Compte rendu

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THE WORK AND PLAY STRUCTURES OF NARRATIVE

Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale*, originally published in Russian in 1928, became widely known to Western scholars only with the appearance three decades later of its English translation (1968 [1958]). The critical reception to Propp's work, particularly in the United States, has been mixed. On the one hand, Dundes (1968: xvi) has asserted that 'Propp's analysis is a landmark in the study of folklore.' On the other hand, Jacobs (1966: 415) has stated that 'the flattery belatedly granted [Propp] has gone out of bounds.' Whatever the ultimate judgment of the merit of Propp's work per se, its seminal nature is attested by the substantial number of publications that its English translation has inspired. Ironically, its greatest impact has been in France, and among scholars who are primarily not professional folklorists. They have not been blind to deficiencies in Propp's work, but have been inspired to an attempt to give more rigor to his principles of narrative analysis and to generalize them into a technique for the analysis of all types of narrative.

One of the most prolific and persistent of these researchers has been Claude Bremond. Over the past decade he has published detailed critiques of Propp's *Morphology* and the work of several scholars (Dundes, Greimas, Todorov) that derives directly or indirectly from Propp. These have been reprinted as Part I (entitled 'The Heritage of Propp') of his recently published book, *Logique du récit.* 1 As Bremond acknowledges in the foreword, these articles do not constitute a critical survey of all the research inspired by Propp (7). But a more basic limitation is that they fail to make clear the nature of the fundamental differences that have emerged from the various attempts to forge a general theory and methodology of plot analysis from Propp's work. This striking diversity in post-Proppian narrative analysis has generally passed unnoticed, more attention having been focused on differences between the Proppian and the Lévi-Straussian modes of analysis. 2 Bremond himself has been a participant in the process of modifying Propp, and Part II of his book (entitled 'The Principal Narrative Roles') develops...
ideas in his earlier papers, including two theoretical ones (Bremond 1966, 1970) not reprinted in Part I.

The major purpose of this essay is to point out the diversity in post-Proppian plot analysis — and, more specifically, to argue that within it one can discern two fundamentally different conceptions of narrative structure. These two conceptions are not merely different theoretical grids superimposed upon the same phenomena, but represent, in fact, two objectively different types of narrative structure. These two types will be referred to as **dramatic structure** and **instrumental structure**, and they may be succinctly characterized by the antonyms 'play' and 'work' respectively.

The work of Bremond will nevertheless occupy a central position in this discussion in that it exemplifies the analysis of instrumental ('work') plot structure. The work of Greimas, who is the other major architect of the revision and 'generalization' of Propp's concepts and analytic techniques, will be discussed as an exemplification of the analysis of dramatic ('play') structure.

That two researchers, starting from the same point, Propp's *Morphology*, arrive at basically different conceptions of narrative structure indicates the need for a careful reexamination of Propp's work. A major part of this essay will consequently be devoted to this matter. In particular, it will be argued that there is a basis in Propp for both conceptions of narrative structure and that Bremond and Greimas, in their efforts to 'generalize' Propp, have each only isolated one of two tendencies coexisting in his analytic approach (or in the materials in his corpus). Our point of departure will be Propp's concept of the basic unit of plot structure, which he terms the *function*. This is a notoriously complex, polysemantic term, one which requires careful, explicit definition. Unfortunately, Propp defines it primarily by exemplification.

The ambiguity of 'function' is manifested in the fact that both Bremond and Greimas retain Propp's term and both characterize their approach as a 'functional analysis' of narrative. While the distinction between instrumental and dramatic structure does not reduce to the conception of function, it is an important aspect. Greimas applies the mathematico-logical concept of function to narrative, whereas Bremond, contrary to the title of his book, utilizes basically the biological sense. The biological perspective is so pervasive in Bremond's approach and concept of narrative structure that it even sets his work apart from that of other exponents of the analysis of instrumental structure (e.g. Dundes).

It is true that Propp himself makes clear, at least by implication, that his source of inspiration was biology. Given Bremond's (unacknowledged) biological orientation, and his assertion that Propp's concept of the function is 'an essential discovery [that] must be carefully preserved' (131), it might
seem that Bremond has remained closer to Propp's original approach than has, say, Greimas. Our reexamination of Propp will reveal, however, that this is not the case. The biological sense of function itself is not univocal, and its various specialized meanings will all be important to a full understanding of Propp's conception of plot function and the relation it bears to the 'functional analyses' of the post-Proppians.

Let us turn now to a detailed examination of Propp's concept of the function. In the foreword to his book Propp notes that the term morphology in the title comes from botany, where it refers to 'the study of the component parts of a plant, of their relationship to each other and to the whole – in other words, the study of a plant's structure' (xxv). The general biological sense of function presupposes such a stable structural configuration, abstracted from diachronic fluctuation and external exchanges with the environment, in that it refers to the contribution of a part (an organ) to the maintenance, the continued existence, of a larger whole (the organism). The function of the heart, for example, is beating; if the heart were to stop beating, the organism would die. Strictly speaking, this is only one type of biological function, which is usually termed 'organic' function. While this type does not exhaust Propp's concept of narrative function, it is an important aspect of it.

In the context of the narrative, the analogue to the biological organ would be the characters. More exactly, the 'organs' of a tale correspond, not to the characters, but to the dramatis personae, each of which has a particular 'sphere of action', in the same way that a biological organ may have a certain range of activities. Propp himself bases one definition of the tale, as an alternative to its definition in terms of plot functions, on the fact that it consists of seven dramatics personae. But these are presented as a list, without any attention to their structural organization.

The major emphasis of Propp is on the actions, not on the dramatis personae who perform these actions; in effect, he reifies the actions into 'stable, constant elements', hence his use of deverbal nouns to refer to the functions. Of course, an activity, such as seeing, implies the organ which performs this activity, namely the eye. Likewise, a villainous act implies an agent, the villain.

The actions of the dramatis personae are 'functional' insofar as they contribute to the maintenance (and development) of the plot. Each function is 'defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action' (21). To properly delimit this sense of function, it must be contrasted with the non-functional elements Propp recognizes as occurring in the narrative. These he discusses in Chapter V, 'Some Other Elements of the Tale', under the headings: auxiliary elements for the interconnection of functions, trebling, and motivations (including the attributes of the person-
ages). Propp concedes that these elements may be an important part of the tale — they can be ‘functional’ in a sense. But the point is that the ‘functions’ are those elements ‘upon which the course of the action is built’ (71), whereas the ‘non-functions’ do not determine the development.

The implication, which Propp never makes very explicit, is that the non-functional elements can be deleted without destroying the plot, or they can be changed without necessitating a concomitant variation in the course of the plot. This aspect of the concept of function is a clear-cut analogue to the organic sense of biological function. An additional analogy can be made to the relation of modifier to head in sentence syntax. A modifier can be deleted without destroying the sentence, and the substitution of one modifier for another does not affect the syntactic structure of the sentence; but the substitution of a plural noun for a singular one will necessitate a change in the verb form.

The distinction between function and non-function is clear enough in the abstract, but it is another matter to specify in rigorous fashion the criteria that would allow the analyst to separate the two from actual narrative texts. Propp, unfortunately, does not devote much attention to this problem. His analytic practice, furthermore, does not always contribute to our understanding. A comparison of some of his functions with his examples of, say, non-functional ‘connectives’ reveals a certain arbitrariness in his procedure. With regard to connectives, Propp notes that if functions which follow one after another are performed by different characters, the second character must be notified or informed of what has happened. The tale has ‘an entire system for the conveying of information’ (71). Other elements serve to link one function to another, without involving the conveying of information. For example, ‘The arrangement of great feasts ... serves to link N (the solution of a task) with Q (recognition of the hero)’ (73-74).

Given these remarks, one might question the functional status of B, which Propp defines in abbreviated form as ‘mediation, the connective incident’ (36). This function introduces the seeker-hero into the tale – he is informed of what has happened. Actually, Propp would have been consistent in this case if he had defined the function as ‘order or request’, since this is a component part of this function. Propp has merely included too much in the definition of the function. Further questions can be raised about the true functional status of Departure and Spatial Transference between Two Kingdoms, etc., since they seem to be ‘connectives’ which merely place the participants on the scene.

Propp’s failure to be more specific about the criteria separating functional from non-functional elements means that in this respect at least his work does not represent any significant advance over earlier work. For example, in his introductory chapter ‘On the History of the Problem’ Propp
refers to Bédier’s *Les fabliaux* in which a distinction is drawn between the constant, essential elements of the tale, denoted by the Greek letter omega, and the variable, non-essential elements, denoted by Latin lower-case letters. But, according to Propp, Bédier’s idea ‘falls apart in its inability to specify the exact meaning of omega. What Bédier’s elements are in reality and how to separate them remains unclarified’ (18).

Bédier does have the merit of making more explicit the biological metaphor that also guided Propp’s work. Bédier compares the tale to a living organism which, in order to live, is subject to certain conditions. It is constituted of an ensemble of organs such that it is impossible to remove one without killing the whole organism. Propp’s work represents an advance over Bédier’s in that he decomposes the organic whole, which Bédier simply designates by omega, into the constituent parts, the functions. But this merely displaces the problem — from that of making clear what constitutes omega to what constitutes a function (cf. note #6).

It is a sad commentary on the fragmented nature of the theory and practice of narrative analysis that Propp, in his history of the problem, does not go beyond earlier efforts within the discipline of folklore. Anyone with a background in literary theory approaching Propp’s work cannot fail to be unimpressed with his ‘major theoretical breakthrough’. The emphasis on plot at the expense of character and the comparison of a literary work with a living organism are at least as old as Aristotle’s *Poetics* (see especially Section VIII). Of course, we have so far presented only one aspect of Propp’s conception of narrative function; other aspects, to be discussed below, can be shown to represent advances over organic views in literary criticism, which are primarily restricted to organic function per se.5

The most damning evidence that Propp failed to specify the organic nature of plot is his concession that ‘by no means do all tales give evidence of all functions’ (22). Yet he can assert later that ‘if we read through all of the functions, one after another, we observe that one function develops out of another with logical and artistic necessity. We see that not a single function excludes another. They all belong to a single axis and not ... to a number of axes’ (64).6

Propp’s position can be understood — but not defended — by noting that his whole of reference is not the individual tale itself, but the ‘genus’ (or the ‘archetype’ assumed to be the historical source of all the existing tales). The same distinction is found in biology, where it is recognized that certain activities may be functional for the species as a whole but dysfunctional for the individual. Consider Propp’s statement that ‘The question of how the given scheme applies to the texts, and what the individual tales constitute in relation to this scheme, can be resolved only by an analysis of the texts. But the reverse question, ‘What does the given scheme represent in
relation to the tales?" can be answered here and now. The scheme is a measuring unit for individual tales. Just as cloth can be measured with a yardstick to determine its length, tales may be measured by the scheme and thereby defined' (65). This is a decidedly non-structural conception of individual tales. It should be noted that according to Bremond (51), Bédier argues that it is possible to arrive at organic form from a type of logical reduction of a single tale. Obviously a general theory of narrative structure cannot be formulated to account for a given text, but a general theory fails if it cannot provide explicit criteria for determining what makes an individual text an organic whole.

Scholars influenced by Propp have proposed solutions to the problem of the omissibility of certain functions in individual tales, following hints to a solution that Propp himself offers. Before turning to a consideration of this matter, as well as further aspects of Propp's concept of narrative function, let us first examine what contribution, if any, Bremond has made to the problem of separating functional from non-functional elements from the plot, and hence, the problem of characterizing the global coherence of the plot.

What we find running throughout Bremond's work is a conception of narrative structure in general and of the function in particular that in effect denies the organic sense of function: an element necessary to the maintenance of the plot as a whole. Before trying to justify this judgment, let us first present Bremond's own position.

Bremond takes Propp to task for not allowing 'pivot functions' in his analysis — i.e. functions which would allow for changes in the course of the narrative (18f). For example, an interdiction in the preparatory section of the Russian folktale is always violated; when the hero is requested or commanded to go on a quest, he always accepts; the hero's struggle with the villain always results in the hero's victory; and so on. (Bremond makes essentially the same criticism of Dundes and of Greimas' 'constitutional model', which confers an inevitability on the sequence of plot events; see 76f and 97f).

Failure to provide for alternatives is said to disregard a 'law of narrativity': 'the obligation of being developed as a sequence of options effected by the narrator, at each instant of the narrative, among several ways of continuing his story' (99; see also 8). To conform to this 'law', each function should be seen as anticipating a future which may or may not be realized (121). Thus, one should never pose a function without at the same time posing the possibility of a contradictory option. As Bremond acknowledges, this amounts to a repudiation of Propp's 'finalist postulate' which he attributes to Propp's perspective: 'he attempts to give an account of a factual situation: the Russian tale's exclusion of options which do not
correspond with its own finality' (25). In other words, the hero’s consistent defeat of the villain is a cultural stereotype, one among several ‘logical possibilities’ of the narrative. Bremond posits alternatives in an attempt to generalize Propp, to delimit the field of the ‘narratable’.

