CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Porphyry, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas
A Neoplatonic Hierarchy of Virtues and Two Christian Appropriations

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Introduction
Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas each refer to a Neoplatonic theory of ethics according to which, above the two familiar levels of human virtue—the political and contemplative—there are two further levels of virtue for immaterial substances. Furthermore, according to this theory, the four cardinal virtues which are usually considered as political (or moral) are in fact manifested in each of these four levels. Both Bonaventure and Aquinas cite Macrobius as the authority for this theory. Though Macrobius’s “Commentary on the Dream of Scipio” claims that Plotinus is the source of the theory, Macrobius appears to rely instead on some writings by Porphyry.1 These writings, which we have come to call the Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes (APHORMAI PROS TA NOETA),2 are a collection of philosophical reflections which may have been intended as supplemental to Plotinus’s Enneads. It is in the 34th of Porphyry’s “Sentences” that we see the theory of a four-fold hierarchy of the cardinal virtues explained in greatest detail. In this chapter, I will first consider this theory as articulated by Porphyry, and then turn to examine the appropriations of this theory by Bonaventure and Aquinas respectively. Finally, I will consider the implications that these two appropriations of the Neoplatonic theory have for Bonaventure and Aquinas’s understanding of the relationship between ethics, philosophy, and theology.

Porphyry’s Hierarchy of Virtues
Porphyry’s Sentences are a collection of forty-four loosely related philosophical discourses, mostly about neo-Platonic metaphysics and psychology. Some of the “Sentences” are just single propositions, while others consist of longer expositions and arguments. By far the longest of all the “sentences,” the thirty-second, gives an account of virtue.3
Virtue

Porphyry begins his account of virtue with the familiar distinction between political and contemplative virtue. Virtues are divided into two sets, “one set of virtues belongs to the citizen, another to the man who ascends to contemplation....” The former, explains Porphyry, consist in “moderation of passion” and “are to follow and to conform to the conclusions based upon a calculation of what is proper or expedient in actions.” Thus they derive their name as “political” virtues from the fact that “they have in view a social organization which shall not inflict injury upon its members.” Porphyry distinguishes four virtues, the “cardinal” Greek virtues which had been appropriated already in the theories of Plato and Aristotle. Porphyry’s description of the set of political cardinal virtues is consistent with this Greek tradition:

... prudence is conversant with that which is reasoned; courage with the passionate; temperance lies in the agreement and harmony of the desires and affections with rational calculation, while justice is the simultaneous limiting of each of these to its own sphere of action, in respect to ruling and being ruled.6

Porphyry continues by describing how these four cardinal virtues are manifested in the contemplative life. He begins by distinguishing generally between the political and contemplative spheres: “The disposition ... which is based upon the political virtues may be stated as consisting in moderation of passion, having for its aim to enable man to live as a man according to nature. [But] the disposition based upon the contemplative virtues consists in apathy, the end whereof is assimilation to God.” From this, it follows that the contemplative virtues “lie in withdrawal from things here [below]” and are considered “purifications.” The political virtues prepare the soul for this purification, but are not themselves purificative, because they necessarily involve the body.8 Porphyry describes the four virtues as purifications thus:

Hence, in purifications, not to opine with the body, but to energize, alone constitutes prudence. Again, freedom from sympathies [with the body] constitutes temperance. [...] Not to fear, when withdrawing from the body, as if it were into something empty and non-being, constitutes courage. [...] And when reason and intellect lead and nothing opposes, this is justice.9

Porphyry goes on to argue that there needs to be further levels of virtue even after the contemplative or purificatory virtues. Purification alone does not make the soul partake of the good, but only rids it of certain evils; further virtues are required for the soul to reach its ultimate end. As Porphyry explains it, “the nature of the soul is not a good, but capable of partaking of the good, and having the form of the good. But the good for it is to be united with that which produced it.” Thus, according to Porphyry, there is “a third class of virtues besides the purificative and political, those, namely,
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which belong to the soul energizing intellectually." This class of virtues is difficult to understand, for they are not available to us in this life; nonetheless, Porphyry explains, even on this level can be found the four virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and courage:

Wisdom and prudence lie in contemplation of the things which nous has, whereas justice is proper action in the progress toward nous, and the energizing toward nous. Temperance again is the turning inward toward nous. Courage is absence of passion, in assimilation to that toward which it looks, and which is by nature passionless.

