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Quale: Introduction to the International Plane*

ABSTRACT: The paper addresses the philosophical presuppositions underlying the concept of the "international system." It suggests that the international system is not a system in any technical sense of this term, but rather a static order – an international order – founded on international boundaries. Nor is there any place in reality that corresponds to the term "international" or, more broadly, the "international plane." The international plane is a state analogous to the quantum state in physics – a quantum state writ large. In reality, the international plane is reducible to an international event taking place on an international boundary. The international order of boundaries, in turn, is ultimately rooted in common sense and metaphysics – the two founding positions of modern philosophy.

Keywords: International order, international plane, quale state, international event, globalization, common sense, metaphysics
Schlagworte: internationale Ordnung, internationale Ebene, internationales Ereignis, Globalisierung, gesunder Menschenverstand, Metaphysik

Suppose the institutional memory of the international system were suddenly lost, by accident or because of a deliberate attempt to reboot the system by pushing the button. Suppose the users of the system were given a choice between restoring the legacy system and creating an entirely novel, alternative system. Should such a choice be taken as self-evident, or as a given, without questioning whether there is any choice but to take it as a given, or should one take issue with the self-evident and question whether there is any international system in place in the first place? In other words, is the supposition that there is a choice between the present international system and a novel, alternative system based on a prior supposition, that is, a presupposition, that must be addressed before one can address the supposition?[1]

* This paper is the first in a series that is currently work in progress.

1 The conceptual wheel of reversion or self-deconstruction consisting, in its entirety or in its com-position, of posing (position), proposing (proposition), sub-posing (supposition) and pre-sub-posing (presupposition); posing and sub-posing forming an imposition (i. e., a vertical or hierarchic relationship) and proposing and pre-supposing forming an opposition (i. e., a horizontal relationship). This conceptual composition logically rotates: just as one must take a position in order to be able to propose, one must suppose in order to be able to propose; however, in order to be able to suppose, one must presuppose – which, in turn, presupposes a certain position. As discussed below, that these concepts constitute, or fall in place

These questions have already begun to answer themselves – it is the question itself that is begging the question. It is begging to question whether there is, as a matter of fact, any international system in place in the first place – since if it turns out that there is in fact none, it could not be lost, by accident or otherwise. An international system would be something that has yet to be created.

What is therefore in question is both the "international" and the "system;" but not necessarily in this particular order.[2]

While the international "system" may indeed be loosely described as a "system," it is not a system in any technical sense of this term, that is, it is not a mechanism with a defined function. In reality, it merely constitutes an *order*. More precisely, it constitutes an order of boundaries between given states, known as States, and as such is static, or nomic, rather than anomic or nomadic, that is, dynamic.[3] The international order *does* nothing; its very function is to remain, precisely, as is. The international order is in the business of being. This is not to suggest that the being of the international order as-is is anything simple: on the contrary, it is something complex, a matter of both as is and as if (*als ob*). The international order is not merely a matter of fact, or a matter of as is – a boundary constituted as a matter of fact – but also a matter of as if – a boundary instituted as a matter of legal fiction. In other words, this coincidence of fact and law, or this boundary condition, is not merely a matter of historical constitution; it is also, simultaneously, a matter of legal institution.[4] It is as if it were – an international legal order.

There is no conceptual hierarchy between the two – a boundary constituted as a matter of fact and one instituted as a matter of law. While international boundaries may,

of, a wheel, or a global apposition, is simply a matter of time rather than of a logic of given, or given as a logic (*es gibt*) – over time, concepts settle in the form of a wheel as time itself rotates around itself, or its own axis (Being); see below note 22. As a result, it turns out, over time, as if these concepts constituted a logic that is something given, or something self-evident, that follows in and of itself, rather than being something historically constituted. For a (rare) philosophical analysis of the concept of presupposition see R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, Martino Publishing (2014), 21–48, esp. at 41 (assuming that metaphysics is "the science of absolute presuppositions … because that is what I find in Aristotle, who invented metaphysics; or rather, because it is what I find left in Aristotle's account of what metaphysics is, when something else which I have shown to be nonsensical has been removed.").
For an analogous introduction to the conceptual system revolving around the root concept of "duction," which in itself does not lead to anything but is surrounded by an entire system of leads – production, reproduction, induction, reduction, deduction – see Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, The University of Chicago Press (1987), 10 ("The third time, putting in question again the trait as a signature, whether this signature passes via the proper name known as *patronymic* or via the idiom of the draftsman sometimes called *ductus*, I explore in its logical consistency the system of *duction* (production, reproduction, induction, reduction, etc."). This paper is an introduction to this system of production, induction, deduction and reproduction of the given.

2 The former is former in time only, *i. e.,* it is mentioned earlier, but the latter is the one being qualified and thus logically the former.

3 Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, Telos Press Publishing (2006), 67–79, Appendix. *See also* Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *Nomadology: The War Machine*, Foreign Agents Series (1988).

4 This is known as the Hegel-Marx question in the history of philosophy – historically, the general emerges through the individual and the particular; once constituted historically, it becomes an institution and wields influence from the general through the particular to the individual (*Allegemeinheit/Besonderheit/Einzelheit*). See further note 9 below.

for largely historical reasons, coincide with natural boundaries between land and sea, or land and a watercourse, this is not legally necessary; as a matter of legal fiction, a boundary may be drawn virtually anywhere. Rather than first drawn on natural boundaries and then on a map, international boundaries may first be drawn on a map and only then on the land, or in water, or eventually in the air – this is the logic of legal institution. In other words, the location of an international boundary, in any given place, may appear to be a natural coincidence and thus have the appearance of a given (*es gibt*),[5] or it may be an artifact and thus rather a matter of taking (*Nahme, Ereignis*, *nomos*) rather than something given.[6] While an international boundary is a matter of both as is and as if, in any given location it may be more one than the other, that is, a given rather than a fiction – and *vice versa*.

International boundaries constitute both the ontology and the deontology of the international order, its being (*Sein*) and its norm (*Sollen*). Such an order may be questioned or challenged only to the extent that it is not taken as if it were a given and as such always already presupposed as a matter of fact and imposed as a matter of law – a superposition of the ontological and the deontological. Anything that takes place within the international order necessarily reproduces rather than questions or challenges the being of the international order as a given and thus falls within the order of the ontical rather than that of the ontological;[7] and similarly, any action that takes the international order as an order, that is, as a norm or command, is governed by the order of the deontical rather than the deontological – it follows from such an order, or such a command, that any action challenging the order, that is, crossing the border without permission, by definition crosses the border of what is permissible, that is, it is prohibited unless specifically permitted. The border is the order. The order of freedom – any action that is voluntary, or normatively indifferent – that is, neither prohibited nor permitted – can only prevail within the deontical order, but not on the border of the order. Just as the ontological dictates the scope of the ontical, the deontical enforces the order instituted by the deontological.[8]

However, the international order is not only a matter of fact and law but also a matter of time and as such a matter of historical constitution. Not only may segments of international boundaries be disputed at any particular point in time (and thus create a risk of

5 *See generally* Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, Harper & Row (1972), 1–24.

6 Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, Telos Press Publishing (2006), Appendix.

7 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Harper & Row (1962), 31–35.

8 For an early outline of deontological logic (which governs the deontological modalities of legal positions), see W. N. Hohfeld, *Fundamental Legal Conceptions*, Yale University Press (2005). As Roscoe Pound pointed out, Hohfeld's conceptual scheme is based on Hegelian dialectical logic. See Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 50 *Harvard Law Review* (1936–1937), 557 *et seq*. ("Hohfeld in 1913, a pupil of Howison, one of the chief American expounders of Hegel … constructed an elaborated scheme of opposites and correlatives based on the Hegelian logic. The defects of Hegel's logic … are brought out in this ingenious and in many ways useful scheme.") *See also* Manfred Moritz, *Über Hohfelds System der juridischen Grundbegriffe*, Lund 1960, 20, fn. 38. For an early outline of deontic logic (which sets out the deontic modalities of action rather than positions, which are governed by deontological modalities), *see* Georg Henrik von Wright, *Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry,* Routledge & Kegan Paul (1963).

fragmentation of the order); they may also radically change, at any point in time, and in any event, more likely than not, over time. But since international boundaries constitute the very ontological and deontological foundation of the international order, any such change tends to constitute an event (*Ereignis*), that is, a change that by definition qualifies as something "historical." This is not a coincidence – it coincides perfectly with the story of the international order's own history. While appearing to be effectively static, if observed at any particular point in time, or even over a relatively short period of time, the international order, as an order of international boundaries, is merely the end result, or the sum total, of the story of the historical developments that preceded it and led to its constitution as a relatively stable institution. In this sense, the international order is something essentially arbitrary – something that is historically constituted – rather than conceptually given: its apparent conceptual necessity as an order of as is and as if, is, at any given point in time, a matter of radical historical contingency. While logically, something that is necessary must be possible and therefore not impossible, and while something that is merely possible but not necessary is necessarily contingent, historically the reverse is true – necessity arises out of contingency: an event that is contingent, is also possible, and since what is possible is not impossible, it is, over time, more or less likely to turn into what in retrospect, that is, logically, appears to be a necessity.[9]

This is the short story, or the novel (*nouvelle*), of the international order as a matter of historical constitution and legal institution: as an order of boundaries, the international order is simultaneously both conceptually necessary and historically contingent.

