Speech Acts: 
The Contemporary Theoretical Landscape 

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Speech-act theory was born of a central insight: language is a medium for many kinds of action, but its superficial uniformity tends to mask this fact. Consider (1):

(1) He should be here by now.

The point of uttering (1) could be to assert that someone should be here by now, to command someone else to get him, to assign blame for his lateness, to threaten, to act out a role in a play, to lodge a formal complaint, and so on. Without a clear understanding of these and other kinds of speech act, we would have no hope of understanding how humans use language. Nor would we have much hope of understanding the many activities in which speech plays a central role. This is why speech-act theory has become essential to so many areas within philosophy and the cognitive and social sciences.

Unless we say otherwise, we will use ‘speech act’ to refer to illocutionary acts. This is a category first singled out by J. L. Austin (1962; 1970). There is no theory-neutral way of saying what makes for an illocutionary act, but it is relatively uncontroversial that paradigm cases include asserting, requesting, commanding, questioning, promising, testifying in court, pronouncing marriage, placing someone under arrest, and so on. In singling out illocutionary acts for theoretical attention, Austin distinguished them from locutionary acts, which are mere utterances of meaningful expressions, and perlocutionary acts, which are acts of producing effects

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1We find early articulations of this insight in Austin’s discussion of the descriptive fallacy (1962, 1–3), in Grice’s theories of speaker meaning and implicature (1957; 1961; 1975), in early versions of metaethical expressivism (Ayer, 1936; Hare, 1952; Stevenson, 1937), and in various guises in the work of Wittgenstein—most poetically, perhaps, in his comparison of linguistic expressions to a collection of handles whose functions are heterogeneous, but that “all [look] more or less alike. (This stands to reason, since they are all supposed to be handled.)” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §12).
that are causally downstream from illocutionary acts. Two utterances of (1) may be utterances of the very same sentence with the very same semantic properties. Yet, on one occasion, the utterance may constitute a complaint, on another, a mere observation. This raises the central question of speech-act theory: what makes it the case that an utterance constitutes an illocutionary act of a given kind? Answers to this question—i.e., theories of speech acts—have proliferated. Our main goal in this chapter is to clarify the logical space into which these different theories fit.

We begin, in §1, by dividing theories of speech acts into five families, each distinguished from the others by its account of the key ingredients in illocutionary acts. Are speech acts fundamentally a matter of convention or intention? Or should we instead think of them in terms of the psychological states they express, in terms of the effects that it is their function to produce, or in terms of the norms that govern them? In §2, we take up the highly influential idea that speech acts can be understood in terms of their effects on a conversation’s context or “score”. Part of why this idea has been so useful is that it allows speech-act theorists from the five families to engage at a level of abstraction that elides their foundational disagreements. In §3, we investigate some of the motivations for the traditional distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force, and some of the ways in which this distinction has been undermined by recent work. In §4, we survey some of the ways in which speech-act theory has been applied to issues outside semantics and pragmatics, narrowly construed.

1 What Makes for a Speech Act? The Five Families

1.1 Convention

One of the two theories of speech acts to be articulated in postwar Oxford is conventionalism, which originates in the work of J. L. Austin (1962; 1963; 1970). According to Austin, an illocutionary act is a “conventional procedure” whose performance is a matter of behaving in accordance with a collection of “felicity conditions”, which are themselves a matter of localized social conventions. Violating some of these felicity conditions, as in making a promise that one doesn’t intend to fulfill, results in an infelicitous act—i.e., a performance that is normatively defective in some way. Violating other felicity conditions, as one would do in attempting to pronounce a couple married without possessing the required status of an officiant, results in a “misfire”—i.e., nonperformance, a failed attempt to perform the act. In illustrating his theory, Austin focuses on highly ritualized examples of illocutionary acts, such as officiating a marriage ceremony, christening a ship, and willing property (1962, 5)—acts whose performance is impossible outside the context of established customs, social institutions, or legal frameworks. Nonetheless, his conventionalist
analysis is intended to apply to all illocutionary acts. To perform an illocutionary act, according to Austin, requires first being in a context in which the convention is in effect, and then acting in accordance with it.

Although conventionalism makes sense of ritualized and institutionalized acts like marriage, it struggles with the illocutionary acts that make up our basic communicative repertoire, including asserting, asking questions, and making requests. Unlike marriage, asserting, asking, and requesting needn't be performed relative to the “jurisdiction” of any particular set of institutions or conventions: it is possible to assert and ask questions across international borders, but not to marry or testify in court, for example. And whereas the nature of marriage varies widely between societies, so that marriage is, at best, a loose cluster concept, asserting, asking, and requesting seem to be part of humans’ cross-cultural toolkit for social interaction (even if the means of performing them vary between languages). It is also striking that every known human language includes clause-types whose function is to perform assertion-like, question-like, and request-like acts (Zanuttini et al., 2015), suggesting that their presence in our illocutionary repertoire is not itself a matter of convention. And whereas there are societies in which marriage ceremonies last years and involve complex exchanges of property, it is difficult to imagine rituals of this kind being necessary to, say, ask what the weather is like. It is therefore tempting to recognize a category of communicative illocutionary acts that function in a different, and less conventional way, than the essentially conventional illocutionary acts on which Austin focused (Bach and Harnish, 1979, chs.6–7).

Considerations like these have led most contemporary conventionalists to hold that the conventions that define acts like asserting, questioning, and requesting are linguistic conventions, rather than social conventions of the kind emphasized by Austin. To assert \( p \), on this view, is to produce an utterance that conforms to the linguistic conventions for asserting \( p \) in the language being used; \( \textit{mutatis mutandis} \) for asking, requesting, and so on. A view of this kind seems to be widely assumed, though it has less often been explicitly defended. An influential defense of linguistic conventionalism—albeit a version that incorporates elements from various competing views to be described below—can be found in Searle’s 1969 book, \textit{Speech Acts}. The most notable recent defense can be found in Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone’s 2015 book, \textit{Imagination and Convention}, which tackles many of the standard objections that have been raised against Searle and other earlier conventionalists.

Linguistic conventionalism faces a variety of serious challenges.\(^2\) One major challenge is to account for semantic underdetermination—the fact that the speech act one performs is rarely, if ever, fully determined by the linguistic meanings of the

\(^2\) For some objections to conventionalism, see Bach and Harnish (1979); Davidson (1979a); Harris (2016); Starr (2014); Strawson (1964); Unnsteinsson (2016).
expressions one uses to perform it. Consider (2):

(2) Can you lend me a hand tomorrow?

In uttering (2), for example, a speaker may be requesting the addressee's help, or merely asking whether it will be available. The content of (2) will vary depending on who the addressee is, the flavor of the modal 'can', and whether the speaker is using 'lend me a hand' with its idiomatic sense or (in the macabre case) with its unidiomatic, fully compositional sense. The linguistic conventions governing (2) would seem to be neutral between these forces and contents; if so, something other than conventions will have to do the work of determining particular answers on particular occasions. Analogous points can be made about a wide range of linguistic expressions, and all (or nearly all) natural-language sentences, even when they are being used to perform direct and literal speech acts. Many have therefore given the speaker's intentions a role to play in determining what is said with an utterance.3

When indirect and nonliteral speech acts are considered, the case against conventionalism seems even more pressing (Bach and Harnish, 1979).

Lepore and Stone mix two strategies for responding to these worries. First, they argue that many alleged instances of illocutionary acts, including those involving metaphor, insinuation, and many cases of indirect speech, should not be considered illocutionary acts at all, since there can be no well-defined conditions for successfully communicating by means of them. There is no clear proposition $p$ such that communication would succeed if one were to take Romeo to be asserting $p$ in uttering 'Juliet is the sun', for example, and many cases of indirect speech seem to face the same issue.4 In effect, Lepore and Stone hold that these phenomena are better understood as perlocutionary acts rather than as illocutionary acts: the speaker's goal is not to communicate a specific content, but merely to cause an open-ended chain of thoughts in the addressee. Lepore and Stone's second strategy is to draw on recent work in dynamic semantics, discourse representation theory, and discourse coherence theory in order to argue that many purported instances of semantic underspecification and indirect speech actually arise from complex but convention-governed interactions between utterances and discourse contexts. Due to the hitherto-unappreciated complexity of contexts and linguistic conventions, Lepore and Stone argue, many more speech acts turn out to be amenable to conventionalist treatment than had previously been thought. Their contribution to this volume, which we'll discuss in §2, applies this strategy to indirect speech acts.

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4Lepore and Stone (2015). This argument's prototype is given in Lepore and Stone (2010), which is influenced by Davidson (1979b).
1.2 Intention

The other classical theory of speech acts is intentionalism, which Paul Grice began to develop in parallel to Austin’s views while they were both at Oxford in the 1940’s. The central claim of intentionalism is that performing a communicative illocutionary act is a matter of producing an utterance with a special sort of intention, normally called a ‘communicative intention,’ a ‘meaning intention,’ or an ‘m-intention.’ The nature of communicative intentions is a matter of debate, but the crucial idea is that performing a communicative act is a matter of producing an utterance intending both (a) for one’s addressee to have a specified response, and (b) for one’s addressee recognize to that this response is intended.

One virtue of this view is that it correctly predicts a three-way distinction among the success conditions for speech acts. To succeed in performing an illocutionary act requires merely producing an utterance with a communicative intention; nothing on the part of the addressee is required. To succeed in communicating via one’s act requires that the addressee recognize what kind of response one is trying to produce. Actually producing this response, on the other hand, constitutes a further kind of perlocutionary success. According to a simple intentionalist account of assertion, for example, asserting \( p \) requires uttering something with a communicative intention for one’s addressee to believe \( p \). Communication happens when the addressee recognizes that this is what one intends. Actually convincing them of \( p \) is another matter.

