Transnational Macro-Narrative Descendancy in Violent Conflict:

A Case Study of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur in Central Sulawesi

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**2015**

Table of Contents

Abstract

This thesis investigates transnational macro-narrative descendancy in violent conflicts and identifies enabling dynamics that facilitate re-framing. To date there has been little focus on actual re-framing processes involved, explicitly narrative descendancy, bridging, resonance building or grafting, representing a critical knowledge gap.

This thesis first reviews relevant literature on constructivism and rational choice theory and tests the findings against an empirical case study in Central Sulawesi. The findings demonstrate that a mixture of approaches is present, though this is likely due to a range of dynamics unique to the conflict itself. The results have high relevance for policy makers and academics across security and conflict disciplines.

Statement of Originality

I, Andrew D. Henshaw, being a candidate to the degree of Master of research, attest that this is an original work that has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

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Andrew D. Henshaw. M-PICT, M-ISS

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Introduction

Narratives are important. They are stories told that define identities and how actors understand causes in terms of political aims and achievements as well as the means to accomplish them. Though where do these narratives come from? In some cases the narratives used by belligerent actors are organic, evolving holistically from non-linear leaderless interaction. In some instances political narratives existed before the outbreak of violence, while in other instances the narrative changes during periods of violent conflict. For example, Abraham Lincoln held strongly to the narrative that the American Civil War was about union,[1] until the final two years of the conflict where the narrative changed and became one about freedom, and in particular the end of slavery.[2] This phenomenon has been common throughout history in conflicts wherein macro political narratives have changed the context of wars, and participation has been justified under terms which have little or no connection to micro-level realities.[3]

There are also many other examples of new international and transnational macro-narratives being adopted in violent conflicts. Robert Mugabe's public proclamation and embracing of Marxism in the Rhodesian war of independence in the 1970's is a good example, but rather than being ideological it was due much more to the supply of troops and arms by the Marxist Mozambique government to his ZANU African National Unity Party.[4] Conversely, in several South American insurgencies incumbent governments openly embraced Communism and Soviet support, changing the context of conflicts and drawing the focus away from local issues and domestic dynamics.[5]

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[1] S. Engle, *The War in the West 1861 – July 1863*, Great Britain, Osprey Publishing, 2001, p.81

[2] J. McPherson, *The Battle Cry of Freedom*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 28

[3] Mearsheimer suggests that conflict is brought about not by underlying issues but by powerful incentives for aggression, meaning that actors seek to maximize their power relative to others. SOURCE: J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', *Journal of International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1990, p. 12

[4] A. Stepanik, 'The Fire is in Rhodesia': Jimmy Carter's Response to the Rhodesian Bush War, Senior Thesis Paper, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, USA. 2009, p.117

[5] R. Weitz, 'Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960 – 1980', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 3, 1986, pp. 397-413

The insurgency in Southern Thailand that has raged for more than 50 years started as a separatist struggle for physical survival, but has metastasized into an Islamic jihadist conflict with dominant religio-political macro-narratives.[6] Other local conflicts in Africa and Asia began over colonisation or post-colonial political and economic organization, yet came to adopt the Cold War's narrative of one side being 'Communist' and the other 'Liberal', representing change at macro levels while micro issues of resources and interests remain the same. It is this last phenomenon that this thesis explores.

Structure

This thesis seeks to answer the question: How do local actors use transnational macro-narratives to re-frame conflicts on micro-levels. Narrative descendancy is the process where international macro-narratives are adopted by local actors as a means to gain advantage in conflicts on micro-levels. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a growing academic interest in civil wars precipitated by the rise in insurgency and other forms of violent conflict.[7] Previous research has focused violence,[8] duration,[9] international factors,[10] social references,[11] social dynamics[12] and onset.[13] Likewise the rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic

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[6] S. Jitpiromrsi and D. McCargo, 'A Ministry for the South: New Governance Proposals for Thailand's Southern Region', *Journal of International and Strategic Affairs,* Vol. 3, No. 3, 2008, p. 405; H. Noor, 'Southern Thailand's Conflict: A Rare Perspective', *Jakarta Post*. 30 March 2008. From: J. Chinyong Liow & D. Pathan, 'Confronting Ghosts: Thailand's Shapeless Southern Insurgency', *Lowy Institute, Paper* 30, 2010. Pp. 71

[7] Europe experienced a strong increase in the number of armed conflicts at the end of the Cold War. SOURCE: P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg, 'After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-94', *Journal of Peace Research*, August 1995, Vol. 32, Pp. 345

[8] T. Cooper and S. Merz and M. Shah, 'A More Violent World? Global Trends in Organized Violence', 'Trends in Human Security' in *Human Security Report 2009/2010*, Human Security Project, 2009. Accessed 04/04/2015 http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2013/4687/pdf/cooper_etal_handbook.pdf

[9] P. Brandt et al, *When and How Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars*, University of Texas, Dallas, USA. March 2007. www.utdallas.edu/~pbrandt/Patrick_Brandts.../CWDurations-26.pdf, (accessed 04/04/2015)

[10] N. Richani, 'The Interface between Domestic and International Factors in Colombia's War System', Working Paper 22, *Netherlands Institute of International Relations* 'Clingendael' Conflict Research Unit. August 2003, Pp. 27

[11] S. Kalyvas, 'The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars', *American Society for Public Administration*, September 2003. Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 475

[12] J. Checkel, 'The Social Dynamics of Civil War: Insights from Constructivist Theory', *Papers in Security and Development*, Simon Fraser University, School for International Studies, , No. 11, March 2011, pp. 5-18.

State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has encouraged greater academic attention on the subject, [14] and coupled with the fact so many civil wars now have transnational dimensions, suggests that violent conflicts are being strongly influenced by international factors, and that transnational linkages are affecting conflict severity and duration. Until recently however there has been limited attention assigned to narrative descendancy in violent conflicts, and the extant literature focuses largely on states more than non-state actors.[15]

This nascent literature can be divided into two rival schools of thought: Constructivism and Rationalism. Constructivism argues that behaviour is socially symbiotic[16] and influences, and is influenced by, constructed environments; the boundaries, perceptions and beliefs about daily life, and that these factors form the norms which guide actors and set the standards of behaviour. Therefore, actors conform to set norms not due to utility maximization as argued by rational choice theory, but because actors understand them as being appropriate and existing within the 'logic of appropriateness.'[17] Upbringing, education, family and social lives all shape political perspectives and religious beliefs and predicate how actors interact

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[13] J. Fearon, *GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL WAR ONSET*, World Development Report, Background Paper, Stanford University Department of Political Science, August 2010, pp. 10-29. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/ReSOURCEs/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Fearon.pdf, (accessed 05/04/2015)

[14] SOURCES: A. Schimd, 'Al-Qaeda Single Narrative and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge', *ICCT Research Paper*, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague, Netherlands, January 2014, pp. 1-40; V. Bartolucci and S. Corman, 'The Narrative Landscape of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb', *Centre for Strategic Communications*, Report No. 1401/ April 2014, Arizona State University, USA, pp. 1-20; Report of the CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program and the CSIS Transnational Threats Project, 'Confronting an Uncertain Threat: The Future of Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements', Centre for Strategic and International Studies, September 2011, pp. 1-80; ICCT Report, *Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism*, Meeting Note, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague, Netherlands, September 2014; C. Bunzel, 'From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State', *Analysis Paper No. 19*, The Brookings Institute on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World.. March 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf, (accessed 03/04/2015); N. Feldman, *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*, Princeton University Press, USA, 2008. http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i8598.pdf, (accessed 04/04/2015)

[15] D. Cunningham and K. Gleditsch and I. Salehyan, 'Dyadic Interactions and Civil War Duration', Paper prepared for the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI, USA. 1-5 March, 2005. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/3457/2/Paper%20D%20-%20anonymized.pdf (accessed 06/05/2015)

[16] K, Hayward, *Irish nationalism and European integration: The official redefinition of the Island of Ireland*, Manchester University Press, 2009, pp. 38- 41

[17] N, Karacasulu, Explaining Social Constructivist Contributions to Security Studies, *Perceptions - Autumn*, Centre for Strategic Research Turkey, 2007, p. 37

with others and treat out-group members.[18] Conversely, rational choice theory maintains that irrespective of how an actor's understanding of life has been constructed and what factors play a role in shaping their beliefs, their decisions will always be made in a rationally consistent manner, making choices that provide the greatest benefit to them with the least amount of down-side.[19]

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One begins by locating narrative descendancy processes in the current body of literature on the subject. It then examines the relevance of constructivism theory. Chapter Two consists of a review of literature on rational choice theory, with both chapters containing an exploration of the expectations of the particular school of thought they discuss. Chapter three tests those expectations against an empirical case study, being the transnational macro-narrative descendancy processes used by the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)[20] in the Central Sulawesi conflict in Indonesia. Chapter Four discusses the findings of the case study, being that narrative descendancy in Central Sulawesi by the MIT displays a mixture of both constructivism and rational choice elements. Chapter five concludes by summarizing the findings and discusses future avenues and directions of research as well as policy implications.

Method

The aim of this thesis is to provide a useful, integrated and theoretically sound understanding of transnational macro-narrative descendancy that will assist policy makers, governments and other international actors to succeed in the challenging tasks of mitigating terrorism, insurgency and militancy. In particular the research is intended to determine and understand how transnational macro-narratives are successfully descended to alter micro-

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[18] Both sociological and psychological studies have well documented that our social interactions with others depend on our relationships with them. In-groups consist of those perceived to be part of 'us' while the out-groups are perceived as 'them,' and we are motivated to maintain more positive attitudes toward in-group members than toward out-group members. SOURCE: L. Allred et al, 'In-Groups, Out-Groups and Middle-Groups in China and the United States', National Social Science Association, 2007. http://www.nssa.us/journals/2007-29-1/2007-29-1-02.htm, (accessed 20/08/2015)

[19] S. Chai, *Choosing an Identity: A General Model of Belief and Identity Formation*, University of Michigan Press, 2001, Chapter 1. Pp. 1

[20] TRAC Database 'Mujahidin Indonesia Timur [MIT]', *Tracking Terrorism*. http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/mujahidin-indonesia-timur-mit, (accessed 05/04/2015)

level realities and prolong existing conflicts through re-framing and new subscriptions. In order to do this the research undertakes a sociological analysis of constructivist and rational choice theories to identify enabling mechanisms and social dynamics that can aid or hinder narrative descendancy, such as leadership, credibility, existing tensions and susceptibility and potential for manipulation.

The outcomes of this analysis are then tested in a South East Asian context, illustrating this phenomenon using a single hard case study, specifically the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in Central Sulawesi and the ongoing ethnic and sectarian conflict in the region. A lack of scholarly research on this subject justifies such research. The underlying ontology of the research lies in the empirical sociological approach taken. Furthermore, the selection of the MIT as the empirical case study is justified due to the presence of several salient factors not readily found in other case studies. These factors include the presence of multi-stream religious and political ideological narratives including al-Qaeda, ISIL and Darul Islam. Second, direct and proximate causes of ongoing violence in the region stem from a plethora of issues including, but not limited to, sectarian divides along ethnic, religious, economic and political lines, and provide a diversity of potential for narrative grafting and subscription to occur, or to not occur. There are also legacy dynamics of long standing jihadist and Islamic extremist influences, as well as government interventions and multiple failed peace processes which add further fertility to the localized environment for subscription, or conversely for the rejection of transnational macro-narratives.

Data for the research and analysis is drawn from a range of sources. For the sociological analysis of competing constructivist and rational choice theories, scholarly research is largely utilized, drawn from journals, databases and other academic sources. Data for the case study is drawn primarily from media sources, government statements, MIT communiqués and social media commentary. Lastly, although access to classified intelligence product may have assisted in understanding Indonesian government analysis and conversely MIT intentions, the availability of open source information, especially that provided by the MIT itself as well as counter-terrorist forces means that the available data is sufficient for the purposes of this research.

Chapter One
Locating the Research

Before commencing it is necessary to place the literature in the correct context with regards to reframing violent conflicts through macro-to-micro narrative descendancy. Essentially, narratives are cognitive beelines that are used to go from experiencing a complex situation to making sense of it on a more practical level.[21] Likewise, narratives facilitate interpretation and understanding of conflict environments and help to portray those to others. Narrative bridges[22] are employed to correlate contexts and meaning to particular phenomenon and assign importance from a human perspective, though doing so often diminishes alternate perspectives because they do not have the same meaning, or as accurately filter perspectives in line with what actors believe they have experienced themselves.

Conscious and pre-conscious understanding is highly relevant to narrative descendancy and is a central precept of how actors at micro-levels will resonate, or not, with narrative bridging attempts. At the conscious level we can expect actors to consider what acceptance means and the rationality of accepting others offerings and interpretations of the world. At a pre-conscious level this may happen automatically because of pre-existing and established beliefs, constructed values and ideology. Because the thinking of actors at the micro-level is largely unknown, successful narrative descendancy requires creating resonance that may include constructivist, rational choice and other representations, which are used not only to re-interpret events on practical levels, but also to further strategic objectives. Elliot et al maintain that narratives can be employed to 'rationalize self-interests, convincing a broader audience, building coalitions, or lending preferentiality to a specific outcome. As such, many factors affect how people frame conflict, which in turn, influences the direction conflict takes.'[23]

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[21] G. Reeher, *Narratives of Justice: Legislators Beliefs About Disruptive Fairness*, University of Michigan Press, 1996, p. 31

[22] 'Narrative bridges' and 'narrative bridging' are terms I have developed to explain how connections between macro-narratives and local issues are made.

[23] M. Elliot and S. Kaufman and R. Gardner and G. Burgess, 'Teaching conflict assessment and frame analysis through interactive web-based simulations', *The International Journal of Conflict Management*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2002, pp. 320-340

Therefore bridges upon which macro-narratives are descended facilitate resonance, and function as bonding nexus, imparting understanding and perception to elicit participation in violent conflict as subscription. Narrative descendancy involves strategic manipulation to enable conflicts to be re-framed in line with macro goals. As truth is subject to the perceptions and interpretations of the actor, the ideology of a particular conflict group, although highly relevant to its members as a defined doctrine, will likely not be so relevant to outsiders. Similarly, different actors will see issues differently, or not at all, because of their own constructed interpretations of the material world, even when co-existing in the same space. For example, insurgent conflict and violent rebellion is often brought about by differences in opinion between the ruling elites and the citizenry, resulting in terrorism by cogitative social norms. Lastly, the social constructs of actors beliefs and identities determine how and why they see injustice and due cause.

I argue that there are three primary components of narrative descendancy processes, being first, descendancy - the process of re-forming macro-narratives involving drawing influence and the extrapolation of ideas, beliefs and ideology from a transnational macro-narrative that has relational or thematic relevance. Second is resonance, the creation of narrative bridges to link the new narrative with micro-level dynamics in existing conflicts. Third is subscription - selling to micro-level actors and grafting narratives onto daily life. Because narratives, including bridging processes, are built upon existing values, experiences and beliefs, they can significantly affect the severity and duration of violent conflicts because alternative narratives become incompatible, and opposing conflict actors are unable to accept the narratives of others.

As Gray & Donnellon state, narratives 'often exist prior to conscious processing of information for decision-making.'[24] Likewise Elliot, Gray & Lewicki attest that actors are also separated not only by 'differences in interests, beliefs and values, but also in how they

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[24] B. Gray and A. Donnellon, 'An Interactive Theory of Reframing in Negotiation', [Unpublished manuscript], College of Business Administration, Pennsylvania State University, in: A. Dewulf and M. Craps and G. Dercon, 'How Issues Get Framed and Reframed When Different Communities Meet: A Multi-level Analysis of a Collaborative Soil Conservation Initiative in the Ecuadorian Andes', *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* Vol.14. 2014, pp. 179

perceive and understand the world, both at a conscious and pre-conscious level.'[25] However, in all instance narratives are likely to be more successful, to resonate, if they are (1) internally consistent and coherent, (2) are externally credible, that is they have some basis in reality and the listener can see that they are based in the real world; and (3) they tap into the language, metaphors, narratives, frames, and cultural forms that are part of the social reality of the listener.

Drawing on the empirical case study this thesis approaches narratives as a means to bring form to experiences and explain or normalize external conditions which can be linked to internal ones. As transnational macro-narrative descendancy is a primary method employed by extremist narrators to form communal sense making and resonance, it is important that the narrative analysis approach is clarified here. Narrative processes for meaning making when employed by militant and extremist religious political agents attempt to blur the boundaries between the listener's personal experiences and those of others to create bonding. They also represent a deliberate crafting by militants to counter and respond to the narratives of others such as the state.

Furthermore, by drawing on pre-established conditions such as religious, communal or ethnic obligations, extremist narratives aim to actively discourage reinterpretation beyond specific boundaries such as defined identify, themes, principles and beliefs. While such approaches are not universally applicable, i.e. they are only effective on certain audiences, when pre-existing conditions do exist they can be highly effective in bonding macro-narratives to micro level actors and discouraging decontextualization and disconnection, reinforcing primary messages and cementing subscription to them on socio-cultural and religious grounds.