Bremond’s arguments may seem to have an intuitive validity, given his goal of accounting for all narratives, not just Russian fairy tales. Yet the price he pays is a complete abandonment of what is widely recognized as the structural law of the narrative, one antithetical to Bremond’s, which can be summed up in Barthes’ (1971: 7) statement that ‘where an action is faced with an alternative ... the narrative invariably chooses that from which it profits, i.e., that which assures its survival as narrative.’ These remarks essentially repeat observations made a decade earlier by Kenneth Burke (1961: 252f), who notes that if Adam had chosen not to sin, the whole design of the Bible would have been ruined. Likewise, the ‘logic of the fable’ required that Othello kill Desdemona. The act is ‘de-termined’ — settled beforehand. The end of the narrative determines what precedes, not vice versa.

Bremond’s assertion that at each instant of the narrative there are alternatives for its continuation is in effect a denial of the organic unity of a work. If any one element can be changed without affecting the rest, then that element is not functional. A choice made at any one point is going to have repercussions at every other point; this means that a different narrative cannot be produced simply by substituting an alternative event at any given point in the plot. Note too that Bremond asserts that these options are not only binary, but contradictory. Thus, with reference to the kidnapping of a princess by a villain (as in Propp’s corpus), the alternative would be that the princess is not kidnapped, yielding the story of an avoided adventure (97). However, it should be obvious that simply saying that something did not happen does not constitute a narrative — a story of an avoided adventure requires certain positive choices, all of which will be interrelated.

But there are further aspects to Bremond’s position than the above account indicates which are somewhat more defensible, though Bremond does himself a disservice by failing to clearly differentiate these aspects, all of which he confounds under the rubric of ‘alternatives’. Sometimes Bremond discusses alternatives, not with reference to different paths of an objective event that would yield different narratives, but with reference to hypothetical possibilities that are revelatory of character.8 Consider his remark: ‘Let us suppose that it is no longer simply a matter of telling a story, but of telling the story of someone. It becomes impossible to avoid the opposition between what happens and what could have happened; impossible to tell the story of Hercules at the crossroads without allowing both routes to be explored in one’s imagination’ (22). Here Bremond seems indirectly to
touch on the Aristotelian concept of *proairesis*; see the discussion in Burke (1961: 253). and in Barthes (1971: 8). The latter notes that ‘Where the narrative in fact opts for its own survival, it is the character who appears to choose his fate; narrative thriftiness ... is sublimated into human free will.’

Related to ‘choices’ which are choices only from the viewpoint of characterization (and not plot structure) are ‘possibilities’ that may or may not be actualized, that have only a subjective existence. Propp excluded from his structural representations any elements pertaining to the subjective (covert, mental) side of events and considered as functional only those elements pertaining to the objective (overt, physical) side of events. Bremond, however, mixes in the ‘why’ with the ‘what’. This accounts in large measure for the fact that Bremond, in an appendix to his book, presents a lexicon of around fifty functions (termed *narrative processes* by him), as opposed to the thirty-one recognized by Propp – which some commentators on Propp (e.g. Lévi-Strauss, Greimas) have proposed reducing in order to remove certain redundancies.

Among the ‘subjective’ functions Bremond postulates is ‘information’ (along with several others which presuppose information). Propp, as we noted earlier, specifically considers the conveying of information as an auxiliary element in the tale. Another group of subjective functions recognized by Bremond centers around the field of ‘influence’, involving an aspect of motivation. Bremond, in fact, proposes a rather elaborate classificatory scheme of motivations. We will not discuss this aspect of his work; it is clear that, rather than clarifying the distinction Propp draws between functional and non-functional elements, Bremond comes close to obliterating it. He does recognize as non-functional, however, some of the aspects Propp does, such as descriptions of personages (with certain exceptions), ‘lyric effusions’, philosophic meditations, etc. (322).

It is not the intent here to deny the value of explicit categories for the description of motivation; but such a description must be seen as supplementary to the description of those objective events essential to the plot. Bremond does not present any evidence that motivations deserve functional status, in the sense of being necessary to the continued existence of the plot or to its development; rather, he concedes that the narrator may choose not to indicate the motivations. Bremond’s mixing of subjective and objective is just one indication (among others to be discussed) that his approach yields a ‘phonetics’ of narrative action, rather than the ‘phonemics’ that Propp tried to achieve.

At this point we have indicated some rather radical divergences between Bremond and Propp. Since no one believes that Propp’s work represents ultima Thule, this fact in itself does not constitute grounds for censure. However, Bremond has also asserted that he is convinced of the validity of
Propp’s method in general and of the fact that the notion of function ‘understood as ‘the action of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action’ ought to be carefully preserved’ (131). In light of this statement, Bremond’s divergences from Propp might seem evidence of a serious misunderstanding on Bremond’s part of what Propp meant by a function. However, this matter can be partially resolved by noting that we have so far discussed Propp’s notion of function only in terms of its being an analogue to the biological notion of organic function. But this constitutes only one, albeit very important, aspect of Propp’s concept — and, in fact, an aspect that Propp himself does not devote much explicit discussion to, an imbalance of treatment that perhaps explains why shortcomings in his delineation of functional from non-functional elements have largely been overlooked.

The notion of organic function pertains to the isolation of those elements essential to the maintenance of the whole. But Propp’s ‘whole’ was not an individual text, but a collection, and he was concerned not just with essence but also with invariance. Propp noted that in many cases identical actions were performed by different characters, but he also noted variation across tales in the actions themselves. What Propp discovered, however, was that these different actions could be seen to have the same meaning or ‘function’. In this context, ‘function’ is being used in a way that is analogous to the ‘activity’ sense of biological function. Consider the earlier example of beating as the organic function of the heart. One can go on to specify the function served by this activity of the heart — namely, circulation of blood throughout the body. Activity function is a variety of teleological explanation — the ‘function’ of an activity is the end or goal, with the activity itself being the means toward its attainment. One characteristic of teleological activity is that the same goal can be reached under different conditions or by different means.

That Propp regarded the relation between action and function in terms of means and end is amply borne out by many remarks; e.g. ‘The actual means of the realization of functions can vary, and as such, it is a variable. Morózko behaves differently than Bába Jagá. But the function, as such, is a constant. The question of what a tale’s dramatis personae do is an important one for the study of the tale, but the question of who does it and how it is done already fall within the province of accessory study’ (20). (Thus, whereas Propp titles Chapter III of his book ‘The Functions of Dramatis Personae’, his presentation there could have been more accurately entitled ‘The Functions of the Actions of the Dramatis Personae’.) Propp includes choice of the means through which a function is realized as one of the areas of freedom for the storyteller, and hence the source of new plots (112). However, Propp confuses matters later by comparing the function to a genus, with the
species said to be particular examples of a function. But the particular examples are in effect various means; and the genus-species relation is not the same as the means-end relation.

It may seem that, as applied to the narrative, the organic and the activity senses of function are incompatible. From the perspective of the definition of an activity function as an end with variable means, Propp's 'connective' could be regarded as a function. But in terms of activities necessary to the continued existence of the plot as a whole, a connective is dispensible. However, this seeming contradiction between the two concepts of function does not actually exist, for the activities whose functions are specified are assumed to contribute to the continued existence of the whole. An activity function is part of a larger whole, and the end of each part is simultaneously a means to the continued existence of the whole. Thus, the function or end of the activity of the heart (beating) can be specified in terms of an ultimate end (maintenance of the organism), or of a more immediate end (circulation of blood). We can see why the basic, or typical, sense of function in biology is that of activity function, for this concept conveys more information than the organic sense — the activity sense makes clear the exact role or contribution that the part makes to the whole.

Incidentally, the concept of activity function, in all of its implications, is not necessarily restricted to a concern for extracting invariance from a group of texts. It is equally applicable to a single text (aside from its obvious relevance for dealing with internal parallelism in the actions constituting a single plot). Hence it has direct relevance for literary criticism, representing in fact an advance over many variants of 'organic' theory, which seem to recognize only organic function, at least explicitly. Consider, for example, the observation cited earlier that Othello's activity of killing his wife is necessary to the design of the play. This statement leaves unspecified the precise function of such an activity.

One problem, particularly from a literary perspective, is that the line between an activity and the function it serves is not easily drawn, for one could assert that killing is an end, with strangulation, say, the particular means. From Propp's perspective, however, which regards plot events from a certain level of abstraction, killing would be regarded as a means. Part of the inexplicitness in Propp's approach is that no clear criteria are given for the level of abstraction that he selects. It is more or less an induction, arising from his comparison of a group of narratives. 10

One possibility for literary critics, of course, is for them to adopt the same cross-textual perspective. Barry (1970: 31) has in fact proposed abstracting what he terms the 'Basic Pattern of Events' — comparable in some respects to a truncated series of Proppian functions — from the specific mechanisms (i.e. the means) for working it out in a given play. He notes that
the same pattern may serve for several different dramas and suggests re-
serving the term 'plot' for the mechanisms specific to a given play. In tradi-
tional literary criticism the term 'plot' seems most often to be used to refer
either to the over-all design of a work, subsuming character, theme, etc., or
to the detailed 'working-out' of the events, the means. But there is no
reason for not redefining the term so as to have it refer to a pattern abstract-
ed from specific means. Such a concept of plot can be utilized even if one's
concern is with an individual work. One can adopt the view that the set of
potential plots that this pattern could 'generate' are unrealized possibilities

Let us return now to a consideration of the relation Bremond's concept
of function has to Propp's. While Bremond seems to deny the organic sense,
he does stress the activity sense. He states that 'the function is defined as
the signification assumed by an event in relation to a finality (which it does
or does not serve) ...' (328-29). But he immediately adds a qualification to
this statement which indicates that his concept of finality differs from
Propp's: 'but a center of finality immanent to the plot appears only when a
subject receives there the attributes of a person.'

Finality for Bremond is viewed from the perspective of purposive, goal-
directed human behavior. In the case of such behavior one can postulate an
intent as the preexistent 'cause' of the future event, thus avoiding one of the
problems of teleological explanation arising from the fact that the cause (the
achieved goal) follows the effect (the goal-directed behavior). But the inten-
tion does not immediately produce the goal; it starts a chain of action, a
process having duration, whose final stage is attainment of the goal. The end
of such a chain is a state of 'temporary quiescence', which may be followed
by another 'cycle' of goal-directed behavior.\footnote{11}

Propp's perspective, in contrast, is an impersonal, non-anthropomorphic
one in which the tale is compared to a plant. Finality for him is not of a
temporary nature, but is permanent — a matter of the survival of the tale as
genus. In other words, while Propp does in a sense recognize the function as
the 'finality' of individual behavior, his emphasis is on the function as a
means to the maintenance of the tale. Consider in this respect Braithwaite's
(1953: 326) observation, in the context of a discussion of attempts to apply
the paradigm of intentional behavior to all forms of teleological explana-
tion, that when the activity to be explained is part of a whole organism, e.g.
the heart's beating, 'the analogue to the intention — the drive or conatus ...
— is usually posited not in the separate organ but in the organism as a
whole — an urge toward self-preservation, for example.'

We can find in Bremond's theory of narrative direct parallels to the
above views of intentional, goal-directed human behavior. For example, in
some of his earlier writings (1966, 1970) Bremond refers specifically to a
A narrative may consist of several such full cycles, or a minimum narrative can consist of a 'demi-cycle', that is, begin with a state of deficiency and end with a satisfactory state (or vice versa). For the moment we will restrict our discussion to the demi-cycle.

Amelioration and degradation are two major narrative processes — an expression Bremond substitutes for Propp's term 'function' (324). Each process is analyzed into the three 'tenses' which mark its development: virtuality, actualization, completion (cf. 35, 131). Each phase is open to an alternative: virtuality may or may not be actualized; and, if actualized, it may or may not be completed (success/failure). We will say no more about the negative alternatives, which are a refinement of the notion of 'pivot function', discussed earlier. Although we can now better understand the rationale of Bremond's position — his 'finality' is actually a virtuality, the goal to be attained — it remains indefensible, being vulnerable now to the criticism that it confuses actual human behavior with the narrative representation of such action, for in real life goals are not always achieved.

In the concluding chapter of his book Bremond tries to forestall this objection to his approach, while at the same time arguing that it is inconceivable that there are two 'logics of roles', one regulating the referential universe of adventures 'in themselves', and the other the universe of these same adventures as signified in the narrative (331; see also Bremond 1966: 76).

We can obtain a better grasp of Bremond's notion of narrative cycle by comparing it (or, rather, the demi-cycle) to the internal structure of process verbs, as analyzed in the current linguistic-semantic literature — despite the fact that Bremond on more than one occasion has rejected a linguistic model for narrative theory. A process verb denotes a change or transition of an entity from one state to another over a time interval (cf. Katz 1972: 302f; Chafe 1970: Ch. 9). The verb itself often expresses the transition, with the initial and final states presupposed (cf. van Dijk et al. 1972: 17). For example, in the sentence The door opened, the presupposed initial state of
the door is 'closed' and the final state is 'not closed' (or 'open'). The noun door would be said to be the 'patient' of the stative 'verbs' closed and open (cf. Chafe, 98). A derived (causative) variant of this sentence would be John opened the door, in which John is the 'agent' of the action/process verb open.

To relate this linguistic analysis to Bremond's narrative cycle, note that the initial state of the narrative process 'amelioration', say, is 'state of deficiency', and the final state is one of 'satisfaction' (or 'not deficient'). Bremond himself notes that the state of deficiency is attributed to a character who is in the role of 'patient'. Furthermore, he points out (175) that the patient role is more basic than the agent role, for every agent is a past and present patient, and the state of patient can be an absolute beginning or end of a narrative. Also, the state of a patient can be modified with or without the intervention of an agent (incarnated as a person); this option corresponds to Chafe's distinction between process verbs proper and action/process verbs.