Different kinds of communicative act are distinguished, on this view, by the different kinds of responses that they are intended to have. To direct someone to \( \varphi \)—to request or command that they \( \varphi \), for example—is to communicatively intend for them to respond by \( \varphi \)ing (or by forming an intention to \( \varphi \)). Questions, according to most intentionalists, comprise a subcategory of directives whose aim is for the addressee to respond by answering. Although intentionalists have typically focused on these three categories, other kinds of communicatively intended responses are easy to think of, and Grice considered some others.

Most of this picture is already visible in Grice’s early work on speaker meaning (1957; 1968; 1969), though Grice avoids most of the vocabulary of speech acts, which he seems to have regarded as proprietary to Austin’s competitor view. Later intentionalists, including Strawson (1964), Schiffer (1972, ch.4), and Bach & Harnish (1979), show how to translate Grice’s ideas into the standard terminology of speech-act theory, construct detailed taxonomies of illocutionary acts by carving up the different kinds of responses at which they’re aimed, and extend Grice’s views in some other ways.

No intentionalist claims that this view applies to all of what Austin called illocutionary acts. One can’t get married or testify in court just by speaking with
certain intentions, for example; various cultural or institutional background conditions must also obtain. Intentionalists typically argue that, unlike these constitutively conventional acts, communicative illocutionary acts needn't be performed relative to any particular cultural or institutional background (Bach and Harnish, 1979, chs.6–7). All that is required to perform an assertion or a request, or to successfully interpret one, on this view, is that one be a creature with an advanced capacity to represent other agents’ mental states. It is therefore open to intentionalists to hold that the categories of speech acts in which they’re interested are natural kinds—defined in terms of cognitive endowments shared by nearly all humans—unlike the localized and contingent social kinds on which Austin focused. Partly for this reason, intentionalism has been an influential view among anthropologists, cognitive ethologists, and cognitive scientists who study the psychological underpinnings and evolutionary origins of language and communication.

An influential kind of objection to intentionalism accuses it of being too unconstrained, in part because it minimizes the role of linguistic convention in limiting which speech acts can be performed. A simple worry of this kind stems from the accusation of Humpty Dumptyism: it seems to follow from intentionalism, as just stated, that any utterance can be used to perform any kind of speech act, so long as the speaker has the requisite intentions. But, according to the critics, we can't say anything we choose with any words we please; the conventions governing the expressions we use place strict constraints on what we can use them to mean (see, e.g., Searle 1965; 1969). Intentionalists typically respond to this line of thought by pointing out that, at least if we are rational, what we intend is constrained by what we believe. You can't rationally intend to eat an entire herd of cattle today because the possibility of doing so is ruled out by your beliefs. Likewise, if you think it is impossible to communicate the entire content of the Pentagon Papers with a wink of an eye, you can't rationally form a communicative intention to do so. On this view, one's appreciation of linguistic conventions constrains which speech acts one can perform by constraining what one can rationally intend to get across by speaking.

The idea that communication requires advanced mindreading capacities is an empirical prediction that some have sought to falsify. For example, the fact that three year olds can use language but routinely fail explicit false belief tasks was widely thought to pose a potential counterexample (e.g., Breheny 2006) until new experimental methods suggested that infants detect others' goals and false beliefs much earlier (Carey, 2009; Carruthers, 2006; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Tomasello, 2008). Some autistic adults pose a similar problem, and a similar dialectic has emerged (for a summary, see Goldman 2012). On the other hand, some accounts of both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of human language hold that advanced mindreading capacities play a crucial role (Bloom, 2000; Hacquard, 2014; Scott-Phillips, 2014; Tomasello, 2008). These views sit nicely with intentionalism.

On this response to Humpty-Dumpty worries, see Donnellan (1968); Grice (1969); Neale (2004).
Of course, it does follow from intentionalism that speakers can sometimes perform speech acts that bear no conventional relationship to the expressions they utter. Given the existence of indirect and nonliteral speech acts, most intentionalists take this to be a welcome consequence of their view. The counterintuitive corollary is that it is also possible for a speaker to perform speech acts that bear no conventional relationship to the expressions they utter, even if they don't intend to speak indirectly or non-literally, provided that they are sufficiently delusional or irrational. If a speaker comes to mistakenly believe that 'it's warm in here' is, according to local conventions, a good way to assert that it's cold in here, then they can indeed do so. The best response available to the intentionalist may be that, although it is indeed unintuitive to say that such speakers are performing the predicted assertions, that is what a hearer would have to interpret them as doing in order for communication to take place. And, indeed, if the hearer is aware of the speaker's delusion, this may very well happen. Supposing that an illocutionary act is that which must be correctly interpreted in order for communication to succeed, intentionalism seems to make the right predictions in such cases.

A final noteworthy consequence of intentionalism is that that communicative illocutionary acts turn out not to be essentially linguistic in nature or form. Grice makes it clear that by 'utterance', he means any observable behavior, linguistic or otherwise, that can serve as a vehicle for speaker meaning. This includes linguistic utterances, but also various other kinds of behaviors, as several of his original case studies demonstrate. Consider Grice's example of drawing a "picture of Mr. Y [displaying undue familiarity to Mrs. X] and show[ing] it to Mr. X" in order to mean "that Mr. Y had been unduly familiar" (1989, 218). There is no convention at work here, but merely a loose iconic relationship between the picture and its subject matter, which the "speaker" exploits in order to guide Mr. X to a correct hypothesis about their communicative intention. But for an intentionalist, the speaker here is performing essentially the same kind of communicative act as they would have if they had said, 'Mr. Y has been unduly familiar with Mrs. X'. What distinguishes the two cases is merely the kind of evidence that the speaker offers of their communicative intentions. Semantics, on this view, can be thought of as the study of a system by which language users encode richly structured, but merely partial evidence of their communicative intentions (Neale, 2004, 2005; Schiffer, 2003; Sperber and Wilson, 1995). This view has interesting consequences for the nature of assertion, among other acts. For, although we can continue to use 'assertion' to denote communicative acts performed with language, this would make the category somewhat theoretically uninteresting. If 'assertion' picks out a natural kind, then it is a kind that brings together both linguistic and nonlinguistic acts that are united by the sorts of intentions with which they're performed.
1.3 Function

The family of views we’ll call ‘functionalism’ is easiest to understand as an alternative to intentionalism. Both perspectives maintain that a speech act is characterized by the effect that it is the act’s purpose to have. But whereas intentionalists think that a communicative act’s purpose derives from the intention with which it was performed, functionalists think that a speech act at least sometimes has a purpose that derives from some other, less agential source. For example, Millikan (1998) argues that, in at least some cases, the properties of a speech act are a matter of its proper function, and that a given kind of speech act acquires its proper function through a process akin to natural selection. Millikan holds that causing belief is the proper function of certain assertions. Assertions will have this function because prior iterations have caused similar beliefs, and, crucially, these past successes have played a crucial causal role in their reproduction. Millikan argues that these functions attach to grammatically individuated utterance-types, such as clause types:

Thus, a proper function of the imperative mood is to induce the action described, and a proper function of the indicative mood is to induce belief in the proposition expressed. (2005, 157)

Millikan’s view is complicated by the fact that she also bases her theory of convention around the notion of proper function. Her theory could therefore be categorized as a compromise between intentionalism and a version of conventionalism: what defines a speech act is its purpose, which may derive from either the intention or the convention (i.e., proper function) behind it, or perhaps some complex combination of the two. However, since Millikan leaves open the possibility that an act-type’s proper function may have been selected for not just during the language-learning process but also during biological evolution—it may be, for example, that the functions of certain grammatical features are innate and universal to humans—her version of conventionalism differs from most of the others on the market.

Building on Millikan’s influence, a related version of functionalism about communicative acts has developed around the study of signaling games in the theory of replicator dynamics.\footnote{Replicator dynamics is the study of evolutionary processes using the theory of iterated games. For an overview of applications to communication, see Harms (2004a); Skyrms (2010).} As in both Grice’s and Millikan’s theories, this view takes communication to be a way of influencing others’ thoughts or actions. We can think of each instance of potential communication as a signaling game in which a sender performs an action and a receiver responds in some way. By making minimal assumptions about agents’ shared interests and capacities to replicate behaviors that have tended to serve those interests in the past, one can show, by means of precise
game-theoretic models, that they will reach equilibria in which senders reliably produce advantageous responses in receivers. This can be seen as a theory of linguistic convention, and as a theory of how different kinds of illocutionary act, which function to reliably produce different kinds of effects in addressees, could enter a population's repertoire. However, as in Millikan's theory, replicator-dynamic models abstract away from questions about whether the kind of replication in question is a kind of learning or a kind of biological evolution. For this reason, such models have become important tools in the study of animal communication (see, e.g., Bradbury and Vehrencamp 2011, ch.1).

The fact that functionalist models of communication have been applied to organisms varying in sophistication from bacteria to humans gives rise to interesting questions. For example: what are the conditions in which signals with different kinds of illocutionary force can be said to exist in signaling systems of this kind? Millikan (1984; 2005) argues that simple organisms and their signaling systems (as well as, e.g., the human autonomic nervous system) should be understood in terms of “pushmi–pullyu representations”, which “at the same time tell what the case is with some part of the world and direct what to do about it” (2005, 87). Similarly, Harms (2004b) argues that only a kind of “primitive meaning”, with no differentiation between assertoric and directive force, can emerge in populations of psychologically unsophisticated organisms.10

Are bacteria communication and human communication really so similar that both can be modeled in the same way? There are some concrete reasons to think not. In order to have a certain communicative function, a signal-type must have a history of differential reproduction. But humans often communicate with novel signal types. Most linguistic utterances, which involve sentences never before uttered, give us one kind of example. It may be that this problem can be solved by showing how sentences’ proper functions are determined compositionally from the proper functions of their sub-sentential parts.11 However, nonlinguistic communicative acts, indirect speech acts, and speech acts performed with context-sensitive vocabulary seem to be improvisational and dependent on humans’ rich cognitive capacities in ways that resist this treatment. In the right context, it is possible to use a sentence to implicate something that it has never been used to implicate before, for example, and a gradable adjective (e.g. ‘tall’) can be used in context to literally and directly express a novel property (tall, by the standards of the marathon runners in this race).

