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ARISTOTLE ON LAW AND MORAL EDUCATION

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How is it that social norms instil good character, rather than mere conformity? It might be thought that Aristotle would have an answer to this question. After all, for him virtue of character is far from the mechanical capacity to repeat actions of a certain kind, and reaches down to all of a person's internal motivations and impulses. Moreover, he emphasizes the social character of human beings and the importance of social and political environment for moral education. But the social and political sources of virtue seem to be in tension with its deep roots in a person's own motivations and understanding. How is it that outside influences—political arrangements, laws, conventions, and social pressures—can produce something as robustly internal as Aristotle's virtue of character? There is a significant gap between the ordinary capacities of laws and conventions, which provide external incentives for external behaviour, and the demands on motivation needed for full-blooded Aristotelian virtue.[1] To see Aristotle's answer to this question, we must look

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[1] The question about the gap between outside influences and authentic virtue as a general question in the philosophy of education is discussed by K. Kristjánsson, *Aristotle, Emotions, and Education* (Aldershot and Burlington, Vt., 2007). In the narrower context of Aristotle's political philosophy, the question of how laws can make people good—especially how coercive law can produce uncoerced authentic virtue—is neglected. R. P. George recognizes the difficulty and proposes that the function of law is to settle down appetites and so allow for further rational development (*Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality* (Oxford, 1993), 23–6). D. Cohen claims that Aristotle's citizens are in fact coerced by the magistrates (*Law, Violence and Community in Democratic Athens* (Cambridge, 1995), 41–4). By contrast, both F. Miller and (more extensively) J. Frank argue that Aristotelian citizens are fully autonomous 'laws unto themselves': F. Miller, 'Aristotle's Philosophy of Law',

more closely at moral habituation than is usual and consider different ways in which it may be the product of law.

1. Conditions for virtue, natural and cultivated

In *NE* 10. 9 Aristotle ends the *Nicomachean Ethics* and turns towards the *Politics* by raising a question about how people are made good.[2] He first suggests that only a few can become good at all, since most people follow their passions. Argument has no force with 'the many', who have not even a conception of the noble (*kalon*) and obey fear of punishment rather than shame (1179^{b}10–16). By contrast, those few with the capacities of free men (*ἐλευθέριοι*) and who have a good character by nature (*ἦθος εὐγενές*) can be positively affected by reason and argument (1179^{b}7–9). The use of *εὐγενές* and Aristotle's continued insistence in the chapter that 'the many' are intractable and respond only to fear of punishment (1179^{b}26–9; 1180^{a}4–5, 10–12) strongly suggest that he is here making a distinction in the basic natural capacities of human beings. Aristotle then distinguishes the natural sources of virtue—over which we have no power—and the role that habit and teaching play in the instillation of goodness. The learner of virtue must be prepared for reason and teaching by habits, as earth is prepared to receive seed (1179^{b}20–6). A person needs good habits for 'rejoicing well and hating well' (*τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν*, 1179^{b}25–6); and it is difficult to obtain the correct upbringing (*ὀρθὴ ἀγωγή*) without laws of a certain kind (1179^{b}31–5).

in Miller (ed.), *A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics* (Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, 6; Dordrecht, 2007), 79–110 at 84; J. Frank, *A Democracy of Distinction* [*Democracy*] (Chicago, 2005). Without an in-depth study of the various members of an Aristotelian political community, the various types of law, and the various ways in which laws may influence citizens in different constitutions, deviant as well as correct, this question cannot be properly settled. This paper is a first step towards such a study. I have discussed the parallel question for Plato in 'Plato on the Sovereignty of Law', in R. Balot (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Oxford, 2009), 367–81; see also J. Annas, 'Virtue and Law in Plato', in C. Bobonich (ed.), *Plato's* Laws*: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge, 2010), 71–91.

[2] As Cooper points out, part of Aristotle's point is to illustrate why legislative and political activity makes its practitioners good ('Political Community and the Highest Good', in J. G. Lennox and R. Bolton (eds.), *Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle: Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf* (Cambridge, 2010), 212–64). My interest is in the other end of the discussion: how exactly the laws and political structures make the citizens good.

Aristotle has clearly indicated that there is a condition of one's affect—what one loves (the noble or *kalon*), fears (disgrace), and hates—necessary for the reception of reason and argument and so for the full development of human virtue. This condition is on the one hand something natural in those who are well-born and found—without cultivation, it seems—in those who are truly fortunate (1179^{b}22–3). On the other hand, Aristotle indicates that the condition of proper affect is cultivated and shaped by habits, and that these are cultivated by good laws: not just any laws, but by those rare constitutions which design education and practices with an eye to virtue (1180^{a}24–9). So the chapter suggests that the natural inclination towards the *kalon* and against shame is necessary but not sufficient for the full development of reason and full virtue, unless one is 'truly fortunate'. Furthermore, most laws fail to cultivate these habits and inclinations properly.

While Aristotle concedes that parents can cultivate virtuous inclinations, he clearly envisages the habituation necessary for moral virtue as brought about, in the best case, by law and political arrangements (*NE* 1180^{a}14–32).[3] Political knowledge (*πολιτική*) and the true politician aim at making citizens good and capable of noble actions (*NE* 1099^{b}29–32; 1102^{a}7–10; *EE* 1234^{b}22–3; 1237^{a}2–3). Accordingly, legislators and writers of constitutions seek to make men good by forming habits in them (*NE* 1103^{b}3–6). But while habits are necessary for any regime, no matter what its goals or principles (*Pol*. 1310^{a}12–25), the good legislator seeks to make men good in the light of the correct end (*Pol*. 1333^{a}14–15; 1333^{a}37–^{b}4). Education and virtue are the criteria for a good constitution (*Pol*. 1283^{a}24–6); and so, although every legislator wants to form good habits, the correct way of forming habits 'makes the difference between a good political system and a bad one' (*NE* 1103^{a}31–^{b}6).

Just how rare are these good constitutions that properly instil habits? Aristotle praises Sparta and the Spartan regime twice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and once in the *Politics* for its provision of a public education in virtue (*NE* 1102^{a}8–11; 1180^{a}25–30; *Pol*.

[3] The dialectical consideration from 1180^{b}3–13 that parents may be superior to legislators in certain ways is clearly counterbalanced by Aristotle's subsequent insistence that the general knowledge implied by the legislative art is the best way to cultivate excellence (1180^{b}13–1181^{a}12), as Brown points out (W. D. Ross (trans.), *Aristotle:* The Nicomachean Ethics [*Ethics*], rev. with intro. and notes by L. Brown (Oxford, 2009), 267).

1337^a31–3).[4] None the less, in both the *Politics* and the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle takes pains to criticize the Spartan regime for its only partial grasp of virtue and its failure to educate properly (*EE* 8. 3; *Pol*. 2. 9; 7. 2; 7. 14–15; 8. 4). These points taken together suggest that the correct form of education—that is, one provided by a truly good political system directed at the proper end of human life—does not yet exist. It is of course possible that Aristotle changed his view of the Spartan regime in the interval between writing his ethical treatises, so that he means to endorse Spartan education or something like it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. None the less, I shall argue that the critique of Sparta and Spartan virtue in the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Politics* helps illuminate Aristotle's remarks on moral education and defective virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics*—and so there is good reason to take the critique of Sparta and the consequent non-existence of the correct form of political education as Aristotle's settled view. I do not claim to have definitively established Aristotle's consistency in this respect, but illumination across Aristotle's ethical treatises strikes me as good evidence of their consistency on these questions.

How do laws produce the condition of being well habituated for virtue, and why are those laws that produce it rare? What goes wrong in the bad constitutions and right in the good ones, so far as habit is concerned? The current literature on moral education in Aristotle leaves us ill equipped to answer these questions.[5] The political and legal sources of good habits are not only a valuable part of the picture in their own right, but are key to understanding what exactly the well-habituated condition is and how exactly it is necessary for virtue.

[4] The first passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* appears to praise Sparta yet more strongly, saying that the lawgivers of the Spartans (and Cretans) are examples of the true politician who 'wishes to make fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws'. For the claim that Sparta was unique in having education as a matter of political arrangement, see also Xen. *Lac*. 2. 1–2.

[5] C. D. C. Reeve, 'Aristotelian Education' ['Education'], in A. Rorty (ed.), *Philosophers on Education: Historical Perspectives* (London, 1998), 49–63, is an admirable exception to the general neglect of the political and legal sources of education for Aristotle. Recent work on the *Nicomachean Ethics* has begun to take into account the political focus of the work; see M. Schofield, 'Aristotle's Political Ethics', in R. Kraut (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's* Nicomachean Ethics [*Guide*] (Oxford, 2006), 305–22; G. Striker, 'Aristotle's Ethics as Political Science', in B. Reis (ed.), *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics* (Cambridge, 2006), 127–41.

2. Pleasure and the goals of habituation

In *NE* 10. 9 Aristotle describes the goal of proper habituation as 'enjoying and hating well' (*τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν*, 1179^{b}25–6) and so as training in proper pleasure and pain. The correct training in pleasure, too, is consistently associated with law and politics: 'The whole concern of virtue and politics', Aristotle says, 'is pleasure and pain' (1105^{a}11–13).[6] After claiming that proper pleasure and proper pain are the signs of virtue and vice, he explains:

> For virtue of character is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence one ought to have been brought up in a particular way straight from youth, as Plato says, so as both to enjoy and be pained by the things that one ought; this is the right education [*ἡ ὀρθὴ παιδεία*]. (*NE* 1104^{b}8–13)[7]

The right education involves being habituated in pleasure and pain; accordingly, the person philosophizing about politics has a special concern for it, since he is 'the architect of the end' (*τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων*, 1152^{b}1–3). The politician and legislator is concerned about habituation and education, then, because of pleasure and pain; since if these are badly ingrained, virtue is impossible. An (admittedly difficult) passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* describes political knowledge (*πολιτική*) as what harmonizes the real good with the apparent good; the means of doing this, Aristotle says, is through pleasure (*EE* 1236^{b}39–1237^{a}7).

It is widely agreed that the goal of habituation for Aristotle is to instil proper pleasures in virtuous action. As Burnyeat explains in a seminal paper, Aristotle's habits are more than mere repetition of correct behaviour.[8] 'We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts' (*NE* 1103^{a}35–^{b}2)—not mechanically, but by learning to enjoy these acts; and not only learning to enjoy them, but also learning to enjoy them in the right way. Burnyeat compares learning to be good to learning to ski;

[6] *περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ.*

[7] All translations from the *Nicomachean Ethics* are modified from Ross, *Ethics*.

[8] M. F. Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on Learning to be Good' ['Learning'], in A. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's* Ethics (Berkeley, 1980), 69–92. The notion that habits are mere behaviours is also criticized by N. Sherman, *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue* [*Fabric*] (Oxford, 1989), ch. 5.

as one continues to practise it, one comes to recognize the intrinsically worthwhile features of the activity, and so learns to enjoy it for the right reasons.[9]

So far, the standard view of moral education and the role of good habits established by Burnyeat seems sound. But the picture seems incomplete. What role do politics, laws, conventions, and outside incentives play in this process? Aristotle says that while every law code commands virtue and forbids vice, not every city succeeds in producing virtue, since not every state has the right education (*NE* 1130^{b}25–9). This means that good laws are not distinguished, as we might think, by the correctness of the actions they command. Rather, certain conditions must be in place in order for citizens to recognize and enjoy the intrinsically worthwhile features of right action. What are these conditions, and how might good laws provide them?