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9 As demonstrated in Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production* (Wordsworth Editions, 2013). Logic, properly (i. e. non-metaphysically) understood, is nothing but a metaphor, or a reflection, of time. As such, as a reflection, logic by definition recounts history in a reversed chronological order – from general through particular to individual (*Allegemeinheit/Besonderheit/Einzelheit*), while historical development moves from the individual through the particular to the general. The categories of modal logic (necessary/possible/impossible/contingent) reflect this logic and this chrono-logy, the latter reversing the order of the former. Also, while the former is deductive and as such conceptually bound, or closed, the latter is inductive and as such conceptually open – what ultimately appears to be necessary does not follow by logical necessity from contingency and possibility. Similarly, as time rotates (instead of moving directly forward in a liner fashion like an arrow), logic also rotates and thus bends, that is, it is *dialectical* in every sense of this word. "**Dialect (n.)**: 1570s, 'language, speech, mode of speech,' especially 'form of speech of a region or group, idiom of a locality or class' as distinguished from the general accepted literary language, also 'one of a number of related modes of speech regarded as descended from a common origin,' from French *dialecte*, from Latin *dialectus* 'local language, way of speaking, conversation,' from Greek *dialektos* 'talk, conversation, speech' also 'the language of a country, dialect,' from *dialegesthai* 'converse with each other, discuss, argue,' from *dia* 'across, between' (see **dia-**) + *legein* 'speak' from PIE root ***leg-** (1) 'to collect, gather,' with derivatives meaning 'to speak (to 'pick out words')'). www.etymonline.com (visited on 15 June 2021). The categories of modal logic – necessary, possible, impossible and contingent – match the conceptual structure of deontological (duty, right, no-right and liberty) and deontic (obligatory, permissible, prohibited and voluntary) logic and can be derived by the same type of (dialectical or intensional) reasoning.

Just as the international order is not a system in any technical sense of this term but merely a static order of boundaries, there is no such place as the "international." While it is commonplace (and as such *topical*, in the Aristotelian sense of this term) to say that the international order is located on the "international level," or on the "international plane," or more juridico-technically, that it constitutes an "international jurisdiction," there is as a matter of fact no such place, on any level, as an "international level" or an "international plane."[10] The terms "international level" and "international plane" are metonyms and as such literally beside the point: they draw on a parallel rather than aim at conceptual accuracy.[11] They should not be taken literally – except in the sense that, as metonyms, they are literally, that is, by definition and therefore precisely, beside the point. They do not go straight to the point since their whole point is not to be on point, but beside the point. The term "international plane," or "international level," literally draws a parallel, that is, a parallel of a place – the State, or the local jurisdiction – but is not itself a place, not even in the sense of a two-dimensional plane. It is merely a parallel, drawn in place of the State, or in place of a local jurisdiction, as if such an international plane also existed somewhere, in its own particular place, or on its own international level. However, as a matter of fact, there is, in reality, no such particular place, on any level.

What is then, the international plane, if not a place? Unlike the State, it is not a state, that is, a matter of statics. It is rather *motion* and as such a matter of dynamics. The international plane is not located in any particular place; it is in time, and in time only, and thus evolves, or unfolds, with time. As such it is continuous, that is, without a beginning or an end, and without any discrete parts, and therefore by definition does not qualify as a thing (*Ding*), that is, as some thing that exists in real time and place. It is not any thing – not even anything.[12] It is rather no-thing (*Nichts*) – continuing uncertainty as to what may or may not take place on an international boundary. Such uncertainty can never be observed as such, or directly, although it may turn into something observable over time, when the time comes (*Werden*). In other words, although one cannot tell for certain when and where, developments on the international plane – increasing or decreasing uncertainty as to what may or may not take place on an international boundary – may turn into an international event, or an event that takes place on an international

10 "International plane" is used less frequently today, but not long time ago, it was used almost as a term of art. Take, for example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides, in Article 2(1)(b), that "[f]or the purposes of the present Convention … 'ratification,' 'acceptance,' 'approval' and 'accession' mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes *on the international plane* its consent to be bound by a treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, 115 *U.N.T.S.* 331. (Emphasis added.) The commentary of the Vienna Convention is peppered with references to the "international plane," which is described as an "entirely different plane[s]" from the plane on which a constitutional ratification of a treaty takes place. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 2 *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 197 (1966).

11 Unlike metaphors, which literally de-scribe whatever they describe, metonyms are literally beside the point – they draw on a parallel. See the definition of metonymy: "the use of a name of one object or concept for that of another to which it is related or of which it is a part." *Webster's Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (1989).

12 Just as anything is continuous, that is, it does not imply a reference to a thing, any thing is literally discontinuous and thus implies such a reference.

boundary, and as such may become observable in real time and place. In the meantime, it depends, that is, it is out there, suspended in time, waiting to happen, like a finger on the button. The international plane is not an actual but a potential event that propagates in time, that is, in uncertainty as to what may or may not take place on an international boundary.[13]

The difference between the realm of the State, or the "local," and the realm of the "international" is thus not unlike the distinction in physics between classical reality and the quantum state.[14] The world of the "local" is the world of classical reality: the State, or the local jurisdiction, is static rather than dynamic. It is defined by its boundary, and thus can be located and measured, in all its four dimensions, including time – it exists in reality, that is, in real time and place. It also has a certain history of constituting events (*Geschichte – geschehen*) that can be counted and recounted, as well as a more or less certain future that can be predicted, at least in the short term.

By contrast, the international plane is the world of quantum mechanics writ large. Just as the quantum state is, broadly speaking, a proto-state or a potential state rather than a real state,[15] that is, it is not located in any particular place and thus is non-local,[16] the international plane is not a real state, except by analogy (metonymy); it cannot be localized in any particular place – that is, it is also non-local. Like the quantum state, the international plane is non-local precisely because it is suspended in time only and is, as such, in continuous motion: it is neither here nor there, as it *is* not. It either becomes (*werden*) or is always already gone, leaving only a trace that can be tracked but by definition only after the fact, that is, after it has taken place as an international event.[17]

13 The international plane is thus uncertainty, or entropy, about what may or may not take place on an international boundary – disturbance or fluctuation (wave) of uncertainty, or entropy (that is, information entropy rather than thermo-dynamic entropy), propagating in time. Or more specifically, time *is,* in and of itself, this process of uncertainty or entropy – a veritable cornucopia of uncertainty as to the events that may or may not take place in reality, and what they will mean. Operationally, time is also the measure of uncertainty – the shorter the time span, the less uncertainty as to future events; the longer the time span, the more there is uncertainty as to what will happen. By extension, international law, in the narrow sense, is about the regulation of the potential (future) events, based on the (uncertain) information available, just as international institutions are about their administration and management. International law in the broad sense includes international dispute resolution which is about the retrospective (*ex post facto*) resolution of disputes that have arisen out of international events.

14 This coincidence is not a coincidence in the sense of being something random, except historically; conceptually, it is a perfect co-incidence: the law (or rather laws – international law and local law) is a reflection, or a metaphor, of the laws of physics, including in terms of its historical constitution and modern institution, rather than something arbitrary or willfully determined.

15 Strictly speaking quantum state is neither quantized (but rather a continuous wave) nor a static state, but dynamic motion. Or, in other words, quantum state is a state in which quanta do not appear as quanta but as a wave that is in continuous motion. Conceptually, quantification is not the same as measurement; measurement is about the ratio between what is quantified and quantification.

16 As demonstrated by experiments confirming Bell's theorem; see J. S. Bell, On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox, in J. S. Bell, *Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics*, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 1987, 14–21. *See also* J. S. Bell, On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics, in J. S. Bell, *Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics*, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 1987, 1–13.

17 *See* Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 75 (G. C. Spivak trans. 1976) ("The trace *is nothing*, it is not an entity, it exceeds the question of *What is*? and contingently makes it possible.") (Emphasis in original).

Just as the quantum state may be described as an unquantified (or "unmeasured") rotating wave of uncertainty,[18] propagating in time, which, as such, stands for a potential (or quantifiable) event rather than an actual (or quantified) event,[19] the international plane can be understood as a potential or unqualified (or as not-yet-conceptualized) event rather than as a real (or qualified and as such conceptualized) international event. In other words, the international plane is in an unqualified state, or in a quale state – a state of continuing uncertainty as to what may or may not take place on an international boundary.[20] Thus, like the quantum state, which cannot be localized, the quale state is not a real state, such as the State, but rather something more uncertain – something with a potential to take place but that has not yet taken place in real time and place.[21] Like the

18 That is, a wave of uncertainty and indeterminacy that has not taken place as an event because it has not yet been interfered with: "**interfere (v.)** formerly also *enterfere*, mid-15c., 'to strike against,' from Middle French *enterferir* 'exchange blows, strike each other,' from *entre-* 'between' (see **entre-**) + *ferir* 'to strike,' from Latin *ferire* 'to knock, strike,' related to Latin *forare* 'to bore, pierce' (from PIE root ***bhorh-** 'hole'). Compare *punch* (v.), which has both the senses 'to hit' and 'to make a hole in'). www.etymonline.com (visited on 11 Nov. 2020). When interfered with, or pierced, the quantum wave collapses into the classical (real) state. Schrödinger's wave function thus represents a continuous wave of uncertainty that must be squared in order to translate it into a discontinuous event taking place with certain probability in real space and time, that is, in a particular place. Squaring – multiplying a number by itself – thus represents mathematically the conversion, or normalization, of a one-dimensional (linear) wave of uncertainty, propagating in time, into a two-dimensional boundary – a field – on which the event in question will take place with certain probability. The third dimension being, mathematically and physically, redundant or holographic; see "**Redundant (adj.)**: 1590s, from Latin *redundantem* (nominative *redundans*), present participle of *redundare*, literally 'overflow, pour over; be over-full;' figuratively 'be in excess,' from *re-* 'again' (see **re-**) + *undare* 'rise in waves,' from *unda* 'a wave,' from PIE **unda-*, nasalized form of root ***wed-** (1) 'water; wet.'.) www.etymonline.com (visited on 22 May 2021). See further below.

