ABSTRACT: When I think that I am now thinking about a rose, are there two mental acts present in the intellect at once, the one direct (about the rose) and the other reflex (about the thought about the rose)? According to a generally accepted principle in medieval psychology, a given mental power cannot have or elicit multiple mental acts at the same time. Hence, many medieval thinkers were unwilling to admit that during such a case of mental reflection there are two acts present in the mind. In this paper, I will look at two theories about mental reflection. According to John Pouilly (1312), during a case of mental reflection there is just one act present in the mind. However, this one act is somehow identical with the direct mental act about the rose that immediately preceded it. If it were not identical with this act, then the sentence “I am thinking that I am thinking about a rose” would be false, since in order for this sentence to be true the direct mental act of thinking about the rose must be present with the reflex mental act of thinking about that act, either as a distinct act, or as somehow identical with it. According to John Baconthorpe (ca. 1325), such a view fails, for even if the reflex mental act were somehow identical with the direct mental act that immediately preceded it, still we would have to admit that it does not coexist with it. On his view, what is sufficient here is that the direct mental act exist merely as a kind of represented object. Hence, for Baconthorpe, when I think that I am thinking about a rose, there is just one act present in the mind, and this one act has as its content another distinct act (the direct act). However, the direct act does not really exist at the same time as it, although it is represented as if it did.

KEYWORDS: State consciousness, John Pouilly, John Baconthorpe, reflex acts.

Sometimes I reflect upon my own thoughts. For instance, I am thinking about the rose on my table and also, for the purpose of writing this paper, taking a step back and reflecting upon the thought that I am having about that rose. Using the scholastic terms, I am eliciting a reflex act (actus reflexus) about a present direct act (actus rectus) about the rose. Call this mental reflection properly so-called (MRP).¹

Broadly speaking, during the High Middle Ages (1250–1350) there were two theories about MRP depending on whether or not we take the reflex act to be identical with the direct act. According to the identity theory, the direct act and the reflex act that concerns it are numerically one and the same act.² This

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¹ The qualification ‘present’ is meant to distinguish MRP from a situation wherein I am remembering a past act. We might add some further qualifications. (1) The reflex act must be non-inferential, so as to distinguish MRP from a case wherein I infer my own or someone else’s mental act. (2) The acts must both belong to the same person. This distinguishes MRP from the peculiar case of mind-reading. On angelic mind-reading in this context, see S. SCHERBAUM, “Ockham on Awareness of One’s Acts: A Way Out of the Circle,” Society and Politics 12, no. 2 (2018): 8–27. (3) The direct act must be thought about in a ‘concrete’ or ‘determinate’, as opposed to ‘abstract’ or ‘indeterminate’, mode, that is, as my thought and not just some thought. This distinguishes MRP from thoughts about thought in general.

² As opposed to specifically or generically the same. In what follows, I drop the qualification ‘numerically’.
is the view that John Pouilly (1312) defends.  


time as the reflex act ‘objectively [obiektive]’, i.e., as a represented object.

As a first approximation, the identity theory is a kind of same-order theory of state consciousness, whereas the distinction theories are higher-order theories of state consciousness. However, it will be important to distinguish between two kinds of state consciousness: reflexive and prereflexive. As I will be using these terms, reflexive state consciousness is explicit whereas prereflexive state consciousness is implicit. As we will see Baconthorpe and Pouilly both take themselves to be discussing reflexive state consciousness and view the reflex act as that in virtue of which we are reflexively aware of our mental acts.

In what follows, I will first go over the texts and context in which Pouilly and Baconthorpe discuss reflex acts. I will then present Pouilly’s identity theory. Next, I will present Baconthorpe’s non-simultaneous distinction theory, as well as his arguments against Pouilly’s identity theory.

1 Texts and context.

John and John develop their theories of reflex acts in the context of a theological discussion of happiness and the beatific vision. In Quodl., V, q. 7, Pouilly wishes to maintain against John Quidort of Paris that happiness primarily consists in a direct act of seeing God and not a reflex act. In the middle of this

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9. Consider. I am so focused on the rose that I am not explicitly aware of my thinking about it, and yet, were you to ask me what I was just then doing, I would respond, “I was thinking about the rose.” Assuming that I was somehow aware of my thinking about the rose before the question was posed, we would say that I was implicitly (prereflexively) aware but not explicitly (reflexively) aware of my thinking about the rose. For a general discussion of this distinction, see D. ZAHAVI, Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation, Evanston, IL, 1999, ch. 2. For a discussion of the distinction in the medieval context, see CORY, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, 134–37. A particularly clear statement of the distinction can be found in Walter Chatton, who distinguishes between the prereflexive ‘experience’ of an act and the reflexive awareness of that act, arguing that reflex acts are only involved in the latter. See GUALTERUS DE CHATTON, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad librum primum et prologus, Prin., q. 2, a. 5, ed. J. WEY, Toronto, 1989. On Chatton, see BROWERTOLAND, “Medieval Approaches”; BROWERTOLAND, “William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness”; RODE, Zugänge zum Selbstd, 249–60; and GIRARD, “Reflexivity Without Noticing.”