One way to approach the social, legal, and political conditions for moral development is through civic courage, the defective version of courage aimed at honour and rooted in shame that Aristotle describes in *NE* 3. 8. This condition is widely held in the literature to be an immature form of virtue, and so to illuminate certain features of moral development. Thus, Richardson Lear claims that civic courage is 'characteristic of a less mature stage of development, before the source of judgment has been internalized'.[10] And similarly Burnyeat claims that 'The only thing that is "second-best" about this form of courage is that the citizen-soldier takes his conception of what is noble from the laws and other people's expectations, rather than having his own internalized sense of the noble and the disgraceful.'[11] Although Burnyeat and Richardson Lear both agree that civic courage is immature and that its shortcoming is a failure to have 'internalized', they in fact hold different views about what internalizing is, and so about what stage has been reached. For Burnyeat, internalization takes place through teaching, e.g. by lectures on ethics, and takes place after habituation in proper pleasures. For him, the civically courageous person is well habituated and takes proper pleasure in the action, but acts none the less out of fear of disgrace. His courage is 'second-best' only because his understanding of why he does what he does is dependent

[9] Burnyeat, 'Learning', 76–7.

[10] G. Richardson Lear, *Happy Lives and the Highest Good* [*Happy Lives*] (Princeton, 2004), p. 154 n. 18.

[11] Burnyeat, 'Learning', 89 n. 3.

on others.[12] Accordingly, the civically courageous person is a well-habituated person who lacks full understanding of what he does.

Richardson Lear, while agreeing that the civically courageous person is immature, puts more emphasis on the moral learner's dependence on shame and external incentives. While for Burnyeat the difference between civic courage and real courage is the degree of understanding, for Richardson Lear it is a difference in the goal of the action: honour for civic courage and the virtuous act itself for real courage.[13] Habituation begins by incentivizing good behaviour with external incentives such as shame or disgrace; with time the learner recognizes the intrinsic good in that behaviour—what is noble or *kalon*—and so takes proper pleasure in the *kalon* in action. Thus the civically courageous person has not completed the habituation process, and does not yet take proper pleasure in the action. While 'internalizing' for Burnyeat involved the understanding given by rational argument and philosophy, for Richardson Lear it involves recognizing and so taking pleasure in virtuous action itself and what is noble or *kalon* in it.[14]

[12] Burnyeat, 'Learning', 78–9, 89 n. 3. Whiting similarly claims that the civically courageous only need philosophical instruction or reflection; she remarks that if one gave them the argument from *NE* 1. 5 that honour cannot be *eudaimonia*, they would recognize that virtue, not honour, is the correct end (J. Whiting, 'Self-Love and Authoritative Virtue: Prolegomenon to a Kantian Reading of *Eudemian Ethics* viii 3' ['Self-Love'], in S. Engstrom and J. Whiting (eds.), *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty* (Cambridge, 1996), 162–202 at 188–9).

[13] Richardson Lear, *Happy Lives*, 154–5. Cf. also S. Broadie and C. Rowe (trans. and comm.), *Aristotle:* Nicomachean Ethics [*Ethics*] (Oxford, 2002), 325, and the more ambiguous statements of C. C. W. Taylor (trans. and comm.), *Aristotle:* Nicomachean Ethics *Books II–IV* [*Books II–IV*] (Oxford, 2006), 186–7, and S. A. White, *Sovereign Virtue: Aristotle on the Relation between Happiness and Prosperity* [*Sovereign*] (Stanford, 1992), 269 n. 37.

[14] Neither Burnyeat nor Richardson Lear makes these details of their view or their disagreement explicit. But their different treatment of the role of shame in moral education is instructive. For Richardson Lear, shame seems connected with fear of the bad opinion of others, and so shows concern with honour and a dependence on external incentives (*Happy Lives*, 154 n. 18). By contrast, for Burnyeat, shame is 'internal' rather than 'consequential' and so is compatible with proper pleasures in the action. It is the 'semi-virtue of the learner' for Burnyeat, not because the learner still relies on external incentives, but because he still makes mistakes worthy of shame ('Learning', 78–9, 89 n. 13). Accordingly, for Burnyeat the civically courageous person's reliance on shame is compatible with correct habituation and reliance on proper pleasure. By contrast, for Richardson Lear shame is consequential rather than internal and so a sign of incomplete habituation, where the learner does not yet take proper pleasure in the action. Burnyeat is right about the function of shame in the best case (as I discuss below), but he is wrong about attributing *that* condition to the person with civic courage. Richardson Lear is right to attribute consequential con-

In this way, the view that civic courage is immature virtue takes two different forms. In the first (Burnyeat's) it is pre-philosophical virtue, grounded in good habits and proper pleasures. It is thus the goal that law ought to aim for when it aims at the instillation of proper pleasures—even if there are yet further goals beyond that. In the second (Richardson Lear's) it is a way station in the process of correct habituation, where one is trained in correct behaviour by external incentives in the form of honour and the threat of shame and disgrace, and comes at some point to recognize the intrinsic value—the *kalon* or noble—in the action itself.

I will argue that both of these views are false, and that civic courage is not an immature form of virtue at all but the product of a defective education. Against the first view, I will argue that acting for the sake of honour is not compatible with acting for the sake of the noble or *kalon* in action, and so is not compatible with choosing the action for its own sake. So civic courage cannot be the well-habituated condition that prepares the moral learner for instruction in reason and argument. Against the second view, I will argue that incentivizing correct behaviour with external goods is something that any law does, and so seems incompatible with Aristotle's insistence that good laws that educate in virtue are rare or non-existent. Nor is there any positive evidence that Aristotle viewed moral education this way. Most importantly, against both views, I argue that there is good reason to think that civic courage is a defective virtue similar to the one Aristotle attributes to the Spartans in the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Politics*. If so, civic courage can be seen as a product of a defective education similar to that which Aristotle attributes to the Spartans in *Politics* 7–8.

If all this is correct, then the question arises of how exactly proper pleasures are instilled or trained in non-defective cases. What is the correct law-ordained education that Aristotle calls for at various points in the *Nicomachean Ethics*? There is evidence that Aristotle's own positive musical education programme in *Politics* 7–8 is meant to meet just this need. This programme trains learners to

cern with honour to the person with civic courage, but wrong to think that this is a stage in proper moral education rather than the result of training in a false end. In the view I defend, shame is used ambiguously in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: it refers both to an undeveloped natural condition for virtue in 10. 9 and to a condition of internal pain at wrongdoing in a decent, well-habituated person in 4. 9. The person with civic courage has the natural condition, but it has been poorly developed and trained on external standards rather than internal ones.

take pleasure in actions themselves from the beginning, through their musical representations. Habituation in proper pleasures is best brought about by those rare or non-existent laws ordaining such an education. This, I will argue, is the best way to make sense of Aristotle's remarks on moral education, proper pleasure, and defective law-ordained virtue.

3. Civic courage and the external *kalon*

We begin, then, with the defective virtue of 'civic' or 'political' courage, which is most fully described in the *Nicomachean Ethics.*[15] After giving his account of the virtue of courage, Aristotle turns to the defective states of character that resemble true courage but fall short in one way or another. The first of these and the one that comes closest to real courage is political courage:

δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς· διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι . . . ὡμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό· χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι . . . καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες, τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. (*NE* 3. 8, $1116^{a}17$–$^{b}3$)

Citizens seem to face dangers because of the penalties and reproaches imposed by laws and conventions, and because of honours; and therefore those peoples seem to be bravest among whom cowards are held in dishonour and brave men in honour. . . . This kind of courage is most like that which we described earlier, because it is due to virtue; for it is due to shame and to desire for what is noble (since it is for honour) and avoidance of disgrace, which is ignoble.[16] One might rank in the same class even those who are compelled by their rulers; but they are inferior, inasmuch as they

[15] Cf. parallel discussions at *EE* $1229^{a}13$–14, 29–30; *MM* $1191^{a}5$–13.

[16] Ross translates *διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ)* 'for it is due to shame and desire for a noble object, i.e. honour' (Ross, *Ethics*); Rackham, 'desire for something noble' (H. Rackham (trans.), *Aristotle:* The Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1934)). It might be thought that the absence of the article with *kalon* supports Rackham and Ross, but the (truly) courageous person is also said to act 'for the sake of the *kalon*' without the article at $1115^{b}23$. I follow Broadie and Rowe, *Ethics*, with 'what is *kalon*', which seems to capture the ambiguity well. The explanation that he aims at honour immediately following this phrase supports the basic idea

act not from shame but from fear, and to avoid not what is disgraceful but what is painful; for their masters compel them . . . And those who give them their posts, and beat them if they retreat, do the same, and so do those who draw them up with trenches or something of the sort behind them; all of these apply compulsion. But one ought to be brave not under compulsion but because it is noble to be so.

Aristotle divides civic courage into two kinds: compelled courage, which he holds in low regard; and courage sought for the sake of the honours it brings, which he praises as coming close to true courage. Courage for the sake of honours is undertaken willingly, and could be ingrained in habits; it could, furthermore, be enjoyed by someone who desires and takes pleasure in honour. The possible honours and reproaches are set by both laws (setting punishments) and conventions (giving reproach).[17] But there is an ambiguity in the characterization of this quasi-courageous state as 'political' and as responsive to law. Is civic courage the state of being well habituated by law that Aristotle endorses elsewhere? If so, we have reached the limits of the capacity of law with habituated, willing virtue aimed at external incentives. Or—as I will argue—does Aristotle rather mean to suggest that civic courage is the result of defective laws or of a defective attitude to the laws, so that the right kind of laws could produce real courage? The answer to this question depends on what, exactly, Aristotle thinks is the defect of political courage compared with real courage.

According to Burnyeat's view, the civically courageous person is well habituated, but lacks full understanding of why he acts as he does. Civic courage differs from real courage in that the politically courageous rely on the opinions of others—those providing the honours for the good action, for instance—whereas the genuinely courageous understand for themselves why their action is good. The idea, then, is that political courage is immature or merely habituated courage that has not yet blossomed into real courage. On this view civic courage would be the best that law and habit can produce, and the rest of the work is done by dialectic or philosophy, such as we find in the *Nicomachean Ethics* itself.

behind Rackham and Ross regardless—honour is not the same thing as the *kalon*, but at best one thing that is *kalon*.

[17] Cf. Aristotle's remark that honours are assigned by legislators (*NE* 1109^{b}35) and the parallel discussion of defective forms of courage in the *Eudemian Ethics*: 'The courage of spirit is above all natural [μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ] . . . But political courage is on account of law [διὰ νόμον]' (*EE* 1229^{a}30).

This interpretation of civic courage might be thought to receive some support from the fact that the courage attributed to the best city in Plato's *Republic* is also called 'political' or 'civic' (429 B–430 C, 442 C).[18] That courage, which is said to consist in preserving the correct beliefs given by the lawgiver as to what is to be feared, is indeed immature virtue by both Platonic and Aristotelian standards. The conviction that the correct commands given by the laws are indeed correct may blossom into real understanding of what makes those laws correct.[19] In both cases the courageous condition is based on reason; but in the former it trusts and relies on the reason of the laws and lawgivers, whereas in the mature state of understanding one's courage is rooted in one's own reason.[20] Likewise, given that civic or political courage is attributed to the just city of the *Republic*, it is plausible to think that such courage is the best that law-instilled habits alone can produce; for the rest of courage, philosophical education is needed.

However, the Platonic parallel seems not to be a good one. Aristotle's civic courage mentions nothing about the correctness of the law or lawgiver, or about deference to the reason of others. Aristotle's civic courage is explicitly said to be rooted in the desire for honour, whereas the courage of the *Republic* has recently and convincingly been interpreted as rooted in a passive or dependent reason.[21] So the civic courage of the *Republic* seems not to be a fruit-

[18] The discussions are often taken to be parallel: cf. H. H. Joachim (comm.), *Aristotle:* The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. D. A. Rees (Oxford, 1951), 120; P. Shorey (ed. and trans.), *Plato:* Republic (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), ad loc. Grant also draws a contrast between the civic courage of the *Republic* and that of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, claiming that 'political' means 'not animal' in the *Republic*, and 'societal' in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (A. Grant (ed.), *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London, 1866), ad loc.). Stewart quotes this approvingly, but goes on to suggest a view close to mine (J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the* Nicomachean Ethics *of Aristotle* [*Notes*] (Oxford, 1892), ad loc.).