Framing and reframing occurs as the result of powerful narratives creating resonance and then subscription. When skilfully employed, strong leaders can manipulate actors on micro

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[25] M. Elliot and E. Gray and R. Lewicki, 'Lessons learned about the framing of intractable environmental conflicts', in: R. Lewicki and B. Gray and M. Elliot (Eds.), *Making sense of intractable environmental conflicts: Concepts and cases*, Washington, D.C. USA. Island Press, 2003, pp. 409-439.

levels not only by gaining acceptance of their own narratives, but critically also by negating counter-narratives by reducing and eliminating opponents access to narrative material needed to form sustainable counteraction. Additionally, narrative frames can be reinforced by actions, particularly those of governments and authority which behave in ways that exemplify the very oppressive nature militants claim they are fighting to stop, such as oppression, brutal policing tactics and human rights violations, often undertaken in response to terrorist acts.

If militants are able to entice their opponents into acting in certain ways in response to acts or words they are able to utilize narrative coercion strategies whereby opponents are compelled, by their own deeds, to endorse or recognise something that they would otherwise reject. In political narrative contests such as between authorities and militants, both sides will invoke cultural identity, beliefs and other supply inputs to anchor their arguments into the reality of the audience. To be successful however it is imperative that narratives be strategic in nature and able to manipulate audience costs of rejection. When audiences are exposed to competing narratives from equally credible sources, the successful framing will come from the narrative that has such strategic inputs, ultimately rendering frame competition negligible.

Constructivism

Constructivist literature is based on the belief that social norms and identities are constructed from processes that exert influence on behaviour, perceptions and outlooks.[26] For instance, social groups in Northern Ireland that have lived side by side for centuries and interacted on a daily basis have come to view each other as enemies i.e. Catholic vs. Protestant.[27] Because of how the reality of their lives has been constructed, reinforced and permeated through every level of their daily existence, a neighbour may be considered an adversary.[28] Dynamic interactions between actors on a daily basis construct reality which is

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[26] I. Hurd, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 303

[27] K. Archick, 'Northern Ireland: The Peace Process', *Congressional Research Service Report*, March 2015, p. 3

[28] J. Vasquez, 'Why Do Neighbours Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1995, Vol. 32, Issue 3, p. 277

determined by and large by the narratives that are used to define those interactions. Therefore narratives play a cornerstone role because they infuse direction into actions and beliefs and govern the politics of individuals, households, social groups and entire nations.

Gecas argues that 'identities and interests are the dependent variable'[29] in narrative descendancy because of the integral forms of systematic theory and social psychology present in it,[30] essentially meaning that an actor's behaviour will be influenced by other actors and by social contexts, allowing examination of the conditions under which they make certain decisions.[31] A central tenant is that ideas and norms motivate behaviour, particularly violent behaviour. Blumer observed that a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.[32] In narrative descendancy terms this means that in order to analyse social actions it is necessary to examine the dynamics that have shaped the construction of those ideas and norms. Berger offered a method of understanding how conflict narratives are formed by explaining how they may be used as entrapping mechanisms to capture engagement from groups, and promote the continuance of violence in pursuit of political objectives. [33] In communities where members have a history of justice-based cooperative engagement this can result in a tidal effect where by a minority of members draw the majority with them.[34] Similarly, conflict narratives themselves can entrap actors into maintaining certain behaviour, and in cases of the ongoing use of violence it can be nearly impossible for actors to de-escalate.

Additionally, as constructivism can be used to describe macro outlooks based upon foundational micro dynamics i.e. a large system is the sum of smaller components, it should

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[29] V. Gecas, 'Rekindling the Sociological Imagination in Social Psychology', *Journal for the Theology of Social Behaviour*, 13 March 1989, pp. 97-115.

[30] Gecas, *Journal of Theology and Social Behaviour*

[31] S. Ayers et al (ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of Psychology, Health and Medicine*, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 88

[32] H. Blumer, 'The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism' in H. Blumer (ed.), *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspectives and Method*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp 1-69.

[33] P. Berger, 'Identity as a Problem of the Sociology of Knowledge', *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 7, Issue 1. May 1966, pp. 105-115

[34] T. Tyler and S. Blader, *Cooperation in Groups; Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Behavioural Engagement*, New York University, Psychology Press, 2000, p. 69

be visible during transitional phases by observation of the effects narratives have at different organizational and community levels. Scholars like Slaughter have done much to describe constructivism in an International Relations (IR) context, contending that it is not so much a theory as ontology: A set of assumptions about the world and human motivation and agency[35]. Its counterpart is not Realism, Institutionalism, or Liberalism, but rather Rationalism[36]. Similarly, Nugroho states that constructivism can describe alliances between states, again in an IR context, or between actors, in micro conflict settings, as basis for cooperative security systems as well as understanding the construction of competitive security systems as well[37]. However, while current literature in the field aptly describes how actors come to view their world,[38] there remains to be a critical knowledge gap in terms of how it explains the transitional phases of macro-to-micro narrative grafting in conflict models.

Kalyvas asserts that in regards to narrative transformation between macro and micro levels, what attempts that have been made consist of insufficient theorization and superficial engagement with the subject matter and a clear absence of adjudication between macro and micro foundations, theoretical constructs and casual mechanisms.[39] Therefore work towards filling this gap is important because it is from micro-levels that macro outlooks, social identity and in-group identity development are based, and within these are inherently embedded animosities, tensions and judgements that are often instigating triggers of violent conflict. It is local actors that draw from the macro-narratives of transnational ones, and utilising social and political perceptions of social sub-groups, such as particular ethnic or religious sectors, alter macro-narratives sufficiently to graft common stories of perceived victimisation and persecution, whether real or imagined, shared history and common plight.

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[35] A, Slaughter, *International Relations, Principal Theories*, 2011,

www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf (Accessed 02/12/2015)

[36] Slaughter, 2011

[37] G, Nugroho, 'Constructivism and International Relations Theories', *Global & Strategies*, Th. II, No. 1, 2008, pp. 85-98

[38] E. Ültanır, 'AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL GLANCE AT THE CONSTRUCTIVST APPROACH: CONSTRUCTIVIST LEARNING IN DEWEY, PIAGET, AND MONTESSORI', *International Journal of Instruction*, Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2012, p. 207

[39] S. Kalyvas, *Promises and pitfalls of an emerging research program: the micro-dynamics of civil war*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 398

Schmitz observed that commonly, challenges to authoritarian rule and repressive practices increasingly create transnational coalitions between domestic actors and outside supporters,[40] because support from external transnational actors may offer near-term and often critical protection and assistance. Similarly, Hellyer demonstrated that by manipulating sectarian divides and inflaming tensions,[41] former out-group actors can create resonance and acceptance of external ideas within a favoured group. This can occur when an out-group actor, who has historically been distanced from mainstream social politics because of extreme views or beliefs can, in a relatively short period of time, be re-admitted into the social collective. Out-group actors who are able to create positive narrative bridges can link what were formally non-accepted macro views onto prominent mainstream social themes. The key is the narrative bridge, which is not the macro-narrative itself, but rather what links it to the receiving group and creates resonance. In turn, resonance is created by highlighting shared issues and particularly shared enemies. This was evident in Egypt in 2011 for instance whereby moderate actors came to accept and even integrate some extremist factions into their group because of the employment of anti-regime narratives, and narratives of shared suffering across economic, class, religious and other divisions.[42]

Other scholars like Devji have analysed the deliberate strategic manipulations of constructivist social foundations by top tier leaders to motivate supporters who are included in the global 'in-group', i.e. the Islamic Ummah.[43] For example, the propagation of the requirement for all Muslims to be pious and undertake jihad is widely prevalent in religiously orientated militancy and is a common tool of resonance building across groups

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[40] H. Schmitz, 'Domestic and Transnational Perspectives on Democratization', *International Studies Review*, Syracuse University, USA., 2004, p. 404

[41] P. Thornton and J. Peacock and P. Inman, *Identity Maters: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict*, London, Berghahn Book, 2007, pp 171-175; H. Hellyer, 'Sectarian divide has been an easy target for manipulation', *The National Opinion*, 17 May 2011. http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/sectarian-divide-has-been-an-easy-target-for-manipulation (Accessed 13/04/2015)

[42] W. Barnes, 'History, Narrative, and Revolution in Egypt', *Muftah*, 13 February 2014. http://muftah.org/history-narrative-revolution-egypt/#.Vc1EJPlBqHt, (accessed 05/04/2051)

[43] Arab World Ministries, 'What is the Muslim Understanding of Ummah?' *Christian Broadcasting Network*. http://www.cbn.com/spirituallife/onlinediscipleship/understandingislam/What_is_the_Muslim_understanding_of_Ummah.aspx, (accessed 13/04/2015)

including al-Qaeda, ISIL, the Abu Sayyaf (ASG),[44] Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and others. By manipulating issues of ethno-political identity, religious understanding and re-defining social norms along faith based lines, additional strength is given to narrative descendancy attempts by encapsulating the battle of interests within a war of religion, so that the obligation of jihad is staking claim to the definition of the world of global and international relations in which it operates.[45]

Identity, beliefs and faith are foundational components of constructivism, and human dynamics such as feelings and attitudes are largely narrative based, therefore possessing an inherent malleability and potential for change. Therefore, constructivism provides a means to understand why particular instances occur, rather than simply seating specific acts of violent conflict amongst general trends or social traits. By identifying specific triggers of conflict it becomes possible to create narrative bridges, connecting essentially separate yet somewhat similar stories together. Similarly, constructivism shows why actors can become more susceptible to narrative grafting. In cases of conflict, constructivism influences actor's perceptions, wherein reality itself can be re-constructed (curve-fitted) to morally justify a necessity for violence. Bar-Tal explained that actors involved in violent conflict can create conflict-supporting narratives which provide explanation and justification for their involvement.[46] This is highly relevant to narrative descendancy because it is the very ability for constructed elucidations to be altered to explain, and consequently fit conflict, which is critical in building narrative bridges.

When actors engage in conflict they become part of a cycle of violence in which group pursuit goals and political ambitions are developed, and once accepted gain legitimacy through consensual validation. Fearon & Laitin describe this as actors attempting to purify

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[44] *Mapping Militant Organizations: Abu Sayyaf Group*, California USA, Stanford University 20 July 2015. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152, (accessed 24/08/2015)

[45] F. Devji, *Landscapes of the Jihad*, Ithica, NY, USA, Cornell University Press, 2005, p. 75

[46] D. Bar-Tal, 'Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case', *International Journal of Conflict Management,* Vol. 9, 1998. p. 22-50

their culture and to 'sharply delineate identity boundaries.'[47] Although this veers somewhat into the rational choice domain it does have relevance to constructivism. Concepts and principles such as 'right to fight',[48] due cause and divine sanction are particularly shaped by factors such as injustice, inequality, and poverty, and can provide legitimacy for violence because of how actors understand the world through their social environments. Such behavioural determining factors are attached to powerful emotional sensitivities which are based on constructivist foundations, making them targets for skilled narrators to manipulate.

Conteh-Morgan cites that with regards to terrorism and political violence it is the negative-form social relationships, like exploitation, and corruption for instance, by which groups define critical self-interests and determine how they pursue goals, whether peacefully or through the use of violence.[49] Similarly, religious aspects of conflict are also relevant because faith can be highly propitious in shaping actors understanding of identity and perceptions of ideal social behaviour. As all communities have a right to withdraw from and resist persecution that is serving to place their survival in jeopardy,[50] religious survival is just as tangible as physical survival. The importance of survival on physical and religious levels is recognized by Helbardt, who contends that insurgent leadership actors utilize specific narrative forms that function to achieve three critical goals, being: 1) the creation of in-group bonds through shared ideology amongst new members, 2) mobilizing for and

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[47] J. Fearon and D. Laitin, 'Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity', *International Organization*, The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000, p. 865

[48] Perhaps inadvertently the United States has actually laid a legal and behavioural basis for an actor's legitimate use of un-incited violence under the rubric of 'pre-emptive self-defence'. SOURCE: C. Richter, *Pre-emptive Self-Defence, International Law and US Policy*, Queensland, University of Queensland, 2003, p. 55

[49] E. Conteh-Morgan, 'Peace building and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2005, p. 73

[50] C. Bailey and J. Miksic, 'The Country of Patani in the Period of Re-Awakening: A Chapter from Ibrahim Syukri's Sejarah Melayu Patani', in Andrew D. W. Forbes (ed.), 'The Muslims of Thailand', *Vol. II: The Politics of the Malay-Speaking South*, India: Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1989, p.151; C. Christie, '*A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism*', London and New York, Taurus Academic Studies, 1996, p. 131

inspiring violence, and 3) legitimizing violence based on perceptions of historic identity-based victimization.[51]

In similar fashion, constructivist terrorism studies by scholars such as Jackson,[52] Gunning[53] and Jarvis[54] have successfully explored terrorism as a social construction with a central understanding that it is established through narratives. This paradigm shift away from affective experience to relational, educational experience through narratives has led to a sharper focus on terrorism and micro-conflict. Through this prism the theory gains added relevance and researchers such as Shoop have utilized constructivism to understand identity reaffirming actions,[55] and Bourke and Stets through their unified theory of depersonalization and self-verification.[56] This is relevant to understanding how communities and actor groups build organizations and institutions, which then generate and exert persuasive interpretative power over social norms and experiences, as well as dictating rules for understanding future events and changes in social and political spheres; also critical aspects of narrative descendancy.

Staniland's work on social constructs and insurgent leadership structures is a good example of a constructivist understanding of conflict re-framing. Staniland states that insurgent leaders, when 'embedded within overlapping social bases have a rich set of pre-existing relationships to one another and ties to local communities through which they can construct nascent organizations.'[57] It is by such means that resonance and acceptance; the bonding agents of narrative grafting are established. Because of horizontal relationships and networks amongst insurgent, terrorist and community leaders, nascent organizations

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[51] S. Helbardt, 'Anatomy of southern Thailand's insurgency: Some preliminary insights.' *New Mandala*, Australian National University, 2010, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/wpcontent/uploads/2010/01/Anatomy-of-Southern-Thailand%E2%80%99s-Insurgency.pdf, (accessed 03/05/2015)

[52] R. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terror*, Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 7

[53] J. Gunning, 'A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2007, pp. 363-393.

[54] L. Jarvis, 'The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2009, p. 23

[55] J. Shoop, 'Understanding and Applying Theoretical Lenses', *The Saylor Foundation*, 2012, p. 4

[56] P. Bourke and J. Stets, Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, *Social Psychology Section Session on Theoretical Frameworks at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 1998*, Washington State University 1999. P. 21

[57] P. Staniland, *Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources and Rebellion in South Asia*, University of Chicago, USA, 2012, p. 152

become the catalysts of conflict reframing and one of the primary bridges that narrative descendancy transitions across, linking the macro to the micro. Gilardi's work on transnational diffusion supports this, asserting that the decisions of local actors can be influenced by an international context, and especially by the ideas, norms and actions displayed or promoted by out-group and transnational actors.[58]

Expectations of Constructivism

Constructivism offers a number of methods to understanding narrative descendancy. First, that ideas, beliefs and meanings are malleable and in conflict they are able to be fitted to the situation, i.e. actors involved in violent conflict may create conflict-supporting narratives which provide explanation and authorization for their involvement.[59] Likewise, constructivism demonstrates that leaders can manipulate the meanings and values that their followers attribute to their political aims. Devji for instance, demonstrated how deliberate strategic manipulation of constructivist social foundations can re-frame issues of ethno-political identity, and of religious understanding and the re-defining of social norms along faith based lines in Islamic countries.

Second, manipulation is not just something that occurs within conflicts by participants but, as Schmitz and Hellyer have shown, outside actors can also change the meaning of conflict dynamics and alter the focus of internal actors to more closely align with external macro aspirations, while building local actor resources. Byman et al also note the importance of external actors, stating that 'external support remains an important source of strength for many insurgencies in the post-Cold War world, playing a major role in initiating, sustaining and bringing victory.' [60] Conteh-Morgan also demonstrated that outside actors can deliberately change the meaning of ideas of those at lower levels, which is also supported by Gilardi's study of transnational diffusion processes. However, while academic debate has

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[58] F. Gilardi, 'Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas and Policies', in W. Carlsnaes and T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, 2012, p. 453.

[59] Bar-Tal *International Journal of Conflict Management,* pp. 22-50

[60] D. Byman and P. Chalk and B. Hoffman and W. Rosenau and D. Brannan, 'The New Face of Insurgency', *Rand Research Brief*, 2001. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7409.html (accessed 0/05/2015)

shown concern about how transnational actors can influence domestic conflicts, to date there has been little scholarship on the specific means by which external macro-narratives are grafted on to domestic micro-level dynamics.

Third, constructivism aids understanding of narrative descendancy processes such as the building of narrative bridges, and how they actually occur through a variety of means. Noor,[61] Merari[62] and Gosh[63] have each explored how manipulation of common social issues such as feelings of oppression, discrimination and victimization can be effectively utilized to create narrative bridges emphasising shared experiences, common histories and mutual enemies. However it is important to note that macro-narratives do not have to be successfully descended and grafted to an entire population, or even a majority to be effective. So long as narrative descendancy process are successful in reframing conflict for the direct participants, being the fighters and operatives, and also at a minimum their direct support bases, transnational macro-narratives have the capability to alter the outcomes of local conflicts.

