Michel Foucault (Ness 2011: 22). In Ness’s estimation it is ‘Foucault’s anti-phenomenological turn’ that has such a ‘distort[ing]’ effect on and for ‘the analysis of dance’ (Ness 2011: 23). And for Ness, history is always implicated in Foucault’s perceived turn away from phenomenology: ‘Foucault’s own rejection of the subject of phenomenology hinges on that subject’s inappropriateness for analysis of scientific discourse that is historical in orientation – his own particular research interest’, Ness maintains (Ness 2011: 23). Here, blame is quite explicitly laid at history’s feet: Ness asks:

[w]hat are the consequences of giving unqualified priority to forms of analysis that foreground historical phenomena and historical processes in the intellectual study of dance? To follow Foucault away from phenomenology [...] is to posit that the historical aspects of dance and choreography are the key to critical insight. The disciplinary alignment privileges absolutely an historical perspective [...] (Ness 2011: 23).

In Ness’s assessment, ‘the importance of this historical orientation cannot be overstated in terms of its influence on Foucault’s theoretical approach [...] Foucault’s approach is historical in its basic character giving priority to relationships between the past and present’ (Ness 2011: 23). ‘To follow Foucault’s lead’ then is, according to Ness:

[a] to forego analyses that would give priority to the identification of that which is definitively emergent or categorically ahistorical in choreographic performance. It would preempt analyses that seek to orient to the immanent and the manifesting, as well as the virtual relations of dance [...]. In sum, the replacement of a phenomenological with a thoroughly historicized subjectivity forecloses inquiry into the more radically creative, emergent (and even liberatory and agentive) forms of danced existence and intelligence (Ness 2011: 23).
Quoting philosopher Todd May, Ness regards Foucault’s work as always “defin[ing] itself against phenomenology” (May, ‘Foucault’s Relation to Phenomenology’, quoted by Ness 2011: 20; italics are May’s). Given its substantive bearing on perceptions of Foucault as a problematic thinker where dance is concerned, it is the characterisation offered by Ness, of Foucault as persistently anti-phenomenological, which this chapter sets out to question and at least in part reverse. To the extent that space allows, phenomenology’s dense web of relationships with history will be returned to later. This will be with a view to testing the hypothesis that phenomenological and historical approaches are necessarily incommensurate with one another, in the ways that Ness seems to imply. First though it is helpful to pause to consider whether Foucault’s antipathy towards phenomenology was indeed as absolute as Ness’s assessment would suggest.

It may well be that in building the case for Foucault’s inattentiveness to the agency of the body, there has been a tendency towards over-valuing certain of Foucault’s texts such as Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. This reliance is something which Ness, who notes this text as ‘the [Foucault] work that is among the most often cited in dance analysis’, herself stresses (Ness 2011: 25). Ness frequently cites this text in her article, using its original French title, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison. (Ness 2011: 25; see for example 19; 26). As Ness also points out, ‘[i]ndeed, the very mention of the term “discipline” in current dance scholarship (and many related fields as well) more or less automatically makes reference to Foucault’s genealogical study of incarceration, Surveiller et punir [...]’ (Ness 2011: 19). And yet ‘discipline’ as a term of reference, may misrepresent, quite fundamentally, Foucault’s text. According to Foucault specialist Stuart Elden, ‘Surveiller et punir does not translate as “discipline and punish”. Survey and Punish would be a closer title of the book.’ (Elden 2014). “Survey” [...] is [...] an attempt to render “Surveiller”, whereas “Discipline” avoids it entirely’ continues Elden, in a research blog entry arguing for a new translation of this key Foucault text (Elden 2014). Other Foucault scholars responded in support and with offers of other titles, Stephanie Martens suggesting “[To] Watch and [to] punish”. Significantly, Martens’ alternative title is more Existentialist given that – as she points out – it captures “veiller sur” (watching and caring both being part, in complex ways, of “surveiller”).’ (Martens’ post on Elden 2014). And Elden considers that mis-, or at least partial, representation of Foucault’s original text extends to other aspects of ‘the English version [which] only includes some of the images from the French. [...]. Tellingly, the English edition tends to have the ones most directly related to the prison, whereas the French edition, and of course
the text itself, brings in a much wider range of examples’ (Elden 2014).