[19] *Rep.* 9, 590 C–D, describes moral education by means of law as 'fostering the best part [of the young] with our own' until they are equipped 'with a guardian and ruler of their own to take our place'.

[20] Although I agree with Wilberding's overall thesis (see next note), I think he is wrong to contend that *Rep.* 9, 590 C–D, refers only to manual labourers (J. Wilberding, 'Plato's Two Forms of Second-Best Morality' ['Two Forms'], *Philosophical Review*, 188 (2009), 351–74 at 355–6). Anyone without 'a republic [πολιτεία] established within himself' (590 E) is under the guidance of law; I take it that this means that only those with philosophic wisdom sufficient to make laws themselves are 'free' from the laws.

[21] I am convinced by Wilberding's argument in 'Two Forms' that the auxiliaries of the *Republic* are not ruled by spirit or *thumos* and the love of honour, but by rea-

ful parallel for the civic courage of the *Nicomachean Ethics*; at least, the parallel does not provide strong evidence that political courage in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, like the courage of the *Republic*, is the product of good habits, dependent on the good reasoning of others and so only lacking the full blossoming of reason.

One might also think that by calling this type of courage 'political' and connecting it with citizenship Aristotle means to suggest that this type of courage is the best that law-induced habits can do.[22] But while the *Republic*, again, refers to political courage in the context of the best city, and so implies that law is doing its best, it is not at all clear that this is the case in our passage. Aristotle uses 'political' (*πολιτικός*, *-ή*, *-όν*) as an adjective in the *Nicomachean Ethics* most commonly when he is describing relations among citizens, by which he means any members of a political community governed by law.[23] So in the clearest case he refers to 'political justice' (*τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον*) as the justice between free citizens under the law (*NE* 1134^{a}24–31).[24] Likewise, his discussion of 'political friendship' (*πολιτικὴ φιλία*) refers to relations between citizens in conventional Greek *poleis* of whatever kind (*NE* 1167^{b}2; 1163^{b}34; *EE* 1242^{a}1–12; see discussion at *NE* 8. 9–12; *EE* 7. 9–10). This is evident from his application of political friendship to a variety of constitutions; he ar-

son, albeit a weak and immature form of reason. The description of the auxiliaries' courage as resulting from their persuasion by the laws strikes me as further evidence that Wilberding is right.

[22] In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *ἀνδρεία πολιτική* is immediately glossed as something *οἱ πολῖται* have (1116^{a}17–18); and just below, Aristotle contrasts the defective virtue of professional soldiers with that of *τὰ πολιτικά*, citizen forces (1116^{b}15–19).

[23] Similarly, Cooper argues that the 'political' in 'political animal' means 'suited to life in a *polis*' (1097^{b}11; 1162^{a}18; 1169^{b}18; *EE* 1242^{a}23: J. M. Cooper, 'Political Animals and Civic Friendship', in G. Patzig (ed.), *Aristoteles' 'Politik'* (Göttingen, 1990), 221–41, repr. in Cooper, *Reason and Emotion* [*Reason*] (Princeton, 1999), 356–77). Contrast the noun *ἡ πολιτική*, which is a technical term for knowledge of the human good, especially in books 1 and 6: e.g. 1094^{a}27; 1094^{b}15; 1095^{b}5 (plural); 1141^{a}29; 1141^{b}23; 1152^{b}1; 1181^{a}12; cf. *EE* 1218^{a}34; 1218^{b}13; 1237^{a}3. Likewise, the noun *πολιτικός* usually means someone having this technical knowledge: 1102^{a}8, 18, 23; *EE* 1216^{a}25; contrast its use to describe a conventional politician at *NE* 1142^{a}2. At 1094^{b}11 Aristotle calls it *πολιτική τις*, suggesting there are other uses or understandings of political knowledge than his, and *EE* 1234^{b}22 may also refer to a conventional notion of *πολιτική*. The remaining use of *πολιτική* is as an adjective applied to life, as in 'the political life' (1095^{b}18–31), with cognate uses applying to a type or sphere of action (1177^{b}6–18; 1178^{a}25–8). I believe this use is ambiguous between conventional and technical senses in Aristotle. He does use *πολιτικὴ ἀρετή* in *Politics* 8 to mean the virtues of the citizen of the best city, especially military virtues (1340^{b}43–1341^{a}1, 1341^{a}7–8)

[24] See R. Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy* (Oxford, 2002), 125–32.

gues that political friendship in a city is tightly linked to its justice, and while accordingly there is little or no friendship in a tyranny, there is more in democracy (*NE* 8. 11). Likewise, his definition of political community (*ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία*) as a compact for the sake of advantage is surely meant to be general and not limited only to the best cities (*NE* 1160^{a}9–29).[25] So it seems reasonable to think that political or 'citizenly' courage is the sort of courage that someone in a conventional Greek city-state would have.[26] Accordingly, Aristotle contrasts it with the yet more inferior courage of professional soldiers, who flee when the going gets tough (1116^{b}15–19).[27]

If political courage is the courage typical of citizen-soldiers in conventional Greek city-states, then there is good reason to think that it is false that civic courage and real courage are both correctly oriented, but differ only in degree of understanding. This is because we know that Aristotle criticizes the ends towards which virtues and quasi-virtues are directed in conventional cities, and argues that true human excellence alone is the proper end of political life (*Pol*. 3. 9; 7. 1–3).[28] We know that the key to right politics is the cor-

[25] Compare *Pol*. 1. 2 and 3. 9. Cf. also 'political community' used conventionally at *NE* 1129^{b}19.

[26] This does not mean that political justice and political friendship are necessarily inferior to real justice and real friendship, as political courage is to real courage. In the former cases, the best cities are included in the set; so, for instance, political friendship is most prevalent in the best cities (*NE* 8. 11). By distinguishing political courage from real courage, Aristotle emphasizes that conventional cities get courage wrong, whereas in the discussions of friendship and justice he emphasizes what they get right. It is furthermore possible that real courage can be achieved outside a political context, for instance by a good man in a bad city.

[27] Stewart and Burnet both point out that the professional soldier was a feature of 4th-cent. Greek life, while the citizen-soldier was a 5th-cent. phenomenon (Stewart, *Notes*, ad loc.; J. Burnet (ed. and trans.), *The* Ethics *of Aristotle* (London, 1900), 146). For the legend of the 5th-cent. citizen-soldier, consider Herodotus' description of some Spartans sent to pay the penalty of death for Persian messengers murdered in Sparta. A Persian general advises them to befriend the Persian king instead and thereby acquire offices in a conquered Greece. The Spartans refuse, saying: 'You counsel us as one who has tried one condition but knows nothing of the other. You know what it is to be a slave, but you have no experience of freedom, to know whether it is sweet or not. If you had had such experience, you would bid us fight for it, not with spears only, but axes as well' (Hdt. 7. 135. 2–3, trans. D. Grene, *Herodotus:* The History (Chicago, 1988)). The freedom of Greek citizenship is appealed to as the explanation of their courage in facing death. See also his description of Leonidas' decision to face certain death at Thermopylae: 'He bade them [the allies] be off home, but for himself it would be dishonourable [*οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν*] to leave. If he stood his ground, he would leave a great name [*κλέος*] after him, and the prosperity [*eudaimonia*] of Sparta would not be blotted out' (Hdt. 7. 220).

[28] So the survey of different accounts of *eudaimonia* in *NE* 1. 4–5 ought also to

rect choice of the final end, in part because of the importance of designing public education towards that end (*NE* 1103^{a}31–^{b}6; *Pol.* 1333^{a}14–15, ^{a}37–^{b}4). So it would be strange if a person well habituated by the laws acted for the sake of honour, a rejected candidate for *eudaimonia* (*NE* 1. 4–5). Because the difference between the end of the best city and those of ordinary cities is most clearly manifested in education (*Pol.* 7. 15–17; cf. *NE* 1130^{b}26–9), there is furthermore good reason to suspect that real courage is the product of correct education, and civic courage the product of an inferior education.[29] In this way civic courage would be the product of a failure in law.

So there are general grounds for thinking that civic courage and real courage have different ends. But there are also substantive grounds within the discussion of virtue and civic courage in *NE* 2–3.

4. Political courage and the end of action

What is the difference between real courage and political courage? Aristotle says that political courage 'arises on account of virtue [δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται]', which he explains as meaning that it is motivated by shame and desire for what is noble (*kalon*),[30] since it is motivated by a desire for honour (1116^{a}27–9). Aristotle says repeatedly that real moral virtue is for the sake of the *kalon* or noble.[31] Acting for the

be taken as a survey of different views of the object of πολιτική or the political art (1095^{a}14–22), as Reeve suggests ('Education', 51–3). He points also to Aristotle's critique of the ultimate goals of democracy (*Pol.* 1310^{a}25–36; cf. 1317^{a}40–^{b}17) and oligarchy (*Pol.* 1280^{a}25–34; 1311^{a}9–10). One could add, from the perspective of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the remark that the good man and the good citizen of any given state may not be the same (1130^{b}26–9).

[29] For a similar reason, one can doubt that Plato, by calling the courage of the *Republic* political, meant to compare it to the courage of ordinary city-states. After all, he insists that only proper education can produce the courage of the auxiliaries (430 B–C) and it is clear that their mode of education is meant to be exceptional.

[30] *Kalon* is notoriously difficult to translate, since it has both aesthetic and moral aspects, meaning 'beautiful' as well as something like 'right' (as J. Owens argues it should be translated, in 'The KALON in Aristotelian Ethics', in D. O'Meara (ed.), *Studies in Aristotle* (Washington, 1981), 261–78). The translation currently preferred by scholars, 'fine', seems to me so far from its common English usage that it is not much more illuminating than leaving it untranslated. Accordingly, I use Ross's 'noble', not because it properly captures all of the senses of *kalon*, but because it seems to me the closest sense in common English to the sense of the Greek.

[31] The courageous man acts for the sake of or because of the *kalon*: *NE* 1115^{b}12–13, ^{b}21–4; 1116^{a}11, 15; 1116^{b}3, 31; 1117^{a}17, ^{b}9, ^{b}14; the temperate man: 1119^{b}16; the

sake of the *kalon* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is closely connected to two other aspects of virtuous action: its being for its own sake and its being pleasant.

Aristotle explains earlier in the discussion of moral virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that a virtuous action is not a product like a fine table or chair that can be evaluated independently of how it was made:

> Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues is not similar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they be in a certain condition, but with the acts in accordance with the virtues it is not the case that if they themselves are in a certain condition, they are done justly and temperately. Rather, the agent must be in a certain condition when he does them: first, if he has knowledge; secondly, if he chooses the acts, and chooses them for their own sake [*προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*], and thirdly if he acts having a secure and unchangeable condition. (*NE* 1105ᵃ26–33)

What does it mean to choose an action for its own sake? In book 6 Aristotle formulates the same idea as acting 'for the sake of the actions themselves' (*αὐτῶν ἕνεκεα τῶν πραττομένων*, 1144ᵃ19–20), and contrasts those who act because they have been ordered by the law or who act unwillingly (1144ᵃ15), as well as those who act in ignorance or 'on account of something else and not for the actions themselves [*δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά*]' (1144ᵃ16). The repeated claim that virtuous actions are sought for the sake of the *kalon* seems meant to be equivalent to the idea of acting for the sake of the acts themselves;[32] and while this is never stated in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, at the end of the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle speaks of *kalon* actions as existing for their own sake (*δι' αὐτὰ ὄντα*, 1248ᵇ20) and describes the fully virtuous man as acting for the sake of *kalon* actions themselves (1248ᵇ34–6; 1249ᵃ2–4).[33]

One connection between choosing an action for its own sake and

generous man: 1120ᵃ24; the magnificent man acts for the sake of the *kalon*, and 'this is common to all of virtue': 1122ᵇ6–7.