The initial state of deficiency pertains to a character in a patient role, but from the perspective of this same character as potential agent, it is equivalent to an 'amelioration to be obtained'. That is, the 'virtuality' of the initial phase of a process is equivalent to the final goal, which guides the activity which is a means toward its attainment. With regard to our example of the process verb open, the final state ('opened') can be regarded as an initial virtuality.

There is one important respect in which Bremond's analysis of narrative structure in terms of the narrative cycle differs from the linguistic-semantic analysis of process verbs and from other approaches to narrative analysis in terms of goal-directed behavior. Consider Dundes' (1964a) Proppian inspired analysis of North American Indian tales, which Bremond has acknowledged as having influenced his own work (1973: 96). Dundes analyzes several tales solely in terms of the single 'motifemic' pair Lack/Lack Liquidated, which leads Bremond to complain that such an analysis omits any reference to the passage from one state to another. 'Lack Liquidated' specifically represents the result of the completion of the process of suppression of lack, with no indication of the means whereby this end is reached.

More generally, Bremond rejects 'a retrospective reading of events, ... a reflection on the completed story' in favor of 'the structuration of the story in progress' (122). Bremond's orientation is toward the future, the realm of the possible, and not toward the past, the realm of the necessary. That this is a matter of perspective is emphasized by the fact that a given verbal expression may ambiguously refer either to the process which tends toward a result, or to the result of the process; e.g. the cat sat on the mat (cf. 64). Depending upon which perspective is adopted, one obtains either a mathe-
matico-logical or a biological conception of structure. Piaget (1973: 15f) has distinguished these two types of structure as follows. Mathematico-logical structures are completed because they result from deduction or axiomatic decision. Biological structures are in the process of constitution or reconstitution; they result from vital processes. Mathematico-logical structures are closed, they have no exchanges outside themselves with the environment; hence, there is no need to distinguish between structure and function in its biological sense.

It is clear that Bremond’s conception of narrative structure is biological in this sense. This does not mean, however, that Bremond views narrative as an ‘open’ system in the usual sense of an external ‘functional’ analysis (as in, e.g., Malinowski 1954) or in the sense of narrative as process rather than as text (see Hendricks 1973b: 254f). That is, Bremond is not concerned with ‘finalities’ outside the narrative, nor with the role audience reception, socio-cultural setting, etc. can play in shaping a narrative during performance or its writing. Rather, Bremond views narrative as an open system in that he in effect obliterates the line between narrative and the physical events that it signifies — by positing alternatives at each phase of a process (cf. the earlier discussion).

Although Dundes also analyzes narrative in terms of purposive goal-directed behavior, his approach is amenable to a mathematical treatment, e.g. in terms of group theory, where the focus is on the end-points or states, and not on the paths to those states. (For an elementary discussion of group theory, see Barbut, 1970 and Pike, 1973.) Whereas Bremond repeatedly emphasizes that the ‘transformations’ of a process take time, have duration, the ‘transformations’ from one state to another in a group theoretical approach are instantaneous, e.g. $1 + 1$ instantaneously equals 2 (cf. Piaget, 1968: 12).

Such a ‘mathematical’ approach to narrative analysis may seem to run counter to traditional literary opinion, which stresses that the essence of story is process; e.g. Wellek and Warren (1956: 205) state that ‘To tell a story, one has to be concerned about the happening, not merely the outcome.’ And critics sometimes criticize a narrative for merely indicating that a change or development has occurred, without the author having portrayed the process of the change. However, a structural representation of the narrative is not to be confused with the narrative itself; esthetic criteria applicable to the narrative are inapplicable to the structural representation. One might nevertheless object that the goal of a structural analysis should be to provide an explicit basis for intuitive judgments regarding the essence of narrative. In the present case, however, these ‘intuitions’ concern superficial phenomena, not the essence. Traditional conceptions of plot as ‘in essence’ a matter of the chronological ordering of events confuse syntagmatic relations with temporal ones (cf. Lyons, 1968: 76f). The ‘temporality’ of plot is
of a kind with the ‘temporality’ of sentences in a natural language, which are
temporal by virtue of the physical means of speech production or the con-
ventions of orthography.

Let us turn now to an examination of exactly how Bremond proposes to
take account of the process itself which ‘mediates’ the passage from the
initial to the final state. Bremond states that each component of the basic
(‘matrix’) narrative sequence (constituted of the three phases of a narrative
process) is capable of further specification — by means of another narrative
process that is ‘enclaved’ (embedded) within the matrix sequence. The en-
claved sequence is the ‘means’ to the end of the matrix process (or the
enclaved sequence may constitute an ‘obstacle’ to achievement of the goal).
Each enclaved process, in turn, is likewise capable of having other processes
embedded in it, resulting in a structural organization somewhat comparable
to the self-embedding construction in sentence syntax.

Bremond elaborates upon the relation between matrix sequence and en-
claved sequences as follows: ‘We can consider each new enclaved sequence
as a specification of the sequence which encompasses it: in ‘Activity of
elucidation of an enigma by elaboration of a hypothesis verified by a test’,
three sequences are ordered according to a relation of hierarchic inclusion
analogous to that which can exist in zoology between the genus, the species
and the sub-species’ (35). Bremond claims that his analysis in terms of
enclaving sequences allows him to avoid the drawback of formalism that
Lévi-Strauss noted in his (1960) critique of Propp — namely, that Propp
showed how all the tales were alike, but failed in differentiating them,
except by surreptitiously reintroducing the brute content eliminated by his
analysis into the generic forms.

Bremond concludes his critique of Propp by stating that ‘The reinterpre-
tation of the results of Propp’s analysis in terms of a more general system,
capable of being applied to every type of narrative message, can therefore be
effected without any loss of information as a result. This generalization does
not entail, as might be feared, the disappearance of the content into forms
more and more empty. On the contrary, it corresponds to a gain in concrete
determinations, to a reinforcement of our grasp of the object studied’
(45-46).

In Part II of his book, however, Bremond states that his ‘coding’ of narra-
tive events involves the loss of an enormous amount of information (323).
This remark occurs in the context of his discussion of the non-functional
content of actions; he notes, for example, that the (voluntary) act of cough-
ing can, in a certain context, be transcribed ‘enterprise of amelioration of
oneself’. But, he adds, there is an infinite number of ways of ameliorating
oneself. Bremond here refers to ‘functional analysis’ in the sense of speci-
fying the end, of which the particular behavior is the means. However,
‘amelioration of oneself’ is generic, and Bremond, as we have just seen, argues for an analysis not just of end but of means, i.e. the sequences enclaved in the matrix sequence which further specify it. It is true that even in cases where enclaves are indicated, use is still made of general categories, so in that respect there is a loss of information — but it is of a sort to be expected in any analysis, which by definition consists of more than a bald repetition of the text itself. In any sort of structural representation, however, one must carefully relate the analytic categories to the actual narrative material they represent. Bremond is not always careful in this respect (nor is he always consistent), the net result being comparable to a statement that a sentence consists of two nouns, a verb, an adverb, etc., with no indication of which word in the sentence belongs in which particular category. 13

The problem with Bremond’s approach is not that it conveys too little information about plot structure, but that it opens the door to an overly detailed representation. On more than one occasion Bremond has emphasized that the phases of a process can be infinitely developed (e.g. 1966: 76). And the more differentiated the process is, the more refined typology of narrative types that results (cf. Bremond, 1966: 64; 1973).

Any attempt to structurally represent the ‘process’ itself is chimerical. The linguistic analysis of process verbs, for instance, typically consists of a representation only of the initial and final states (with perhaps provision for the specification of an intermediate state; cf. Katz, 1972: 305). Relevant in this context is one of Zeno’s paradoxes concerning motion. At any instant t of an arrow’s flight, the arrow is in a definite position p. At the very next instant t + 1, it is in another position p + 1. The question is, when does the arrow move from one position to another? At each instant of its flight, the tip of the arrow occupies a definite position. The arrow cannot move at that instant, for an instant has no duration. Hence, the ‘moving’ arrow is always at rest. This paradox can be explained, as Kline (1953: 403-04) notes, by means of the theory of infinite sets. From this mathematical perspective, motion is nothing more than a correspondence between positions and instants of time, the positions and the instants each forming an infinite set. (Between any two points, A and B, there is an infinite number of points.) The ‘motion’ picture, it should be remembered, is nothing more than the projection on the screen, at the rate of 16 frames/second, of a series of still pictures.

To support the judgment that Bremond’s attempt to analyze process results in a ‘phonetics’ of narrative events, as opposed to the ‘phonemics’ that Propp wanted to establish, one could cite almost any of the many brief sample analyses Bremond presents in his book — examples from La Fontaine’s Fables, the Arabian Nights, the Bible, Poe’s short stories, etc. The detailed nature of Bremond’s analyses is somewhat obscured, however, by the fact
that he analyzes only small fragments of any given work. Thus, rather than cite one of his analyses, we will attempt to apply his analytic categories to a young children’s story, *The Little Mouse Who Tarried*. The story may be summarized as follows.

Old Grandma Mouse became upset when by late afternoon her granddaughter, Little Mouse had not yet returned home from a trip to the store to get bread for dinner. Her neighbor, Mr. Crow, suggested that they go ask the cat to help find Little Mouse. But the cat said she was too sleepy to help. Mr. Crow then suggested they ask the dog to wake up the cat by barking so she would go find the missing granddaughter. The dog also refused. Mr. Crow then proposed that they ask the broom to hit the dog so he would bark. The broom refused, so they next approached the sickle with a request to threaten to cut the broom. Next, they sought the aid of a stone, asking it to chip the sickle. Rebuffed again, they asked the fire in the hearth to crack the stone with heat. The fire also refused, but the water jar nearby overheard the predicament of Grandma Mouse and felt sorry for her. It began to jiggle and water splashed out. When the fire saw this happening, it quickly turned into a ball and rolled toward the stone. When the stone saw the fire approaching, it jumped up and ran toward the sickle; and so on down the line, until the dog woke up the cat, which went off in search of Little Mouse. And just before the sun set, Little Mouse returned home with the bread.

At the beginning of the narrative, Grandma Mouse is the ‘patient’ (more exactly, ‘victim’) of an unsatisfactory state — the absence or ‘lack’ of her granddaughter — without this being attributed to the action of a ‘degrader’ (cf. Propp’s function ‘a’). At this point the grandmother is the possible beneficiary of a possible process of amelioration. The possible (voluntary) agent of a process of amelioration (the ‘ameliorator’) is Mr. Crow, who is provided with information indicating that the occasion is offered to envisage a project (a task), the goal or ‘end’ of which is, ultimately, finding the missing granddaughter. Mr. Crow immediately agrees to help Grandma Mouse, and the narrative does not indicate any particular motivation for his agreeing to help. The next step is the execution of his project, putting the means into operation (i.e. obtaining the services of a prestator in the person of another, the cat). This process of ‘obtaining’ represents an elementary sequence embedded into the execution phase of the matrix sequence (the task of ameliorating the lot of another). The cat is provided with information concerning the occasion for rendering assistance; at this point the cat has the option of either agreeing or abstaining from action. The cat chooses to abstain, making Mr. Crow the victim of a process that forms an obstacle to the execution of his task (the cat is an ‘obstructor’ or ‘frustrator’). At this point a new sequence is embedded — the agent (Mr. Crow) attempts to
neutralize the obstructor, and, to do this, he undertakes to obtain the services of yet another person, the dog.

We will not pursue the analysis of the other incidents in which the broom, the sickle, etc. are each asked to lend assistance. Note, however, that these further episodes are embedded in the preceding ones. We do not have here a simple concatenation ‘end-to-end’ — a type of connective which would exist if the crow went to each personage and made the identical request for direct assistance in finding Little Mouse; i.e. asked the broom to look for her, rather than to threaten the dog, and so on.

It is only when the water jar learns of the problem that Grandma Mouse and Mr. Crow succeed in obtaining the services of a (voluntary) prestator (co-ameliorator). His willingness to help is the means whereby the other personages, who earlier abstained from action, become involuntary prestators. By ‘involuntary’ is meant, not ‘involuntary action’ in the usual sense of, say, reflex action; rather, it refers to an agent who intends to accomplish goal x, but whose actions actually result in the accomplishment of goal y.

For example, the fire rolled off the hearth in order to avoid a degradation of his own lot (a voluntary act of protection), but in doing so, he happened to (involuntarily) accomplish what he had earlier refused to do, namely, force the stone to threaten the sickle. The narrative proceeds in this way, working from the most deeply embedded sequence outward, until finally the cat goes off in search of Little Mouse.

This narrative obviously lends itself well to analysis in terms of Bremond’s approach. Though the story is lacking in the subjective, motivational aspects that Bremond allows for, he does note that these are options that the storyteller need not exercise. On the other hand, the options in the course of the action that Bremond would posit at each and every step are not really offered to the narrator. If Mr. Crow had not agreed to help Grandma Mouse, the story would have aborted. And simply stating that Mr. Crow would not act would not yield the story of an unsuccessful attempt at amelioration of the lot of another. Note too that the initial refusal of the dog, cat, and so on is just as crucial to the over-all design of the story. Of course, if the cat had immediately agreed to go in search of Little Mouse, we would have had a minimal narrative, in perhaps the technical sense, but it would be a rather mundane, uninteresting one. But in the story as written there is a fatal inevitability that Bremond’s approach does not provide for, since it requires a perspective antithetical to his future-oriented, contingent one.