10 Criteria for distinguishing assertoric and directive force in iterated signaling models are proposed by Blume and Board (2013); Franke (2012); Huttegger (2007); Zollman (2011). Murray and Starr (this volume) use work in the functionalist tradition to draw fine-grained distinctions between kinds of illocutionary force.

11 This is what Millikan suggests in her discussion of "semantic mapping functions" (Millikan, 2005, ch.3).
This suggests that human communication is thoroughly infused greater flexibility
than functionalist models can account for.

In practice, many theorists have therefore sought to combine functionalist and
intentionalist models, with the former accounting for animal communication and
perhaps some simple cases of human communication, and the latter accounting for
flexible and cognitively demanding instances of human communication.\footnote{E.g., Green (2007b); Millikan (1998); Scott-Phillips (2014).}

1.4 Expression

We’ll use the label ‘expressionism’ for another family of views that have often been
advocated as less intellectually demanding alternatives to intentionalism.\footnote{Note that the term ‘expressionism’ should not be confused with ‘expressivism’. Although some versions of expressivism assume that speech acts are individuated by the kinds of mental states they
express, so that, for example, moral claims are distinguished from factual assertions by the fact that they express non-cognitive states of mind rather than beliefs, other versions of expressivism have been
constructed to fit with other theories of illocutionary acts. We’ll say more about this in §§2–3.}

Theories of this kind are based on the idea that performing a speech act is fundamentally
a matter of expressing a state of mind, and that different kinds of illocutionary acts
express states of different kinds. Expressionism is a close relative of intentionalism,
since it grounds the properties of illocutionary acts in facts about speakers’ mental
states. Whereas intentionalists categorize speech acts in terms of the psychological
responses they are intended to produce in addressees, however, expressionists cate-
gorize speech acts in terms of the different kinds of states in the speaker’s mind
that they express. So, for example, whereas a simple intentionalism will say that a
speech act is an assertion because it is performed with the intention of getting the
addressee to form a belief, a simple expressionism will say that an act counts as an
assertion because it is an expression of the speaker’s belief.

Several arguments for preferring expressionism over intentionalism rest on the
premise that intentionalism over-intellectualizes the performance of speech acts by
requiring speakers to have complex, higher-order thoughts. Some have doubted
that such complex cognitive states are necessary for language use, or that they are
present in many human language users. Others have argued that intentionalism’s
rich psychological commitments obscure important points of contact between speech
acts and closely related categories of communicative action. Green (2007b) argues
that expressionism makes better sense of the continuities between illocutionary acts,
on one hand, and behaviors that are expressive of thought in less controlled or vol-
tuntary ways, on the other. In a similar vein, Bar-On (2013) argues that expression-
ism does better than intentionalism at explaining the continuities between human
communication and the kinds of less cognitively sophisticated communication em-

ployed by our non-human ancestors.14

The crucial ingredient in any version of expressionism is the relation of expressing a state of mind. Different versions of expressionism cash out this relation in different ways. Some accounts of the expressing relation are epistemic. According to Davis’s account (1992; 2003), to express a thought is to do something in order to indicate—i.e., to give strong but defeasible evidence—that one has the thought. Pagin (2011) articulates an alternative epistemic relation between assertions and thought contents that he calls ‘prima facie informativeness’. Green (2007b) combines expressionism with intentionalism in holding that performing a speech act is a matter of intentionally and overtly making one’s thoughts manifest, but argues that it is also possible to express mental states in ways that don’t presuppose intentional control. Other expressionist accounts have been spelled out in terms of relations that are causal rather than epistemic in nature (Rosenthal, 1986; Turri, 2011), including some who have appealed to the idea that it is the proper function of certain behaviors to express certain kinds of thoughts, thus blurring the lines between functionalism and expressionism (Bar-On, 2013; Green, 2007b). More often, the idea that it is the role of speech to “express thought” has been presented as a platitudinous or as a pretheoretic datum, without a serious attempt to elucidate the notion of expressing involved (e.g. Devitt 2006, §8.2; Fodor et al 1974).

One additional challenge for expressionism is to find a different kind of thought to individuate each theoretically interesting kind of speech act. It is a commonplace among expressionists that assertions express beliefs (or, alternatively, knowledge; see Turri 2011). But what about other kinds of speech act? One methodological tactic for answering this question revolves around Moore’s paradox. Assertions of sentences of the form ‘p, but I don’t [believe/know] that p’, such as (3) and (4), are always infelicitous in some way, although their contents are neither contradictory nor necessarily false.

(3) I have two hands, but I don’t believe that I have two hands.

(4) I’m doing philosophy, but I don’t know that I am doing philosophy.

Some have argued that infelicity of this kind arises because, for example, someone who uses (3) literally would be expressing a belief that they have two hands (with the first conjunct) while also reporting that they lack this belief (with the second conjunct).15 So, although the content of a Moore-paradoxical assertion is not contradictory, there is clearly something irrational about performing such an assertion.

14For a rejoinder to Bar-On’s line of thought, see see (Scott-Phillips, 2014, §2.7), who argues that human communication is discontinuous with all known non-human communication precisely because of the role played by communicative intentions.

15E.g. Black (1952); DeRose (1991, 2002); Green (2007a); Rosenthal (1986); Slote (1979); Turri
The subsequent line of thought is that we may be able to use variations on Moore’s paradox to diagnose the mental states expressed by other kinds of speech act. For example, Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) argue that sentences of the form ‘φ, but I don’t want you to φ’, such as (5), are Moore-paradoxical.

(5) Take the train, but I don’t want you to take it.

Partly on the basis of this evidence, Condoravdi and Lauer conclude that the speech acts we canonically perform with imperatives are expressions of “effective preference”, which they take to be a species of desire.

Expressionism is sometimes preferred to intentionalism on the grounds that, by removing the addressee from the picture, it can account for speech acts that lack an addressee (e.g. Davis 1992, 239). However, this feature can also be a bug. Removing the addressee from the picture is problematic because a single utterance sometimes seems to be used to perform two distinct speech acts with distinct addressees. To use a slightly silly example, imagine a harried Wall-Street trader shouting ‘sell!’ while holding a phone to each side of his face—one connecting him to stock broker A, who handles his Apple stock, and the other connecting him to stock broker B, who handles his Google stock. A plausible description of what is going on here would be that the trader is telling A to sell his Apple stock and telling B to sell his Google stock—two distinct directives, aimed at different addressees, performed by means of a single utterance. Although this case is somewhat artificial, a variety of real-world analogues are possible. Egan (2009) considers distributed readings of multiple-addressee assertions and directives in which a different content is expressed relative to each addressee, for example. It is quite plausible that a similar phenomenon is at work when a political satirist manages to come across as endorsing a policy to a right-wing audience while simultaneously mocking that audience and the proposal to a left-wing audience. The same sort of phenomenon is frequently exhibited by politicians and other public figures when they employ dogwhistles—speech acts that communicate a literal meaning to the public while also communicating some more controversial message to a subset of the public who are in the know.

The most obvious accounts of these and other highly nuanced communicative phenomena draw on the resources of intentionalism: one can perform two speech acts addressed to two audiences with a single utterance because one can communicatively intend to affect two addressees in different ways at the same time. Jennifer (2011); Unger (1975); Williamson (2000). The origins of this way of thinking about Moore’s paradox can be found in the late work of Wittgenstein (e.g. 1953, §§87ff.). Of course, proponents of each of the other families of views about speech acts have proposed alternative accounts of Moore’s paradox as well, and so it is controversial whether Moore’s paradox gives any support to expressionism as such.
Saul (this volume) gives roughly this kind of account of what she calls ‘overt dog-whistles’. In a similar vein, Elisabeth Camp (this volume) argues that insinuation is a speech act that is made possible by communicators’ highly nuanced appreciation of one another’s beliefs, intentions, and commitments. Any version of expressionism or functionalism that wishes to avoid appealing to intentionalist resources will have to say what is going on in such cases. In practice, many expressionists and functionalists do appeal to speakers’ intentions, if only to explain what makes such cases so much more sophisticated than run-of-the-mill speech (Green, 2007b; Millikan, 1998).

1.5 Norm

A final family of theories holds that speech acts are fundamentally normative phenomena. An influential version of this idea holds that the act of asserting is constitutively normative—that at least part of what makes an act an assertion is that the act is governed by a special epistemic norm. Although normative accounts of assertion have been around for decades (Dummett, 1973; Unger, 1975), the view has recently been revived and influentially defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that the knowledge norm is the constitutive norm of assertion.