[32] This is suggested by both J. M. Cooper, 'Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value' ['Value'], in M. Frede and G. Striker (eds.), *Rationality in Greek Thought* (Oxford, 1996), 81–114, repr. in Cooper, *Reason*, 253–80 at 278–9 (all citations from the reprint), and T. H. Irwin, 'Aristotle's Conception of Morality' ['Morality'], *Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 1 (1985), 115–43 at 125–6, 135–6, as well as Richardson Lear, *Happy Lives*, 124–5. Irwin's point that the *kalon* is often contrasted with the necessary or expedient is particularly strong ('Morality', 125).

[33] The text in these passages is corrupt; see M. Woods (trans. and comm.), *Aris-*

choosing it for the sake of the *kalon* is that the pleasure of virtuous action seems to be especially connected with the *kalon*. Aristotle speaks of the virtuous man's pleasure in *kalon* actions early in the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these things are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and excellent actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in themselves. Their life, therefore, has no need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For besides what we have said, the man who does not enjoy noble actions is not good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in other cases. (*NE* 1099^{a}11–20)

The truly virtuous take pleasure in things that are truly pleasant, which are *kalon* actions and virtuous ones; the *kalon* is singled out as what the virtuous man loves and what delights him. Indeed, Aristotle says here that taking pleasure in the virtuous action is a necessary condition for being a virtuous person. He makes it clear further on that such pleasure is a sign of a virtue, i.e. a sign that one chooses the action for its own sake:

> We must take as a sign of states the pleasure or pain that supervenes on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys that very thing is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent. (*NE* 1104^{b}3–7)

But there are more reasons to connect the choice of something for its own sake with pleasure in the action. The self-indulgent man chooses certain (excessive) pleasures 'for their own sake and not for the sake of anything else' (δι' *αὑτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον*, 1150^{a}16–21). All of the prospective ends of life apart from wealth—honour, pleasure, and contemplation—are 'loved for themselves' (δι' *αὑτὰ ἀγαπᾶται*, 1096^{a}8); the three objects of choice, the noble or *kalon*, the pleasant, and the advantageous, all appear pleasant (1104^{b}30–1105^{a}1). Likewise, when Aristotle returns to the question of happiness in 10. 6, he says that 'to do noble and worthy actions is choiceworthy for their own sake [*τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν*]'; and notes that pleasant amusements are also chosen

totle: Eudemian Ethics, *Books I, II, and VIII*, 2nd edn. [*Eudemian Ethics*] (Oxford, 1992), ad loc.; on the first passage see Cooper, ' Value', 271–2 with n. 28.

for their own sake (1176^{b}7–10). All of these passages suggest that when one loves something and acts out of desire for it, rather than some further thing, one takes pleasure in the achievement of that thing and so values it for its own sake.[34]

What, then, ought we to make of the claim that civic courage is 'out of desire for the *kalon*, since it is for honour'? In other passages the *kalon* seems closely related to honour; Aristotle sometimes characterizes the *kalon* or relates it closely to what is 'worthy of praise' (*Rhet*. 1366^{a}33–4; *EE* 1248^{b}19–20).[35] He also calls honour the 'prize appointed for the noblest things' (1123^{b}18); the 'prize of virtue' (1123^{b}35; 1163^{b}3–4); and the 'wage' (μισθός) for the just magistrate's services to others (1134^{b}1–7).[36] Honour—or at any rate 'certain honours'—is ranked among things valuable in themselves both in *NE* 1. 6–7 (1096^{b}16–18, 23–4; 1097^{b}2) and in 7. 4 (1147^{b}29–31).[37] Furthermore, he sometimes speaks of the political life as being in some sense or other for the sake of honour: in his preliminary account of views about the ultimate end of action, he attributes the ultimate love of honour to 'refined and practical men', calling honour 'nearly [σχεδόν] the end of the political life' (1095^{b}23). Aristotle goes on to suggest that virtue, not honour, is the correct political end, since real honour is bestowed by those with practical wisdom (1095^{b}26–31).[38] However, when he returns to the subject of the political life in *NE* 10 he claims that it seeks 'beyond political

[34] Other evidence that the pleasure in virtue is closely connected to the *kalon* is Aristotle's comparison of the virtuous man's pleasure in action to pleasure in beautiful melodies (1170^{a}8–11; cited by Richardson Lear, *Happy Lives*, 125); the formula 'the noble and the pleasant' (1113^{a}31; 1179^{b}15); as well as Aristotle's claim that the end of the act of courage—identified with the *kalon*—is pleasant, although the pleasure is masked as in boxing (1117^{a}35–^{b}9).

[35] Cf. *NE* 1101^{b}31–2; 1109^{a}29–30; 1144^{a}26; 1155^{a}28–30. See discussion in Cooper, 'Value' 271–2, and Irwin, 'Morality', 125–31.

[36] Elsewhere Aristotle indicates that any reward for virtue is inadequate, even honour (1124^{a}7–9; 1164^{b}3–5); and the man with true self-love will trade honour (along with other goods) for the sake of the *kalon* and virtue (1169^{a}18–25).

[37] So Cope concludes that for Aristotle any action for the sake of honour rather than profit is *kalon*, on the basis of *Rhet*. 1366^{b}26 (E. M. Cope (ed. and comm.), *The* Rhetoric *of Aristotle*, rev. and ed. J. E. Sandys, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1877), i. 166). He seems not to take into account those passages where Aristotle criticizes the pursuit of honour as not being for the sake of virtue. Connected to this is his mistaken claim that greatness of soul and the small virtue about honour are for the sake of honour. See Whiting, 'Self-Love', 170–2, for an effective criticism of this interpretation.

[38] Contrast the parallel discussion at *EE* 1215^{a}32–^{b}4, where Aristotle does not mention honour even as a conventional end of politics, and says that the end of the political life is 'noble actions [καλαὶ πράξεις], that is, actions proceeding from virtue'. He goes on to contrast the true πολιτικός as one who seeks noble actions with

action itself tyrannical power and honours, or indeed happiness for himself and his citizens' (1177^b12–14).[39] It is because of the apparent closeness between honour and the notion of the *kalon* that older translations sometimes translate *kalon* as 'honour'.[40]

Aristotle speaks in various places of the *kalon* as something for which the virtuous person trades other kinds of advantage, including honours (*NE* 1168^a9–12; 1162^b36–1163^a1; 1169^a18–30). But honour too is something worth trading other advantages for. Elsewhere, Aristotle speaks of honour as something for which one ought rationally to trade gain, wealth, and other types of advantage. So 'power and wealth are choiceworthy for the sake of honour' (1124^a17–18); in the *Eudemian Ethics* the great-souled man is said to prefer honour 'to wealth and life' (*EE* 1232^b10–12).[41] So also just relations between a superior and an inferior involve an exchange whereby the inferior person receives an advantage (*κέρδος*) proportional to the honour received by the superior (*NE* 1163^b1–12; cf. 1134^b2–8; *EE* 1242^b10–21; *MM* 1195^b9–17). As a good for which one appropriately sacrifices money, power, and one's life, honour involves a kind of victory over appetite. Here Aristotle speaks in accordance with the conventional value of honour. Dover cites a number of passages from Athenians roughly contemporary with Aristotle describing *philotimia* ('love of honour') as the willingness to sacrifice profit, health, life, etc. for the sake of the public good.[42] The conventional distinction between honour and gain is also found in the *Rhetoric*, where honour is called *kalon* because it is choiceworthy while profitless (1367^a23), and it is said that *kalon* things in general bring no profit (1367^a27).

However, honour, unlike the *kalon* in action, is an external good (*NE* 1123^b17–21; contrast 1099^a13–16), even if it is one for which, like virtue, one would sacrifice money or life. So it is clear that honour and the *kalon* are closely related but importantly distinct

one who seeks reputation (1216^a19–27); but the main contrast is with the many, who seek political things 'for the sake of money and greed'.

[39] *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τήν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις.*

[40] See Irwin, ' Morality', 121, who cites two instances in Ross's original translation.

[41] Likewise, the great-souled man prefers 'beautiful and profitless things' (*NE* 1125^a11–12); see the passages from the *Rhetoric* below.

[42] K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* [*Greek Popular Morality*] (Indianapolis, 1974), 230–1.

for Aristotle. Honour is the conventional end of the political life;[43] Aristotle wishes to replace it with the genuine moral virtue of which real honour is only an outward sign. Since honour is given by others who may or may not have good judgement, it ought not to be pursued as an end in itself (1095^b23–30; cf. *EE* 1232^b15–24). More importantly, since virtue must result from a stable condition of the agent, it cannot depend on the approval of outsiders. So in the discussion of political courage in the Aristotelian *Magna Moralia*, the author points out that action based on shame is not virtuous, since if the cause for shame disappears, the person will not perform the action in question (*MM* 1191^a11–13). In genuine moral virtue, by contrast, the *kalon* is in the action, and is sought even without public recognition. So, if the politically courageous person acts for the sake of honour, at best he acts for a *kalon* object given by the public, not the *kalon* embedded in the action.

It ought to be abundantly clear that if we judge the goal of habituation to be valuing the action for its own sake, and so acting for the sake of what is the *kalon* in the action itself, a person acting for the sake of an external good—even a *kalon* good like honour—cannot be choosing the action for its own sake. Accordingly, the first view of civic courage as immature virtue has been ruled out. Civic courage cannot be the condition the virtuous person is in prior to receiving lectures on virtue and the human good.

5. Shame, honour, and habituation

It might still be true, however, that civic courage is the best law can do, since it remains possible that civic courage is a different type of immature virtue. Along the lines suggested by Richardson Lear, civic courage might be a stage in the process of habituation, rather than habituation's end-point. On this view moral education begins with external incentives such as honour, even if along the way the external end must be replaced by an internal one, just as one may have to be coaxed up the ski slope initially, but once one has learnt to ski the need for incentives drops away. This is such

[43] See Dover, *Greek Popular Morality*, 226–9, for evidence that Aristotle's diagnosis was correct. Dover plausibly suggests that the reason that the Athenians would treat matters of public reputation and morality as interchangeable was not so much a substantive belief that only appearances mattered, but rather a lack of interest in cases where these two things came apart.

a natural thought, and so ordinary to how we think about education, that Aristotle's rejection of it as the way to habituate people in proper pleasures is harder to see.

One general reason to doubt that Aristotle thought that correct behaviour ought to be trained initially by external incentives is that he describes correct habituation as something difficult without laws of a certain kind (*NE* 1179^{b}31–2); and he makes it clear that incentivizing good behaviour is something any law does (1130^{b}22–9; 1129^{b}11–25). Indeed, it would seem that even effective parenting without the aid of laws would be sufficient for education on this model. Aristotle makes it clear, by contrast, that the good laws he mentions in 10. 9 are rare (1180^{a}24–9; 1102^{a}7–12; cf. 1130^{b}26–9). Likewise, parental education, while advantageous in certain ways, is a second choice (1180^{a}29–32). If, as Aristotle says, all laws enjoin virtue and assign honour and disgrace as well as punishments accordingly, it would seem to follow that all who are naturally capable of virtue in any city would become virtuous. But he does not seem to think this.

Nor does Aristotle describe education as beginning with external incentives such as honour or disgrace and culminating in the learner's recognition of the intrinsic value of the action. The only signs of such a view are the brief mentions of shame and disgrace in 10. 9 (1179^{b}11–13). Aristotle claims earlier that shame is valuable only in the young (4. 9) and defines it as 'fear of ill repute' (ἀδοξία, 1128^{b}11–12). These passages, taken together with civic courage's dependence on shame, suggest that civic courage could indeed be an immature condition, before the learner has come to recognize the value of the *kalon* in the actions themselves.