Our abbreviated analysis should make obvious the minute detail which Bremond’s approach allows. Nevertheless, there is much that is left unsaid. It is assumed that the degree of differentiation of the amelioration process presented by the narrator is totally arbitrary. But one cannot help
wondering whether there is any significance in the fact that Grandma Mouse and Mr. Crow had to approach seven personages before they found one who would help. Note that the interlinked pairing of the personages is as follows:

- cat/mouse
- dog/cat
- broom/dog
- sickle/broom
- stone/sickle
- fire/stone
- water/fire

Note that these pairings seem 'natural' (though ultimately they probably reflect cultural stereotypes). Cats chase or hunt mice (and this can be playful, not predatory). The same relation is repeated in the dog/cat pair. The relation shifts somewhat in the broom/dog pair. The broom is asked to hit (damage) the dog. Whereas the dog and the cat had pleaded laziness when asked to lend assistance, the broom cites at its reason for abstention that it is being asked to do something 'unnatural' — its function is sweeping, not hitting. (The broom episode also marks the shift to a series of inanimate — though personified — objects.) The sickle also foregoes cutting (damaging) the broom because this goes against its usual function — but note that there is a closer relation between sickle and broom than between broom and dog. The sickle says that it is meant for cutting fresh meadow grass, not old brown straw; but 'straw' equals dried out meadow grass. Likewise, the stone, which is asked to chip (damage) the sickle, can also be used to sharpen it; and the fire, which is asked to crack (damage) the stone, can be produced from the friction of stones. The fire refuses assistance because it is busy making the water in the pot boil so the farmer's wife can cook. We have an effect of crescendo when we reach the water jar, for water will not just damage fire, it will totally annihilate it.

The above remarks are quite sketchy, but their implications for plot analysis are suggestive and can be related to certain issues raised by Bédier. Consider Bédier's formulation of the organic form of 'The Lay of the Sparrow Hawk', cited by Bremond (54-55): A woman has two lovers. While she is entertaining one, the other arrives. She hides the first and entertains the second. At that moment her husband appears. She persuades the second lover to leave by simulating great anger and by making threats. She explains to her husband that this man had pursued one of his enemies, who had taken refuge in her house, and that she had not felt obliged to turn him over. She has the first lover come out of hiding, and her husband lets him leave without difficulty.
Bédier notes that the main difficulty for a narrator treating this 'theme' is that of inventing a circumstance that will explain why the first lover cedes his place to the second, rather than making a jealous scene. Without such justification, the plot will not function satisfactorily.

One might object that Bédier is here touching on a matter of motivation — but it clearly is not 'motivation' in the usual psychological sense. It is more a matter of what could be termed 'structural motivation', something that Propp's whole functional approach may be said to concern itself with. Propp, while excluding motivations in the sense of 'the reasons and the aims of personages which cause them to commit various acts', does note that 'The majority of characters' acts in the middle of a tale are naturally motivated by the course of the action ... (75). 17 This type of 'structural motivation' is an important part of the narrator's art, and may well entail adding or modifying characters in order to make the plot 'hang together', so that concern for such details does not give priority to character over plot. Such devices are of paramount importance in stories of 'intrigue' (e.g. the novels of Eric Ambler).

In the case of 'The Lay of the Sparrow Hawk', Bédier notes that, to satisfy the 'logic of the tale', various versions make the two lovers father and son, master and slave, debtor and creditor, etc. That is, they place the first arrival, in relation to the second, in the same situation of subordination, of fault or of fear, as the second is in relation to the husband. This analysis elicits the following two objections from Bremond (55). One, if the plot requires this relation between the two lovers, then why does Bédier's statement of the organic form ('omega') not make mention of this? Second, the 'logic of the tale' does not require that the relations be of a conjugal or sexual nature. One could have a tale with the same abstract plot schema in which the husband and wife are replaced, say, by two kings who have entered into a pact with certain mutual obligations and which proscribes either from concluding a similar pact with a third party.18

Bremond concludes by attributing to Bédier the error of considering as data entering into the definition of the invariant element of the tale such local institutional facts as the relations husband/wife, father/son, etc. To such cultural relations he opposes narrative roles such as deceiver, villain, judge, etc. which, along with such plot elements as interdiction, contract, punishment, etc., are said to constitute true universals of the narrative. But Bremond overlooks the fact that Bédier generalizes from these particular relations and posits the more abstract one of superiority/inferiority between the two lovers. And Bremond himself had just previously noted that the husband/wife relation could likewise be generalized. In Lévi-Strauss' terminology, such generalized relations constitute the 'armature' of a narrative (cf. the discussion in Hendricks, 1973b: 247f), which can be 'coded' in
different ways depending on the culture.

The oppositions Lévi-Strauss establishes between dramatis personae are usually regarded as pertaining more to ‘theme’ than to ‘plot’. Bremond himself differentiates his approach from that of Lévi-Strauss in these terms (31). He states that Lévi-Strauss is concerned with the structuration of mythic themes taken in charge by the techniques of the narrative, whereas his goal is the structuration of the technique itself. From Lévi-Strauss’ perspective, it is important that Cain, in Genesis, is opposed to Abel as farmer to shepherd; but from Bremond’s perspective the significant opposition is that between the roles ‘rejected seducer who gets revenge on his rival’ and ‘successful seducer who is a victim of his rival’.19

What the preceding discussion, including that of The Little Mouse Who Tarried, tends to suggest, however, is that oppositions of the type investigated by Lévi-Strauss may actually play a role in plot structure. This possibility, implicit in Bédier’s work, has been neglected by Propp and the post-Proppians. It merits exploration in future research on narrative structure.

Let us turn now to a closer examination of the relation of Bremond’s analytic approach to that of Propp. We have already pointed out that Bremond’s concept of the function as ‘finality’ is related to, but distinct from, Propp’s concept of the function. However, what seems to be the crucial difference is the emphasis that Bremond gives to the means-end relation within narrative, his emphasis on analyzing a basic narrative process in terms of enclaved sequences, theoretically without limit, which specify the means to the end or finality of this process (matrix sequence). Bremond’s approach, in this respect, may in fact seem to be ultimately a repudiation of ‘functional analysis’ in Propp’s sense, which emphasizes the ‘what’ and not the ‘how’, the separation of variable means from invariant ends.

However, Bremond’s approach remains recognizably Proppian in inspiration. Note, with regard to Bremond’s narrative cycle, that the initial state of amelioration clearly corresponds to Propp’s function ‘a’ (lack); and the final state corresponds to Propp’s function K (or W, etc.). Furthermore, and this is an important point, the means-processes that intervene between these two states can be seen to be comparable or equivalent to functions recognized by Propp. Bremond himself has stated that ‘If we compare these results [of analysis in terms of the narrative cycle] with the typical sequence of the Russian folktale, we shall see that all the functions outlined by Propp appear at one moment or another in our analysis’ (1970: 275).

To see the justification for this statement, let us briefly recapitulate Propp’s notion of function. The basic sense for Propp is that of the invariant end, which has means of being obtained that vary from plot to plot. Furthermore, such (local) ends are simultaneously means to the global end of maintaining the plot as a whole. The major theoretical weakness of Propp’s
conception is that not all thirty-one functions he posits need occur in any
given tale. This omissibility of certain functions corresponds to Bremond’s
recognition that the narrator has a choice as to how much detail to provide
about the basic process of either amelioration or degradation. However,
Bremond provides a theoretical basis for this variability — for him it is not,
as it is for Propp, merely an empirical fact. Bremond accounts for the
omissibility of Proppian functions by positing a unit intermediate between
the tale as a whole and the individual function. This intermediate unit is the
‘elementary (enclaved) sequence’, composed of the three phases of a pro-
cess. The final phase of this enclaved sequence is an end, with the preceding
phases the means, and this end is intermediate between the local end each
function itself represents and the global end of maintenance of the plot as a
whole.

Although Bremond does not make the point, it is the case that this
intermediate end is an analogue to yet a third sense of ‘function’ in biology
— what is sometimes termed ‘internal function’. This is a type of function-
ing ‘in which the functional effects of the unit’s activities are not considered
in their bearing on the functioning of the total structure but rather on that
of some other part which participates in the same structure’ (Greenberg, 1957:
77). For example, the circulatory system, among other activities, brings the
material which maintains muscle fibers. (The term ‘internal’ is somewhat
unfortunate in that the other senses, organic and activity, are also internal in
that they pertain to the organism as ‘closed’ — self-contained, not in inter-
action with the external environment.)

Bremond points out that Propp himself made some tentative steps to-
ward recognition of the existence of the ‘elementary sequence’ in his sense
of the expression. He refers here to Propp’s suggestion that certain functions
form groups. Propp points out, for instance, that D-E-F (first function of
donor-reaction of hero-acquisition of a magical agent) ‘form something of a
whole’ (65). Propp does not comment further on this particular example;
but one can easily see that D and E can be regarded as means to the end of
acquiring the magical agent. This acquisition, in turn, is the means toward
the end of the ultimate liquidation of the initial misfortune or lack (K).
(From Bremond’s perspective, the group D-E-F is an enclaved means of
neutralizing an obstacle that stands in the way of the process of amelio-
rating an unsatisfactory state of deficiency.) Since the functions D, E, and F
form a group, it is to be expected that if one is omitted (e.g. D), the others
will also be omitted. This omissibility implies that the liquidation of mis-
fortune or lack can be accomplished without the means of a magical agent,
and Propp in fact cites one such tale, Afanas’ev #53 (101).

Propp comes even closer to an explicit recognition of internal function in
the following remarks, overlooked by Bremond, which concern the 'prepara-
tory section' of the tale:

... all seven functions of this section are never encountered within one
tale, and an absence here can never be explained as omission. They
essentially are incompatible. One may observe here that one and the
same phenomenon is capable of being elicited by several means. For
example, in order that the villain may create misfortune, the storyteller
has to place the hero or the victim in a certain state of helplessness.
Most often he must be parted from his parents, elders, or protectors.
This is brought about by the hero's violation of an interdiction ... or it
is achieved by the fact that the hero yields to the deception of the
villain who invites him to walk toward the sea or who lures him into the
forest, etc. Thus, if the tale makes use of one of the pairs \( \gamma-\delta \) (inter-
diction-violation), or \( \eta-\theta \) (deception-submission to deception) for this
end, the use of a second pair is often unnecessary (108-09).

By establishing a similarity between Bremond's narrative theory and Propp's
original approach, we make Propp vulnerable to the same criticisms that
have been leveled against Bremond; e.g. the criticism that Bremond's ap-
proach yields a 'phonetic' description of narrative events, which reproduces
variability rather than revealing the underlying invariance. The fact that not
all thirty-one of Propp's functions need occur in a given tale is a source of
variability, but one that Propp retained in his 'functional' analysis.

What would constitute, then, the ultimate invariance that a functional
analysis could achieve? This amounts to asking what could constitute a
minimal narrative (or, more exactly, the minimum structural representation
of a narrative). Propp in effect answers this with his observation (102) that
the only function that is obligatory for all tales is A (villainy) or its variant
'a' (lack). However, this must be qualified by Propp's earlier remark (53)
that the function K (initial misfortune or lack is liquidated) forms a pair
with A. Likewise, Bremond has observed that the narrator has the option of
simply indicating that the transition from the initial state of the matrix
process to the final state has occurred, with no specification of the inter-
vening phases.

Such a reduction of Proppian functions, through elimination of those
that are means to the ends represented by other functions, might seem to
result in too gross and uninformative a representation of narrative structure
(and a more flagrant 'formalism' than that which Lévi-Strauss and Bremond
criticize Propp for).

Consider in this regard the Bremondian analysis of *The Little Mouse Who
Tarried*. If we eliminate all the enclaved sequences, specifying only the
initial and final states of the matrix narrative process, the structural repre-
sentation would consist solely of the functional pair Lack/Lack Liquidated (in Propp's notation: a-K). The extreme generality of this representation may seem to be a defect when compared with the greater detail provided by Bremond's type of analysis. Nevertheless, Bremond's analysis provides too much information in that it obscures the fact that Little Mouse does have a very elementary structure (if we overlook some of the complications discussed earlier). Presumably most narratives will be found to have a 'complex structure', in a technical sense. By complex structure is meant a plot consisting of a recurrent cycle of elementary structures (e.g. matrix sequences, in Bremond's terminology, containing no enclaved sequences). Bremond explicitly postulates that a narrative can consist of several matrix sequences concatenated 'end-to-end', forming a continuous cycle of the processes of amelioration and degradation (1966: 63).

Given such a complex structure, an analysis solely in terms of elementary sequences will not seem so impoverished, whereas a Bremondian analysis of enclaved sequences would submerge the global organization. In any case, one could always regard analysis of the internal structure of each cyclically recurring sequence as a supplement, at a lower level of abstraction, to the analysis of the global plot structure. (Bremond, however, mixes the two.) Such an analysis of global plot structure, it must be emphasized, does not constitute a complete structural analysis of a narrative, but only of one of its component systems.

The notion of plot as a recurrent cycle of elementary sequences is implicit in Propp. Not, it should be noted, in his observation that some functions fall into groups; rather, in his conception of move, defined as 'any development proceeding from villainy (A) or a lack (a), through intermediary functions to marriage (W*), or to other functions employed as a denouement' (92), e.g. the function K.