(1) THE KNOWLEDGE NORM

One must: assert p only if one knows that p.  
(Williamson, 2000, 243)

It is important to separate out two claims here. First, it is relatively uncontroversial that assertion is governed by some epistemic norm or other. We subject speakers to warranted criticism for saying things that they don’t believe, that aren’t true, for which they lack evidence, or that they don’t know. It is tempting to think that Moore-paradoxical claims of the form ‘p, but I don’t [believe/know/have evidence] that p’ are not merely infelicitous, but normatively defective—a point that Williamson uses to defend the knowledge norm. Much of the debate about norms of assertion has revolved around whether the norm of assertion should be formulated in terms of knowledge, belief, truth, justification, or some other notion.16

16 Proponents of some version of the knowledge norm include Adler (2002); Benton (2011, 2012a,b); DeRose (2002); Engel (2008); Hawthorne (2004); Reynolds (2002); Schaffer (2008); Stanley (2005); Turri (2010, 2015); Unger (1975); Williamson (1996, 2000). Others have argued, instead, that knowledge is governed by norms of knowledge-transmissibility (Garia-Carpintero, 2004; Hinchman, 2013; Pelling, 2013), belief (Bach, 2008), rational belief (Douven, 2006, 2009), reasonable belief (Lackey, 2007), supportive reasons (McKinnon, 2015), justification (Kvanvig, 2009, 2011), evidence-responsiveness (Maitra and Weatherson, 2010), epistemic certainty (Stanley, 2008), and truth (MacFarlane, 2014; Weiner, 2005). For overviews of this literature, see Weiner (2005) and Pagin (2016, §6.2).
A second, much more controversial claim is that being subject to an epistemic norm of this kind is what makes an act an assertion—i.e., that there is a constitutive norm of assertion. Few of Williamson’s arguments seem to bear on this issue, and few others in the literature on knowledge norms have taken it up either. But, for the purpose of understanding the nature of speech acts, this is the crucial issue. After all: an intentionalist, conventionalist, functionalist, or expressionist could agree that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm, but could argue that this follows from their particular account of assertion, together with broader facts about the norms governing social interaction more generally. Certain normative consequences follow from Searle’s (1969) accounts of various speech acts, for example, but he holds that this is a consequence of the conventions governing speech acts’ sincerity conditions. Likewise, an intentionalist might argue that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm because it is governed by the maxim of quality, which is just one manifestation of Grice’s cooperative principle, which governs all cooperative activities. On this view, arguments over the formulation of the knowledge norm might best be understood as arguments over which formulation of the maxim of quality follows from the cooperative principle.¹⁷

A second worry about the idea that assertion is constituted by an epistemic norm is that it is hard to see how such an account would extend to other speech acts. How, for example, would we fill in the gaps in (2)–(4) in order to give constitutive accounts of questioning, requesting, and advising?

(2) One must: ask someone whether q only if …

(3) One must: request that someone ψ only if …

(4) One must: advise someone to ψ only if …

No attempt has been made to answer these questions, or to say what would count as a general theory of speech acts in the spirit of an epistemic-norm account of assertion. However, the idea that we should treat assertion as theoretically disjoint from other speech acts is bizarre. As McGlynn puts the point, knowledge-norm accounts of assertion threaten to repeat the mistake that speech-act theory was founded in order to address, since they ignore “the worry that many philosophers had fetishized the speech act of assertion, and ignored all the rest” (2014, 82). This presumably plays a role in explaining why interest in epistemic-norm accounts has been stronger among epistemologists than among philosophers of language or linguists.

¹⁷The idea of reducing the norm of assertion to a Gricean maxim has been suggested by Cappelen (2011); Goldberg (2013); Montgomery (2014); Sosa (2009). Benton (2016) argues that this sort of reduction fails. Ball (2014) argues that the normative properties of speech acts follow from their naturalistic properties by giving an account that draws on both Grice’s and Millikan’s ideas about speech acts.
A different kind of normative account is built around the idea that performing a speech act is, fundamentally, a matter of doing something that gives rise to certain rights (or entitlements) and obligations (or commitments). An influential defense of this idea is due to Brandom (1983; 1994; 2000), who argues that to assert \( p \) is to do something that entitles participants in the conversation to make a characteristic range of \( p \)-related inferences and responses, and that commits the speaker to justify \( p \) and related claims going forward. Homolka and Lance (2009; 2013) have developed a related, normative treatment of a range of other illocutionary acts, and several authors have argued that normatively rich accounts of speech acts can help us to understand speech acts of urgent social concern. Kukla (2014) draws on an account of this kind in order to argue that a speaker’s social status can contravene their intentions, altering their act’s illocutionary force—for example, by demoting it from a command to a request. Lynn Tirrell has used a normative pragmatic framework to understand the hate speech that typifies the buildup to acts of genocide (2012). In a series of papers, Mary Kate McGowan has argued that a wide range of speech acts, including regular communicative acts but also pornography and hate speech, should be understood as having “covert exercitive force”: they change what is permissible in a norm-governed social activity going forward (2003; 2004; 2009a; 2009b; 2012; this volume).

How should we understand the claim that speech acts of a given kind enact norms? This could be a fundamental fact about the speech act—part of what makes it the kind of speech act it is. Brandom, MacFarlane, and Lance clearly wish to be understood in this way, and so their theories must be understood as competing with the other accounts of speech acts outlined here. A deflationary alternative would be to concede that the speech acts in question sometimes, normally, or even always have the effect of enacting normative facts, but to hold that this is a mere consequence of some not-essentially-normative account of the speech act itself, together with facts about the wider normative scene in which speech acts are situated. Promising, for example, would seem to be a norm-enacting speech act

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18 Brandom says that his theory of assertion “is largely a footnote to Sellars’ [1956] seminal discussion of …endorsement” (1983, fn.14). Sellars can also be seen as a major influence on functionalist theories. For an discussion of Sellars' differing influences on Millikan and Brandom, see Millikan 2005, ch.4.

19 Krifka (2014) also endorses a commitment-theoretic account, of illocutionary force, but without fleshing out the foundational details.
if any is, since a felicitous promise is characterized by the creation of what is often called a “promissory obligation”—the speaker’s obligation to keep the promise. Theories that take speech acts to be fundamentally norm enacting would seem to have a head start on explaining this phenomenon. However, there are alternative options. In Searle’s (1969, ch.3) influential account of promising, which serves as the template for his account of other illocutionary acts, enacting new commitments is indeed part of what it is to make a promise. However, for Searle, this outcome of promises is, like the rest of his theory of speech acts, ultimately a matter of linguistic convention. Likewise, an intentionalist, a functionalist, or an expressionist could hold that promissory obligation results from the expectations that tend to result from successfully coordinating one’s intentions with others—a view that can be made to fit with a range of normative theories (see, e.g. Norcross 2011; Scanlon 1990; 1998, ch.7). Likewise, the commitments engendered by assertion might be understood as consequences of intentionalism plus Grice’s cooperative principle: roughly, asserting p commits one to justify p, and to retract p should its falsity come to light, because it would be uncooperative to intend for one’s actions to produce a belief in p if one did not undertake commitments of this kind.20

2 Discourse Context and Conversational Score

Much recent work on speech acts, including most of the work collected in this volume, is based on the idea that conversations are organized around contexts. In the technical sense at issue here, contexts are shared and evolving representations of the state of play in a conversation that both shape the qualities of speech acts and are in turn shaped by them.21 Following Lewis (1979), it has become common to discuss context through the metaphor of “conversational score”. Just as the activities in a baseball game are dictated by the current state of its score—the current inning and number of runs, outs, balls, strikes, etc.—a conversation’s score dictates how context-sensitive expressions can be used and interpreted. And just as plays in a baseball game function to change one or more elements of the score, moves in a language game—i.e., speech acts—function to change the state of the context.

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20 Several authors have defended similar lines of thought aimed at showing that the normativity of both speech acts (and, in some cases, also thoughts) is not among their fundamental features (Ball, 2014; Boghossian, 2003; Glüer, 2001; Glüer and Wikforss, 2009; Wikforss, 2001).

2.1 Score and the Five Families

Score-theoretic accounts of speech acts are sometimes treated as an alternative to the five families of theory discussed in §1. In fact, however, talk of context and conversational score has been variously interpreted so as to be compatible with theories of all five kinds. As a result, many debates in contemporary semantics and pragmatics appear to be framed in terms of shared assumptions about conversational score, but this framing often masks foundational disagreements.

According to one influential view, originating with Stalnaker (1978), the context of a conversation reduces to the shared propositional attitudes of its participants. To perform a speech act is to do something with an intention of changing these shared attitudes. This amounts to a version of intentionalism that substitutes shared, public mental states for the private ones that Grice took to be the targets of speech acts.\(^{22}\) In her contribution to this volume, Craige Roberts articulates a detailed theory of this kind that accounts for assertions, questions, and directives. Roberts follows Stalnaker in taking assertions to be aimed at adding their content to the common ground—the set of propositions that the participants in a conversation commonly accept for the purposes of the conversation. Questions and directives aim to alter other components of the context, each of which reflects participants’ publicly shared goals. A directive’s aim is to add to the addressee’s domain goals—the perhaps extra-conversational goals to whose satisfaction participants are publicly committed. The aim of a question is to make it the new question under discussion (QUD)—the question that it is currently the participants’ conversational aim to answer. Roberts’ version of intentionalism resembles Grice’s, except that the roles he assigns to beliefs and intentions are, for her, played by the interlocutors’ shared information and goals. At this level of abstraction, Roberts agrees with Portner (2004; 2007; 2012), who argues that assertions are proposals to change the common ground, questions are proposals to change the QUD, and directives are proposals to change the To-Do List, which he thinks of as the “public and interactional” counterpart to agents’ desires or intentions, just as common ground is the public and interactional counterpart to their beliefs (2004, 242).