However, Aristotle's discussion of shame makes it clear that he envisages it as an internalized state in the best circumstances. Aristotle says that a decent person will not feel shame, because he will not do anything deserving disgrace—and he adds that he means neither anything disgraceful in truth nor merely thought to be disgraceful (1128^{b}21–5). Shame in the best case is the internal cringing at having made a mistake, not the public shame of having fallen short of the expectations of outside observers.[44] Shame would then be valued only in the young, not because they value virtue for externally imposed incentives, but because only the young make mistakes that warrant shame. Furthermore, as I have suggested, part

[44] As Burnyeat points out ('Learning', 78–9, 89 n. 13).

of the purpose of 10. 9 is to describe the natural conditions for virtue as well as the conditions aimed for by education. The sense of shame seems to be ranged with the natural conditions such as good birth (1179^b7–13), rather than the cultivated conditions seen later in the chapter. If so, we can reasonably suspect that the reliance of civic courage on shame is the indication of a natural condition, not the mature, well-habituated, internal sense of shame described in *NE* 4. 9. There is no need to think of external and internal focus as different stages of the development of shame; an internal focus might be trained from the beginning.

So there are general reasons to doubt that Aristotle viewed moral education as relying fundamentally on incentives external to the actions themselves. However, the most important reason to reject understanding moral education as a process beginning with external incentives and culminating in the internalization of externally imposed values is that such a process does not distinguish between the cultivation of virtue proper and the cultivation of certain defective virtue-like states. A method relying too heavily on external incentives would risk habituating improper pleasures: pleasures in prizes and in looking good to others. Thus an education too heavy on externals would risk educating in the wrong end: honour, rather than virtuous activity itself.

While Aristotle seems to think that it is possible for someone with externally imposed, honour-based habits to develop genuine goodness—otherwise his lectures would be in vain—he suggests that there is a better sort of habit to cultivate, and one more likely to produce the right result. This better sort of habit involves taking pleasure in the actions themselves, rather than in their results, from the beginning. Such a habit is cultivated by education in music—that is, in musical imitations of virtuous actions. The claim that some kinds of habituation are better than others, and that the worse kind can result in a defective virtue-like state, is made clear only in the *Eudemian Ethics* and in the *Politics*. There the nature of civic courage and similar defective law-induced states is made much more clear.

6. Sparta and political virtue

The use of virtue or virtue-like states for the purpose of attaining external goods, including honour, appears elsewhere in Aristotle's

moral and political writings; it is his charge against the Spartans and the Spartan constitution in the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Politics*.[45] At the end of the *Politics* he connects his criticisms of the Spartan regime with its manner of education, and contrasts it with a form of education ordered towards the proper end of a city and consisting in proper training in the *kalon*. So it seems reasonable to think that civic courage and similar states are the product of an improper education in the good.

It has been noticed in the context of political courage that Aristotle speaks elsewhere of virtue-like states motivated by honour and external goods rather than goods inherent in the actions themselves, and that he calls such states 'political'.[46] In the last chapter of the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle describes the condition of having all of the virtues, here called 'nobility-and-goodness' (*καλοκἀγαθία*).[47] He also marks out a certain set of goods as 'natural goods', elsewhere called 'goods without qualification' or external goods: 'honour, wealth, bodily excellence, good fortune, and power'

[45] For discussions of Aristotle on Sparta see W. L. Newman (ed. and comm.), *The* Politics *of Aristotle* [*Politics*], 4 vols. (Oxford, 1902), ii. 212–14; S. Salkever, 'Women, Soldiers, Citizens: Plato and Aristotle on the Politics of Virility', in C. Lord and D. O'Connor (eds.), *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science* [*Essays*] (Berkeley, 1991) 165–90; White, *Sovereign*, 219–46; Whiting, 'Self-Love'; S. Broadie, 'Virtue and Beyond in Plato and Aristotle' ['Beyond'], in T. Roche (ed.), *Spindel Conference 2004: Ancient Ethics and Political Philosophy* [*Ancient Ethics*] (*Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 43, suppl.; Memphis, 2005), 97–114; R. Barney, 'Comments on Sarah Broadie, "Virtue and Beyond in Plato and Aristotle"' ['Comments'], ibid. 115–25; Frank, *Democracy*, 127–32. For a cogent defence of the coherence of Aristotle's account of Sparta against the charges of earlier scholars see E. Schütrumpf, 'Aristotle on Sparta', in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *The Shadow of Sparta* (London, 1994), 323–46. For a useful account of Aristotle's criticisms of non-ideal regimes, including Sparta, see R. Bodéüs, 'Law and the Regime in Aristotle', in Lord and O'Connor (eds.), *Essays*, 234–48. For an account of the role of Sparta in Plato's political philosophy, especially the *Republic*, see S. Menn, 'On Plato's *Politeia*', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 20 (2005), 1–55; M. Schofield, *Plato: Political Philosophy* [*Plato*] (Oxford, 2006), 32–43.

[46] White, *Sovereign*, 225–36; Whiting, 'Self-Love', 188–9. Barney, 'Comments', 119–21, also gives some background on 'political' virtues in Plato. *πολιτικὴ ἀρετή* appears in the Great Speech of Protagoras, as a shorthand for 'all of virtue' (*Prot.* 322 E 2; 323 A 7; 323 B 2; 324 A 1), as Socrates also appears to mean by it in *Ap.* 20 B 5. But in *Phaedo* 82 A 11 it means virtue acquired by 'habit and practice, without philosophy or understanding'.

[47] This virtue is not distinguished in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. See Whiting, 'Self-Love', for an examination of what virtue *καλοκἀγαθία* corresponds to in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, considering the three virtues said in that work to involve all the virtues: greatness of soul (*μεγαλοψυχία*); general justice; and practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*).

(1248b28–9).[48] Aristotle explains that for the noble-and-good man (*καλὸς κἀγαθός*) all of the 'natural goods' are good, whereas these same goods are harmful to the vicious and the foolish (*EE* 1248b25–1249a16).[49] He contrasts nobility-and-goodness with a certain 'political condition' (*τις ἕξις πολιτική*) of the Spartans, where the virtues are sought as a means to the natural goods.[50] If conjectural reconstructions of a difficult text can be trusted, Aristotle praises someone in the 'political condition' as good, and claims that the natural goods will also benefit a person in this condition, in contrast to the harm they cause a vicious person (1249a1–2). However, Aristotle says, actions undertaken for the sake of natural goods are not undertaken for the *kalon* or the noble, and so the actions resulting from the 'political condition' are not for their own sake (1249a2–5).[51] Indeed, those who seek the virtues for the sake of external goods do noble things (*τὰ καλά*) only by accident (1249a14–16).[52] Aristotle further suggests that virtuous actions are pleasant only when undertaken for the sake of the *kalon*, as by the noble-and-good man (1249a17–20); and so only real virtue produces happiness.[53]

[48] Aristotle describes them as 'the goods men fight over' (*τὰ περιμάχητα*); for the phrase see also *NE* 1168b19; 1169a21; and in a similar context to the *Eudemian Ethics* passage, *Pol.* 1271b8.

[49] Parallels: *NE* 1113a24–8; 1129b2–6; 1137a27–30; *EE* 1227a18–30; *Pol.* 1332a21–5; *MM* 1199b13–35; 1200a12–30; 1207b21–1208a4; these goods are called *δυνάμεις* at *MM* 1183b27–35. Cf. *NE* 1134a34; 1134b4; 1147a31–2; 1148a32–b2; and see discussion in Woods, *Eudemian Ethics*, 148–50, 176–80.

[50] Xenophon calls the virtue of the Spartans 'political virtue' (*πολιτικὴ ἀρετή*), and in the same passage, *καλοκἀγαθία*. He describes Lycurgus as having compelled (10. 7. 1; 10. 4. 5) virtuous behaviour on pain of losing citizenship; so someone who avoided the observance of the customs was no longer counted a citizen (lit. reckoned among the *ὁμοῖοι*) (*Lac.* 10. 4–7).

[51] *Contra* Kenny, who claims that while Spartans perform virtuous actions for their own sake, their view of the 'second-order question' of the point of being virtuous is that it is for the sake of external goods, or because 'virtue pays' (A. Kenny (trans. and comm.), *Aristotle:* The Eudemian Ethics (Oxford, 2011), 187). The passage by contrast makes it clear that while virtuous actions are praiseworthy for their own sakes in themselves, only the noble-and-good man actually chooses them as such.

[52] *ὁ δ᾽ οἰόμενος τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν δεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ καλὰ πράττει.*

[53] I take it that by restricting pleasure to action (*πρᾶξις*) Aristotle indicates that the pleasure in goods as such (*ἁπλῶς*) must be in the action attaining them and not in the result. That is why, Aristotle concludes, the truly happy man lives most pleasantly. Woods, *Eudemian Ethics*, 178 doubts that the passage belongs here; but it does tie the end of the *Eudemian Ethics* closely with its beginning, where Aristotle sets out to show that happiness is not only the finest and best thing, but also the most pleasant (1214a1–8).

It is difficult to understand just why Aristotle says that the 'political condition' is good and beneficial, and it is not obvious that this claim is consistent with things he says elsewhere.[54] However, in the *Politics* he repeats and amplifies his criticism of the Spartan moral character, connecting it to failures in the regime, especially the failure to provide the proper education directed to the correct final end. In doing so, he attributes to the Spartans not only an interest in having virtue and a certain virtue-like condition—as we see in *EE* 8. 3—but calls the condition they achieve a type of virtue.

In the *Politics* Aristotle makes two related criticisms of the final end of the Spartan regime: it is directed at only one part of virtue, the virtues of war;[55] and it holds that virtue is a means to other goods, namely external goods, the natural goods, things good without qualification. These criticisms are first made in *Politics* 2, where the failings of various constitutions and theories of constitution are outlined:

> There is another criticism one might make of the principle [τῇ ὑποθέσει] of the legislator [of the Spartan constitution], a criticism also made by Plato in his *Laws*. The whole system of laws is directed towards a part of virtue, virtue in war [τὴν πολεμικήν], because this is useful for gaining power [τὸ κρατεῖν]. As a result the Spartans remained secure as long as they were at war; but they collapsed once they had acquired rule, because they did not know how to be at leisure and they had never accustomed themselves to any discipline other than and superior to that of war. Another failing [of the Spartans] is not lesser than this one. They hold that the goods for which men strive are to be attained by virtue rather than by vice, and in this they are right; but they are not right in supposing that these goods are greater than virtue. (*Pol.* 1271^{a}41–^{b}10, translation loosely based on Barker)

The second claim, that the Spartans use virtue as a means to achieving natural goods (or τὰ περιμάχητα; cf. *EE* 1248^{b}28–9), and that they do so with some success, looks similar to the claim about the 'political condition' in the *Eudemian Ethics*. This charge is com-

[54] At *NE* 1137^{a}27–30 Aristotle says that things good in themselves are 'beneficial up to a point' for some people, although from the context it looks as if he should be referring to the virtuous (those who are neither gods nor vicious people); cf. *NE* 1153^{b}14–25. But in most of the parallel passages in note 49, the good man (ἀγαθός) seems meant to be a fully virtuous person. Further, if we take Aristotle's claim that the Spartans do not enjoy virtuous actions seriously, it conflicts with *NE* 1099^{a}17–18, where Aristotle says that a person who does not enjoy virtuous action is 'not even good' (ἀγαθός).

[55] For the claim see Plato, *Rep.* 548 A; *Laws* 625 C ff.; 705 D.

bined with a charge from Plato's *Laws* that only a part of virtue is cultivated, virtue in war, and that this is used to attain power or rule over other cities.