In texts such as *Discipline and Punish* Foucault’s ‘canvas [was] thick with bodies – bodies in hospitals, in clinics, in asylums, and in prisons’ (O’Brien 1989: 35). And as Ness observes, in works such as these, Foucault is generally understood, including by Dance Studies, to have constructed the body as subjugated and subject to surveillance. In other, typically later, texts however, Foucault conceives of the body in markedly different, decidedly less passive, terms. In beginning to assess whether it is still tenable to read Foucault as entirely or irrevocably anti-phenomenological in light of these later texts, it may be helpful to take into account the time at which Ness was writing. *The Courage of the Truth*, for instance, as the last series of Collège de France lectures Foucault delivered before his death, was only published in English translation in 2011, the year in which Ness’s article was also published. The original, French-language version of *The Courage of the Truth*, which had appeared in 2005, forms a constituent part of ‘the publication of Foucault’s lectures on *parrhésia* – roughly, frank speech that puts the speaker at considerable risk’ (Hull 2018: 251). As such, according to philosopher Gordon Hull, ‘it invites a general reassessment of his late work.’ (Hull 2018: 251). In fact, Ness tends to focus on what she terms ‘the “early Foucault’s lead”’, that is, on ‘the relatively early Foucault texts that have been most at issue for dance theory’ (Ness 2011: 20; note 4, 29). May, on whose work Ness draws, similarly focuses his consideration of Foucault and phenomenology around early Foucault works (May 2005). Hitherto unpublished Foucault texts however, some landmark ones among them, continue to be made available posthumously, three plus decades after Foucault’s death. Volume IV of *The History of Sexuality*, for instance, was only published in French as recently as 2018, as this chapter was being written. Moreover, the Foucault publishing enterprise is projected to continue well into the foreseeable future. It is not inconceivable that Dance (Studies) may want to turn to at least some of this enterprise. This would particularly be the case if Foucault’s anti-phenomenological stance can be brought into question, and consequently some of the supposed stigma surrounding Foucault, for dance, be removed.

The agency clearly ceded to the body in the late Foucault of *The Courage of the Truth*, as a capable – indeed invaluable – vessel for the practice of radical. Cynic philosophy, might serve to encourage dance scholars to return to, and re-evaluate, the historical – that is historian – Foucault. For Cynicism, in Foucault’s understanding and extended analysis – he offers in effect a history of Cynicism in Hellenistic Greece and ancient Rome – relies upon a highly motile and ambulatory, agental rather than subjugated, notion of embodiment, one which at times also calls to mind
a theatricalised body. This is something Foucault repeatedly stresses, placing emphasis, for instance, on the ‘Cynic’s body and comportment’; on how it is the job of the Cynic ‘to prove with the qualities of his [or her] body’ (Foucault 2011: 310); on Cynicism as less ‘a doctrine’ and much more ‘an attitude, a way of being’ (Foucault 2011: 178). It is therefore hard to square the agency ceded to embodiment in lecture series such as The Courage of the Truth, with Ness’s assertion that the corporeal is ‘in general’, for Foucault, ‘a kind of prison’ (Ness 2011: 26). Indeed, according to philosopher Richard Shusterman, the same Foucault who:

showed how ‘docile bodies’ were systematically yet subtly, secretly shaped by seemingly innocent body disciplines and regimes of biopower so as to advance oppressive socio-political agendas and institutions, emerges also as the pragmatic methodologist proposing alternative body practices to overcome the repressive ideologies covertly entrenched in our docile bodies (Shusterman 2008: 29).

This is to the extent that Foucault, in Shusterman’s estimation, practices a variant of ‘somaesthetics’. In fact, for Shusterman, somaesthetics, as a ‘discipline’ which ‘puts the body’s experience and artful refashioning back into the heart of philosophy as an art of living’, was even ‘inspired by Foucault’s embodied vision of care for the self’ (Shusterman 2008: 15; 23). ‘Somaesthetics, as I conceive it, has three fundamental branches, all powerfully present in Foucault’, writes Shusterman, for whom ‘his [Foucault’s] somaesthetics confronts us (even affronts us) with the crucial issue: conceived as an art of living, philosophy should attend more closely to cultivating the sentient body through which we live’ (Shusterman 2008: 23; 48).

Understood in this way, Foucault’s investment in the attitudinal potential of embodiment modifies Ness’s assertions that, following his early break with phenomenology, ‘the primacy of experienced, embodied but object oriented, transcendental consciousness was replaced by the primacy of historicised conceptuality’; and that Foucault was ‘never to return to either the mainstreams or the margins of phenomenological investigation’ (Ness 2011: 25; 20). Furthermore, the central responsibility of the Cynic is, according to Foucault, ‘the staging [through his or her body] of life under the real gaze of others ... of the greatest possible number of others’ (Foucault 2011: 253). As such, the Cynic’s principal concern is with ‘a dramatization of the principle of life [...] this dramatization of the principle of independence in the form of life itself, of physical, material life [...]’ (Foucault 2011: 256). This is to the extent that the Cynic, for Foucault, ‘is the very being of the true, rendered visible through the body’ (Foucault 2011: 310). As, in effect, close synonyms for the act of dancing
itself, the small sample, offered here, of Foucault’s many observations on Cynicism, might bring into question; or be brought into useful dialogue with, Foucault’s supposed antipathy to dance and its close cognates. According to Ness:

Foucaultian conceptualist perspective implies that dance enquiry can and indeed must depart from its dancing subjects, its living, experiencing corporeal beings, in order to maintain an intellectual relation to them. It must deny recognition of non-enunciative, embodied, intelligently performative presence in order to pursue interpretive analytics (Ness 2011: 25; italics are Ness’s).

