What Do We Lose to a Video?

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I think we have come to a point in the current state of technology where we, as appreciators, makers, and producers of live performances, must ask ourselves an important question. We must ask ourselves whether, in a world where we can easily access videotapes of performances, there is something important that we obtain through our engagement with live performances that we cannot get in our engagement with even the best quality videos.[[1]](#footnote-1) The performing arts, as artforms which perform with real bodies on a stage, seem to be on the verge of an existential crisis. Given the sheer cost of live productions of artworks, it might seem more and more tempting, from both an audience’s and a performing arts organization’s standpoint, to simply create videos of artworks and make them publicly available through the Internet. However, despite the cost efficiency of recordings, many of those who attend live performances have an intuition that there is something we get from a live performance that we cannot obtain from a mere video of that performance. Such intuitions and claims can seem more like bare assertions about the value of live performance, instead of true justifications for it. As Philip Auslander notes in his book questioning the value of live performance:

I quickly became impatient with what I consider to be traditional, unreflective assumptions that fail to get much further in their attempts to explicate the value of “liveness” than invoking cliché and mystifications like “the magic of live theatre,” the “energy” that supposedly exists between performers and spectators in a live performance, and the “community” that live performance is often said to create among performers and spectators.[[2]](#footnote-2)

He gives three different explanations here all of which can seem either odd or unconvincing. On the face of it, any talk about live theatre being magical can seem odd or metaphorical from a secular perspective. Similarly, no one has ever seen this energy between performers and spectators in live performance, and many have probably not even felt it while seeing live performance. As far as community goes, it is fair and not at all odd to say that live performance cultivates a community, but what is left wanting is an explanation as to how this community is special compared to any other community generated by mediatized artforms. Certainly there are more people in a film community or a videogame community than in the typical theatre community.

Each of these answers then fail to satisfy. They fail to satisfy in part because they appear unexamined and unjustified, at least to those who have not already absorbed such claims as being true. This paper wishes to give a more elaborate and detailed examination and justification of one of these claims: that we lose the sense of presence of the performers when the work is mediatized. I argue that this can be understood in virtue of another concept, called kinesthetic distance.[[3]](#footnote-3)

**The “Ideology” of Liveness**

Before proceeding, it is worth taking a step back and examining some recent criticisms of liveness as a special value. These criticisms are that claims made in favor of the value of live performance are more a result of cultural anxiety about the growing irrelevance of live theatre, rather than an actual property of live work. There is something importantly right about this. The notion that there is something more valuable about live performance compared to recorded performance is nothing new. As soon as films and cinema were first produced, you had the rise of debates arguing that these forms were not art. Given the cultural value of art, this is in effect an assertion that live performance was more valuable than recorded performance. I will not get into these debates here, as there have been extensive historical and contemporary discussions of them.[[4]](#footnote-4) What is important to note is that separating and distinguishing the value of the live from the value of the recording has had a trenchant past. While most scholars today accept that films and photography can be art, and some have elaborated exactly how they can be art in response to this, I think this initial temptation of distinguishing the value of live and recorded performances remains, and remains not just among scholars but among the public at large.

To criticize these conceptions of the value of live performance, Auslander rejects the exclusive distinction of the concept of live and mediatized performance (roughly the same thing as I have been called recorded performance).[[5]](#footnote-5) He points to how certain mediatized forms, such as television, have historically been considered and valued in terms of their “liveness”. More recently, we have the concept of livestreaming such as on the Youtube platform or the Metropolitan Opera’s *Live in HD* broadcasts to cinemas. Thus liveness seems to be a concept applicable to these forms as well. The reverse is also true. Some contemporary dance and theatre utilize livestreams of their work which capture what the dancers are doing, but then projects it onto a screen onstage at the same time. Symphony orchestras and sporting invents have incorporated live video screens which provide additional perspectives, especially close-up perspectives, on what is occurring. Furthermore, the notion of live performance as we know it today only arose within the cultural context of recorded work. He argues then that the notion of “liveness” is not actually a natural, independent phenomenon, but one intrinsically dependent on the notion of mediatized work. Thus, it seems like any talk about live performance as being valuable in a distinct way from mediatized performances is questionable just on the grounds that liveness does not seem an exclusive property from mediatized.