These are the virtues of "the soul already looking inward toward nous, and filled from it," and they are higher than those (the contemplative virtues) "which belong to the soul of a man purifying itself, and purified from the body and irrational passions," which are in turn higher than those (the practical virtues) "belonging to the soul of man which adorns the man, by setting limits to irrationality and inculcating moderation of the passions."

But these intellectual virtues are not themselves the highest, for above them are the paradigm, or "pattern," virtues. These are "in nous," and are "superior to those of the soul, and are the patterns of those to which the similitudes of the soul belong." Thus, the three lower levels of virtues are exemplifications of this highest level of virtue, "for nous is that in which all things are as patterns." So the four virtues, which are manifested on the three lower levels, have their pattern here:

wisdom is nous cognizing; self-attention, temperance; peculiar function [justice], proper action. Courage is sameness, and a remaining pure of self-dependence, through abundance of power.

These pattern or exemplar virtues, the highest level, are, like the virtues of the purified soul, unavailable to man in this life, but they are available to certain higher orders of being:

Hence he who energizes according to the practical virtues is an earnest man; he who energizes according to the purificative ones, is a demonic man or even a good demon. He who energizes according to those alone which relate to nous is a god. He who energizes according to the pattern virtues is the father of the gods.

Men, therefore, should strive to attain the lower two levels, but a man may not have the higher without the lower. He must, then, ascend from the lower level of virtue to the higher.

He who has the greater, has, of necessity, the less; but by no means vice versa. Moreover, from the fact of having the less, he who has the greater will no longer energize according to the less by predilection, but only in consequence of the circumstance of birth.
Virtue

The human soul cannot properly exhibit the highest, exemplar virtues; nonetheless, because the lower levels of virtues are analogically related to the higher levels, the human soul can share in them according to its own mode, namely by striving toward them through the political and contemplative virtues.

Bonaventure on the Neoplatonic Hierarchy of Virtues

Bonaventure is among those medieval Christian philosophers who specifically address this Neoplatonic theory of a hierarchy of virtues. He discusses it at length in *Collationes in Hexaemeron* 6, where he attributes the theory to Plotinus, apparently on the authority of Macrobius; Collation 6 ends with a long excerpt from Macrobius’s *Dream of Scipio*.

Bonaventure begins the sixth Collation as a discussion of the passage at Genesis 1:4: “God saw the light that it was good; and he divided the light from the darkness.” He uses this text as an occasion to discuss God as an exemplar cause, the source, and “illuminating light,” of all truth — “the truth of things, the truth of words, and the truth of morals.” Bonaventure believes this to be a central Christian teaching, but it is one which some non-Christians have grasped: “the most noble and ancient philosophers have come to see this, that there is a principle, and an end, and an exemplar reason.”

The noble philosophers which Bonaventure has in mind are Plato and his followers, representing a tradition more or less defined by its willingness to countenance “exemplar” causes. This tradition is to be contrasted with that of Aristotle and his followers, for Aristotle repeatedly criticized the notion of an exemplar cause and Plato’s doctrine of “ideas,” especially, as Bonaventure points out, in the *Metaphysics* and in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For Bonaventure, this distinction between the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions is so important that it separates philosophers as God separated the light from the dark. Indeed, Bonaventure explains in detail how the failure to acknowledge exemplars led Aristotle into a “threefold blindness,” believing that the world is eternal, that there is only one intellect, and that there is no punishment or glory after death. So that we do not misunderstand him about the cause of these mistakes, Bonaventure asks, “Why did some,” namely the Aristotelians, “follow the darkness?” The answer is that while acknowledging a first principle and final end of all, they denied that there were exemplars of things.

The specific Neoplatonic doctrine of the hierarchy of virtues is thus introduced by Bonaventure because of its articulation of the exemplar virtues. After discussing the fundamental errors which follow from a denial of the existence of exemplar causes, Bonaventure says that “the eternal light is the exemplar of all,” and that “in it the first to appear to the soul are the
Exemplars of the virtues." Emphasizing the necessity of considering the exemplars of the virtues, Bonaventure quotes Plotinus, who said that it would be absurd for the exemplars of all things to be in God, and not the exemplars of the virtues.