10. IOHANNES PARISIENSIS QUIDORT, In quartum Sententiarum, d. 49, ed. JESCHKE, Deus ut tentus vel visus, 613–623. See JESCHKE, ch. 2 for a thorough discussion of Paris’s view. Pouilly in fact considers (and rejects) two views that happiness consists in a reflex act. The first is Paris’s view, according to which happiness consists in a reflex act of the intellect (reflexive vision) about a direct act of the will (holding God). Call this View A. View B maintains that happiness consists in a reflex act of the intellect (reflexive vision) about a direct act of the intellect (seeing God). Both views agree that the reflex act and the direct act are somehow one and the same act and that even so happiness primarily consists in the reflex act (or the act qua reflex). View B is attributed to Durand in the margins of the print edition of John Baconthorpe’s In Sent., d. 1, q. 1, Cremona, 1618, p. 46b, where Baconthorpe is presenting (almost verbatim) Pouilly’s discussion from Quodl., V, q. 7. Following this marginal suggestion, KNEBEL, “Durand, Quirós, Consciousness,” 348, fn. 21 attributes the view to Durand. Durand does defend the claims that happiness consists in a reflex act of the intellect about a direct act of the intellect and that it primarily consists in the reflex act in his early treatment of happiness in Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum: distinctiones 1–3 libri primi, ed. G. GULDENTOPS, Leuven, 2019, d. 1, q. 1 and Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum: distinctiones 43–50 libri quarti, ed. T. JESCHKE, Leuven, 2012, d. 49, q. 5. (Note that this is the middle [B] redaction and that there is no extant witness to the earliest [A] redaction for these texts.) However, he remains (explicitly) neutral about the claim that in general reflex and direct acts are one and
discussion, he considers the more general question of whether a reflex act is the same as a direct act.

While Pouilly, who held one of the ‘secular’ chairs of theology at the University of Paris from 1307 until 1312, harbored no particular institutional attachment to Thomas Aquinas,\textsuperscript{11} in \textit{Quodl.}, \textbf{V}, q. 7 he notes (correctly) that one of (the Dominican) John of Paris’s adequacy conditions, as it were, on a theory of happiness is that it conform with at least two claims that ‘brother Thomas’ seems to have put forward, namely, (1) that happiness consists in a ‘vision’, and (2) that it consists in ‘one’ act.\textsuperscript{12} Paris, for reasons we need not go into, was convinced that happiness cannot consist merely in the direct vision of God. Further, since Aquinas had stated that it consists in a \textit{vision}, Paris argues that it must consist in a \textit{reflex} vision. However, since Aquinas also maintained that happiness consists in just \textit{one} act and not two, Paris decides that, in general, a reflex act is somehow \textit{(aliquo modo)} identical with the direct act it concerns, and so Paris endorses some form of the identity-theory of reflex acts. John of Paris is fairly opaque about what it might mean to claim that the reflex act is ‘somehow’ one and the same as the direct act.\textsuperscript{13} John Pouilly, however, is quite explicit about what this might mean. While Pouilly rejects Paris’s claim that happiness primarily consists in a reflex act, he accepts the claim that (in general) reflex acts and direct acts are the same act, and he spends quite a bit of time spelling out how this identity theory might work, and, further, how it could be that happiness primarily consists in the direct act granted that the direct and reflex acts are the same act.

John Baconthorpe’s \textit{In I Sent.}, d. 1, q. 1 is, ostensibly, about whether our fruition concerns the ultimate end as a final cause. In the first two articles, however, he rehearses (often verbatim) Pouilly’s discussion from \textit{Quodl.}, \textbf{V}, q. 7, spending the bulk of the second article on precisely the question of whether reflex and direct acts are the same. He also quotes from Durand’s \textit{QQ. de lib. arb.}, q. 3 (a single argument about motion that, Baconthorpe tells us, \textit{clarifies} Pouilly’s view)\textsuperscript{14} and Guy Terrena’s \textit{Quodl.}, I, q. 14, presenting Guy’s

\textsuperscript{11} See, e.g., \textit{JOHANNES DE ARISIENSIS}, ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{12} Often, he just insists that they are one and the same act in a \textit{sui generis} sort of way, namely, because the reflex act reflects upon the direct act. See, e.g., \textit{JOHANNES PARISIENSIS QUIDORT}, \textit{In IV Sent.}, d. 49, n. 19, ed. \textit{Jeschke}, 621: “Tu arguis quod consistet in duobus actibus. Dico quod sunt unum per reflexionem unius in alternum.” See also \textit{Id.}, nn. 22 and 25, ed. \textit{Jeschke}, 621 and 622.

\textsuperscript{13} See, e.g., \textit{JOHANNES DE POLLIAICO, Quodl.}, V, q. 7, nn. 9 and 12, ed. \textit{Jeschke}, 688 and 689. For discussion of Aquinas and Pouilly on this issue, and texts in Aquinas where he seems to make these claims, see \textit{Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus}, ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{JOHANNES DE BACONTHORPE, In I Sent.}, d. 1, q. 1, n. 31, ed. \textit{Jeschke}, 603: “Hoc etiam alii declarant sic.” Note that in the print edition (Cremona, 1618, p. 49ra) this ‘clarification’ is attributed to Peter of Palude in the margin and the main text (“Hoc etiam declarat Petrus
objections (originally directed at Durand) as though they were objections to Pouilly’s version of the identity theory.\textsuperscript{15} He then sets out his own view.

\section{2 John Pouilly’s identity theory.}

John Pouilly’s main argument for the identity theory is negative in character (\textit{Quodl.}, V, q. 7, nn. 35–42, ed. \textsc{Jeschke}, 697–700). While the argument is somewhat complex, we can perhaps simplify it as follows. A mental act can be said to be distinct from some other mental act only under certain conditions. But none of these conditions are met in the case of the direct act and the reflex act that concerns it during an episode of MRP. Hence, they must be one and the same act. I’ll call this the master argument.

