Research Article

Joshua Fahmy-Hooke*

Heidegger's Critical Confrontation with the Concept of Truth as Validity

Abstract: My primary goal in this article is to provide a historical reconstruction of Heidegger's relationship to Hermann Lotze's logic of validity (*Logik der Gültigkeit*). Lotze's characterization of truth's "actuality" solidifies the fallacious presupposition that the essence of truth is to be understood primarily in terms of logical assertions. In Heidegger's view, the predicates "true" and "false," as the paradigmatic attributes of propositions and judgments, are derivatives of a fundamental and "primary being of truth" known as disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*). Heidegger marks this decisive position in §44 of *Being and Time* and gains its methodological purchase by deconstructing traditional logic (*kritischer Abbau der überlieferten Logik*). Heidegger's treatment, however, is abbreviated, and his sources remain notoriously concealed. For this reason, much is to be gained by examining the supplement provided one year earlier in a lecture course titled *Logic: The Question of Truth* (WS 1925–26). Heidegger devotes nearly 100 pages to the contemporary situation of philosophical logic. In this course, Heidegger critically evaluates a core principle of both phenomenology and neo-Kantian *Erkenntnistheorie*: the concept of validity (*Geltung*). This term originates from Lotze's Platonic *Ideenlehre*, which asserts that Platonic "ideas" correspond to thoughts through a logical necessity. Consequently, they are deemed valid and eternally self-identical but do not need to exist in the world. For the purposes of this study, I show the historical significance and influence of Lotze's *Logic* on twentieth-century Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology. I provide a detailed account of Lotze's interpretation of the Platonic theory of ideas, which supports his theory of validity. By returning to Lotze's text, I provide an in-depth review of Heidegger's reading of Lotze, whom he charges with misleading twentieth-century epistemology. If successful, this article provides the necessary and historical context to understand what is left unsaid and concealed in §44 of *Being and Time*. This article also serves the auxiliary purpose of acting as a prolegomenon for Heidegger's urgent return to Aristotle's thought and accurately determining the essence of truth.

Keywords: Hermann Lotze, Martin Heidegger, phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism, theory of ideas, epistemology, truth

1 Historical Introduction

Tracing the historical roots of Neo-Kantianism from 1870 to 1920, readers of Martin Heidegger not only observe philological and methodological affinities between Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology but also recognize the significance and urgency of Heidegger's radical solutions presented in *Being and Time*.[1] The Neo-Kantian

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1 Let me at once introduce the other works of Martin Heidegger to which reference will be made in the present article. Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* in *Gesamtausgabe*. References to this text will be made using the abbreviation "SZ" followed by the paragraph number. On occasion, references are made to the section number, indicated by a pilcrow (§). The *Gesamtausgabe* is cited hereafter as GA followed by the volume number. All volumes of the GA are published by Klostermann in

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* Corresponding author: Joshua Fahmy-Hooke, Department of Philosophy, Memorial University, Newfoundland, Canada,
e-mail: jdhooke@mun.ca

movement, emerging amidst the decline of German Idealism, owes much of its development to the "late Idealism" of the nineteenth century.[2] The core ideas of the twentieth century Neo-Kantianism were principally articulated by Hermann Lotze in *Logic* (1874).[3] Contemporary with the publication of *Logic* (1884), the so-called *Psychologismus-Streit* lies at the heart of German academic philosophy. Broadly construed, Psychologism maintains that logic is a part or branch of psychology. Accordingly, logic is concerned with the correctness of thinking and the laws inherent to thought processes.[4] In other words, "the laws of thinking or knowing are a subclass of psychological laws"; therefore, to understand thinking and knowing, psychology must be the object of study.[5] In what Heidegger calls the "age of psychology," it is hardly surprising that psychology extended to philosophy, specifically logic, as the science of thought. The long-prevailing psychological interpretation of Immanuel Kant, established and favored by Arthur Schopenhauer, Johann Friedrich Herbart, and Jakob Friedrich Fries, elevated psychology to prominence alongside the rise of the natural sciences and the "naturalization of consciousness" (GA1: 1).[6] Logic is said to be exhausted by psychological facts and laws; thus, psychology is the basis for knowledge and subsequent claims about how we experience the world.[7] We can never go beyond the limits of the conceivable and what is psychologically given.[8] Amidst the *Psychologismus-Streit*, however, Lotze proposed an antipsychologist position by delineating a categorical difference between psychology and logic.[9] Lotze states that "to found logic or epistemology in psychology produces a vicious circle ... psychology presupposes logic and epistemology" (L: 543–4).[10] Therefore, Lotze distinguishes between a genetic, psychological explanation, and an *a priori* foundationalist view of logical *validity* (*Geltung*).

Lotze's *Logic* represents the earliest attempt to counter the looming specter of psychologism by offering a logic of critical idealism. Lotze introduces the term "validity" (*Geltung*) to distinguish the logic governing pure

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Frankfurt am Main. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften (1912–1916)* (GA 1), 189–411; Heidegger, Logic: The Question of Truth; Heidegger (GA 21), *Towards the Definition of Philosophy* (GA 56/57); Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology: Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, trans. Tracy Colony (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2010) (GA 58).

2 See Beiser, *Late German Idealism*.

3 Lotze, *Logik*; Lotze, *System of Philosophy, Part I. Logic, in Three Books*. The second edition (1888) was reissued in the series called *Phenomenology: Background, Foreground, and Influences* (no. 8), 2 vols (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1980). Hereafter, denoted by *L*, followed by the paragraph number.

4 In the history of psychologism, three distinct forms emerge: 1. logical psychologism proper, 2. semantic psychologism, and 3. epistemological psychologism. I note this differentiation to prevent common misunderstandings whereby one psychological perspective is attributed to another. Logical psychologist does not have to maintain semantic psychology (Mill). Semantic psychology does not need to commit to epistemological psychology (Brentano). Epistemological psychology can be maintained without adhering to logical psychology (Fries). For a detailed analysis of each of these accounts, see González Porta, *Psychologism Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Also relevant to the present study, see, Mill, "*System*, VIII: 872–3" and "(*Notes on the Analysis*, XXXI: 413)" in *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91).

5 Fries, *System der Metaphysik*, 104; Lipps, *Grundzüge der Logik*, 1–2.

6 See, Wicks, "Schopenhauer's Naturalization of Kant's a Priori Forms of Empirical," 81–196; Beiser, "Johann Friedrich Herbart, Neo-Kantian Metaphysician," 89–141; Beiser, "Jakob Friedrich Fries and the Birth of Psychologism," 23–88; Pecere, "Physiological Kantianism and the Organization of the Mind," 693–714.

7 Lipps, *Grundzüge der Logik*, 26f; See, George, "Psychologism in Logic," 213–42; Gethmann, "Phänomenologische Logikfundierung," 85–101.

8 Erdmann, *Logik*, 375; Lipps, "Die Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie und die Wundt'sche Logik" *Philosophische Monatshefte* 16 (1880): 529–39.

9 Also, see, Husserl, "Logische Untersuchungen, 1 Bd: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik" ed. Elmer Holenstein (Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1975), 183f. Psychologism in logic or epistemology involves validity, whether related to logical laws or the truth of statements in general. Two domains emerge: one addressing the question of truth (Wahrheit), and the other focusing on the meaning of the statement (Sinn, Bedeutung). Semantic psychologism, however, deals with establishing the significance or meaning status. Since there is no absolute objectivity the truth of knowledge is restricted either to "the species (e.g. homo sapiens)" or "Human knowledge is capable of attaining absolute knowledge that is valid for every rational being." Mario González Porta, Psychologism, §1.1f. Between semantic and hermeneutic psychologism within the Geisteswissenschaften is Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, 140, 405–7. Natorp, "Zur Frage der logischen Methode," 270–83.