This is Bonaventure's opportunity to begin to offer descriptions of the individual cardinal exemplar virtues ("virtutes exemplares sive exemplaria virtutum," Collationes 6.7), considered as the first features revealed by eternal light: "the height of purity, the beauty of clarity, the strength of power, and the straightness of diffusion." Bonaventure associates each of these features of divine light with one of the traditional cardinal virtues, for each one is the cause of a cardinal virtue manifested on a lower level. Specifically, the cardinal virtues are impressed in the soul by that exemplar light and descend into the cognitive, affective, and operative realms. By the height of purity is impressed the sincerity of temperance; by the beauty of clarity is impressed the serenity of prudence; by the strength of power is impressed the stability of constancy [or fortitude]; by the straightness of diffusion is impressed the sweetness of justice.

Immediately after this summary of the exemplar virtues, Bonaventure again emphasizes their importance by saying that "these are the four exemplar virtues with which the whole of Sacred Scripture is concerned." And immediately after that, he again returns to the observation that only some philosophers were aware of them: "Aristotle sensed nothing of them," in contrast to "the ancient and noble philosophers" who did.

Though he is most concerned to concentrate on the exemplar virtues, and to remind his readers of the limitations of those philosophers who did not acknowledge them or exemplars in general, Bonaventure does discuss the entire four-fold hierarchy of virtues. The other three levels of virtues, according to Bonaventure, are designed to lead men back to the origin of virtue in the exemplars:

These virtues flow from the eternal light into the hemisphere of our minds and retrace the soul to its origin, as a perpendicular or direct ray returns by the same path by which it went out. And this is beatitude. Whence the first [level of virtues] are political, the second are purificative, and the third for the soul already purified. The political [virtues] consist in action, the purificative [virtues] in contemplation, and those of the soul already purified in the vision of the [divine] light.

Bonaventure proceeds to quote at length Macrobius describing this hierarchy of virtues, in details that are to be found in Porphyry's discussion considered above. But before he does so, Bonaventure is careful to establish that his concern with these levels of virtues is not based strictly on pagan sources.
He cites a Christian authority for this hierarchy of virtues, Origen. Origen, according to Bonaventure, wrote that Solomon was concerned with the three lower levels of virtue at different points in the Old Testament: he was concerned "with the political in Proverbs, with the purificative in Ecclesiastes, and with those of the soul already purified in the Song of Songs."

Following his long quotation of Macrobius, which ends Collation 6, Bonaventure recapitulates his discussion of the hierarchy of cardinal virtues at the beginning of Collation 7. He states again that "some philosophers attacked the ideas," thus being separated from other philosophers as darkness from light. As evidence of this, he again describes the "threefold blindness" which is caused by a failure to recognize the ideas or exemplar causes. Then he notes that other "enlightened philosophers ... posited exemplar virtues, from which the cardinal virtues flowed, first into the cognitive power and then through that into the affective, and then into the operative." These are the cardinal virtues,

of which the first are called political, insofar as they pertain to worldly relations; the second are purificatory insofar as they pertain to solitary contemplation; the third for the purified soul; as they make the soul to be at rest in the exemplars. ... [T]hrough these virtues the soul is modified, purified, and reformed.

Though crediting the "enlightened philosophers" with grasping this theory, Bonaventure's emphasis here is much different than in Collation 6, when he drew attention to the difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions, criticizing only the latter. For in Collation 7, Bonaventure insists that the "enlightened" Platonists are still in some degree of darkness, for they lack the light of faith. So after complimenting the Platonists for seeing truths that Aristotle did not see, he proceeds with his specifically Christian goal of articulating the necessity of faith. Of course Bonaventure must believe that Christ only can bring the soul back to God, not the pagan virtues - even if the virtues are grasped in a hierarchy presided over by the exemplars. "The philosophers," he says, "had the wings of ostriches, because their affective powers could not be healed, nor ordered, nor rectified; for this is done only by faith."

Thomas Aquinas on the Neoplatonic Hierarchy of Virtues

Like Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas directly addresses the Neoplatonic theory of a hierarchy of virtues. The theory makes an appearance in the Summa Theologiae, where Aquinas, like Bonaventure in the Collations, does not attribute the theory to Porphyry but to Macrobius. The fifth article of question 61 (IaIae) asks: "Are the cardinal virtues appropriately divided into political, purifying, purified, and exemplar virtues?"
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After citing some Aristotelian (and one Ciceronian) objections that seem to arise from Macrobius’s account of virtue, Aquinas allows Macrobius to cite his own authority, whom Aquinas has no reason to doubt is “Plotinus, along with Plato.” To mediate this dispute, Aquinas appeals to Augustine, who says, “the soul must follow something so that virtue can be born in it; and this something is God, and if we follow Him we shall live a moral life.” From this, Aquinas concludes:

the exemplar of human virtue must pre-exist in God, just as the exemplars of all things pre-exist in Him. In this way, therefore, virtue can be considered as existing in its highest exemplification in God, and in this fashion we speak of exemplar virtues. Thus the divine mind in God can be called prudence, while temperance is the turning of the divine attention to Himself. ... The fortitude of God is His immutability, while God’s justice is the observance of the eternal law in His works.