It is important that neither here nor in the *Eudemian Ethics* does Aristotle charge the Spartans with greed or πλεονεξία. They have external goods as their end, but in a sufficiently ordered way to attain a kind of virtue and benefit from it. (At 1334^{b}2–3 Aristotle describes the achievement of the Spartans as 'a sort of virtue' (τις ἀρετή).) One way to try to put the pieces together is to think of the external goods as being a common aim of the city or constitution. The Spartans, disciplined to be good soldiers and citizens, individually sacrifice their own gain for the sake of the common end of the city, and in doing so attain a kind of virtue, albeit a second-rate kind. The common end of their city, in turn, is military domination of other cities; and so the public goods turn out to be the natural goods: the honour achieved in war and the spoils gained by empire.[56]

Aristotle also indicates that Spartans achieve an imperfect kind of virtue when he categorizes their regime as an aristocracy (*Pol.* 1293^{b}7–18)—apparently because it awards some offices according to merit—and when he ranks it as a polity, among the correct regimes.[57] In general in the *Politics*, Aristotle distinguishes the regime which is ordered towards virtue simply from regimes that are ordered towards virtue 'under a hypothesis', that is to say, under the hypothesis that wealth (in the case of oligarchy) or freedom and equality (in the case of democracy) is the good or the final end.[58] The Spartan regime does not fall in any obvious way into either category; its 'hypothesis' seems to be virtue in war, which is neither virtue simply nor the principle of a deviant regime. So the restraint of the Spartans ought not to be considered the same as simple restraint of short-term ends for the sake of long-term appetitive goals. It seems that because their restraint involves some

[56] That the result is the corruption of individuals from honourable pursuits into greed is a standard note in aristocratic critiques of Sparta in the 4th cent. See Plato, *Rep.* 8, 550 C–551 B; Xen. *Lac.* 14; and Schofield, *Plato*, 103–4 with references.

[57] At 1294^{b}14–19 Aristotle suggests that Sparta is a polity: a mixture of rule of the people and rule of the rich (Newman, *Politics*, ii. 314). This is not necessarily incompatible with being an aristocracy; in the earlier passage he suggests that the attainment of virtue is not fully intentional, although virtue is indeed attained.

[58] Democracy aims at liberty: 1317^{a}40–1318^{a}10; tyranny at power: 1314^{a}35–8; the general contrast between the relative goodness of constitutions under a false good and the goodness without qualification of the best constitution: 1328^{b}38; 1293^{b}3 ff.; 1309^{a}36 ff.; 1269^{a}32 ff.

attention to the common good, they achieve virtue of a kind, rather than a sort of orderly vice.

What kind of virtue is it, exactly, that the Spartans achieve? In our earlier passage from book 2, Aristotle calls it 'virtue in war' (*ἀρετὴ πολεμική*). When describing how the Spartan laws neglect women, he says:

> The lawgiver wished to make the whole city able to endure [*καρτερική*]; and it is clearly so in the case of the men; but he has neglected the women, who live in every sort of self-indulgence [*ἀκολασία*] and luxury. (*Pol.* 1269^{b} 19–23)[59]

The suggestion is that the virtue sought and achieved by the Spartan lawgiver is a kind of restraint or endurance, directed at fighting and winning in war, and that this restraint succeeds in preventing self-indulgence.[60] In his main discussion and critique of the Spartan constitution in book 7, he describes the Spartans as 'trained to face dangers' (1333^{b}21), by which he means trained in war.

The restraint and endurance that allows one to face dangers and hardships is a genuine good for Aristotle. In his positive discussion of the virtues needed in the best city or 'city of our prayers', he says that the best city must be able to endure (*καρτερική*), as well as being moderate and brave, necessary conditions for leisure (1334^{a}18–20). He explains that those who cannot face danger courageously will be slaves, and so not have leisure; so courage and endurance (*καρτερία*) are needed for work (*ἀσχολία*), by which he seems to mean war (1334^{a}22–3). So Aristotle consistently treats the cultivated ability to endure danger and hardship as genuinely valuable, useful in war

59 Here Aristotle appeals to a common claim about Spartan women, going back at least to Euripides. See citations in Newman, *Politics*, ii. 318; further discussion in P. Cartledge, 'Spartan Wives: Liberation or License?', in Cartledge, *Spartan Reflections* (London, 2001), 106–26.

60 Newman points out that *καρτερεῖν* and enduring labours and dangers also feature in the account of Spartan education in Plato's *Laws*, 633 B ff. (Newman, *Politics*, ii. 318). See also Aristotle's description of certain features of the Spartan constitution that exceed in harshness, 'with the result that they are not able to endure but in secret run away from the law to enjoy sensual pleasures [*ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρᾳ τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν*]' (1270^{b}33–5). It is unfortunately not clear what these features are; they may be rules applied to citizens other than the ephors (Newman, *Politics*, ii. 337), or ways in which the ephors enforce the law (C. Lord (trans.), *Aristotle:* The Politics (Chicago, 1985)), or aspects of the lifestyle of the ephors (C. D. C. Reeve (trans.), *Aristotle:* Politics (Indianapolis, 1998)). For the image and the language in the passage see Plato's timocratic or Spartan constitution in *Rep.* 8, 548 B.

and in preventing self-indulgence.[61] It is this that he praises as the virtue of the Spartans.

Spartan virtue shows close connections with civic or political courage: it involves constraint and sacrifice of other goods for the sake of the public good and success in war; and it is for the sake of external goods, including honour.[62] In *EE* 8. 3 the Spartans are said to choose noble actions without choosing them because they are noble; they do noble things 'only coincidentally' (κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, *EE* 1249^{a}14–16; cf 1249^{a}1–3; 1248^{b}34–6). Likewise, civic courage is said to be 'due to desire for what is noble (since it is for honour)' (*NE* 1116^{a}28–9): it aims at a noble or *kalon* object, but not the *kalon* in the action itself. Furthermore, if civic courage were Spartan courage, we would have an explanation of the claim that civic courage is 'on account of virtue' (*NE* 1116^{a}27–8), while being at the same time a defective state that merely resembles true courage. The virtue of the citizen-soldier would be the sort of virtue he attributes to the Spartans: a habituated condition, directed at the common good, rooted in a sense of shame and disgrace rather than in fear of punishment, and involving a kind of restraint of and victory over the appetites.

Sparta is also closely associated with other conventional regimes. Aristotle elsewhere makes it clear that the Spartans, in adopting the goods of fortune or external goods as their ultimate ends, are following conventional political practice; this is what every city does (1334^{a}41–^{b}3).[63] What makes them unique is that they believe that one gets these things by virtue and discipline; and they cultivate

[61] See the closely parallel discussion of the training in endurance of pain and fear (καρτερήσεις) in the Spartan constitution in Plato, *Laws* 633 B–635 D. The Athenian argues, in parallel with the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, that education must be in proper pleasure 'from infancy', not only in enduring fear and pain (643 B–D).

[62] Broadie argues that the political condition of the Spartans in the *Eudemian Ethics* cannot be civic courage, since it is for the sake of all the external goods, and not only honour ('Beyond', 110–11 n. 15). I think that the use of πολιτική in the two passages must be analogous. One thought about how to solve Broadie's difficulty is what I mention above: the Spartans act individually for the sake of honour, but collectively for the sake of domination and empire. Another possibility is that Aristotle runs the external goods together in order to bring his critique of the Spartans into line with 4th-cent. reality, as seen in aristocratic authors: the Spartans are increasingly wealth-driven (see n. 56). And both honour and wealth, for Aristotle, are tools of virtue, not objectives for which virtue is useful (1332^{a}25–7). Yet a third possibility is that Sparta, as the most praised of conventional regimes, is a sort of stalking-horse for conventional regimes in general; if the best conventional regime has these failings, *a fortiori* the others must fail.

[63] Aristotle describes these things as 'what most people desire' at *NE* 1168^{b}17.

this virtue or discipline in their educational system. In *Politics* 7 Aristotle praises the public education provided by the Spartans (1337^a29–32); this is echoed by passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he praises the regime twice for its provision for a public education in human excellence (*NE* 1102^a8–11; 1180^a25–30). All the same, Aristotle's discussion of education takes pains to distinguish his ideal from the Spartan ideal, both in terms of the way it conceives its final goals or ends, and in its training for those goals. Its training to endure the dangers of war is a training for power and domination over other regimes; and this power and domination is aimed at external goods, the goods of fortune (1333^b5–21). Aristotle aims to replace training in the disciplined acquisition of the goods of fortune with proper education in the light of full rational excellence and the pursuit of leisure. So it is in his account of education in *Politics* 7–8, I argue, that we find the clearest expression of the difference between law-governed restraint and real virtue, and so an account of the origins of both civic courage and real courage in different kinds of law.

7. Spartan education

Aristotle views Spartan education as partly successful; Spartans do achieve a part of virtue or a sort of virtue. This virtue involves physical constraint and endurance of danger and hardship, and it has genuine value from its usefulness in war and from its prevention of self-indulgence in bodily or sensual pleasures. However, Spartan education is infected by its constitution's misorientation to the wrong end, war and external goods (1334^a40–$^b5$). How is it, specifically, that Spartan education fails? Aristotle gives very few direct and specific criticisms. The clearest is that the Spartans 'brutalize' their children—making them like wild animals—by the strenuousness of their training:[64]

> The Spartans have not made this mistake [of injuring bodies by certain kinds of athletic training], but they make them like wild animals [θηριώδεις] with strenuous exercises, thinking that this is most beneficial for courage. And yet, as has been said many times, the care one takes must not look to a single virtue, nor should it look to this one above all. And even if this virtue were the aim, they do not recognize the way to achieve it. For we do

[64] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 430 B; 410 C–D.

not see, either among other animals or among foreign nations, that courage accompanies those who are wildest [*τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις*], but rather those of a gentle and lion-like character. . . . What must play the leading role, therefore, is the noble [*τὸ καλόν*] and not animal ferocity [*τὸ θηριῶδες*]. (*Pol.* 1338^{b}11–32)[65]

The Spartans train their young for war by means of notoriously severe exercises.[66] Aristotle contrasts such an approach with one where the noble or the *kalon* would take a leading role. He suggests at the end of the chapter that the severe Spartan form of education impedes the development of the understanding (*διάνοια*) (1339^{a}9–10), as is also surely suggested by the comparison with wild animals. Aristotle argues here that the neglect of rational capacities harms even the Spartans' courage; once other cities trained for war, they were quickly beaten even on the battlefield (1338^{b}24–9). So Spartan education fails both with respect to the *kalon* and (relatedly) as a preparation for the development of rational capacities.

Aristotle's chief argument, that education must not neglect rational development, is made through his praise of the higher use of rational activity in leisured activities rather than in war. He launches his main critique of the cultivation of this virtue and so of the Spartan constitution in *Politics* 7, where he argues that the proper end of the city is leisure, not work or war; as war is for the sake of peace, so is unleisurely activity for the sake of leisure (1333^{a}30–^{b}5; 1334^{a}11–40).[67] Accordingly the external goods or natural goods sought by the Spartans through war are not ends in themselves, but ought to be pursued for the sake of the goods of the soul: the moral virtues and especially the virtues of leisure (1333^{a}16–1334^{a}10; 1334^{a}40–^{b}5).[68]

In this way, while the Spartans have acted correctly in aiming for virtue by legislating a form of public education, their conception of virtue is wrongheaded and so their education seriously flawed. In

[65] Translations from *Politics* 7–8 are based on R. Kraut (ed. and trans.), *Aristotle:* Politics *Books VII and VIII* [*Books VII and VIII*] (Oxford, 1997).

[66] On which see Xen. *Lac.* 2. 2–3.

[67] See *NE* 10. 7, 1177^{b}4–6, for the claim that war is for the sake of peace, work for the sake of leisure.

[68] What this leisure consists in is controversial; C. Lord argues that it is philosophy broadly speaking, meaning music and culture (*Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle* [*Culture*] (Ithaca, NY, 1982), ch. 5); D. J. Depew that it is philosophy strictly speaking ('Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle's Ideal State', in D. Keyt and F. Miller (eds.), *A Companion to Aristotle's* Politics (Oxford, 1991), 346–80).