19 *See* Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy*, Penguin Books (1962), 11 ("The probability wave … meant a tendency for something. It was a quantitative version of the old concept of '*potentia*' in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.") *See also* 2 *The Complete Works of Aristotle, Collected Works* (Ed. by Jonathan Barnes) 1009(a) 31–35, and *passim* (1984). For definition of information as a superposition of possible messages *(i. e.*, uncertainty as to which message is in fact selected) see Claude E. Shannon, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, in Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, University of Illinois Press (1949), 31 ("The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have a *meaning*; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is *selected from a set* of possible messages.") (Emphasis in original.) *See also* Warren Weaver, Some Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication, in Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication,* University of Illinois Press (1949), 8–9 (defining the amount of information "to be measured by the logarithm of the number of available choices").

20 *Cf.* C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order*, 121, Dover Publications, Inc. (1929) (defining qualia as "recognizable qualitative characters of the given"). The term "quale" is used in this paper in a more technical (linguistic) sense to refer to a quale state where there is no difference between a concept and a metaphor; see below notes 26–27 and accompanying text. *Cf. also* the concept of "*Urbegriff*" (or "primordial" or "original" concept"), which was aptly defined by Immanuel Kant as "the sum-total of all possibility." *See* Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* 489 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 1965).

21 Thus the meaning of the term "international plane" is indeterminate, or undefined (vague), just as the fate of a quantum wave is uncertain. In the absence of a clearly defined boundary of meaning or a horizon of certainty, both remain entangled in uncertainty and indeterminacy (*Verschränkung*) – that is, time.

quantum state, the quale state cannot be grasped and captured (*begreifen*), or qualified, in a non-exhaustive manner, as a formal concept, just as one cannot accurately conceptualize or quantify pure motion, or motion as such. This is the conceptual, or qualitative, reading of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle or, more accurately, inaccuracy principle (*Ungenauigkeit*): one can neither accurately conceptualize nor precisely quantify pure motion, without converting it in parallel, that is, metonymically, into a static position – but this is not to say that such a parallel reality in fact exists.[22] It is merely a parallel, or a reflection, but not a real place. Just as a quantum wave cannot be observed directly, as such, but only indirectly, after its quantification as a particle, the quale state can be grasped, or conceptualized, only after the fact, that is, after its qualification as an international event.

An international event is thus the product of an act of qualification, just as a particle is the product of an act of quantification.[23] There is no international event in and of itself, just as there is no particle in and of itself. In other words, just as quantification causes the abstract and non-local quantum wave to spiral into a collapse and compress into something concrete that exists in real time and place – a particle –, the qualification of movement of something – anything – across an international boundary as an interna-

22 The "international plane" thus is a conceptual counterpart of an imaginary number: just as an imaginary number tracks motion (rotation) around an imaginary axis, the international plane can be understood as an imaginary axis that stands vertically on an international boundary between States. The rotation of the standing international plane to the plane of the State stands for the "international" movement (*i. e.*, across the border). The "international plane" is thus a symbol of rotation, which implies – since the international plane is one-dimensional and rotates in time only – that time itself rotates, like the hand of a clock. Thus, just as the international plane may be understood as rotation around an imaginary axis standing on an international boundary, time rotates around itself, or its own axis, without being anything other than motion, and without its axis being anything other than a notion (*Sein*), that is, at absolute rest. Time is thus by definition the number of times (sic) time has rotated around itself and can be defined as the ratio between the two, rotation and absolute rest. Mathematically, counting of rotations is the conceptual expression of multiplication, as opposed to adding up – one rotation around oneself is one times one; two rotations around oneself is two times one, two rotations around two rotating selves is two times two, that is, four, etc.), which translates, mathematically, into $x/0 = \infty$ and, since x rotates, into $\infty = i$. Consequently, qualitative "self" corresponds to quantitative "0," which explains why self-reference in mathematics and formal logic tends to lead to a paradox – it corresponds to dividing by zero and therefore does not produce a fixed or determinate result because it refers to motion (rotation). Thus, the solution to a paradox (e. g., Russel's paradox: Assume R is a set of all sets that are not members of themselves; then if R is not a member of itself, by definition it is a member of itself; if it is a member of itself, then it is not a member of itself, since it is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves) does not have one fixed answer; it moves back and forth from one to the other – that is, the answer is imaginary (rotation) and can be represented mathematically by an imaginary number. For an account of the history of imaginary numbers (and its discovery as the "rotation operator") *see, e. g.,* Paul Nardin, *An Imaginary Tale: The Story of* $\sqrt{-1}$, Princeton University Press (2007).

23 Quite literally, the product of the quantifier (h, or Planck's constant) and frequency (f) of the quantum wave ($E = hf$). Quantification also being a form of qualification (contraction), just as qualification is a form of quantification (compression). Both are forms of action that cause the quantum/quale state to collapse and are quantitatively captured in Planck's constant, which in itself quantifies the action of quantification (quantum of action). Quantum is thus the most compressed unit of measurement possible (i. e., it sets the boundary of the measurable), just as quale is the most contracted (*de minimis*) form of conceptualization (i. e., it sets the boundary of the conceptualizable). One cannot produce a more compressed particle than the quantum, and one cannot produce a concept with a more contracted meaning than the quale.

tional event causes the abstract and non-local international plane to contract into something concrete that exists in real time and place – an international event. Or, in more theoretical terms, just as quantification transforms an abstract mathematical quantity (wave function) that is suspended as a mere probability in time into a concrete particle existing in real time and place (collapse of the wave function), qualification translates an abstract and vague metonymy (international plane) into a concept that refers to something concrete that takes place in real time and place – an international event. While quantification causes the compression of an (abstract and non-local) quantum wave into a (concrete and local) particle, qualification causes the contraction of the abstract and vague metonymy of international plane into a concrete and local international event. There can be no international event before its qualification as such. The boundary between the quantum/quale state and the classical state is a boundary between the future and the present.

These two phenomena, or these two events – compression of a quantum wave into a particle and the contraction of the international plane into an international event – have similar consequences, literally by definition (that is, by de-fining, or by turning something infinite into finite), and are thus neither completely causally determined nor entirely spontaneous.[24] Rather they are something *produced* (*hervorbringen, poiesis*) by actions of quantification and qualification; even when highly probable, or virtually certain, they do not occur in reality until they are produced.[25] As such, as something produced, they also, inevitably, have their own production cost – for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The production of a particle, like the production of an event, results in a remainder, or a residue, that is neither concrete nor determinate. Just as the collapse of the quantum state produces, by way of compression, or contraction, a concrete particle, it also produces, by way of counter-action, an inflation, that is, open (empty) space, that effectively (dis-)embodies the trans-action cost required to cause the contr-action (or the embodiment), and to produce something real.[26] In other

24 Interestingly, the term "spontaneous" is of uncertain origin, that is, it appears to have emerged, almost spontaneously, out of uncertainty. *See* "**spontaneous (adj.)** 1650s, 'occurring without external stimulus,' from Late Latin *spontaneus* 'willing, of one's free will,' from Latin *(sua) sponte* 'of one's own accord, willingly,' a word of uncertain origin. Related: *Spontaneously*; *spontaneousness*. Used earlier of persons and characters, with a sense "acting of one's own accord" (c. 1200). *Spontaneous combustion* first attested 1795. *Spontaneous generation* (the phrase, not the feat) attested from 1650s." www.etymonline.com (visited on 19 June 2021).

25 Produced, that is, lead or brought forward; brought into existence: "Produce (v.): early 15c., 'develop, proceed, extend,' from Latin *producere* 'lead or bring forth, draw out,' figuratively 'to promote, empower; stretch out, extend,' from *pro* 'before, forth' (from PIE root ***per**-(1) 'forward' hence 'in front of, before, forth') + *ducere* 'to bring, lead,' from PIE root ***deuk**- 'to lead.' Sense of 'bring into being' is first recorded 1510s; that if 'put (a play) on stage' is from 1580s." https://www.etymonline.com/word/produce#etymonline_v_2617 (visited 25 May 2020). *See* Martin Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (Harper & Row, 1977), 10 ("Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, *poiesis. Physis* also, the arising of something from out of itself is a bringing-forth, *poiesis*.") Mathematically, energy is also literally a product rather than something natural or original (E = hf). See fn. 23 above.

26 Production of empty (open) space – or more, precisely, the opening of a third dimension (see para. 18 *supra*) – being a counter-action to contraction, or compression. Quantum jump can therefore be defined

words, it turns out that a quantum state (dis)embodies only a potential rather than an actual event because, as a wave of uncertainty, it (dis)embodies not only energy, but also, simultaneously and without difference, entropy – that is, it consists of a superposition of energy and entropy. Thus, when a quantum state collapses, as a result of the act of quantification, the superposition of energy and entropy also collapses, producing two distinct quantities – compression of energy into a particle and decompression, or inflation, of the rest of the quantum wave (of uncertainty in time) into open (empty) space, that is, into entropy, which is abstract and indeterminate and as such without any concrete quantity but which can be measured indirectly, or operatively, by anything concrete that flows into it.[27]

Similarly, the international plane is a broad and vague term because it makes no distinction between an event and a non-event, or action and inaction; in other words, it

as a gap (or break or interval), that is, as *space* – a quantum jump is by definition an empty space between quanta. It is the appearance of this gap, or the emergence of space, that breaks the continuous wave into a discontinuous or discrete particle and that emerges when the quantum wave contracts into a quantum of energy. This contraction cannot be observed directly because it is caused by the very act of quantification; and it is the act of quantification that marks the boundary, or the space, between the quantum state and classical reality. A boundary is by definition a gap in something continuous, that is, a result of qualification of something continuous as some and thing, that is, as some thing discontinuous, separated by a gap. Space is thus an emergent property – it is a consequence of quantification, and the fact that it is an emergent property explains why it cannot be quantized itself. It is the space itself that quantizes, i. e., it is the difference that creates quanta (quantities). In other words, space is entropy – the side product, or the waste, or what is left over in the process of production of a particle. This is also reflected at the level of theory: to calculate the probability of an event, Schrödinger's equation is squared, not cubed, since the rest is entropy – the third dimension does not really matter. Conversely, quantum state is the square root of an event – a potential event, that is, an event that is in time only, or in a compacted state).