Although Propp recognizes the existence of multi-move tales, it is not the case that, strictly speaking, the move is a cyclically recurrent unit. Propp, in fact, postulates the existence of two fundamentally different moves, based on the incompatibility, within a single move, of two pairs of functions, H-I (struggle-victory) and M-N (difficult task-resolution). Propp claims, however, that this observation does not contradict his earlier assertion that all fairy tales are completely uniform in their structure. His rationale is that in two-move tales the pair H-I always occurs in the first move and the pair M-N in the second. While one-move tales occur, with either H-I or M-N (or neither), Propp asserts that 'only a combination of the two moves produces an entirely complete tale' (103). The tale with two such moves is said to be canonical – the historical source of all the tales in his corpus (104).

It would be theoretically more satisfying (for reasons yet to be fully
articulated) if multi-move tales could be shown to involve the periodic recurrence of elementary sequences of functions with identical internal structure. One reason, already indicated, is that this would allow us to isolate a level of invariant gross structure, without becoming entangled in variable concrete detail.

Such a reorganization of Propp's analysis has been carried out by Greimas (1966), who develops a suggestion originally made by Lévi-Strauss (1960). Lévi-Strauss pointed out that Propp's 'fragile hope' for a morphological classification of tales collapses as soon as one recognizes that the two fundamental moves, one with H-I and the other with M-N, can be seen as variants of each other (139-40). Specifically, the function M (assignment of a difficult task) can be regarded as a 'transformation' of H (struggle); and N (resolution), a 'transformation' of I (victory). Greimas assimilates not only M-N, but also D-E (hero's interaction with the donor) to the H-I structure. To understand the reasoning behind such a reduction, we must first examine Propp's basis for differentiating these functions in the first place.

Despite Propp's attempt to establish a tale typology, the major thrust of his analytic approach focuses primarily on establishing similarities across tales, rather than on noting similarities among the functions constituting a single tale. In fact, Propp defines the 'function' so as to exclude in effect the recognition of identical groupings of functions within a given tale. As we noted earlier, a single function can subsume a range of different actions. But Propp also notes that the same action can have different 'meanings' (functional values) — that is, different ends (functions) can be reached by one and the same means, a phenomenon Propp terms 'assimilation of the means of fulfillment of functions' (66). In such circumstances, according to Propp, 'it is always possible to be governed by the principle of defining a function according to its consequences' (67).

This definitional criterion must not be confused with that of defining a function according to its 'significance for the course of the action' (21), though Propp himself never makes the distinction clear. This latter definition might be termed a concern for global consequence, and pertains to the distinction between function and non-function. An element is a function only if its removal or alteration has a consequence the failure to maintain the plot as a whole. The other definition, in terms of what may be termed local consequence, pertains to the identity of an element whose basic functional status is established. This notion of local consequence is correlated with the 'internal' sense of biological function.

Let us examine one example Propp gives of assimilation. Both the function D and the function M may involve the proposal of the same type of difficult task. But, Propp points out, the consequence of each is different (67). If receipt of a magical agent follows the solution of a task, then we
have a case of the donor testing the hero. If receipt of a bride and marriage follow, then we have M. This example, which is typical, indicates a seeming confusion on Propp’s part between local and global consequence. While in a sense receipt of a magical agent is the end of a sequence of functions involving the donor (D-E-F), in another sense F is only the means to an end. Marriage (W), on the other hand, can be the denouement of an entire tale (or of a move). This difficulty can be rectified if we assume that the consequence of M is, not marriage, but a more immediate function, such as Q (recognition of the hero), which can be regarded as a means to marriage or reward. Propp himself notes that the hero is sometimes recognized by his accomplishment of a difficult task (62). Another example of assimilation Propp cites involves dragon fighting. A princess may demand that the hero conquer the dragon if he wants to obtain her hand in marriage. Propp codes this as M, not H, since a marriage follows and, furthermore, ‘struggle has been defined ... as struggle with a villain, and the dragon in this instance is not the villain, but is introduced ad hoc ...’ (68).

Greimas in his analysis of Propp’s results explicitly rejects the differentiation of functions according to their consequences. That is, by abstracting from consequences, he is able to discern the recurrence of the same group of functions within a given tale. Greimas terms this elementary sequence the test. Each test consists of the same two pairs of functions, which Greimas designates A, ‘contract’ (the functional pair injunction-acceptance) and as F, ‘struggle’ (confrontation-success). Although Greimas states that Propp’s inventory of functions is redundant in that the functional pair he labels F corresponds to Propp’s D-E, H-I, and M-N, Greimas indirectly retains the differentiating aspects arising from the various consequences by giving each test a different identifying label: ‘qualifying’, ‘principal’, and ‘glorifying’. However, such differentiations are a necessary supplement to a reduction of plot sub-sequences to recurrent sames in order to account for the ‘progression’ aspect of plot (which should not, to repeat, be identified with chronology). Also, in the case of a cycle of recurrent sequences, we need to specify what contribution each sequence makes to the whole of which it is a part. Greimas sees such sequences of ‘tests’ as serving to effect the transformation of the content of the global initial situation of the narrative into that of the final situation.

Greimas’ conception of the elementary narrative sequence has been refined in his later writings (e.g. 1971), where it assumes the following form: Confrontation (of Subject and Anti-Subject)-Domination (‘victory’)-Transfer (of ‘object of value’). Greimas notes that the role of victor can alternate between Subject and Anti-Subject. This constitutes, in effect, removal of further redundancies in Propp’s inventory of functions that result from his failure to explicitly indicate the dramatis personae that are asso-
ciated with each function. For instance, Propp gives a special function, I, for the hero’s victory over the villain; but he codes the villain’s initial victory over the victim-hero as A.23

There is one issue that is raised by Lévi-Strauss’ original suggestion of a transformational relation between M-N and H-I that Greimas never does allude to. This concerns the direction of the transformational mapping. Why transform M into H, rather than vice versa? (Of course the question of directionality of mapping would not arise if both H and M were related to a hypothetical third element.) It would seem just as plausible to make M-N the basis of the elementary narrative sequence, which can constitute a minimal narrative and also cyclically recur in complex structures.

As a matter of fact, the Proppian pair M-N is at the basis of the cyclically recurrent elementary sequence postulated by Bremond (the matrix sequence, minus any enclaved sequences): Project (conception of task to be accomplished)-Execution-Completion (success/failure) Cf. these remarks of Bremond: ‘We define as voluntary agent (or accomplisher of a task) any person who, having conceived the project of modifying the existing state of things, proceeds to act to realize this alteration’ (176; cf. also 116).

Since Bremond’s approach, in the preceding discussion, has been implicitly considered in terms of a lack and its liquidation, we need to say something about the relation between Propp’s function ‘a’ and his function M. As we have already indicated, ‘lack’ refers to a person in a patient role, whereas undertaking a task pertains to a person as agent (though note that the agent need not be the same person who is patient of a lack). A lack may be said to provide structural motivation for undertaking a task. Furthermore, from the perspective of teleological, goal-directed behavior, a lack is equivalent to a ‘task to be accomplished’ (cf. Bremond, 70-71).

In parallel fashion, the act of villainy (Propp’s function A) should be regarded as the structural motivation for the struggle; it is the source of the conflict that leads to the confrontation. To capture this, the elementary sequence posited by Greimas, in which H-I is central, should be reformulated as follows (cf. Hendricks 1974: 117f): Conflict-Confrontation-Domination.

What the preceding remarks imply is that Propp’s function ‘a’ is not a mere variant of A, and that A is an integral part of the Hi-I move and ‘a’ an integral part of the M-N move. Propp, however, did not regard these functions in such an antithetical manner. His position is that ‘lack can be considered as the morphological equivalent of seizure [A] ...’ (34). For example, the abduction of a bride is an act that creates an insufficiency and provokes a quest; but the ‘lack’ of a bride may provoke a quest, with no preceding act creating this lack. Propp states that ‘In the first instance, a lack is created from without; in the second, it is realized from within’ (35). Furthermore,
Propp notes that a move with M-N can begin with either A or 'a' (102). However, if there is no instance of the functional pair H-I, it is debatable whether the agent of a lack created 'from without' should be regarded as a 'villain' (cf. Propp, 68). Note that while Bremond postulates a role of 'degrader' and of 'obstructor', he does not recognize a role of 'villain' proper.

What is striking is that Bremond and Greimas, beginning from the same work, Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale*, and pursuing basically the same goal, a 'correction' and 'generalization' of Propp's methods and results, should arrive at such fundamentally different conceptions of the elementary narrative sequence, and hence, of the basic structure of plot. Tacitly present in the preceding discussion is a conviction that these two conceptions are not merely different models of the same objective phenomena, but that they reflect two intrinsically different types of narrative structure, which we propose to refer to as *dramatic structure* (Greimas) and *instrumental structure* (Bremond).

Propp himself had this essential insight. Consider his remarks: 'Tales with H-I and those with M-N are essentially tales of different formation ...' (102). However, this insight comes into conflict with one of the basic theses of Propp's work: 'All fairy tales are of one type in regard to their structure' (23). Propp tries to resolve the conflict by suggesting that 'It is quite possible that two types [H-I and M-N] existed historically, that each has its own history, and that in some remote epoch the two traditions met and merged into one formation' (103). However, the extent to which there has been a 'merger' is debatable. Propp himself says of the canonical two-move tale that 'It is easily separated into two parts' (103). It is much more likely that Propp's analytic practices merely submerge the distinction between dramatic and instrumental structure.

Although this distinction has not been recognized in recent structuralist studies of the narrative, one can find a few vague hints suggesting such a distinction in the literature of traditional *narrative theory* and *literary theory*. For example, Maxcy (1911) recognizes three different types of narrative structure, which he designates *chronicle*, *drama*, and *story*. In chronicle the climax is said to be found in the completion of the detailed action as a whole, and he cites biography as an example of this type of structure, where the narrative process reaches its final stasis with the death of the subject. (Bremond, as we have seen, shifts the perspective from such biological processes per se to the more temporary ones involving human purposive activity.) In drama, the idea of struggle is said to be fundamental. The struggle is between two conflicting forces, protagonist and antagonist, with the ultimate triumph of one over the other. Maxcy notes that the course of the dramatic struggle becomes apparent if we contrast the relative positions of the two conflicting forces at the beginning and at the close of the action. As
for the third type of structure, story, Maxcy's discussion is so vague — as is most of his discussion, when compared with the relative explicitness of recent structuralist studies — that the nature of its distinction from 'drama' is unclear.  

Let us turn now to the thesis that Propp submerges the distinction between dramatic and instrumental structure. As a means to this end, we will correlate this distinction with the antonyms play and work, respectively, taking the former term in approximately the sense it has in Huizinga (1955).

To motivate this correlation, we will first consider the terms test and task, both of which Propp uses in a seemingly non-systematic way, whereas Greimas uses the former to characterize his elementary sequence, and Bremond the latter to characterize his. The typical dictionary definition of task is 'a piece of work assigned to or demanded of someone'; and work, in turn, is defined as 'purposeful activity; bodily or mental effort exerted to make or do something'. A test, on the other hand, implies a trial or examination. Greimas has also labeled his elementary sequence ordeal. Originally this referred to a method of trial in which the accused was exposed to physical dangers, which were supposed to be harmless to him if he were innocent. As Huizinga points out (81), the starting point of such ordeals must have been the contest, a social form of play.

'Playing together' has an essentially antithetical character (Huizinga, 47). A game or contest is played between two parties or teams. A task, on the other hand, is often a totally solitary activity; or, if it does involve other people, it is a matter of cooperation. It is true that in carrying out a task, one may encounter obstacles, which can be incarnated in human agents. But in such circumstances it is not the case that we have opposing parties, each contending for something to which each feels it has a right (cf. Huizinga, 90).

A task implies purposive activity. Play, in contrast, is superfluous. 'It is never imposed by physical necessity or moral duty. It is never a task' (8; emphasis added). The contest, like all forms of play, is largely devoid of purpose in that the outcome does not contribute to the necessary life-processes of the group (49). One participates in a contest to win, to show oneself to be superior — not to liquidate a lack.

But, Huizinga adds, something more than honor is typically associated with winning — there can be a prize; e.g. a King's daughter (50; cf. also 83). The word prize, Huizinga notes, is etymologically related to Latin pretium 'price', having shifted from the sphere of economics to that of play and competition. The reverse direction has marked the development of the word wage, which was originally identical with gage, in the sense of a symbol or challenge. 'We do not play for wages, we work for them' (51). We play for
prizes, which are awarded us.

The congruence between the notion of play and dramatic narrative structure (in which the agonistic struggle between hero and villain plays a central role), on the one hand; and work and instrumental narrative structure (which focuses on an agent’s undertaking a task) should be obvious. Let us turn now to exploring the ultimate basis for both types of structure in Propp’s analytic results.

Work and play elements are literally present in the species and varieties of several of the functions posited by Propp, including in particular H-I and M-N. What this means is that the relation between these pairs of functions is more complex than Lévi-Strauss or Greimas assumed. That is, the distinction between dramatic structure and instrumental structure is not reflected in Propp’s recognition of an incompatibility between the pairs H-I and M-N; rather, the individual functions themselves conceal the distinction. Strictly speaking, this is true only of M-N and D-E, for H-I is exclusively a matter of play.