10 This view is also supported by Natorp, "Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis," 257–86.

thought and psychology comprising the acts of thinking.[11] Lotze maintains that "concept-formation belongs to [pure] thought and not to the psychological processes of abstraction or synthesis."[12] The starting point of logic becomes evident through *a priori* truths, which are universal and necessary ideas that form combinations through which the laws of thought ought to obey. Regardless of their origins, ideas exist as truth and untruth (*L*: 8). As the contents of thought, ideas are obtained through the necessity and universality of logical laws (i.e., the laws of identity, noncontradiction, and excluded middle). Logical *validity*, therefore, is the formal structure of reasoning independent of empirical or psychological considerations.[13] On this view, validity is not empirically founded (e.g., the adequacy of the intellect to the thing). Instead, validity pertains to the correspondence between the "identical, permanent, and stable nature of ideas" amongst representations (*Vorstellungen*). Truth, therefore, consists of the content of representations corresponding to ideas. This correspondence is deemed valid when "ideas" are affirmed, emerging in, but not reduced to, consciousness. For Lotze, "thought in general and those universal forms and principles of thought which hold good everywhere, both in judging of reality and in weighing possibility, are irrespective of any difference in the objects" (*L*:10–1). Lotze's new idealism, therefore, attempts to establish absolute validity as a foundation of unassailable apriorism.[14] As such, we can establish an "unchangeable system of thought ... independent of any correspondence with supposedly real things" (*L*: 506–8). Unaffected by the Heraclitean flux of experience, "knowledge is immune to skepticism regarding the outer world" (*L*: 506–8).

    Under the influence of Lotze, yet still imbued with Kantian sympathies, an alternative to speculative metaphysics and materialism emerged as the Neo-Kantian movement. This movement split into two schools, one centered around Hermann Cohen at Marburg University and another based in southwest Germany around Wilhelm Windelband. The classical Neo-Kantian idealism of the Marburg school, with the late additions of Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer, and Nicolai Hartmann, focused on the logic of the exact sciences.[15] From Lotze, the Marburg school distinguished between the *validity* of atemporal ideal contents of judgments (logical truth, values) and the "real" temporal acts of judging (GA17: 47, 111, 163). Heidegger recounts that Cohen's *Kant's Theory of Experience* reinstated the rigorous and foundational meaning of the transcendental method and the transcendental itself in philosophical thought. Cohen argued for the essential methodological connection between the *Critique of Pure Reason* and mathematical natural science. Following suit, the Marburg school sought an objective methodological structure "given to mathematical natural science" as an "inquiry into the logical foundation of knowledge" (GA56/57: 121). This inquiry concerned the "logical and categorial conditions of its possibility itself" and, thus, not with *transcendent* realities "but with logical foundations" of *transcendentality* (GA56/57: 120). The Southwest "Baden" school, with Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, and Bruno Bauch, sought historical and cultural sciences alongside *transcendent* value (*Wert*).[16] "Ideal assessments" are methodological norms rather than constitutive: "A law of nature is a principle of explanation [and] a norm is a principle of evaluation [*Beurteilung*]."[17] Windelband stresses that, among the multitude of representational connections, "only a few possess the value of normativity" (GA56/57: 121). Similarly, for

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11 See Lotze, *Logic*, §332; §337. For the act/content distinction, see Lotze, *Microcosmus*, §630. A point of reference can be drawn to Hegel's system. Gustavus W. Cunningham points out that in the *Phenomenology,* "thought" is observed and determined in its relation to the objects of time and place. Comparatively, in the *Logic*, the temporal and spatial relations of thought are ignored, and "we move in the ether of pure thought" (46). The concrete categories of the *Phenomenology* are, in the *Logic,* considered for their own sake, making their "inter-relations" determined apart from their experiential basis. The *Phenomenology* assumes that thought is always concrete because its procedure consists in an exhibition and necessity of this assumption. In Cunningham's words: "The *Logic*, likewise, takes this for granted but as a fact established by the *Phenomenology* and then proceeds to investigate specifically thought as it is in and for itself." *Thought and Reality in Hegel's System*, 46.

12 Sullivan, "Rudolph Hermann Lotze, Logic (1817–81)," 1; Milkov, *Hermann Lotze's Influence on Twentieth Century Philosophy*, 163f.

13 Hookway, "Lotze and the Classical Pragmatists," 5.

14 Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 9; Beiser, "Historicism and Neo-Kantianism," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 39, no. 4 (2008): 554–64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.09.002.

15 Natorp maintains that we cannot see the sphere of experience in its primordial givenness, see, Natorp, *Allgemeine Psychologie*, 190; For Heidegger's acknowledgment of this position see, GA56/57: 184.

16 Lotze, *Metaphysics, in Three Books*; Lotze, *Microcosmus*.

17 Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, 449f.

Rickert, logical assessments are "*definite types of representational connection* alongside others, distinguished only by the value of normativity."[18]

In both camps, the "psychological interpretation of Kant," with its "naturalization of consciousness," is displaced with the "transcendental-logical conception" (GA1: 1; GA56/57: 121). Heidegger recalls this shift, suggesting that the Neo-Kantians believed that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* "did not inquire into the psychological origin of knowledge but into the logical value of its validity" (GA 1:19). With respective justification, Kant is enlisted in both camps, reflecting the pluralism of the neo-Kantian movement despite the divergent agendas and competing claims. Some orientation is, therefore, indispensable for understanding what lies between classical neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. Heidegger rightly sees that Lotze is the remaining constant among the neo-Kantians, suggesting: "When one speaks of Neo-Kantian schools today, one thinks primarily of the two renewals of the Kantian philosophy, inaugurated by Cohen and by Windelband"; however, their motives for an "interpretation of Kant are mediated through Lotze" (GA56/67: 121). For Husserl, "Lotze spoke of truths in themselves [*Wahrheiten a sich*], and so it was logical to transfer all things mathematical and most of what traditionally belonged to logic into the realm of ideality."[19] With "truths in themselves," Husserl refers to Lotze's concept of "eternally valid true propositions," namely, logical Platonism (L: 509).[20] Aligning himself with this view, at least in part, Husserl defends a conception of logical truth as a "unity of validity in the timeless realm of ideas, [which] is valid" even if we have yet to "discern it and maybe never discern it."[21]

Heidegger wrote in "§1 Logischer Gegenstand und Geltung" of his dissertation, *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus* (1912), that "the Being of beings, which according to Aristotle 'is said in many ways' in the 'schemata of the categories,' is at bottom 'validity' and has 'logical value'" (GA1: 10f). Heidegger states that "is" "does not mean 'existing,' [as] being actual in the manner of sensory and super sensory objects … What is meant instead is the manner of actuality (*esse verum*) … the *form* of being-there belonging to the logical object" (GA1: 170). For the young Heidegger, "Lotze found the decisive term in the German language," stating: "We have available to us today the fortunate expression 'to be valid' [*Gelten*] …, next to an 'it *is*' there is an 'it *is* valid'" (GA1: 26, 170).[22] Heidegger correctly recounts that Lotze arrives at his concept of validity through "the problem reality" belonging to Plato (GA1: 170). Plato wanted to teach us that truth is valid "irrespective of whether anything in the outer world instantiates it" (*L*: 513).[23] For Heidegger, Plato's ideas, understood as a "form of reality" that is identical and uncovered in judgment, can only be considered valid (*Gelten*). To illustrate this point, Heidegger takes from Lotze that the being-gold of the book cover is "at most" valid, but it never exists, neither in the world nor the realm of the supersensible (GA1: 170).[24]

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18 See Windelband, "Normen und Naturgesetze," 69–72.