By providing understanding and clarity of how social relationships define self and group interest's, constructivism reveals how local institutions, nascent organizations and community leaders play key roles in resonance development and macro-narrative seeding to the wider community. It is through these means that grafting and re-framing takes place. Adding to this are two further points of significant interest. First, is the strong move to independent subscription that is being witnessed, whereby local actors need not seek permission to 'join' before undertaking attacks attributable to external groups, and where actors can simply self-declare themselves as members, is rising.[64] ISIL in particular encourages non-members to act in their name with little or even no prior contact. Benefits

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[61] M. Noor, 'The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction', *Journal of Law and Religion*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1985, pp. 381-397

[62] A. Merari, 'Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency', *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 5, Issue 4, 1993, pp. 213-251

[63] B. Gosh, 'Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura', *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. 52, No. 2, September 2003, pp. 221-243

[64] Localized groups that have started out with area specific aims can come to view themselves as being an integral part of a wider international struggle and, after declaring their affiliation can look to expand their operational scope as capability develops. SOURCE: C. Humud et al, 'Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa', *Congressional Research Service Report*, 10 October 2014, pp. 14. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf, (accessed 17/05/2015)

of this are that macro-narratives are not promoted actively by ISIL et al directly to local actors as a deliberate action, but rather are sought out and self-promoted internally by groups and individuals seeking transnational affiliation. Equally, the freedom to operate independently creates strong resonance for actors that align closely with ISIL and jihadist ideology in general, like an off-the-shelf macro-narrative that can be tailored to reflect actors own experiences and beliefs, in turn forming strong resonance between leaders and followers.

Second, it is important to realise that although this developing paradigm continues to demonstrate significant strength across operational spectrums, it possess just as much potential as a source of fundamental weakness at strategic levels. There is a real risk that those who are adopting transnational macro-narratives as a means to alter local situations may end up diverging from their original ideology and pursuit goals framed in terms of self-right, religion, legitimate social and political change and into acts of criminality and barbarism such as murder and random killings. Heiburg, O'Leary and Tirman argue that civilian killings threatens to undermine support[65] and alienate sympathizers, and for many potential followers can significantly reduce subscription due to a disassociation with jihadist principles or religious and moral tenants.

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[65] M. Heiburg. and B. O'Leary and J. Tirman (eds.), *Terror, Insurgency and the State*, USA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, P. 215

Chapter Two

The Relevance of Literature of Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory asserts that actors become involved in violent conflicts when potential gains from participating (power, resources, justice etc.) outweigh the costs.[66] Cramer explains instances of violent conflict as political war-economics and rebellion as rational behaviour by profit-maximising agents.[67] Richani supports this, stating that war-economics sustain conflicts because 'of the lack of institutional mechanisms to quell conflicts between antagonist groups, all of which benefit from the war situation.'[68] Essentially, the actors involved do so because they understand their own goals and ambitions, the costs of pursuing them and their risk appetite in doing so. Therefore conflict narratives are important because they can help increase the perceived gains while decreasing costs and risks. For example, fighting for an international caliphate is a greater payoff than narrow local issues, and having God on your side and being guaranteed entry into heaven in the event of death decreases the risks and costs of fighting.[69]

Moreover, rational choice theory is applicable to narrative descendancy because of its power to explain the choices actors make. Beyond political war-economics and trade-offs, choices about the levels of violence used and justifications for it are equally important, as are the influence of general social-psychological mechanisms in civil wars and violence conflicts,[70] such as the particular social group status of narrative descendancy actors and the group-based inferences assigned to them. Equally important are relationships between elites and the people. External threats can create strong bonds of unity that in turn can be manipulated by elites to divert attentions away from other issues, or to increase power and

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[66] J. Hirshleifer, 'The dark side of the force', *Economic Inquiry*, Vol, 32, 1994, p. 5

[67] C. Cramer, 'Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of war', *World Development*, 2002, Vol. 30, No. 11, p. 1847

[68] N. Richani, 'The Political Economy of Violence: The War-System in Columbia', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol, 39, No. 2, 1997, p. 37

[69] K. Vail, et al, *Dying to Live: Terrorism, War, and Defending One's Way of Life*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 60

[70] M. Haller, 'The Nation State and War', *Swiss Journal of Sociology*, Vol 35, Issue 1, 2009, p. 14

popularity.[71] Likewise, even without ideological subscription elites can draw on the macro-narratives of transnational actors not because they share similar goals, but because the benefits of doing so will aide their own ambitions. Be it in democracies or dictatorships, in the realm of war, any apparent rationality on the part of the people arises largely through the process of elite cue taking.[72]

However, in areas where civil war, insurgency and other forms of armed and violent rebellion are already established the reasons for participating in violence may not be readily clear, and are often loosely attributed to the meta-narrative of conflict such as us vs. them, or East vs. West.[73] For instance, meta-narratives are historical and identified with symbolic representations of conflict and of national ethos, like Israeli vs. Palestinian,[74] or Catholic vs. Protestant.[75] In long running civil wars this can hamper understanding of causes and processes by which on-going violence is really taking place, because it is not easy to determine the rational choices for participation. Bar-Siman-Tov asserts that the salience of meta-narratives is especially expressed in intractable conflicts where both sides use them for justifying violence.[76] Danger lies in making simple assumptions about conflict narratives that are incorrect, or attributed to the most basic of reasons such as a right of self defence.

Many scholars have attempted to address this by drilling down through meta-narratives to situate violent conflict within rational choice frameworks. For instance, Caplan examined actor-specific rationalities;[77] Kydd, Walter & Pape looked at the rationality of the strategic actions and choices of terrorist actors; Libicki, Chalk & Sisson analysed the rational thinking

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[71] C. Knutsen, 'Security Threats, Enemy-Contingent Policies and Economic Development in Dictatorships', *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, Vol. 37, Issue 4, 2011, p. 3

[72] A. Berinsky, 'Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict', *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 69, No. 4, 1997, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, p. 975

[73] J. Lee, Meta-narratives and Performance Perversity in the War on Terror', *The Monitor*, Summer 2012, p. 56

[74] J. Beinin and L. Hajjar, 'Palestine, Israeli and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Primer', *Middle-East Research and Information Project*. 2014. http://www.merip.org/primer-palestine-israel-arab-israeli-conflict-new, (accessed 14/07/2015)

[75] J. Ruane and J. Todd. *The dynamics of conflict in Northern Ireland, Power, conflict and emancipation*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 288

[76] Y. Bar-Siman-Tov, *Justice and Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Routledge, 2014, p. 31

[77] B. Caplan, 'Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model', *The Political Economy of Terrorism*, Vol. 126, 2006, pp. 91-107

behind terrorist motivations;[78] Crenshaw explored the rationalism of the causes of violent attacks,[79] while Oberschall focused on collective action theory and the role of groups,[80] such as structuring actors preferences to assign positive welfare values to group members,[81] generating reciprocity amongst actor groups[82] and building group behavioural coordination.[83]

Hoffman asserts that an actor's participation in violent conflict can be rationalised as being 'the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.'[84] Conversely, Jenkins attests that it is not actors themselves that perpetrate violence, 'or their motivation, cause or justification, but the act itself.'[85] The absence of a unified understanding of overriding motivational forces and a lack of identification or acknowledgment of macro-narratives that authorise violent actions is one of the critical failings of existing studies into violent conflict, because without clarity of the linkages it is not possible to understand the genuine reasons for engagement in violent conflicts. This not only places severe restrictions on what can be done to resolve them but it also can steer other conflict actors and resolution efforts on tangent courses, which may actually exacerbate violent conflict.

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[78] A. Kydd and B Walter, 'The Strategies of Terrorism,' *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2006, pp. 49-80; R. Pape, 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2003, pp. 1-19

[79] M. Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism,' *Journal of Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1981, pp. 379-399

[80] A. Oberschall, 'Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory,' *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2006, pp. 26-37; M. Libicki, and P. Chalk, and M. Sisson, 'Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences,' *RAND Corporation Monograph Series*, 2007. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG483.pdf, (accessed 05/08/2015)

[81] H. Tajfel, et al.,, 'Social categorization and inter-group behaviour', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 1, 1971, Pp. 149-178

[82] M. Humphreys and D. Posner and J. Weinstein, 'Ethnic Identity, Collective Action, and Conflict: An Experimental Approach', *Paper prepared for Presentation at APSA*, Boston, USA, September 2002, p. 2

[83] R. Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1998, p. 51

[84] B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 40

[85] B. Jenkins, 'Where I draw the line,' *Christian Science Monitor*, 2012. http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/terrorism/frameset.html, (accessed 28/06/2051)

For example, the confusion about the motivations of suicide bombers[86] as described by Asad,[87] demonstrates the lack of clarity present in current scholarship. Far from a demonstration of religious devotion, the deployment of suicide bombers[88] is a rational, political and tactical action[89] and is intended to affect an opposing audience on macro-political levels, and like audiences to derive ideological, material and logistical support.[90] Though in order to win supporters there must be persuasive, rational narratives that convince micro-level actors to subscribe to macro ones by illustrating effective methods to achieve political aims, supporting the message that societal conflict can be resolved through violence.[91] In narrative descendancy this may be done by making rational choice trade-off arguments such as 'this will neither weaken nor hurt our economy [but will further our cause]',[92] or by contextualizing the enemy as a legitimate threat to a group, a nation, or way of life.[93]

Still, actions undertaken because of strong religious values cannot be discounted or considered irrational, but rather should be considered central to understanding rational choice theory and narrative descendancy. This is because macro-narratives that are

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[86] S. Atran, 'Trends in Suicide Terrorism: Sense and Nonsense', *Presented to World Federation of Scientist Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism.* Sicily, Italy, August 2004. http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/atran-trends.pdf, (accessed 26/05/2015)

[87] T. Asad, *On Suicide Bombing*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 77-78

[88] According to some Islamic scholars the term 'Suicide bomber' is a derogatory term invented in the West to try and describe what in Islam is known as a Fedayeen or Shahid - a martyr. The point of the bomber isn't suicide - it is to kill infidels in battle. SOURCE: A Guide to Understanding Islam, 'Suicide Attacks (Martyrdom),' *The Religion of Peace*. http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/quran/018-suicide-bombing.htm, (accessed 14/07/2015)

[89] According to the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism's Suicide Attack Database there were 1183 attacks globally between April 2013 and April 2015 resulting in 10353 deaths. SOURCE: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism 'Suicide Attack Database 2013-2015', http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_results_new.php, (accessed 06/08/2015)

[90] N. Fink and J. Barclay, 'Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communications and the United Nations', *Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation*, 2013, p. 9

[91] Fink and Barclay, *Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation*, p. 9

[92] M. Tomz and J. Weeks, *Military Alliances and Public Support for War*, Stanford University, February 2015, p. 6. http://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/TomzWeeks-Alliances-2015-02-14.pdf, (accessed 16/08/2015)

[93] Religious macro-narratives legitimizing suicide bombing as killing the enemy rather than suicide are also used by groups such as Hezbollah. SOURCE: D. Helmer, 'Hezbollah's Employment Suicide Bombing during the 1980s: The Theological, Political, and Operational Development of a New Tactic', *Military Review*, July-August 2006. https://www.questia.com/read/1G1-150356900/hezbollah-s-employment-suicide-bombing-during-the, (accessed 22/06/2015)

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carefully developed to display religiously inspired precepts can bridge contentious issues like morals and norms by re-framing them politically. Bray asserts that rational choice models need to incorporate concepts of cultural and religious beliefs[94] because they are commonly considered key motivating factors in political violence. Incorporation rather then exclusion means that rational choice theory does not pass judgement on an actors beliefs or morals and instead focuses examination on the trade-offs actors make within the context of conflict. This provides greater clarity and importantly, identifies fertile ground for narrative bridging.

Others such as Cerna, Hooge & Marks have applied rational choice from the micro-level up, rather than from the macro-level down, and in doing so have provided a feasible methodology to detect narrative descendancy attempts starting with an end result and working backwards.[95] Camerer et al, have examined the underlying physiological processes of decision making, asserting that rational choice models are much more applicable to 'intuitive or instinctual decisions than to complex, abstract or long-term choices.'[96] From peripheral support to direct engagement in violent conflict, rational choice theory enables examination of narrative descendancy and its bearing on the conditions under which the micro-level expressions of strong political beliefs turn into violence acts.[97]

Although the pursuit of political goals of macro-narratives is beyond the rationale of basic group survival, micro-level actors may be willing to accept particular religious, political or other macro-narratives so long as they provide for their most immediate needs. Nicholson & Snider support this and attest that rational choice theory is 'a positive theory rather than a normative one'[98] and can be used to analyse political, belief and faith based narratives to

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[94] J. Bray, 'Rational Choice Models of Political Violence: The Role of Injustice and Retribution', *Institute for Homeland Security Solutions*. September 2009, p. 1

[95] L. Cerna, 'The Nature of Policy Change and Implementation: A Review of Different Theoretical Approaches', *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*, 2013, p. 11; L. Hooge and G. Marks, 'Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 2, 2003, p. 233

[96] C. Camerer and G. Loewenstien and D. Prelec, 'Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics', *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2005, p. 55

[97] Bray, *Institute for Homeland Security Solutions*, p. 1

[98] W. Nicholson and C. Snider, *Microeconomic theory: Basic principles and extensions*, Cengage. Chicago: Dryden Press, 1989, p. 9

examine the trade-offs actors make within such contexts.[99] As long as narrative descendancy and in particular, narrative bridging, can establish sufficient linkages, subscription to macro-narratives will continue. Likewise, this enables recipients at the micro-level to make determinations about particular macro-narratives without having to make assessments of them in terms of value judgements, or right and wrong in social and religious contexts.

Richardson suggests that there are three primary motivations for the engagement in political violence outside of normative social behaviours, each malleable, and having strong connective potential and suitability to narrative bridging. They are revenge, renown, and reaction.[100] Themes of revenge are prevalent in Islamic extremist groups from al-Qaeda to ISIL, Boko Haram and the MIT, that all claim they fight to avenge the persecution of Muslims,[101] and stop occupation of Muslim lands by Crusaders.[102] Additionally, renown as a motivation/justification has increasingly gained notoriety in recent decades and is exemplified by example of the martyr. Similarly, the ability to connect macro-narratives to local grievances has been validated by the rise in allegiance pledges to ISIL and defections from al-Qaeda, offering insight into the resonance power ISIL macro-narratives are having. The rationality of aligning with others belonging to the same in-group is plain to see, because the macro messages appear to reflect their own circumstances and experiences which greatly assist narrative bridging, and also because they offer opportunity to obtain revenge, renown or reaction.[103]

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[99] W. Enders and T. Sandler, *The Political Economy*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 39

[100] L. Richardson, *What terrorists want: Understanding the enemy, containing the threat*, New York: Random House, 2006, p. 113

[101] From the Holy Quran: 'And fight with them until there is no more persecution and all religions are for Allah' (8:39). SOURCE: The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, 'The True Spirit of Jihad', 27 June 2002, http://www.muslim.org/islam/jihad.htm, (accessed 13/06/2015)

[102] The First Fatwa issued by Osama Bin Laden was a 30 page polemic entitles 'Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places', *The Heritage Foundation: Al-Qaeda – Declarations and Acts of War*. http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/enemy-detention/Al-Qaeda-declarations, (accessed 14/06/2015)

[103] Both ISIL and the MIT commonly attack associate members of their target out-groups such as the United States (ISIL targeting Iraqi forces/MIT targeting Det 88), because as Resnick describes, if you can't strike your enemy directly, someone close to them will do. This is called 'displaced revenge'. SOURCE: M. Resnick, 'OUT-GROUP IDENTITY RESONANCE', *The Quarterly of Human Factors Applications*, 4 March 2015. http://ergonomicsindesign.com/2015/03/group-identity-resonance/, (accessed 03/08/2015)

A brief examination of the Second Chechen war demonstrates that a significant rise in attacks by Islamist terrorists, although credited to the success of al-Qaeda re-framing tactics, was not brought about by deliberate ideological or religious re-framing, but rather by rational choices made by local insurgent leaders like Shamil Basayev.[104] al-Qaeda tactical expertise and experience in terrorist and insurgent strategy was a valuable asset to the incumbent Chechen resistance, which represented an opportunity for the grafting of macro-narratives because al-Qaeda transnational fighters offered the most rational choice.[105] Initially facing local resistance to the mass conversion to extremist forms of Islam, it was the local insurgent leadership who re-framed the struggle and highlighted the rational material and military benefits – not the religious or ideological ones.