It’s easy to see that a functionalist about speech acts can adopt a similar approach by positing the same components of context, grounded in the same way in agents’ propositional attitudes. The difference would be that what makes it the case that an utterance of a certain kind is a speech act of a certain kind is that, in at least some

\(^{22}\) Although Stalnaker often frames his view as a version of intentionalism—including in his piece for this volume—he sometimes instead refers to speech acts as “proposals” to change the context without further cashing out this talk of proposals in terms of the speaker’s intentions. And in at least one place, he expresses doubt about whether every such proposal to change the context must be intended to change the context in the way proposed (1999, 87).
cases, utterances of that kind have the proper function of changing the context in a
given way.

Each of the foregoing views presupposes psychologism about context—the view
that facts about context are somehow grounded in facts about the mental lives of
the participants in a conversation. But there are several alternative conceptions of
the metaphysics of conversational score. For example, Brandom argues that speech
acts “alter the deontic score, they change what commitments and entitlements it is
appropriate to attribute, not only to the one producing the speech act, but also to
those to whom it is addressed” (Brandom, 1994, 142). On this view, facts about
score are deeply normative, and may float free of participants’ opinions about what
the score is. In their contributions to this volume, both McGowan and Camp argue
that at least some components of the score must be objectively normative in this
sense. McGowan’s reason is that an objective notion of score is needed to make
sense of covert exercitives—speech acts that change permissibility facts in ways that
may go unacknowledged by the participants in a conversation. Camp argues that a
normative account of score is needed to make sense of the way in which insinuation
can give rise to unacknowledged commitments on the part of the speaker.

Camp also argues that at least some aspects of the score are “essentially linguist-
ic”, in that “the kind of commitment one undertakes by an utterance depends in
part on the language game in which it is generated” (p.XX). This idea presents an-
other sort of alternative to psychologism about context. On this conventionalist
approach, conversational score is the product of the conventions governing either
language use itself or social interaction more broadly. This way of thinking is sug-
gested by Lewis’s (1979) analogy with baseball score. The fact that baseball involves
both balls and strikes is due to nothing deeper than the conventions of baseball. Per-
haps the fact that contexts include both, say, a common ground and a To-Do List
is similarly due to nothing deeper than the conventions governing our language
games. Imagine that, halfway through a baseball game, everyone involved is over-
come by a collective delusion: although the home team has scored only two runs,
everyone comes to commonly believe that they have scored three. Nonetheless, this
delusion would not make it the case that a third run has been scored. There are
objective, mind-independent facts about what a baseball game’s score is at a given
moment. These facts are determined by the conventional rules governing the kine-
matics of baseball—the rules by which games may unfold over time—together with
facts about what has already taken place in the game. In principle, everyone could
be wrong about the score. According to DeVault and Stone (2006), we should un-
derstand conversational score as being “objective and normative” in just this sense.

21 For a lucid comparison of Brandom’s views to those of orthodox dynamic semanticists, see Nickel
(2013).
Conversational score is determined by the rules of language, together with the fact that certain other moves have been made up until now in the discourse. Although participants should attempt to track the score with their shared attitudes, the score is not just whatever interlocutors take it to be. The chief advantage of this conception of score, according to DeVault and Stone, is that it allows us to make better sense of discourses that turn on the participants’ confusion about what has already taken place in a conversation.

A conventionalist approach to conversational score fits nicely with dynamic-semantic approaches to sentence meaning. On views of this kind, the meaning of a sentence is its context-change potential—a function that determines a unique output context for every context in which the sentence can be felicitously uttered. On this view, provided that participants are speaking literally, the series of past conversational moves together with the semantics of the language being spoken would fully determine the score at a given moment.

This is the sort of system that DeVault and Stone (2006) present, and that Lepore and Stone (2015; this volume) defend. At the center of their approach is an attempt to respond to a serious problem for conventionalist approaches built around conversational score, stemming from the observation that the context of a conversation often seems to evolve in ways that aren’t wholly governed by convention. Some aspects of conversational score can be manipulated by means of indirect speech acts, whose content and force seemingly aren’t a matter of convention. Lepore and Stone reply that these supposedly non-conventional speech acts fall into one of two categories. Some aren’t really illocutionary acts at all: since it’s impossible for interlocutors to agree on the precise way in which many indirect speech acts are intended to update the score, they mustn’t be attempts to do so. On the other hand, some genuine examples of indirect speech acts should be understood as semantically encoded. In their essay for this volume, Lepore and Stone develop this approach by giving a dynamic-semantic treatment of the indirect-request reading of sentences like ‘can you pass the salt?’. On their view, this sentence has a reading on which its semantic value is a context-change potential that specifies two successive updates to the context, the first a question and the second a request. If an account of this kind can be generalized to make sense of other indirect speech acts, conventionalism will

\footnote{Note, however, that the connection between dynamic semantics and conventionalism about conversational score is somewhat loose. An intentionalist could adopt dynamic semantics, taking each sentence’s context-change potential to be evidence of how a speaker who used the sentence literally would be intending to affect the context. Likewise, conventionalism about context does not, strictly speaking, entail dynamic semantics: a static semantics could be paired with pragmatic rules governing the kinematics of score, but these pragmatic rules could be construed as ultimately a matter of social convention. The latter option would depend on some explanation of why we should distinguish the semantic conventions from the pragmatic conventions, but the position is a coherent one.}
have answered one of its most significant objections.

Further challenges lurk, however. One way for it to become common ground that there is a goat in the room is for someone to assert that there is a goat in the room; another way is for a goat to wander into our midst and for us all to notice it (and notice each other noticing it, etc.). Importantly, each of these events can influence the future of the conversation in similar ways. For example, either event licenses the use of a pronoun (‘it’, or perhaps ‘he’ or ‘she’) to discuss the goat. Roberts (2002; 2003; 2005) argues that this is no coincidence: definite noun phrases are sensitive to facts about the context, but don’t care whether the context got that way by linguistic or nonlinguistic means. Roberts thus advocates a kind of “dynamic pragmatics” on which the rules by which conversational score evolves is largely a matter of pragmatic, rather than semantic, factors. Other defenders of dynamic pragmatics include Karen Lewis (2011; 2012; 2014), Portner (2004; this volume), and Stalnaker (2014; this volume). Stalnaker’s contribution to this volume, in particular, is aimed at challenging both conventionalist theories of context and dynamic approaches to semantics; he argues that we should “represent the structure of discourse in a way that is independent of the linguistic mechanisms by which the purposes of the practice of discourse are realized” (p.XX).

2.2 Speech-Act Taxonomy and The Structure of Contexts

Theories of speech acts that are spelled out in terms of context or conversational score suggest the following approach to taxonomizing speech acts: identify the components of context (score) that we have reason to posit, identify the different ways in which those components can be manipulated by speaking, and individuate speech-act categories in terms of these different ways of manipulating the different components of score.45 As we have already seen, Roberts and Portner each pursue a version of this strategy to account for the difference between assertions, questions, and directives.

But of course, these aren’t the only three interesting categories of speech act. There are also various other categories, and there are apparently also sub-categories within these categories. The latter point is most obvious in the case of the speech acts that we tend to perform with imperative sentences, which include distinct sub-categories of directives, such as requests and commands, as well as weaker, non-

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45Influential early statements of this idea include Carlson (1982); Cohen and Perrault (1979); Gazdar (1981); Hamblin (1971); Heim (1982, 1983); Kamp (1981); Lewis (1979); Stalnaker (1978). The idea is now too widespread to comprehensively cite, though some influential recent contributions that focus on the nature of communicative acts include Beaver (2001); Condoravdi and Lauer (2012); Farkas and Bruce (2010); Ginzburg (2012); Gunlogson (2001); Murray (2014); Murray and Starr (MS); Portner (2004, 2007, 2012); Roberts (2004, 2012); Starr (ms, 2010, 2014); Thomason (1990); Veltman (1996); Yalcin (2007, 2012).
directive acts, such as permissions, acquiescences, wishes, and disinterested advice.  

5 Bring me my scepter!  COMMAND/ORDER  

6 Pass me the hammer.  REQUEST  

7 Have a cookie.  PERMISSION/OFFER  

8 (Go ahead:) Eat the rest of my sandwich.  ACQUIESCENCE  

9 Get well soon!  WISH  

10 Take the six train.  DISINTERESTED ADVICE/INSTRUCTION

Various strategies for drawing these distinctions have been pursued. One idea is that the different uses of imperatives involve different kinds of indirect speech acts either in addition to or instead of the main speech act. Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) defend a version of this view on which imperatives literally encode an expression of desire, and on which various flavors of directive force arise due to features of the context. Harris (2014) argues that imperatives encode neutral directive force, but follows Schiffer (1972) in thinking that both individual flavors of directive force and non-directive uses result from indirect speech acts that communicate the reason for which the speaker expects the addressee to act. von Fintel (1994) and Charlow (this volume) argue that some indirect-speech-act account must be correct, without supplying one.

Portner (2007; 2012) defends a different pragmatic account of imperatives’ illocutionary variability. On his view, imperatives are always used to update the addressee’s To-Do List, but each To-Do List contains different sub-lists corresponding to the different kinds of reasons that agents have for acting. Whereas a command proposes an update to the part of the To-Do List that corresponds to the addressee’s duties, a request proposes an update to the part of the To-Do List that corresponds to the speaker’s desires. In his contribution to this volume, Portner further elaborates this picture by distinguishing the To-Do Lists that represents interlocutors mutual commitments from those that publicly represent their individual commitments. In effect, this gives Portner a way of modeling the idea that whereas directive acts (such as requests and commands) propose coordination on a new shared commitment on the basis of the speaker’s preferences, weak uses of imperatives (e.g. permissions and permissions and

Stalnaker (this volume) suggests that the same issues arise for declaratives, and that what what many philosophers think of as assertions should be thought of as an epistemically distinctive sub-genre of what Stalnaker categorizes as assertions.
acquiescences) propose coordination on a new shared commitment on the basis of the addressee's preferences.

