ABSTRACT: Husserl’s notion of “sense” has often been interpreted through a Fregean lens. I will show that Husserl saw it as an acquaintance with the background or horizon of perceptual objects. He understands reason (Vernunft) as prescribing rules for performance with regard to perceptual objects. Thus Husserl’s view has a wider scope of experience than Kant’s sense of it as a pre-reflective acquaintance with one’s environment. After Ideas I Husserl develops these notions as part of his theory of the intersubjective world. Heidegger takes over the insights of Husserl and brings out the performative turn inherent in phenomenology by critiquing Husserl’s orientation to theoretical perceptual experience. The reference of performative expressions is not determined by the contents but by performance. What is disclosed in the phenomenological notion of sense is the background against which human existence is to be understood.

WITHIN THE RANGE of interpretations offered to Heidegger’s thought there are two prominent views that contradict each other. One is Dreyfus’s reading, which regards phenomenology as a critique of the mentalistic theory of intentionality. The other is Lafont’s reading, according to which Heidegger presupposes the view that intension determines extension. The difference between them can be clearly seen in their interpretation of the understanding [Verstehen] in Being and Time.¹ Dreyfus takes Heidegger’s view of understanding to involve the pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic coping that we share with other animals, but Lafont regards it as linguistic understanding of “something as something.”² Despite this difference, both take for granted the Fregean reading of Husserl.³

It remains an open question, however, whether Heidegger himself interprets Husserl in this way. In his Marburg lecture on Aristotle, for instance, Heidegger considers the phenomenological concept of corporeality to provide a decisive critique of the

Cartesian distinction between res cogitans and res extensa. It is well known that, in the early stages of his career, Heidegger was heavily influenced by the Husserlian notion of categorial intuitions. If we bear this point in mind along with Heidegger’s remarks on corporeality, we can assume that Heidegger did not see any unbridgeable gap between this view and Husserl’s later theory of embodied subjectivity.

I wish to propose a different interpretation of Husserl’s thought and his influence on Heidegger. The growth of his thought from the doctrine of categorial intuitions in Logical Investigations to the theory of embodied subjectivity and lifeworld in Ideas II is not a case of rupture but of continuity. I will first focus on Husserl’s notion of “sense” (Sinn) in relation to his notions of “reason” (Vernunft) and “appresentation” (Appräsentation). Husserl developed this point in his lectures on intersubjectivity, and Heidegger used it in his lecture “History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena.” Through consideration of appresentation, we can see that what Husserl calls the “modes of appearance” (Erscheinungsweisen) of intended objects can be considered as an aspect of “sense” that is related to linguistic meaning, but not identical with it. The interpretation of “noemata” in relation to perceptual objects can be criticized by those who interpret this in a Fregean way, for it is difficult to see how aspects of objects can be regarded as sense, which must be abstract, ideal, and intersubjectively shared. I will show the kinds of ideality that the modes of appearance can have and argue that they are the background against which explicit linguistic expressions with indexical meaning or speech acts in practical contexts are to be interpreted.

CATEGORIAL INTUITIONS AND THE MEANING OF INDEXICAL EXPRESSIONS

It is widely accepted that both Frege and Husserl distinguished between sense and reference. In Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Ideas I, however, there is a notion of sense for which we cannot find any exact equivalent in Frege. Husserl calls this notion “fulfilling sense” (erfüllenden Sinn) in Logical Investigations and “noematic sense” in Ideas I. The close relationship between fulfilling sense and noema is confirmed through the footnote to §88 of Ideas I. According to the Fregean reading of noema, the “noematic sense” is taken as an abstract entity. This is to be distinguished from the real psychical processes of each individual. It is the entity through which an object is intended. Nevertheless, the following passage from the

Sixth Investigation suggests another reading and gives a hint how the “noematic sense” is to be interpreted:

One might therefore be tempted—I myself hesitated long on this point—to define meaning as this very “matter,” which would, however, have the inconvenience that the moment of assertion in, e.g., a predicative statement, would fall outside of that statement’s meaning.\(^\text{10}\)

By “matter” Husserl means the content or intension that determines the reference to a certain object, i.e., the Fregean concept of “sense.”\(^\text{11}\) Frege takes assertion into account and distinguishes the mere grasp of a thought from the recognition of its truth value and assertion. But his interest is restricted to the recognition of its truth value, which must be independent of the first-person perspective of a judging subject. In considering truth-value, one can ignore such things as the meaning of tense, for the truth-value of a proposition does not change with time.\(^\text{12}\)

Compared with Frege, Husserl deals with assertion together with other illocutionary acts like expectation, remembrance, and so on. This he labels act-quality in *Logical Investigations* and noetic character in Ideas I,\(^\text{13}\) for his study of intentionality is oriented to the performance involved in perception.\(^\text{14}\) If I move, objects will show themselves from different perspectives. Together with the change of the perspectives, the illocutionary force of my propositional attitude will also change. Although Husserl articulates the concept of “kinaesthesia” first in the lecture *Thing and Space* in 1907, this concept is already implied in his notion of fulfilling in *Logical Investigations*.

I might, for instance, have an expectation that the backside of a cube is a square. If I move around it and find out that the side is *really* a square, then my expectation is fulfilled. In this case I can also utter: “The back side must be a square” or “This side is indeed a square.” It is important not to formalize these expressions as P because Husserl’s insight resides in the very fact that the illocutionary force of propositional attitudes towards perceptual objects can be understood by direct acquaintance with their perspective appearance, which he calls adumbration (*Abschattung*). The change of the illocutionary force from an expectation to an assertion is to be comprehended in combination with the change of the perspectives. Moreover, the change of the perspectives is recognized not through the expressions used for intentional matter like side, color, or square but through the change of meaning in the indexicals, modal verbs and tense of copula, that is, the fulfilling sense of categorial expressions.

As Husserl says, the perceptual experience contributes to the meaning of indexical expressions.\(^\text{15}\) This contribution must be distinguished from the real contents

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\(^{10}\)LI 2: 240.

\(^{11}\)LI 1: 201 and 2: 121–22.


\(^{13}\)Ideas I, p. 310.