27 The contraction, or the compression, thus by de-finition constitutes an *event* (*Ereignis*) in the technical sense of this term, that is, in the sense of information theory, and is consistent with the principle of least action: the event (the contraction) is likely to take place in the most probable location (as quantified by squaring the wave function), which is by definition the location where its information content will be the lowest (since the more probable the event, the lower its information content). By coincidence, this is also the place where the transaction cost is the lowest in terms of the quantum of action required to cause the contraction as it coincides with Planck's constant, which cannot be further compressed. Consequently, the information content of an event cannot be less than Planck's constant (there cannot be absolutely certain or pre-determined events; the uncertainty associated with an event cannot be compressed to a quantity less than Planck's constant), and vice versa, no event can take place – that is, nothing happens – without at least the minimum of action corresponding to Planck's constant. If and when an event takes place, the quantum of action required corresponds to the information content of the event, that is, its probability. An event thus compresses the energy/entropy suspended in a quantum wave into actual energy (particle) while disclosing entropy, the quantity of the actual energy representing the sum of all probabilities of a quantum wave, consistent with the first law of thermodynamics, and the volume of entropy being always greater than that of the compressed particle, consistent with the second law of thermodynamics. Similarly, the contraction of the broad international plane into a punctual international event cuts off (and discloses and sets aside as waste) a broad slice of the international plane as a meaningless metaphor, while producing the conceptual core of what the international plane in fact, or in reality, means – an event. Thus, just as entropy, as open (empty) space, is physically the leftover resulting from the production of a particle of energy (what is left over after the quantification of the particle), the increase in metaphoricity – broadly meaningless information – is the price to be paid for coining a concept, or the other side of the coin of concept. Unlike a metaphor, which is all over the place, a concept is information in a contracted form (just as a particle is energy in a compressed and localized form, while entropy is literally all over the place, as open space).

embodies both, without distinction. Thus, when the quale state is qualified, or conceptualized, the superposition of action and inaction collapses and produces, virtually by de-finition, a concise and definite concept that captures a quale of concrete action – an international event. This gain in concreteness and definition – or this contr-action of the broad and vague international plane into a concrete and definite international event – has its own trans-action cost: the vast expanse of the rest of the international plane, as an empty metaphor devoid of any concrete reference, into a conceptual void of a non-event.[28] Just as an open (empty) space cannot be quantified, or measured, except indirectly (by way of measuring what fills it, once bounded), inaction cannot be qualified, or conceptualized, except indirectly, by way of a counterfactual, that is, by conceiving an event that could have taken place but in fact did not. Thus (empty) space and inaction are both strictly indeterminate – they have neither concrete content nor definite boundaries.[29] Both are, in a very real sense, unreal, that is, virtually indistinguishable from fiction.

It is this double quantum of action – this transformation (*En-tropie*) or translation – that makes the difference in reality and indeed is the very action that pro-duces the reality by way of contraction: just as it disentangles the abstract and continuous quantum wave propagating in infinite (continuous) time and contracts it into a concrete, point-like particle existing in a de-finite position, it disentangles the abstract and vague international plane and contracts it into a concrete and definite international event – an instance that takes place in real time and place. The collapse of the quantum wave, or the contraction of the quantum wave into a particle existing in a definite position, and the contraction of the international plane into a concrete and definite international event, are both literally contractions or compressions (of wave/particle and plane/event respectively), that is, trans-actions across a boundary, or cross-border contr-acts – they quantify and conceptualize the production of the real, but at the cost of increasing entropy in an amount that is always greater in terms of volume than the volume of the contracted particle, or at the cost of disseminating, or broadcasting, broadly meaningless information while producing a conceptually more concise and accurate account of reality. A particular particle embodies all of the many (theoretical) probabilities (dis)embodied in a wave function (the rest of the wave being left over as entropy and turning into – or rather out to – empty space),[30] just as the concept of international event occupies only a narrow boundary on the verge of (taking place on) the international plane (the remain-

28 Quantification and qualification are thus forms of *Destruktion*, or de-construction – just as the former destroys (or de-constructs) the quantum state, the latter destroys (or de-constructs) the quale state. In other words, they are forms of *Destruktion* in the Heideggerian sense; see Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* Harper & Row (1962), 44.

29 See "**Indeterminate (adj.)**: late 14c., from Late Latin *indeterminatus* 'undefined, unlimited,' from *in-* 'not, opposite of' (see **in-** (1)) + *determinatus*, past participle of *determinare* 'to enclose, bound, set limits to' (see **determine**)." www.etymonline.com (visited 19 June 2021).

30 Indeed literally "turning into" since entropy means, etymologically, turning into: "[E]ntropy n. *Physics* the part of energy that cannot be converted into work, 1868, borrowed from German *Entropie*, from Greek *entropia, entrope*, a turning towards (*en-* in + trope a turning, *entrope,* a turning towards (*en*. in + *trope* a turning … .)"), *Chambers Dictionary of Etymology* 2015 (Chambers Harrap Publishers). Once emerged,

der being set aside, or left over, and lost into the semantic void of a non-event, that is, metaphysics, and eventually forgotten).[31] In other words, just as quantification results in extension of time into space, as space (empty space, quintessence), qualification results in extension in time of what is, as is (inaction, non-event); however, this is a purely extensional description; intensionally, all that matters, that is, all that is meaningful in the sense of having a concrete reference (an international event), is compressed into a concept, just as all the energy of a quantum wave is compressed into a particle – the rest turns (*Entropie*) into empty space, a quintessential non-event.[32]

The quantum state thus collapses because the action of quantification disentangles the (entangled) quantum state, just as the quale state collapses because the action of qualification disentangles the (entangled) quale state.[33] However, both of these collapses are only relative – a matter of perspective, or optics, rather than a reality in and of itself *(an sich)*. The collapse of the quantum state is in the eye of the beholder: while the quantum state collapses in the eyes of the quantifier/qualifier (or the "observer"), this is only because the observer itself gets simultaneously entangled with the quantum state and thus both become part of the "environment."[34] In other words, the quantum state, or the entangled state, simply moves to another "level" – instead of the observer being outside the (entangled) quantum state, it falls in its place and gets entangled with

entropy can be measured by energy dispersal within a (bounded) space. Entropy is thus literally a trope, or a reflection, of energy.

31 For the linkage of metaphysics and forgetfulness see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Harper & Row (1962). Forgetting in its physical sense being the opposite of conceptualizing (*greifen, Begriff*): "Old English *forgietan* 'lose the power of recalling to the mind; fail to remember; neglect inadvertently,' from for-, used here probably with privative force, 'away, amiss, opposite' + *gietan* 'to grasp' (see get (v.)). To 'unget,' hence 'to lose' from the mind. A common Germanic construction (compare Old Saxon *fargetan*, Old Frisian *forjeta*, Dutch *vergeten*, Old High German *firgezzan*, German *vergessen* 'to forget'). The physical sense would be 'to lose (one's) grip on,' but that is not recorded in any historical Germanic language. Figurative sense of 'lose care for' is from late 13c. Related: *Forgetting*; *forgot*; *forgotten*." (Emphasis added.) https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=forget (visited on 29 May 2020). Inaction (non-event) can thus be understood as a parallel, or a metaphor (reflection), of entropy: just as entropy produces empty space (i. e., space that is devoid of energy), inaction produces a meaningless metaphor – what is left of the international plane once it has been conceptualized as an international event – that has no conceptual content, that is, neither has any concrete reference in reality. Such a metaphor is metaphysical in the sense that it is conceptually indistinguishable from fiction.

32 Hence the references herein to etymology – etymology is, in itself, a reflection of the formation of concepts from terms that do not, initially, distinguish between a concept and a metaphor, which are still in a quale state. *See* Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (translated by Ralph Manheim, Yale University Press, 1959).

33 The quantum/quale state and the classical state are thus complementary perspectives: one can only be on one side of the boundary at a time, or conversely, one cannot be on both sides of the boundary at the same time. *See* Niels Bohr, The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory, *Supplement to Nature*, 14 April 1928, 580, 590 (suggesting that the classical and quantum perspectives are not "contradictory … but complementary pictures of the phenomena, which only together offer a natural generalisation of the classical mode of description. … [T]he idea of complementarity is suited to characterise the situation, which bears a deep-going analogy to the general difficulty in the formation of human ideas, inherent in the distinction between subject and object.")

34 The collapse of the quantum state is thus not only a matter of quantification (or "measurement") but also of qualification, that is, an intervention by the observer.

the "system."[35] Similarly, the collapse of the quale state is only apparent: as a result of qualification, the qualifier itself gets entangled with the "system" and is surrounded and submerged by it – in other words, it turns into a concerned insider, or a sub-server instead of remaining an external, objective ob-server.[36] The macroscopic, classical world thus emerges as a result of this double movement, or this *Aufhebung*, which resolves the contradiction between the quantum state and the classical state, and that between the quale state and the classical State – these states together, *aufgehoben*, constitute the macroscopic system which contains the observer within itself, as an entangled element of the system.[37] As a result, from the perspective of the observer, quantification and qualification are symmetry-breaking events – just as quantification breaks the superposition (quantum state) of energy and entropy, qualification breaks the superposition (quale state) of action and inaction. Their product is a classical state, or a *place* – an environment where, in the absence of symmetry, energy remains constant while entropy tends to increase as energy spreads out and fills in the empty space,[38] and where the meaning of concepts is constrained by their reference while metaphors tend to propagate and spread all over the place – and beyond, into the realm of metaphysics.[39] Unlike concepts, metaphors know no boundaries; they operate on a higher – international – level.

35 This is a form of "decoherence" (albeit extended in the sense that it comprehends the observer). For discussion of decoherence see, e. g., Maximilian Schlosshauer. *Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition*, Springer, 2007. Entanglement thus means, in the simplest terms, that the observer and the system are *in the same time* (but not in the same place). Conversely, when the observer and the system are not entangled, that is, when the system is in the quantum state but the observer is not, they are not in the same time. Relative to the observer, the quantum state is *in the future*. It follows that there is no contradiction between causality and quantum mechanics since causality operates the other way round – from the past to the future, and not from the future to the past.