1. A mental act X is distinct from a mental act Y if and only if either (a) X and Y have distinct subjects or (b) X and Y have (suitably) distinct objects or (c) X and Y occur at distinct times.\textsuperscript{16}

2. Not (a): The reflex act and the direct act it concerns have the same subject, e.g., the intellect. [The same-subject thesis]

3. Not (b): They have the same object. [The same-object thesis]

4. Not (c): They occur at the same time. [The simultaneity thesis]

In what follows I will look at how Pouilly justifies (2)–(4).

\subsection{(2): The same-subject thesis.}

Provided we are interested in intellectual cases of MRP, the same-subject thesis was relatively uncontroversial. When I (intellectually) think about one of my intellectual acts, then both the reflex and direct act belong to the same power, namely, my intellect, and so they have the same subject.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} For these objections, see footnote 26 below.

\textsuperscript{16} I \textsc{ohannes de Polliaco}, \textit{Quodl.}, V, q. 7, n. 35, ed. \textsc{Jeschke}, 697–698: “... distinctio actuum eiusdem potentiae non potest esse (a) ex subiecto. ... Ergo actus praedicti distinguuntur vel (b) ex objecto, quia creantur ab alio et alio objecto, (c) vel ex tempore, scilicet quia sunt in alio et alio tempore.”

\textsuperscript{17} However, the same-subject thesis with other cases of MRP was more controversial. Indeed, most medieval authors, accepting some form of Proclus’s limitation on (mental) reflexivity, rejected the thesis at the sensory level. A sensory power, being somehow a corporeal power, cannot reflect upon itself. Hence, sight cannot see its own vision, etc. In such cases, the usual solution was to posit some higher-order (really distinct) power, namely, the common sense, whose job it was to cognize the acts of the lower-order power. The common sense senses visions in the visive power, hearings in the auditory power, and so on. This is the solution that Pouilly (among others) pursues (nn. 53–56, ed. \textsc{Jeschke}, 702–704). But some authors, e.g., Radulphus Brito, insisted upon the same-subject thesis even at the level of sensation. After all, a dog without an intellect can still reflect upon its acts of common sense. Hence, to avoid a regress of (corporeal) powers, we should admit that the common sense, at least, can reflect upon its own acts. But if the common sense can do this, then why not also suppose that Proclus’s limitation is generally false, and so even the particular senses can reflect upon their own acts, e.g., sight upon its own visions, etc. Hence, for Brito the same-subject thesis is true for any case of MRP. (Brito does concede that such corporeal forms of reflection are ‘incomplete’ compared to intellectual forms of reflection.) See R\textsc{adulphus Brito}, \textit{Quaestiones super secundum librum Aristotelis De anima}, q. 42, Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 3061, f. 20rb-vb.
(3): The same-object thesis.

By contrast, the same-object thesis was more controversial. Many authors, in fact, held that the direct act has as its object some external thing, e.g., a rose, whereas the reflex act has as its object some internal thing, namely, the direct act, and so they quite plainly have distinct objects.18

Pouilly offers a somewhat novel defense of the same-object thesis. A student of Godfrey of Fontaines, Pouilly appeals to a rather strong form of Godfrey’s famous act-potency axiom: nothing can reduce itself from potency to act with respect to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect, neither on its own nor together with an accident that inheres in it.19 But the direct act is an accident that inheres in the intellect. Further, the object of a mental act is, at least in ordinary cases, the cause of that mental act, that is, it reduces a mental power from potency to act. For instance, the rose reduces the intellect from potency (potentially thinking) to act (actually thinking). Hence, Pouilly reasons, were the direct act the object of the reflex act, and so the cause of the reflex act, it would reduce the intellect from potency (potentially reflexively thinking) to act (actually reflexively thinking). But then a patent violation of the strong form of the act-potency axiom would follow: the intellect would be reduced from potency to act thanks to an accident inhering in it (the direct act).20 Hence, the object of the reflex act cannot be the direct act. But since there is no other suitable candidate for its object, it follows that the object of the reflex act is the same thing as the object of the direct act, namely, the rose.

(4): The simultaneity thesis.

Granted, then, that the subject is the same (the intellect) and the object the same (the rose), the only option remaining to distinguish the direct and reflex acts would be to appeal to time. Perhaps the direct act occurs at time T1 and the reflex act at time T2. The simultaneity thesis—in the above master argument—closes off this option: the direct act and the reflex act that concerns it, during a case of MRP, must occur at the same time.

While the simultaneity thesis might seem trivially true, Pouilly defends it with an argument I will call the reflexive truth argument.21 As Pouilly puts it,
if, during a case of MRP, the reflex act and the direct act it concerns were not simultaneous, then

(1) every reflex act would be false, for when I think about a stone with a direct act and I reflect, I state that I am thinking about a stone. The reflex act would be false unless with or in it I am thinking about a stone. (2) However, it is problematic that every reflex act be false. (3) Hence, the reflex act is simultaneous with the direct act.22

In the minor premise (2) Pouilly appeals to a kind of adequacy condition for any theory of MRP. Call it the reflexive truth criterion: reflex acts are never always false. Whatever theory we have about MRP should at the very least meet this criterion. Pouilly’s reflexive truth argument, then, seems to be that were the direct act not present, either in itself as a distinct act or as identified somehow with the reflex act, then that reflex act would be false. But since the direct act cannot be a distinct simultaneous act (because of the same-subject thesis and the same-object thesis), it follows that these acts are one and the same act somehow.