\(^{15}\)LI 2: 196.
of perception such as sense qualities, shapes, and so on. These real contents can be perceived, even if perceptual experience is not articulated by any categorial acts. But if the real contents are integrated in the conceptually articulated perceptual experience, the same perceptual contents not only fulfill the meaning of expressions of the real contents intuitively but also serve as a foundation of categorial expressions and play a new role. Husserl writes:

In general we may say that the intuitive . . . fulfillment of categorial acts, is founded on acts of sense. Mere sense, however, never fulfils categorial acts, or intentions which include categorial forms: fulfillment lies rather, in every case, in a sensibility structured by categorial acts.\[^{16}\]

When the new acts of conjunction, of disjunction, of definite and indefinite individual apprehension (that something) of generalization, of straightforward, relational and connective knowledge, arise, we do not then have any sort of subjective experiences, nor just acts connected with the original ones. What we have are acts which, as we said, set up new objects, acts in which something appears as actual and self given, which was not given, and could not have been given, as what it now appears to be, in these foundational acts alone. On the other hand, the new objects are based on the older ones, they are related to what appears in the basic acts. Their manner of appearance [Erscheinungsweise] is essentially determined by this relation. We are here dealing with a sphere of objects, which can only show themselves in “in person” in such founded acts. We have the categorial element in intuition and knowledge, in them assertive thought, functioning expressively, finds fulfillment; the possibility of complete accord with such acts determines the truth, the rightness, of an assertion.\[^{17}\]

This “categorial element in intuition” or “categorial intuition” should not be taken as some kind of “magical” intuition of an intellectual sort but as a “sensibility structured by categorial acts” or as a role of the perceptual intuition within categorially structured space of reasons. We have to take into account the role of perceptual experience if a perceptual fulfilling (that is, a change of illocutionary force from an expectation to an assertion) takes place. This change cannot be grasped naturalistically through a causal explanation of brain processes but only through the justificatory role of perception, which can be understood only in view of an implicitly presupposed inference such as “Because this is a cube, the backside must be a square.” The probability of the backside’s being square and the actuality or truth of this side’s being a square cannot appear only through “foundational acts” or within perceptual experience without any conceptuality. The articulation of conceptual structure of perceptual objects “sets up new objects” or makes objects show in their new modes, even though they cannot lose the founding relationship with the original perceptual appearances.\[^{18}\]

\[^{16}\]LI 2: 186, my italics.
\[^{17}\]LI 2: 282–83, italics in original.
Some living beings without any conceptual ability can surely perceive surrounding objects from a certain perspective. Nevertheless, it is to be questioned whether they can modally differentiate the appearances of objects into present or past actualities as *reasons* for future appearances and into mere possibilities without any justificatory reason or the possibilities inferred from the present or past actualities. In his lectures during the 1910s Husserl calls the latter possibilities *motivated possibilities* and differentiates motivation as justificatory association from its naturalistic interpretation.\(^{19}\) In other words, there must be a *kind of conceptuality* also in the modally differentiated modes of appearances or in the contexts of appearance (*Erscheinungszusammenhänge*) of perceptual objects that indicate the corresponding contexts of motivations (*Motivationszusammenhänge*).\(^{20}\)

By my interpretation, it is these modally differentiated appearances of perceptual objects that Husserl has in mind when he describes *characters* of noematic correlates as ideal (*ideell*) in *Ideas I*. Smith and McIntyre interpret noetic and noematic characters, respectively, as “a real phase of the act’s noesis” and its “ideal correlate.”\(^{21}\) By contrast with this Fregean reading, I would like to suggest an interpretation of the correlation of noetic and noematic characters as the correlation between *categorically articulating intentionality* and the modally differentiated appearances of intended objects. Husserl writes on the noematic character in the following way:

That which is identical is at one time intended to “originarily,” at another time “memorially,” then “pictorially,” etc. In that connection, however, characteristics [*Charaktere*], found when one’s regard is directed to the noematic correlate and not to the mental process and its really inherent composition, are indicated in the “appearing tree as appearing.” Expressed, accordingly, are not “modes of consciousness” in the sense of noetic moments, but rather modes in which the object itself intended to and as intended to [als solches] is given. As characteristics belonging to what is, so to speak, “ideally inherent” [*ideellen*], they are themselves “ideal” [*ideell*] and not really inherent [*reell*].\(^{22}\)

The phrase “as characteristics belonging to what is ‘ideally inherent’” can be literally translated as “as characters on what is, so to speak, ‘ideal’” (*als Charaktere am sozusagen ‘Ideellen’*). Although it may sound awkward, it is, I think, a literal translation that is true to the meaning of the original text. “What is, so to speak, ideal” is not the “intensional entity” but the “new objects” or their “modes of appearance” set up by categorial acts or *noesis*, and these modes cannot appear to blind *aisthesis*.\(^{23}\)
As modal character of appearances, the actualities of the perceived front side or the possibilities of the unperceived backsides are ideal or conceptually structured. It is this noematic character through which Husserl also explains the problem of illusion:

Looking into the stereoscope, we say: this appearing pyramid is “nothing,” is mere “semblance.” What is appearing as appearing is obviously the subject of predication and we ascribe to it (which is a physical thing-noema but not a physical thing [ein Ding]) what we find present in it itself as a characteristic [Charakter]—precisely nullity.\(^{24}\)

A thing-noema can be, as mode of appearance, characterized as real or as semblance. Only in the case of noema characterized as real is there a corresponding physical thing, whereas in the case of noema characterized as nullity there is no physical object. The real-being of an object should be regarded as the mode of appearance of the object itself, but this mode is not given through perceptual contents alone, because the same perceptual contents leave room for several different interpretations. For instance, in the darkness, a figure with a certain perceptual content can look like both a human and a tree. Depending on the interpretations, the same perceptual content shows different possible contexts of appearances according to which a corresponding context of motivations will be formulated. If someone decides for one of the interpretations as real and considers the other as semblance, this decision cannot be made by means of the perceptual content alone but only together with the justificatory “force” (\(Kraft\)) of motivations.\(^{25}\)

Husserl considers these modes of appearances as the widest notion of sense,\(^{26}\) for it is these modes of appearance of intended objects to which indexical and modal expressions about perceptual objects such as “back,” “this,” “must be,” “is indeed” refer. The general meaning of indexical expressions, or in his words in the *Logical Investigations* “indicating meaning” (\(anzeigende\) Bedeutung) cannot determine their reference, but it is the direct acquaintance with the modes of appearance, or “indicated meaning” (\(angezeigte\) Bedeutung), that determines the reference.\(^{27}\) In *Ideas I* Husserl says that also a noema relates to an object through its sense.\(^{28}\) But this noematic relation to objects is enabled not through the intensional entity but through the direct intuitive relation of “the sensitivity structured by categorial acts” as an intuitive contribution to the indicated meaning of indexical expressions.\(^{29}\)

This widest notion of sense must be distinguished from the meaning of explicit linguistic expressions (for which Husserl’s *Ideas I* uses “meaning”) for two rea-

\(^{24}\) *Ideas I*, p. 257.