36 It is as a result of the entanglement of the observer with the system that the quantum state is writ large on the macroscopic scale of the international plane – the observer is enclosed within the quantum state, and as a result the microscopic appears classical whereas the macroscopic appears to be in a quantum state.

37 An *Aufhebung*, that is, a simultaneous collapse of the conceptual distinction between the microscopic (quantum) state and the macroscopic (classical) state and thus the solution (*auflösen*) to the contradiction between them – the "observer" becomes part of the "system" and thus comprehends it (that is, disentangles it), while being comprehended (that is, entangled) by it. *See* G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II* (Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg, 1975), 48–62.

38 Place simply being mass (a form of energy) in space, which in turn tends to be filled in by energy (entropy). Thus, in reality, there can be no place without a mass (as it is mass that creates a place) and no empty space (as energy tends to fill in empty space). *See* Albert Einstein, *Relativity: The Special and the General Theory*, Routledge, 1916, 156–57 ("On the basis of the general theory of relativity, … space as opposed to 'what fills space,' which is dependent on the co-ordinates, has no separate existence. … There is no such thing as empty space, i. e., a space without a field. Space-time does not claim existence on its own, but only as a structural quality of the field.").

39 In other words, just as concept may be conceived of (*begreifen*, grasp) as a parallel of a particle, that is, as some thing with a concrete reference, a metaphor may be conceived of as a parallel of empty space, that is, as a metaphor of something that has no concrete reference and thus no real meaning (since space is spread all over the place, it cannot by definition have concrete reference; it is literally devoid of any concrete meaning). Like metaphysics, the science of space – geometry – deals with something that is abstract rather than concrete, something that has no position but is rather something within which any thing can have a position, that is, it is something that cannot be placed because it is by definition, or rather by in-definition, all over the place. Like a metaphor, space cannot be grasped (*begreifen*); however, it can be bounded and, once bounded, measured – just as a metaphor can be circumscribed and as such interpreted.

This, in short, is what the international plane means *in reality*: movement of things across an international boundary, insofar as they qualify as international events. The rest of the term is, in strictly semantic terms, a meaningless metaphor without concrete reference.

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Movement of things across an international boundary may or may not qualify as an international event, depending on its scale, that is, depending on whether it takes place on a large (macroscopic) or a small (microscopic) scale – it is only macroscopic movement that tends to qualify as an international event.

If the movement of things takes place on a large scale – over an extended length of the boundary – the observer tends to place itself *within* rather than outside the phenomenon (*in-der-Welt-sein*) and thus tends to qualify the event as a (discontinuous) event – as an instance – rather than as a (continuous) movement.[40] Conversely, if the movement of things takes place on a small scale – at a discrete point of a boundary – the observer tends to place itself *outside* rather than inside the phenomenon and thus tends not to see in the continuing flow of things over the boundary anything unusual or extraordinary that would justify its qualification as an event. Thus, the distinction between large and small scale, or the macroscopic and the microscopic, is qualitative rather than quantitative and as such a conceptual quantum (or rather quale) leap – literally an event – rather than a sliding scale, or a flow of uneventful observations, or observations of the uneventful. In other words, the distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic is in the eye of the server (*Dasein*) – it depends on whether the ob-server is sufficiently *concerned* (*Besorgen*) with the movement in question to turn from an ob-server into a sub-server.[41] If so, it tends to be affected by such movement and qualify it as an event; if not, it will simply view the movement as a flow of uneventful instances – or at most, as an interesting instance, but nothing concerning. Thus it is the server that draws the distinction between an event and an instance that merely qualifies for (an) instance, or between the macroscopic and the microscopic, or between the inside and the outside.[42]

40 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Harper & Row (1962), 78 et seq. (defining Being-in-the-world [*In-der-Welt-sein*] as a "state of Being" of Dasein, *i. e.,* as the state of the Observer.)

41 *See* Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* Harper & Row (1962), pp. 83 et seq. ("[T]he expression 'concern' [*Besorgen*] will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an *existentiale*, and will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. This term has been chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent 'practical' and economic, but because the Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as *care* [*Sorge*]. This expression too is to be taken as an ontological structural concept. … It has nothing to do with 'tribulation,' 'melancholy,' or the 'cares of life,' though ontically one can come across these in every Dasein. These – like their opposites, 'gaiety' and 'freedom from care' – are ontically possible only because Dasein, when understood *ontologically*, is care [*Sorge*]. Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world [*Sein zur Welt*] is essentially concern [*Besorgen*].") Dasein could be translated here, in this context, as "observer."

42 Thus the distinction is similar to the distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic in physics.

The server is the measure of all things – including the boundary between ob-serving and sub-serving, or between the microscopic and the macroscopic.[43]

Once qualified as an international event, movement of things over an extended length of a boundary constitutes by definition a single event rather than a series of instances that qualify only for instance. As such, an international event amounts to more than a simple sum of its parts, or a collection of the individual instances of which it is composed – the individual instances are entangled as part of the larger whole that includes the observer and thus amount to a single international event.[44] Thus, deployment of military resources across an international boundary tends to constitute a single event rather than a series of small-scale instances, even if it also consists of a series of such instances. Deployment of military resources across an international boundary tends to be concerning in the eyes of the observer as it tends to challenge or at least question the very foundation of the international order as an order founded on international boundaries. Thus a war, and even a lesser scale cross-border conflict, virtually by definition qualifies as an international event insofar as it tends to challenge the very ontological and deontological foundation of the international order – the location, if not the very existence, of an international boundary.[45]

Small-scale movement of things across an international boundary does not tend to raise such concerns, precisely because observers tend to qualify such movement merely as small-scale, or microscopic, instances. However, such small-scale movement may nonetheless be of interest, including of commercial interest, for instance, when it involves things of commercial value such as goods, services, capital or labor (persons).[46] While such cross-border transactions may on aggregate amount to many, and while their volume may fluctuate significantly over time, this does not change their nature, or qualification, as fundamentally individual and, as such, as microscopic (and micro-

43 *Cf.* Protagoras: "man is the measure of all things." *See* Plato, *Thaetetus,* Penguin Books, 1987, *passim*. The observer is not necessarily a man; animals similarly make revealing observations. *See* Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, Fordham University Press (2008).

44 The observer and the observed are entangled because the observer is inside the "system," that is, it is *in* (and not "at") *the same time* as the system. This is the basis of relativity: the observer is entangled with "its" time, and always travels with "its" time.

45 "Challenging" in the Heideggerian sense of "challenging-forth" (*herausfordern*), that is, seeking to appropriate or extract something rather than merely making use of it as is. *See* Martin Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, Harper & Row (1977).

46 Many other things may cross a boundary, without raising any interest, including animals, various types of gases or liquid, that have no commercial or economic value. Thus they do not amount to cross-border transactions, whereas the movement of goods, services, capital and labor (persons) does. Such movement may take place by means of transportation (carriage of persons and goods) or communication (carriage of services and capital), so long as it involves crossing of an international boundary. The difference between these two types of movements depends on whether it is the means or transportation or the things themselves that move: when moving people and goods across an international boundary, it is the means of transportation that move and not the things that are being moved (except relatively speaking), and when moving services and capital, it is the things themselves that move and not the means of communication (which stand still, relatively speaking). Thus electronic transfer of capital (value) across an international boundary, or provision of legal advice by email, or transportation of gas in a pipeline, involves movement of the "things" themselves (money, legal services, energy) rather than of the means of transportation.

economic) instances; unlike events taking place on a macroscopic scale, they do not form part of a larger whole. As such, as small-scale instances, cross-border transactions do not pose a challenge to the international order and thus are in principle permitted under international law unless specifically prohibited.[47] Thus the distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic is not only a matter of socio-economics but also a matter of international law, just as international boundaries are not only a matter of fact, or a matter of as-is, but also a matter of international law (and indeed the only (subject-) matter of international law there is), and as such a matter of as if.[48]

However, although cross-border transactions take place on a microeconomic scale, they may have, on aggregate, macroeconomic effects, depending on their frequency. But this does not turn them into international events, in the proper sense of the term. The macroeconomic effects of cross-border transactions are rather captured by the term "globalization," which is a (continuous) process rather than a (discontinuous) event. Thus, globalization can be defined as a *change* in the rate, or velocity, of the movement of goods, services, capital and labor across an international boundary. Globalization may thus accelerate, which qualifies as "globalization" in the narrow, conventional sense of the term, or it may decelerate, which is also a matter of "globalization" in the broad sense of the term as it involves a change in the velocity in the movement of goods, services, capital and labor – although it may also, although less properly, be defined as "de-globalization" or "localization" as this aptly describes its economic effect. "Localization" reflects, and captures, any reduction in the velocity of cross-border movement of goods, services, capital and labor, and as such is a reverse form of globalization in the broad sense of this term. In both instances, however, what is at stake is movement of goods, services, capital and labor across an international boundary, whether on an accelerating or decelerating scale, which as such is measurable and may be quantified scientifically. As a historical phenomenon, or as a phenomenon taking place in time, globalization naturally rotates – it consists of cycles of globalization and de-globalization.

Globalization, therefore, is not a novel phenomenon. It has always existed, historically, in its accelerating or decelerating form, so long as the international order of things has existed in in its classic form, that is, in the form of a relatively stable order of international boundaries. An international boundary is the place where globalization becomes a reality – the place where globalization takes place. Globalization in a conventional sense, as movement of goods, services, capital and labor across international boundaries, is therefore ultimately reducible to a local event – to an event that takes place on an

47 Rather than challenging or questioning international boundaries, cross-border transactions seek to make use and benefit from them (and any economic differentials that may exist between the economies separated by the boundary). In Heideggerian terms, they fall under the category of "*hervorbringen*" (or *producing*, "bringing forth") rather than "*herausfordern*" (or challenging).