Through the provision of training camps, fighters, weapons and expertise, Basayev used brokerage, such as mediated and relational diffusion whereby actors emulate each others ideas and morals,[106] and by operating and fighting side-by-side come to accept the moral norms and behaviours of each other.[107] This highlights perhaps the most significant manner in which macro-narrative descendancy is achievable in rational choice models. Diffusion and brokerage represent different means of building narrative bridges; but both are powerful in propelling groups towards collective actions.[108] As evidenced by al-Qaeda in Chechnya, macro-narratives descend to micro-levels across narrative bridges both horizontally, which is non-hierarchical across geographical space, and vertically by the flow of information between transnational actors and local ones. Alimi & Norwich state that 'mechanisms of brokerage operate through agents who actively encourage links between two or more

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[104] G. Steinburg, 'A Chechen al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups Further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle', *Stifung Wissenschaft und Politik*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2014, p. 2

[105] Alliance with Islamist actors was motivated by the prospect of foreign monetary support, and by the need for allies. The ideology was just happened to be an accompanying factor, in A. Calgar, 'In the Spotlight: The special purpose Islamic Regiment' *Straus Military Reform*, 28 March 2003. www.cdi.org/terrorism, (accessed 14/06/2015)

[106] K. Bakke, 'Transnationalized Civil War' in J. Checkel (ed.), *Dynamics of Civil War,* New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.4

[107] K. Bakke, *Copying and Learning from outsiders? Assessing Diffusion from Transnational Insurgents in the Chechen Wars*, University College of London, 2010, p. 11

[108] D. McAdam and S. Tarrow and C. Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, Cambridge University Press, England, 2001, p. 127

previously unconnected [actors]',[109] emphasising the critical role of leadership figures as agents of resonance formation.

However, what about when choices are not logical? Vallier overcame the significant hurdle of accounting for irrational behaviour[110] by actors in violent conflicts which can be tested in the Yugoslav war. In the early 1990's,[111] Slobodan Milosevic convinced his fellow Serbs to engage in ethnic warfare, and in what became ethnic cleansing, by convincing them that Croatia was bent on violence against the Serbs. Understanding how Milosevic employed narratives that, on the surface were irrational but none the less held significant resonance with the citizenry, especially given the Serbian peoples strong disposition to peace and not violence,[112] is a critical aspect of the conflict. By playing on Serbian memories of victimization from two previous civil wars that century, Milosevic cleverly used the long standing myth that Yugoslavia was designed specifically to limit Serbian influence and power.[113]

Gagnon contests that alleged threats from the outside world can play key roles in shaping internal domestic political strategy.[114] Having no aggressive intent towards Serbia initially, Milosevic's provocations against his neighbours by means of making extremist claims upon their intentions was seen as highly irrational, though the conviction of his claims, even if false and therefore irrational, saw them respond exactly in the manner he intended, and

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[109] E. Alimi and L. Norwich, 'LEARNING FROM THE FAILURES: WHY AND HOW 'SCALE SHIFT' FAILED TO LAUNCH – EVIDENCE FROM THE CASE OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB LAND DAY', *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, 2011, Vol. 31, p. 40

[110] K. Vallier, 'Rational Markets, Irrational Actors', *Political Philosophy and Ethics at Bowling Green*, 2009, p. 14. www.kevinvallier.com/wp.../Rational-Markets-Irrational-Actors-2.0.pdf, (accessed 22/05/2015)

[111] V. Pecis, 'Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis', *United States Institute of Peace*, March 2005, p. 28

[112] Ordinary Serbians had little to gain and much to lose by continued warfare, and are therefore were much more receptive to peace. SOURCE: D. Johnston and J. Eastvold, 'Religion in the Bosnian Conflict', *International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy*, January 2004, http://icrd.org/rp24/, (accessed 22/07/2015)

[113] The diminished role of federal structures implied a diminished Serbian role within Yugoslavia. SOURCE: T. Szayna and M. Zanini, *The Yugoslav Retrospective Case: Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model*, RAND Corporation, 2000, p. 102.

[114] V. Gagnon, 'Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia', *The Journal of International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994, p. 136

that was to take aggressive stances towards Serbia in return.[115] As Fiqueiredo & Weingast observed, this 'meant that the citizens had to decide what was most likely to endanger their security and threaten peace';[116] meaning Milosevic was the most rational choice to defend them. As Devji demonstrated how strategic manipulations of social foundations can re-frame issues of ethno-political identity, so too can cultural history be manipulated to ensure conformity with a national leadership that may otherwise not have the support of the masses.

Expectations of Rational Choice Theory and Macro-narrative Grafting

Rational choice theory and transnational macro-narrative grafting reflect cooperate/win relationships that focus on facts and actions rather than on affective experience. Identified across the literature are a number of reasons why rational choice processes can generate resonance with actor groups in conflicts. First, nascent organizations rarely survive without some form of external assistance which, other than being material in nature can be in terms of connecting with a larger cause.[117] By gaining membership or affiliation with transnational groups, local actors can connect to macro strategic political objectives to gain micro-level support as discussed by Calgar.[118] This in turn, as Bray surmises, can enable the expression of strong political beliefs as acts of violence. The transformative components of narrative descendancy, in the forms of narrative bridging and the development of resonance, are critically important for local leadership actors to develop if they are to succeed in building support and gaining subscription.

Second, an expectation of rational choice theory is that the process of narrative descendancy will ultimately be driven by the local actor, drawing from the macro-narratives

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[115] Realizing the usefulness of nationalism as a political weapon, Milosevic took steps to exacerbate tensions by voicing sentiments that would incite the mass support of Serbs. SOURCE: D. Anderson, 'The Collapse of Yugoslavia: Background and Summary', *Research Paper No. 14 ,1995-96*, Parliamentary Research Service, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, November 1995, p. 8

[116] R. Fiqueiredo and B. Weingast, 'The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict', *Institute for War and Peace Studies*, February 1997, p. 5

[117] Q. Huy and C. Zott, 'How Entrepreneurs Regulate Stakeholder's Emotions To Build New Organizations', *Faculty and Research Working Paper*, INSEAD Business School, 2007, p. 3

[118] Calgar, *Straus Military Reform*

of transnational organizations. At micro-levels actors may choose to accept the language and rhetoric of macro actors engaging in larger conflicts for a number of reasons. Richardson suggests that revenge, renown, and reaction are primary drivers of violent conflict, though local actors are highly unlikely to experience any of these without external support or assistance. Therefore, it is not the direct pursuit of these goals specifically, but rather the capabilities to achieve them that can generate resonance, and in turn subscription. Adopting the macro-narratives of transnational actors who offer resources, capability development, funding and just as importantly, awareness of local issues provides actors on micro-levels with capability enhancements, a sense of legitimacy and perceived justification.

Third, while actors may wish for peace they may engage in violence because they perceive the consequences of not doing so to be far worse. Particularly in contested areas, political actors use violence to force people to take sides.[119] Rather than becoming victims, people will rationally choose to support and even engage directly in violence because of the severe penalties they may suffer as a result of not doing so, especially when in danger of becoming the minority.[120] Fear of suffering the same violence they may ultimately impart onto others rationally motivates them.

Similarly, Fiqueiredo & Weingast state that many observers point out the answer concerns fear.[121] Because actors are willing to support extreme ends when they fear for their livelihoods and families they may, under certain conditions, engage in violent conflict because they believe the messages of their leaders offer the best and most rational solutions. Conversely, Gagnon aptly described the manner in which negative external pressures can be critical in shaping internal domestic political, social and security environments such as was seen in Serbia in the 1990's. Be it by national or by local insurgent leadership, or the active involvement in civil wars by transnational actors, rational choice

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[119] S. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, New York University, March 2000, p. 17.

[120] S. Kaylvas and N. Sambanis, 'Bosnia's Civil War: Origins and Violence Dynamics', *Understanding Civil War*, p. 207 in E. Newman, *Understanding Civil Wars: Continuity and Change in Intrastate Conflict*, Routledge, 2014.

[121] Fiqueiredo and B. Weingast, *The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict*, Institute for War and Peace Studies p. 5

theory validates the deliberate manipulation of conflict dynamics in ways which raise fears and garners support for violence by means of re-framing issues to gain subscription on micro-levels.

Additionally, rational choice theory explains the irrationality dilemma of social cooperation present in situations where it seems most logical for actors to adhere to non-participation, but participate anyway.[122] Including positive theory also dispels falsehoods like the irrationality of suicide bombers and why actors can rationally sacrifice their lives for a greater cause. As Pape states, 'rather than religion or any other ideology, what almost all suicide terrorist attacks since 1980 have in common is a specific strategic political objective that seeks to compel a democratic state to withdraw combat forces'. [123] Furthermore, rational choice theory proves effective at illuminating the specific processes of macro-narrative descendancy, particularly those of narrative bridging and the development of resonance between macro and micro perspectives. Using diffusion and brokerage as an example, Bakke described how rational choice can explain the methodology of descendancy and the important roles of agents, leaders, and organizations in connecting local actors with international monographic ideologies.[124]

Lastly, it demonstrates that macro-narrative descendancy cannot take place in a vacuum and requires the presence of certain factors to succeed, which may originate organically from local actors as a result of rebellion or insurgency due to the failure of political and social systems, or from external forces like covert interference by neighbouring states. Thus, transnational macro-narrative descendancy requires 1) local actors and leadership elements with power and influence who seek to engage with macro-narratives. 2) A requirement for capability development and the pursuit of justification, legitimacy or material enhancement. 3) Opportunity for narrative bridging in the form of exploitation of existing divides and animosities along social, ethnic, religious and cultural lines, often expounded by the

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[122] R. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1984, p. 117

[123] R. Pape, 'Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,' *Australian Army Journal*, Vol. III, Number 3, 2005, p. 28

[124] Bakke, *Copying and Learning from outsiders? Assessing Diffusion from Transnational Insurgents in the Chechen Wars*, p. 11

identification and determination of a specific threat such as external ethnic groups and political oppression, or the potential for internal physical, economic or ethnic victimization.

Chapter Three

The Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT) and Central Sulawesi

The violent conflict in Central Sulawesi and around Poso has raged for nearly two decades. In the years from 1995 to 2005,[125] Muslim and Christian residents clashed in violent confrontations and retaliations that encompassed the neighbouring Maluku Islands, with the most serious violence occurring in the bloody riot of Banjarmasin in May 1997.[126] Thousands of people died as a direct result of the fighting and homes, churches and mosques were destroyed. With homes burnt to the ground about half a million people were displaced and in Poso alone over 145000 people (of a population of 230000+) became homeless.[127] Many blamed the terror group Laskar Jihad,[128] a group many long claimed to have strong ties to al-Qaeda (a claim it denied[129]), for reframing communal violence under the auspices of Islamic struggle.[130]

The continuing violence post the signing of the Malino Accords I & II[131] in 2002, which were meant to ensure peace between Christians and Muslims, demonstrates that the continuing conflict is driven by multiple sectarian issues. Likewise the continuing violence post the disbanding of Laskar Jihad in May that same year[132] also suggests the presence of dynamics

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[125] S. Aritonang and K. Steenbrink, 'A History of Christianity in Indonesia', *Koninklije Brill NV*, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2008, p. 523

[126] T. Dibley, 'What price victory? The 1997 Elections', *Inside Indonesia*, July-September 1997. http://www.insideindonesia.org/what-price-victory-the-1997-elections, (accessed 15/08/2015)

[127] S. Schroter, *Christianity in Indonesia*, Transaction Publishers, UK, 2010, p. 261

[128] Laskar Jihad ('Holy war fighters') is Indonesia's most notoriously militant sect. Its parent body, Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah (FKAWJ), officially surfaced on 14 February 1998 in Solo. SOURCE: Inside Indonesia, 'Laskar Jihad', *Edition 121*, Jul-Sep 2015. http://www.insideindonesia.org/laskar-jihad, (accessed 07/07/2015)

[129] S. Wahyuni, 'Laskar Jihad differs with Al-Qaeda', *The Jakarta Post*, 24 January 2002. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/01/24/laskar-jihad-differs-with-alqaeda.html, (accessed 11/06/2015)

[130] A. Shubert, 'Indonesian minister assesses conflict-torn Sulawesi', *CNN World News*, 5 December 2015. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/12/05/indon.sulawesi/index.html, (accessed 02/06/2015)

[131] The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 'The Moluccas Agreement in Malino (Malino II) Signed to End Conflict and Create Peace in the Moluccas', *Government of Indonesia*, Embassy Washington, USA, February 2002. https://www.google.com.au/?gws_rd=ssl#q=The+Moluccas+Agreement+in+Malino+%28Malino+II%29+Signed+to+End+Conflict+and+Create+Peace+in+the+Moluccas, (accessed 11/06/2015)

[132] Human Rights Watch, 'Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi', *Human Rights Watch*, Vol. 14, No. 9, 2002, p. 12

beyond sectarian tensions alone. For years the violence continued and terrorist instances of bombings, assassinations and murders persisted, With approximately 150 people being killed in terrorist shootings, sectarian murders, sporadic attacks on Muslims and Christians, and in operations by security forces as noted by McRae[133]. However, the horrific beheading of three Christian school girls by Muslim extremists in 2005 re-ignited already high communal tensions.[134]

In 2010, several Islamist groups joined together to start a training camp in Aceh, incorrectly thinking that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)[135] and the wider Acehnese community would be welcoming. By April that year intelligence gains by authorities saw the camp raided resulting in the killing of eight fighters, including its leader and one of the most wanted terrorists of the time[136] Dulmatin,[137] and the arrests of 48 others.[138] The remaining survivors of the raids and subsequent mop-up operations scattered to Kalimantan and Poso and created new networks and groups which continued to target the 'far enemy' (Western tourists and American hotels) as per al-Qaeda's macro-narrative, but also the 'near enemy' (the police and authorities) more in line with ISIL's. These new organizations focused on what Richardson described earlier as being cornerstone motivations of terrorism – revenge, renown and reaction.[139]

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[133] D, McRae, *A Few Poorly Organized Men: Interreligious Violence in Poso, Indonesia*, Brill Publishing, The Netherlands, 2013, p. 5

[134] M. Hariyadi, **'**Central Sulawesi, new wave of Islamist violence: Murders, kidnappings, mutilations', *Asia News*, 21 January 2015. http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Central-Sulawesi,-new-wave-of-Islamist-violence:-Murders,-kidnappings,-mutilations-33245.html, (accessed 06/06/2015)

[135] N. Hasa, 'Indonesia: Acehnese Criticize Ex-Rebel's Plan to Join IS', *Benar News*, 10 July 2015. http://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/Aceh-IS-07102015191852.html, (accessed 11/07/2015)

[136] B. Roggio, 'Indonesia bombing mastermind Dulmatin confirmed killed', *The Long War Journal*, 10 March 2010. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/indonesian_bombing_m.php, (accessed 03/7/2015)

[137] A.K.A. Joko Pitono, better known as Dulmatin. SOURCE: The Jakarta Post, 'Dulmatin buried, relatives reject labelling him terrorist', *Jakarta Post National News*, 13 March 2010. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/03/13/dulmatin-buried-relatives-reject-labeling-him-terrorist.html, (accessed 03/07/2015)

[138] International Crisis Group, 'Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh', *Asia Report No. 189*, 20 April 2010, p.3. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/189-indonesia-jihadi-surprise-in-aceh.aspx, (accessed 25/06/2015)

[139] Richardson *What terrorists want: Understanding the enemy, containing the threat*, p. 113

The Poso collective was led by a former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)[140] man and ex-Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)[141] sub-commander with established networks to groups across Indonesia, who today is known as Abu Wardah Santoso. Now as head of his own group called the Mujahidin of Indonesia Timur (MIT)[142] he has attracted fighters and supporters from Makassar, Bima in Sumbawa, Java, Medan and elsewhere.[143] The MIT began training themselves and other jihadist fighters from groups around the region, and in doing so made Santoso the nerve centre of extremist networks in Indonesia.[144] However, al-Qaeda in the first instance and ISIL macro-narratives in the second didn't simply appear in Central Sulawesi overnight. They were brought there by Santoso and his followers who, through operational and leadership and experience in JI and JAT had significant exposure to those external macro-narratives already. Pre-existing contacts with al-Qaeda's Global Islamic Front (GIMF)[145] enabled Santoso to lay claim to being the first Indonesian terrorist commander to swear allegiance to ISIL, further building his jihadist credibility. Coupled with a string of attacks on police stations, civilians and officials and his persisting ability to escape efforts to kill or capture him, demonstrating a high capacity to resist suppression, Santoso and the MIT became terrorist target number one.

Adding further dimension are the multifaceted macro-narratives involved including al-Qaeda 'far enemy' and ISIL 'near enemy' political goals, as well as more localized narratives of East Asian jihadist networks . In addition, the pan-Indonesian roots of the MIT compliment ISIL macro-narratives espousing the creation of smaller sub-regional Islamic

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[140] International Crisis Group, 'Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates', *Asia Report No. 43*, 11 December 2002, pp. 19-24. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/043-indonesia-backgrounder-how-the-jemaah-islamiyah-terrorist-network-operates.aspx, (accessed 29/07/2015)

[141] C. Rotenberg, 'Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT): The Perpetual Threat', *Osgood Centre*, February 2012. www.osgoodcenter.org/PDF/JAT.pdf, (accessed 05/08/2015)

[142] TRAC Database 'Mujahidin Indonesia Timur [MIT]

[143] J. Zenn, 'East Indonesian Islamist Militants Expand Focus and Area of Operations', *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 11, No. 11, 30 May 2013. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40960andtx_ttnews[backPid]=684andno_cache=1#.VaXmGEZBgHs (accessed 13/06/2015)

[144] Zenn, 'East Indonesian Islamist Militants Expand Focus and Area of Operations'

[145] G. Steinberg, *German Jihad on the Internationalism of Islamic Terrorism*, Columbia University Press 2013, p. 133

caliphates, such as in Central Sulawesi, similar to what Boko Haram have done in Nigeria.[146] Therefore understanding what drives the re-framing of historical violence in Central Sulawesi and the narrative descendancy processes of the MIT is critically important. However, in order to determine by which means it is taking place it is necessary to understand the determining dynamics, including actors, nascent organizations, personalities and jihadist nexus that drive narrative descendancy, narrative bridge formation, and that have shaped how and why the MIT came to be the most wanted terrorists in Indonesia today.