\(^{25}\) Cf. *Ideas I*, p. 250 and Hua XVI, p. 34.


\(^{28}\) *Ideas I*, p. 309.

sons: (1) the modes of appearance are not always accompanied by explicit verbal expressions,\textsuperscript{30} even though a perceiver is implicitly acquainted with modally differentiated appearances; (2) each mode of perspective appearance of objects implies a horizon of infinite possibilities of further appearances\textsuperscript{31} that cannot be exhausted by finite linguistic expressions. The widest notion of sense implies therefore the transcendental object X as the prescribed horizon of the ideal possibility of complete fulfilling. This fulfilling cannot be realized in concrete experience, but it still serves as a rule to which our intentional behaviors to perceptual objects must conform,\textsuperscript{32} so that they can be seen as rational. If someone asserts in a perceptual experience (such as “This is a cube”), that person presupposes a horizon of the infinite possibilities of the appearances of the cube, even though this presupposition remains an implicit acquaintance that can never be fully expressed in linguistic expressions. This presupposed implicit acquaintance with the infinite horizon of perceptual objects is reason (Vernunft) in the Kantian sense.\textsuperscript{33} The reason gives each intentional behavior to an identical perceptual object its “force” and prescribes the coherence (Einstimmigkeit)\textsuperscript{34} among these behaviors by means of positing\textsuperscript{35} the transcendental object X as the ideal possibility of its complete givenness. But the phenomenological notion of the reason covers a much wider area of experience than Kant’s notion, that is, a pre-conceptual, non-reflective acquaintance with the background. This notion of the reason must be distinguished from the conceptual ability of discursive concepts\textsuperscript{36}—that is, “understanding” (Verstand) in the Kantian sense—but it is not non-conceptual in the sense of “blind sensibility.” Rather, it works in perceptual experience as the basis of conceptuality, because it prescribes the implicit rule for the discursive conceptual ability. We will see below how this phenomenological notion of reason as the basis of conceptuality will function in the case of mutual understanding among individuals, and we will consider its hermeneutic transformation by Heidegger.

Smith and McIntyre are of the opinion that the meaning of indexical expressions is dependent on the contextual influence of physical circumstances that can be interpreted causally.\textsuperscript{37} But it must be now clarified how this external influence should be interpreted.

\textsuperscript{30}Ideas I, p. 294.
\textsuperscript{31}Ideas I, p. 357.
\textsuperscript{32}Ideas I, p. 341.
\textsuperscript{34}Ideas I, p. 332, translation modified.
\textsuperscript{35}Ideas I, p. 340: “positing of the reason” (Vernunftthesis), translation modified.
\textsuperscript{37}Smith and McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality, p. 216.
In order to investigate the Husserlian notion of sense further, the concept of subjectivity must be analyzed. Frege conceived subjectivity as the opposite of objectivity in the linguistic sense. Indeed, the sense of indexical expressions is not objective in the same sense as true mathematical propositions or true descriptions of physical structures. This kind of truth is in principle perspective-free, or in Husserl’s words, “truths in themselves,” whereas the truth of indexical expressions is dependent on a certain perspective. But it is still intersubjectively accessible as expressions from the second- or third-person perspective of an utterer. It is here important to distinguish between the perspective-free descriptions and the intersubjective accessibility of the third-person perspective, for the former lacks any kind of subjectivity and the latter is concerned with a subjective meaning of indexical expressions that has a certain conceptuality and is also referred to the subjectivity of the third person and that person’s surrounding world. What we need, therefore, is a notion of subjectivity that can be harmonized not with the perspective-free objectivity but with the inter-subjectivity of meaning.

For this purpose, the notion of perspective must be examined. Here I support the interpretation of noema by A. Gurwitsch as one of the possible aspects of the perceptual object. In my interpretation the noema is the basis of the non-Cartesian subjectivity, which I would like to call lifeworld subjectivity. This is to be distinguished from Cartesian subjectivity, for it includes spatiality within its scope. In the Cartesian definition of subjectivity as a sphere of incorrigibility, spatiality has been excluded from the scope of subjectivity, for the knowledge of spatial objects is always exposed to a possible doubt. Thus, inside the Cartesian tradition, space is reduced to the perspective-free structure of geometrical space. The Cartesian subject loses sight of the perspective space-structures such as right, left, up, down, near, far, although it incessantly makes use of them in everyday actions. This flaw of the Cartesian subjectivity is still not eliminated from contemporary discussion about qualia or mental events insofar as the ontological status of perspective directions is left unquestioned.

Berkeley famously criticized Lockean primary qualities on the ground that their phenomenal appearance is never without secondary qualities and therefore dependent on the first-person perspective. But he wrongly identified this dependence with the existence within the mind. But it is clear that the perspective appearance of spatial objects such as front, back, right or left, are not something mental, even though they are not part of the physical structure of objects, and their existence is dependent on a standpoint of a perceiver. Husserl writes:

38LI I: 223.
The adumbrating is a mental process [Erlebnis]. But a mental process is possible only as a mental process, and not as something spatial. However the adumbrated is of essential necessity possible only as something spatial, . . . and not possible as mental process.41

For Husserl, “what is ‘presented’, ‘adumbrated’ . . . belongs in the noema.”42 The noema is therefore an utterly “non-selfsufficient” object. “Its esse consists exclusively of its percipi—except that this proposition does not have a Berkeleyian sense because here the percipi does not include the esse as a real component [reelles Bestandstück].”43 In other words, the being of the spatial adumbration of perceived objects such as front, back, and so on are dependent on the point of view of the perceiver, but this spatial being must be distinguished from the non-spatial being of the perception as mental process.