Nor is Ness alone, among dance scholars, in characterising Foucault in this way. The positions adopted by dance philosopher Jonathan Owen Clark and dance historian Mark Franko, respectively, both writing in 2011, are illuminating in this respect. According to Clark, bringing a Foucauldian lens to dance analysis results in the notion of an anonymized ‘subject of the anunciated,’ – the third-person entity subjected to the manipulation of anti-humanistic and autonomous socio-symbolic structures and ideologies beyond its control and/or the human reduced to the dispassionate object of rational scientific study (as in Althusser, Foucault, Lacan, etc.). (Clark 2011: 52).

Franko adopts a somewhat more equivocal stance in relation to the range of possible legacies of Foucault’s thinking for dance inquiry. On the one hand, Franko, writing in the year in which Ness’s article, for which he served as editor, also appeared, subscribes to Ness’s position where the mature Foucault’s stance vis-à-vis phenomenology is concerned: ‘It becomes clear in The Archaeology of Knowledge that the thesis of historical discontinuity and the critique of the historical document as a repository of unified intention is also an anti-phenomenological critique of the unified subject (Ness, 2011).’ (Franko 2011: 101). Yet on the other hand, Franko seems at the same time sympathetic to the position adopted by this present chapter, concerning a perceived over-emphasis, in the dance-based reception of Foucault, on the notion of the Foucauldian body as a subjugated surface to be written upon. In this regard Franko makes a point very similar to the one argued for in the present text, in suggesting that:

[s]ince Discipline and Punish, when the body and power became Foucault’s central focuses, thinking on Foucault and the body has centered perhaps excessively on issues of inscription [...]. This idea of writing on the body’s surface in order to engender a style of movement and of being has tended to dominate the way we read Foucault on embodiment – the problem of discipline and agency. (Franko 2011: 101).
Franko suggests that ‘Foucault’s discussion of art may offer an alternative to inscription as the only possible relation of the body to knowledge’ (Franko 2011: 103). Foucault researcher and classicist Richard Alston agrees. According to Alston, Foucault, in ‘What is Enlightenment?’, ‘offered a seemingly more positive position on agency in modernity [...] Foucault points to the “asceticism of the dandy who makes of his body, his behaviour, his feelings and passions his very existence, a work of art”’. (Alston 2017: 98). Franko has ‘Le corps utopique’ specifically in mind; a radio talk broadcast by France Culture in 1966, in which ‘Foucault described some dynamic aspects of corporeality in phenomenological terms’ (Franko 2011: 103). Franko points out how, in this interview, Foucault’s oral rather than written performance suggests the influence of both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. It is also the only text in which Foucault comments (if only once) directly on dance. ‘Le corps utopique’ explores alternative scenarios of the personal experience of bodyliness. The entire talk is, in fact, a meditation on the body as a medium of movement in relation to desire as a transcendence of place (lieu) to which our bodies condemn us. (Franko 2011: 103).

Franko, then, is clearly alert to the phenomenological orientation of Foucault’s thinking on embodiment. But occurring in 1966, the radio interview which serves as Franko’s source in this regard concerns the early Foucault. What cannot be as fully gleaned, therefore – at least from Franko’s 2011 article, alone – is the extent to which Franko is willing to understand Foucault’s predisposition towards phenomenology as extending into; enduring in, the later work of Foucault, and so postdating Foucault’s early, and supposedly complete, break with phenomenology.

If it is initially difficult to reconcile Franko’s characterisation of Foucault’s relation to the body, here, as phenomenological, with Ness’s assertion that the corporeal is ‘in general’, for Foucault, ‘a kind of prison’ (Ness 2011: 25), this divergence between Franko and Ness’s opinions can arguably be accounted for by the different – early and mature – phases in Foucault’s intellectual development which their comments respectively relate to. Yet in the case of the divergence between what Ness terms ‘the shadow cast’ on embodiment by ‘Foucault’s turn to conceptualism’ (Ness 2011: 25), on the one hand, and, on the other, the agency which Foucault clearly cedes to embodiment in the lectures published as The Courage of the Truth, the same chronological gulf does not apply. For The Courage of the Truth is the publication of the last Collège de France course of public lectures which Foucault gave before his death in 1984. These lectures therefore postdate, considerably, Foucault’s ‘turn to conceptualism’. As a
broad historical account of Cynic philosophy as a practice in late ancient Greece and Rome, the lectures are representative of Foucault’s late work as a whole. For, according to French philosopher Pascal Michon, the late Foucault is typified by ‘studying the technologies of the self during antiquity [...] the slow drift of lifestyles, which the spreading of Christianity brutally ended around the end of the fourth century AD.’ (Michon 2002: 179).