Politics 8. 3 Aristotle defends the idea that education must be for leisure, not work; and that the right kind of education is given 'not because it is useful or necessary, but because it is a free and noble thing' (1338ª30–2). Political leaders and legislators must keep their eye on the proper end of life, which is the highest rational functioning of human beings (1333ª16–30):

> The political leader [πολιτικός] must legislate by looking to [peace, leisure, and what is noble] . . . Therefore it is with a view to these targets [τοὺς σκοπούς] that one must educate both those who are still children and also the other ages that need education. (*Pol*. 1333ª37–ᵇ5)

What exactly does Aristotle mean by proper education in the highest good? In *Politics* 7. 13 he describes education in the best city, the sort of education that he thinks answers the difficulties raised for Spartan education. His account there is incomplete—the text breaks off in book 8 before the narrative finishes. All the same, it is clear that it is education in music that he has in mind as an alternative to the severe physical exercises of the Spartans. This musical education is meant both to promote high-level rational activity and to develop virtue in its fullness, as something sought for its own sake and not for the sake of external goods. But how this could be true is difficult to see. It will help to situate it in the context of the claims Aristotle makes for moral education in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

8. Negative and positive moral education

It is widely accepted that for Aristotle, the positive goal of moral education is pleasure in virtuous action for its own sake—i.e. pleasure in what is *kalon* in the action. There is good reason to think that this pleasure is produced by the musical education described at the end of the *Politics* and that this explains Aristotle's enormous rhetorical emphasis in the *Nicomachean Ethics* on legislation and its importance for education in pleasure and pain. Furthermore, this view would explain how correct moral habituation does not result in action for the sake of external goods such as honour, and why the right public education would be rare or non-existent. It is of course important to remember that law-ordained education, whatever it turns out to be, is not a necessary condition for the acquisition of

full virtue. Aristotle makes it clear in *NE* 10. 9 that good luck and in certain cases private education may do the same work (1179^b21–3; 1180^a29–32).

I would like to begin, however, by showing that one aspect of moral education described in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is in fact attained well by Spartans and perhaps others. It is key to Aristotle's praise of Sparta in the *Politics* that the Spartans learn to endure pain, so attaining restraint (καρτερία) and avoiding self-indulgence (ἀκολασία). A good part of the work of habituation in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the negative avoidance of appetitive pleasures. Aristotle repeatedly calls attention to the dangers of untrained appetitive pleasure in our cognitive and rational capacities and in our choice of the good.[69]

So in addition to the positive function of habituation in instilling an attraction to the right thing, moral education for Aristotle also seeks to remove the impediments to rational understanding caused by false or harmful pleasures, and he reasonably seems to think that appetitive pleasures are the biggest threat. The worst impact is on the person's conception of the good.[70] Contrasting the virtuous with the self-indulgent, and distinguishing both from the weak-willed person, Aristotle says:

For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy the first principle [τὴν ἀρχήν], and in actions the final cause is the first principle, as the hypotheses

[69] Curzer draws attention to this aspect of moral education by finding passages about the pain of virtue and the necessity of avoiding pleasure (although he does not notice the passages describing the harm of pleasure to one's conception of the good). So temperate people may be moderately pained by the absence of desired goods (1119^a14); liberal actions may be painless rather than pleasant (1120^a26–7); courage is marked by the pain of death and wounds (1117^a32–5); any virtuous action that 'does not achieve its end' is not pleasant (1117^b15–16). Curzer uses these passages to criticize Burnyeat's view that moral education is learning to enjoy virtuous actions (H. Curzer, 'Aristotle's Painful Path to Virtue' ['Painful Path'], *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 40 (2002), 141–62). His criticism of Burnyeat falls flat once one recognizes that Aristotle, like Plato, distinguishes three types of desire and pleasure: spirited, rational, and appetitive. (Burnyeat, 'Learning', 77, himself points out that Aristotle makes a distinction between kinds of pleasure.) Accordingly, pleasure in the *kalon* is a spirited pleasure compatible with a certain amount of bodily or appetitive pain. For a defence of the claim that Aristotle recognizes three types of desire see Cooper, 'Value'. I add to Cooper's already convincing evidence the claim that lying for the sake of gain is more blameworthy than lying for the sake of honour: *NE* 1127^b11–17; and numerous distinctions in the *Politics* between money-lovers and honour-lovers: *Pol*. 1266^b39; 1267^a1; 1318^b17; 1311^a6; 1321^a42.

[70] See Reeve, 'Education', 55–6, for a clear explanation of the impact of habits on one's conception of happiness or the end.

are in mathematics; neither in that case is it reason that teaches the first principles, nor is it here—virtue either natural or produced by habituation is what teaches right opinion about the first principles. (*NE* 1151ᵃ15–19)

The first principle, Aristotle says, is the final cause: the end for the sake of which one acts (*NE* 1140ᵇ16–17; 1144ᵃ31–6; 1102ᵃ2–4; 1151ᵃ15–19). In this respect, Aristotle seems to think, even the weak-willed are in the same class as the virtuous person; so much the more a defective, partial virtue like that of the Spartans. Aristotle's thought seems to be primarily negative: vice, brought about by bad habits, destroys the correct opinion about what one ought to do. The bad habits—taking excessive pleasure in food, drink, or sex—harm one's ability to understand what is genuinely good and encourage the false belief that pleasure is the good. It is by good habits that people become genuinely good; but 'it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad [*φαῦλοι*]' (1104ᵇ21).[71]

It is because of the power of untrained pleasure that Aristotle advises learners to aim for the furthest extreme from what is pleasant for us; we must 'drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme' (1109ᵇ4–5); and 'in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against' (1109ᵇ7–8). So it is suggested that moral learning is more a matter of constraint and discipline than of skipping freely towards the delights of virtue.[72] In Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in *NE* 10, he distinguishes proper pleasures (those completing or perfecting excellent perceptive or contemplative activities) from 'alien' pleasures, namely unconstrained appetitive or bodily pleasures (1175ᵇ2–24). These pleasures, he says, are 'impediments' (1175ᵇ2). One reason why virtue of character is required for *phronēsis* or practical wisdom is that 'wickedness [*ἡ μοχθηρία*] misleads us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points of action' (1144ᵃ35–6). A disciplined education in military virtue will not (I suspect) provide us with the starting-points for *phronēsis*, but it will protect us from the harm of having pleasure as our starting-point.

These passages make it clear that the point of education in character is not only learning to delight in the rational activity involved in

[71] It is also worth noticing that although the self-indulgent man acts by choice and believes that he ought to pursue the present pleasure (1146ᵇ22–3), and although this state may be brought about by bad habits, it is nowhere said to be the product of education or of law.

[72] Curzer, 'Painful Path', rightly draws attention to these passages.

virtuous action, but to avoid and guard against appetitive pleasures, and so against impediments to understanding and to the natural development and perfection of our natural capacities. To this extent, Spartan education based on severe discipline and on external incentives such as honour and shame is beneficial and partly effective. By contrast, disciplining correct behaviour by incentives such as tasty treats and painful punishments would not be, as it would hold in place or even encourage the conception of pleasure as the good. It might even be possible that the defects in Spartan-style education allow persuasion by reason and argument, if the learner's understanding is sufficiently free from the obscuring effects of alien pleasures. The weak-willed person, for instance, is said to be persuadable in certain respects (1151^a14).

Whatever the partial merits of Spartan education, there is clearly more to moral education than negative training away from pleasure. There is also the positive training in proper pleasures in the action, and the existence of defective Spartan forms of virtue makes it clear that the former is not sufficient for the latter. Training in proper pleasure, Aristotle thinks, is the best preparation for reason. The Spartans, whatever their virtues, are not famed for wisdom and rational excellence. As is indicated by the discussion of political courage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the political condition of the *Eudemian Ethics*, the choice of the virtuous action for its own sake and pleasure in the *kalon* in action are key conditions for full virtue and key distinctions between authentic virtue and even the best forms of conventional virtue.

So how is authentic virtue cultivated, if it is not enough to discipline learners away from appetitive pleasures by means of external incentives? Other conditions—beyond repetition enforced by honour and disgrace—must be in place for learners to recognize intrinsically valuable aspects of their actions. The *Nicomachean Ethics* itself gives little hint as to what these conditions are. The account of how the proper pleasure in virtuous action is trained is not given in the *Nicomachean Ethics* but ought rather to be identified with the account of musical education at the end of the *Politics*. This education, I will argue, is what is meant to save Aristotelian virtue from honour-driven constraint. It does so by training the young to take pleasure in the actions themselves from the beginning, and especially in orderly features of those actions closely connected to their *kalon* or noble features.

9. Musical education in the *Politics*

I have argued that the commonly recognized goal of moral habituation in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, taking pleasure in virtuous action in the right way ('well', *καλῶς*, 1179^b24–6; 'as one ought', *ὡς δεῖ*, 1154^a17–18), is not adequately accounted for within the work itself. The means by which it comes about must be more rare and more specialized than mere repetition guided by external incentives such as honour and disgrace. Aristotle claims in *Politics* 8 just this goal for musical education: that it teaches the young to take pleasure correctly in moral actions. He suggests this at the beginning of his discussion, and later endorses it:

ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς. (*Pol.* 1339^a21–5)

Music to some degree contributes to virtue, because, just as gymnastics produces a body of a certain quality, so music too has the power to produce a character of a certain quality, by habituating us so that we can enjoy ourselves in the right way.

Music has three functions in the 'city of our prayers' described in *Politics* 8. It provides relaxation or amusement; it is connected in an obscure way with leisure time (*διαγωγή*) and wisdom (*φρόνησις*) for adults; but most importantly for our purposes, it is used to educate the young in virtue (*Pol.* 8. 5). Education in music 'produces a character of a certain kind' (1339^b42–1340^a12), and it does so because of the type of pleasure it brings about (1340^a12–28, $^b15$–20).

What exactly do we enjoy in music, so that our characters become of a certain kind? Music represents character and virtues of character; by listening and especially by learning to perform it, we become accustomed to enjoy those features of character; and we learn to judge or distinguish them. Aristotle is emphatic that it is music strictly speaking—its rhythms and melodies—that has these effects.[73] In *Politics* 8. 5 he explains and defends the effect of rhythm and melody on the soul; in 8. 6 he argues against the professionali-

[73] Ford's arguments against the alternative—that narrative, for instance, plays a key role—are persuasive (A. Ford, 'Catharsis: The Power of Music in Aristotle's *Politics*' ['Catharsis'], in P. Murray and P. Wilson (eds.), *Music and the Muses: The Culture of 'Mousikê' in the Classical Athenian City* (Oxford, 2004), 309–36). For an account of the importance of music in the strict sense (not just representational nar-

zation of music, and claims that music must be performed to have the best educational effects; and in 8. 7 he examines which modes and rhythms are most appropriate for moral education.

Musical education provides the right kind of habituation because character and action are represented by it, and so by hearing (and performing) musical representations, one practises certain emotional responses to qualities of character and action:

ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοί τινες τὰ ἤθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. . . . ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν. (*Pol.* 1340^{a}5–18)

Rather we must see whether music contributes in some way to character and the soul. Obviously it would, if one's character takes on a certain quality because of music. . . . Further, everyone who listens to representations comes to have similar emotions, even apart from the rhythms and melodies of those representations.[74] And since it so happens that music is one of the pleasures, and virtue has to do with enjoying, loving and hating in the right way, obviously one must learn and become accustomed to nothing so much as correctly distinguishing and enjoying decent characters and noble actions.

The language here given for the goal of musical education—'enjoying, loving and hating in the right way' (*τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν*)—is nearly identical with how Aristotle describes the well-habituated condition that laws ought to aim at in *NE* 10. 9: 'enjoying and hating well' (*τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν*, 1179^{b}24–6). Aristotle argues that the emotions represented in the music have the power to produce similar emotions in the hearer. The music

rative) in education in Plato's *Republic*, see M. Schofield, 'Music all powr'ful', in M. McPherran (ed.), *Plato's* Republic*: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge, 2010), 229–48.

[74] I translate the transmitted text, which suggests that hearing representations (*ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων*) is valuable apart from the music, but this goes against the grain of the immediate context of the chapter as well as its overall argument, which emphasizes the opposite point: that music and rhythm apart from words have these effects. Nor is it signalled as a counter-argument, but is presented as supporting evidence (*ἔτι δέ*). Ford, 'Catharsis', 316–25, discusses the responses to the difficulty, including a proposed emendation by Susemihl to change the meaning to its opposite. Regardless of how the transmitted text is understood, it is evident (and well argued by Ford) that Aristotle's main point in the chapter is to establish the usefulness of the representations of character in melody and rhythm alone in moral education.

represents in whatever way 'decent characters and noble actions', so that we learn, by performing musical representations of good characters and actions, to enjoy, love, and hate them in the right way.