Let me now try to clarify the significance of this insight for contemporary philosophy. Husserl’s concept of lifeworld subjectivity offers a new type of argument against physicalism. For instance, using the example of a cube with two separate observers, the physical structures of the cube and the observers’ bodies can be described without any perspective. In other words, the truth-value of these descriptions is independent of the factual situation of the perception, where the cube appears to the two observers from different perspectives. The truth-value of the physical descriptions of the cube and of the physical structures of their bodies is insensitive to the difference between the cube’s ways and modes of appearance, i.e., the perceptual truth that an identical side of the cube appears as a front side to one observer and as a backside to the other. The difference between these perspective ways of appearance cannot be explained through the underlying physical structure of the cube and the bodies, for this structure is perspective-free and remains the same. There is no physical difference on which the difference between two ways of appearance can supervene, for the truth-value of the propositions about their weight, size, molecular-structure, the electro-magnetic waves that stimulate the retinas and so on is independent of the difference among perceptual truths about various perspective appearances.

On the contrary, the difference between perspective appearances of perceptual objects as background cannot be ignored when we comprehend the meaning and illocutionary forces of expectations or assertions like “The backside must be a square” or “This side of the cube is really red.” The intentionality of our perceptual experience or speech acts is a kind of reality that cannot exist without the perspective appearance of surrounding objects. For example, if one of the observers makes a false assumption about the color of the backside of the cube, that observer will be pardoned because of the impossibility of looking at that side. This talk of the mistake committed by the person would not make any sense if objects were described only through physical terms whose truth-value is perspective-free. Therefore, we need to accept also a kind of reality that is neither physical nor mental, that is, neither the noema as modally differentiated perspective appearance of objects themselves [a kind of reality corresponding to the noema] nor the perspective appearance of

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41Ideas I, p. 88.
42Ideas I, p. 238.
43Ideas I, p. 241. Here I do not follow the reading of F. Kersten.
Indeed, Husserl asked in a manuscript on intersubjectivity how the objectivity of adumbration or appearances of things is to be construed and there he mentioned the notion of the objectivity of “between,” that is, the objectivity of what occurs between physical things and an intentional life. In the next section, we will examine this objectivity of the perspective appearance together with the notion of appresentation.

The recognition of the perspective appearance as a kind of objectivity is a decisive step that leads to a revolution in the field of subjectivity, which we can observe in *Ideas II*. If the front side of a cube, for instance, motivates me to assume that its backside must be a square, it is neither the physical structure of the cube nor its causal relation to the physical structure of my body, but the perspective appearance of the cube that motivates me. That “the front side is a square” is the reason why I make the assumption about the backside. In correlation to the mode of appearance of the surrounding world, the body of a person must be viewed not in respect to its physical structure but as a center of orientation in the person’s lifeworld. Husserl writes:

> It is evident what foundational sense there is to the relation between man as personal subject and the objects of his surrounding world versus the natural relation between the naturally understood man (as psychophysical reality) and other realities. “Stimuli” are said to be emitted especially by the physical objects of nature, and the sensitive nerves are said to be stimulated by physical excitations. But if we place ourselves on the terrain of the intentional relation between subject and Object, the relation between person and surrounding world, then the concept of stimulus acquires a fundamentally new sense. Instead of the causal relation between things and men as natural realities, there is substituted the relation of motivation between persons and things, and these things are not the things of exact natural science with the determinations which gives them only objective truth value but are the experienced things as such, intentional objects of personal consciousness.

It is the conceptual structure of perspective appearances of objects themselves that prescribes the scope of possible expectations about perceptual objects. Depending on the force of motivations or the reason of expectations, an expected aspect of a perceptual object appears in different modes. The backside of a cube appears, for instance, as a square in an almost necessary mode of being, to which the meaning of “must be” refers, whereas its color appears only in a possible mode of being, to which the meaning of “can be” refers. If the expectations are fulfilled, these beings of the cube appear in the mode of actuality, to which the meaning of “is indeed” refers.

Husserl describes his notion of sense in an article in the following way:

> It is the conceptual structure of perspective appearances of objects themselves that
prescribes the scope of possible expectations about perceptual objects. Depending
on the force of motivations or the reason of expectations, an expected aspect of a
perceptual object appears in different modes. The backside of a cube appears, for
instance, as a square in an almost necessary mode of being, to which the meaning
of “must be” refers, whereas its color appears only in a possible mode of being, to
which the meaning of “can be” refers. If the expectations are fulfilled, these beings
of the cube appear in the mode of actuality, to which the meaning of “is indeed”
refers.
In the most general sense, the noematic study describes the objects in the how of the modes of appearance. It investigates all the modes of appearance, without which what belongs to objects cannot appear, be perceived and therefore be intuited at all. . . . It studies altogether the changing noematic mode of appearance of the whole object as sense and its every intuitive component.48

It is unusual to investigate perspective appearances of objects and their modes in respect to sense. Nonetheless, the reason seems to be clear. Each perspective appearance of an object implies a horizon of its retained experience and further possible perception, and this is the background in implicit acquaintance with which the illocutionary force of propositional attitudes towards perceptual objects can be construed. Husserl could not (already in Logical Investigations) restrict his notion of sense to proposition or to its perspective-free truth-value, for illocutionary forces in perceptual experience are to be interpreted only against the background of the perspective dependent spatiotemporal structure of lifeworld.

APPRESENTATION AND INTERSUBJECTIVE ACCESSIBILITY OF PERSPECTIVE APPEARANCE

This view on intentionality and its background has an important effect on the conception of language. If we consider the linguistic expressions used in daily speech acts, we are describing neither the perspective-free physical structure of speakers’ bodies nor that of the expressions. When we grasp linguistic meaning, we behave not according to what Husserl calls the attitude of natural science but according to the personalistic attitude or the attitude of human science. In the latter attitude, a speech act is understood not in respect of its natural causality but with regard to the “because” of motivation and the corresponding perspective appearance of its environment.49 In this attitude the language is taken neither as vibrations of air for the physicists nor as processes of nerves for the physiologists but “my” words within “my” environment.50

One might object that, despite its spatiality, the lifeworld subjectivity is still solipsistic. The fulfilling sense as direct acquaintance with the perceptual appearance of perceptual objects seems to be limited to the accessibility of a first-person perspective. But if we hear indexical expressions of others, we can comprehend their meaning, even though, strictly speaking, nobody else can have the exact same access to the perspective appearance of the lifeworld of an utterer. If I hear someone say “The backside of this cube must be a square,” I do not have to observe directly the cube and person to grasp the meaning of “back.” The spatial relationship between the person and cube is implied in the expression, together with other directions, and also with the temporal structure of the retained past perception, the present perception, and the future oriented expectation. Put differently, indexical expressions of others can be appropriately interpreted only against the spatiotemporal background

50Hua XIII, p. 474.
of an utterer. If we comprehend indexical expressions of others, we are, so to say, put in their place through empathy (Einfühlung), as if we were in their position.