Aquinas’s discussion here recalls the words of Porphyry, cited above, concerning the exemplar virtues: “wisdom is nous cognizing; self-attention, temperance; peculiar function [justice], proper action. Valor is sameness, and a remaining pure of self-dependence, through abundance of power.”

Aquinas’s words are surprising because up until this point in the Summa, he has been speaking of virtue primarily in the political sense; “man is a political animal by nature,” and “man comports himself rightly in human affairs by these [political] virtues.” But Aquinas acknowledges the philosophical necessity of understanding the political virtues as having their origin in higher virtues. Thus, in answer to the objection that Aristotle says it is inappropriate to attribute the virtues to God (NE, X, 8, 1178b10), Aquinas answers that Aristotle must be speaking of the political virtues — for surely we would not want to deny to God any excellence of activity. And again, to the objection that the virtues concern the regulation of passions, and so could not exist if the soul was completely purified of passions, Aquinas says this is only true of the political virtues. Beatified souls, however, are without the passions of wayfaring souls; it is these souls which achieve the purer virtues.

To the objection that the purifying virtues cannot be virtues since they involve “flight from human affairs,” Aquinas agrees that “to neglect human affairs when they require attending to is wrong.” But otherwise such flight is virtuous. Here, Aquinas appeals to Augustine, who says: “The love of truth needs a sacred leisure; the force of love demands just deeds. If no one places a burden upon us, then we are free to know and contemplate truth; but if such a burden is put upon us, we must accept it because of the demands of charity.”

The purifying virtues, commonly called the contemplative virtues, are the virtues of “those who are on the way and tending toward a likeness of
what is divine." In agreement with Porphyry’s description of these virtues is Aquinas’:

Thus prudence, by contemplating divine things, counts all worldly things as nothing and directs all thought of the soul only to what is divine; temperance puts aside the customary needs of the body so far as nature permits; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of withdrawing from bodily needs and rising to heavenly things; and justice brings the whole soul’s accord to such a way of life. 49

Above these are the “purified” virtues. Porphyry would attribute them only to the gods (all those other than the “father of the gods”), that is, to immaterial souls; Aquinas, in keeping with this, attributes these virtues to the souls of men who have been beatified – and even, it seems, to saints in this life:

... prudence now sees only divine things, temperance knows no earthly desires, fortitude is oblivious to the passions, and justice is united with the divine mind in an everlasting bond, by imitating it. 50

Conclusion

In comparing Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’s appropriations of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of virtues, we note first that both Christian writers affirm the theory without hesitation. Even though they confront it in specifically theological contexts, both authors eagerly adopt from a pagan authority a theory bearing on the end of man. Indeed, both of them give specifically Christian emphasis to the ethical theory. Bonaventure insists that “the whole of Sacred Scripture” is concerned with the exemplar virtues. Aquinas too makes significant theological use of the theory, choosing to introduce it at a crucial point in the dialectic of the Summa. The article of the Summa considered above is the last article of the last question on cardinal virtue; as such it helps form a transition between Aquinas’s discussions of moral and theological virtue.

At first glance, Aquinas’s appropriation of the Neoplatonic theory may seem more surprising than Bonaventure’s. Bonaventure rather predictably uses the Neoplatonic theory to criticize Aristotle and to articulate a Christian conception of the soul’s journey to God. Gilson, in discussing this appropriation, notices an appropriate parallel between Bonaventure’s understanding of a divine illumination in human knowledge, and a divine illumination of human virtue. 51 But this is precisely the Bonaventure that we expect, and one which we are used to contrasting with Aquinas. Gilson uses this very “doctrine of moral illumination” to contrast Bonaventure’s “Christian Platonism” with Aquinas’s “Christian Aristotelianism” (Gilson 1938, 428-430). Yet, as we have seen, Aquinas assents to the same
Neoplatonic theory of a hierarchy of virtues which characterizes the Platonist “doctrine of moral illumination.” This makes it tempting to try to bring Aquinas’s appropriation of the Neoplatonic theory to bear on some of the persistent questions in the interpretation of Aquinas's thought: Is Aquinas’s Aristotelianism more important than his Neoplatonism? Is Aquinas’s ethics really Aristotelian? Does Aquinas have a properly philosophical ethics?