In Ness’s assessment, embodiment, for Foucault is:

> in and of itself an inherently epistemological reality. It is posited as a primordially unknown condition, a way of being that does not know, yet lives. It is not where the intellectual action is, ontologically speaking, in relation to conceptual processes. In terms of reasonableness, it is the dark place of the self (Ness 2011: 25).

Yet it is hard to square Ness’s account with Foucault’s historical study of Cynic philosophy in *The Courage of the Truth* with its characterisation of the Cynic as the articulation of *parrhēsia* – that is, free-spokenness and the speaking of truth to power – expressly enabled by embodied agency. Alston, in ‘Foucault’s Empire of the Free’, his study of Foucault’s late work engagement with the ‘historical specificity’ of ancient Greece and Rome, agrees: ‘In contrast to Foucault’s earlier work on the social technologies of modernity within institutions, focus on the individual offered a prospect of agency and hence a measure of freedom’ (Alston 2017: 95). ‘Foucault sees the Greek idea of *parresia* as having a close relationship to the Roman concept of *libertas*’ Alston continues, and in *parresia*, ‘Foucault offers us a model not just of individual agency, but of how philosophy can engage politically’ (Alston 2017: 96; 100). Michon does not subscribe to such an unequivocal reading as Ness either and here it is worth turning to an extended quotation from his account of how, in the late Foucault, the body is understood as both historicised and possessive of agency:

> Foucault doesn’t return at the end of his life, as [Béatrice] Han claims through a not always precise reading of his texts, to the classical conscious, reflective and auto-instituted subject. He proposes a real history of subjectivation processes, without postulating a transhistorical subjective entity. He fully historicizes the subject, the body and the truth. But on the other hand, he is far from explaining this history, as Dreyfus and Ijsseling say, as a result of the ‘sending of the being’, of an erratic history of truth in time, which man would only passively receive and of whose actions he would be the result. Foucault certainly proposes to historicize the concept of man, to dissolve any transcendental principle through genealogy
and archaeology, but this doesn’t lead him, in contrast to Heidegger, to abandon the notion of human liberty for the only liberty of the being (Michon 2002: 184).

Foucault’s early, supposedly decisive and irrevocable, break with phenomenology was, also, according to Ness, entirely in keeping with Foucault having ‘proclaimed himself to be a being who loathed spending time and/or energy in “nature”, a realm that apparently included the motile dimensions of his own organism.’ (Ness, including quoting David Macey, 2011: 20). Against this assessment, however, needs to be set the very real importance which the late Foucault, at least, attached to motility and to nature. For in Foucault’s eyes, both were intrinsic features of the Cynic life. As such, in Foucault’s estimation, they had been indispensable in order for Cynic philosophy to thrive (see Hammond 2017: 23-25; 30-31).

In Ness’s estimation, alongside Foucault’s ‘rejection of phenomenology’, no field ‘was potentially more foreign to his own understanding, or more marginal to the development of his critical theory, than dance’; his ‘individual affinity for […] dance was, to put it mildly, minimal’ (Ness 2011: 20; 21). This makes Foucault, for Ness, very much compromised as a thinker to whom dance scholars may wish to turn. In Ness’s evaluation the incompatibility of Foucault and dance rests, to a large extent, on the grounds of Foucault’s supposed complete break with phenomenology. Yet Foucault’s turn to history did not, I have tried to suggest, necessarily entail as absolute a break with phenomenology as Ness seems to envisage. Nor does Ness’s assertion, concerning the extent to which phenomenology and history are incommensurate, necessarily hold. Indeed, The Courage of the Truth begs the question of whether the late Foucault marks a return, in some guise, to the phenomenology of his early career and with which he subsequently and apparently so decisively broke. In other words, Foucauldian analyses and phenomenology may not necessarily be entirely alien to one another, a reading which counters some commonly held assumptions concerning their supposed incompatibility. From the vantage point of this re-assessment might spring manifold implications, both for the standing of the ‘historical’ Foucault within Dance Studies and, consequently, for Foucault’s perceived utility as a scholar relevant to the subject area. For one thing, Foucault might no longer be perceived – in view of his unstinting efforts to track and pursue the implications of the itinerant and therefore incessantly ambulatory Cynic body – as insufficiently attentive to the motility of the body; as having ‘disregarded’ the human body’s ‘inherent motility to a nearly absolute extent’ (Ness 2011: 26). As a consequence, Foucault becomes divested of some of
what Ness terms his ‘anti-phenomenological perspective’ (Ness 2011: 23). In view of the re-assessment of Foucault, especially centred in his last Collège de France lecture series, that is offered here, he might be turned to once again, and with renewed energy and interest, as a thinker with much, methodologically speaking, still to offer to a considered dance analysis.