I have no problems with Auslander’s criticism of this exclusive ‘dualism’. It seems perfectly right to say that liveness is bound up inextricably with the mediatized today. What I disagree with is that this does not render the question, “What makes live performance valuable as opposed to mediatized work?” inert. In fact, it only makes it a more important question to ask, it just needs to lose the problematic assumption it is based on. One way to do this is to ask, “What do we lose to a video?” or more precisely: “What valuable properties of a performance does a recording fail to replicate?”

It thus still makes sense to ask about the differences between live performance and mediatized work. The question only becomes more important once we recognize the intimate relationship between live performances and their recordings, and the different ways in which they can and do affect each other. We may only be able to understand recorded and mediatized works in virtue of live performance and vice-versa. And the central question asked in this paper remains. While a recording might be able to replicate certain aspects of liveness, such as that that the television program is being recorded and broadcast to your television right now, it is still an open question as to whether that recording can replicate everything. Whatever aspects of liveness livestreaming and television retains, they are going to be in part parasitic on the unmediated performance. Thus we need a way of understanding what our experience of unmediated, live work is in order to better understand the aspects of liveness which are embedded within these mediated experiences.

**Imaginative Reconstruction**

Some time ago, I was engaged in a project which I think many dance scholars and appreciators engage in. I was trying to analyze dance pieces from videotapes of performances. Most dance scholars, out of necessity, analyze these works with videos of those pieces, and many of these videos are of poor quality. They must make the best of whatever quality videos they have. To overcome the poor quality one strategy which they can use is imaginative reconstruction. They can imaginatively reconstruct what it would be like to have watched that performance live, usually drawing on their past experience and knowledge of what it is like attending live performances. Even in the case of our best quality videos, dance scholars must often reconstruct quite a few different properties of live performances to determine more fully what it would be like to see that performance in person.

What is it that dance scholars reconstruct imaginatively when they watch even the best quality videos? Given that videos are almost always two-dimensional in nature, they must reconstruct a sense of the three-dimensional space, the depth of the movers’ bodies, and the depth of the stage. The flatness of the screen often hampers the ability to judge the relations between the dancers at any time.

Furthermore, they reconstruct what it would be like to see the piece from a particular audience member’s point of view. Live performances are rarely watched from the points of view of the cameras recording them. This is true if the cameras are constantly changing points of view, in the case where we have multiple cameras whose film is edited together, and it is also true if the camera is still in the back of the audience. Live performances are rarely watched from the viewpoints of the cameras, because audience members do not sit where the cameras are.

Something that the best quality videotapes often do is zoom in and focus on particular performers at particular times. The videotapes choose for you what is important at any particular time in the dance, instead of allowing you the freedom to decide for yourself and interpret as you see fit. Dance scholars may reconstruct this freedom as best they can, by creating a picture of what the whole stage might look like in their mind and focusing on other aspects instead. Of course, this is a cognitively demanding task, imagining things happening on stage that you cannot see. But, it is not entirely impossible. Perhaps you had seen it a few times before, or have several different videos to use. You might even be able to infer certain things about movement going on off screen from the movement that is on screen.[[6]](#footnote-6)

These three types of imaginative reconstruction performance scholars must go through indicate three things that we typically lose even to a quality recording: Three-Dimensionality, a Particular Perspective, and Spectator Freedom. I want to suggest a fourth: We lose the feeling of being in the presence of live bodies and the feeling of what it would be like to perform that movement. This is something that I, and other performance scholars, often try to reconstruct when we watch videotapes of live performances. We want to feel what it would be like to be in the presence of these performers.