Of course the evidence of ST 1-2.61.5 does not determine answers to any of these questions. In fact, there is good reason to think that such questions cannot be answered by unqualified affirmations or negations, and ST 1-2.61.5 helps to illustrate this. For one thing, it is clear that in the mind of Aquinas, the Neoplatonic theory of the cardinal virtues does not compete with, but complements, the Aristotelian account. Mark Jordan has said that Aquinas’s appropriation of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of virtues “stretches the analogy of [Aristotelian] virtue almost to breaking” (Jordan 1993, 239). Yet as we have seen from the discussion above, in Aquinas’s mind the analogy does not “break”; the Neoplatonic “stretch” is, for Aquinas, compatible with Aristotle’s ethics.

This is all the more evident when Aquinas’s treatment is contrasted with Bonaventure. Bonaventure uses the Neoplatonic theory as an occasion to criticize Aristotle. Aristotle, for Bonaventure, follows a way of “darkness,” making philosophical mistakes for which the Neoplatonic theory offers a corrective. As Aquinas presents it, the Neoplatonic theory does not so much correct as supplement the Aristotelian account of virtue. For Aquinas, the Neoplatonic theory provides a way of understanding the relationship between the political and contemplative lives which, on the one hand, seems to address philosophical questions raised by Aristotle’s ethics, but which, on the other hand, is not at odds with Aristotle’s ethics.

We may note two such complementary aspects of the Neoplatonic analysis of the political and contemplative lives. First, it preserves a strong – and certainly Aristotelian – connection between being, the object of metaphysics, and goodness, the object of ethics; virtue is a reflection of divine virtue, and is pursued as part of a creature’s proper end, (re-) union with the creator, who is the ultimate good, and the complete being. Second, and because of this strong connection between being and goodness, it allows us to understand how human “lives” that can be differentiated can still be necessarily related: the political man and the contemplative man are engaged in different activities, but both are engaged in human activities, and so the same virtues are actualized in them according to different modes. The contemplative life is superior to the political life just insofar as the virtues manifested in the contemplative life are closer to the exemplar virtues, and preparative of the purified virtues appropriate to separate substances.

While disagreeing over whether the Neoplatonic theory is a philosophical corrective or a philosophical complement to Aristotle, Aquinas and
Bonaventure seem to agree that the theory addresses what we would think of as properly theological issues. Aristotle is famous for avoiding questions about the separability of the human intellect from the body, and the survival of the soul after death. Bonaventure and Aquinas, equipped as they are with confidence in the Christian faith, do not avoid these questions: the human soul can survive the death of the body, and can then achieve the higher virtues, and union with God. As we have seen, the Neoplatonic account of the hierarchy of cardinal virtue helps them to introduce and articulate this theological position.

Of course this does not mean that for either Bonaventure or Aquinas the Neoplatonic theory is itself a sufficient Christian theology of virtue. Here we must notice that for both of them, not only does the Neoplatonic theory correct or complement Aristotle, but faith complements the Neoplatonic theory. Bonaventure makes this clear in an extended discussion of the limitations of pagan virtue, and the necessity of Christ and His grace. Less explicitly indicated, Aquinas’s agreement is suggested in the citation of Augustine on charity. While the theory of the hierarchy of cardinal virtues gives an account of the relations between the active and contemplative lives, and accounts for the superiority of the latter, in doing so it may seem to recommend the philosophical life unconditionally. Aquinas is careful to consider the possibility of a motive to sacrifice contemplation for action. The appeal to Augustine on this matter implies that, for Aquinas, such a motive is best understood by supplementing the pagan philosophical ethics, referring beyond the cardinal virtues to the specifically Christian virtue of charity.

Notes

1 In crediting the theory to Plotinus, Macrobius refers to the treatise “On the Virtues” (Enneads I.ii). But the extensive details of the theory that Macrobius relates cannot be found in Plotinus’s text, while they can be found in Porphyry. The question of Macrobius’s use of Porphyry on this particular issue is bound up with more general questions about Porphyry and Plotinus as sources for Macrobius, about which there is some controversy. For summaries and references, see Macrobius 1952, 28–29; 121, n. 5, and Gersh 1986, 2:508–509, n. 91.