48 An international boundary thus constitutes both a totem and a taboo – it stands for something unarticulated that is simultaneously both sacred, i. e., a totem (something that protects the kinship and must be protected by the kinship) and prohibited, *i. e.*, a taboo (something that cannot be crossed by those not belonging to the kinship except for peaceful purposes of a cross-border transaction, such as marriage). International law is thus fundamentally primitive. *See generally* Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (Vintage Books, 1946).

international boundary. As such, it does not challenge or question existing international boundaries – on the contrary, it relies on them and thus reproduces them. Globalization is an economic process of reproduction of the existing international order.

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The international order, as an order founded on international boundaries, is ultimately founded on what international boundaries themselves are founded on – land, water and air. These elements are what the "earth," as a metaphor of the "world" (*die Welt*),[49] as opposed to "cosmos,"[50] has been understood to be fundamentally composed of since the antiquity.[51] Land, water and air comprehensively and exhaustively capture the phenomena through which the earth appears to the observer – solid, liquid and gas – with one exception, plasma (fire), which is too unstable an element to be capable of serving as a

49 See the etymology of the word "world" – the "age of man:" "Old English *woruld*, *worold* 'human existence, the affairs of life,' also 'a long period of time,' also 'the human race, mankind, humanity,' a word peculiar to Germanic languages (cognates: Old Saxon *werold*, Old Frisian *warld*, Dutch *wereld*, Old Norse *verold*, Old High German *werlt*, German *Welt*), with a literal sense of 'age of man,' from Proto-Germanic **weraldi-*, a compound of **wer* 'man' (Old English *wer*, still in *werewolf*; see virile) + **ald* 'age' (from PIE root *al-(2) 'to grow, nourish'). *See* https://www.etymonline.com (visited on 7 March 2021). *Cf.* **earth (n.)** Old English *eorþe* "ground, soil, dirt, dry land; country, district," also used (along with *middangeard*) for "the (material) world, the abode of man" (as opposed to the heavens or the underworld), from Proto-Germanic **ertho* (source also of Old Frisian *erthe* "earth," Old Saxon *ertha*, Old Norse *jörð*, Middle Dutch *eerde*, Dutch *aarde*, Old High German *erda*, German *Erde*, Gothic *airþa*), perhaps from an extended form of PIE root ***er-** (2) "earth, ground." Cf. the word "world:" "Old English *woruld*, *worold* 'human existence, the affairs of life,' also 'a long period of time,' also 'the human race, mankind, humanity,' a word peculiar to Germanic languages (cognates: Old Saxon *werold*, Old Frisian *warld*, Dutch *wereld*, Old Norse *verold*, Old High German *werlt*, German *Welt*), with a literal sense of 'age of man,' from Proto-Germanic **weraldi-*, a compound of **wer* 'man' (Old English *wer*, still in *werewolf*; see virile) + **ald* 'age' (from PIE root *al-(2) 'to grow, nourish'). *See* https://www.etymonline.com (visited on 7 March 2021).

50 "Cosmos" extending beyond the earth, the metaphor of the "world" of collective experience, that is, common sense. In this sense, "cosmos" refers to the world beyond the world of common sense, or the earth: "**Cosmos (n.)** c. 1200, 'the universe, the world' (but not popular until 1848, when it was taken as the English equivalent to Humboldt's *Kosmos* in translations from German), from Latinized form of Greek *kosmos* 'order, good order, orderly arrangement,' a word with several main senses rooted in those notions: The verb *kosmein* meant generally 'to dispose, prepare,' but especially 'to order and arrange (troops for battle), to set (an army) in array;' also 'to establish (a government or regime);' 'to deck, adorn, equip, dress' (especially of women). Thus *kosmos* had an important secondary sense of 'ornaments of a woman's dress, decoration' (compare *kosmokomes* 'dressing the hair,' and **cosmetic**) as well as 'the universe, the world.' Pythagoras is said to have been the first to apply this word to 'the universe,' perhaps originally meaning 'the starry firmament,' but it later was extended to the whole physical world, including the earth. For specific reference to 'the world of people,' the classical phrase was *he oikoumene (ge)* 'the inhabited (earth).' Septuagint uses both *kosmos* and *oikoumene*. *Kosmos* also was used in Christian religious writing with a sense of 'worldly life, this world (as opposed to the afterlife),' but the more frequent word for this was *aiōn*, literally 'lifetime, age.' The word *cosmos* often suggested especially 'the universe as an embodiment of order and harmony.'" https://www.etymonline (visited on 25 April 2021).
"Cosmos" is thus a cosmetic (and in this sense, feminine) extension of the concept of "world" beyond the common-sensical "earth." Because cosmos traditionally had no practical, common-sensical use or utility, it is merely "cosmetic," when compared to the earth, as it only has aesthetic value.

51 See, e. g., *Fragments of Empedocles* (John Burnet trans.).

foundation of an international boundary.[52] Land, water and air are phenomena that need no further explanation;[53] they are given (*es gibt*) as a matter of collective experience and, as such, unquestionable as matters of common sense.[54] It makes common sense – it is self-evident – that international boundaries must be founded on these elements because there are self-evidently no other, more fundamental elements on which they could be founded – or even if there were, it would literally not matter because they would not make common sense.[55] What makes common sense needs no further evidence because it is self-evident as a matter of collective experience. Common sense, as the depository of collective experience, is the institutional memory of the international order.

Although founded on common sense, the modern international order did not emerge in an instant, or as a single event. It developed over time, in the course of history – indeed, its emergence coincides with the very emergence of history itself. The drawing of a first boundary, or the first drawing of a boundary, not only constituted the first historical record; it also constituted the place on which history could first take place.[56] There cannot be history without events – history is constituted by a record of events – and there cannot be events without a boundary on which they can take place. An event is not possible without a boundary – by definition it consists of a crossing of a boundary – and thus the drawing of a boundary is what makes history conceptually possible in the first place; a boundary is the very condition of its possibility. Not an event in itself, but something that makes an event possible.[57]

52 Thus, as the fourth element of antiquity – fire – is too unstable by its very nature to be capable of serving as a substratum of international boundaries, it may be understood as an element that underlies their change rather than as one on which they are founded. Indeed, unlike land, water and air, which support a boundary, fire (if not domesticated and controlled) may cross and consume a boundary, whether naturally or artificially, that is, by force of war; in other words, it is a metaphor of the anomic and the nomadic rather than the nomic.

53 "**Phenomenon (n.)** 1570s, 'a fact directly observed, a thing that appears or is perceived, an occurrence,' especially a regular kind of fact observed on certain kinds of occasions, from Late Latin *phænomenon*, from Greek *phainomenon* 'that which appears or is seen,' noun use of neuter present participle of *phainesthai* 'to appear,' passive of *phainein* 'bring to light, cause to appear, show' (from PIE root ***bha-** (1) 'to shine'). Meaning 'extraordinary occurrence' is recorded by 1771. In philosophy, 'an appearance or immediate object of experience' (1788). The plural is *phenomena*." https://www.etymonline.com. (visited on 7 February 2021).

54 The term "common sense" goes back to the antiquity, where it was literally understood as a sense common to all senses. *See* 1 *The Complete Works of Aristotle, Collected Works* (Ed. by Jonathan Barnes) 676 (425(a)) (1984).

55 This remains true in the era of modern physics – it makes sense to draw a boundary or to build on land (or the earth), but not on an atom (or any other, more fundamental particle), which mainly consists of empty space. Although land is composed of atoms, it is more stable, phenomenologically, than the elements of which it is composed.

56 "**Record (v.)** c. 1200, 'to repeat, reiterate, recite; rehearse, get by heart,' from Old French *recorder* 'tell, relate, repeat, recite, report, make known' (12c.) and directly from Latin *recordari* 'remember, call to mind, think over, be mindful of,' from *re-* 'restore' (see **re-**) + *cor* (genitive *cordis*) 'heart' (as the metaphoric seat of memory, as in *learn by heart*), from PIE root ***kerd-** 'heart.' Meaning 'set down in writing' first attested mid-14c.; that of 'put sound or pictures on disks, tape, etc.' is from 1892. Related: *Recorded*; *recording*." www.etymonline.com (visited 13 March 2021).

57 This is not to suggest that, historically, there was such an event as a drawing of a first boundary. Drawings are likely to have existed well before they were conceptualized, *ex post facto*, as a boundary. Rather, it is

While boundaries were initially drawn on the land, over time, that is, in the course of history, they were also increasingly drawn on water and eventually in the air. The extension of international boundaries, as a matter of both fact and law, to water and eventually in the air was a consequence of the improved technological ability of the existing territorial political units – known today as States – to monitor and control their boundaries rather than of any conceptual distinction between them – like land, water and air, as fundamental constitutive elements of the earth, are natural extensions of the international order of boundaries. In the course of its expansion on land, and further extension to water and air, the region bounded by international boundaries also expanded and, as a result, turned the then-existing ephemeral and unstable ontical territorial entities, or beings (*Seiende*),[58] into ever larger and more stable political units – they turned into (classical) States.