Understanding this feeling of presence or liveness in precise terms is difficult. And it, like most qualitative experience, has a certain ineffability to it. But I shall do the best I can. Given that I have described it as ‘the feeling of being in the presence of live bodies,’ it can be decomposed into two different feelings which combine and merge with one another: the feeling of other bodies and the feeling of liveness. The feeling of other bodies is just the result of what I call motor response below. We all feel our own bodies through proprioception. We feel where our limbs are in space as well as how we are moving. But when we watch other people move, we feel that we are no longer alone; we get the sense of their own bodily movement and what it would be like to move in the way they are moving. The feeling of liveness often accompanies this when we see people move in person. Phenomenologically speaking, it can be described as a feeling of the ephemerality of the movement, that you will only be able to see and feel that movement once. As soon as that movement is finished, you cannot get it back. You cannot replay it. There is a sense of importance which accompanies each seen movement. These two feelings then combine to give us the feeling of being in the presence of live bodies.

Something which needs to be explained is why the feeling of liveness needs to be reproduced while watching a video. Why does it not come with watching a quality video? After all, you cannot get back each second in which you are watching the video. Sure, you can replay it, but every time you replay it, you might see the same movement, but each experience of the movement is unique and disappears as soon as you experience something new. One would expect that this feeling of live presence is produced directly through our experience of the videotape. But this is not the case. As I stated earlier, dance scholars need to reproduce the experience of liveness, it is not something they get passively from watching the video in the same way they would get it from watching a live performer. So we need to explain why it is that we do not experience live presence from the video directly, but do directly experience it from live performers.

**Motor Response**

Motor response, generally speaking, is the ability to feel what it would be like to perform the movement we see. The status of whether motor response exists and whether it can be used in the appreciation of the performing arts is controversial.[[7]](#footnote-7) However, we can see how motor response, if it existed, would facilitate a feeling of presence. If we have an ability to feel what the performers are doing, then it seems that a feeling of a performers’ presence may be facilitated by it. If we feel their movement, the performers’ movement we are feeling makes their live presence more vivid to us. One place to look then for why we need to reconstruct the live presence of the performers, is in our best accounts of motor response.

In the philosophical literature thus far, we have two plausible models for how motor response works. One comes from Barbara Montero, the other from Noël Carroll and William Seeley.[[8]](#footnote-8) Both accounts rely on neuroscientific and behavioral studies, and they differ primarily in how they see motor response is facilitated. Montero thinks that what underlies motor response are neural mechanisms she calls “mirror neurons”. Mirror neurons are supposed to behave so that when we are watching a particular movement, the neurons in our brain, which would be responsible for performing that movement, would activate as well. Under the proposed view, this is an automatic mirroring of the movement we see through our brains.

For Carroll and Seeley, what underlies motor response is a multimodal relationship between areas in the brain responsible for vision and motor preparation. These studies show that when points of light are placed at the joints of a human figure moving, with all other information concealed, participants easily discriminated what movements the figure were performing. While watching these videos, not only did the part of the brain responsible for vision activate, but also the part responsible for motor preparation. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that those who had damage to the motor preparation area, had a much more difficult time discriminating the movement. This gives them reason to believe that what underlies our kinesthetic capacities is a cross-modal relationship between these two sense modalities which work together to give us a deeper understanding of movement.

Note that neither Montero’s nor Carroll and Seeley’s view can account, without modification, for why dance scholars need to reconstruct kinesthetic sensations while watching a video. If motor response operates through automatic mirroring of seen movement, then a quality video should give us the same kinesthetic sensations as seeing the movement in person. If motor response operates through motor preparation, informed by vision, then a quality video would give us the same kinesthetic sensations as seeing the same movement in person. Therefore, something more is needed to account for the feeling of live presence.