19 Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen,* 297.

20 Arnold, "Plato's Ideas in Lotze's Light – On Husserl's Reading of Lotze's Logik," 89.

21 Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen,* 136; Arnold, "Plato's Ideas in Lotze's Light – On Husserl's Reading of Lotze's Logik," 90. In addition to a conception of truth, Husserl forms his view on "'ideal' meanings, the ideal contents of imagination and judgment [*Vorstellungs- und Urteilsinhalten*]" from Lotze. See, Husserl, *Aufsätze und Rezensionen* (1890–1910), Hua XXII, herausgegeben von Bernhard Rang (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 156. To be sure, Husserl presents the *Logical Investigations* as having "picked up strong and gratefully recognized inspiration from the writings of Lotze," particularly in relation to the "absurd inconsistencies [of] psychologism," while also acknowledging that Lotze did little to move beyond this critique. With the publication of the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* and its portrayal of phenomenology as "descriptive psychology," readers and contemporaries believed (e.g., Paul Natorp) Husserl had reverted to psychologism. Evaluating this uncharitable reading lies beyond the scope of this paper. See Husserl, *Introduction to the Logical Investigations: A Draft of a Preface to the Logical Investigations* (1913), ed. Eugen Fink (Springer Netherlands, 1975), 44.

22 Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger,* 75f. Theodore Keisel states here "the difference between the existential and the logical expressed most graphically in the neo-Kantian Lotze's impersonal "It 'is' not, rather It holds [gilt = carries weight, is effective, valid]" Keisel, "Introduction to Recent Research in Logic," 33.

23 Different edition than what has previously been cited. Lotze, *Logik.*

24 Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger,* 68f; Heidegger states that for [the form of being-there belonging to the logical object] Lotze has found the decisive term in the German language: next to an "it is" there is an "it is valid." The form of reality of the identical factor uncovered in the process of judgment can only be validity (*Gelten*). The being-gold of the bookcover at the most is valid, but it never exists. The young Heidegger, thus, maintains that "simple representing," which gives me something objective does not give me the existence of what *is* represented, namely its significance or validity. What is presented is what "it *is*" in regard to its content (that which makes up the idea); I only know of "its" existence in meaning, which is valid (GA1: 166).

Since Plato, it is assumed that the fundamental distinction between the "sensible" and the "nonsensible" is equivalent to a distinction between a sensible being and a supersensible (metaphysical) being.[25] Kant, still committed to a two-world theory, could not adequately distinguish "categories, from psychological functions on the one hand, and metaphysical elements, on the other."[26] Despite being the theme of transcendental logic, Kant's logic remained "completely homeless in his thought."[27] Lotze saw the problem in Kant and argued that the traditional two-world theory gives way to a duality more fundamental than the previously held metaphysical duality. Lotze's "liberating and clarifying achievement" therefore "conceives of the totality of thought in terms of an ultimate duality ... between that which *is* [*Seiendem*] and that which *holds* [*Geltendem*], the realm of *beings* and the realm of *validities* ... between that which *is* and *occurs,* and that which *is valid* without having to *be.*"[28] The fundamental distinction for transcendental philosophy, Lotze contends, is not between physical and metaphysical *existents* but between *existents* and *validities*.[29] The real object of research (*Gegenstand der Untersuchung*) is "not an inquiry into the existent content of the [lawful] principles" of the world, but "the grounds upon which, in a subjective sense, their certainty rests" (L: 406f; 337, 411–2). The object of research, therefore, is not the truth itself but the *marks* by which we recognize it and distinguish it from error.[30]

In his major work, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre* (1911), Emil Lask finds a bridge between the conflicts of idealism, materialism, and scientific value-neutrality. Influenced by Lotze's *Geltungslogik*, Lask proposed a principled distinction, asserting that the "validity character" of "the object of logic" is defined as the theory of meaning (*Bewandtnis*). From Lask, Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift* presents an account of "universal validity and the existing-in-itself of meaning rooted in the absolute spirit of God."[31] As such, Heidegger's ontotheology shares a family resemblance to Plato's transcendent and immutable "idea of the good" as interpreted by the Neo-Kantians (GA1: 176, 187). The Lotzean and Neo-Kantian forms of Platonism, following the notion of the idea of the good as beyond being, conceived "ideas" as "values" or functions of validity that do not exist but are valid.[32] The primary locus of truth is the "noematic meaning in the judgment," and the psychological activity of judging is true only in a "derivative sense" (GA1: 176).[33] Heidegger states that "insofar as the 'significance-content' is valid for the object of judgment as determining it, the judgment is true or false" (GA1: 213f; 401–408). As such, Heidegger states that "the old concept of truth, *adaequatio rei et intellectus,* can be elevated to the purely logical if *res* is conceived as an object [of thought] and *intellectus* as determining the content of significance [the realm of ideas]" (GA1: 176).[34] What is true is the content of the

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25 Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 41.

26 Lask, "Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre," 234.

27 Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 41. See, GA1: 260.

28 Lask, "Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre," 6.

29 Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 41.

30 Anticipating the discussion to come: At the root of skepticism is the alleged impossibility of distinguishing truth from error. The human mind attempts a reflection upon the peculiar laws of its activity and wonders why these laws bring with them a promise of true knowledge, and, despite this, we are often attracted, seemingly inevitably, to error. The conclusion leads to skepticism if this apparent contradiction is not thoroughly investigated. For Lotze, skepticism cannot deny that human thought has specific fundamental laws that affirm the impossibility of agreement between representation and truth for all events. Moreover, the skeptic must admit the presence of truth because it is precisely through these laws of thought that doubt is produced and extended to all our investigations of knowledge.

31 Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 71; Cf. McGrath, *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for The Godforsaken* (Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 185f; For the discussion to come, Heidegger is Emil Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre: eine Studie über den Herrschaftsbereich der logischen Form* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993).

32 Heidegger critically referred to his earlier appropriation of the Lotzean and NeoKantian notion of "validity" in his habilitation writing, characterizing this type of philosophy as "Platonism" (GA 21: 64, 75, 62–8; 42–3; GA20: 92, 102).

33 Derivative of the transcendental logic worked out by Lotze and adapted by Lask. Lotze focused on subject logic, while Lask focused on object logic. See, Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 15f.

34 Krell, "Review of Being and Truth, Being and Time by Martin Heidegger," 154. Heidegger continues stating: It is simply not possible to compare the meaning of a judgment with real objects, as knowledge and judgment are the means through which I gain precise understanding of real objects. Consequently, Duns Scotus abandons the copy theory and opts for immanence-thoughts. The "reality of the external world" is not thereby "argued away." The properly understood thought of immanence does not dissolve reality, and the outer world does not evaporate into a dream. Instead, through the absolute priority of valid meaning, all

representation "corresponding" to the idea. The meaning is valid when it is thought; thus, judgment is meaning (GA1: 31, 38–41).[35]