The genesis of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur

It was not that Santoso fled to Poso from Aceh; he did so because Poso is his home. And in what seemingly mirrors his changing allegiances from al-Qaeda to ISIL, his background also demonstrates changing attitudes and persuasions. Born the son of a Javanese migrant to Poso, Santoso[147] started his working life with the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works for a brief period before joining Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and travelling to Afghanistan for training and jihad. After further radicalization under the mentorship of Isam Mohammad Tahir Al-Barqawi, a Jordanian-Palestinian jihadist cleric,[148] he returned to Poso and was paid a cash grant by the regional government to establish a small business as part of a de-radicalization effort; however the overture failed to change Santoso's fervent ideological and politically extreme views. Jones stated that Santoso was 'once given a position and capital in the form of money by the Poso Regency government. That capital was used to pay salaries to his followers and to finance their radical activities.'[149] He took the name Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi Al-Indunesi after Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIL's forerunner, al-Qaeda in Iraq

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[146] J. Chasmar, 'Boko Haram leader declares Islamic caliphate in Nigeria', *The Washington Times*, 24 August 2014 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/24/boko-haram-leader-declares-caliphate-nigeria/, (accessed 06/06/2015)

[147] A.K.A. Abu Wardah, Abu Wardahk, Abu Yahyaor, San. SOURCE: The New Paper, 'Meet Indonesia's most-wanted terrorist', *Asia One News*, 15 June 2015. http://news.asiaone.com/news/asia/meet-indonesias-most-wanted-terrorist, (accessed 28/06/2015)

[148] M. Batal al-Shishani, 'Islamic State finds fertile ground in Jordan', *BBC News*, 24 September 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29335811, (accessed 28/06/2015)

[149] Y. Herawati and P. Dewiyani, 'De-radicalization Working for Bali Bomber Umar Patek: Indonesian Officials', *Benar News*, 29 June 2015. http://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/umar-patek-06292015164850.html, (accessed 1/07/2015)

(AQI)[150] and was also the first Indonesian Jihadi commander to swear allegiance to Abu Bakar al-Baghdai, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's successor. a.k.a. 'Caliph Ibrahim',[151] the self declared leader of ISIL,[152] and having done so Santoso then declared Poso an Islamic State province.[153]

Now established as the head of the principal terrorist nexus in the region, MIT narrative descendancy displays a melding of transnational monographs. According to terrorism expert Al Chaidar, the focus on ISIL political doctrine of attacking the near enemy and apostate governments, and the pursuit of establishing an Islamic State province in Indonesian Central Sulawesi is very strong.[154] This is echoed by Jones who asserted, 'If [Islamic State] as announced by Baghdadi is seen as a caliphate that will rest on building blocks of Islamic polities from around the world, then Indonesian jihadists believe the building block somehow will be centred on Poso.'[155]

It is therefore logical that Santoso's group actively pursues ratification from Caliph Ibrahim, which if gained, would be highly symbolic and a critical achievement not only for the MIT, but also for regional terrorist organizations affiliated with them. Mitchell claims that Santoso has already received international recruits and support from the Islamic State,[156]

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[150] United States Government, 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)', *National Counter-Terrorism Centre*, 2014. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqi.html, (accessed 28/08/2015)

[151] J. Shashank, 'Killing Caliph Ibrahim Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would not be the end of ISIL', *The Telegraph, World News*, 11 November 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11222807/Killing-Caliph-Ibrahim-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-would-not-be-the-end-of-Isil.html, (accessed 02/07/2015)

[152] Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi is also though to use the aliases 'Abu Duaa' and 'Dr Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai' SOURCE: BBC News, 'Profile: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi', *Middle East News Section*, 15 May 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676, (accessed 01/07/2015)

[153] At the time of writing the ISIL Caliph Ibrahim had yet to fully endorse Santoso yet has provided support to the MIT.

[154] Indonesia in Focus, 'Unfinished Journey', *News and Features on Indonesia*, 16 September 2014. http://newsandfeaturesonindonesia.blogspot.com.au/2014/09/unfinished-journey-91.html, (accessed 01/09/2015)

[155] A. Chew, 'Indonesian Islamisits exploit political vacuum ahead of Widodo presidency: Room to grow as jihadist groups as Indonesia focuses on transition of presidency, experts warm', *South China Morning Post*, 18 September 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1595568/indonesian-islamists-exploit-political-vacuum-ahead-widodo-presidency, (accessed 02/07/2015)

[156] S. Mitchell, 'Police Combing Indonesian Island for the Country's Most Wanted Terror Leader', *VICE NEWS – Defence and Security*, 3 February 2015. https://news.vice.com/article/police-combing-indonesian-island-for-the-countrys-most-wanted-terror-leader, (accessed 01/09/2015)

further reinforcing the need to descend ISIL macro-narratives as much as possible. Such a reciprocal relationship demonstrates the resonance of ISIL's politico-religious logic with Santoso and his supporters.

Equally important is the genesis the MIT has undergone from its grass roots to its current incarnation. Although Santoso split from both JI and JAT[157] his early indoctrination and learning in those groups, centred on al-Qaeda doctrine of the times, played a key role in shaping his ideological development. With his combat training and experience in Afghanistan[158] and further radicalization by Isam Mohammad Tahir Al-Barqawi,[159] his deep connections across significant sections of Indonesian and pan-regional extremist networks then melded the nationalistic concepts of Darul Islam with jihad against the near enemy.[160]

For the MIT and many other Indonesian jihadist groups, the genesis seed of radicalization grew out of domestic dynamics as opposed to global ones, primarily inter-communal and sectarian tensions driven by micro narratives of ethno-religious issues. In Central Sulawesi especially, the *Pilkada* dynamics of local political control and leadership between Muslims and Christians[161] played a key role in driving conflict. It is also widely accepted that there are defined links between outbreaks of violent conflicts across the Indonesian archipelago and the end of Suharto's regime in 1998[162], although as Bertrand and Tadjoeddin assert, in many cases violent conflict had already broken out in these regions.[163]

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[157] R. Sugara, 'Santoso: The Terrorist Leader from Nowhere', *Counter-terrorism Trends and Analysis, A JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, Volume 6, Issue 10, November 2014, p. 25

[158] Sugara, *A JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH, p. 25*

[159] Batal al-Shishani, *BBC News*

[160] 'When Indonesia became an independent country the stricter Muslim groups were to become disappointed as there was no room for an Islamic state. Part of the radical Indonesian Muslim community joined the Darul Islam rebellion which aimed for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. This movement started in the 1940s but was eventually crushed by the Indonesian military in 1962. However, segments of the Darul Islam went underground and would produce and inspire other radical movements'. SOURCE: Indonesia Investments, Risks and Radical Islam. http://www.indonesia-investments.com/business/risks/radical-islam/item245, (accessed 02/07/2015)

[161] G, Brown & R, Diprose, Bare-Chested Politics in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia: The Dynamics of Local Elections in a 'Post'-Conflict Refion, CRISE Working Paper No. 37, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford, 2007, p. 7

[162] M, Mietznre, *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance*, Policy Studies 23, East-West Centre, Washington U.S.A., 2006, p. 3

The heavy influence of al-Qaeda and opportunity for fighters to travel to Afghanistan for training and combat was an ideal way of strengthen the local jihadist struggle, rather than external ones. Likewise, longstanding domestic conflict drivers such as independence from the Dutch, the root of Darul Islam Indonesia,[164] and ongoing clashes between Muslims and Christians across the Indonesian archipelago continue to stoke extremist ideology, resulting in violent conflict as a means to achieve political ambitions.

It may be ISIL macro-narratives that hold the greatest resonance with Santoso now, but his indoctrination in al-Qaeda ideology was pivotal in shaping his current beliefs.[165] Like AQI leader Al-Zarqawi before him, Santoso, under Al-Baraqawi's tutelage, was taught Salafisim, the basis of al-Qaeda's ideological heritage.[166] Furthermore, Santoso's hero-like worship of Al-Zarqawi and his taking of the name Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi Al-Indunesi after him demonstrate the impact and resonance both Al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda had. It is also a nexus point where his beliefs melded with the new macro-narratives of ISIL. Al-Zarqawi, who had sworn allegiance to Osama Bin Laden,[167] developed AQI from an al-Qaeda bannered organization into the foundations ISIL.[168] Similarly, Santoso developed the MIT out of JI and JAT.

What is now being observed is an amalgamation of the macro-narratives from both organizations, the near and the far, the global and the domestic. In the context of the

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[163] Bertrand, J, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge University Press. 2004, p. 104; M, Tadjoeddin, 'Anatomy of social violence in the context of transition: The case of Indonesia, 1990-2001' *United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) Working Paper no. 02/01-E*, 2002, pp. 1 – 34

[164] J. Lee, 'The Failure of Political Islam in Indonesia: A Historical Narrative', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 85-104

[165] Tahir Al-Barqawi also had a significant impact on the broad jihadist networks in Afghanistan and his writings on Salafist teachings were widely read. SOURCE: J. Brachman, *Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice*, Routledge, 2009, p. 68

[166] T. Stanley, 'Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafisim', *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 3, Issue. 14, July 2005. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=528and#.VekiY5dBqHs, (accessed 24/08/2015)

[167] O. Nasr, 'How Zarqawi's Terror Network Morphed Into ISIS', *Al Arabiya News*, 1 July 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/07/01/How-Abu-Musab-al-Zarqawi-shaped-ISIS.html, (accessed 30/08/2015)

[168] Z. Laub, 'The Islamic State', *Council of Foreign Relations*, 18 May 2015. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811, (accessed 01/09/2015)

Central Sulawesi conflict both narratives compliment one another, thereby making narrative descendancy and bridge formation much easier. ISIL is primarily focused on Iraq and Syria and on other nearby Muslim countries[169] and its goals are to maintain the establishment of the caliphate and to fight apostate governments, [170] whereas al-Qaeda remains focused on attacking the United Sates and the West in general.[171] MIT narratives of attacking apostate authorities as the near enemy reflect this. Likewise, Santoso's aspirations to create a Poso-centric caliphate in Indonesia and attacking the far enemy, the West, is also evidenced by repeated framing of Indonesian counter-terrorism efforts, specifically Det 88, as being agents and puppets of Western powers.[172]

In similar fashion to fighters joining the war in Afghanistan in the 1980's and 1990's and then developing JI's operational capabilities in the 2000's,[173] MIT trained fighters travelling to Syria logically build networks that strengthen relations between groups at home and abroad.[174] Indonesian fighters in Syria have established networks with Jabat al-Nusra, ISIL and Caucasian and Central Asian jihadist groups that enable them to bring their Syrian experience back to Indonesia, under the umbrella of Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (MIT).[175]

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[169] D. Byman, 'Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets', Prepared testimony before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Brookings Institute, 29 April 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/04/29-terrorism-in-africa-byman, (accessed 01/09/2015)

[170] E. Davis, 'ISIS's Strategic Threat: Ideology, Recruitment, Political Economy', *The New Middle East*, 17 August 2014. http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com.au/2014/08/isiss-strategic-threat-ideology.html, (accessed 01/09/2015)

[171] Byman, 'Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets'

[172] 'Abu Wardah Santoso, the leader of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (East Indonesian Mujahideen), incited Muslims to kill members of Densus 88, the Indonesian Special Forces counter-terrorism squad, and claimed they are American and Australian agents'. SOURCE: SITE Intelligence, 'Video From MIT Leader Calls to Kill Special Forces, Claims they Are Agents of America and Australia', *Indonesia Reporting*, 22 April 2014. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/video-from-mit-leader-calls-to-kill-special-forces-claims-they-are-agents-of-america-and-australia.html, (accessed 01/09/2015)

[173] J. Zenn, From Syria to Sulawesi: Could Mujahideen Indonesia Timor become and ISIS Ally? Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 12, No. 7, 2014. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42183&no_cache=1#.VhRpuitBqHs, (accessed 01/10/2015)

[174] J. Wilson, 'Return to jihad in Indonesia', *NEWMANDALA*, Australian National University, 18 June 2015. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/06/18/return-to-jihad-in-indonesia, (accessed 01/09/2015)

[175] Zenn, *Terrorism Monitor*

Demonstrating the gains already made, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the senior spokesman for ISIL[176] declared in August 2013 that 'Our goal is to establish an Islamic state that doesn't recognise borders, on the Prophetic methodology. And Indonesian members of the Islamic State want to establish an expanded caliphate into Southeast Asia.'[177] Additionally, ISIL Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi declared in early 2015 that 'South Asia was now an Islamic State province',[178] demonstrating the outreach ISIL is performing to regional groups who have aligned with it. According to Sing, ISIL has reached out to jihadist groups in conflict zones in Indonesia, including the MIT.[179] Though not a full endorsement, it is certainly a move in that direction and one that serves to strengthen MIT resolve and the power of its narratives.

Ways and Means

When conflicts draw international attention the narratives of principle conflict actors gain strength and exposure. Moreover, the longer global conflicts in Syria and Iraq rage, the stronger networks of fighters and recruiters become and the greater the likelihood that fighters will return home with the skills, experience and vision to affect significant changes in the security environment.[180] Europe for instance has already experienced multiple terrorist plots by returned fighters from Syria,[181] and the possibility of attacks occurring elsewhere is real. This assertion is also backed by a 2013 IPAC report that estimates Indonesia is at a tipping point and that the current levels of capability weakness in regional terrorist groups could 'change with an infusion of new thinking or training from abroad or if

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[176] C. Lister, 'Islamic State Senior Leadership: Who's Who', *Brookings Institute*, December 2012. www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/.../en_whos_who.pdf, (accessed 01/09/2015)

[177] Lister, 'Islamic State Senior Leadership: Who's Who'

[178] M. Singh, 'Terror expert: ISIS targeting Indonesia', *The New Paper Online*, 13 June 2015. http://www.tnp.sg/news/singapore-news/terror-expert-isis-targeting-indonesia, (accessed 02/09/2015)

[179] Singh, 'Terror expert: ISIS targeting Indonesia'

[180] D. Byman and J. Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be a Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, *Foreign Policy Paper Number 34*, Brookings, 2014, p. 2

[181] A. Zammit, Australian foreign fighters: Risks and responses, *Lowy Institute For International Policy*, 2015, p. 2 http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/australian-foreign-fighters-risks-and-responses.pdf, (accessed 01/10/2015)

some smarter, more experienced fugitives now lying low were to be persuaded to become active.'[182]

Likewise, narratives are never isolated but are always inter-contextual and in dynamic relationship to other narratives from other actors. It could therefore be argued that in one sense there will always be narrative contestation between different actors, and that all discourses are produced inter-subjectively. This helps to understand how MIT transnational macro-narrative descendancy processes counter and respond to competing narratives, such as those of officials, rival groups and any counter-narratives of peaceful moderate community voices. Advantageous to the MIT has been a lack of well formed or politically coherent and sustained counter narratives. The head of the Indonesian National Police's Special Detachment 88 (Det 88), Brigadier-General Tito Karnavian said in 2010 that 'and soft and hard measures we have successfully conducted thus far were actually personal and ad-hoc initiatives – things we thought would work best (operationally) under the circumstances'[183], demonstrating the absence of strong opposing narratives.

Conversely, legacy narratives from the decade of Reformasi[184] following the demise of Indonesia's New Order Regime (1966-1998) in May 1998, and even as far back as the revolutionary struggle against the Dutch between 1945 and 1949 left a 'heritage of radical nationalism, generated conflicts within Indonesian society, and created a complex of social and political alignment – all of which persist today throughout the archipelago.'[185]

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[182] The Mujahidin of Western Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, MIB) is an excellent example of this. The MIB were a short lived group that undertook no actual terrorist operations, had no religious indoctrination and were essential a band of criminals. However they did manage to unite many fighters from other groups in an ideologically cohesive element which was aligned with Santoso and the MIT. SOURCE: Institute of Policy Analysis of Conflict, 'WEAK, THEREFORE VIOLENT: MUJAHIDIN OF WESTERN INDONESIA', *IPAC Report No. 5*. 2 December 2013. p. 17

[183] Private conversation with Brigadier-General Tito Karnavian, then the Head of Special Detachment 88, Jakarta, 9 July 2010. SOUCRE: N, Hasan et al,. *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia,* Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clinggendael', 2012, p. 6

[184] A, Pohlman, *Indonesia and Post-New Order Reforms: Challenges and Opportunities for Promoting the Responsibility to Protect*, Research Report on Indonesia No. 1, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, university of Queensland, 2010, p. 6

[185] G, Pauker, *The Role of the Military in Indonesia, Research memorandum*, The Rand Corporation, 1960, p. 3

As a result, MIT narratives must be responsive to the needs of a range of conflict actors, encompassing the sensitivities of the pan-Indonesian jihadist outlook, which are traditionally more closely aligned with al-Qaeda, those of local groups with international aspirations such as JI, and of course to ISIL as its primary transnational affiliate. However, other groups such as Ring Banten,[186] Darul Islam Charismatic Group (DICG)[187] and Darul Islam-Akram[188] who are as yet un-affiliated or only loosely affiliated with ISIL, can still be important allies to the MIT. Not only do nexus members of regional jihadist groups facilitate greater movement between organizations for fighters, they also provide important support networks in terms of logistics, expertise and critically, sanctuary in some cases.