It might be objected that Propp’s notion of struggle, which may result in the villain’s being killed by the hero, transcends play, the competitive contest. However, as Huizinga points out, ‘The mediaeval tournament was always regarded as a sham-fight, hence as play, but in its earliest forms it is reasonably certain that the joustings were held in deadly earnest and fought out to the death ...’ (89). Even war can be considered a game, and Huizinga devotes a chapter to this comparison. Note that one of the varieties of villainy that Propp recognizes is ‘the villain declares war’ (34).

Furthermore, Huizinga’s observation (19) that one of the important characteristics of play is its spatial separation from ordinary life – a closed space is marked off, either materially or ideally – may be related to the fact that the hero’s struggle with the villain takes place in ‘another’ or ‘different’ kingdom from the hero’s home (see Propp, 50). Finally, note that Propp includes among the varieties of H some that are literally and unquestionably a matter of play; e.g. ‘the hero and the villain engage in a competition;’ ‘they play cards’ (52).

Another clarification of the assertion that work and play elements are literally present in Propp’s functions is necessary in connection with the notion of ‘lack’. As Propp notes, the lack in the fairy tale may be far removed from the basic needs of everyday life, that is, be of a fantastic rather than practical nature; e.g. someone may lack a magic egg (35-36). However, a fantasized lack is still a lack, which may be liquidated by the successful completion of a task. In any case, Propp does note the existence of ‘rationalized’ forms of lack, such as ‘money, the means of existence, etc.’

Let us turn now to the examination of instances in which Propp’s functions D and M conflate the distinction between instrumental and dramatic
structure. Consider the specific varieties of the function D that Propp cites; one involves a witch giving a girl household chores to do (39); another involves a hostile creature who engages the hero in combat (42; cf. 51). Likewise, some varieties of M fall into the category of play; e.g. riddle guessing, tests of strength, adroitness, fortitude. Others, however, are clearly a matter of work – tasks of supply and manufacture, etc. (60-61).

The above considerations may in themselves seem an inadequate basis for claiming that Propp conflated tests and tasks. However, two additional criteria can be brought to bear on the differentiation of the two. One is a revision of Propp’s criterion of defining a function by its consequence in cases of assimilation. Consider Propp’s discussion of the fact that tasks may be assimilated with dragon fighting (68). Propp states that if a marriage is the consequence, then we have an instance of M, not H. In a discussion of species of K, however, Propp notes that in one case, K4, the object of a quest is obtained as a direct result of the preceding actions (note that H precedes K, which precedes M); e.g. Ivan kills a dragon and later marries the princess whom he has freed (54). In other words, the consequence of both H and M can be the obtaining of a bride.

But other remarks of Propp’s indicate a difference in the two situations: ‘If marriage follows the fulfillment of a task, this means that the bride is earned …’ (67; emphasis added). With regard to a bride obtained by conquering the villain, in contrast, Propp indicates that the girl is a prize: ‘A great many tales end on the note of rescue from pursuit [after defeat of the villain]. The hero arrives home and then, if he has obtained a girl, marries her, etc. Nevertheless, this is far from always being the case. A tale may have another misfortune in store for the hero: a villain may appear once again, may seize whatever Ivan has obtained … In a word, an initial villainy is repeated …’ (58). This villainy, labeled by Propp VIIIb1s – the villainy function of the first move is number VIII – creates a new move, and is defined as ‘Ivan’s brothers steal his prize [i.e. his bride]’ (59; emphasis added). Instances of M and H can therefore be distinguished by attending to the relation between marriage and the preceding action, that is, noting whether the bride is earned or is awarded to the hero.

The second, more important, criterion for differentiating test from task pertains to the number of individuals involved. A task is undertaken by one person, but a test, a contest, necessarily involves at least two people. Propp does not explicitly provide this information in his structural coding, for he regards it as an instance of non-functional trebling. But, as Bremond points out (in connection with a different argument), Propp confounds two different phenomena under the rubric of ‘trebling’ (22f). Sometimes it is a matter of the repetition of the same series of functions, creating an effect of crescendo; e.g. a series of three progressively difficult tasks are imposed on
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the hero. At other times, there is an opposition between the last series and the first two; e.g. a king initiates a competition among three young men who are vying for the hand of his daughter; the first two fail and the hero succeeds. In the latter case we clearly have a contest between opponents. This differs from a 'struggle', Propp's function H, only in that the opponents do not directly confront each other — the confrontation is 'mediated' by a task (which may implicate a third person).

Note that this implies that dramatic structure can also contain elements of instrumental structure, just as any narrative can contain elements of description and exposition. However, the reverse does not seem to hold — that is, a narrative that essentially has an instrumental structure will not contain elements of dramatic structure.

Our discussion of work and play elements in Propp's work requires one final clarification. There is a sense in which all narratives, like all literature, can be regarded as play — esthetic theories have echoed Huizinga's characterization of play as 'disinterested' (9). But our perspective is what is narrated, not the narrating text in relation to the society or culture of which it is a part. Even from the perspective of the 'function' of narrative in culture, the work-play distinction is relevant. From Malinowski's (1954: 101) 'functionalist' (biological-external) perspective, myth 'is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active force' that contributes directly or indirectly to the satisfaction of basic human needs. Huizinga himself, while stressing that play does not serve biological needs, does not deny a serious cultural function to play. He recognizes that play is significant — there is something 'at play' which imparts meaning to the action (p. 1). Play is representative of something (13). In particular, the contest can serve to represent abstract ideas — cf. Huizinga's remark that 'All knowledge is polemical by nature, and polemics cannot be divorced from agonistics' (151). Malinowski, on the other hand, downplayed the role of symbolism in primitive myth, asserting that 'myth ... is not an idle rhapsody, not an aimless outpouring of vain imaginings, but a hard-working, ... cultural force' (97).

Leach has characterized Malinowski's approach as a concern for 'things done', as opposed to Lévi-Strauss' concern for 'things said' (1973: 37-38; cf. also Leach, 1971: 23). Leach's distinction can more appropriately be applied to the work of Greimas and Bremond. The latter's approach can be characterized as a sort of 'intratextual functionalism' — instrumental narrative structure portrays 'things done'.

This perhaps explains why Bremond, unlike Greimas, has never addressed himself to working out the precise relations between plot and thematic structure, despite his assertion that plot events may be only the 'pretext' of a narrative text (322). Furthermore, Bremond has criticized Greimas' efforts to relate plot and thematic structure as a reduction of the narrative to
something that is non-narrative, namely logical interaction among abstract, non-anthropomorphic atemporal concepts represented by the ‘polemic’ confrontation of anthropomorphic characters.26 (See Bremond’s paper, reprinted in Part I of his book, on Greimas’ constitutional model.)

Thematic analysis of instrumental narrative structure is not ruled out in principle, but it does seem to be the case that the relation between plot and theme is not as direct and clear-cut as in the case of dramatic structure, which lends itself more readily to thematic analysis. This is due to the fact that in dramatic structure the characters (with a few minor exceptions) are polarized. They can be grouped into one of two opposing sets (corresponding to the protagonist-antagonist distinction), each of which can be given thematic labels, such as nature-culture, life-death, etc. (cf. Hendricks, 1974: 107f; 178f).

Incidentally, the grouping of characters into opposing sets is an important aspect of the analysis of dramatic structure that is not incorporated into Greimas’ approach. His early (1966: 172ff) formulation of ‘actantial structure’, essentially a reorganization of the seven dramatis personae recognized by Propp, does not directly pair hero and villain, but hero and sought-for person (princess), with the villain (renamed ‘adversary’) relegated to a peripheral status (cf. Doležel, 1972: 63). In later work (1971) Greimas does refer to a confrontation between Subject and Anti-Subject, but there is no indication that these can represent groups of characters.

The difference between instrumental and dramatic structure is not restricted to the type of interrelation with thematic structure and the functional composition of the elementary narrative sequence. It extends also to the nature of the relations posited between the constituent functions — and, more importantly, to the very concept of function itself.

As we have seen, Bremond’s conception of the relation between the functions that constitute the elementary sequence is primarily one of teleological cause-effect — his orientation is toward the future, the possible. Greimas’ orientation, in contrast, is toward the past, the necessary, in that he posits a relation of logical implication among the functions that constitute his elementary sequence. Whereas confrontation chronologically precedes domination which precedes transfer, the ordering is reversed from a logical perspective: transfer presupposes or implies domination which presupposes confrontation.

Such logical implications are a matter of the semantic structure of words, not of contingent facts in the real world, of things-in-themselves. Bremond’s teleological cause-effect relations, on the other hand, do directly pertain to empirical behavior. Greimas’ conception thus gives due recognition to the semiolinguistic status of the narrative, as opposed to the traditional view of narrative as a mimesis, a re-presentation of external events. The analysis of
narrative structure requires a theory of language-internal sense relations — a simple semantic model based on sign-referent (words and things) is inadequate.

For an example that clearly indicates the difference between the two conceptions, consider the verb *divorce*, the dictionary definition of which is 'to dissolve legally a marriage between'. We may formalize this meaning in terms of the following 'quasi-implication' (see Bellert 1970):

\[(x, y) (x \text{ divorced } y \rightarrow x \text{ was married to } y)\]

This may be read as 'for any x and any y, if x divorced y, then x was married to y'. Given the antecedent, one can infer, by the rule of modens ponens, the consequent. Such implications are usually discussed in terms of inferences the hearer can make about the speaker's beliefs or attitudes (as is the case in Bellert); that is, if the speaker states that 'x divorced y', the hearer can infer that the speaker believes that x was previously married to y. As applied to narrative theory, such implications pertain to previously occurring narrative events. However, the consequent need not be physically present — given the antecedent, one can supply the consequent.

Note that this implicational relation is asymmetric or directional: given 'x married y', one cannot validly infer 'x divorced y'. This directionality, of a non-temporal nature, can thus account for the fact that plot progresses, that narrative action is oriented. Note further that the negative form of the antecedent, 'x did not divorce y', also has the same consequent. It might seem that Bremond's analytic approach is simply a different way of looking at the same facts and that one could regard marriage as a situation opening up two different possibilities, 'divorce' and 'divorce not actualized'. However, Bremond's means-end analysis is not really applicable in this situation: one does not typically get married as a means to the end of getting a divorce, though it is the case that, empirically speaking, a marriage may or may not end in divorce.

The differences between Greimas' and Bremond's conceptions extend also to the notion of function. As Greimas makes clear, at least in his later writings, he is using the term 'function' in basically its mathematico-logical sense, as opposed to the biological sense that Bremond adopts. The essence of dramatic structure is such that it requires a 'functional analysis' in a sense analogous to the functional calculus in logic; and insofar as dramatic structure is implicit in Propp's work, to that extent Propp's concept of function cannot be interpreted in an exclusively biological sense.

As a necessary preliminary to a discussion of these points, we must first examine, at a very elementary level, the mathematical and logical concept of function. A mathematical function is a relation between variable quantities; it correlates or associates an element from one set (called the 'argument' or independent variable) with an element from another set (called the
value' or dependent variable). For example, we can speak of the power function \( P[m] \), where 'm' is a parameter. If 'm' = 2, we have the second power, \( x^2 \) This can be written \( f(x) \), where 'x' is the argument; and the value, which can be symbolized 'y', is the number obtained from the operation of multiplying 'x' by itself once. If the value of 'x' is 3, then 'y' equals 9. The power function, with the parameter 2, thus relates the number 3 to the number 9; the number 4 to the number 16, and so on. We can write this in functional notation as \( P[2](9,3) \).

The notion of function is not restricted to quantifiable variables that vary continuously. The logical notion of function, which derives from mathematical usage, is a case in point. Here we can refer to 'propositional function'; an example would be '... is tall', which we can symbolize \( f(x) \). It correlates or associates a set of propositions to a set of argument-names (e.g. 'John', 'Bill', 'Joe'). That is, if the argument is 'John', the value of the propositional function is the proposition 'John is tall'. In the case of a two-place propositional function, such as '... loves ...', the function will relate two arguments, say 'John' and 'Mary', to the proposition 'John loves Mary'.

However, a logical function need not to be a propositional function. Rather than regarding 'love', say, as a function with two arguments or independent variables, yielding as value a proposition, we can regard 'love' as having one argument, say 'John', and yielding as value 'Mary'. That is, 'love' can be regarded as a function that relates John to Mary (rather than relating John and Mary to the proposition 'John loves Mary').

These two conceptions of function in language make a difference when it comes to 'descriptional functions' (see Reichenbach, 1966). Given a functional \( f(x,y) \), one can 'solve' it for, say, the argument 'x', obtaining \( x = f(y) \). (A mathematical formula such as \( d = 16t^2 \) is a descriptional function which results from solving the functional \( f(d,t) \) for \( d \).) This is referred to as a descriptional function since its special value, resulting from specialization of 'x' (i.e. substitution of a particular argument-name for the variable) is a description, not a proposition. If we conceive of functions as establishing n-adic relations between nouns, we obtain descriptional functions corresponding to the notional relations between noun and verb that Fillmore (1971) calls 'cases'. If we conceive of functions as relating nouns to propositions, we obtain descriptional functions equivalent to the traditionally recognized grammatical 'functions' such as subject (of a sentence), direct object, etc.