Husserl’s theory of empathy can be regarded as an interpretation of the subjunctive of first-person pronouns or the I-saying of others. It is not possible to have two direct acquaintances with an environment from different perspectives at the same time, but it is possible to comprehend the subjunctive of a first-person pronoun like “If I were there, I would see such and such.” In this comprehension of the subjunctive of the first-person pronoun or the I-saying of others, we are indirectly acquainted with the background of indexical expressions in analogy with the spatiotemporal structure of our own lifeworld. In other words, the empathy as the interpretation of the I-saying of other persons can be carried out by “inserting” the same system of appearance (Erscheinungssystem) as one’s own into that of other persons. Husserl calls this indirect acquaintance with the background of other persons as “appresence” (Appräsenz) in distinction from the primal presence (Urpräsenz) as direct acquaintance with one’s own lifeworld. He writes:

"My appearance belongs to me, his to him. Only in the manner of appresence can I have, co-given with his body, his appearances and his “here,” to which they are related."

Elsewhere in Ideas II Husserl calls the “rules of lived experiences” the “grammar” of “expressions of life of soul.” In other words, the reference to the system of appearance is incorporated in the grammar of indexical expressions, expressions of perspective directions or prepositions. The meaning of these expressions exists together with a whole system of appearance within which an intentional life of a subject of speech acts can be intersubjectively accessible. It would be, for instance, impossible to learn and master the usage of the verb “see” without learning at the same time the usage of the phrases like “in front of,” “near,” “far” or other words of directions that refer to the perspective appearance of surrounding objects.

If we connect the notion of appresence with Husserl’s analysis of illusion, we can see more clearly why Husserl had to develop this notion when he was developing the concept of lifeworld. Through this analysis we can also recognize why the modes of appearance as reference of indexical expressions, modal, tensed verbs or directional expressions must be distinguished from the non-conceptual direct

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51Hua XIV, p. 241.
52Ibid., p. 254.
53The appresence of the perspective of others must be distinguished from the appresence of unperceived aspects of objects (Gegenstandsappräsentation). Cf. Hua XIII, p. 226 and Ideas II, p. 177.
54Ideas II, p. 177.
55Ideas II, p. 178, my italics.
56Ideas II, p. 175, translation modified.
acquaintance with environment. Let us consider the same example of the illusion again: a perceiver mistakes a figure in the dark as a tree, but it is indeed a human. In this case the perceiver can assume in the following way: “If I could have seen it from that angle, I would have taken it not as a tree but as a human.” What appeared within her first person perspective is now characterized as semblance, but the human, whose way of appearance was not accessible from her first-person perspective, was really there. This mode of reality in the past tense must be comprehended from a possible perspective of someone who could have seen the figure from “that” angle. The mode of appearance of lifeworld is dependent on a certain perspective, but this mode must have its own objectivity in the sense of intersubjective accessibility, so that the perceiver, who made a mistake about the figure, is able to grasp the contrast between reality and semblance. If a living being is confined in the non-conceptual acquaintance with its own perspective and cannot have any indirect access to a possible but real perspective that is partly inferentially structured, then that living being is unable to understand the world’s independence of the being’s sometimes delusive experience.\footnote{It is Heidegger who productively construes the reality or the intersubjective world’s independence as “character of being.” Heidegger, \textit{Sein und Zeit}, 18. ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001), hereafter \textit{SZ}, p. 207. See Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserlian theory of illusion in his logic-lecture: \textit{Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit}, Gesamtausgabe vol. 21, ed. Walter Biemel (Frankfurt-a.-M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976) hereafter GA21, pp. 187–88. This is the reason why Heidegger regards animals as “world-poor” (\textit{weltarm}), that is, surrounding objects cannot appear to them with any character of being. See Heidegger, \textit{Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit}, Gesamtausgabe 29/30, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt-a.-M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), p. 450.}

Above we saw that the phenomenological notion of sense as acquaintance with the horizon can be interpreted as reason in the widely understood Kantian sense. In \textit{Ideas I} Husserl recognized that the phenomenology of illusion is necessary for the phenomenology of the true reality.\footnote{Ideas I, p. 364.} For it is indispensable to develop the intersubjective accessibility of the phenomenological notion of sense through the notion of appresence and empathy in order to grasp the intersubjective rationality of the intentional attitude to perceptual objects. Husserl writes:

\begin{quote}
[E]very person as such (essentially) has his surrounding world, first of all his subjective world of appearances and then, by means of a relation to a nexus of persons, at the same time a relation to the common Objective surrounding world, in reference to which the subjective surrounding world is mere appearance.\footnote{Ideas II, p. 213.}
\end{quote}

I have the “relation to a nexus of persons” because “in empathy [I] participate in the other’s positing.”\footnote{Ideas II, p. 177.} Although Husserl considers the empathy mainly in the case of the actually perceivable human body, there must be also the empathy with possible experiences of which there is no actual owner. For instance, if someone comprehends a statement: “The railway station is in front of the post office,” that person can roughly grasp the constellation of the buildings, even though she may have never
previously been in that location. In this case, she is “participating in the positing” of anonymous others.\textsuperscript{61} The phrase “in front of” is interpreted from a certain possible but real perspective from which the horizon of possible experiences of the buildings is prescribed. She must be indirectly and implicitly acquainted with these structures or the “system of appearance” in order to comprehend the sentence. Through such an indirect acquaintance with background, we can always understand more than what is literally said in the form of sentences. This fine-grained understanding of each situation as an intersubjectively-shared and implicit acquaintance cannot be reduced to the conceptual network of beliefs, for there are always infinite possibilities of appearance that cannot be exhausted by it. Thus this intersubjectively-shared implicit acquaintance with background as the phenomenological notion of sense or as the phenomenological notion of reason is the basis of the conceptuality of our everyday discourse.