Aristotle continues to explain that in rhythms and melodies themselves, and so in music in the strict sense, without words, there are likenesses or similarities to emotions, character traits, and virtues:

> In rhythms and melodies there is the greatest likeness to the true natures of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, all of their opposites, and the other characters. This is obvious from the facts: we undergo a change in our souls when we listen to such things. Someone who is accustomed to feeling pain and pleasure [*τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν*] in things that are likenesses is close to someone who reacts in a similar way to the truth. (*Pol.* 1340^{a}18–28)

Hearing the musical versions of these character traits (and the emotional components of character traits) affects our souls in a manner similar to their truthful versions.

Truthful versions of moral actions and traits can be observed both in other people and in ourselves. Since the goal of musical education is our own proper pleasure in our own virtue, musical education is not merely passive. The Spartans, Aristotle says, listen but do not learn to perform (1339^{a}41–^{b}4). One ought to learn not only to listen to music, but to perform it, in order to learn to judge and discriminate better:

> There is no doubt that whether someone himself participates in a performance makes a great difference to the development of certain qualities. For if people do not participate in performances, then one thing that is impossible or difficult is for them to become excellent judges of it [*κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους*]. (*Pol.* 1340^{b}20–5)
>
> Since one must participate in performances for the sake of judging [*τοῦ κρίνειν*], they should for this reason give performances while they are young but give up the performances when they get older, and by means of what they learnt while young be able to distinguish what is done well and to enjoy rightly [*τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς*]. (*Pol.* 1340^{b}35–9)

By performing one learns how to judge well what one has done oneself. Accordingly, by learning to take pleasure in the performance of music representing virtues, good characters, and noble actions, one trains oneself to enjoy one's own real-life virtues, good character, and noble actions.[75]

[75] As Sherman also argues (*Fabric*, 180–3), properly emphasizing the internal qua-

We also learn to distinguish the good characters and noble actions; Aristotle glosses the type of judgement later as 'distinguishing the things done rightly [*ta kala*]' (1340^{b}38–9). It is clear enough from the emphasis on the moral qualities of the music that he does not mean merely aesthetic judgement.[76] Aristotle means that musical education teaches one to distinguish good music from bad, where good music means the representation of good characters and deeds. Correct moral judgement is also a feature of virtue aimed for in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and often discussed closely with the proper pleasure in moral action. So the noble and the pleasant are said to guide judgement, and 'the good man is said to judge each thing correctly [*ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς*]' (*NE* 1113^{a}30; cf. 1099^{a}23–4).

Because musical representations of moral traits and actions are available and enjoyable from a young age, they make it possible for young people to take pleasure in moral actions, especially the proper rational order of such actions. This pleasure is not in hoped-for results such as prizes or honour, but is experienced internally as a part of one's own action, from the beginning, first representationally through melody and rhythm, and then in reality. As such, it is of key importance to producing real virtue rather than the constrained versions of virtue found in conventional city-states and especially among the Spartans.

It is true that Aristotle calls music a 'sweetener' of the actions, which suggests that in its own way it is an extrinsic incentive for action (*Pol.* 1340^{b}13–17). However, he emphasizes the likeness between the musical features of the action and the genuinely valuable features of the action, so that experience with imitations gives greater facility with matters in truth. It is commonly and plausibly argued that the *kalon* in action for Aristotle is fundamentally aesthetic, and has to do with the orderly features of the action.[77] The

lity of pleasure in music and its relation to moral action. I agree with Ford that Sherman over-rationalizes the process; it is significant, as Ford points out, that music is compared to exercise—'lifting dumbbells' as Ford puts it ('Catharsis', 316, with n. 24).

[76] As might be suggested by Kraut's translation of *κρίνειν* as 'judging'; and as Kraut himself seems to think when he discusses the value of learning to perform for judgement (*Books VII and VIII*, 199–200). See Lord, *Culture*, 74–5, 99–104, for a more extended argument that moral rather than aesthetic judgement is in play.

[77] Following the treatment of *kalon* in non-moral contexts, especially *Metaph.* 1078^{a}31–^{b}6. See D. J. Allan, 'The Fine and the Good in the *Eudemian Ethics*', in

two types of beautiful order, musical and moral, may be closely related. If so, the transition from pleasure in musical order to moral or rational order may not seem as sharp to Aristotle as it does to us. Moreover, it may plausibly be seen as an easier transition than the one from an action motivated by an external good to action motivated by the action itself.

The musical training of *Politics* 8 explains why Aristotle urges that we should be brought up in right habits 'straight from youth' (1104^b8–13; 1105^a2; 1179^b24–6), and why he never describes a conversion process from an externally determined end to an internal one. Proper habituation in the *kalon* trains the pleasure towards the correct end or something very closely resembling it from the very beginning.

Another advantage of understanding proper habituation as rooted in musical education is that it explains Aristotle's cryptic claim that we learn virtue by performing virtuous actions:

> The virtues we get first by exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things that we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them: for example, men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. (*NE* 1103^a31–$^b2$)

The complaint against this view is obvious: how is it that one can perform a just act or a brave act before one has acquired the virtues of justice or courage? Aristotle seems to be suggesting that a virtuous act is a mere behaviour, whereas we know that virtue involves robust interior and motivational conditions.[78] But if we learn by first performing represented musical versions of virtuous acts, the problem is mitigated. While these represented actions and their early real-life versions may be rationally deficient, their orientation to the *kalon* provides them with significant purchase on real virtue.

P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger (eds.), *Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik* (Berlin, 1971), 63–71; K. Rogers, 'Aristotle's Conception of *to Kalon*', *Ancient Philosophy*, 13 (1993), 355–71; Cooper, 'Value', 270–6; Richardson Lear, *Happy Lives*, 126–30, and 'Aristotle on Moral Virtue and the Fine', in Kraut (ed.), *Guide*, 116–36. For criticisms of the aesthetic interpretation see Irwin, 'Morality', and Taylor, *Books II–IV*, 92 n. 12.

[78] Curzer, 'Painful Path', 147, complains with particular vividness: '[Could it be that] habitually resisting pressure in committee meetings and declining hot-fudge sundaes disposes us to want to stand fast when we find ourselves in our first battle, and run fast from our first seduction?'

I have argued that the difference between political courage aimed at honour and real courage aimed at the noble or the *kalon* is a difference between the ends aimed at, and not a difference between the same end being determined externally or internalized. Seeking the *kalon* in action is an accomplishment of habit, and it is the kind of habit that politicians and legislators would do well to try to instil. Proper habits, Aristotle says, ought to be instilled by a public education properly aimed at cultivating pleasure in the *kalon* and constraining other pleasures. The constraint of pleasures for the sake of honour, however, is not enough to produce pleasure in the *kalon* in action. The transition from external good to internal good is difficult; it may rather be easier to go from a good external good such as honour to an unworthy one such as money.[79] The constraint of bodily pleasure is at best a partial preparation for rational activity, and severe constraints may be counter-productive. Education in music, by contrast, instils proper moral pleasure. Through learning to perform and act out musical representations of good character and good actions, one becomes adept at judging and taking pleasure in what is done well. In this way, in the best cases, Aristotle thinks that laws can make people good.

10. Conclusion: difficulties

The importance of musical education best explains, I think, Aristotle's emphasis in the *Nicomachean Ethics* on habit, proper pleasure, and the role that law and politics play in producing the right habits and their proper pleasures. It is the correct education prescribed by law that not only avoids the dangers of untrained appetitive and pleonectic desires, but can also prepare for the best, happiest life aimed at the highest good. However, my view raises at least one serious difficulty. Aristotle praises his audience for having been brought up in good habits ($1095^{a}2$–11; $1179^{b}4$–31). He cannot mean that they have received the specialized musical education described in *Politics* 8. The contrasting cases in these passages are rather those who follow the passion of the moment and live by promptings of pleasure and pain. Aristotle's audience does not include hedonists or the self-indulgent. If my view is correct, the suggestion is that his audience, although it may include those fully vir-

[79] As is frequently charged against the Spartans; see n. 56.

tuous by good luck, is neither properly educated in the strict sense nor hedonistic. They are rather simply constrained or disciplined in something like the Spartan style. They are not self-indulgent or greedy; they do not live by their passions; they are not ruled by their impulses or appetites. Rather, they have trained their appetites in pursuit of some public good.

One possible response to this difficulty is to see the *Nicomachean Ethics* by analogy with Plato's *Republic*. In the *Republic* a robust form of virtue is described as the product of an elaborate (and heretofore non-existent) education. The interlocutors of the *Republic*, the stand-ins for its audience, do not have this sort of virtue. Rather, they have some imperfect form, however we understand it, brought about by some combination of good luck, good nature, and perhaps certain adequate laws or conventions. The arguments of the *Republic* are meant to convince them of the importance of full virtue for living the best, happiest, and most pleasant life. If the *Nicomachean Ethics* is thought of as an analogous type of work with an analogous function, one ought to view the good habits of the audience as distinct from the good habits produced in the best conditions.

But further difficulties remain. If musical education is Aristotle's solution to externally constrained Spartan virtue, it remains true that Aristotle speaks frequently of virtue of character and the rule of reason in stark contrast with the rule of the appetites or the passions (e.g. $1095^{a}4$–8; $1156^{a}31$–3; $1179^{b}5$–15; $1168^{b}12$–$1169^{b}2$). By contrast, while he frequently emphasizes education, and while musical education (on my view) is the best way to educate for full virtue, he mentions constrained virtue directed at external ends only once, in the discussion of political courage. This suggests an ambiguity in the *Nicomachean Ethics* between two different ways of cultivating virtue and avoiding the harms of excessive pleasure: constraint in the light of the common good, and positive training in proper pleasure aimed at true *eudaimonia*. Both aspects of education are important, and Aristotle appeals to them ambiguously.

I say ambiguously rather than inconsistently, because it would be appropriate in certain ways for Aristotle to be ambiguous. After all, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* are directed at potential political leaders and lawmakers in a variety of circumstances; some may have the possibility of founding new colonies; others face trying to

make this or that oligarchy or democracy more orderly and stable.[80] Consider Aristotle's description of the well-ordered democracy in the *Politics*:

> Those who govern themselves this way [when the rich hold the offices and the poor audit them] must necessarily be governed well; the offices will always be in the hands of the best, while the people will agree and not envy the decent; and this arrangement is necessarily satisfactory to the decent and reputable, since they will not be ruled by their inferiors, and they will rule justly because others have authority over the audits. For to be under constraint and unable to do whatever seems good is beneficial. The licence to do whatever one wishes cannot defend against what is bad in each human being. (*Pol.* 1318^{b}33–1319^{a}1)

Here both the people and the rich agree, because they have something of what they want; and the rich 'rule justly' because they are constrained by the law, enforced by the auditors. Such constraint is beneficial; but it seems far from what we would imagine from a community of fully virtuous Aristotelian agents. Education, Aristotle says, must be 'in the regime' (1310^{a}15–22); we ought to expect that inferior regimes produce virtues that look more like constraint than like the full virtue described in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. So it seems possible that Aristotle outlines an ideal of full virtue while suggesting, albeit subtly, a second-best option of constraint. Constraint might have two forms, based on the material we have looked at so far: first, the honour-driven, shame-based constraint of the civically courageous; next, the law-governed constraint of social classes seeking wealth and power that we see here. Unlike the Plato of *Republic* 8, the Aristotle of the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not seem to discuss the money- or freedom-driven constraint found in degenerate regimes; his suggestion in the *Politics* seems rather that such motives are best constrained by the common good through mixed constitutional forms. To explore these questions more thoroughly, however, belongs to another project.

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[80] On the audience of the *Nicomachean Ethics* see R. Bodéüs, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's* Ethics, trans. J. E. Garrett (Albany, NY, 1993).

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