1.1 The Deconstruction of The Traditional Conception of Truth and the Question Concerning its Ontological Foundations

It must have come as a surprise, pressing through the "phenomenological decade" on the way to *Being and Time*, Heidegger tells his students that "validity has become, as it were, the magic word for logic today [and] it must be made clear why this magic word is at bottom a ball of confusion, helplessness, and dogmatism" (GA21: 79).[36] By 1927, in *Being and Time,* Heidegger continues his critique of Lotze, stating that the term "validity" (*Geltung*) is a "verbal idol" (*Wortgötzen*), which developed the ultimate degeneration of truth to the theory of value constitution.[37] In other words, as David Krell points out, Heidegger saw the *Wertphilosophie* of Windelband and Rickert as the outcome of *Geltungslogik* and described it as "the final stage for the decline of the question of truth."[38] Moreover, the theory of objective validity in Marburg's "Neo-Kantian epistemology of the nineteenth century" aimed to address the "methodologically naïve realism" of *adaequatio rei et intellectus* (SZ: 215).[39] Neo-Kantianism and all prevalent philosophy in Germany continued their inquiry into truth through this directive indication. Philosophy has oriented itself toward "the validity of theoretical knowing" as that which constitutes "the truth of the theoretical proposition, namely, the assertion" (GA21: 8; *SZ*: 155). After Lotze, truth is to be understood primarily in terms of the logical assertion grounded by logical concepts and laws of pure thought.[40] Daniel Dahlstrom notes that this presumption "abets and is abetted by the notion that theory and scientific knowledge consist of systematic sets of true assertions as the endgame of philosophy."[41] (GA21: 10). Likewise, Bruno Bauch wrote a few years earlier than Heidegger that "through Lotze, the concept of validity has been conceived as the fundamental concept not only of philosophy but of all science and all knowledge."[42] Every entity is true to the extent that it can assimilate itself to validity, entering knowledge using logical axioms to determine that it is always true.[43] Put simply, valid meaning corresponds with ideas to ground true judgments expressed in the propositional form.[44]

Despite Lotze's attempt at a new system of idealism, Heidegger suggests that Lotze's concept of "validity" maintains a narrow sense of being (*ens*). For Lotze, validity constitutes "something" being true (*Wahrsein; Weir sen der Wahrheit; ens tanquam verum; verum transcendens*).[45] While this criticism is initially puzzling, let me briefly outline how Heidegger arrives at this conclusion. To reiterate, Lotze argues that validity is thought corresponding to immutable ideas (*Anschauung*, θεωρία). Lotze avoids psychologism by differentiating

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physiological, psychological, and economic-practical epistemologies are condemned, and the irrefutable foundation of the absolute being-valid of truth, genuine objectivity, is established (GA1: 273).

35 GA 1: 17–43; "Recent Research in Logic," in *Becoming Heidegger: On the trail of his early occasional writings, 1910-1927*, ed. trans. Theodore Kisiel (Northwestern University Press, 2007), 31–44.

36 Crowell, "Heidegger's Phenomenological Decade" *Man and World* 28, (1995): 435–448. https://doi-org.qe2a-proxy.mun.ca/10.1007/BF01273742.

37 SZ: 146; To be sure, Heidegger is not only referring to Lotze but also to others who have followed a similar path.

38 Krell, "Review of Being and Truth, Being and Time by Martin Heidegger," 157. See, SZ: 33.

39 Natorp, "Ueber objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntniss," *Philosophische Monatshefte* 23: 257–286. Translated as "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge," by Phillips, L., Kolb, D., *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 12 (1981): 245–266. Reprinted in NKR, §4; Cohen *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1902: §11.

40 Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, 171.

41 Ibid.

42 Bauch, "Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit, Wert und Wirklirhkeit," 36; siehe auch I, II, 4: "Geltung und Gültigkeit" und I, III, 1: "Wahrheit, Sachverhalt und Geltung." Siehe auch LV II/1, 43f.

43 Heidegger, *Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (1916), 267; Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 75f.

44 Heidegger finds truth conceived of in this way, while varied in degree and nuance, at the core of both phenomenology and neo-Kantianism.

45 Heidegger, *Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (1916), 268. Heidegger proposes in *Being and Time verum transcendens* as the ecstatic disclosedness of Dasein, marking the ontological difference between Being (Sein) and being (ens).

between the real (thought) and the ideal (the realm of validities) but must do so by positioning ideas, at least by an immediate acquaintance, outside psychological processes (GA21: 59).[46] I will show later, ideas are merely "occasioned" through sensibility. For Heidegger, the questions that follow are: How do we come to know ideas through things? And why does logical validity account for the correct affirmation? Further, Heidegger reformulates the classical critique of μέθεξη: What kind of actuality can be attributed to the validity of ideas? Lotze anticipates these critical rejoinders, suggesting that ideas are "actual" (*Wirklichkeit*) when they are "affirmed" in four irreducible modes of reality. We can call an idea actual when it is "affirmed" for (1) the being of things, (2) the occurrence of events, (3) the subsistence of relations, and (4) the validity of propositions (L: 511). Lotze states that ideas have a certain element of "affirmedness" "in an extremely general sense that accounts for recognizing ideas attributing to 'something'" (L: 207, 511).[47] In each case, "the being of actuality" is claimed to be something available, albeit not *necessarily* "on hand" (GA21: 75, 77). However, Lotze restricts the "being of things" to something sensory and materially "present" (GA21: 192). By doing so, Lotze forecloses the possibility of maintaining the authentic Greek conception of οὐσία, which, for Plato, designates a presencing (*Anwesen; Gegenwärtigen*) for "something to be encountered at all," namely, presence for a "being to be uncoverable" (GA21: 192).[48] While Lotze believes he dissolves the participation problem, Heidegger claims he neglects the ontological consequence of his view (GA21: 62f).[49] Heidegger glosses these concerns in *Being and Time*, suggesting that "since the time of Lotze," discussions about truth have been problematized based on a derivative relationship between truth and being (*SZ*: 154–5). Lotze claims that "one should not ask further … how it happens that a truth is valid and what this validity means, along with the presupposition that what it intelligibly means could be derived from something else" (*L*: 512–3). Heidegger reminds us that with the acceptance of Lotze's account, the logic of validity is regarded as the "primal phenomenon which cannot be traced back any further" (SZ: 155–6; GA21: 62). [50] However, when "the actuality of the true proposition is identified with validity," and when validity is fundamentally understood as the affirmedness of truth, the denomination "true" is merely attributed to the proposition without ontological clarification about the essence of truth (i.e., "the truth that makes the true thing be true") (GA21: 62). Thus, the logic of validity fails to show what the essence of truth is and why being, in relation to truth, must be maintained as that which is merely present.

In section §44 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger endorses the legitimacy of the μέθεξη problem; however, he claims that philosophy has made "no headway into the question" because it has "already been perverted in the very way it has been approached" (SZ: 217). Lotze is correct to question the relationship between being and truth, yet his solution – being-true as the actuality of true propositions – is based on "an ontologically unclarified character" (*SZ*: 154). With this error in mind, Heidegger declares the task of "clarifying the kind of being which belongs to knowledge itself" (SZ: 217).[51] This declaration comes in the paragraphs leading up to subsections (b) and (c) of §44, where Heidegger seeks to establish the genuine or authentic relationship

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46 Krell, "Review of Being and Truth, Being and Time by Martin Heidegger," 156.

47 Dastur, "The Logic of 'Validity'," 11–2.

48 Dahlstrom in *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, notes that Heidegger will take up Aristotle's ideas of presence as "uncovering, precisely because it is thanks to the unthematic, foregoing, and sustained presence of the entity that it can be perceived and pointed out by means of an assertion" 222.

49 Krell, "Review of Being and Truth, Being and Time by Martin Heidegger," 156. Seen within the sphere of consciousness, the contents are ideas as something that is "eternally and constantly equal to itself (Descartes's *ideae*). Here something is "stabilized as an abiding object of inner intuition" (*L*: 509). Accordingly, the changing whole is not "without a pervading truth" (*L*: 508). These contents are nothing other than what Plato designated as ideas as permanent existence, ἀεὶ ὄν), the "first true object of certain knowledge" These lines are quoted by Heidegger in GA21: 55.