THE PERFORMATIVE TURN IN PHENOMENOLOGY

On the basis of this interpretation, a new light can be shed on the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. Here I will concentrate on the interpretation of the character of meaningfulness (Charakter der Bedeutsamkeit) and the appresentation in early lectures, and suggest an interpretation that Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is the radicalization of the performance-oriented notion of sense, which Heidegger calls “performative sense” (Vollzugssinn).

In early Freiburg lectures Heidegger deals with the notion of sense in respect to three aspects, that is, content (Gehalt), reference (Bezug) and performance (Vollzug). In these lectures Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s doctrine that the contents of “objectifying acts” determine references and other intentional qualities are dependent on this referential function.\textsuperscript{62}

But exactly because the formal determination is entirely indifferent as to content, it is fatal for the referential- and performative-aspect of the phenomenon, because it prescribes, or at least contributes to prescribing, a theoretical referential meaning. It hides the performative [das Vollzugsmäßig[e]—which is possibly still more fatal—and turns one-sidedly to the content.\textsuperscript{63}

Although Heidegger stops using the term “performative sense” in his Marburg lectures, his interest in the performative continues to be one of the important parts of his notion of hermeneutic As. In his Logic-Lecture he writes:

\textsuperscript{61}It should be emphasized that Husserl uses the notion of “average-ness” (Durchschnittlichkeit) and “one” (Man) in the very similar context to that of Being and Time already in Ideas II. See Ideas II, p. 207 and p. 269.

\textsuperscript{62}LI 2, p. 167.

If I were to say as I am writing “This chalk is too hard”—or “too scratchy,” or whatever—I would be making a statement within a practical function, namely, that of writing. . . . [W]hen I make the statement, “This chalk is too scratchy,” I do not mean to determine the thing I have in my hand as something possessed of the property of grittiness or scratchiness. Rather, what I mean to say with my statement is that it is an obstacle to my writing. The statement is interpretatively related to my writing activity, my primary concern to write.64

Heidegger’s claim here can be interpreted in the following way. “This chalk is too hard” seems to have the same content as a statement “This chalk is hard [without any practical implication].” The difference between two statements seems to be explained through different intentional qualities or noetic characters, for example, one as a theoretical claim and the other as an utterance in irritation, which can be expressed by “too.” But the reference of the two statements is determined by the identical content. In this view, the matter of fact characterized by the value property such as “too hard” is taken as superficial compared with the more basic structure revealed in theoretical attitudes such as perception. For example, Husserl writes:

Thus, in the world of experience, nature is the lowest level, that which founds all others. The existent in its simple, experienceable properties as nature is the substrate which lies at the basis of all other modes of experience, of all evaluation and conduct. Nature is the invariable foundation for all the changing relativity of evaluative judgments which bear on it and for all the changes in its usefulness with regard to the various ends which are set in order to produce something different from naturally given “material.”65

Although Husserl develops the theory of lifeworld, he still holds that the perceptually given nature is the foundation of cultural world characterized by predicates like “useful.” In this point, Husserl undertakes a kind of argument that Heidegger criticizes as “deworling of worldhood of the ready-to-hand” (Entweltlichung der Weltmächtigkeit des Zuhandenen).66 The same kind of argument can also be made against Husserl’s notion of lifeworld. The perspective-free physical structure is the invariable foundation for its perspective appearance. If the foundational structure were essential for the notion of lifeworld, why would the perspective-free physical structure not be the foundational layer of the world? If the concept of lifeworld as a kind of reality is introduced especially for the sake of the intersubjective accessibility of intentional life, then the intersubjective accessibility of the practical life should be investigated with a view to the corresponding specific mode of appearance of surrounding objects. It is true that the structure of a perceptual object such as sense qualities or of aspects such as front, back, right and left remains invariable even though the object can be useful for one purpose and not for the other. But there can also be the context of appearance of practical objects against whose background only the corresponding practical life can be intersubjectively accessible.

65Husserl, Experience and Judgment, p. 54.
Although Heidegger does not provide any decisive reason why the analysis of lifeworld must start with practical objects (Zeug), we can find a hint from his analysis of guilt in *Being and Time*. That is, *Dasein* is a kind of life that is primarily able to choose. In order for this life to be guilty of its choice, it must be able to have access to other possibilities that it did not or could not choose. Practical objects are something that can be chosen by agents. If these objects have their own contextual structure within which they can appear as useful or not useful, then it is this very structure that can serve as the background of a choice. A mode of appearance (such as “being too heavy” as said of a hammer) can indicate a corresponding context of motivations or the “If-then” structure of practical deliberation that presupposes the acquaintance (Vertrautheit) with the context of “in order to” (Bewandtnis) among practical objects.

Heidegger’s notion of *understanding* is the pre-predicative acquaintance with the context of “in order to” with a view to the possibility of “I” as an agent, which Heidegger calls “being able.” In this context surrounding objects appear as relevant, meaningful, or significant (bedeutsam) for a future possibility toward which an agent strives. Above we saw that the Husserlian notion of sense must be fine-grained when compared to the meaning of explicit linguistic expressions. This is also true of the Heideggerian notion of understanding. What is implicitly understood in a statement like “The hammer is too heavy” is the whole background against which the statement can be properly interpreted as a speech in a practical situation. The primary function of a statement resides in the “making the context of ‘in order to’ manifest.” If the statement is considered as predication, the primary understanding will be restricted, for the fine-grained acquaintance with background cannot be exhausted by explicit concepts.