2 The critical edition is by Lamberz (Porphyry 1975). In this chapter I use an English translation by Thomas Davidson (Porphyry 1869), standardizing the names of the four virtues—courage, temperance, prudence, and justice—which Davidson translates inconsistently. Davidson’s translation is based on the edition of the Greek text edited by Creuzer (in Plotinus 1855). In the notes I give the Greek text of Lamberz, citing by page and line numbers (e.g. 22:14–15).

3 Manuscript variations in the ordering of the “sentences” mean that Creuzer, and thus Davidson, arrange them in a different order than the critical edition of Lamberz; the Lamberz “sentence” number 32, which takes up 139 lines, is Creuzer’s number 34 (146 lines). The next longest of the “sentences” is number
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40, with 78 lines (Creuzer's number 41, at 81 lines), which is concerned with ethics in terms of the achievement of divine knowledge and the soul's union with God.

4 "Allai hai aretai tou politikou, kai allai hai tou pros theorian aniontos" (Porphyry, Sententiae 32; 22:14-15, Lamberz).

5 "Hai men tou politikou en metriopatheia keimenai to hepestathe kai akolouthein to logismo tou kathekontos kata tas praxeis: dio pros koimnian blepousai ten aablhe ton plesion ek tou sunagelasmou kai tes koionias politikai legontai" (Ibid.; 23:3-8).

6 "kai esti phronesis men peri to logizomenon, andria de peri to thumoumenon, sophrosune de en homologia kai sumphonia epithumetikou pros logismon, dikaiosune de he ekastou touton homou oikeiopragia arkes peri kai tou archesthai" (Ibid.; 23:8-12).

7 "he men oun kata tas politikas aretas diathesis en metriopatheia theoreitai, telos ekousa to zen hos anthropon kata phusin, he de kata tas theoreitikas en apathiea, hes telos he pros theon omooiosis" (Ibid.; 25:6-9).

8 "kai prodromaoi ge hai politikai ton katharseon" (Ibid.; 24:6-7).

9 "dio en tais katharisei to men me sundoxazein to somati, alla monen energein huphistesi to phronein, ho dia tou katharos noein teleioutai, to de ge me homopathein sunistesi to sophernein, to de me phobeisthai aphismatenen tout somatos hos eis kenon ti kai me on ten andrian, hegoumenen de logou kai nou kai medenos antiteinontos he dikaiosune" (Ibid.; 24:9-25:1).

10 "all be psuches ouk en agathon, all agathou metechein dunamenon kai agathoeides ... to oun agathon aute en to suneinai to gennesanti ..." (Ibid.; 26:9-12).

11 "allo oun genos triton areton meta tas kathartikas kai politikas, noeros tes psuches energouses ..." (Ibid.; 27:7-9).


13 Here and elsewhere I replace Davidson's use of "intellect" with "nous."

14 Here and elsewhere "proper action" replaces Davidson's rather too Hegelian translation of "oikeiopragia" as "self-related action."

15 "sophia men kai phronesis en theoria hon nous echei, dikaiosune de oikeiopragia en te pros ton noun akolouthisi kai to pros noun energein, sophrosune de he iso pros noun strophe, he de andria apathiea kath homoiosin tou pros ho blepei apathes o ten phusin" (Ibid.; 27:9-28:4).

16 "hai de psuches pros noun enoroses ede kai pleroumenes ap autou" (Ibid.; 29:10-11).

17 "hai de psuches anthropou kathairemenes te kai kathartheis apom somatos kai ton alogon pathon" (Ibid.; 29:11-12).

18 "hai de psuches anthropou katakosphiones ton anthropon dia to metra te alogia aphorizein kai metriopatheian energazesthai" (Ibid.; 29:12-30:1).

19 This use of "intellectual virtues" should not be confused with the sense of "intellectual virtues" that is contrasted with "moral virtues" by Aquinas (e.g. ST 1-2.53) and Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics 1103a14ff); the Aristotelian contrast between the intellectual and moral virtues is much closer to Porphyry's distinction between the purificative (contemplative) and political (practical) virtues - but even here the parallel is not perfect.