Consider: loves (John, Mary). If we solve this for 'John', we can obtain a description of John; such descriptions are formed by means of special grammatical devices, in English either by the derivational suffix -er (lover [of Mary]), or by use of a participial plus the word one (loving one). If we
obtain the converse function, 'Mary is loved by John' and solve for 'x', we obtain 'loved one'. Grammatical 'case' relations such as 'agent' and 'patient' are in effect generalizations from such descriptive functions.

If we take the propositional function to be 'loves Mary', with 'John' as the argument and the proposition 'John loves Mary' as the value and then solve for 'x' (that is, establish a dyadic relation, not between 'John' and 'Mary' but between 'John' and the entire proposition), we obtain the descriptive function 'subject (of the sentence)'; cf. the discussion of such functions in Chomsky, 1965: 68f.

Another type of descriptive function (which results from 'event-splitting') describes an event-argument, as opposed to a thing-argument (which results from 'thing-splitting'). In event-splitting, a proposition is divided into event and event property: g (v₁), where 'g' denotes the property and 'v₁' the event. However, the event is usually denoted, not by a proper name, but by a description using the function \([f(\pi)]^\star\), derived from the thing-argument and its predicate by means of such derivational suffixes as -ion. (For more discussion, see Reichenbach, 1966: 268f.) For example, we can 'transform' the enemy destroyed the city into destruction of the city by the enemy; or one of the arguments can be absorbed into the event-function, resulting in, say, destruction of the city.

It is obvious that what Propp terms a function is a descriptive function of the event-type, with one or, in some cases, both arguments absorbed (e.g. H, 'struggle'; E, 'the hero's reaction'). But this is basically a fact about the linguistic formulation Propp uses (deverbal nouns), and it also holds true for Bremond's narrative processes. One can, however, effect a mathematico-logical analysis of narrative materials that is not necessarily tied to the means-end analysis that Bremond, following Propp, stresses.

Note that Propp's functions can be seen as comparable to sentential 'functions' such as subject, object, etc. We interpret in this way Greimas' somewhat cryptic remark that 'the correlative analysis of narrative sequences of the tales belonging to the corpus allows Propp to establish the invariants called functions' (1971: 798). A correlative analysis entails setting up a proportion A: B: :C: D; that is, establishing an equivalence of the relation between A and B, on the one hand, and C and D on the other. As applied to narrative sequences, the letters correspond to narrative propositions (functions and associated dramatis personae). Consider the following set of events that Propp presents in order to illustrate his method of functional analysis (19):

A tsar gives an eagle to a hero. The eagle carries the hero away to another kingdom.
An old man gives Sucenko a horse. The horse carries Sucenko away to another kingdom.

Events A and C can be regarded as the same function (Receipt of a Magical Agent) because each is in the same relation to the following events B and D, respectively. The 'relation' between A and B on the one hand, and between C and D on the other is of an abstract, formal nature and can be given various semantic interpretations. In this particular case, one possible interpretation is that of means to an end.

Strictly speaking, this correlative analysis pertains, not to the establishment of functions as distinct from non-functions, but to Propp's criterion by which functions can be identified in terms of their (local) consequences in cases where there is assimilation of means. The redundancies in Propp's inventory of functions, which we noted earlier as resulting from utilization of this criterion, are thus comparable to the redundancies that would exist in a syntactic description of a sentence that utilized functional notions such as subject and object as if they were categorical elements, with no recognition of the fact that one and the same categorical element, noun phrase, could fulfill both functions without any change in its internal structure.

Incidentally, Propp also gives an alternative formulation to the criterion that a function can be defined according to its consequences, namely 'an action cannot be defined apart from its place in the course of narration' (21; cf. also 70). This remark has been interpreted by some commentators as indicating that Propp arrived at his inventory of functions by means of 'distributional analysis'. However, if this expression is taken in the sense it has in post-Bloomfieldian linguistics, then it represents a misinterpretation of Propp's methodology, for post-Bloomfieldian distributional analysis, in theory if not in practice, excluded functional notions (part-whole relations) in favor of part-part relations (cf. Haas, 1973: 75).

The most far-reaching implications of the introduction into narrative theory of the mathematico-logical notion of function arise from applying it to the internal structure of the narrative event (cf. Hendricks, 1973a). A 'narrative function' in this sense is an invariant relation between sets of characters, which can be established by means of the four-term proportion cited above, with A, B, C, D referring to characters. That is, rather than regarding a function as an invariant end with varying means of reaching it, we can regard it as an invariance in the relation between characters A and B on the one hand and C and D on the other.

While Propp himself emphasized the biological conception of function, not all of the functions he posited actually fit this teleological paradigm. Although N, 'the task is resolved', fits, the function H, 'the hero and the villain join in direct combat', does not. And we suggested earlier that the sequence A-H-I, like the sequence marriage-divorce, cannot be interpreted in
terms of means-end.

This is further evidence of the existence of two objectively different types of narrative structure which Propp's analysis conflates. Instrumental structure readily lends itself to analysis in biological terms; and dramatic structure, in logical terms. More exactly, dramatic structure requires analysis in terms of the modern functional calculus, for Bremond's analysis of instrumental structure is ultimately based on traditional Aristotelian logic, which divides a proposition into 'subject' and 'predicate' (property).

Bremond explicitly states that his conception of narrative role is by definition the attribution of a predicate-process to a subject-person (134). Recall that the initial state in instrumental structure consists of a stative verb (which might be what is traditionally called an adjective) predicated of a single anthropomorphic noun which is in the relation of patient to the verb.

The modern functional calculus is not restricted to dealing with properties, but can also handle relations between entities. Functional analysis, as adapted to linguistics, thus does not divide a sentence into subject and predicate (where the predicate includes any nouns associated with the verb as complements); rather, the verb is regarded as central, with the nouns as satellites. Functional analysis is necessary to capture the initial state of dramatic structure since it involves a relation between two persons.

One might object at this point that instrumental structure likewise involves relations (interactions) between characters. For instance, a proposition such as 'John lacks a bride', which can serve as the initial state of instrumental structure, may seem to refer to two persons. Two responses can be made to this. One, any function of the form x(A,B) can be interpreted as being of the form y(A); thus, in the proposition cited, the function can be taken to be 'lacks a bride'. Second, and more importantly, the complement to a verb such as lack cannot be said to establish a 'discourse referent' (in the sense of Karttunen, 1969). It must be regarded as a property.

However, the argument that character interaction plays a role in instrumental structure cannot be disposed of so easily. For instance, Bremond notes that 'Most often the narrative assigns an agent and a patient to each process ...' (310); and he recognizes a number of more specific variants of the agent and patient roles, such as obstructor, degrader, etc., all of which seem to involve 'interaction' of characters. These roles, however, pertain largely to enclaved sequences, not to the basic (matrix) sequence, which focuses on one agent's undertaking a task.

The 'interaction' of characters that Bremond's model accounts for is simply a somewhat more elaborate version of what von Wright (1966) indicates as a possible extension of his 'logic of action'. Von Wright's basic
model deals only with the presence of one agent (who may be the patient of a change); but he states that his approach may be generalized to cases where there are two or more persons, in which case it becomes a theory of the interaction of persons. Von Wright means by this, however, only situations in which person A changes one state and lets B change another, or prevents B from changing it (127).

Von Wright's logic of action is comparable to Bremond's so-called 'logic of narrative' only in that both restrict themselves to instrumental behavior, which brings about a change in the state of the world. Whereas Bremond uses the term 'logic' in a non-technical sense, von Wright's approach is in fact 'logical' in a technical sense. He utilizes the notational conventions and inferential rules of the propositional calculus.

The nature of character interaction in dramatic structure is such that each 'side' has an interest that conflicts with that of the other side. This is reflected in the fact that the verb struggle, which is central to dramatic structure, is a 'reciprocal' verb; that is, the hero and the villain struggle with each other equals the hero struggles with the villain and the villain struggles with the hero. Consequently, each noun in the sentence must be analyzed as simultaneously fulfilling both the agent role and the patient role; cf. Chafe's (1971: 12f) analysis of the verb collide with.

The agent-patient distinction is in effect neutralized so that these terms are inadequate to indicate the narrative roles in dramatic structure, although they do suffice for instrumental structure. For dramatic structure, we need to replace these terms by protagonist and antagonist. Although these terms have a long tradition of use in literary theory of the narrative, their status as roles, each potentially borne by different characters within a given narrative, has not been explicitly recognized. The protagonist, for instance, is usually taken to be the main character of a narrative. 29

The best way to indicate that Bremond's treatment of character interaction does not capture the essence of dramatic structure is to examine his tactic when confronted with a narrative which exemplifies dramatic structure. In a nutshell, what Bremond does is divide dramatic struggle into two parallel sequences, each conforming to his model for the accomplishment of a task. Such an analysis, as we will presently show, destroys the dramatic structure. The rationale for Bremond's treatment is clearly revealed in his comments on Dundes' (1964b) analysis of children's games in terms of Proppian functions. 30

Incidentally, Dundes' article does not anticipate our discussion of the 'play' element of (or in) narrative. For one, his analyses of games are primarily in terms of the motifemic pair Lack/Lack Liquidated; and he does not point out a single instance of H-I in the games he discusses. Moreover, Dundes asserts that there is an important difference between the structure
of the folktale and the structure of a game: the former is 'unidimensional', whereas the latter is 'bidimensional'.\textsuperscript{31} That is, in the folktale either the hero's or the villain's actions are discussed at any one moment. In games, however, one finds a contrast: there are at least two sequences of actions going on \textit{simultaneously}. When A is playing against B, both A and B are operating at the same time, all the time' (277). Hence Dundes' structural representation of the game 'Hare and Hounds' presents two parallel sequences of the functions Lack-Interdiction-Violation-Consequence: one from the perspective of the hare, the other from the perspective of the hounds.

Bremond, in his commentary on Dundes' argument, accepts the unidimensional-bidimensional distinction; but he applies it, not to the characterization of tale and game structure respectively, but to that of the told story, on the one hand, and the narrative techniques that convey the story, on the other. He claims that it is the intrusion of the narrator's point of view that masks the essential bidimensionality of narrative structure (78).

As for Dundes' analysis of 'Hare and Hounds', Bremond argues that the functional pair Assignment of Task/Task Accomplished is also necessary — one plays to win, not to avoid losing (74). In the game each side has to accomplish a task in order to be victorious. More exactly, each side has two distinct tasks which must be simultaneously undertaken: an offensive one, designed to attain the goal which gives victory; and a defensive one of avoiding the errors which lead to defeat.

From our perspective the so-called 'bidimensionality' of narrative and game is a characteristic of dramatic (play) structure per se, reflecting the fact that it involves two persons (or groups) with opposed interests; and in the case of 'agonistic' conflict, reflecting the fact that the struggle is reciprocal. The notion of struggle, of a contest, is lost, however, by analyzing such a structure as two parallel sequences of instrumental behavior, even if they are posited as being simultaneous. And in the case of a contest in which each opponent takes turns rather than directly confronting each other, one ends up in effect with a unidimensional analysis. We can illustrate this point by examining Bremond's analysis of 'Phoebus and Boreas', from \textit{The Fables of La Fontaine}.\textsuperscript{32}

The fable may be summarized as follows. The sun (Phoebus) and the north wind (Boreas) observe a traveler dressed in a warm cloak, for it is a time of uncertain weather. The wind says to the sun, 'This man thinks himself impregnable ... but my force can prevail ... Do you fancy a contest [to see who can first unfasten the traveler's cloak]?' The sun agrees and lets the wind try first. The wind, 'with the wager to win', begins to blow. But the harder he blows, the tighter the traveler wraps his cloak about him. The wind finally gives up. Then the sun, taking his turn, begins to shine; and the warmth causes the traveler to shed 'a wrap too warm for the day'.
Bremond does not present a complete analysis of this fable. Rather, he discusses fragments of it in different parts of his book in order to illustrate various aspects of his theory and analytic technique. However, we can piece these together so as to reveal the main thrust of his conception of the fable’s structure. Bremond’s first reference to the fable is in connection with a discussion of the role of patient, which he assigns to the traveler. He codes the role of the traveler as follows (the non-italicized part is the object-language — events and situations in the fable — to which the italicized meta-language refers): ‘patient with a state A attributed to him (covered with a cloak); possible patient of a possible modification of this state (Boreas bets Phoebus that he can make the traveler shed his cloak); possible patient of an actualized process tending to modify this state (Boreas blows); patient maintained in his initial state by the incompleteness of the process tending to modify this state (Boreas fails and gives up’) (141). When Phoebus ‘takes his turn’ and wins the bet, Bremond codes the traveler’s role as: ‘patient attributed with a modified state non A (deprived of his cloak) resulting from the completion of the process tending to modify the initial state A.’

Bremond makes two other references to the fable in the short final chapter in which he proposes a more systematic coding in terms of narrative propositions. Bremond refers to the codings presented in the bulk of his book as ‘precodings’ utilizing natural language (309). The more ‘formalized’ language primarily utilizes grammatical terminology, with information about a narrative distributed in a complex, cumbersome tabular array. We will not reproduce this coding, which is said to constitute an advance over the precoding in that it effects the synthesis of the complementary participation of agent and patient in the same event (321).

One of the samples of this systematic coding which Bremond presents in the final chapter indicates the evolution of the interaction between Boreas and the traveler: initially Boreas is the agent and the traveler the patient of a process of degradation; and then the traveler is agent and Boreas patient of a process of protection which forms an obstacle to Boreas’ attempt to degrade the lot of the traveler (318).