**Two Options**

There are at least two ways of trying to account for why one needs to reconstruct the feeling of live presence while watching a video. One is a reductive account, the other, a nonreductive. The reductive account holds that one would not have to reconstruct the feeling of presence if all the other properties were reproduced sufficiently close to reality. The reductive claim would be that if looking at a nearly perfect reproduction of a performance, complete with Three-Dimensional Space, A Particular Perspective, and Spectator Freedom, then we would have this feeling of live presence. However, it is unclear how the addition of these three elements would provide us with the feeling of live presence. In addition, if we think that motor response plays an important role in providing the feeling of liveness, then the reductive account is only available to Montero. Recall that Carroll and Seeley’s account only requires that one observes points of light placed on joints to work, and to work well. Getting more visual detail, a sense of three dimensional space, etc., would not give us greater movement insight through motor response. Montero’s, on the other hand, allows for the reductive account, but does not explain why having a nearly perfect reproduction of the performance would cause greater mirror neuron, and hence kinesthetic, response. Therefore, Montero’s account still leaves the feeling of live presence in a live performance unexplained.

A further possible reductive, but non-motor response-related, explanation for why one needs to reconstruct the feeling of kinesthetic presence, is derived from how close the performance is to real life. Perhaps, says the reductionist, the reason why kinesthetic presence might arise when we are watching a nearly perfect reproduction of a performance is just that the reproduction most closely resembles our actual experience of the performance.

There are two ways of elaborating on this in the literature that I know of, and both refer to vivacity. Both understandings of vivacity primarily concern pictures. Under Kendall Walton’s view, a picture is more vivid if it more closely resembles the structure of how we would ordinarily look at the picture if it were seen in real life.[[9]](#footnote-9) The example he gives is that of Hobbema’s *Mill*. Walton invites us to think about three different situations: (1) Looking at an actual scene of “a red-roofed mill near a cluster of large trees with ducks in a pond and peasants in the background…from the left bank of the river some two hundred yards downstream from the mill.”[[10]](#footnote-10) (2) Looking at Hobbema’s *Mill*, a painting which depicts the same scene from the same viewpoint and (3) Reading a rich depiction of the same scene in a book. Walton contends that (2) is going to give us a richer and more vivid experience of the scene, in that it is more like our experience of (1), than (3). The reason why is that with (2), I can do things which are more similar to my situation in (1) than (3). For example, while looking at the painting, I can zoom in and out as I will, focus on one detail rather than the other; while reading a description, I cannot. The painting, because it is similar to the situation in real life, will be more vivid. The thought, when applied to a video, is that the reason why the video is lacking in vivacity does not inspire as vivid a sense of being there that needs to be reconstructed is that Spectator Freedom is being restricted. But, once we have a recording, say one that projects the experience in a virtual reality of some sort, we will have just as vivid a sense of being there as in real life.

Part of the issue with using Walton’s account to give a reductionist explanation of why we need to reconstruct the feeling of presence is that his account is restricted to visual vivacity.[[11]](#footnote-11) If we think about a feeling of the presence of a person, this feeling is not something which appears to be visual in any way. There is no reason why having a more visually vivid experience would translate to having a *kinesthetic* feeling of presence. Of course, there is a relationship between the visual and the kinesthetic, in that one does not have the kinesthetic experience without the visual. And presumably this dependence would mean that the more vivid the visual experience is, the more vivid the kinesthetic experience would be.[[12]](#footnote-12) However, the feeling of presence while watching someone move, sing, or act does not seem to be merely vivid kinesthetic feelings, if vivid is just taken to be understood as something along the lines of detailed, clear, and forceful. It is a peculiar feeling. It is a feeling that there is a person in my presence, one with an inner life of emotions and sensations. This feeling just does not seem to able to be derived from visual vividness, even given a dependence relationship between the visual and the kinesthetic.