50 To be sure, Heidegger asserts that the primary ambiguity of Lotze's account lies in his expression of what it means for a proposition "to be true." The derivation "to be true" as "being-true" means the same as "the being of the true" (i.e., the being of the true proposition).

51 This pronouncement comes in the paragraphs leading up to Section §44 (b): The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the Traditional Conception of Truth. Heidegger ultimately asserts that "Being-true" ("truth") means Being-uncovering, which means taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). In other words, Being-true is ἀληθεύειν in the manner of ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

between being and truth. In these sections, Heidegger relies on the concept of λόγος established in subsection (b) of §7 (SZ: 32–4). Heidegger draws from the Greek conception of λόγος to assert that a definite mode of truth "lets something be seen in discourse" (SZ: 33–34). Here, Heidegger sets the stage to argue that "Being-true" ("truth") means Being-uncovering: taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness) (SZ: 219). This is the principled function of λόγος. An assertion, therefore, "is true" if it reveals the entity as it is in itself or, in other words, an assertion "points out" and "lets" the entity "be seen" (ἀποφαίνεσθαι) in its uncoveredness. Despite establishing the principled function of λόγος, Heidegger claims assertions still cannot be the primary "locus" of truth (SZ: 33–34). In proposing this "defini-tion' of truth," Heidegger contends that he has not "shaken off the tradition but [has] appropriated it in a primordial way" (SZ: 220). Successfully doing so, however, requires Heidegger to demonstrate that λόγος, functioning as Being-uncovering, is possible only on the basis of a primordial and ontological sense. The "Being-true" of an assertion and "Being-uncovering" of an entity is, in turn, "ontologically possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world" (SZ: 220). This latter phenomenon is known as "the basic state of Dasein and is the foundation for the primordial phenomenon of truth" (SZ: 220). With further nuance, Heidegger claims that "only with Dasein's disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained" (SZ: 220). Being-true and Being-uncovering together make up ἀληθεύειν, disclosure, in the manner of ἀποφαίνεσθαι, making manifest (SZ: 220). Therefore, the existential–ontological foundations of truth are conjunctive with being-in-the-world and disclosure. Disclosedness is now named as that which, in a primary sense, allows entities, beings, and Being to be referred to by assertions or propositions. According to Heidegger, the truth of propositions can be traced back further than *valid* propositions to the presuppositions that condition their possibility, namely, Dasein constituted by disclosedness (SZ: 226).

For this study, as well as for Heidegger's in the winter semester of 1925–26, the analysis of truth begins with a historical development through the nineteenth century, especially the schools of thought born out of the refutation of psychologism, namely, the Lotzian theory of ideas.[52] For Heidegger, an adequate analysis of truth must give an account of itself and the sense of being it presupposes. However, before discussing any positive account that Heidegger offers, it is only through the engagement with Lotze and the traditionally defined concept of truth that "the need to take the question of the essence of truth back to Aristotle" gains its methodological purchase (GA21: 74f). To provide a positive account of Heidegger's concept of truth, one must first see the determinate influences that catalyze the "critical deconstruction of traditional logic" (*kritischer Abbau der überlieferten Logik*). Through a confrontation with Lotze, Heidegger makes his first attempt at what will later be known as the ontological difference, namely, investigating the division between beings and their ontological constitution. Theodore Kisiel argues that through Lotze, Heidegger recognizes the difference between "the entitative and the validating," "psychological occurrences and their logical content," "beings and their meaning," and "things and their thingliness."[53] Truth is neither the correspondence between representations and the realm of validity nor the correspondence between the intellect and objects, but rather the discovery of meaning, exercised through the pre-logical "categories" or "existentials" of human existence. In other words, meaning is attained through the constitutive categories as the structured form of existence as such, namely, that which is constituent but reducible to beings in the world.[54]

For Heidegger, the decisive passages in *Logic* are the first two chapters of the third book, "On Knowing (Methodology)." The interpretation of Plato in chapter two, titled "The World of Ideas," holds the most significance for Husserl and the Neo-Kantians. However, the first chapter, "On Skepticism," includes essential elements of Lotze's epistemology, an account that Heidegger believes obscures the relationship between being and truth. I will outline the details from both chapters to determine whether Heidegger's criticisms of Lotze's ontological implications are warranted and to lay the groundwork for the subsequent issues Heidegger

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52 In the German edition, Heidegger, *Logik, die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), section 9: 62–88.
53 Introduction to Heidegger, "Recent Research in Logic," *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 9 (2009): 34.
54 See, Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 77f.

identifies in the history of philosophy.[55] Much of the scholarship devoted to this topic takes Heidegger at his word, basing its interpretations on the paragraphs in *Logic* that Heidegger quotes. In doing so, it neglects the fine-grained details of Lotze's view, making it difficult to determine whether Heidegger's exposition is faithful to Lotze.[56] The most glaring confusion arises from Heidegger attributing a view to Lotze that he directly opposes as the primary thesis of *Logic*. To reiterate, Heidegger believes that Lotze reduces being to sensible being (*Wesenheit*), truth to actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), and the essence of truth to valid propositions (*gültige Vorschläge*). Yet, Lotze believes his project overcomes skepticism and psychologism by maintaining a new form of idealism whereby pure and valid logic stands apart from the flux of the world and our psychological considerations.[57] Nevertheless, Heidegger's exposition does not efface the historical value of this study. Heidegger's critique of Lotze in *Logic: The Question of Truth* forms the foundation for his subsequent and critical views in §44 of *Being and Time*.[58]

2 Lotze's Concept of Validity and The Formation of a Concept

In *Logic*, Chapter 1: "On Skepticism," Lotze gives an implicit nod to Kant's *Copernican revolution*, suggesting that the history of philosophy has falsely presumed that the mind aims to copy or picture the world of objects, with knowledge being defined by our ability to mirror those objects (L: 177) accurately.[59] If we analogize our ideas to pictures, we might assert that knowledge entails our mental images faithfully depicting real-world objects. Therefore, truth is the agreement of our ideas with the "real" condition of what they profess to copy (*L:* 419). For the skeptics (e.g., Sextus Empiricus), if our immediate awareness of objects is the criteria for knowledge, we cannot ensure the accuracy of these depictions and cannot deem them true. For Lotze, however, these claims are *prima facie* intelligible only because "doubt is the presupposition of some acknowledged truth" (*L*: 177). Lotze claims that we never raise doubt about whether a given representation holds because it would be a matter of indifference unless there is a recognized standard by which they are measured. Skepticism, therefore, cannot mean an absolute negation of truth unless "in a word, a veritable criterion of truth" is presupposed.[60]

Lotze's rebuttal to the skeptic does not endorse the old picture-world theory. For Lotze, the external world should not insert itself into knowledge as the standard by which truth is measured. Instead, truth is measured through "our network of representations," irrespective of whether they are immediately evident or require clarification through other thoughts (*L*: 187). Lotze posits that "nothing but the connection of our representations with themselves can ever constitute the object of our investigations" (*L*: 187). We can compare only the known with the known, not the known with the unknown. That is, representations with representations, and not a representation with the thing it represents. Representations form "the only thing that is immediately given from which our knowledge can begin" (*L*: 493, 498; GA24: 64f). Lotze views representations as mental

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55 Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, 1f.

56 Carl F. Gethamann notes, for example, that Heidegger's criticism of Lotze is "stylized into a generality about the history of philosophy." Gethmann, "Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption in seiner Marburger Vor lesungen" in *Martin Heidegger: Innen- und Außenansichten* ed. Hg.: Peter Rohs, Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg, Siegfried Blasche, Wolfgang R. Köhler, Wolfgang Kuhlmann (Suhrkamp Verlag, 3rd edition, 2016), 110.