20 "Tetarton de eidos areton te ton paradeigmatikon, haiper esan en to no, kreit tous ousai ton psuchikon kai touton paradeigmata, hon hai tes psuches esan homoiomata: nous men en bo hama ta hosper paradeigmata" (Porphyry, Sententiae 32; 28:6-29:3, Lamberz).

21 Davidson has "self-relatedness."
22 “sophia de ginoskon ho nous, to de pros auton he sophrosyne, to de oikeion ergon he oikeiopragia, he de andria he tautotes kai to eph heautou menein katharon dia dunameos periusian” (Ibid.; 29:4–7).

23 “dio kai ho men kata tas praktikas energon spoudais en anthropos, ho de kata tas kathartikas daimonios anthropos e kai daimon agathos, ho de kata monas tas pros ton noun theos, ho de kata tas paradeigmatikas theon pater” (Ibid.; 31:4–8).

24 “ouketi mentoi to echein kai tas elattous ho echon tas meizous energesei kata tas elattous proegomenos, alla monon kata peristanis tes genesesos” (Ibid.; 30:2–5).

25 One manuscript variation actually gives: ton de loipon analogos tois eirhmenois, “the scope of the others [the pattern virtues] is in a manner analogous to those mentioned [the political, contemplative, and intellectual virtues],” (Ibid., 31:3–4); but even without this explicit statement, the causal dependence and hierarchical ordering of the levels of virtue establish the analogical relationship.

26 The text of Bonaventure, Collationes 6:25–32, is taken from Macrobius’s In Somnium Scipionis, chapter 8, from paragraph 3 (all but the first line) to the first line of paragraph 11. On Plotinus and Porphyry as sources for Macrobius, see note 1, supra.

27 Bonaventure, Collationes 6.1: “Propter primam visionem intelligentiae per naturam inditae sumtum est verbum illud: Vidit Deus lucem, id est videre fecit .... radiat lux ut veritas rerum, ut veritas vocum, ut veritas morum .... Et ad hoc venerunt philosophi et nobiles eorum et antiqui, quod esset principium et finis et ratio exemplaris.”

28 Ibid., 6.2: “Divisit tamen Deus lucem a tenebris, ut, sicut dictum est de Angelis, sic dicatur de philosophis. Sed unde aliqui tenebras secuti sunt? Ex hoc, quod licet omnes viderint primam causam omnium principium, omnium finem, in medio tamen diversificati sunt. Nam aliqui negaverunt, in ipsa esse exemplaria rerum; quorum princeps videturuisse Aristoteles, qui ... exsecratur ideas Platonis.”

29 Ibid., 6.6: “Apparent ergo primo in luce aeterna virtutes exemplares sive exemplaria virtutum, scilicet celsitudo puritatis, pulcritudo claritatis, fortitudo virtutis, rectitudo diffusionis.”

30 Ibid., 6.10: “Haec imprimuntur in anima per illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in affectivam, in operativam. Ex celsitudine puritatis imprimatur sinceritas temperentiae; ex pulcritudine claritatis serenitas prudentiae; ex fortitudine virtutis stabilitas constantiae; ex rectitudine diffusionis suavitas iustitiae.”

31 Ibid.: “Hae sunt quatuor virtutes exemplares, de quibus tota sacra Scriptura agit; et Aristoteles nihil de his sensit, sed antiqui et nobiles philosophi.”


33 Ibid., 6.25: “Et de his agit Salamon, ut dicit Origenes, de politicis in Proverbiis, de purgatorius in Ecclesiaste, de animi iam purgati in Cantico canticorum.” In fact Bonaventure’s attribution to Origen of this insight is a stretch. In his prologue to the Song of Songs Origen discusses not a Greek hierarchy of virtues but the traditional Greek division of disciplines into moral, physical and
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theoretical; it is this division that Origen says Solomon understood before the
Greeks and treated in turn in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs.