The interpretation offered above gains added traction from the extent to which the question of Foucault and phenomenology has preoccupied scholars working on Foucault, including in the period preceding Ness’s evaluation of Foucault. As Ness points out, in reading ‘Foucault’s work [... as] “always defin[ing] itself against phenomenology”’, ‘May’s assessment [...] is not without its opponents’ (Ness 2011: 20; note 4, 29), though Ness does not elaborate upon, or specify, these. The notion of ‘Foucault’s [continuing] phenomenological heritage’ (Thompson 2008: 3) does indeed have its detractors, well placed figures such as Foucault scholar and philosopher Colin Koopman among them. Yet as Koopman acknowledges, ‘a growing body of interpretive literature concerning the work of Michel Foucault asserts that Foucault’s critical project is best interpreted in light of various strands of phenomenology’ (Koopman 2010: 100). Interestingly, May features on Koopman’s list of ‘other recent contributors to this interpretation’. This list, which is not reproduced here given its extent, also includes work by Oksala and Thompson on which this chapter draws.10 And although May – like Ness – might view Foucault’s phenomenological period as an early career phenomenon, he considers that Foucault ‘retains what might be called the spirit or motivation behind the phenomenological project’ (May 2005: 285). It is to work on Foucault’s ‘phenomenological project’, particularly its dimensions which pursue Foucault and phenomenology in relation to dance, that attention now turns, as part of this chapter’s unfolding project to rehabilitate Foucault, his investment in history especially, for Dance Studies.

**Redeeming History for Dance Studies**

**ii) Phenomenology, Foucault, Husserl, Dance and History**

In light of *The Courage of the Truth*, it has so far been proposed that assertions concerning the extent to which phenomenology and history are incommensurate do not necessarily hold. In fact, dance philosopher Philipa Rothfield actually proposes *turning* to historicisation as a means of escaping what is, for her, phenomenology’s universalist bind. In Rothfield’s understanding, phenomenological universalism is so troubling given what she terms as ‘an ethical danger that corporeal forms of
difference which occur within networks of domination will be elided; that the desire to achieve universality will blind itself to the discriminations performed in the name of sameness.’ (Rothfield 2010: 306).¹¹ ‘Whilst phenomenology’ – and here Rothfield has ‘Merleau-Ponty’s sense that the world is refracted through our bodily sensibilities’ especially in mind – ‘could simply reassert its universalism, it seems to me [writes Rothfield] that it has the potential to work through difference by approaching lived bodies according to their lived situation’ (Rothfield 2010: 306). In Rothfield’s reformulation of phenomenology, then, history is no longer recognisable as the confining straitjacket which renders the experiencing – that is, phenomenological – body mute; subjugated; and colonised, in the ways that Ness describes. Rather history, in Rothfield’s formulation, becomes instead the very lever through which the body’s experience is particularised, and attended to, in all its individuality. Moreover, in Rothfield’s (re)configuration, phenomenology and history are blended expressly to enable a phenomenologically-based investigation of ethics: ‘The descent of phenomenological discourse into the terrain of social and historical articulations is also its entrance into the ethical and political complications which characterise social life’, writes Rothfield (Rothfield 2010: 306-307). And it is especially significant, for the purposes of this chapter, that in advocating for history like this, Rothfield has Foucault particularly in mind. It therefore makes sense to consider further, if only in outline given the constraints of space, Rothfield’s critique. Pausing in this way, enables the present discussion to demonstrate how, in Rothfield’s estimation, Foucault, and his configuration of history as genealogy in particular, do not stand as obstacles strewn in phenomenology’s path, as they do for Ness. Rather, for Rothfield, genealogy, in releasing phenomenology from the grip of universalism, thereby equips phenomenology with newfound credentials as a conduit for undertaking ethics-based enquiry.

‘What if phenomenology were to relinquish the ideal of universalism, recast the lived body in pluralized terms, and aim instead for a regional series of understandings?’; how might that ‘occur in relation to one field, that of dance[?]’ asks Rothfield (Rothfield 2010: 306). Posing this question leads Rothfield to identify other, ancillary ones: ‘To what effect is the phenomenological project independent of history? […] What does this say about the “totality” of dance? Is it “essentially” unaffected by historical development?’ she asks (Rothfield 2010: 308). And ‘if history [indeed] impacts upon essence,’ suggests Rothfield by way of striving to answer the questions which she poses herself, ‘then we are returned to the Foucauldian formulation: [that is, that the] “putting into play of these universal forms is itself historical” (Foucault 1984: 355).’
Rothfield’s elision of phenomenology and history, Foucauldian history especially, is particularly striking in light of Ness’s argument concerning the incommensurability of phenomenology and Foucault. For Ness, the incompatibility of phenomenology with history therefore automatically follows since, in her account, Foucault stands for the practice of history. It is this incommensurability which Rothfield in effect, and significantly, over-turns. For, in calling for a phenomenology that is adequately historicised, Rothfield specifically nominates Foucault, as a corrective to curb what she perceives as phenomenology’s universalism. Moreover, Rothfield resorts to the historical Foucault; reaching out for his notion of history as genealogy, in particular:

The point is that the experience of dance, so-called immediate and immanent, is shaped by the various fields in which it occurs, and the corporeal specificity of its observers. One way of putting this is to advocate Foucault’s emphasis on the conditions, practices and relations which shape ‘the historicity of forms of experience’ (Foucault 1984: 334). (Rothfield 2010: 310).