57 Moreover, the long exegetical section in the forthcoming section can be justified because it fills the gap in current Lotzean studies. To recall, Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*: "few philosophers have been so pillaged as Lotze was" (51), therefore, few papers deal specifically with Lotze from a Heideggerian perspective.

58 See especially SZ: 216–9. This position can also be read as a conjunctive critique of Husserl's, *Logical Investigations*, especially the 1st, 5th, and 6th.

59 Translations of this work have been modified throughout.

60 See, Lotze, *Logic*, 416. Following Lotze, Heidegger adds that "we must somehow know what a thing is if we are to decide its being or non-being … 'Is there any truth?' is affirmative even when we deny that there is truth, insofar as the denial claims to be a true statement about the non-existence of truth. The denial of the existence of truth affirms the truth of the denial, and therefore the existence of truth. The positing of such a denial, which we usually call skepticism, contradicts itself and therefore is impossible (GA 24: 17f).

constructs that mediate our interaction with the world. They are not mere copies or reflections of external objects but are actively constructed by the logical necessity of thought.

The connections between our representations are identified through the logical principle of relation.[61] Relation is the inherent structure of ideal thought that provides the "capacity and coherence" to measure and interpret our representations. Further, truth consists "solely in universal laws of combination ... that find themselves confirmed in a definite majority of representations without exceptions as often as these representations repeatedly surface in our consciousness" (*L*: 497f). From our representations, we find "the original, and fixed points where certainty lies" (*L*: 503). We deem these fixed points "ideas," allowing our representations to distinguish and differentiate between each other, forming a coherent web of knowledge. Lotze continues, stating: "Truth has always been and will always be valid ... Let us endeavor to ascertain where within this world, the primary fixed points of certainty are to be found, and how it may be possible to communicate this certainty" (*L*: 427). We should "entirely leave out of the question about the opposition between our world of ideas and a world of things" (*L*: 427). Truth and the knowledge *of* truth consist solely in the laws of interconnection, which obtain universally within a given set of ideas that persist in our consciousness. Lotze then urges us to "look upon the former [interconnection of ideas] alone as the *Betreff* we have to deal with" (*L*: 427). In doing so, we can arrive at the essence of truth (*L*: 427).

Departing from a traditional interpretation of Plato, Lotze claims that ideas should not be understood in terms of the kind of being normally ascribed to physical objects.[62] Lotze argues that ideas are "eternal, neither coming into being nor vanishing," and thus "untouched by change" (L: 514). Ideas are always true because they are logically available, but their manifestation in the world is not guaranteed. Ideas possess "a certain element of affirmation" [*Bejahtheit*] that persists even when the concept of "being-a-thing" denies them.[63] Put simply, ideas are true irrespective of our claims to know them. Thus, we can only affirm them when they become "actual" in thought. For example, "color as such" and "sound as such" possess constancy and self-sameness as "concepts or ideas," regardless of their manifestations in thought or the world. In this way, the impressions we receive from the world are distinguished in a "fundamental way" from the content we represent.[64] Lotze describes ideas, therefore, as "independent content, always meaning what it means, and whose relations to others keep their identical eternal validity" or as "quality," "eternally self-identical" (*L*: 507). Lotze's object of investigation is not with the things themselves but with the relation of ideas with the content of thought.

While sense impressions are usually understood as the immediate and direct result of sensory perception, Lotze maintains that "between our passive impressions" lie universals, which present the "aspects of the matter of the impressions" (*L*: 10/19). The impression merely occasions the "objectification" in the initial moment of thought. To that end, Lotze states that "the various instances of first universals distinguish one sensation from another" (*L*: 16/24). Although relations and the comparisons of first universals may subsist "to some degree" for the object, the "common sensible element undetermined by any degree" is not an object of perception (L: 16/24).[65] First universals are "injunctions to our consciousness to present to itself and compare

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61 For Kant the categories of relation are conceived of differently. Inherence and Subsistence (*Inhärenz und Subsistenz*): the relationship between a substance and its properties or accidents. Substance is that which exists in itself and is subject to change, while properties are attributes that adhere to or depend on a substance for their existence. Causality and Dependence (*Kausalität und Abhängigkeit*): the relationship between cause and effect. Every event has a cause that necessitates its occurrence, and every effect depends on its cause for its existence. Causality is a fundamental principle that governs the temporal order of phenomena and the connection between events. Community (*Gemeinschaft*): the relationship between the parts and the whole (i.e., concepts of unity, totality, and the organization of elements into a coherent whole. Community involves the idea that individual elements are interconnected and contribute to the unity or coherence of a larger system. Kant argues that these categories are not derived from experience but are inherent in the structure of the human mind, providing the framework through which we interpret and make sense of empirical data. See A80/B106 in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.*

62 Lotze, *Logic* II, Book III, chapter 1: 199.

63 Dahlstrom, *Heiddegger's Concept of Truth*, 41.

64 Ibid., 40.

65 Although it is beyond the scope of this study, consideration could be made regarding Kant's *common mark* (*nota communis*) in the formation of a concept. Further comparison could be made regarding Kant's pure logical judgments of relation as categorical judgements (*a* is *b*), hypothetical judgements (if p then q), and disjunctive judgements (p or q or r).

the ideas of individual tones and colors" by merely "grasping a common element which our sensation testifies" (L: 16/24). As such, "the first universal cannot be detached from their differences and make the material new and equally perceptible to the idea" (*L*: 16/24). For example, when I see something red here and now and recognize that I sense the color red, I have already transcended, Lotze contends, the sensation and thus apprehend the *universal content* of "red."[66] A *first universal* is thus an individual red as a particularizing of red-in-general. Red is raised to a level of *objective content*, or *"autonomous content,"* whereby the color is no longer a passive affection but something we can name as "redness." As *objectified content*, "redness" is not a thing but a relation we intend as "redness."[67] Despite the sensible flow of change (i.e., this red object looks different to me in a different light), the *objective content* remains "eternally equal to itself," and from out of this content, we can still call the sensible beings red. The content is nothing other than what Plato designated as ideas (i.e., permanent existence, ἀεὶ ὄν), the "first true object of certain knowledge" (GA21: 55; *L*: 509). The object can only be to us as it is because of the content. Determining concepts (such as redness) predicate what we assert to identify things "as this or that" (GA21: 56). In similar cases, the content, as the generic determinations of the sense qualities, forms "the first adequate and solid object of unchanging knowledge" (L: 508). Therefore, "truth is entirely independent of the skeptic's question about their agreement with some essence of things lying outside knowledge" (L: 508). Plato thus makes "the first and most original attempt to make use of this truth that belongs to our world of ideas in itself quite apart from its agreement with some assumed essence of things outside those ideas" (L: 506–507).

It is traditionally assumed that thought abstracts a common element from different instances and forms a universal (concept).[68] To abstract from our sense impressions is to disregard difference and focus on sameness. Lotze contends, however, that abstractions of this kind are "second universals" that "work upon" the first universals (L: 43). For Lotze, traditional abstraction does not explain the connections among the parts that make up a concept. The abstractionist way of forming a concept merely captures a "list of common elements which might not cohere" (L: 11, 35, 43). As such, knowledge gained from subsuming a particular under a concept is negligible or accidental (L: 52).[69] Here, Lotze picks up on an aspect of Kant's account of concept formation that remains troubling in contemporary Kant scholarship. In *Jäsche Logic*, Kant writes:

> I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I *reflect* on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree.[70]

Kant appears to presuppose the recognition of things by their common features before the formation of a concept. Why should I group the species of trees (i.e., spruce, linden, and willow) under the concept of "tree" if I am not already conscious of their common features? Two possible solutions arise. First, the concept of "tree" is constitutive of other concepts (e.g., branches and leaves) down to simple representations. Second, the concept of "tree" is presupposed before it is named and accompanies my perception of the tree species. The first solution is implausible for Kant because the form of any concept is generated by the *logical actus* of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. A concept is formed regardless of whether it is based on "empirical, arbitrary, or intellectual" content.[71] The second solution implies a circularity. However, instead of renouncing this circularity, Hannah Ginsborg justifies it. Ginsborg argues that Kant's concept formation is "not a constituting answer to the question of how empirical concepts are possible, but only as explaining how concepts we

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66 See also Rollinger, "Hermann Lotze on Abstraction and Platonic Ideas," 156f.