Moreover, even if we went directly to kinesthetic vivacity as an attempt to explain the feeling of presence, there is no change in the kinesthetic structure to real life when going from a live performance to a video. If there is a feeling of being present, of being here as a person, the structure of that is presumably derived from the structures of bodily perceiving ourselves. But when I am perceiving a performance live, I am not in a different relationship to my body structurally than when I perceive a recorded performance. It is not as if, when I watch a performance on a video, the whole structure of how I relate to my body or other bodies changes from seeing it live. I am still sitting there, perhaps in a movie theater watching a recording. There may be some differences in how I relate to my body. Perhaps I am more comfortable at home in bed watching the video. Perhaps I pay less attention to my internal sensations. But this is not a change in structure. Nothing about how I am relating to my own body or others’ bodies has changed, except for my attitude towards it. I can still relate in all the same ways as the live performance. Nothing stops me from doing so, like it does in the case of a person looking at an actual scene like Hobbema’s *Mill* and a vividly rendered description of the experience of looking. One is prevented in the description from having an open-ended visual experience, our experience is being structured by the description. However, there does not seem to be anything similar happening in how we kinesthetically feel. When watching a video, nothing prevents us from relating to our bodies and kinesthetic sensations in precisely the same way as we do in live performance.

Another promising way of pursuing a reductionist account thinks that the feeling of liveness or presence can be derived from having a Particular Perspective. Given that the video makes us lose our own unique perspective on the performance, if we were able to replicate this, in our video, we would regain our feeling of presence. An answer along these lines might be given derived from Mohan Matthen, who believes that we lose a feeling of this presence when objects are merely represented by pictures as opposed to objects we perceive in life.[[13]](#footnote-13) This is because, Matthen thinks, we are no longer representing the objects in relationship to ourselves. We are representing the objects independently of our relationship to them. Matthen, armed with evidence from perceptual psychology, thinks that there are two kinds of vision. One operates how we normally think of vision, as painting a picture which is to be looked at and observed and to give us fine detail about what objects look like. The other represents objects in relation to ourselves, for the purposes of being able to grab, touch, and perform other actions on them. And, Matthen thinks this ‘egocentric’ representation provides a feeling of presence when we interact with real objects and not when we interact with mere representations of the objects.

Matthen might think that what is happening in the case of the video is the same phenomenon. When we videotape someone, our feeling of their presence is removed because we are no longer representing these people as people to be interacted with, but now as mere representations to be scanned. I have my own worries about Matthen’s account, but even granting everything Matthen’s account says applied to live performances and videos, it is doubtful that the sense of presence Matthen focuses on will give us the sense of presence of live human beings. Presumably human presence is a distinctive form of presence from 3-dimensional objects. To be in the presence of a human being is to be in the presence of a being with internal life and agency. If egocentric vision just gives us a sense of presence because we can grasp the object, it is missing the sense of presence that human beings have. The sense of being in the presence of a being with internal life and agency is just not the same as a sense of presence that I am in relationship to an object which I can grasp. Unless Matthen has an additional feature of human vision which can allow us to feel not just their physical presence in space, but also something of their internal presence or life, then his account still lacks an explanation for the need to imagine human presence. Additionally, even if Matthen thinks that he can extend his view to not just spatial features of objects, but in the case of humans, their internal human presence, then I do not see any reason why one could not get the feeling of human presence through a videoscreen. Say egocentric vision encompasses not just relating oneself to another object in space, but also any relationship between how I see myself and the object of interest. In this case, watching a person on a videoscreen performing a movement would still allow me to relate myself to them, perhaps by saying to myself, “Wow, I could never have done that!” But then Matthen’s account, interpreted this way, could not be right, because then it would have predicted that I did not need to imagine the sense of presence. However, I did need to imagine the sense of human presence. So egocentric representation, interpreted as providing a sense of presence when we are near three-dimensional objects we can interact with, does not give us a distinctively *human* type of presence that we think is necessary. But if we interpret it in a way that includes human features, such as their internal life, then it would predict that we need to imagine the sense of presence when watching a video. So either way, Matthen’s account does not seem to work well as an explanation of why I need to imagine the sense of presence while watching a video.