Rothfield turns first to ‘social theorist’ David Hoy (Rothfield 2010: 303). According to Rothfield, ‘[t]he idea behind Hoy’s proposition is to safeguard the phenomenological moment of analysis whilst juxtaposing a Foucauldian genealogical perspective. […] Foucault functions to remind us that the “putting into play” of universal structures is always socio-historically specific’ (Rothfield 2010: 303-304). And as a means of making Foucauldian historicisation available, in practical terms, to the phenomenological, experiencing, dancing body, Rothfield proposes adopting ethnographer and cultural phenomenologist Thomas Csordas’s notion of ‘somatic attention’. Csordas conceives of ‘the bodily act of perception...as a form of somatic attention’ (Rothfield: 311). ‘The cultural differentiation of somatic attention’ rests, to quote Csordas, on “culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one’s body in surroundings that include the embodied presence of others”’ (Csordas quoted in Rothfield 2010: 311). For Rothfield, Csordas’s ‘cultural differentiation of somatic attention’ is significant because it marks the descent of the phenomenological subject into the terrain of Foucauldian inscription: ‘...descent attaches itself to the body. It insinuates itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus: it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets.’ (Foucault 1977b: 147). (Rothfield 2010: 311).

In turning to Foucault in her self-described ‘attempt a[t] modification of the phenomenological approach’ Rothfield also paves the way to
a re-consideration, with dance-based inquiry specifically in mind, of the relationship between phenomenology and history more generally (Rothfield 2010: 307). And reconsidering the significance of history for phenomenology like this should, by extension, have implications for dance history. For if historicism is shown to be held in high regard by phenomenologists, as something that is genuinely useful, even indispensable, rather than antagonistic to their project, it would follow that the same should apply – more or less – in the case of Dance Studies, given the extent of its methodological affinity with, and indebtedness to, phenomenology. Even the briefest survey of phenomenologists would seem to indicate that conceiving of the world in inescapably historicist terms is an intrinsic dimension of their respective projects. For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘our past is not something that we merely contemplate as spectacle but something that is “sedimented” through our bodies, in the background to ourselves that we are now’ (Matthews 2002: 96). Consequently, ‘a person’s body’ is, according to Merleau-Ponty, the ‘eloquent relic of an existence’ (Merleau-Ponty quoted in Matthews 2002: 93). From this it naturally follows, again to quote Merleau-Ponty, that ‘time is not an object of our knowledge but a dimension of our [very] being...embodiment and the temporality of existence are thus...inextricably connected’ (Merleau-Ponty quoted in Matthews 2002: 94). Consequently, philosophers such as Koopman conceive of ‘a quintessentially phenomenological combination of “historicity” and “transcendentality”’ (Koopman 2013: note 47, 286).

Whereas in Rothfield’s estimation, Foucauldian models of history enable phenomenology to escape its universalist bind, in phenomenologist David Carr’s account of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, the effects of the equation of history and phenomenology are no less significant, even if they are almost exactly reversed. For in Carr’s understanding, historical reduction – as formulated by Husserl, founder of the twentieth-century phenomenological movement – ‘offers at least some aid in the transcendental project’ (Carr 2009: 263) which was, for Husserl, phenomenology’s driving goal. ‘Historical reduction is the philosopher’s recounting of the tradition as it exists in him [or her] through his [or her] participation in the historical-cultural milieu’, writes Carr (Carr 2009: 264). ‘Aiming at the particular’, historical reduction is put in the service of transcendental philosophy by ‘bringing to the fore the relevant prejudices of the philosopher’s historical position’ (Carr 2009: 264). ‘[A]s long as the results of historical reduction – in the form of a characterization of the dominant prejudices of the philosopher’s age – are clearly before his [or her] mind, [(s)]he can at least guard against naively giving expression to them’, explains Carr (Carr 2009: 264). In this way, here
too, historical reduction serves an explicitly ethical dimension. Ethical in the sense that historical reduction is directed towards phenomenology as transcendental philosophy. For ‘[b]ased as it is upon the recognition of the historicity of consciousness, of the role of historical prejudices in conscious life, this reduction consists in the attempt to make those prejudices explicit, hold them up to view, retrieve from their habitual role as unexamined Selbstverständlichkeiten’ (Carr 2009: 263). Historical reduction, then, serves a ‘dual [....and] critical function’. For in helping to realise ‘philosophizing, [in which] we are not merely mirroring the prejudices of our age’, ‘it [...] holds open the possibility that reflection can succeed in arriving at a philosophical description which is not encumbered by such prejudices’ (Carr 2009: 63).