But the acquaintance with the structure of perceptual objects or the horizon of perceptual objects prescribed by Husserlian noema is not sufficient as the background of a choice and a practical deliberation. In order to carry out an action successfully, an agent must also be familiar with the qualitative distance (Ent-fernung) such as “too far,” “too near,” or “enough distance” and with the qualitative duration of time (Gespanntheit) like “enough time,” “too short,” or “too long,” which are understood in respect to the end to which an action is directed, and for which practical objects are relevant as means. Suppose that the too-heavy hammer is wrongly brought to the work place by an inexperienced trainee. The hammer appeared to him as appropriate for the task, but in reality he is “guilty” of this wrong choice. It is now not possible to explain the reality of the wrong choice by means of the underlying physical or perceptual structure of the hammer, for this is independent of the difference between the modes of appearance, that is, the difference between the appropriateness and the

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67SZ, p. 285.
68*Being and Time*, p. 359.
69*Being and Time*, p. 183.
70*Being and Time*, pp. 196–97.
71SZ, p. 105.
inappropriateness of the hammer. Because the wrongness of a choice or an agent’s being guilty is an intersubjectively accessible reality, the whole spatiotemporal structure of the practical context as the background of the choice must also exist in its own right. The practical truth of “being too heavy” of the hammer or “the being too far” of the storehouse are neither their physical structure, nor measurable distance between two physical things, nor the mental content of the agent. Rather, it is a mode of appearance of the hammer and the storehouse themselves (An-sich des Zuhandenen)\textsuperscript{73} that shows itself only within the whole structure of practical contexts. Our action is a kind of reality that can exist only within the practical spatiotemporal structure that is characterized as meaningful for future possibilities of agents.

It is this character of meaningfulness that Heidegger investigated intensively during his early Freiburg and Marburg lectures.\textsuperscript{74} He compares the correlation between the “dealing with” (Umgang mit) and the “dealt with” (Womit des Umgangs) with the Husserlian noesis-noema.\textsuperscript{75} He also recognized that the Husserl’s original achievement resides in his analysis of the noematic character.\textsuperscript{76} In distinction to Husserl, however, Heidegger’s interest is directed to always changing characteristics of practical or historical objects corresponding to the “performative characteristics” (Vollzugscharakteristik)\textsuperscript{77} of the practical life. Heidegger claims that the reference is determined not through the content, but is instead “had in the performance.”\textsuperscript{78} What we refer to in speech acts of everyday practical contexts is differently characterized modes of practical objects themselves depending on always changing situations:

That which life lives, what it goes toward in caring, what it waits for, what takes it by surprise in its caring, what ac-cedes [zu-fällt, happens as an accident/Zufall] to it—has the encounter-character [Begegnischarakter] of that which provokes the inclination, solicits it, claims it, or impedes it, and of something meaningful in one or the other way [so und so Bedeutsamen].\textsuperscript{79}

In order to grasp the reality of action in its own right, it is necessary to analyze the spatiotemporal structure as a reality within which practical objects show themselves in corresponding changing characters:

\textsuperscript{73}SZ, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{74}Especially Gesamtausgabe vols. 18, 20, 24, 58, 61, 63.
\textsuperscript{76}GA 17, p. 263.
The nearest world, the things encountered in it are not placed along the lines of a geometric-mathematical system of points but within environmental contexts of reference: on the table, by the door, behind the table, on the street, around the corner, by the bridge. These are very definite orientations which bear the character of meaningfulness purely environmentally, which means the where of the whereabouts of everyday concern.\footnote{Prolegomena, p. 229, my italics.}

Before all the scientific conceptualization of space (especially the mathematic conception enabled by the combination of algebra and geometry by Descartes), there is a pre-scientific spatial acquaintance. While Husserl is oriented to perceptual spatial structure of bodily acquaintance, Heidegger was interested in the practical-cultural spatial structures expressed by different meanings of prepositions. We have to be not only bodily but also culturally acquainted with the spatial ways of appearance of surrounding objects. This cultural acquaintance is implied, as subtle sense, in various meanings of prepositions\footnote{Cf. Heidegger, \textit{Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung}, Gesamtausgabe vol. 61, ed. Walter Bröcker and K. Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt-a.-M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), p. 85 and SZ, p. 103.} that must be correctly (e.g., not “at” but “on the street”) used in different situations. These ways of appearance are the reference to which the different meanings of prepositions in our speech acts are directed.

It is in the development of this intersubjective accessibility of the meaningful structure of the world where the Husserl’s notion of appresentation strongly influenced Heidegger. In early Freiburg lectures he uses the concept of meaningfulness together with the notion of “self-world” (Selbstwelt).\footnote{GA59, p. 81.} But in \textit{Prolegomena} he criticized this notion in favor of the “being-with.”\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Prolegomena}, p. 242; GA20, p. 333–34.} In this lecture he uses the concept of appresentation in the same context as Husserl, that is, in the context of the intersubjective accessibility of the appearance of environment from the perspective of an alter ego: The others can be encountered environmentally. The poorly cultivated field along which I am walking apprehends its owner or tenant. The sailboat at anchor appr\textemdash;ents someone in particular, the one who takes his trips in it. But this encounter has a different structure of appre\textemdash;resentation here. These others do not stand in the referential context of the environing world but are encountered in that with which they have to do, in the “with which” of their preoccupation (field, boat) as the ones who are preoccupied with it. They are encountered as they are in their being-in-the-world, not as chance occurrences but as the ones who till the field or sail the boat. They are there in their being-in-the-world, and insofar as they are there for me in this way, they are there with me, I myself who have this being of being-in-the-world. They are there with me in the one world.\footnote{Ibid., p. 240, my italics.}

As Husserl distinguishes between the appresentation of objects like their backside and the appresentation of the other intentional life, Heidegger differentiates here the appresentation of referential context from the appresentation of other agents. The life of other agents is not something that we can refer to like practical objects.
but exists as other “systems of appearance” or as their “being-in-the-world.” This system of appearance is characterized primarily through the meaningfulness for intersubjectively sharable ends of actions. Therefore it is not possible, even methodologically as Husserl did in the fifth meditation of *Cartesian Meditations*, to start the analysis of the lifeworld with the perceptual world of *solus ipse*. For in our everyday world we act according to certain social roles and this action is directed to common purposes shared or sharable with others (*Fürsorge*). Thus the character of the meaningfulness as the mode of appearance of surrounding objects must always imply the presence of actual or possible others.