The most prominent semantic account of the illocutionary variability of imperatives has been defended by Kaufmann (2012), who argues that imperatives are deontic modals whose presuppositional contents force them to be used performatively. Just as the flavor of a deontic modal depends on the ordering source relative to which it is interpreted, the kind of speech act one performs by uttering an imperative depends on the operative ordering source (and perhaps also on other contextual parameters as well). In her contribution to this volume, Roberts splits the difference Portner's and Kaufmann's views: imperatives denote properties rather than modals, and they are used to propose shared goals (a view similar to Portner's), but, like deontic modals, imperatives' semantic values are parameterized to a modal base and ordering source, allowing them to be used with different forces.

In their contribution to this volume, Murray and Starr take a different kind of approach to the illocutionary variability of the three major clause types. They individuate speech acts at two distinct levels of abstraction and defend different kinds of theory about how individuation works at each level. At the more abstract level, Murray and Starr are conventionalists: each major clause type (declarative, interrogative, and imperative) is governed by a linguistic convention according to which uttering a clause of a given type results in a distinctive kind of context update. When it comes to finer-grained distinctions within each of these broad categories, Murray and Starr are functionalists. They argue that the particular illocutionary force of a speech act is a matter of how updating the context functions to affects interlocutors' private mental states. Although all literal speech acts performed using imperatives update the dimension of context that represents interlocutors joint preferences, doing so may have the function of changing interlocutors' private mental states in different ways, and their illocutionary force is a matter of this function, which arises from a selection process akin to those posited by, e.g., Millikan (1998) and Skyrms (1996).

A wide range of different kinds of context update have been posited in the semantics and pragmatics literature, and it is an open question whether all of these should be thought of as illocutionary acts. There are several interesting borderline cases. For example: one early argument for extending Stalnaker's model of common ground came from Irene Heim (1982; 1983), who argues that a variety of data about anaphora motivates positing a stock of discourse referents in as a component

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27The idea that imperatives are deontic modals in disguise has also been defended by Han (1998); Lewis (1975). Charlow (2010; 2014; this volume) also posits a close connection between deontic modals and imperatives, but with the twist that he is an expressivist about deontic modals, so that his view might better be described as one that uses the resources of a theory of imperatives to understand the nature of modals, rather than the other way around.
of the context. On Heim's view, the semantic values of definite noun phrases are determined, in part, by facts about the discourse referents currently on file in the context. On the other hand, part of the semantic role of indefinite noun phrases is to establish new discourse referents. In uttering 'A dog ate my homework', for example, a speaker not only contributes some information about the fate of their homework; they also establish a new discourse referent that may help to determine the semantic value of future definite noun phrases. From the fact that indefinites are, on this view, used to change the context in a distinctive kind of way, should we conclude that indefinites are used to perform a distinctive kind of illocutionary act? An affirmative answer would seem to follow from some versions of the idea that kinds of illocutionary act just are kinds of context update (e.g. Gazdar 1981), but more nuanced ways of drawing principled distinctions between illocutionary updates and other kinds of updates may also be available (e.g. Murray 2014).

A related set of questions arises from ways of conveying information that are unlike assertion in various respects. Take the following examples.

\[(11)\]
\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{a.} & \text{Tony, who is a linguist, often says 'ah ha' when listening to others.} \\
\text{b.} & \text{Tony is a linguist.}
\end{array}\]

\[(12)\]
\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{a.} & \text{My sister is coming to town.} \\
\text{b.} & \text{I have a sister.}
\end{array}\]

\[(13)\]
\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{a.} & \text{É-hótȟéva-Ø Sandy} \\
\text{3-win-dir Sandy} & \text{‘Sandy won (I witnessed).’} \\
\text{b.} & \text{I have direct evidence that Sandy won.}
\end{array}\]

\[(14)\]
\[\begin{array}{ll}
\text{a.} & \text{I'm in a bit of a hurry. Is there any way we can settle this right now? [to a cop after being pulled over for speeding]} \\
\text{b.} & \text{I am willing to bribe you not to write me a ticket.}
\end{array}\]

In uttering (11)a, one normally conventionally implicates a proposition that could be paraphrased with (11)b. Conventionally implicating a proposition is normally a way of informing one's interlocutors about it (Potts, 2005, §2.5.3). In uttering (12)a, one normally presumes a proposition that could be paraphrased with (12)b. Presumption is often explicated by saying that an utterance that presumes \( p \) is felicitous only if \( p \) is already in the common ground. However, presupposed contents

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\[^{18}\text{Heim explicitly construes her theory of context as an extension of Stalnaker's in her dissertation (1982, ch. 3, §§1.3–1.4). For related views, each of which can be understood as positing similar components of context, see (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1989, 1991; Kamp, 1981; Kamp and Reyle, 1993; Kattunen, 1976).}\]
that aren't already common ground are often accommodated (Lewis, 1979; Roberts, 2015a), so that (12)a can be a way of informing others that one has a sister. By virtue of the semantic rules governing evidential particles in Cheyenne, a speaker who utters (13)a would normally convey the content of (13)b. In uttering (14)a, one would normally be insinuating something that could be paraphrased as (14)b. However, each of these ways of informing differs from asserting in being less direct and harder to respond to in some ways. One can't disagree with any of these contributions by saying 'wrong' or 'that's false', for example, and they otherwise resist being referred to with propositional anaphora, as in 'that's very interesting'.

Some have tried to account for these phenomena by complicating their theories of conversational score in various ways. For example, Murray (2014) argues that, in addition to adding its content to the common ground, a successful assertion updates the score by establishing a propositional discourse referent for its content, allowing it to be anaphorically picked up by propositional anaphora. Not-at-issue contributions to common ground, such as those made via conventional implicatures, presuppositions, and evidentials, differ in that they fail to establish discourse referents.

Camp (this volume) pursues a similar account of insinuation and other communicative strategies that she describes as “off-record”. She distinguishes between the common ground, which is roughly as Stalnaker describes it, and the conversational record, which is an objective record of prior conversational contributions, and whose state is (at least largely) determined by linguistic conventions. Whereas a normal, literal, direct, and linguistically encoded assertion, if successful, both adds its content to the common ground and registers itself on the conversational record, not-at-issue contributions such as (11)b–(13)b may be added to the common ground without making it onto the record, and insinuated contents like (14)b can be communicated via a roughly Gricean mechanism despite neither becoming common ground nor registering on the conversational record. This not only explains why insinuated content can't be the target of propositional anaphora; it also explains why the speaker can often get away with denying that skillfully insinuated content was intended at all, even after having successfully communicated it to the addressee.

Another area where various novel ways of manipulating contexts have been posited is the literature on expressivism. One way of framing the project of expressivism is to say that when a speaker utters declarative sentences containing expressions of a certain kind—for example, normative expressions—the speech acts that

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99On the idea that some speech acts can be understood in terms of addressee-directed communicative intentions but not in terms of context-directed communicative intentions, see also (Harris, 2014, ch.3).
they perform aren’t normal assertions, but something else. For example, Hare (1952) argues that declarative sentences containing moral terms are used to perform special kinds of acts of recommendation, commendation, and condemnation, rather than assertion. On the contemporary scene, the obvious move is to develop expressivism into the view that certain expressions are used to update contexts in ways that differ from regular (i.e. ‘factual’) assertions. Recent years have seen an explosion of theories of this kind.

In his contribution to this volume, Seth Yalcin argues that it is a mistake to view these theories as trafficking in claims about illocutionary force, at least if ‘illocutionary force’ is understood in the same sense that speech-act theorists have traditionally been interested in. More broadly, Yalcin distinguishes the illocutionary force of a speech act from what he calls its dynamic force. By the latter, he means just the sort of force that we’ve been discussing in this section: the characteristic effect of an act on the context. But Yalcin argues that this notion of force is distinct from illocutionary force as traditionally conceived. The two notions belong to two kinds of theories that describe conversation at different levels of abstraction. Illocutionary force belongs to a level at which we aim to characterize the extra-linguistic uses to which speech is put. Dynamic force, on the other hand, characterizes conversation at a level of abstraction that “prescinds from the question what exactly the conversational state is taken by the interlocutors to be characterizing, and from the question what the speaker might be aiming to do, extra-linguistically speaking, by adding certain information to that state” (p.XX).

Yalcin’s is a heterodox view; most proponents of context-change accounts of speech acts have taken their theories to be in competition with alternative theories of illocutionary force. Moreover, several others have given rather different answers to the question of how facts about context relate to facts about interlocutors’ beliefs, plans, and other private mental states. As we have seen, Murray and Starr (this volume) argue that changes to context have the function of causing changes to interlocutors’ private mental states. Harris (2014, ch.3) argues for the more tradi-
tionally Gricean view that speech acts are aimed primarily at changing addressees’ private mental states, with changes to the context being a downstream consequence in at most some special cases. And Camp (this volume) argues that a full appreciation of the range of speech acts we perform requires us to distinguish between those that change the objective context, those that change the intersubjective context, and those that change only interlocutors’ private mental states. How best to understand the relationship between contexts and interlocutors’ minds is thus an open and important theoretical question.

3 Force and Content

According to Austin, we should “distinguish force and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference within meaning” (1962, 100). Similarly, Searle argues that we should distinguish between an illocutionary act and the act of expressing a proposition at its core. For Austin and Searle, these are distinctions between two levels of abstraction at which we may individuate speech acts. A locutionary or propositional act is a speech act individuated only in respect of its content, and illocutionary force is the extra ingredient bridging the gap from sense and reference to the full illocutionary act. Some distinction of this kind is now widely taken for granted, though different theories draw it in different ways.