Pouilly’s incidental-identity theory.

Pouilly, then, rejects the view that, during a case of MRP, there are two acts present in the mind (one direct and the other reflex). Quite the contrary, when one reflects upon the fact that one is thinking about a rose, there is just one act (call it R) present in the mind just as there is just one act present in the mind when one merely thinks about the rose without reflection (call this act Dpure, to indicate that it is a pure direct act). Now, clearly, R will be somewhat different from Dpure. First, its content will be different, for R is about not just the rose on its own (as Dpure is), but also the further fact that the rose is now being thought about, that is, it is about the rose as cognized. Further, R is not just about the cognized rose but also about the fact that I am the one cognizing the rose. In other words, R will be a complex act with complex content, whereas Dpure is a simple act with simple content.

However, Pouilly maintains an even more radical thesis. He does not merely hold that during a case of MRP there is just one act and not two acts. Rather, he claims that this one complex act is somehow also numerically identical with Dpure, the simple act that immediately preceded it.23 His motivation for this further claim seems to have been this. The reflexive truth criterion requires that sentences of the form ‘I am thinking that I am thinking about a rose’ are true if and only if Dpure (which is what ‘I am thinking about a rose’ at least in part refers to) exists with R. My (pure) direct thought about the rose must exist at the same time as my reflex act in order for such sentences to be true. But since Dpure cannot exist as an act numerically distinct from R, it must be somehow numerically identical with R.

22. Quodl., V, q. 7, n. 36, ed. JESCHKE, 698 (translated text in italics): “Item non possunt distinguiri quia sint in intellectu in alio et alio tempore, immo sunt simul, quia alter omnis actus reflexus esset falsus, quia cum intellige lapidem actu recto et reflector, dico me intelligere lapidem, quod esset falsum nisi cum sive in actu reflexo intelligam lapidem. Inconveniens autem est omnem actum reflexum esse falsum. Ergo est simul cum actu recto.” See also Id., n. 37, ed. JESCHKE, 698–699. Cf. IOHANNES DE BACONTHORPE, In I Sent., d. 1, q. 1, nn. 24 and 26, ed. JESCHKE, 602 and 602–603.

23. Even if the reflex act occurs at the same time as the pure direct act, there is still a sense in which the pure direct act at least conceptually precedes the reflex act. See footnote 28 below.
But how can something complex (R) be numerically identical with something simple (D<sub>pure</sub>)?<sup>24</sup> Further, the pure direct act can occur on its own—Pouilly does not think that reflexive consciousness is ubiquitous.<sup>25</sup> But how can two things be numerically identical if one can exist when the other does not?<sup>26</sup>

Pouilly’s answer to such worries turns on his theory about the individuation of actions. Actions are what medieval authors called successive entities as opposed to permanent ones.<sup>27</sup> A permanent entity, such as Socrates, is such that it can exist all at once whereas a successive entity is such that it only exists over a continuous stretch of time. An action, as a successive entity, necessarily exists over a stretch of time.<sup>28</sup>

According to Pouilly, an action is the (numerically)<sup>29</sup> same action at any given time within this continuous stretch of time. When fire is burning a log for five minutes, it is the same action throughout the entire process, even though this process occurs over a continuous stretch of time. Hence, two actions can be distinct in time and yet still considered the same action provided there is no temporal gap between them. The fire’s burning is the same action at two minutes that it was at one minute, and so on.

Moreover, or so Pouilly argues, the very same action at a later time might have a feature that it did not have at an earlier time. In such a case, the action at the later time can be said to be ‘incidentally’ identical with itself at an earlier time, and also ‘incidentally’ distinct from itself at an earlier time. Since

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24. See here the objection that Palude puts to his own view in *Quodl.*, q. 6, Toulouse, BN, Cod. 744, f. 102rb ([1] = delenda; <> = addenda): “illi actus non sunt unus numero quorum est unus simplex et respectu simplicis <obiecti> [apprehensionis?] et alius est necessario complexus et respectu <complexi> [complexionis!?]. Sed actus rectus est simplex rei apprehensio et respectu simplicis objecti, actus vero reflexus est necessario respectu complexi.”

25. *JOHANNES DE POLLILACO, Quodl.*, V, q. 7, n. 51, ed. JESCHKE, 702.

26. As well, Pouilly thinks that the pure direct act is beatific whereas the reflex act that concerns it is not (Id., nn. 41, 51, and 57, ed. JESCHKE, 699, 702, and 704). These, and other nearby objections, can also be found in GUIDO TERRENI, *Quodl.*, I, q. 14, nn. 5–9, ed. JESCHKE, 458–460, who raises five such objections to Durand’s version of the identity theory. (1) The direct act might be mere belief (opinativus) or uncertain (incertus) whereas the reflex act that concerns it knowledge (scientifius) or certain (certus); (2) the direct act might be false (erroneus) whereas the reflex act true (verus); (3) the direct act might exist whereas the reflex act does not; (4) the direct act might be understood whereas the reflex act not; (5) reflex acts might be multiplied *ad infinitum* whereas the direct act is not. These objections are reported (verbatim) by Baconthorp in *In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, nn. 32–36, ed. JESCHKE, 604–605, but applied as objections to Pouilly’s position. Baconthorp also offers us potential replies on Pouilly’s behalf (Id., n. 44, ed. JESCHKE, 607).