Additionally, a considerable amount of operational freedom has also played a part in MIT development. Governments are often much weaker in the periphery, and rebel groups that would seem weak in military terms are often able to evade government repression in their core areas, particularly in cases where they exercise de facto territorial control, as the MIT does in the mountains around Poso.[189] Such conditions help to explain how the MIT has prospered, because in the early period of its existence, authorities, especially the police, lacked the capability to hinder or mitigate terrorism to a large extent.

Second, MIT attacks such as the slaying of two police officers, both Brigadier's, found with their throats cut reportedly while searching for a MIT terrorist training camp in an area near Poso,[190] and the ambush attack on a Brimbom Police patrol in Poso city in December 2012,[191] demonstrate the strength of the MIT by means of the weakness of the authorities.

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[186] G. Fealy, 'Militant Java-based Islamic movements', in A. Tan (ed.), *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia,* Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007, p. 70

[187] K. Ramakrishna, *Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Indonesia: The Power of the Manichean Mindset*, Singapore, Springer Publishers, 2015, p. 174

[188] Ramakrishna, *Islamic Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia*

[189] I. Salehyan and K. Gleditsch and D. Cunningham, 'Transnational Linkages and Civil War Interactions'*, University of Essex*, UK, August 2006, p. 4. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/dscw2007/Gleditsch.pdf, (accessed 11/08/2015)

[190] G. Roberts, 'Indonesian anti-terror police found with throats cut', *ABC News Online*, 2012. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-18/indonesian-terrorism-investigators-found-with-throats-cut/4319704, (accessed 27/08/2015)

[191] Bilal, 'Al-Ansar007 release Mujahidin Indonesia East recognition for the attack in Poso', *Arrahamah News*, 21 December 2012. http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2012/12/21/25601-al-ansar007-rilis-pengakuan-mujahidin-indonesia-timur-atas-serangan-di-poso.html, (accessed 01/09/2015)

They also support MIT narratives that those who do not support them are evil, as well as MIT justifications for violence against non-adherents to fundamental Islam as evidenced by the murdering of police.

Third, as intended, successful attacks like these often elicit harsh response form authorities, which can quickly erode any good will they may have developed with local residents.[192] Restrictions on liberties and gatherings, intrusive searches and cordons and other activities can quickly become detrimental and actually work in favour of opposing forces by turning the people away from the government. Santoso has widely used such instances to his favour, frequently inciting police to act harshly with operations that alienate the people,[193] but reinforce MIT's rhetoric of apostate government oppression.

Almost prophetically, the significant military and Para-military security response to the rise of the MIT, and the media presence and logistics the Indonesian government has devoted to hunting down Santoso and his group may have actually aided them, reinforcing MITs rhetoric and compounding its legend. However, the forces hunting the countries most wanted terrorist[194] have also had successes. The opportunistic slaying of MIT fighters, and particularly the killing of Santoso's second in command Daeng Koro, alias Sabar Subagyo,[195] in April 2015 dealt significant tactical and strategic blows which have seen MIT operational capabilities fluctuate over the past several years.[196] Though beyond tactical gains on the ground, counter-terrorism efforts have largely failed to consider the domestic narratives upon which localised violence in the region has been built.

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[192] Wikileaks, 'Cablegate: Central Sulawesi: Police, Laskar Mujahidin Clash', Scoop *Independent News*, 18 January 2007. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0701/S00568.htm, (accessed 28/07/2015)

[193] G. Roberts, 'Indonesian military mount major show of force in terror leader's mountain stronghold', *ABC News*. 1 April 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-01/indonesian-troops-attack-santoso-base/6363466, (accessed 02/08/2015)

[194] G. Roberts, 'Indonesian Police shoot dead two terror suspects, arrest seven others linked to most-wanted Santoso', *ABC News*, 26 May 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-25/indonesian-police-shoot-dead-two-terror-suspects/6496504, (accessed 02/09/2015)

[195] R. Sangadji and F. Sundaryani, 'Poso cops working to confirm terror kingpin's death', *The Jakarta Post*, 5 April 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/05/poso-cops-working-confirm-terror-kingpin-s-death.html, (accessed 02/09/2015)

[196] J. Cochrane, 'Indonesian Police Kill Suspect in Attempted Bomb Attack', *The New York Times*, 14 may 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/world/asia/indonesian-police-kill-suspect-in-attempted-bomb-attack.html?_r=0, (accessed 02/09/2015)

Similarly, although the transnational narratives the MIT draws from have been acknowledged as extremist, they continue to be considered just another brand of terrorist ideology. After the official banning of ISIL in Indonesia in 2015, Berger stated that 'it has become clear over subsequent weeks that it amounted to little more than a political statement.'[197] The lack of political will to seriously destroy ISIL influences in Indonesia only aids Santoso in drawing authorities into responses that actively support MIT narratives, with which he has been able to attract supporters and recruits in response to police abuses and heavy handedness.[198]

MIT's rhetoric seeding and narrative descendancy

At the sharp end of MIT narrative descendancy is Santoso himself. Self styled Emir, charismatic leader of the brave mujahidin and a critical leadership node in a terror nexus spanning Asia and the Middle East. With personal connections on micro, meso and macro levels to global terrorist organizations, Santoso seemingly has all the characteristics required to successfully build narrative bridges and descend macro-narratives. Demonstrating power, influence, connections and community standing in Poso and the wider jihadist community, Santoso is able to exercise brokerage, mediated and relational diffusion through MIT training camps, and through operational interaction with other terrorist groups. Doing so supports and strengthens nascent organizations and aids resonance formation amongst local jihadist and social community members.

Furthermore, as Emir, Santoso headlines all MIT communiqués. Disseminated through an international media network including al-Qaeda's Global Islamic Media Front, ISIL's media arm,[199] and its own media arm – the MIT Press, [200]Santoso has released over a dozen video

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[197] D. Berger, 'Why Indonesia banned ISIS', *New Mandala – Indonesian Politics*, Australian National University, 2014, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/10/01/why-indonesia-banned-isis/, (accessed 01/10/2015)

[198] B. Saragih and R. Sangadji, 'Police arrogance, brutality may harder resolve in Poso', *The Jakarta Post, Central Sulawesi*, 6 November 2012. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/11/06/police-arrogance-brutality-may-harden-resolve-poso.html, (accessed 14/08/2015)

[199] Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict, 'INDONESIA'S LAMONGAN NETWORK: HOW EAST JAVA, POSO AND SYRIA ARE LINKED', *IPAC Report No. 15*. 15 April 2015. p. 1

[200] T. Huda, 'East Indonesian Mujahidin baiat To Khilafah Islamiyah', *Ashhabulkahfi Media*, 2014. http://ashhabulkahfie.blogspot.com›rilisanmujahidin.htm, (accessed 03/09/2015)

messages from 2013 to 2015.[201] In response, Indonesian authorities launch media efforts about attempts to capture or kill Santoso and his fighters. Asides from social media though, the MIT undertakes operational activity to make statements as was the case in the murder of Poso resident M. Fadli, aged 50, who was killed by machete in front of his house in Padalembara village[202] in 2014. The MIT claimed it was in retaliation for his cooperation with authorities, specifically Detachment 88, a US backed and trained elite anti-terror squad,[203] though many saw it as an attempt to incite religious violence and detract authorities from the hunt for him. Actions like this are not only effective but also in line with MIT political narratives.

The July 2013 video uploaded to YouTube by MIT Press includes several salient indicators useful for discerning the basis of MIT actions. First is the ever present ISIL paraphernalia such as flags and banners, which coupled with Santoso's opening baya (religious oath of allegiance[204]) and declaration of Poso as being a part of the ISIL Caliphate,[205] demonstrates a strong subscription to ISIL political doctrine. Just as al-Qaeda's ideology galvanised extremist groups around the world in the wake of 9/11,[206] so too has ISIL been able to draw on those same networks consisting of localised and home-grown jihadists groups such as the MIT. Gunaranta asserts that ISIL propaganda is 'politicising, radicalizing, and militarizing Sunni

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[201] SOURCE: A. Zelin, 'Mujāhidīn of Indonesia Timur', *Jihadology*. http://jihadology.net/category/mujahidin-of-indonesia-timur/, (accessed 16/08/2015); SITE Intelligence Group, 'Indonesia' *Jihadist Threat*. https://news.siteintelgroup.com/tag/69.html, (accessed 06/08/2015)

[202] R. Sangadji, 'Resident murdered by radical group in Poso, say police', *The Jakarta Post*, 20 September 2014.
http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/20/resident-murdered-radical-group-poso-say-police.html, (accessed 03/08/2015)

[203] Det 88 a.k.a. Detachment 88 is a highly trained US backed tactical counter-terrorist unit of the Indonesian police which has been accused of human rights violations in the past, in: P. Parameswaran, 'The Trouble With Indonesia's New Counterterrorism Command: A new anti-terror squad could raise old concerns in the country', *The Diplomat*. 11 June 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-indonesias-new-counterterrorism-command/? (accessed 03/08/2015); Human Rights Watch, 'Letter to president-elect Joko Widodo Re: Human Rights Concerns in Indonesia', *Open Letter*, 28 August 2014. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/letter-president-elect-joko-widodo-re-human-rights-concerns-indonesia, (accessed 03/04/2015)

[204] A. Zelin, 'The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda fir Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement', *Research Notes* No. 24, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2014, p. 2

[205] V. Arianti and R. Sugara, 'Declaration of a State of Islam 'Caliphate': Will discord among Indonesian Jihadists breed violence?' *RSIS Commentary No. 135/2014*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 10 July 2014, p. 2

[206] R. Bartolo, 'Decentralised Leadership in Contemporary Jihadism: Towards a Global Social Movement', *Journal of Terrorism Research*, Vol. 2, Issue. 1, 2011, p. 4

Muslim youth at an unprecedented scale, especially its message and actions that suggest Muslim supremacy, infecting a growing segment of the community.'[207]

Second, the MIT's loyal subscription to ISIL ideology and political outlooks demonstrate the holistic bearing it has in terms of understanding actions and beliefs to be one and the same; representing constructivist logic. The fusion of ISIL extremist religious logic with Jihadism at the local level in the name of upholding a morality and orthodoxy[208] of Islam further supports such a conclusion. Third, of significance are repeated referrals made to Det 88 throughout MIT rhetoric, referring to them as agents of the US and Australia, frequently associating them with Satan and as foreign invaders intent on punishing innocent Muslims – a theme well established by al-Qaeda as well as ISIL.

However, Santoso's vehement hatred of Det 88 is also logical, and the inclusion in MIT narratives that people must abstain from providing any form of assistance to them makes sense from a rational choice perspective. Det 88 have been responsible for the killing, arresting and hounding of Santoso and MIT operatives more than any other department of the police or military. Therefore from personal, organizational and tactical perspectives it is rational that Santoso see's them as his greatest nemesis, and melding that to narratives of Muslim oppression, the rise of crusader forces, and the assignment of poor regional governance and Western Crusader forces is powerful.

Likewise, by publicly naming Det 88 officers as evil, terrorists, torturers, and as agents of the West,[209] Santoso is attempting to restrict police intelligence activities and create division between the authorities and the people. As an operational decision this makes sense because the most rational course of action for the MIT is to reduce the effectiveness of their adversary. Therefore the crafting of a narrative which achieves those goals and resonates at micro-levels, but for more seemingly noble reasons is prudent. Similarly, the response by authorities to MIT communiqués is to take them down from the internet as quickly as

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[207] R. Gunaranta, 'Global Threat Assessment New Threats on the Horizon?' *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, Volume 7, Issue 1, January/February 2015, p. 8

[208] International Crisis Group, 'Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon', *Asia Briefing No. 132*, 26 January 2012, p. 1

[209] Mujahidin Indonesia Timur Media Arm (MIT Press), 'Matters for the Muslim Community in Poso', *YouTube*, 7 July 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fC_XDXRZQYQ, (accessed 03/08/2015)

possible, which interestingly seems to validate the rationality of MIT efforts to cast the authorities in an oppressive light and as a force against Islam.

In October 2012 the MIT released a statement claiming responsibility for the bombing of a Poso Police traffic post and an arson attack on a Church,[210] stating it was in direct response to Det 88 operations against them. This statement played several roles. First, it cast the MIT as Holy Islamic warriors fighting for good, and in turn the police (polri[211]) as being against God. Laced with religious reference to the duties of Muslims to help their brothers and of responsibilities to undertake jihad and gain entry into heaven, Santoso urged the residents of Poso to kill the police 'wherever you find them, kidnap them, surround them and spy on them until Islam reigns supreme.'[212] This reflects two important aspects of narrative descendancy, being 1) a world view the MIT leadership has developed that has been brought about by social constructions and the societal organizations it has experienced, shaping its perceptions of an ideal future and driving its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in the archipelago. 2) It also demonstrates a logical and tactical understanding of the steps needed to achieve a military victory.

Additionally, a central part of pro-ISIL macro-narratives is the manipulation of tenants of the Islamic faith used by extremists to justify action. Schmid states that one of ISIL's chief claims is that 'Muslims are persecuted and their rights violated all over the world and that the only solution to stop this is to fight back.'[213] This is a theme reflected in Indonesian jihadist politics and exemplified in the Yogyakarta Charter of 2001, in which various Mujahidin agreed together to reject false ideology and the tyrannical abuse of human rights of Muslims.[214] Also common in al-Qaeda narratives are ideological justifications for violence because of the oppression of Muslims and the need for the righteous to stand up and

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[210] R. Sangadji and Y, Perdani and B. Saragih, 'Suicide bombing hits restive Poso', *The Jakarta Post – Palu/Jakarta Headlines*, 1 June 2013. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/04/suicide-bombing-hits-restive-poso.html, (accessed 03/08/2015)

[211] SOURCE: Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (POLRI) @ http://www.polri.go.id/

[212] Thoriqul Huda, Al Jihad Sabiluna, 'Statement Amaliyah Post Then Smaker Poso and others', *Statement No. 04*, 23 October 2012. https://thoriquna.wordpress.com/category/sariyatu-tsari-wad-dawaa/, (accessed 03/08/2015)

[213] A. Schmid, 'Challenging the Narrative of the Islamic State', *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism* – The Hague, June 2015, p. 5

[214] G. Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*, University of New South Whales Press, 2004, p. 69

protect Islam, with help from the people to fight the forces of evil.[215] The MIT have effectively harnessed these and are able to diffuse principal concepts, such as Islamic struggle, across a variety of social and political levels. In a MIT Press release of 30th October 2013, Santoso called on authorities to cut ties with America, Australia and other countries that participated in the massacre of Muslims around the globe, and went on to name America and Australia amongst other countries as ones that terrorized Muslim brothers.[216]

Similar themes run right through MIT media releases. In June 2015 Santoso continued to call on the Muslims of Poso to help destroy America and its allies, 'destroy the apostate government of Indonesia, destroy the military and the police, and destroy all their allies as well as any person who is helping them.'[217] The statement about killing any who support its enemies emphasises the authority the MIT claims in executing civilians, as it did to the aged farmer in Padalembara village, and reinforces MIT narratives that not only speak to the people in terms that cast themselves as wholly necessary to combat evil, but which also attempt to create division and even gain support from the military opposing them.

With the issuance of a direct challenge to Det 88 in July 2013,[218] Santoso framed the MIT as Islamic heroes and Det 88 as 'the real Satan'.[219] In later statements Santoso made efforts to separate the Indonesian Military (TNI) forces[220] from Det 88, even offering them amnesty. By doing so the MIT attempted to divide its enemies and garner support for its cause by highlighting the US backing that Det 88 receives over other forces, and likewise by fostering animosity. In the same communiqué Santoso stated that 'the police (Det 88) have no shame

[215] C. Heffelfinger, *Waiting out the Islamist Winter: Creating an Effective Counter Narrative to Jihad*, Monash University Australia, March 2012, p. 1.