Drawing even briefly, as is the case here, from Carr’s account of Husserl’s phenomenology, reveals the extent to which, in Carr’s understanding, Husserlian phenomenology’s claims to the status of transcendental philosophy depend precisely on historical reductionism. For Husserl’s conceiving of the world in historical terms like this is, according to Carr, with the express intention of attempting to escape, or avoid repeating, history. Or, to put it another way, and turning this time to philosopher Kevin Thompson, ‘for Husserl, the historical a priori is the non-historical, unchanging transcendentality structure of history itself: “the living movement of the coexistence and interweaving of original sense-production (Sinnbildung) and sense-sedimentation (Sinnsedimentierung)”’ (Thompson 2008: 14). Thinking historically, in other words, serves a strategic function as part of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, enabling philosophy to transcend limitations inherited from the past. History, then, was intrinsic to phenomenology from its very foundations in Husserl’s transcendentalism. It is similarly gratifying, from the vantage point of a chapter that seeks to validate history as having much, methodologically speaking, to offer dance enquiry, that in the context of a Dance Studies paradigm heavily indebted to phenomenology, Rothfield advocates turning to history specifically. As has been demonstrated, Rothfield has resort to Foucauldian models of history as genealogy specifically in mind, as a means of releasing phenomenology from the grip of universalism.

Nor is Rothfield alone in this regard: according to phenomenologist and Foucault scholar Johanna Oksala, ‘Foucault’s attempt to investigate “the historical a priori of a possible experience” should be read as a continuation of phenomenology in the crucial sense that it attempts to radically historicize the transcendental’ (Oksala 2012: 533). Oksala belongs to what Koopman has described as ‘a general strategy of reinterpretation of Foucault through the lens of phenomenological
concepts like historic-transcendentality [that] is gaining increasing attention among Foucault scholars today’ (Koopman 2010: 105; italics are Koopman’s). And in Oksala’s understanding, as in Rothfield’s, it is precisely Foucault’s commitment to history that enables his contribution to phenomenology’s development, ‘continu[ing] the phenomenological project in important ways’ (Oksala 2012: 528). For ‘while it is impossible to study the conditions of possibility of our own thought, it is possible to reveal the fundamental structures determining the order of knowledge of a different age’ (Oksala 2012: 534). It is through an insistence that the transcendental is always historical, and so must be historicised, in other words, that Foucault’s ‘method does thus not mark any straightforward continuation of the project of Husserlian phenomenology, but rather continues its critical development’ (Oksala 2012: 528). In this vein, for instance, Thompson, quoting from the The Archaeology of Knowledge, understands Foucault’s archaeological [a]s thereby a phenomenology of the concept – it ‘describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive’ (AS [L’archéologie de savoir], 173/131) and this means, that at its core, it thinks transcendentality and historicity together as the stratum of the positivity of knowledge (Thompson 2008: 17).

From this it would follow that abandoning history, at least Foucauldian history, should not be the price automatically exacted from Dance Studies for its embrace of phenomenology. Engagement with one need not be at the expense of the other. For dance’s claims to phenomenological status are not necessarily threatened by history and are, perhaps, rather even bolstered or extended by it. And as the first part of this chapter sought to demonstrate, Cultural Studies advocated a modification of, rather than retreat from, historical method. So, by the same logic, allegiance to Cultural Studies does not demand the disregard of history. In historicising Dance Studies’ emergence and methodological indebtedness to Cultural Studies and phenomenology alike, this chapter has set out to equip the discipline with a genealogy of its own intellectual inheritances. This has been with a view to suggesting that history might be (re)turned to, and with renewed energy and interest, as possessing much of worth, methodologically speaking, still to offer to a considered investigation of dance. The respective positions consistently adopted vis-à-vis history by some key, foundational figures – and now, present-day scholars and artist-scholars – in both Cultural Studies and phenomenology, would seem to bear out, and support, the vindication and recuperation of history in the ways which this chapter has argued. Carr, for example, ‘think[s] the term “historicity” is the key to understanding’... ‘phenomenological
encounters’: ‘In various ways [Carr continues] phenomenologists have recognised and given an account of the thoroughly historical character of consciousness, experience and human existence’ (Carr 2012: 240-241).