The gradual extension and stabilization of these units was not only a quantitative change, or an increase in terms of surface (and volume, in terms of airspace) of the entities in question; it was also a qualitative change. While the territory of the dominant political unit of the antiquity – the city, or the *polis* – was not always well-defined or delimited, it was a well understood phenomenon in the sense that it was limited to a particular place that could, by and large, be observed and, as such, experienced. However, the modern State, even if more clearly delimited, is not founded on a "place" in any phenomenological sense of this term. Unlike the city, or the *polis*, which was founded on an observable place,[59] the territory of the modern State expands well beyond anything that can be experienced by the senses of any particular observer. While the territory of the modern State can be re-presented, that is, drawn on a map, it cannot be pre-sented to an observer as a phenomenon, that is, as an entity (*Seiende*) that can be experienced

more likely that, historically, a boundary emerged from a series of differences – conflicts – that resulted in a draw; in other words, the process of drawing a boundary was not a single event but a drawn-out process, and as such extended over a period of time. In other words, a boundary emerged, over time, in the place where the drawn-out process of conflict ended in a draw. "**Draw (v.)** 'give motion to by the act of pulling,' c. 1200, *drauen*, spelling alteration of Old English *dragan* 'to drag, to draw, protract' (class VI strong verb; past tense *drog*, past participle *dragen*), from Proto-Germanic **draganan* 'to draw, pull' (source also of Old Norse *draga* 'to draw, drag, pull,' Old Saxon *dragan* 'to carry,' Old Frisian *drega*, *draga*, Middle Dutch *draghen* 'to carry, bring, throw,' Old High German *tragan* 'carry, bring, lead,' German *tragen* 'to carry, bear'), from PIE root **dhregh-* (see **drag** (v.))." www.etymonline.com (visited on 10 April 2021). It follows that the longer time, the stronger the boundary, and vice versa, the shorter the time, the weaker the boundary.

58 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Harper & Row (1962), 29 ("Being is always the Being of an entity (*das Sein eines Seienden*). The totality of entities can, in accordance with its various domains, become a field for laying bare and delimiting certain defined areas of subject-matter. These areas, on their part …, can serve as objects which corresponding scientific investigations may take as their respective themes.") *See also* "**Entity (n.)**: 1590s, 'being,' from Late Latin *entitatem* (nominative *entitas*), from *ens* (genitive *entis*) 'a thing,' proposed by Caesar as present participle of *esse* 'be' (see **is**), to render Greek philosophical term *to on* 'that which is' (from neuter of present participle of *einai* 'to be,' from PIE root ***es-** 'to be'). Originally abstract; concrete sense in English is from 1620s." www.etymonline.com (visited on 21 Feb. 2021).

59 *See* Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (translated by Ralph Manheim, Yale University Press, 1959), 152 ("*Polis* is usually translated as city or city-State. This does not capture the full meaning. *Polis* means, rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there is. The *polis* is the historical place, the there *in* which, *out of* which, and *for* which history happens.")

as something present and observable.[60] In other words, while the territory of the State can be re-presented on a map, it does not constitute a phenomenon that can be experienced phenomenologically, that is by the senses, except to the limited extent that it expands in the immediate vicinity of the observer – but this of course is not the territory of the State in itself, in its entirety, but merely a region thereof. The territory of the State spreads out and expands well beyond the observer's phenomenological capacity to experience.[61] The territory of the State is represented rather than presented to the senses as something present. It represents its own presence, without itself being present. It is representation without any original presentation.[62]

This almost indistinguishable, or non-observable, shift from presentation to representation is radical: it constitutes both literally and laterally a metaphor (*meta-fora*), or transportation, of an observable place to a different territory – from the place of the immediately present and sensible to the territory of the metaphorical. Unlike the city, or the *polis*, which is founded on a firm ground that can be observed virtually with the naked eye, the territory of the State expands well beyond the world of the observable and thus exceeds it. When transferred beyond the horizon of the city, or the *polis*, the foundation of the city literally expands beyond, and thus transcends, the world of phenomena – the world that can be observed by the senses of an observer – and becomes a representation of a three-dimensional place drawn on a two-dimensional map.[63] It becomes literally something meta-physical that cannot be directly experienced.

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60 Presented in the original sense of being at hand, immediate, given; see *Chambers Dictionary of Etymology* 2015 (Chambers Harrap Publishers). *See also* Online Etymology Dictionary, <www.etyomline.com> (visited 7 March 2021): "**present (adj.)** c. 1300, 'being in the same place as someone or something;' early 14c., 'existing at the time,' from Old French *present* 'evident, at hand, within reach;' as a noun, 'the present time' (11c., Modern French *présent*) and directly from Latin *praesentem* (nominative *praesens*) 'present, at hand, in sight; immediate; prompt, instant; contemporary,' from present participle of *præesse* 'be before (someone or something), be at hand,' from *prae-* 'before' (see **pre-**) + *esse* 'to be' (from PIE root ***es-** 'to be'). Meaning 'biding in a specified place' is from mid-14c. in English. As a grammatical tense expressing action or being in the present time, recorded from late 14c."

61 The observer here being an observer in a phenomenological sense, that is, a layperson (a *Jedermann*), and not a scientist who can with the help of technology make observations from a distance (from higher atmosphere or space). Even then, of course, what is observed is not the territory of a State, as a place, but the surface of the earth.

62 For discussion of this "metaphysics of presence" s*ee, e.g.*, Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, Northwestern University Press (1973); Jacques Derrida, *Ousia* and *Gramme*: Note on a Note from *Being and Time*, in *Margins of Philosophy*, The Harvester Press (1986), 31 *et seq. See also* Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Harper & Row (1962), 47.

63 "**Map (n)**: 'drawing upon a plane surface representing a part or whole of the earth's surface or the heavens, with the various points drawn in proportion and in corresponding positions,' 1520s, a shortening of Middle English *mapemounde* 'map of the world' (late 14c.), and in part from French *mappe*, shortening of Old French *mapemonde.* Both the fuller English and French words are from Medieval Latin *mappa mundi* "map of the world.' The first element is from Latin *mappa* 'napkin, cloth' (on which maps were drawn), 'tablecloth, signal-cloth, flag,' said by Quintilian to be of Punic (Semitic) origin (compare Talmudic Hebrew *mappa*, contraction of Mishnaic *menaphah* 'a fluttering banner, streaming cloth'). The second element is Latin *mundi* 'of the world,' from *mundus* 'universe, world' (see **mundane**)." www.etymonline.com (visited on 25 Feb. 2021)-

The modern international order is thus ultimately founded on two different ends – on common sense, on one end, and on metaphysics on the other.[64] It is founded on common sense insofar as international boundaries are founded on land, water and air; and it is founded on metaphysics insofar as it expands beyond the *polis* into the realm of the unobservable territory of the State.

The two ends of the modern international order are in the end not only different; they also have opposite ends. On one end, they constitute the places, or the fora, on which modern philosophy has gathered, or which modern philosophy has gathered (*legein, logos*)[65] – the two gatherings of modern philosophy or, as they are more commonly known, analytical and continental philosophy. On the other end, they also constitute the two opposite ends, or the meta-fora, of modern philosophy and, as such, the sites of their politics – the controversy about whether philosophy is ultimately founded on, or an extension of, common sense, or whether it expands into, and is ultimately indistinguishable, from metaphysics.[66] The former school of thought seeks to model philosophy on science, while acknowledging that philosophy will always be rooted, at least in part, in common sense,[67] whereas the latter approach seeks to dissociate philosophy from metaphysics, while acknowledging that it can never quite achieve its end – metaphysics will always figure at least in the historical background, if not in the conceptual

64 "End" (also) in the sense of a "place." *See* Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, in *Basic Writings*, Harper & Row, 1977, 375 ("The old meaning of the word 'end' means the same as place: 'from end to the other' means from one place to the other. The end of philosophy is the place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility. End as completion means this gathering. … As a completion, an end is the gathering into the most extreme possibilities.")

65 *See* Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (translated by Ralph Manheim), Yale University Press, (1959), 169–179.

66 A controversy (or dispute, or difference) can be described in geometric terms as two vectors that have turned against each other. "**Controversy (n.)**: 'disputation, debate, prolonged agitation of contrary opinions,' late 14c., from Old French *controversie* 'quarrel, disagreement' or directly from Latin *controversia* 'a turning against; contention, quarrel, dispute,' from *controversus* 'turned in an opposite direction, disputed, turned against,' from *contra* 'against' (see **contra** (prep., adv.)) + *versus* 'turned toward or against,' past participle of *vertere* "to turn" (from PIE root ***wer-** (2) 'to turn, bend')." www.etymonline.com (visited on 15 April 2021).

67 *See, e.g.,* W. V. Quine, The Scope and Language of Science, in *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, Harvard University Press (1966), 229–30, 233 ("[T]he scientist is indistinguishable from the common man in his sense of evidence, except that the scientist is more careful. Science is not a substitute for common sense but an extension of it. The quest for knowledge is properly an effort simply to broaden and deepen the knowledge which them man in the street already enjoys, in moderation, in relation to the commonplace things around him. To disavow the very core of common sense, to require evidence for that which both the physicist and the man in the street accept as platitudes, is no laudable perfectionism; it is pompous confusion, a failure to observe the nice distinction between the baby and the bathwater. … If … the terms 'reality' and 'evidence' owe their intelligibility to their applications in archaic common sense, why may we not then brush aside the presumptions of science? The reason we may not is that science is itself a continuation of common sense."); W. V. Quine, *Word and Object*, The M. I. T. Press (1968), 275–76 ("The philosopher's task differs from others, then, in detail; but in no such drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the philosopher a vantage point outside the conceptual scheme that he takes in charge. There is no such cosmic exile. He cannot study and revise the fundamental conceptual scheme of science and common sense without having some conceptual scheme, whether the same or another no less in need of philosophical scrutiny, in which to work.") The relationship of common sense and science is like that between classical physics and quantum mechanics.

ground, of all philosophy.[68] The politics of modern philosophy is thus about the ultimate site, or the *polis*, that is, the end, of philosophy – whether it should aim to become radically more scientific, or at least more like science even if ultimately rooted in common sense, or whether it should become critically different from metaphysics, while acknowledging its own metaphysical roots. While the two philosophical orientations are politically irreconcilable, frontal confrontations between them have been relatively rare, precisely because they tend to occupy opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum and be preoccupied by themselves rather than the other: analytical philosophy tends to be more interested in the philosophy of the microscopic, that is, theoretical philosophy and the philosophy of science, whereas continental philosophy has traditionally been more concerned with the philosophy of the macroscopic, that is, practical and social philosophy.[69] This, in turn, has led to an effective division of modern philosophical labor without any philosophy of the whole. There is today, effectively, no philosophy. There are regional philosophies (of the large and the small) and politics of philosophy between them, but there is no philosophy of the whole.