28. This is something of an oversimplification. We can understand actions as coming in two basic sorts: diachronic actions (which occur over a temporal continuum) and synchronic actions (which are ‘instantaneous’, that is, they occur at a single moment in time). Baconthorp, when presenting Pouilly’s reflexive truth objection, explicitly allows that the direct and reflex acts might (at least sometimes) be taken to be one and the same synchronic action. See *In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, n. 24, ed. JESCHKE, 602: “... si different in numero aut ... in eodem subiecto causarentur in diverso tempore aut saltem in diversis instantibus.” For example, if at the very first (temporal) instant in which I think about a rose I also reflect upon that thinking, then the acts, if they are one action, will be a synchronous action. (Of course, this is compatible with supposing that often they are a diachronic action.) Even so, such a synchronic action still ‘unfolds’ as it were within that single temporal instant, such that there is still a before and after in terms of non-temporal instants within that temporal instant. In what follows, I will talk of the direct act and the reflex act as if these were a diachronic action, but we need only replace ‘continuous stretch of time’ with ‘continuous stretch of non-temporal instants within a given temporal instant’ and ‘at a given time’ with ‘at a given non-temporal instant within a given time’ to account for cases where the action is synchronous.

29. Again, I will assume that the distinction or sameness in question is numerical, as opposed to specific or generic, unless otherwise noted.
Pouilly calls this ‘incidental identity’ (*identitas accidentalis*), I will call this the *incidental-identity theory of actions*.\(^{30}\)

Pouilly puts forward two examples.

If a hot thing on its own and directly is burning something and then one adds to that hot thing something which does not altogether block its burning, such as a fork or a point, it will cause the numerically same act as the one before, which is, however, incidentally distinct from itself [as it was before].\(^{31}\)

A hot rod will cause the same action (burning) over a continuous stretch of time even if we shape that hot rod into various shapes, provided, of course, the shape does not block its action. Likewise, my prayer before and after God has infused grace into me can be said to be the same prayer.

The numerically same act incidentally can be natural and virtuous. For instance, if, while I am praying, grace is given to me: the numerically same act is natural and meritorious—the same, I mean, incidentally. And the natural act taken on its own is incidentally distinct from itself as meritorious.\(^{32}\)

Pouilly goes on to apply this view of individuation to mental acts. Recall, first of all, that Pouilly follows Godfrey of Fontaines in maintaining a kind of passive view of the mind.\(^{33}\) The object is the total and sufficient efficient cause of a mental act\(^{34}\) and a mental act persists only so long as the object is acting upon the mind. Mental ‘actions’ like seeing, thinking, and so on, are, in fact, passions: whenever I am seeing something, the soul (or more precisely, its visive power) is passively being affected by the visible object. But what goes for actions also goes for passions, for a passion too is a successive entity. Hence, a passion is the same passion over a continuous stretch of time just as the action is, even if something is added to the agent or patient, provided what is added does not ‘block’ the action/passion.\(^{35}\)


31. *Quodl.*, V, q. 7, n. 52, ed. *Jeschke*, 702 (translated text in italics): “Et declaratur per simile quod obiectum acceptum cum actu intelligendi causet eundem actum numero quem prius differentem accidentaliter. Sicut si calefactum calefaciat aliquid secundum se et immediate, et illi calido addatur aliquid quod non omnino impediat calefactionem, sicut ancipita vel tela aliqua, creabit eundem actum numero quem prius differentem accidentaliter a seipso. Ita etiam obiectum cum actu illo recto sive ut agens actum rectum in eadem potentia creat eundem actum numero quem prius differentem accidentaliter et eundem accidente, quod est idem.”


33. See footnote 19 above.

34. Or, in cases of intellectual cognition, the object together with the agent intellect.

35. Pouilly (and Godfrey) also hold that there is also an *effect* over and above this passion, namely, a quality inhering in the soul, but this quality too persists only so long as the object is acting upon the soul and the soul is being acted upon by the object, that is, it persists only if there is the relevant action and passion. Now, even though this effect (the quality) is not itself a successive entity, we might still hold that its individuating conditions will be parasitic upon the individuating conditions of the passion and action involved in its continuous generation. Hence, mental acts are a peculiar sort of quality, a quality that is wholly dependent upon the continuous activity of its agent, much like, on some views, the light in the air is a quality that continuously depends upon the Sun’s action of illumination. See GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, *Quodlibeta*, IX, q. 19, ed. J. HOFFMANS, *Le neuvième Quodlibet*, Louvain, 1928, and IOHANNES DE POLLIACO, *Quodl.* IV, q. 2, Paris, BNF, ms. lat. 15372, ff. 102vb–112va. For discussion of
Hence, Pouilly argues as follows. Suppose I turn my head and start to think about the rose on my table. As with the hot rod, the rose (the object) causes a certain effect in me (namely, act $D_{\text{pure}}$). If we ‘add’ to the rose certain non-essential features that do not block its action, and hold everything else equal (except the continuous passage of time), it will cause the (numerically) same effect in me, just as is the case when we shape the hot rod without blocking its burning action. The action will be the same action, and so too the passion and effect, even though the action (and so too the passion) has a non-essential feature now which it did not have before.\(^{36}\)

Now, in the case of MRP, what is ‘added’ to the object is not a shape but rather it is this: its being cognized.\(^{37}\) Since this added feature (its being cognized) does not ‘block’ its action upon me, the effect it (continues to) bring about (namely, act $R$) can be said to be (incidentally) numerically the same as the effect it brought about in me before on its own (namely, $D_{\text{pure}}$). Hence, Pouilly can maintain that the reflex act and the (pure) direct act are the same act, even though the former is complex with complex content and the latter simple with simple content. Likewise, they are the same act even though $D_{\text{pure}}$ can exist when $R$ does not exist.