36 Ibid., 7.3: "... ali i philosophi illuminati ... posuerunt virtutes exemplares, a
quibus fluunt virtutes cardinales, primo in vim cognitivam et per illam in
affectivam, deinde in operativam. ..."
37 Ibid., 7.4: "Illi autem praecipui philosophi posuerunt, sic etiam illuminati,
tamen sine fide, per defluxum in nostram cognitionem virtutes cardinales. Quae
primo dicuntur politicas, in quantum docent conversationem in mundo;
secundo, purgatoriae quantum ad solitariam contemplationem; terto, purgati
animi, ut animam quietari faciant in exemplari. Dixerunt ergo, per has virtutes
anamam modificari, purgari et reformari."
38 Ibid., 7.3: "Sed adhuc isti in tenebris fuerunt, quia non habuerunt lumen fidei.
... alii philosophi illuminati ... posuerunt virtutes exemplares, a
quibus fluunt virtutes cardinales, primo in vim cognitivam et per illam in
affectivam, deinde in operativam. ..."
39 Ibid., 7.5: "Sed adhuc in tenebris sunt ...
40 Albertus Magnus also mentions this Neoplatonic theory, attributing it to
Plotinus (Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica Commentum et Quaestiones 2.2; 4:12;
5.3; 7.11).
41 ST 1-2.61.5: "Utrum virtutes cardinales convenienter dividantur in virtutes
politicas, purgatorias, purgati animi, et exemplares."
42 Ibid., corpus: "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de
Moribus Eccles., oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possis
virtus innasci: et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene vivimus." The citation of
Augustine is from De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae 1.6.
43 ST 1-2.61.5, corpus: "... exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et
in eo praexsistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic igitur virtus potest considerari
vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, et sìc dicuntur virtutes 'exemplares'. Ita
scilicet quod ipsa divina mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero,
conversio divinae intentionis ad seipsum ...; fortitudo autem Deus est eis
immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae in suis operibus,
sicut Plotinus dixit. " Cf. Quaestiones de Virtutibus Cardinalibus 1.4 ("Utrum
virtutes cardinales maneant in patria"): "... fortitudo divina est eis
immobilitas; temperentia erit conversio mentis divinae ad seipsam; prudentia
autem est ipsa mens divina; iustitia autem Dei lex eius eret perennis.
44 ST 1-2.61.5, corpus: "Et quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal
politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem
suae naturae, politicae vocantur: prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes
recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de
his virtutibus locuti sumus. " Cf. 1-2.61.1, corpus: "... dicendum quod, cum
simpliciter de virtute loquimur, intelligimus loqui de virtute humana.
45 ST 1-2.61.5, ad 1: "... dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus
secundum quod sunt circa res humanas: puta iustitia circa emptiones et
venditiones, fortitudo circa timores, temperantia circa concupiscentias. Sic enim
ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere."
46 Ibid., ad. 2: "dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet
virtutes hominum in hoc mondo conversantium. Sed virtutes eorum qui plenam
beatitudinem assequuntur, sunt absque passionibus." Cf. Quaestiones de
Virtutibus Cardinalibus 1.4: "Dicendum, quod in patria manent virtutes
cardinales, et habeunt ibi alios actus quam hic.
47 ST 1-2.61.5, ad 3: "... dicendum quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas
imponitur, vitiosum est: alias est virtuoserum."

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Augustine’s words are from De Civitate Dei 19.19.

49 ST 1–2.61.5, corpus: “... quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium: et hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despicat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola diregat; temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam.”

50 Ibid.: “Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam similitudinem: quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantiae terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetua foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum.” Cf. De Virtutibus Cardinalibus 1.4, ad. 7: “dicendum, quod virtutes purgati animi, quas Plotinus definiat, possunt convenire beatis: nam prudentiae ibi est sola divina intueri; temperantiae, cupiditates oblivisci; fortituidinis, passiones ignorare; iustitiae, perpetuum foedus cum Deo habere.”

Mark Jordan has suggested that in ST 1–2.67.1, Aquinas says that both the purifying and the purified virtues remain in patria (Jordan 1993, 239). In fact, in that question Aquinas says that in patria the “formal” element of the moral virtues remains without the “material” element, and Aquinas’ description of what these virtues are like is consistent with the position articulated in ST 1–2.61.5, that only purified virtues are had in patria.

51 Gilson 1938, 422: “... should we hold ... that there is a divine illumination of the virtues corresponding to the divine illumination of the ways of knowing? That is the key problem of morality for Bonaventure, and his solution makes morality exactly parallel with knowledge and binds both of them to their common origin in illumination from above.”

52 John Inglis offers a more detailed historiographical discussion of why such questions themselves need to be called into question (Inglis 1998). Inglis discusses the question of the character and relation of Aquinas’s philosophy and theology, with special attention to ethics, in the final chapter, “The False Dichotomy of Reason and Revelation.”

53 See De Anima, 429b22, 430a17–27, 431b17–19; see also Nichomachean Ethics 1178a22–24.

References


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MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
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