The second reference to the fable occurs as illustration of a particular case of the causality relation between independent narrative propositions (as opposed to phases of a single narrative process), that of means-end. The interaction of Phoebus and the traveler is coded: Phoebus (agent) undertakes to modify the lot of a patient (traveler) and, in order to do this, undertakes to obtain his involuntary services, and in order to do this, undertakes to persuade him ..., and so on (317).

We can make the following specific remarks about Bremond’s analysis in order to reinforce the general remarks made earlier. In his coding Bremond totally neglects the dramatic interaction between Phoebus and Boreas.
Bremond is presumably misled by the fact — solely a matter of the superfical structure of the 'textual surface' — that Boreas and Phoebus do not directly struggle with each other. While each in turn undertakes a 'difficult task', the task is only a means to the end of winning the bet. The conflict resulting from the desire of each to win the bet is central to the structure of the story. And the wager is a matter of pure play — neither is motivated by any lack (of a cloak or whatever). Bremond's analysis, by splitting the dramatic interaction into two sequences of instrumental behavior, thus destroys the dramatic structure, which we may schematically represent as follows: Conflict (the wager, which each wants to win)-Confrontation (here 'mediated' by the traveler)-Domination (Phoebus shows himself superior to Boreas by winning the wager).

Furthermore, Bremond's failure to recognize the basic dramatic structure results in his distorting the instrumental structure which is a subordinate part of it. Bremond makes the traveler a voluntary obstructor to Boreas' attempted process of degradation of his lot, in that he clutches his cloak tighter and tighter as the wind blows harder and harder. However, the obstructing effect of this behavior is involuntary in that the traveler's primary intent is to keep warm from the cold blasts, not to prevent the wind from winning the bet by uncloaking him. Also at work here is a stratagem of the sun's for increasing his likelihood of winning the bet. Note the reference in the fable, when Boreas takes his turn, to 'the cloud [which] had made it cool', which we can link to the earlier lines in which the sun agrees to the wager proposed by the wind: 'The sun said, "I do ... Let us see which can first unfasten the mantle/Protecting the pedestrian./Begin: I shall hide; you uncloak him if you can."' By hiding behind a cloud, the sun reinforces the chill produced by the wind's own blasts. When the sun comes out of hiding to take his turn, his warmth genially persuades the traveler to cast off his too warm cloak.

The dramatic structure of the fable readily lends itself to a thematic interpretation in which the (personified) sun and wind stand for non-animate concepts. The wind represents brute force; cf. his remark: 'This man thinks himself impregnable ... but my force can prevail ...' The sun represents clemency; cf. the final line of the poem, which gives the moral: 'Clemency may be our best resource.' Incidentally, in the preface to his fables La Fontaine notes that a fable consists of two parts, which he terms 'body' (the story) and 'soul' (the moral). He says that he has dispensed with the moral 'only when I could not include it appropriately, or where the reader could supply it himself.' Note too that in this particular fable there is no 'mediation' in the Lévi-Straussian sense — that is, there is no dialectics in which the opposition between force and clemency is replaced by a third concept which combines the two polar extremes or represents a middle position.
There is simply the domination of one concept over the other.

The essentially dramatic structure of 'Phoebus and Boreas' becomes clear if it is compared with our analysis of *The Little Mouse Who Tarried*, which has a purely instrumental structure. In that narrative there is no interaction of protagonist and antagonist, no contest or struggle of competing forces.

There is no doubt that Bremond's approach provides a firm basis for a relatively insightful analysis of instrumental narrative structure. Bremond deserves credit as the main architect of a theory of instrumental narrative structure, a type of narrative structure that has been more or less neglected in both traditional literary theory and in recent structuralist studies. Bremond has also significantly elaborated an apparatus for dealing with the 'inner lives' of fictional characters; future researchers will, however, have to not only refine it but also properly integrate its output into structural representations of narrative. But the principal task for future researchers should be further refinement of the distinction, only sketched here, between dramatic and instrumental narrative structure.

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NOTES

2. It must be noted, however, that Lévi-Strauss has had impact on some of the work that modifies Propp, particularly through his (1960) critique of Propp, undoubtedly one of the major factors that led to the strong interest in Propp among certain French scholars.
3. The following discussion of biological function draws primarily upon Greenberg, 1957 and Braithwaite, 1953.
4. We are depending upon the summary and quotations from *Les fabliaux* provided in Bremond's article 'Joseph Bédièr, Precursor of the Structural Analysis of Narratives', reprinted in Part I of his book. Further aspects of Bédièr's work, as discussed by Bremond, contain implications for plot analysis not touched on by Propp that we will consider below.
5. The literary 'organic' view which we refer to here must not be confused with that of New Criticism, which is defined in terms of the entire verbal texture of a work — a view which denies not only the possibility of style analysis but also the isolability of a plot structure from the actual language of a text, a basic assumption of all structuralist approaches to narrative analysis.
6. Propp's position that no function excludes another and that the order of the functions is always identical has the net effect of undercutting his putative advance over Bédièr's postulation of omega as the essence of a tale. Propp's position results in the entire series of functions constituting the actual basic unit of the plot. As Bremond observes (26), the parts are sacrificed to the whole.
It should be noted that the problem of global coherence is solved in part by solution of the problem of omissibility of functions.

Yet another aspect, which we can only mention in passing, also pertains to objective alternatives, but on another level from that of different stories per se. 'Narrative possibilities' can include different genres, different narrative techniques. Some differences of genre result, at least in part, from different choices of events at certain restricted parts of the narrative, e.g. the ending (which may be happy or tragic). Burke notes that Othello had to kill Desdemona not only because of the 'logic of the fable' but also because of 'the formal requirements of tragedy' (253). Cf. Bremon (1973: 118f), who postulates a genre difference - between the 'moral' (fairy) tale and the 'tragic' tale - solely on the basis of a difference in outcome; e.g. whereas demeritorious behavior is always punished in the moral tale, it goes unpunished in the tragic 'anti-tale'. However, in at least one instance, the fairy tale T.451 in the Delarue and Tenèze collection Le conte populaire français, Bremond arbitrarily manipulates his analysis so as to make the story fit this mould; see p. 98, where Bremond claims that the tale has no character in the degrader role since no one is punished for a misdeed.

Rescher (1966: 218) has stressed the intimate interrelation of both these aspects, claiming that it is not feasible to keep the description of the what from description of the how. However, his frame of reference is the everyday language of human behavior, which is said to be permeated with coloration of intentionality. But one of the tasks of a structural study of plot is a separation of an objective series of events as a system independent from the actual language of the text, which intimately interwines aspects of plot, character, description, etc. Terms for these events may be drawn from everyday language but, like logical terms vis-à-vis natural language, they can be given a special, more restricted meaning.

Note that if we apply Propp's distinction between action and activity function at a lower level of abstraction than he does - that is, not at the level of gross plot architecture - we obtain results more or less comparable to those resulting from an application of J.L. Austin's distinction between locutionary act and illocutionary act; cf. Ohmann, 1973; Labov, 1972: 301f. Also, Stanislavsky's distinction between text and subtext seems approximately comparable to Austin's; see the discussion in Vygotsky, 1962: 149-50.

In his concern for the 'mediating process', the means of the transition from an initial state to a final state, Bremond has claimed a similarity to the work of the Marandas (1971). But, Bremond (1970: 248) notes, whereas the Marandas resorted to differences in the outcomes of mediating processes to construct a typology of narratives, leaving the mediating process itself undifferentiated, he attends to the analysis of the mediating process itself; the successive differentiation of it can play an important taxonomic role. However, the Marandas use the term 'mediating process' in a completely different way than Bremond. Their approach is implicitly formulated in terms of dramatic structure, not instrumental structure.

Another aspect of the 'loss of information' to which Bremond refers pertains to the fact that plot structure is only one aspect of a text - and, in Bremond's words, may in fact be only the 'pretext' of the text (322). We will return to this point later.

We touch here on a matter that cannot apparently be easily handled by purely formal analysis, but which seems to require appeal to 'functional' factors external to the text that have an effect on the narrative structure itself; cf. Labov and Waletzky, 1967: 34; van Dijk,1974: 39f.

The minute detail Bremondian analysis allows is obscured somewhat by the abbre-
viatory device we utilized, namely, noting the recurrence of essentially the same structural organization, repeated 'n' times. This remains only a notational device concerning the presentation of the analysis, not the analysis itself. This repetitive feature of the story is not comparable to the rhetorical device Propp terms 'trebling'.

17 Bremond's modification of Propp's approach in effect does deal with 'aims of personages' in that he structures the elementary sequence around goal-directed behavior; but such behavior can be treated objectively, without necessarily dealing, as Bremond does, with characters' subjective impressions of the goal and their reasons in terms of a classification of motives into ethical, hedonistic, and pragmatic (187-88).

18 Another example that Bremond discusses makes clear that this issue basically overlaps with what Bogatyrev and Jakobson (1929) refer to as the 'preventive censorship of the community' (for discussion, see Hendricks, 1974: 83f): namely, his reference to a story told by Plutarch in which a father gives his new wife to his son after learning that the son is secretly in love with her. Bremond notes that Racine was able to make an acceptable use of this story for a Christian culture by making the girl only the fiancee of the father (56-57).

19 Cf. Bremond's similar remarks in the introduction to Part II of his book (133f) in which he distinguishes between two levels of organization of the plot: (1) that of cultural routines and finalities that transcend the plot, and (2) conceptual necessities immanent to the development of roles. The first is said to give the particular meaning of each narrative, utilizing a procedure inspired by linguistics; the second establishes its general intelligibility — it is the object of a 'logic' of the narrative, which must necessarily precede its 'semiology'. Bremond is here using the term *semiology* apparently in a narrower sense than in his earlier writings. For a discussion of the immanent organization of plot as a matter of *semiology*, see Hendricks, 1974: 128f.

20 Strictly speaking, the structure is Task/Task Accomplished; see the discussion below.

21 Connection of narrative processes 'end-to-end' is an alternative to connection by means of enclaving. Bremond calls the result of both types of connection a 'complex sequence', but we are reserving this expression solely for connection by end-to-end concatenation.

22 The notion of transfer is a generalization of the notion of consequence discussed above, e.g. receipt of a magical agent.

23 Bremond indirectly touches on this point when he also criticizes Propp for defining functions according to their consequences (20f). But Bremond understands consequence in a sense different from Propp or Greimas; for them the consequence of H might be K, but Bremond interprets it as being I. Bremond's rejection of the criterion of consequence is related to his criticism, discussed earlier, that Propp fails to provide for 'pivot functions'. The net result, as we have seen, is a rejection of global consequence.

24 Cf. Wellek and Warren (1956: 207) who, while noting that plot is usually spoken of in terms of dramatic conflict, add that 'there are plots which it seems more rational to speak of in terms of a single line or direction, as plots of the chase or the pursuit ...'

25 In some instances, sequences of instrumental behavior may occur as 'enclaves' within dramatic elementary sequences. Greimas does not recognize the possibility of enclaves within his elementary sequence — which perhaps explains why Bremond criticizes Greimas' approach for not accounting for the variety of concrete actions in narrative (90).

26 See Burke (1961: 31f) for an argument that one can easily translate 'narrative style' into 'philosophic (logical) style'.


28 Except for a couple of exceptions, Propp's dramatis personae, e.g. donor, helper, etc., are equivalent to descriptional functions of the thing-type. The same is true of Bremond's roles, such as ameliorator, etc., which he recognizes as more specific variants of agent or patient. Bremond also uses the term 'role' to refer to the proposition
from which the descriptional function is derived; e.g., the ameliorator role is sometimes formulated as 'someone undertaking an enterprise of amelioration of the lot of another'.

Although this point cannot be elaborated on here, we should note that Propp's terms 'hero' and 'villain' are simply variants of 'protagonist' and 'antagonist'. Unlike the other dramatistic personae, they are not derived from verbs (cf. note 28).

Bremond's treatment of dramatic (play) structure antedates his commentary on Dundes. In an earlier article (1966) Bremond recognizes as one type of connection between elementary sequences — in addition to 'end-to-end' concatenation and 'enclaving' — what he terms 'joining', symbolized by the sign 'vs'. This type of connection is supposed to account for the fact that 'The same sequence of events cannot at the same time and with regard to the same agent be characterized as amelioration and degradation. This simultaneity becomes possible only if the event affects two agents at the same time who are animated by opposed interests: the degradation of the lot of one coincides with the amelioration of the lot of the other' (1966: 64). Note that this constitutes, in effect, a definition of dramatic structure. In the present work (132) Bremond retains the notion of joining, but he utilizes the sign '≈', which he has elsewhere defined as signifying that 'the same event fulfills simultaneously, in the view of a same participant ... two different functions' (1970: 250).

Another difference that Dundes posits is that, unlike the tale, the outcome of a game is contingent; that is, no one side is fated to win. Bremond rejects this difference (75-76); but we reject his rejection — for reasons put forth earlier in another context.

The English translation by Marianne Moore will be cited (New York: The Viking Press, 1954, pp. 120-21.)

It is typically the case in dramatic structure for the confrontation to be 'mediate' rather than 'immediate'; cf. Hendricks 1974: 192f. The writer should confess here that in the past he has erred in the opposite direction. The two narratives analyzed in Hendricks, 1974: Ch. VI, are implicitly assumed to exemplify dramatic structure, but in retrospect they seem to be exemplifications of instrumental structure.

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