Despite this critique of the solipsism, the influence of the notion of appresence on Heidegger can hardly be overestimated. Heidegger uses the concept, for instance, when he defines the notion of *discourse* in *Prolegomena*:

As self-articulation of in-being and being-with, speaking is being toward the world-discourse. It expresses itself first and foremost as a speaking concern for a world. This means that *discourse is discourse about something*, such that the *about-which* becomes manifest in the discourse. This becoming manifest of what is under discussion for all that does not need to become known expressly and thematically. Likewise, *discoursing about . . .* does not stand primarily in the service of an investigative knowledge. Rather, making manifest through discourse first and foremost has the sense of interpretive appresentation of the environment under concern; to begin with, it is not at all tailored to knowledge, research, theoretical propositions, and propositional contexts. . . . Discourse as a mode of being of Dasein qua being-with is essentially communication [*Mitteilung*], so that in every discourse that about which it is, is shared with the other through what is said, through the said as such. Communication accordingly means the enabling of the appropriation of that about which the discourse is. . . . Discourse as communication brings about an appropriation of the world in which one always already is in being with one another. The understanding of communication is the *participation* [*Teilnahme*] in *what is manifest*. All subsequent understanding and co-understanding [*Nach- und Mitverstehen*] is as being-with a taking part [*Teilnahme*].

It seems to be obvious that here Heidegger takes over the Husserlian theory of the intersubjective world. According to Husserl, the indexical and other similar expressions imply, as “grammar of the life of soul,” the spatiotemporal structure of lifeworld as background. To live in the intersubjective world means to “participate in” (*mitmachen*) the positing of others. In this participation, the perspective appearance of surrounding objects is “appresented” or “made manifest” as background of the indexical and other expressions of others. Therefore, Heidegger calls in this lecture the adverbs “here” and “there” as related to “I” and “you,” the “adverbs of Dasein” (*Daseinsadverbien*), that is, the adverbs of the life of the human soul.

In his lectures on intersubjectivity and *Ideas II*, Husserl deals with Dilthey’s notion of re-enactment (*Nachverstehen, Nach-erleben*) through his theory of empathy and

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85 *Prolegomena*, pp. 262–63, italics in original.
86 GA20 p. 349.
interprets the hermeneutic experience of tradition by means of the appresentation. The tradition is namely transmitted to us by the appresentation through empathy, that is, by our participation (Anteilnahme) in the experience of others: “We humans are together combined to the unity of a communicatively experiencing subjectivity.”

It is not surprising that the appresentation, that is, the intersubjective accessibility of the background as the widest notion of sense, plays a significant role in the transmission of the tradition. If we read and interpret historical texts, we have to be indirectly acquainted with their background, with the awareness that this background cannot be exhausted even by the whole of transmitted texts and historical evidences.

Despite his recognition of the importance of appresentation, Heidegger was not satisfied with Husserl’s orientation to the theoretical perception. Rather, he tries to develop the Husserlian notion in the direction of Diltheyan “expressions of life” (Lebensäußerungen) as cultural phenomenon. What Heidegger accentuates as elements of discourse is not the identical content of theoretical propositions but performatives such as “intonation, modulation, or tempo of discourse.” This is because what the performatives make manifest and communicate is the mood and the emotional acquaintance with always changing situations (Befindlichkeit). Our mood and emotion can change depending on whether we are confronted with possible consequences of our daily actions (Besorgbare) or with the possibility of our own death. When someone is afraid of a possible bad consequence of an action, a practical object that person is about to choose shows a significant character for another better possibility. If the individual is “anxious” about the possibility of death, all means to any ends of everyday actions will lose their daily meaningfulness, even though their perceptual qualities of surrounding objects remain the same. What is decisive for the being of human life is not the invariable perceptual content but the always changing scenes of human life that are disclosed through differently characterized emotions and moods. The silence in the scene of one’s own deathbed, for instance, is the performative par excellence that makes manifest the mood only in which the human existence itself can be appreciated.

The idea that guides the existential analytic is therefore not the idea of Husserlian regional ontology as the transcendental object X (what), but the idea of existence (who). It is the abyss (Abgrund) of the human existence in the existentiell scene of death that gives the primordiality to the existential interpretation. The abyss of the human existence can be considered as an idea as long as it is inexhaustible through the daily discourse carried out and interpreted from the perspective of any social roles that can be replaced by someone else. Although Heidegger uses the notion of appresentation, when he defines his notion of sense in Prolegomena, the Heideggerian notion of sense as “in-respect-of-which of the primary project” (Woraufhin des primären Entwurfs) makes not only the background of the theoretical attitude

88 Hua XIII, p. 469, my translation.
89 Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt, p. 255.
90 Prolegomena, p. 263 and Being and Time, p. 205.
91 Being and Time, pp. 71, 275, 358.
92 Prolegomena, p. 213.
93 SZ, p. 324.
but also all kinds of backgrounds of human existence intersubjectively accessible. These must include also the backgrounds against which our confrontation with the possibility of our own death or of the other’s death is to be understood. Thus the phenomenological notion of sense or the phenomenological notion of reason as acquaintance with the infinite horizon of objects is by Heidegger hermeneutically transformed into the inexhaustible abyss of the human existence that he calls transcendence.\textsuperscript{94}

CONCLUSION

The phenomenological notion of sense developed by Husserl and Heidegger should be taken as background of speech acts. It shares the same insight with the contemporary critique of the intensionalism that the reference cannot be determined by mental contents alone. Through the notion of fulfilling sense and appresentation, Husserl could take into account the external and social influence on meanings that determines the reference of indexicals and other expressions. For this purpose, the perspective ways of appearance of surrounding objects should be recognized as reality, which is to be distinguished from physical or mental phenomena. This insight results in the Husserlian theory of embodied subjectivity and lifeworld. Heidegger took over these basic insights of Husserl and developed them hermeneutically. The \textit{performative turn} was inherent in Husserl’s phenomenology, but not completed by him on account of his view that perceptual contents determine the reference and constitute the foundational layer of lifeworld. Heidegger radicalized the performative turn in phenomenology with his accentuation of the performative sense. What speech acts or their performative aspects refer to is always changing and emotionally characterized modes of appearance of surrounding objects themselves. These modes of appearance are \textit{intersubjectively accessible sense} as background of performatives. Although the pre-conceptual understanding of human existence as acquaintance with its background is distinguished from the conceptuality of discursive concepts, it is not non-conceptual in the sense that living beings without any conceptual ability are acquainted with their environment. Rather it is, in the widest sense of the term, conceptual as a phenomenological-hermeneutical re-interpretation of the Kantian reason. This conceptuality includes the possibility of intersubjective appreciation of the deathbed scene in a form of performatives such as silence.