If the modern international order – and by extension, modern philosophy – is ultimately founded on a controversy about the very issue of what philosophy is, or should be, is there any alternative other than taking a position in this controversy? Is it inevitable that an engagement in philosophy will amount to an engagement with one or the other of the modern philosophical positions? Is it inevitable that an engagement in philosophy will involve choosing between being interested in the philosophy of the microscopic or concerned with the philosophy of the macroscopic? Is it inevitable that an engagement in philosophy necessary involves choosing between being interested in or being concerned with – that one must necessarily be strictly *motivated* to begin with, that is, moved by an interest in, or a concern with, the *problématique* of a particular regional philosophy?[70] Is there no room for a disinterested and unconcerned philosophy – that

68 *See, e.g.,* Jacques Derrida, Signature, Event, Context, in *Limited Inc,* Northwestern University Press (1977), p. 21 ("There is no concept that is metaphysical in itself. There is labor – metaphysical or not – performed on conceptual systems.")

69 There have been occasional frontal confrontations. *See, e.g.,* the debate about whether Jacques Derrida should be awarded an honorary degree at the University of Cambridge, or criticism of Heidegger's philosophy as obscurantist "conceptual poetry." Barry Smith et al., "Open letter against Derrida receiving an honorary doctorate from Cambridge University," *The Times* (London), Saturday, 9 May 1992, available at http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/varia/Derrida_Letter.htm (visited on 12 April 2021); Bertrand Russell, *Wisdom of the West*, Bloomsbury Books (1989), 303 ("Highly eccentric in its terminology, [Heidegger's] philosophy is extremely obscure. Once cannot help suspecting that language is here running riot. An interesting point in his speculations is the insistence that nothingness is something positive. As with much else in Existentialism, this is a psychological observation made to pass for logic."); Rudolf Carnap, "The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language," in *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (Michael Murray ed.), Yale University Press (1978), 23, 31 (analyzing extracts from Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics" and concluding that they are metaphysical "pseudostatements," and stating, more broadly, that philosophy should be limited to a "method of logical analysis. … It is the indicated task of logical analysis, inquiry into logical foundations, that is meant by 'scientific philosophy' in contrast to metaphysics.") *See also* Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc,* Northwestern University Press (1988).

70 Interest and concern are thus the *motives* of politics – what makes politics move. "**Motive (n.)**: late 14c., 'something brought forward, a proposition, assertion, or argument' (a sense now obsolete), from Old

is, a philosophy that is neither interested in nor concerned with any regional – whether microscopic or macroscopic – motivations? Is there no room for a novel philosophy, or a philosophy of the whole – a sound philosophy that contains both the large and the small within itself, as *aufgehoben*?[71]

It may indeed be the case that there is no serious alternative to the politics of modern philosophy. It may indeed be the case that one must inevitably choose between one or the other position – unless, of course, one takes the position that such an alternative need not be *serious* in the first place.[72] Since even if one may not be able to evade the inevitable, one may try to postpone it. An engagement in philosophy need not amount to an engagement with common sense or with metaphysics if it is not meant to be serious in the first place – if it is not meant to be a real engagement, or an engagement till the inevitable do us part. An engagement in philosophy may be only provisional – an engagement that does not imply any serious, long-term commitment to anything that can be taken as self-evident, or as a given (*es gibt*). It may simply be an *act,* without any motivation other than to act.[73] Precisely because such an act would not be serious, any-

French *motif* 'will, drive, motivation,' noun use of adjective, literally 'moving,' from Medieval Latin *motivus* 'moving, impelling,' from Latin *motus* 'a moving, motion,' past participle of *movere* 'to move' (from PIE root ***meue-** 'to push away') Meaning 'that which inwardly moves a person to behave a certain way, mental state or force which induces an action of volition' is from early 15c. Hence 'design or object one has in any action.'"

71 "Whole" in every sense of the word, including sound: "**Whole (adj.)**: Old English *hal* 'entire, whole; unhurt, uninjured, safe; healthy, sound; genuine, straightforward,' from Proto-Germanic **haila-* 'undamaged' (source also of Old Saxon *hel*, Old Norse *heill*, Old Frisian *hal*, Middle Dutch *hiel*, Dutch *heel*, Old High German, German *heil* 'salvation, welfare'), from PIE **kailo-* 'whole, uninjured, of good omen' (source also of Old Church Slavonic *celu* 'whole, complete;' see **health**). The spelling with **wh-** developed early 15c. The sense in *whole number* is from early 14c. *Whole milk* is from 1782. *On the whole* 'considering all facts or circumstances' is from 1690s. For phrase *whole hog*, see **hog** (n.)." See https://www.etymonline.com (visited on 26 April 2021).

72 Including in the sense of opposite to light, or a (non-serious) act of art: "**Serious (adj.)** mid-15c., 'expressing earnest purpose or thought' (of persons), from Old French *serios* 'grave, earnest' (14c., Modern French *sérieux*) and directly from Late Latin *seriosus*, from Latin *serius* 'weighty, important, grave,' probably from a PIE root **sehro-* 'slow, heavy' (source also of Lithuanian *sveriu, sverti* 'to weigh, lift,' *svarus* 'heavy, weighty;' Old English *swær* 'heavy,' German *schwer* 'heavy,' Gothic *swers* 'honored, esteemed,' literally 'weighty'). As opposite of *jesting*, from 1712; as opposite of *light* (of music, theater, etc.), from 1762. Meaning 'attended with danger' is from 1800." *Cf.* "**Light (adj.1)** 'not heavy, having little actual weight,' from Old English *leoht* (West Saxon), *leht* (Anglian), 'not heavy, light in weight; lightly constructed; easy to do, trifling; quick, agile,' also of food, sleep, etc., from Proto-Germanic **lingkhtaz* (source also of Old Norse *lettr*, Swedish *lätt*, Old Frisian, Middle Dutch *licht*, German *leicht*, Gothic *leihts*), from PIE root ***legwh-** 'not heavy, having little weight.' The adverb is Old English *leohte*, from the adjective. Meaning 'frivolous' is from early 13c.; that of 'unchaste' from late 14c., both from the notion of 'lacking moral gravity' (compare **levity**). Of literature from 1590s. ***Light industry*** (1919) makes use of relatively lightweight materials. The notion in ***make light of*** (1520s) is 'unimportance.' Alternative spelling *lite*, the darling of advertisers, is first recorded 1962. ***Light horse*** 'light armed cavalry' is from 1530s. ***Light-skirts*** 'woman of easy virtue' is attested from 1590s. ***Lighter-than-air*** (adj.) is from 1887."

73 That is, *as if* as in art, rather than *as if* as in law, which is a matter of legal fiction and as such a matter of reality (as if). Such an engagement would not be "political" precisely because it would not be serious, but merely an act, without any intentions – an act of art, or performance. Unlike art, politics is based on the fiction of not having anything to do with fiction – politics provides an explanation of the world as if there was no figment of imagination – no fiction – in its explanation. This fiction – the fiction that there is no fiction in politics – creates the dynamics that enable politics to turn fiction into a reality: as it denies hav-

thing construed in the course of its performance may be de-construed as soon as it no longer serves a purpose, that is, as soon as there is no longer any appreciable risk that its de-construction would undermine the stability of the entire philosophical construction undertaken in the meantime. In other words, it would merely serve as a temporary scaffolding, or a frame without reference, to enable one to take distance, in the direction of the non-serious, that is, fiction, from the binary, two-dimensional choice between common sense and metaphysics, and to defer the taking of a position between them at the outset – and thus enable the construction of something more serious and lasting in the meantime.[74]

Such a philosophy could be a novel philosophy of the whole – a holographic philosophy, or a cosmic and as such *cosmetic* philosophy, that is, a philosophy that is not constrained by a binary choice but extends into the third dimension – the direction of fiction.[75] A philosophy that would be *authentic* rather than one based on a self-evident observation or a metaphysical representation.[76]

To be continued

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ing anything to do with fiction, politics produces a political reality out of the fiction that there is no fiction in politics. It follows that an engagement in philosophy can only avoid the inevitable – reproduction of the politics of philosophy – by openly acknowledging that it produces fiction, that is, by acting *sincerely*, without any intentions or motivations.

74 *See* Jacques Derrida, Differance, in *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, Northwestern University Press (1973), 129.

75 "**Holograph (n.)**: 'document written entirely by the person from whom it proceeds,' 1620s, from Late Latin *holographus*, from Greek *holographos* 'written entirely by the same hand,' literally 'written in full,' from *holos* 'whole' (from PIE root ***sol-** 'whole, well-kept') + *graphos* 'written,' from *graphein* 'to write' (see **-graphy**). Modern use, with reference to holograms, is a 1960s back-formation from **holography.**" http://www.etymonline.com (visited on 25 May 2021). *See also* "**Hologram (n.)** 1949, coined by Hungarian-born British scientist Dennis Gabor (Gábor Dénes), 1971 Nobel prize winner in physics for his work in holography; from Greek *holos* 'whole' (here in sense of 'three dimensional;' from PIE root ***sol-** 'whole, well-kept') + **-gram**." www.etymonline.com (visited on 22 May 2021).

76 A holograph is thus "authentic" (rather than a common-sensical fact or a scientific truth) precisely because it is "written wholly in the handwriting of the author:" "will or other document written wholly in the handwriting of the person in whose name it appears. 1623, borrowed from Late Latin *holographus* written wholly in one's own hand, from Greek *hológraphos* (*holós* whole + *-graphos* written from *gráphein* written, from *gráphein* to write). *Chambers Dictionary of Etymology* 2015 (Chambers Harrap Publishers). See also above fn. 75.