[216] A. Zelin, 'New video message from Mujahidin of Indonesia Timur: About the Martyrdom Operation in Poso', *Jihadology*, 30 October 2013. http://jihadology.net/category/mujahidin-of-indonesia-timur/, (accessed 28/08/2015)

[217] A. Zelin, 'MIT Press presents a new statement from the Mujahidin of Indonesia Timur: Congratulations of the Two Martyrs of the Mujahidin in Eastern Indonesia', *Jihadology*, 5 June 2015. http://jihadology.net/category/mujahidin-of-indonesia-timur/, (accessed 29/08/2015)

[218] G. Roberts, 'Indonesian terrorist Santoso shows his face in online video calling for more martyrs', *ABC News*, 10 July 2013. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-09/indonesian-terrorist-santoso-shows-his-face-in-online-video/4810004, (accessed 04/08/2015)

[219] Roberts, *ABC News*

[220] P. Fardah, 'Poso Transformed Into Battlefield Against Terrorist', *Antara News*, 3 April 2015. http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/98359/poso-transformed-into-battlefield-against-terrorists, (accessed 06/07/2015)

as their rivals in TNI trudge through muddy, mosquito-infested forests in the rain every night, while they sit back drinking coffee and eating street stalls in Lape Village and spending their nights at motels in Poso city.'[221] Further supporting its pseudo truce offering, the MIT asked the TNI not to interfere in the battle between the Mujahidin and the 'cowardly police.'[222] This tactic of singling out a specific force from amongst the enemy collective can be powerful in creating division and uncertainty.[223]

Third, drawing from the macro-narratives of ISIL, the narrative descendancy processes involved justify the actions of the MIT and what it sees as its principal causes, which are: of fighting the enemy at home (near enemy), fighting the far enemy (the West), and establishing the Islamic State (Caliphate) as a transnational movement in Poso. As well as building subscription and support to enable recruitment from a wide base, narratives are also crafted to strengthen subscription because the ramifications of non-subscription are clearly stated. For example, at the end of the 14 October 2012 statement,[224] Sheikh Abu Wardah states clearly the one thing they (MIT & ISIL) possess which their enemies do not is the grace of God, who has created mankind and helps the faithful;[225] much like the Christian verse from Romans 8:31 'If God is for us, who can be against us?'[226] In doing so, Santoso was clearly stating that MIT and ISIL forces are supported by God in just cause, meaning that any who oppose them are infidels. By such a declaration the MIT need not actively recruit as it forces those who hear it to choose what is correct, and then determine which side they are on. Such determinations are made because actors share similar constructivist value systems, or by rational choice – are the people better off with the authorities or the MIT?

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[221] Thoriqul Huda, Al Jihad Sabiluna, 'Statement Amaliyah Post Then Smaker Poso and others'

[222] Thoriqul Huda, Al Jihad Sabiluna

[223] A. Gilbert, *Machiavelli - THE CHIEF WORKS AND OTHERS VOL II, [Divide and Conquer]*, Duke University Press, 2003, p. 697

[224] SITE Intelligence Group, 'Indonesian Jihadists Challenge Government Forces' *Indonesia Reporting*, 19 October 2012. https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Western-Jihadist-Forum-Digest/indonesian-jihadists-challenge-government-forces.html, (accessed 13/08/2015)

[225] The Holy Quran, 'Surat Al-'An`ām (The Cattle) - سورة الأنعــام',S. 6:70 Y. Ali. http://quran.com/6/70, (accessed 04/08/2015)

[226] Bible Gateway, The Holy Bible New International Version (NIV), Romans 8:31 – More that Conquerors. https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans%208:31, (accessed 04/08/2015)

Also, recruitment methodology is a valuable tool in understanding motivations and the methods by which groups attract, indoctrinate and retain new members. Having the local knowledge advantage, Poso was not only an opportunistic place to start the MIT due to the history of ethnic and religious violence, but it afforded the group relative safe haven[227] and importantly, space for training camps. As Aragon attests, Santoso 'successfully recruited local fighters to participate in a sectarian conflict in Poso that resulted in thousands of deaths.'[228] ISIL macro-narratives are being successfully drawn from and descended by the MIT, and fuelling the ambitions of local fighters in large part because of the rational attraction to the expansionist nature of ISIL rhetoric, as well as calls to undertake violent jihad in the service of the caliphate.

Wilson observes that in recent years the MIT has 'evolved into a network of terrorist organizations with high-ranking members who are connected to jihadist groups in Indonesia and abroad.'[229] Therefore leadership-to-leadership communications, organizational structures and lateral relationships mean that ISIL macro-narratives, distilled through MIT ideology and political aspirations, are not only seeded directly to the public but also horizontally to other groups and then down through the narrative bridges of third parties. Essentially this constitutes a force multiplier effect for the MIT whereby its narrative bridging and resonance formation are replicated almost exponentially by other jihadist leaders.[230] There are some quite specific counter narratives in the form of 'defectors' such as Nasir Abas, Ali Imron and Khairul Ghazali, who have all written extensive monographs

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[227] Even with the ongoing presence of several hundred police, military and law enforcement officials in Poso and surrounding areas working cooperatively to kill or capture him, Santoso has managed to continually avoid their traps and sweep operations. This has significantly added to his jihadist leadership credentials. SOURCE: The Jakarta Post, 'Security Authorities discuss terrorism in Poso', *National News*, 6 February 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/06/security-authorities-discuss-terrorism-poso.html, (accessed 04/08/2015)

[228] L. Aragon, 'Reconsidering Displacement and Internally Displaced Persons from Poso', in E. Hedman, (ed.) *Conflict, Violence, and Displacement in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, USA, 2008, p. 26

[229] J. Wilson, 'Return to jihad in Indonesia', *New Mandala* Australian National University, 18 June 2015. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/06/18/return-to-jihad-in-indonesia/, (accessed 04/08/2015)

[230] F. Galamas, 'Terrorism in Indonesia: An Overview', *The Militant Groups of Radical Ideology and Violent Nature Series Area: Indian Subcontinent and Southeast Asia*, Research Paper 04/2015, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE), 2015, p. 8

that undercut the religious justifications used by terrorists to sanction the use of violence[231].
However, although promoted by authorities, specifically Det88 as evidence of their
successful de-radicalization efforts, this small group seems largely ignored by jihadist
entirely, and of little interest to non-jihads who have no concern for the subject matter
anyway.

In provincial Sulawesi, continuing sectarian violence means that simmering tensions are
never far from the surface of the social fabric. The MIT are attempting to revive the conflict
– and it is working. Santoso is not only succeeding in further propagating an already highly
resonant macro-narrative set which has attracted other, already highly radicalized
extremists to his political ambitions of an Islamic caliphate in Poso,[232] but he has also proven
effective in recruiting from a population previously unconcerned with such things. According
to Jones, Santoso has become the symbolic heart of ISIL in Indonesia.[233] It is therefore not
surprising that Santoso targets university mosques to find new fighters. In the past, police
have successfully disrupted MIT recruiters in mosques and at religious events,[234] while the
MIT cadre focuses on sustaining its infrastructure of hidden jungle training camps where
indoctrination and mental reconstruction of new recruits can take place unhindered.

In January 2015 the situation became so tenuous that the police and local authorities invited
citizens, for security reasons, not to leave their homes. The prohibition extended to farmers
who couldn't tend their fields.[235] While Santoso is trying to distract his foes he still has his
sights set very firmly on the continuance of jihad against those he perceives as the

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[231] S, Sim, *Countering Violent Extremism: Leveraging Terrorist Dropouts to Counter Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia*, The Qatar
International Academy for Security Studies, Phase II, Volume II, 2013, p. 2

[232] V. Arianti, 'Southeast Asia: Indonesia', in *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis – A Journal of the International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2015, p. 9

[233] S. Jones - In G. Taylor, 'Indonesia cracks down on suspected jihadists as Islamic State fears mount', *The Washington Times*, 16
September 2014. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/16/indonesia-cracks-down-on-suspected-jihadists-as-is/?page=al,
(accessed 04/08/2015)

[234] The Australian, 'Indonesia foils terror plot on tourist spots: police', *AFP News*, 8 January 2013.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/indonesia-foils-terror-plot-on-tourist-spots-police/story-e6frg6n6-1226549892825, (accessed
05/08/2015)

[235] Hariyadi, *Asia News*

ideological enemies of Islam - Westerners and Christians.[236] As Zenn notes, the violent activities of the MIT as well as 'those of the local government officials that turn a blind eye or actively support them opens up the operational space for the MIT to expand recruiting and operations.'[237] Santoso and his group have actively published articles and uploaded audio and video messages to Indonesian and Arabic social media forums frequented by known terror identities and sympathisers. This has had a catalyst effect and enabled the MIT to descend ISIL macro-narratives in line with its own agenda, including recruitment from local populations.[238] Young males are increasingly being attracted to MIT narratives and ideology, perhaps helping them to understand what many view as a complex and disappointing world.[239] Likewise they justify 'violence to overcome their feeling of powerlessness, which stems from factors ranging from economic and educational marginalisation to job opportunities.'[240]

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[236] K. Ramakrishna, 'The East Indonesian Mujahidin Commandos: New Faces, Same Ideology', *RSIS Commentaries*, 17 January 2013. https://counterideology2.wordpress.com/2013/01/17/rsis-commentaries-the-east-indonesia-mujahidin-commandos-new-faces-same-ideology, (accessed 05/08/2015)

[237] J. Zenn, 'A Closer Look at Terrorism in Southeast Asia', *War on the Rocks*, August 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/a-closer-look-at-terrorism-in-southeast-asia/, (accessed 05/08/2015)

[238] V. Arianti, 'Southeast Asia: Indonesia'

[239] The Conversation, 'To stop Islamic State spreading to Indonesia, target the young and reform prisons', *Politics + Society Australia Edition*, 15 August 2014. http://theconversation.com/to-stop-islamic-state-spreading-to-indonesia-target-the-young-and-reform-prisons-30406, (accessed 05/08/2015)

[240] The Conversation, *Politics + Society Australia Edition*

Chapter Four

MIT narrative descendancy in Central Sulawesi – A mixture of approaches

Transnational macro-narrative descendancy by the MIT demonstrates constructivist and rational choice elements. Drawing from multiple macro-narrative streams, the MIT is grafting its own narrative onto the existing violent conflict and re-framing it in terms favourable to itself and its primary narrative patrons. The constructivist elements are largely evident in the bridging processes and the correlation of shared stories, principles and the alignment of religious and social histories. Rational choice features more towards the micro-levels of narrative grafting where the MIT demonstrate the practical reasons why subscription is the best option for the residents of Central Sulawesi, such as championing the people against frequently repressive measures by authorities. Equally are claims of improved daily life under strict Islamic law and the expulsion of Christians increasing opportunities for local Muslims land rights, in government, and other community benefits.

This melding of constructivist and rational choice elements stems from the complex mix of ethnic, religious, cultural and historical tensions present in the region, making straight forward singular approaches difficult. Because ethnic and religious lines are not as firmly entrenched as in other violent conflicts like the Arab-Israeli conflict, Catholic vs. Protestant conflict, or the insurgency of Southern Thailand, predominantly constructivist narratives would likely not succeed. Yes there has been sectarian violence along religious lines in Central Sulawesi, but it simply does not have the legacy and multi-generational embedded cultural memories and animosities that other long standing civil wars do. The fact that the current conflict is largely limited to the current generation+1 means it has finite potential as a support base, especially given counter-narratives and pressures that older generations who lived before the current violence may exert on the younger one.

Likewise, rational choice theory by itself does not explain how the MIT has survived for as long as it has. Not being as powerful as other al-Qaeda or ISIL affiliates, the MIT is simply not capable of asserting sufficient wide-spread trade-off pressures (with us or against us) on

vulnerable populations like Boko Haram has in Nigeria for instance,[241] or of manipulating conflict war-economics on the scale that has happened in Chechnya and the Serbia/Croatia conflicts. Singularly it also cannot fully explain MITs operational successes. For example, Poso is a well suited location for constructing training camps and for developing important regional and transnational networks, though Santoso's personal and familial ties to the region likely led the he and MIT to believe they were more welcome than they were, rather than being an accurate assessment of the local ideological environment. Additionally, the lack of outright opposition to the MIT taking up residence was probably seen as a form passive endorsement; however this also likely reflects a familiarity with Jihadist groups by the community rather than a tacit form of acceptance, with Laskar Jihad having been a prominent actor in the early days of the current conflict before disbanding.[242]

Consequently, narrative descendancy in Central Sulawesi has never been a matter of re-framing by simple means; rather it is promulgated on multiple levels. First is the need to draw from the transnational macro-narratives of ISIL and al-Qaeda, with ISIL macro-narratives having directional primacy and al-Qaeda macro-narratives that support local jihadist political goals. Second is seeding directly to the Ummah, the Muslim populations in Poso and surrounding islands and provinces. Third, disseminating macro-narratives laterally as well as horizontally to the meso levels of regional jihadist networks to alter their perceptions of the importance of Santoso's war in Poso, both ideologically (constructivist based) and practically (rational choice based). Four, grafting macro-narratives across geographical space enables dissemination even further through jihadist nexus to new micro levels across the archipelago, providing the MIT operational and ideological support at level and utilizing subordinate actors to seed to a wider basis than the MIT itself is capable of.

The success Santoso and the MIT has had is evident in the fact that the ideologist rhetoric they disseminate has grown beyond the scope of their relatively small physical stature. Not

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[241] P. Asfura-Heim and J. McQuaid, 'Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northern Nigeria', *Occasional Papers Series,* Centre For Strategic Studies, USA, 2015, p. 39

[242] Laskar Jihad commander, Jafar Umar Thalib, dissolved the organization in line with local requests to promote conflict resolution.
*Christian militia groups were also asked to disband. In: Tempo National News, 'Ask Poso Muslim Laskar Jihad Disbanded', 18 October 2002. http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2002/10/18/05831024/Muslim-Poso-Minta-Laskar-Kristus-Dibubarkan, (accessed 16/08/2015)

only credited with localized home-grown terror, the significant investment in training camps has built a reciprocal relationship with ISIL, as well as fostering greater awareness of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. According to Afrida & Sundaryani 'Poso has been a place for training for jihad and most of the militants who went to Syria to join the Islamic State had been in Poso.'[243] Santoso is not only subscribing to and descending ISIL macro-narratives to the local level, but he is also taking active measures to future-proof the MIT by sending fighters to Syria to undertake combat operations, which strengthens alliances and brings ISIL jihadists directly back to Poso.

Actively supporting ISIL as a primary narrative patron creates symbiosis in which returning fighters would be eager to continue to support and expand an Islamic Caliphate, which is exactly what Santoso is trying to build in Sulawesi. Likewise, the breadth of direct integration that Santoso and other MIT operatives maintain across Indonesian, pan-regional, and the global jihadist nexus affords MIT narrative descendancy a significant degree of legitimacy, as well as increasing its resonance potential. There is also an additional benefit for the MIT in promoting ISIL macro-narratives. As Morrow attests, when groups draw support from transnational actors they often face a trade-off decision in the form of relinquishing some form of autonomy, meaning that they are required to promote the goals of patrons above their own.[244]

In many instances this can be detrimental as it means a shift away from local group aspirations and focus. For Santoso however this is not the case, indeed, the establishment of an ISIL endorsed caliphate centred in Poso, presumably with himself as the Emir, and the practice of Islam as per ISIL doctrine is exactly what he and the MIT are trying to achieve. For others however, such as the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, subscription is more a matter of ensuring the continuance of its legitimacy[245] within the regional terror nexus, because in

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[243] N. Afrida and F. Sundaryani, 'Police benefit from Poso operation: IPAC', *The Jakarta Post*, 28 April 2015.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/28/police-benefit-poso-operation-ipac.html, (accessed 06/08/2015)

[244] J. Morrow, 'Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances', *American Journal of Political Science*, 1991, Vol. 35, pp. 904-933

[245] R. Spencer, 'Philippines: Islamic jihad group Abu Sayyaf pledges allegiance to the Islamic State', *Jihad Watch*, 17 September 2014.
http://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/09/philippines-islamic-jihad-group-abu-sayyaf-pledges-allegiance-to-the-islamic-state, (accessed 30/08/2015)

realistic terms it has little desire to respond to ISIL wishes of attacking apostate rulers, or going to the trouble of establishing an ISIL caliphate when it is too busy profiteering from crime and terror.[246]

Similarly, MIT narrative descendancy direct to local actors to build conflict support and to recruit and indoctrinate new fighters is entirely different from garnering support from colleagues who are already closely aligned. What's evident in the political nature of MIT narrative bridge formation and resonance building, are the changes in the macro-narratives it draws from, because to align contextually into the Central Sulawesi conflict they must be modified to fit the situation and incorporate a mixture of approaches. Therefore from a rational choice perspective it is expected that narrative descendancy would highlight distinct issues and offer tangible solutions to daily life. For instance, the Christian population of Central Sulawesi is considered to be evil and oppressive of Muslims by the MIT, though to some ordinary residences they are simply neighbours. So in order to attract Muslim farmers and peasants to support the MIT in targeting Christians, the MIT are highlighting how Christians are receiving preferential treatment and land access rights, better prices at market for crops, and better education and healthcare.[247]

However, convincing the same residents that the government is apostate and are agents of Satan because of US and Australian backing is more difficult if they have no rational stake in the matter. In fact stakeholder status appears to be a critical determinant of successful narrative descendancy in rational choice models. At the local level, internal conflict actors in Central Sulawesi have no stake in ISIL political objectives, therefore the MIT, as the agents of brokerage and diffusion, have sought to correlate specific aspects of its macro-narrative to the local situation to make micro-level actors believe they do indeed have some form of ownership of issues. Islamic struggle (jihad), the threat of apostate religions (Christianity), and an emphasis on the direct negative impacts they have on the daily suffering of the

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[246] S. Smith, 'Financing Terror, Part III: Kidnapping for Ransom in the Philippines', *STRIFE*, 26 January 2015.

http://strifeblog.org/2015/01/26/financing-terror-part-iii-kidnapping-for-ransom-in-the-philippines/, (accessed 30/08/2015)

[247] Historically there has been significant disparity in employment as government officials: almost 40 percent of government officials were Christian, who constituted only 21 per cent of the adult population in 1990. In rural areas Christians as a whole had slightly larger landholdings than Muslims. SOURCE: G. Brown and Y. Tajima and S. Hadi, 'OVERCOMING VIOLENT CONFLICT', *Peace and Development Analysis in Central Sulawesi*, Vol. 3, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU), United Nations Development Programme, 2005, p. 23

average Muslim in Central Sulawesi, real or not, highlights belonging to the same group, and secondly intimates that one can help the other on tangible micro-levels.