3 John Baconthorpe’s non-simultaneous distinction theory.

John Baconthorpe rejects Pouilly’s identity theory. However, he does not, then, pop for something like Guy’s simultaneous distinction theory, according to which the direct and reflex acts are two (numerically) distinct acts that occur at the same time. He rejects Guy’s view on the grounds that it violates the principle that a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given time.\(^{38}\) Instead, Baconthorpe champions a view I call the non-simultaneous

\(^{36}\) John Baconthorpe’s non-simultaneous distinction theory.\(^{37}\) Pouilly will variously characterize the object in such a case as the ‘cognized’ object, the object ‘with the direct act’, or the object ‘as bringing about the direct act’.\(^{38}\) On this principle, see footnote 7 above.
distinction theory. 39

Baconthorpe rejects the simultaneity thesis (i.e., [4] in Pouilly’s master argument). He thinks that during a case of mental reflection properly so-called the direct act and the reflex act that concern it need not be really simultaneous. On his view, during a case of MRP, the reflex act really exists but the direct act does not really exist. However, he admits that the direct act must somehow exist at the same time as the reflex act. The sense in which it exists is the sense in which a thing that does not now really exist can be said to exist by way of a representation of that thing. For instance, a rose that does not now really exist can be said to exist by way of a representation of that rose. So too a direct act that does not now really exist can be said to exist by way of a representation of it. Baconthorpe calls such existence ‘objective [objectivum]’ existence. 40

39. He appears to have drawn his view from Radulphus Brito, who also defends it. Unfortunately, the sole textual witness we have of Brito’s discussion is contained in an abbreviatio in Prosper’s Notebook (Quaestio “Utrum actus rectus...”, Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1086, ff. 205va–206rb). It is included among a set of quaeestiones on ff. 195r–208r which likely all belong to Brito: ‘Rad.’ is written in the top middle margin of these folios, and on f. 80ra, Prosper quotes verbatim from this abbreviatio and in the left margin of that folio he attributes the quote to ‘M. Radulphus Brito’. On the attribution, see W. Courtenay, “Radulphus Brito, Master of Arts and Theology,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin 76 (2005): 149, fns. 54–55 and Friedman, “On the Trail,” 449, fn. 42. Courtenay tells us that he does not know which of Brito’s works this abbreviatio is an abbreviatio of, although it might belong to Brito’s Quodlibet, as is the case with certain other abbreviaciones included in this section of Prosper’s Notebook. If it is a quodlibetal question, then that sets a terminus a quo of 1314, when Radulphus incepted as master. In any case, the abbreviatio itself reports verbatim Thomas Wylton’s position in Quaestio “Quod in intellectu possunt esse plures intellectiones simul”... ed. Stella, “Le Quaestiones,” 507–517, and so it must be posterior to it and Durand’s QQ. de lib. arb., q. 3 (which is what Wylton is responding to), that is, after 1312. The view is also discussed in Petrus de Palude, Quodl., q. 6, which, according to Joseph Koch, was delivered in December, 1314 and available in written form during the first half of 1315. On the dates for Palude’s Quodlibet, see R. Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260-1330;” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, ed. C. Schabel, Leiden, 2007, 453. Assuming Palude is discussing Brito’s view, this establishes a terminus ante quem of December, 1314. Hence, Easter, 1314 seems to be a reasonable hypothesis for its date. However, the same sort of view is considered in J ohannes de Polliaco, Quodl., V, q. 7, mm. 37–41, ed. Jeschke, 609–610 (1312). It is also (albeit briefly) considered in Durandus de S. Sancto Porciacho, QQ. de lib. arb., q. 3, ed. Stella, 497.21–24 (1312), and even more briefly by Guy Terrena in an abbreviatio of Quodl., I, q. 14, contained in Vatican, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1086 on f. 263va-b (1313). Brito had a long career at Paris—he was an arts master from 1300 until 1307—so perhaps the view these earlier authors discussed was also his, from an earlier text. I have consulted his De anima and Sentences commentary, and no such view is put forward there. (Courtenay also could find no discussion of reflex acts in Brito’s Sentences.)