There are probably other ways in which one might attempt a reductive account to explain why we might get the feeling of presence from a reproduction of a performance suitably close to how we experience a live performance. My guess is, however, that short of the performance being replicated by something like androids which are very close in movement to the original performers, the sense of live human presence is not going to be able to be replicated. And even then, I have my doubts. This is because I have the intuition that there is something special about a human being moving that is not replicable. There is something special about this present moment, our sensing of their agency, their particular way of living within and through the movement they are performing, and of their decision making in the moment that is nearly impossible to replicate. The only way that replication of this would be possible, is if you replicated the entire sequence of decision making of that particular human body. While this may be possible, my guess is that it would be extremely difficult to do so even given future technological advances. Instead of arguing for this intuition, I leave it to those who are skeptical to provide an explanation as to how the experience of live presence might be produced through a recording. I shall now proceed to a nonreductive account as to what provides a feeling of kinesthetic live presence.

**Kinesthetic Distance**

In my answer as to what we lose which accounts for a loss of kinesthetic live presence in a video, I wish to suggest that there is something which might be called ‘kinesthetic distance’. My suggestion is that when we watch a video, we become distanced from the internal life and agency of the performers we are interested in watching. And this is true no matter how close the reproduction of the performance is to the live performance. A reproduction necessarily takes us away from the in-the-moment internal life and agency of the performer. It is a reproduction, and in virtue of being a reproduction, it is an object which is removed in time and place from the real performance, and hence removed from the in-the-moment inner life and agency of the performers.

The kinesthetic distance that results, I think, explains why I need to reproduce my feeling of live presence when watching a video. I need to imagine that I was actually there, experiencing an actual person moving and making decisions in the moment in order to reproduce the sense of excitement and presence that I would have gotten at the live performance. I need to, in some way, close the gap in the kinesthetic distance that was created by the videotaping of the performance. The performance happened in a particular time and place, and the videotape is a recording of the performance which happened in that time and place. What I have to imagine then, to get the feeling of liveness, is to imagine that I am in the place and time the performance occurred. That is not something I can get from watching the recording absent of additional imaginative work because I am not *in* that time and place. I need to imaginatively close the kinesthetic distance between my own location in time and space and the performance’s location in time and space. The video is just a vehicle for enabling that to happen by providing some visual replication of the performance.

However, one might worry about the use of the term ‘distance’ here; it may after all, be merely metaphorical. After all, it might be that there is no strong analogy between this and real distance. Distance requires degree rather than a mere change. It is not as if I would want to be committed to the view that the further away in time and space a recording is from the real performance, the more kinesthetically distanced we would get. Therefore, under my view, being removed in time and space only counts for one degree of distance that does not increase the further away in time we get from the performance.

To more robustly fill in the analogy to distance, to be kinesthetically closest to the inner life and agency of the performers, is to be the performers themselves. To be further removed is to be a spectator close to the performers. To be even further removed one can be physically distant, but still present and close enough to see the performers live. Further removal, along the lines of my suggestion, is to videotape the performance with just a reproduction of the entire stage. Even further removal might result from routine close-ups and camerawork, mediating the agency and inner life of the performers through the interpretations of additional machinery and agents, which might be even further removed if there is significant editing of footage by editors afterwards. This is not intended to be an exhaustive account of how kinesthetic distancing might occur, but to suggest that the analogy to distance might be stronger than it at first appeared.

**Conclusion and Relevance of Kinesthetic Distance**

To those familiar with some work in early 20th century aesthetics might have noticed the similarity between what I have called ‘Kinesthetic Distance’ and what Bullough called ‘Psychical Distance’.[[14]](#footnote-14) He even seems to have thought of something similar about live performance:

...speaking generally, theatrical performances…run a special risk of a loss of Distance owing to the material presentment of its subject-matter. The physical presence of living human beings as vehicles of dramatic art is a difficulty which no art has to face in the same way. A similar, in many ways even greater, risk confronts dancing...[[15]](#footnote-15)

However, I am not interested in distance as such a general phenomenon as Bullough is interested in it. I am only interested in distance in relation to a single phenomenon, the internal life and agency of performers. Bullough thinks that distance in time increases the older the object is, the more we are removed from the socio-cultural origins of the object, and that distance increases if we are removed from all practical worries. I am not interested in these claims, and I think that they may be implausible. I think my more specific view of kinesthetic distance derives more plausibility from its specificity, rather than trying to tie together disparate types of distance into one unified understanding of distance.