Additionally, Santoso's fixation on Det 88 also demonstrates rational choice narrative bridging whereby the targeting of the anti-terror force, and other police more generally, is not only logically and tactically sound, but also demonstrates two important facts. First, successful MIT bombings of police check-points and attacks on police stations[248] demonstrate the vulnerability and ease with which the 'agents of Satan' can be attacked and killed. This supports MIT political claims that social issues can be resolved through violence. Second, attacks against the police elicit harsh responses which affect the general community far more so that it does the MIT, with anti-terror operations involving the random searching of resident's houses during which there are frequent allegations of police abuses, brutality and rights violations.[249] As intended, such events not only drive a wedge between the people and the authorities but also reaffirm MIT narratives of oppression, casting them as righteous and the police as evil. On a rational choice level it also provides conflict supporting narratives for micro-level actors to rationally explain and justify the use of violence.

As a result, narrative descendancy in Central Sulawesi is a winner-takes-all process wherein different macro-narrative exegesis represents alternate action choices, which then compete to inhibit others from influencing the basis of an actor's decision making, such as peace vs. violence for instance. By emphasising shared history, common themes and mutual experiences, narrative bridges are created that increase attraction to particular ideals through resonance. Once micro-level actors become tuned into the resonance of macro-narratives, those narratives begin to take over and set into motion processes of additional

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[248] The MIT/Santoso have been accused of having perpetrated a string of attacks at the Poso Pesisir Selatan Police headquarters in June 2014, as well as the killing of two police officers in Tamanjeka Village, Poso in October 2012, as well as multiple attacks against the National Police Mobile Brigade (Brimbob) from 2012 onwards, killing several police officers. SOURCE: The Jakarta Post, 'Poso terrorist group responsible for 7 incidents: Acting Police Chief', *National News*. 5 April 2015. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/05/poso-terrorist-group-responsible-7-incidents-acting-police-chief.html, (accessed 13/08/2015)

[249] Saragih and Sangadji, *The Jakarta Post, Central Sulawesi*

decision making along similar lines, further isolating other influences and alternate narratives.

On a positive note for the MIT, this does not equate to a zero-sum game. It does not need to build subscription to narratives across a majority basis, simply enough to generate operational support in the form of new recruits and sympathisers. And, if not successful in gaining adherents, be powerful enough to stop others from siding with the authorities. Crucially for the MIT, the ongoing violence of the region means that it is able to reinforce and even qualify at times its narrative content, such as Christian dominance of local government,[250] or Islamic repression by an apostate authority, and in turn manipulate and inflame already high communal tensions.

Doing this supports the attainment of the primary goals of MIT narrative descendancy which are to recruitment new fighters, create and maintain support bases, and change the conflict dynamics to its advantage by establishing a regional caliphate with strict adherence to ISIL ideology, including the destruction of infidels. This represents and emphasises a constructivist wellspring as the MIT are seeking to change Poso on political, social and religious levels into what they see as an Islamic utopia. Likewise, the propagation of the belief that Poso will be the centre of a qoidah aminah,[251] or base of an Indonesian caliphate where residents can live under ISIL defined Sharia law, and then expand to areas such as Maluku and farther afield is strong and compelling, and has been recognized by scholars including Chew, Singh and Jones.[252] Building on this is the indoctrinating influence of jihad itself and the bearing it has had on local and transnational conflict actors alike, many who have trained and fought in Poso and other parts of Indonesia as well as Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. The credenda of conflict has so deeply shaped some fighters that it has

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[250] A clear example is the position of District Head (bupati) which was meant to alternate between Muslims and Christians. SOURCE: G. Aditjondro, 'Kerusuhan Poso dan Morowali, Akar Permasalahan Jalan Keluarnya', *Jakarta ProPatria*, 20 August, 2006. https://translate.google.com.au/translate?hl=enandsl=idandu=http://gorgadeo.blogspot.com/2006/08/akar-masalah-konflik-poso-dan-morowali.htmlandprev=search, (accessed 02/08/2015)

[251] A. Surrette III,' Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: The Effect of Islamic Nationalism on the Indonesian Political Climate', *Webster University*, Missouri, USA, 2009, p. 54. https://books.google.com.au/books?isbn=1109153651, (accessed 04/09/2015)

[252] Chew. A, 'Indonesian Islamisits exploit political vacuum ahead of Widodo presidency: Room to grow as jihadist groups as Indonesia focuses on transition of presidency, experts warm'; Singh. M, 'Terror expert: ISIS targeting Indonesia'; Jones. S, in Taylor. G, 'Indonesia cracks down on suspected jihadists as Islamic State fears mount'

reconstructed their outlooks in such ways that it is difficult for them to consider life in any other terms.[253] Correspondingly, it not only controls their outlook but is also what they actively seek to maintain and build for others.

Lastly, the publicized success Santoso has had in avoiding the authorities and resisting suppression has only made his legend grow. Long touted by authorities as Indonesia's most wanted terrorist,[254] amongst jihads networks he and the MIT have gained significant credibility and operational draw. This unique dynamic has itself become a contributing factor of MIT narrative descendancy, because to have enduring power and build strong resonance narratives must be consistent and constantly applied. The longer Santoso and the MIT are involved in the conflict the more they grow in status and increase subscription to their ideology.

Furthermore, transnational macro-narrative descendancy in Central Sulawesi and in Indonesia more broadly has seen local jihadist struggles transformed into direct support for ISIL, as well as its vision of building regional caliphates. The MIT's deepening integration into the violence of Central Sulawesi is cementing its role as the principle ISIL affiliate in Indonesia, where it is no longer 'possible to understand Indonesian pro-ISIL networks without understanding Poso.'[255] Likewise, support received from the Lamongan network,[256] a pro-ISIL organization with links to many of the most dangerous terrorist in Asia,[257] was also instrumental in connecting Santoso with al-Qaeda and then to ISIL media arms, without which the MIT would likely not be placed as it is to reach a wide audience for its narratives.

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[253] International Crisis Group, 'Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso', *Asia Report No. 103*, 13 October 2005, p. 3

[254] FOX News, 'Indonesia's most wanted militant urges jihad', 10 July 2013. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/10/indonesia-most-wanted-militant-urges-jihad/, (accessed 04/08/2015)

[255] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 'INDONESIA'S LAMONGAN NETWORK: HOW EAST JAVA, POSO AND SYRIA ARE LINKED' *IPAC Report No. 18,* 15 April 2015. p.1

[256] The Lamongan network is a network of extremist jihadist fighters and preachers from Lamongan in Indonesia that has spawned some of the most dangerous terrorists in the country. It has also provided recruiters, fighters and propagandists for ISIS. SOURCE: M. Singh, 'Terror expert: ISIS targeting Indonesia', *The New Paper Online*, 13 June 2015. http://www.tnp.sg/news/singapore-news/terror-expert-isis-targeting-indonesia, (accessed 05/08/2015)

[257] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 'INDONESIA'S LAMONGAN NETWORK:HOW EAST JAVA, POSO AND SYRIA ARE LINKED'

With these connections in place the MIT has realized some critical goals, such as generating direct connections to ISIL, sharing fighters, expertise and ideology, and gaining recognition and legitimacy, and having done so it is building its capabilities and strengthening its localized narrative descendancy attempts. By crafting the premise that the MIT jihadist cause is perhaps larger and more extensive than it may actually be, the narrative bridging and descendancy attempts display increased resonance, sufficient to persuade recruits from inside as well as outside Poso and Central Sulawesi to join, and essentially to believe that jihad is a fight worth fighting.

Chapter Five

Conclusions

The violent conflict of Central Sulawesi has presented some challenging dynamics for the MIT. Although sectarian tensions have been high since the mid 1990's, an absence of multi-generational animosities or long running historical grievances has meant that building support from the people is very much about the here and now. Resultant from this is a multifaceted approach that draws from numerous macro-narratives, primarily ISIL and secondly al-Qaeda, with due reference to pan-Indonesian jihadist narratives founded on concepts of Darul Islam. Also challenging has been the manner in which narrative bridging and resonance creation has been undertaken to build subscription. These dynamics have resulted in both constructivist and rational choice approaches being witnessed in MIT transnational macro-narrative descendancy processes.

Using the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the conflict in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia as an empirical case study, this thesis has answered the question: How do local actors use transnational macro-narratives to re-frame conflicts on micro-levels. It has determined that under the right conditions both theories have validity and transformative power to re-frame conflicts. Furthermore, it has demonstrated that due largely to a range of conflict specific dynamics such as lack of inter-generational depth, previous jihadist influences, topography, and tactical advantage, both approaches are evident in MIT narrative descendancy and conflict re-framing attempts. The MIT is successfully building its support base, attracting new fighters and aligning affiliates with its re-formed narratives, as well as gaining legitimacy and support from its macro-narrative patrons. Second, the case study reaffirms the importance of transitional phase enablers identified in the literature review, such as nascent organizations, lateral relationships, charismatic leadership, and the presence of sectarian divides, capability gaps, and conflict dynamics vulnerable to manipulation.

As Bar-Tal[258] showed, constructivist perceptions, ideas, and meanings at the micro-level are malleable and can be altered to fit new situations by providing narratives that explain them and authorize violence in response. Likewise the findings support Devji's[259] claims that leaders can manipulate followers on social, ethnic and religious levels to realign their beliefs with political aims. Second, the impact of transnational actors and external macro-narratives cannot be understated, and the thesis demonstrates the power they have in affecting conflict continuance, supporting local actors, and significantly influencing domestic conflict dynamics down to the micro level as Schmitz,[260] Hellyer[261] and Byman[262] discussed. Testing Gilardi's[263] theory of transnational diffusion, the thesis also illustrates several examples of international macro-narratives changing the meanings of ideas at lower levels, as happened in Chechnya and Serbia. It has also illuminated the current lack of scholarship on specific macro-to-micro narrative descendancy and grafting processes.

Furthermore, the research has shown that constructivism can be used to identify how effective narrative bridges are built, such as through the manipulation of common social issues, shared histories and identification of mutual enemies as Noor,[264] Merari[265] and Gosh[266] acknowledged. Constructivism can also reveal the mechanics of how narrative bridges and descendancy possesses define individual actors and group interests, and how community leaders play key roles in resonance development and macro-narrative seeding. It is through these means that grafting and re-framing takes place.

In addition, rational choice theory demonstrates ways and means by which narrative descendancy can, does and has taken place. A rational focus on facts and actions has shown

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[258] Bar-Tal, pp. 22-50

[259] Devji, *Landscapes of the Jihad*, p. 75

[260] Schmitz, *International Studies Review*, p. 404

[261] Hellyer, *The National Opinion*

[262] Byman et al, *Rand Research Brief*

[263] Gilardi, *Handbook of International Relations*

[264] Noor, *Journal of Law and Religion*, pp. 381-397

[265] Merari, *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*, pp. 213-251

[266] Gosh, *Sociological Bulletin*, pp. 221-243

that nascent organizations rarely survive without some form of external assistance, and that by gaining affiliation with transnational groups, local actors can manipulate macro strategic political objectives and reframe them in terms that are compelling at micro levels, such as trading subscription for weapons, equipment and training for instance. It has also compellingly demonstrated that processes of narrative descendancy are driven by local actors, and that without external assistance they are unlikely to realise their political aspirations. As Kalyvas[267] explained by way of violent intimidation by political actors in contested areas, it also enables understanding of positive rational choice incetivization as well as negative ones. Similarly, Fiqueiredo & Weingast[268] ascribed fear as a rational motivator to persuade actors to participate in violent conflict, a tool which has been employed effectively by the MIT and demonstrated clearly in the case study.

Furthermore, rational choice theory demonstrates that macro-narrative descendancy cannot take place in a vacuum and requires the presence of certain factors to succeed, including local actors and leadership elements with power and influence who seek to engage with international narratives; a requirement for capability development and the pursuit of justification, legitimacy and material enhancement; and opportunity for narrative bridging in the form of exploitation of existing divides and animosities along social, ethnic, religious and cultural lines.

This thesis has examined transnational macro-narrative descendancy but it also has strong relevance to a range of other research agendas. The multifaceted and multi-stage nature of conflict re-framing and narrative grafting offers opportunity for further examination of the individual processes involved, in addition to the overall impact on broader sociological, political and ethnic groups including positive and negative form influencing. Likewise there is significant scope for extending the research to include other analytical approaches such as dyadic, statistical, inferential and qualitative approaches. Equally there is scope for future research to explore counter descendancy approaches and building resistance through community engagement, and through the development of new economic and political

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[267] Kalyvas, *Promises and pitfalls of an emerging research program: the micro-dynamics of civil war*, p. 398

[268] Fiqueiredo and B. Weingast, p. 5

structures. However, my interests lay in other areas. Having formulated a sound basis for identifying the critical role that nodes and nexus junctions across leadership and nascent organizational networks play, upon which successful narrative bridging and descendancy is predicated, it is my intent to use this research at PhD level for the future development of strategic intelligence modelling to clandestinely influence and disrupt terrorist networks.

Likewise, the potential implications for policy makers are far reaching. Traditional analysis of violent conflict has largely focused on structural and proximate conflict dynamics. This has helped academics understand the results of violent conflict and its effects, yet it has done little to help understand transnational influences, macro-narrative grafting and conflict re-framing. Because of the prevalence of violent and insurgent conflicts in Indonesia and across the Southeast Asian region this is surprising, particularly given the significant influence of Darul Islam from the 1940's, al-Qaeda macro-narratives of the 80's, 90's and early 2000's, and now the influence of ISIL across regional jihadist networks.

In areas where violence has been halted in the past, such as in Poso, there has not been any conclusive addressing of the underlying causes of conflict dynamics, and remaining unaddressed, violence has continued to flare over ethnic, religious, political and other issues. Ongoing mismanagement and inadequate approaches to dealing with and understanding conflict means that issues remain fragile and highly susceptible to manipulation. By identifying the ways and means by which it takes place, this thesis has demonstrated that analysis of transnational macro-narrative descendancy processes would enable the development of stronger security, counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency policies into the future, which has wide reaching policy implications in terms of addressing human security issues such as mass migration, societal breakdown, rebellion, food, water, health and energy security.

Furthermore, understanding how beliefs, ideals and particularly social psychology can be manipulated to align with macro transnational narratives offers opportunity to develop effective outreach strategies not only to micro-level actors, but also to insurgent and armed rebel groups to address grievances and reduce or mitigate violent confrontation through

pre-emptive political means. It also has ramifications on strategic policy in terms of understanding the scope of foreign interference in a host nation's national security, and of external assistance to insurgent groups and the provision of covert support to rebels willing to surrender a measure of autonomy to pursue the political objectives of patrons over their own in return for material support. Achieving this would change the way governments deal with localized violent conflict and could alter the means of address from purely military and security solutions to developing broad based approaches which are capable of addressing a number of issues across the conflict spectrum simultaneously, including on social, economic, political and material levels, thereby mitigating destabilization efforts by local actors and transnational influences.

Likewise, conflict narratives involving the use of violence tend to repeat the longer conflict goes on, thereby making them difficult to change. As Marc observed, 'It would be naïve to think that differences in culture, historical experience and political disagreement could be bridged simply.'[269] The manner in which conflict actors understand themselves and those they fight with are critical facets of identity, which are entrenched in narratives that persist through time and perpetuate the power relations of actors in conflicts.[270] Therefore further research is needed to address the failure to understand how conflict actors draw from transnational macro-narratives to build subscriptive social architecture. Moreover, identifying and determining the origins of the perceptions and interpretations of conflict dynamics, upon which decisions are made is important. So to is understanding the susceptibility and malleability factors of conflict dynamics that enable and manipulation of conflicts on macro and micro levels.

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[269] R. Marc, *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 320

[270] O. Weinburg, 'Transformative Approach to Mediation: Radical Insight or Pie in the Sky?' *iBrarian*, 2003. http://cfcj-fcjc.org/clearinghouse/drpapers/2003-dra/weinberg.pdf.(accessed 11/08/2015)

Map 1 Central Sulawesi Indonesia in relation to Australia.

Map 2 Detailed map of Central Sulawesi

Map 3 MIT map of declared ISIL Caliphate in Central Sulawesi

* Map reads (translation from Google Translate):

> *At the time of the massacre of Muslims in Poso where were the police and military?*

> *Poso has now become Daulah Islam*

> *Mujahideen eastern Indonesia has pledged to allegiance to [ISIL] Caliph Commander*

> *Ibrahim bin Awwad hafidhuallah [a.k.a. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi]*

Image 1 Mujahidin Indonesia Timur [MIT] logo and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur [MIT] Press logo

Image 2 MIT Emir Abu Wardah Santoso (centre) with fighters

al-Ustadz Abu Wardah Bersama dua orang mujahidin lainya

Translation (Google Translate): Al-Ustadz Abu Wardah Together with two mujahideen iainya

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