40. In I Sent., d. 1, q. 1, n. 49, ed. Jeschke, 609–610: “… cum dico, ‘Intelligo me intelligere lapidem’, sensus [est]… quod intellectione reflexiva intelligam ipsum actum rectum quasi … simul in esse obiectivo. … Licet enim transeat actus rectus adveniente actu reflexo quantum ad existentiam realem, tamen obiective remainet in memoria et repraesentatur ibi… Cum enim dico, ‘Intelligo me intelligere lapidem’, haec est vera quia intelligere lapidem est in rerum natura in esse obiectivo in memoria licet non in sua rea li existentia.” Cf. Radulphus Brito, Quaestio “Utrum actus rectus...”, Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1086, f. 205vb: “Ideo non oportet quod sint simul ut actus nec actu, quia aliquid potest esse obiectum dato quod non sit… Dicendum quod sufficit quod sit habituiter et in ratione obiecti.” f. 206ra: “… sunt simul unum obiectivo. Ideo non oportet quod sit actu sed sufficit quod sit in aliquo repraesentativo… Et cum dicas quod falsum diceres dicendo, ‘Intelligo me intelligere’, dicendum quod sic verum est dicendo, ‘Intelligo rosam’, dato quod non sit, ita hic.” Petrus de Palude, Quodl., q. 6, Toulouse, BN, Cod. 744, f. 102va (presenting Brito’s view; * = lectio incerta): “Respondent quod si dicatur quod sunt simul sed unus ut actus et alius ut obiectum, concedunt quod sint simul, sed non utrumque ut actus. Quia si primo fit actu intelligendi lapidem et postea aliquid intelligi se lapidem intelligere, sufficit ad hoc quod haec* [sic] licet: ‘Intelligo me intelligere lapidem’] si vera quod prima intellectio tunc sit ibi in habitu et non in actu, quia solum requisitum quod sit in ratione obiecti. Sicut quando intelligere lapidem, lapis est in ratione obiecti, contingit etiam quando intelligere me intelligere lapidem, intellectio lapidis est in ratione obiecti. Sed ad hoc quod aliquid sit in ratione obiecti respectu intellectus non oportet quod sit praesens secundum suam actualitatem.” f. 103va: “… actus rectus et reflexus numquam sunt simul actu,
However, the mere ‘objective’ existence of the direct act is insufficient, for when I remember a past act, the past act also has mere ‘objective’ existence.\(^{41}\) Hence, Baconthorpe goes on to argue that, during a case of MRP, the direct act is not merely represented but represented \textit{as though it were a really present and existing act}.\(^{42}\) It is in this (what we would call) \textit{subjective}\(^{43}\) sense, then, that the direct act is ‘simultaneous’ with the reflex act.\(^{44}\)

Baconthorpe thinks that his theory has advantages over Pouilly’s identity theory. While he adduces a number of objections to the view, his chief objection is that it fails (ironically) to preserve the reflexive truth criterion. Recall that, according to the reflexive truth criterion, it is absurd to suppose that \textit{all} our reflex acts are false. According to Pouilly, we can safeguard the idea that a reflex act is true only if we suppose that the direct act it concerns coexists with the reflex act, either as (incidentally) identical with it or as a distinct simultaneous act. However, Baconthorpe argues, Pouilly’s incidental-identity theory at least is not a strong enough form of identity to provide us with the coexistence of the direct act.

Consider the example of the hot rod’s burning or my prayer from earlier. According to Pouilly, we can claim that action A and action B are the (incidentally) same action over a continuous stretch of time even if we add something to the agent (or patient), provided that what is added does not ‘block’ the action of the agent upon the patient. Hence, my prayer that occurs at time T1 is numerically the same prayer that occurs at time T2, even though at time T2 I acquire a non-essential feature that I did not have at T1, namely, grace, and so my prayer at T2 is supernatural or meritorious whereas at T1 it was natural.

However, as Baconthorpe points out, even if we accept this much, we still will not have the claim that Pouilly wants. This is because the (temporal) \textit{parts} of a successive entity do not coexist with each other. Even though it is the same

\[ \text{qua ad hoc quod talis actus intelligendi sit intelligibilis in ratione objecti non oportet quod sit praesens in sua existentia in actu intellectus, sed sufficit quod sit ibi habitualiter vel quod ali- quando fuerit ibi, quia ad hoc quod aliquid moveat intellectum in ratione objecti non requiritur quod sit praesens in sua existentia, quia intelligo rosam non entem ibi et quia remanet in phantasia adoe repraesentativum rosae. Sic etiam sufficit quod aliquid aliter in habitu sit intellectio ista in intellectu ad hoc quod sit intelligibilis. Vel forte per apparentes quod repraesentabit rem cius erat intellectio poterit intellectus moveri ad cognoscendum illam intellectionem ut est quoddam intelligibile respectivum ad aliquid objectum cuius est vel etiam ut est quaedam res absoluta in se de genere qualitatis. Et sic non erunt simul plures actus intelligendi inquantum sunt actus intelligendi.} \]

See also the presentation of the view found in Pouilly, Durand, and Guy, discussed above in footnote 39.

42. \textit{In I Sent.}, d. 1, q. 1, n. 49, ed. \textit{JESCHKE}, 609: “Licet enim transeat actus rectus adveniente actu reflexo quantum ad existentiam realem, tamen obiective remanet in memoria et repraesentatur ibi quantum ad ommem rationem eius ut est actus intelligendi lapidem \textit{et quantum ad rationem actus secundum quod actus dicitur elicitus}… ut non sit sensus, ‘Intelligo me intelligere lapidem,’ quia intellecto lapidem in praeterito, sed in praesenti.” Cf. \textit{PETRUS DE PALUDE, Quodl.}, q. 6, Toulouse, BN, Cod. 744, f. 102va: “Unde tunc ista erit vera, ‘Intelligo me intelligere lapidem,’ quia intelligo intellectionem lapidis esse in me in ratione objecti moventis ad talem intellectionem.”
43. The medieval Latin contrasting pair ‘objective-subjective’ is more or less opposite what we nowadays take these terms to mean. For medieval scholastics, to say that something has subjective existence is to say that it has real and objective existence, whereas to say that something has (mere) objective existence is to say that it has existence (merely) as an object of thought. For discussion of this distinction in medieval authors, see recently \textit{PINI, GIORGIO}, “Duns Scotus on What Is in the Mind,” \textit{Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévale} 87, no. 2 (2020): 321–323 and \textit{KLEIN, MARTIN}, “Mental Gaze and Presence,” \textit{Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévale} 87, no. 2 (2020): 371–392.
44. Baconthorpe’s view, then, comes close to contemporary higher-order theories that hold there is no need for a ‘real immediacy’ of the direct (lower-order) act to the reflex (higher-order) act, but instead a mere ‘subjective immediacy’ suffices. See \textit{ROSENTHAL}, “Varieties of Higher-Order Theory.” 33.
day during the evening that it was during the morning, the earlier part of a day does not exist at the same time as the later part of the day. So too we would say that the earlier part of the action does not exist with the later part of the action. To continue our example: the natural prayer at T1 does not exist when the supernatural prayer at T2 exists. We can claim that these are (incidentally) one and the same prayer, but there is still a crucial sense in which the natural prayer (the earlier part) does not exist when the supernatural prayer (the later part) exists.45