67 Rollinger, "Hermann Lotze on Abstraction and Platonic Ideas," 149.

68 Cf. Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation* (Longmans, Green, 1898), 194; 428; see, esp. chapter 2, of Abstraction, or the formation of conceptions. Lotze is drawing on Kant here. For a consolidated literature review, see, McAndrew, "Kant's Theory of Concept Formation and his Theory of Definitions," 591–619.

69 Also See, Lotze (1880), § 23.

70 Kant, *Lectures on logic*, 9:94.

71 Ibid.

already possess can be clarified or made explicit."[72] In this case, the concept functions as a rule for grouping the tree species before comparison and reflection. As such, the logical act indicates the criteria for applying the rule.[73] To defend this claim and provide further nuance, Béatrice Longuenesse distinguishes two operative accounts of Kant's use of concept. First, the rule-forming concept allows the "imaginative syntheses to become aware that a given object falls under its concept."[74] Second is the "discursive and reflective" sense of concept whereby we evaluate the "marks" that comprise the object-concept relationship. In doing so, the rule already operative in the "pre-discursive" figurative syntheses of the imagination is evaluated regarding their classification.[75]

For Lotze, both solutions posit the logical form of a concept as $S = a + b + c + d$. Unsatisfied with this account, Lotze proposes the logical form of $S = F(a, b, c, d...)$. In Lotze's proposal, the value of S is obtained only by combining a, b, c, d, particular to each case a concept is presented (L: 28). In the former, S is equal to the sum of the variables $a + b + c + d$, and thus, the concept is not a function in the strict sense, and problematically merely an addition. Lotze contends, in the latter, F takes four inputs a, b, c, d, and produces an output for S. The nature of the function F combines the inputs to produce the output S and thereby forms the rule, idea, or essence of the function F. In Lotze's gloss, a given configuration of presented contents S is a concept "if a universal S is co-thought which contains the conditioning foundation for the being-together of all its features and the form of their interconnection" (L: § 26).[76] The concept arises consequently "not through the simple omission or addition of different features s^1 and s^2, f^1 and f^2 which occur in the different single cases, but from the universal features S from F."[77] Lotze argues that this latter approach, which involves a function, captures the structure of the concept successfully because it accounts for the interconnections between variables. In short, Lotze's concept formation emphasizes the importance of understanding how the inputs combine to produce the output rather than simply including or excluding features that do or do not obtain. In combining the two Kantian interpretations, Lotze concludes that first universals, working like "simple ideas" in empiricist accounts, allow the concept to function like a rule. In other words, the concept already contains a combination of thoughts, providing the relationship between the first universals; however, they still need to be assessed based on their coherence with the output.

Lotze attempts to ground Kant's claims about the "identity" and "sameness" of the features constituting a second universal.[78] Despite the constant alteration of our presentations and the world, one "obtains" "first universals" as "marks" that are "not fleeting, but eternally selfsame and independent" (L: 32f/40f; 157–159, 436). Therefore, Lotze grounds the concept manifested through a unity of "simple ideas" that cohere (L: 158f/155–6; §318).[79] The world of ideas as concepts holds "affinities" with experience, and thus, "guarantees the security

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72 Ginsborg, "Thinking the Particular as Contained Under the Universal," in *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy* ed. Rebecca Kukla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 40.

73 Newton, "Kant on the Logical Origin of Concepts," *European Journal of Philosophy* 23, no. 3 (2015): 458.

74 Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 46–7.

75 Ibid.

76 Rollinger, "Hermann Lotze on Abstraction and Platonic Ideas," 147–61. Heidegger's Logical Investigations: A Critique Of Husserl, Neo-Kantianism, And Plato, 153.

77 In Aristotle's Metaphysics, accidental attributes (i.e., incidental attributes, or properties) are characteristics that do not define the essence or identity of an object. Instead, they are qualities that an object may possess but could exist without. Substance refers to the underlying essence or nature of an object, which gives it its identity and defines what it is. Accidents, on the other hand, are attributes that can change or be absent without altering the fundamental nature of the object. These accidental attributes include things like color, size, shape, location, and condition. For example, consider a red ball. The redness of the ball is an accidental attribute because the ball could still exist even if it were a different color. Similarly, if the ball were moved from one place to another, its location would change, but it would still be the same ball. The distinction made aims to identify what is merely incidental or contingent for the essence of an object. The insight that Lotze aims to uncover is recognizing that accidental properties of an object relies on the givenness of first universals. In this case, it amounts to "redness" as a concept of color.

78 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B133n: The analytical unity of consciousness pertains to all common concepts as such, e.g., if I think of red in general, I thereby represent to myself a feature [Beschaffenheit] that (as a mark [Merkmal]) can be encountered in anything, or that can be combined with other representations; therefore only by means of an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytical unity.

79 To reiterate, "objectification" in the form of an autonomous content always means the same thing and that continues to mean it "independently of the fact of knowing whether or not our consciousness aims at it" (L: 436).

with which thought can move," and for thought to "investigate the systematic and invariable connections obtaining among the elements of that world [of ideas]" (L: 285). As grounds for "eternally valid, true claims" (e.g., "sweetness itself does not become sourness, a tree does not become a car"), ideas hold in "an unalterable system of thought" and form "the first worthy and fixed object of an immutable knowledge" (L: 352f/508f).[80] To that end, Lotze maintains that:

> We all feel certain in the moment in which we think any truth, that we have not created it for the first time but merely recognized it; it was valid before we thought about it and will continue so without regard to any existence of whatever kind, of things or of us, whether or not it ever finds manifestation in the reality of Existence, or a place as an object of knowledge in the reality of a Thought. (L: 318f/442)

"New" connections formed by thought inevitably have a place in the world of ideas that were previously not discovered (L: 35). The ground upon which eternally valid judgments and propositions are made stand in the realm of Ideas in a fixed mode, awaiting our manifestation of their existence through our acts of judgment (i.e., we judge that adding red and green together does not combine to make blue) (L: 352f/508f).

Ideas are "something" and "not nothing," but this "something" is not the actuality of a thing that is purely of itself, even when it is not an object for anyone.[81] As Jordan Collins puts it: "The contents of the possible ideas stand in fixed, universal, unalterable, timeless relations regardless of what or when we may think of them. The objective and infinitely complex interrelation of the world of ideas remains forever fixed and remains at the foundation of all empirical acts of thought as the necessary condition for their possibility."[82] Ideas are real or actual when their content is valid for determining the given being.[83] To substantiate this interpretation, Lotze states:

> Plato relegates the Ideas to a home which is not in space, he is not trying to hypostasize that which we call their validity into any kind of real existence […] Nor is it any objection that the Ideas are called unintelligible essences … what constitutes the meaning of an Idea, and of a complex no less than of a simple Idea, is that it manifests itself as a unity, unifying the elements which **cohere** in it and rejecting that which is alien to it. Nevertheless, though these various expressions point to the existence of the Ideas, their external validity alone does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of what they truly are. (L: §318)

The transcendental conditions for truth and falsity rely on the truth value remaining identical but not ontologically necessitated. Lotze's conception of *validity*, therefore, "as a form of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*]" presupposes "the eternally self-identical significance of Ideas" but does not necessarily include the "being or existence [*Sein*]" of these Ideas and their conceptual content (*L*: §317). Validity (*Geltung*) denotes the "inherent quality of truth" that exists regardless of subjective interpretation or the context in which it is expressed. It encompasses the objectivity of truth, independent of the intended real object and the intending mind of judgment. A proposition is true not because it is thought identically by everyone but rather because all thinking minds necessarily "recognize" it as such by the idea, as a unity of elements that coheres.[84] In this logical move, Lotze asserts that actuality in thought coheres with ideas. By affirming this relation, the declaration is deemed valid. Validity is a concept everyone understands but cannot be constructed from elements that do not already contain it (L: 316/440).