Added to which, condemning Foucault and Foucauldian histories would risk allying Dance Studies with some unlikely intellectual bedfellows. This chapter has shown how Foucault has been discounted for dance research on the grounds of an ‘excessive’ preoccupation with history. However, it is perhaps helpful to recall, that he has, somewhat paradoxically, often been dismissed by the historical establishment, on the grounds of not being historical enough: ‘Foucault is thus regarded by the majority of conservative as well as mainstream historians as anti-historical’ (Munslow 1997: 120). Ness’s comment, quoting philosopher Gary Gutting, that ‘particularly in the discipline of history, Foucault’s work is judged, even by its supporters as “seriously wanting”’ might usefully be brought into consideration here’ (Ness 2011: 20). In his study ‘of the reception of Foucault by historians [which is understood as] falling into three stages...of “non-reception”, “confrontation” and, finally, “assimilation”’, historian Allan Megill, writing in 1987, observed that indeed ‘the[ir] main complaint is perspectival and methodological’ (Megill 1987: 125; 132). This criticism can be understood as arising at least in part – and again to quote Megill – from the extent to which Foucault ‘himself underlined his difference from disciplinary history, and rightly so, for he stands apart from the generally unquestioned conceptual and methodological assumptions that define its boundaries’ (Megill 1987: 117). Other similarly well-placed commentators on Foucault and the historical community agree. For O’Brien, key Foucault works ‘are self-proclaimed histories. Yet they are not “generic” products of the historical discipline’ (O’Brien 1989: 32). And according to Thomas Flynn, for whom ‘all of Foucault’s major works are histories of a sort, which is enough to make him a historian of a sort’, Foucault’s ‘archaeology is both counter-history and social critique. It is counter-history because it assumes a contrapunctal relationship to traditional history’ (Flynn 2005: 29; 33; italics are Flynn’s).

To join ‘mainstream historians’ in their disregard for Foucault, would therefore actually bring Dance Studies into some unexpected allegiance with the very establishment mainstream which Stuart Hall had sought to break away from, so decisively, in founding ‘Birmingham School’ Cultural Studies in the first place. In disdaining Foucault and Foucauldian histories, therefore, Dance Studies risks disregarding, even reneging upon, one of the founding tenets of its Cultural Studies parent. A strong case for retaining history – Foucauldian histories in particular – for Dance
Studies can be built on these grounds alone. And yet in making that case, this chapter’s aim has not been to shift, unambiguously, the status of Foucault for Dance Studies from that of proscribed to prescribed thinker. For one thing, to do so would be to fly in the face of Hall’s very ‘mode of thinking’; to disregard his eschewal of ‘closure and certainty’ (Slack and Grossberg in Hall 2016: xi). Rather, in formulating arguments for the possible rehabilitation of Foucault, and so history, for Dance Studies, this chapter itself arguably adopts a somewhat Hallian position. It therefore seems appropriate to give the last word to Hall. Hall, note Jennifer Daryl Slack and Lawrence Grossberg, ‘was an essayist’:

> Essays are specific interventions into specific intellectual debates, and into specific historical and political contexts. They do not create fixed and universal positions; they are not finished statements, for they are always open to revision as new intellectual resources become available, as historical contexts change, and as the relations of power (domination and resistance, containment, and struggle) face new challenges. This was Hall’s mode of thinking... (Slack and Grossberg in Hall 2016: x-xi).

This chapter is offered in this same spirit of the inherent contingency of Cultural Studies that is the hallmark of Hall’s thinking. Sharing Hall’s reluctance to ‘police the [disciplinary] boundaries’, and drawing upon ‘new intellectual resources [that have recently] become available’, it is conceived as one such contribution to ‘specific interventions into specific [Dance Studies] intellectual debates’ (Slack and Grossberg in Hall 2016: xiv: x). Indeed, in debating history for Dance Studies, this chapter is involved, in effect, in the extension to Dance Studies, of the same ‘process of continuous theorizing’ through which ‘Cultural Studies constitutes itself’ (Slack and Grossberg in Hall 2016: xi).
Notes

1. This re-titling of the programme is, perhaps, especially poignant given that California/Riverside had hosted the ‘Choreographing History’ conference in 1992. See *Choreographing History*, edited by Susan Leigh Foster, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995.

2. In Stuart Hall’s recollection: ‘Later Thompson made it clear that he hated Cultural Studies...he [Thompson] ripped us up and set out to destroy one of his greatest devotees, Richard Johnson. This was a savage, savage attack, and it represented a parting of the ways. We never really got it together again.’ (Hall with Schwarz 2017: 265).

3. This is the manuscript version, made digitally available by the author, of McRobbie, Angela (2016) ‘Stuart Hall: Art and the Politics of Black Cultural Production’, *South Atlantic Quarterly* 114 (4), pp. 665-683.


5. See May 2005 in the Reference list.


8. For a fuller account of the extended analysis of Cynic philosophy presented in Foucault’s *The Courage of the Truth* and its strong interconnection with, and implications for, embodied agency and dance inquiry, see Hammond 2017, especially pp. 23-42.


10. For this list, see Koopman 2010, note 9, p. 105. For additional ‘contributors to this interpretation’, see Thompson 2008, note 1, p. 3. Subsequent and valuable further contributions to this debate include Thompson 2010 (a response to Koopman 2010); and Koopman 2010b (a response, in turn, to Thompson 2010).

11. Citations to Rothfield’s text are to its inclusion in *The Routledge Dance Studies Reader*. It had originally been published, under the same title given to the chapter in that volume – ‘Differentiating Phenomenology and Dance’ – in the philosophy journal *Topoi* (2005) 24, pp. 43-53.
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