Applied to the case at hand, even if the direct act $D_{\text{pure}}$ at time T1 precedes the reflex act R at time T2 such that there is no intervening temporal gap and nothing added that would block the action of the object upon the mind—and so we can claim that they are the same action/passion—we still have to admit that at time T2 $D_{\text{pure}}$ does not exist when R exists. But in order for the reflexive truth criterion to be met, it is not enough that $D_{\text{pure}}$ merely come before R with no temporal gap between the two, that is, mere incidental identity is insufficient. In order for a reflexive statement such as ‘I am thinking that I am thinking about the stone’ to be true, it must be the case that $D_{\text{pure}}$ coexists with R.46

How, then, does Baconthorpe think that his view meets the reflexive truth criterion? After all, he fully admits that the reflex act and the direct act don’t really coexist! On Baconthorpe’s view, we can safeguard the idea that a reflex act is true not because the direct act really coexists with it, but because the direct act subjectively coexists with it, that is, because it is suitably represented, namely, represented as though it were present.47 While Baconthorpe isn’t very explicit here, the idea seems to be that as long as the content of a reflex act is such as the sentence reports, then that sentence (and by extension the reflex act) will be true. As long as I represent a direct act as being present, the sentence “I am thinking about a present direct act” will be true, and so too by extension the sentence “I am thinking that I am (now) thinking about a rose.”

To be sure, there are mysteries here. If I can represent something that does not really exist as present (as really existing) in the case of MRP such that the sentence “I am thinking about a present, really existing direct act” is true even though a direct act does not really exist, then why not suppose this generalizes to other cases? For instance, I might represent a rose that does not exist as though it were present and so make the sentence “A rose exists” true. But if this generalizes to other cases, then it would seem that the truth of an act (or the corresponding sentence) will not depend upon what is the case, but

45. In I Sent., d. 1, q. 1, n. 45, ed. JESCHKE, 608: “… quando actus duo sunt idem per accidentes, tunc primus non permanet cum secundo, sed solum succedit sibi, et sunt solum unus per accidentis per hoc quod unus continuatur cum aliciune interpolatione temporis. Verbi grata, in exemplo eorum, quando operatio quae primo fuit naturalis fit supernaturalis per hoc quod in medio suae durationis infundebatur gratia, planum est quod operatio supernaturalis succedit naturali, naturalis tunc noviter cessat, et a solum dicuntur unus per actus propter continuationem in invicem:”

46. In I Sent., d. 1, q. 1, n. 45, ed. JESCHKE, 608: “Sed in proposito oporteret quod actus rectus permaneret simul cum reflexo et non solum quod continuetur sibi per continuationem sine interpolatione. Alius enim omnis actus reflexus esset falsus dicens intelligo me intelligere.” Note that this will be true even if $D_{\text{pure}}$ and R occur at the same time, that is, even if we accept that we are dealing with a synchronic action (see footnote 28 above). Within a given moment in time we can still claim that there are two non-temporal instants, I1 and I2, such that $D_{\text{pure}}$ exists at time T1 but instant I1 whereas it does not exist at time T1 instant I2, which is ‘when’ R exists. So we will never have a non-temporal instant within a temporal instant wherein both $D_{\text{pure}}$ and R coexist. It seems to me that Pouilly could answer as follows. The mere continuation of R and (pure) D is sufficient to distinguish MRP from remembering, and if these are exhaustive options, then it would be sufficient for the truth of the statement “I am thinking that I am (now) thinking about a rose.”

47. See the texts quoted in footnote 42 above.
upon what seems to me to be the case. Perhaps there is a way to avoid the
generalization, although Baconthorpe does not offer us any suggestions here.
But perhaps such a commitment is the cost we must pay if we wish to square
reflexive state consciousness with, on the one hand, the dogma that two mental
acts cannot coexist in the mind at the same time, together with the failure of
Pouilly’s incidental-identity theory, on the other.

4 Conclusion.

Let’s take stock. According to Pouilly, during a case of MRP, the direct act and
the reflex act that concerns it are numerically identical, albeit in the qualified
sense that the earlier and later parts of a single action are numerically identical.
However, as Baconthorpe points out, Pouilly’s view fails to satisfy the reflexive
truth criterion. In order for the sentence ‘I am thinking that I am thinking
about a rose’ to be true, the direct act that the phrase ‘I am thinking about a
rose’ partially refers to must exist at the same time as the reflex act. Yet, on
Pouilly’s view the direct act cannot really exist at the same time as the reflex
act any more than the earlier and later parts of a day can really coexist with
each other. For Baconthorpe, the direct and reflex acts must both coexist, but
they need not really coexist. Instead, the direct act merely needs to exist as a
represented object provided it is represented as present, that is, it merely needs
to seem to be present, even though it is not in fact present.