There are two influential reasons for thinking of the illocutionary force of a speech act as something that can be abstracted away from its content. One is that the two components can apparently vary independently. Assertion is something that can be done with any proposition, and a given proposition can apparently serve as the content of various other illocutionary acts as well. For example, one can assert, suppose, deny, promise, and command that Fido will fetch his stick, and one can also ask whether Fido will fetch his stick. All of these acts plausibly have the same propositional content, but involve doing different things with this content.

In a similar vein, it has sometimes been claimed that trios of sentences such as the following can be used to perform literal and direct speech acts that have the same content but that differ only in force.33

(15) Fido will fetch his stick.

(16) Will Fido fetch his stick?

(17) Fetch your stick. [addressed to Fido]

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Some support for this idea comes from data about cross-force propositional anaphora. The following example is naturally described by saying that Ann asserts a proposition, Bob asks a polar question whose content is the same proposition, and Ann points this out.\(^3^4\)

\[(18)\] Ann: Fido will fetch his stick.
Bob: Will Fido fetch his stick?
Ann: That's what I just said.

Similar data suggests that the contents of speech acts can also serve as the contents of a variety of intentional mental states.

\[(19)\] Ann: Dogs are better than cats.
Bob: That's what I [think/believe/hope].

It is also sometimes possible to coordinate speech-act reports, suggesting that the speech acts being reported share contents.

\[(20)\] Ann claimed, but Bob merely suggested, that dogs are better than cats.

\[(21)\] Judy asked whether, and John confidently asserted, that you will be at dinner tonight.

A second kind of argument for the force–content distinction stems from the idea that semantic composition acts only on contents, not on speech acts. This view originates with Frege (1879), whose *Begriffsschrift* notation separates force from content by representing force with the vertical judgment stroke ‘|’ and content with the horizontal content stroke ‘—’, along with everything that follows it. Importantly, Frege’s syntax allows for only one judgment stroke per sentence; it is only content-denoting expressions that can recursively combine. The idea that speech acts have a single force but arbitrarily complex contents has proven influential, as has the related idea that sentences can be factored, for the purposes of semantics, into a component that expresses their content (sometimes called a ‘sentence radical’) along with a component that determines the illocutionary force with which they can be literally uttered (a ‘mood marker’ or ‘force indicator’).\(^3^5\)

Both of these arguments for the force–content distinction have recently faced challenges from a range of angles. An initial challenge comes from evidence about

\(^3^4\) It is notably harder to find analogous data suggesting that directive acts can have the same contents as assertions or polar questions.

\(^3^5\) Davidson (1979a); Grice (1968); Hare (1952); Lewis (1970); Sadock (1974); Searle (1965, 1968, 1969, 1975); Starr (ms, 2010).
the semantics of non-declarative clauses, which purports to show that interrogative and imperative clauses don’t express *propositional* contents at all. This is most intuitive in the case of wh-interrogatives, such as (22), for which there is no plausible propositional semantic value.

(22) Who loves the funk?

Semanticists now widely believe that an interrogative’s semantic content is a set of propositions (or a property that these propositions share). Intuitively, the propositions in question are the possible or actual answers to the question that the interrogative encodes. For example, the semantic value of (22) might be identified with the set of propositions \( p \) such that, for some agent \( x \), \( p \) is the proposition that \( x \) loves the funk. Similarly, several authors have argued that imperatives’ semantic contents aren’t propositions but some other kind of semantic object, such as addressee-restricted properties or actions.

By undermining the idea that, for example, assertions, questions, and directives can have the same content, these views undermine one of the motivations for drawing a content–force distinction. Still, a modified force–content distinction is viable. For example, Gazdar (1981) argues that whereas the (not-necessarily-propositional) content of a literal and direct speech act is just the semantic content of the sentence uttered, the speech act’s illocutionary force is supplied by a pragmatic “force-assignment rule” that maps this content to a way of updating the context. In their contributions to this volume, Stalnaker, Roberts, and Portner defend views that incorporate versions of this dynamic-pragmatic take on the force–content distinction.

Further problems lurk, however. One is that, as Starr (2016a; ms) has pointed out, imperatives can be conjoined and disjoined, both with other imperatives and with declaratives. Moreover, any such combination can be the consequent of a conditional.

(23) Fix me a drink and make it a double.

(24) Mow the lawn and I’ll wash the car.

(25) Play a waltz if the mood is right.

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36 See, e.g., Gazdar (1981); Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984); Hamblin (1958, 1973); Karttunen (1977); Roberts (2012).

37 Barker (2012); von Fintel and Iatridou (ms); Hausser (1980, 1983); Portner (2004, 2007, 2012); Roberts (2015b, 2017); Zanuttini et al. (2012). Even Frege (1892) argues that non-declarative sentences express non-propositional contents (i.e., incomplete thoughts that lack *Bedeutungen*).

38 There remain some interesting reasons to think that polar questions have propositional contents; see Farkas and Bruce (2010); Gunlogson (2001).
(26) If you’re an egalitarian, how come you’re so rich?

(27) If we only have enough money to buy one book, put back Naked Lunch or I’ll put back Waverly.

Examples like these undermine the traditional force–content distinction in several ways. First, there seems to be no simple answer to the question of whether, in using a mixed imperative-declarative sentence literally, one would be performing an assertoric act or a directive act. Rather, the speech acts involved appear to be complex hybrids of the two. Second, and relatedly, there is seemingly no way to factor out the force-marking components of sentences like these from their content-expressing components. Both of these observations suggest that conjunction, disjunction, and conditionalization can act on speech acts’ forces and not merely their contents. Third, several authors have argued that the speech acts we perform with conditional imperatives and conditional interrogatives, such as (25) and (26), must be thought of not as questions and directives with conditional contents, but as conditional questions and conditional directives. In uttering (25), for example, one does not request for a conditional to be made true; rather, such a speech act would be satisfied only if the addressee enters a conditional state of mind—something like a contingency plan.

These observations have led several theorists to adopt techniques from dynamic semantics. Some have taken clauses to be context-change potentials: the meaning of any clause is an operation on contexts, but clauses of different kinds manipulate different components within contexts. This is the view that both Murray and Starr and Lepore and Stone advocate in their contributions to this volume, for example. Others have identified clausal semantic values with the cognitive instructions they give to addressees: the meaning of every clause is modeled as a condition on addressees’ mental states, but clauses of different kinds instruct addressees to change mental states of different kinds. Either of these views allows for complex meanings to be recursively defined out of simpler meanings without first separating out the parts responsible for force from those that encode content.

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39See, e.g., Edgington (1986; 1991; 1995); von Fintel (ms); Charlow (this volume); Krifka (2014).
40Charlow (this volume) and Starr (2016a; ms) argue that these data pose insurmountable challenges to views on which imperatives denote properties. Charlow (this volume) marshalls further evidence, in the form of sentences in which quantifiers outscope imperative operators (e.g., ‘everyone take [his/her/their] seat’), to object to Kaufman’s view that imperatives are deontic modals. Like Krifka’s (2001) related argument that quantifiers sometimes outscope question operators, these data further undermine the standard, Fregean abstraction of force from content.
41See also Asher and Lascarides (2003); Condoravdi and Lauer (2012); Farkas and Bruce (2010); Gunlogson (2001); Krifka (2014); Murray (2014); Murray and Starr (MS); Starr (ms, 2010); ?.
42Charlow (2014, this volume); Harris (2014).
A modified force–content distinction may still be salvageable in light of these views. Speech acts of different kinds—and the meanings of the sentences that encode them—can be understood in terms of different kinds of effects that they have on either contexts or addressees’ minds. Whereas the force of a speech act is a matter of which component of the context (or mind) it operates on, its content is a matter of the contribution that it makes there. For example, although Charlow (2014) represents the semantic values of both declarative and imperative clauses as properties of agents’ minds, declaratives (and so, the assertions they encode) place conditions on the doxastic components of minds whereas imperatives (and so, the directives they encode) place conditions on their planning components. Complex sentences that combine declarative and imperative clauses encode more complex properties of minds that may place conditions on both doxastic and planning components. So, some sentences encode speech acts whose forces are hybrids of assertion and direction, and whose contents are difficult to disentangle from their forces.43

In his contribution to this volume, Peter Hanks has defended a much more radical rejection of the force–content distinction than anything we’ve discussed so far.44 On Hanks’ view, the force of a speech act is determined by the very relation that unifies its propositional content. Recall (15)–(17):

(15) Fido will fetch his stick.

(16) Will Fido fetch his stick?

(17) Fetch your stick. [addressed to Fido]

Bracketing tense and aspect, the contents of these sentences have the same components: Fido, the relation of fetching, and Fido’s stick. But, Hanks points out, a proposition is something over and above its components. A proposition must be unified in some determinate way, and distinct propositions may consist of the same parts unified in different ways; this is why the proposition that Fido fetches his stick is distinct from the proposition that Fido is fetched by his stick. Hanks argues that the differences in the speech acts we would perform with literal utterances of (15)–(17) consists of differences in the ways in which their parts are unified. Assertions are acts of predicating propositional components of one another; questions are acts of asking whether the components of propositions are connected in certain ways; directives are acts of ordering a propositional component (normally, the addressee) to have a certain property. On this usage, predicating, asking, and ordering are different kinds of combinatory acts—different ways of forming propositions from their

43 For similar views, see Harris (2014); Murray (2014); Starr (ms, 2010).
44 Hanks’ paper builds on ideas that he has defended elsewhere—e.g., Hanks (2007, 2011, 2013, 2015).
components. Hanks posits an analogous suite of combinatory mental acts to explain the difference between believing a proposition, wondering whether it is true, and desiring for it to be true. On this view, there is nothing like a force–content distinction: speech acts of different kinds differ solely in having different kinds of content.