In addition, I hold no assumptions about what about what values must or are derived from kinesthetic distance. Bullough seems to be committed to the view that the greater the distance from the objects of interest, the better our appreciation of those objects, so long as we are not so distant, that we are unconnected to the object. I think that intimacy is often a value many have when they see live performers. Many want to be as close kinesthetically to the performers as possible and they derive a great amount of pleasure from this. But I also think that we might value distance in the same way that Bullough does. Perhaps the distance of a video might give us better appreciation of certain qualities of a dance that we would not notice if we saw the performance live. I am open to thinking that being kinesthetically distant might have its virtues, but I also think that many would think that the intimacy and kinesthetic closeness of a live performance has its own value as well. It is this value of live performance that we lose to a video: we lose an intimate connection with the performers’ agency and inner-life. For those of us who value this, and value it highly, we would most certainly prefer going to live performances over just merely seeing movement on a screen.

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1. This question has of course already been asked. In fact, it has been continuously asked since we started recording work and distributing in *en masse*. Dance has sometimes been touted as one artform that cannot be mass produced in this way, but even this has come in question recently through the popularity and success of programs like *So You Think You Can Dance*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Philip Auslander, *Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture*, (New York: Routledge, 2008[1999]), 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This paper can thus be seen in response to Connolly and Ralley’s request that defenders of live performance demystify and explain more concretely what is meant by presence. Roy Connolly and Richard Ralley, “Something Real is Needed: Constructing and Dismantling Presence,” *Studies in Theatre and Performance*, 30:2 (2010), 203-218. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For the contemporary version of cinema and photography art-skepticism, see Roger Scruton, "Photography and Representation," *Critical Inquiry* 7:3 (1981): 577-603; Roger Scruton, "The Photographic Surrogate," *The Philosopher on Dover Beach* (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990). For some responses see Robert Wicks, "Photography as a Representational Art," The British Journal of Aesthetics 29 (1989), 1-9 and Berys Gaut, “Cinematic Art,” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 60:4 (2002), 299-312. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Auslander, *Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Though it should be noted that inductive inferences of this sort are more problematic in dances than real life. While we think we have good reason for thinking that the past will resemble the future in the natural world, due to our past experience, we do not typically have the same thing for the performing arts. Artists often undermine expectations of audience members, and being surprised in this way often is considered a virtue of the work. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. I will not be going into this debate here. The main skepticism of motor response comes from Graham McFee across several works. Graham McFee, *Understanding dance*. (New York: Routledge, 2003); Graham McFee, *The Philosophical Aesthetics of Dance: Identity, Performance and Understanding*. (Hampshire: Dance Books, 2011); Graham McFee, "Defusing Dualism: John Martin on Dance Appreciation." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 71:2 (2013), 187-194; and Graham McFee, *Dance and the Philosophy of Action*, (Hampshire: Dance Books, 2018). For responses, see the 2013 symposium on “Dance and Science” in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Barbara Montero, “Proprioception as an Aesthetic Sense,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 64:2 (2006): 231-242; Barbara Montero, "The Artist as Critic: Dance training, Neuroscience, and Aesthetic Evaluation," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 71:2 (2013): 169-175; Barbara Montero, *Thought in Action: Expertise and the Conscious Mind*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) and Noël Carroll and William Seeley, “Kinesthetic Understanding and Appreciation in Dance,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 71:2 (2013): 177-186. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Kendall Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid., 304-305. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. It is also problematic for not giving a clear understanding of what visual vividness is. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Though of course, this dependence relation should not be taken for granted and needs to be supported itself. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Mohan Matthen, *Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 272-324. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," *British Journal of Psychology*, 5:2 (1912), 87-118. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid., 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)