One challenge for Hanks is to draw more fine-grained distinctions between kinds of speech acts within his three broad categories, such as the distinction between requests and commands. Another important challenge to Hanks' view is developed by Green (this volume), who argues that we can't do without at least some combinatory acts—some forms of predication, say—that are force neutral. In using a declarative sentence in the context of pretense, or to suppose a proposition for the sake of reductio, or as the antecedent of a conditional, for example, one doesn't assert the proposition expressed, but one does express a unified proposition.

4 Applied Speech-Act Theory

Speech-act theory has always been driven by issues that extend beyond the study of language and communication. Austin's earliest deployment of his theory of performative utterances took place in the context of a debate with John Wisdom about the problem of other minds, for example (Austin, 1946). Work on expressivism—early versions of which Austin (1962; 1970) mentions as a precursor to his theory of speech acts—aims to solve big philosophical problems about the metaphysics and epistemology of normativity. Grice's original pitch for his theory of implicature was that it could be used as a tool for countering certain views put forward by ordinary-language philosophers, both in the philosophy of perception (1961) and in semantics and the philosophy of logic (1975). Debates between the five families of speech-act theory have often turned on the question of which theory is best able to fit meaning and intentionality into a naturalistic worldview.

Speech-act theory has continued to be a versatile philosophical tool, particularly in the philosophy of law and social and political philosophy.

Consider the philosophy of law. It is tempting to think of the creation of laws as a kind of speech act. But several considerations have led philosophers to think that legislative speech acts are special, and, in particular, that their properties cannot be grounded in speakers' intentions: they are performed by legislatures rather than

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For related concerns, see Hom and Schwarz (2013); Reiland (2013, 2017); Stokke (2016).


H. L. A. Hart is one of only three philosophers whom Austin cites by name in How to do Things with Words (1962, 711), and was one of the earliest philosophers to apply Austin's ideas (Hart, 1949, 1954).
individual speakers, it is a democratic imperative that the law be public, and whereas
the usual pragmatic mechanisms for interpreting speech acts depend on cooperativeness, legal contexts are adversarial (Marmor, 2008, 2014; Poggi, 2011). These and other considerations have led some to conclude that we should avoid intentionalist accounts of legislative speech acts, opting instead for views on which the properties of these acts are determined by linguistic convention alone (“textualism”) or by some combination of convention and legal principles or the purposes to which laws are put (“purposivism”).48 Others have argued that some role for speakers’ intentions in fixing the properties of legislative speech acts is both workable and unavoidable.49

In social theory, speech acts have been of interest for the roles they play in the construction of various social entities and institutions. This idea is already present in the early work of Searle (1969, §2.7) and Bach and Harnish (1979, appendix), and Searle has developed some of the connections in his influential work on social construction (Searle, 1995, 2010). Austin’s ideas have also been a significant influence on Judith Butler’s influential view that gender is a performative social construct (1990; see also Salih 2007).

Certain categories of speech act have also held special interest for ethicists and political philosophers. A large literature has grown up around the nature of lying, for example, and some have argued that the distinction between lying and misleading is not merely of normative interest, but is also a useful diagnostic for distinguishing what speakers say from what they merely implicate.50 In a similar vein, much work has gone into understanding the nature of promises, not just because promises and other commitment-engendering speech acts are held to play a special role in normative ethics and political philosophy, but also because this role is sometimes held to demand a deeply normative theory of the speech act itself.51

A particularly rich application of speech-act theory has centered around a cluster of issues pertaining to freedom of speech. The central insight of this work is simple and compelling: many of the traditional defenses of liberal free-speech protections depend on the assumption that the function of speech is to express beliefs and share information. But the founding insight of speech-act theory is that speech

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48 Scalia (1998) influentially defends textualism. An influential version of purposivism has been defended by Dworkin (1986). For an overview of the space of options and related issues, see Marmor (2011).

49 E.g. Elkins (2012); Marmor (1995, 2014); Neale (ms).

50 On the idea that the lying–misleading distinction can serve as a guide to the saying–implicating distinction, see, e.g., Adler (1997); Michaelson (2016); Saul (2012). For overviews of the literature on lying, see Mahon (2016); Stokke (2013).

51 For an overview of the literature on the nature of promises, see Habib (2014). Habermas (1984; 1998) and (Raz, 1986) defend deeply normative accounts of a variety of speech acts on the grounds that they play an essential role in democratic institutions.
does much beside this, sometimes in ways that are easy to miss. To varying extents, recognition of this point is already baked into most legal systems, which don’t grant everyone an equal right to issue commands, for example, and which don’t protect incitations to violence and disorder. But speech-act theorists have argued that the upshots of this line of thought have not been fully appreciated. For example, MacKinnon, Langton, Hornsby, and others have developed an influential case against free-speech protections for pornography, on the ground that, if we take seriously the idea of pornography as speech, this speech should be understood as constituting illocutionary acts of silencing and subordinating women.\textsuperscript{52} Related considerations have been brought to bear on hate speech. McGowan’s contribution to this volume builds on her previous arguments that certain forms of speech, including some hate speech, can change societal norms in pernicious ways as a matter of their illocutionary force.\textsuperscript{53} Waldron (1999) argues, in effect, that publicly displayed hate speech works via a pair of indirect speech acts, issuing a threat aimed at its targets and a covert rallying cry to like-minded bigots.\textsuperscript{54}

A closely related and rapidly expanding literature deals with slurs and other pejorative expressions. Here two debates converge. One debate, which dovetails with debates about hate speech, concerns the nature of the derogation or harm that seems to be consistently accomplished by the use of slurs. A second debate concerns the nature of the linguistic mechanisms by which slurs accomplish their derogative effects. Although some have argued that the derogative function of slurs can be understood as an aspect of their semantic contents, most have located the effect in some orthogonal semantic or pragmatic dimension of their use, invoking presupposition, conventional implicature, or some variety of expressive meaning.\textsuperscript{55} Camp (2017) argues that slurs should be understood as devices for performing two speech acts at once—one neutral act of predicating a property of group membership, and another of casting their targets in a hateful perspective. In his contribution to this volume, Nunberg effectively agrees with this dual-speech-act view, but denies that we need to appeal to any special semantic mechanism in order to explain how these speech acts are performed. Slurs, he argues, are native to the dialects of hateful and oppressive groups; to use a slur is to mark oneself as hateful, either by virtue of belonging to one of these groups, or by means of a kind of manner implicature that

\textsuperscript{52}See, e.g., Hornsby (1993); Hornsby and Langton (1998); Langton (1993, 2009); MacKinnon (1987, 1993); Maitra (2012). See also Stanley (2011) for applications of the idea of silencing to political speech, and Murray and Starr (this volume) for a functionalist account of silencing.


\textsuperscript{54}For several other recent philosophical contributions to the literatures on free speech, censorship, hate speech, and related topics, see the essays in Maitra and McGowan (2012).

\textsuperscript{55}For overviews of the slurs literature, see Hom (2010) and Nunberg (this volume).
affiliates one with the group.\textsuperscript{56} Nunberg’s account is interesting not just as a purely pragmatic theory of slurs, but also as a case study in how the philosophy of language can benefit from some of the explanatory resources of sociolinguistics.

Another rich area of applied speech-act theory deals with speech that is less than fully cooperative—a genre that many theorists have idealized away. For example, McKinney (2016) argues that some false confessions constitute what she calls “extracted speech”—speech acts performed unintentionally and against the speaker’s will, and that are made possible by felicity conditions that have been set up and exploited in ways that serve interrogators’ interests. Stanley (2015) argues that some propaganda can be understood as involving a special kind of not-at-issue speech act, whereby the propagandist surreptitiously changes the conversational score in a way that bypasses interlocutors’ consent. Several contributions to this volume develop related themes. Camp and McGowan both use uncooperative speech to build on contemporary theories of conversational score and not-at-issue content. Langton’s contribution explores strategies for blocking pernicious not-at-issue contributions that have a tendency to be sneakily accommodated against some interlocutors’ interests. In her contribution, Jennifer Saul argues that although some dogwhistles work by being understood in overtly different ways by different audiences, others are covert: they function by activating hearers’ prejudices in ways that are outside their conscious awareness. And because these speech acts rely on unconscious, arational psychological mechanisms, they can be performed unintentionally—for example, when a newscaster unwittingly repeats a politician’s covertly prejudiced buzzword. Each of these essays both highlights some of the ways in which speech-act theory can be applied to help us better understand kinds of speech that are of urgent social concern, while also showing how these applications can give us new reasons for revising or enriching our theoretical outlooks.

5 Speech Act Theory as an Integrated Conversation

Speech-act theory has often proceeded as a series of separate conversations—one pertaining to foundational issues about the nature of communication and illocutionary force, another centered around technical and empirical issues in the semantics of non-declarative clauses, and another centered around social, moral, and political issues arising from normatively important or problematic kinds of speech. We believe that each of these conversations can succeed only when they are self-consciously taken to be strands within a single, broader conversation about the nature and uses of speech acts. Applied speech-act theory that is not grounded in current technical, empirical, and foundational developments deprives itself of new

\textsuperscript{56} For a similar pragmatic account, see Bolinger (2015).
resources and datapoints. Work on the semantics of non-declaratives that floats free of both foundational underpinnings and practical applications risks superficiality. Work on foundational issues that proceeds independently of technical, empirical, and applied issues will be overly speculative. All three conversations must proceed in parallel and with attention to what is happening in the others, if any of them can hope to get us closer to the truth. The essays collected here exemplify this integrative approach to speech-act theory, and we hope that they will inspire more work of a similar kind.

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