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80 Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth,* 40.

81 This is not the case for all ideas Lotze says, "we do not speak as of pain that could exist when no one feels it, brightness if the eye does not see it, freedom if there were no entity which itself enjoyed [it]." (Lotze (1880), § 3). Moreover, Lotze states, It is not objectivity in the sense of some sort of real existence which would subsist though nobody had the thought of it, that, by the logical act of creating a name, is accorded to the subject-matter to which that act gives rise. The true meaning of the first act of thought is best exemplified by those languages which have maintained the use of the article… When we speak of "the toothache," "the day," "the franchise," we do not imply that they could exist if there were no person to feel, to see, to enjoy them, respectively. Still less, when we talk of "the adverb" or "the conjunction," do we mean to indicate by the article that the subject-matter described by these words has any sort of existence outside thought (L: 8/11).

82 Heidegger's Logical Investigations: A Critique of Husserl, Neo-Kantianism, And Plato.

83 Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, 40.

84 Ibid., 41.

3 Heidegger on Lotze: The Question of λόγος

In the summer of 1919, Heidegger argues that "Lotze had decisive intuitions, but he was always in danger of falling back into a speculative theological metaphysics, and in principle, he overcomes naturalism" (GA 56/57: 117). However, Heidegger adds that Lotze was also too "philosophically accommodating" to "his empirically oriented age" (GA 56/57: 117). Lotze saw the fundamental error in the mid-nineteenth century of "absolute reification that promoted naturalism" and, with it, "the reduction of all Being to corporeal matter" (GA56/57: 116–7).[85] Lotze puts into motion "the discovery of a non-empirical, non-naturalistic, non-experiential sphere of a non-sensory world that avoids the extravagant supra-sensoriness of the old metaphysics" (GA56/57: 117). However, Lotze's attempt "did not achieve [its] radical insight ... nor did it have the ruthlessness to seize the experiential world and enclose it in a worldview system" (GA56/57: 117).[86] Heidegger points out that for Lotze, sense impressions supply the content for "the first fundamental propositions of knowledge," which "subordinate to the multiplicity of ideas" (GA21: 55f).[87] For Lotze, "We undoubtedly have a conception of affirmation or 'position,' in an extremely general sense, that accounts for the recognition of an idea 'being something'" (e.g., redness being a color). For example, there is "a certain element of affirmation when I distinguish color in general from sound in general, and if I say that they are different sense qualities, then I affirm something. I have something given, to which I say yes" (GA21: 59; L 506–507). Lotze maintains a relational understanding of being; thus, being is known by the "affirmation" or "actuality."[88] In short, Lotze's proposal to the prevailing naturalism of his day is sought through "affirming as an act," which he defines as "nothing but a judgment in which the content of the notion is brought into relation with that of another" (*Micro*, II, 582).

To reiterate, ideas are "something" rather than "nothing" because they are "affirmed." Yet, they must also "already be there" in some way to be "recognized." Lotze claims that "things must be before they can stand in the relations in which ... their [actuality] can become perceptible to us" (*Micro*, II: 583).[89] Simply put, Ideas are "actual" when they hold in a logical relation. However, when distinguishing four irreducible forms of actuality, Lotze "declares that the actuality of *being* could only be ascribed to an enduring thing and that it is proper to the individual thing alone."[90] Heidegger charges Lotze with making a silent yet decisive concession to the prevailing naturalism of the nineteenth century despite otherwise fervently contesting it. Thus, the "logical" difference between "the entitative and the validating" is already ontological for Lotze. In other words, the relationship between validity and actuality concerns the *being* of entities.[91] To clarify this step of Heidegger's argument, we must look closer at Lotze's conception of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). Lotze states that ideas have actuality when:

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85 Lotze saw that the traditional world of the nonsensible there are the "supersensible" beings of metaphysics and the nonsensible validities of logic. The metaphysical two-world theory, Lotze contends, gives way to a fundamental and transcendental duality.

86 With this method, philosophy begins and is initially concerned with processes of knowledge; logic begins as distinct from psychology Lotze (11f): "Presupposing that there are perceptions, representations, and combinations of these according to laws of psychological mechanism, logic itself begins with the conviction that matters cannot rest there, and that in the sphere of representational connections, however these may arise, a distinction can be made between truth and untruth, that in the last instance there are forms to which these connections correspond and laws which they should obey" *Logic*, introduction. Noted by Heidegger in GA56/57, 106–9.

87 Although appearance is not like "reality" – the world of ideas – it does, nevertheless, provide knowledge of reality.

88 Dastur, "The Logic of 'Validity'," 11. Despite Lotze's reduction of being to material being, "ideas are characterized by a certain element of affirmation" or "affirmedness" (Bejahtheit)" that remains even when any sense of being-a-thing is denied of them (11).

89 Lotze's solution, keeping with the process of our thinking and not explicating any supposed relation of mind and world, insists that the very indispensability of cause and effect in human cognition entails a necessary rejection of metaphysical pluralism. Thus, for Lotze, we must abandon "our preconceived idea that they [i.e., things] are originally many and self-existent, and ... [instead adopt] the view that there is a truly existent being m ... [and that] this m is the ground and basis of all individual beings a, b, c, ..." Lotze, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Frederick C. Conybeare (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892). 39.

90 See, *L*: 516f.

91 It is possible that Heidegger is attributing this Lotze after his influence on the scientification of philosophy that followed, and thus, misreads Lotze. Emil Lask read Lotze in a different way, claiming that "the being of entities [*Sein des Seienden*] belongs to the realm of validity, and thus to the non-entitative [*Nicht-Seienden*]" Lask, "Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre," 46.

> We call a thing Real [*wirklich*] which is [*ist*], in contradistinction to another which is not [*nicht ist*]; an event Real which occurs or has occurred, in contradistinction to that which does not occur; a relation Real which obtains [*besteht*], as opposed to one which does not obtain; lastly we call a proposition Really true [*wirklich wahr*] which holds or is valid [*gilt*] as opposed to one of which the validity is still doubtful. This use of language is intelligible; it shows than when we call anything Real [*Wirklichkeit*], we mean always to affirm it, though in different senses according to the different forms which it assumes, but one or other of which it must necessarily assume, and of which no one is reducible to or contained in the other [...] The reality of a proposition means that it holds or is valid [*gilt*] and that its opposite does not hold. (L: 316/439)

Lotze chooses the word *Wirklichkeit* (Real, reality, actuality) to provide a quaternity of ideal correlates and to dispense with the univocal understanding of the term being (*Sein*). Ideas do not depend on sensible beings, yet they can be affirmed in reality or actuality (*Wirklichkeit als Bejahtheit*). Lotze states that the Greeks "never found any term to express the reality of a simple validity as distinguished from the reality of Being, and this constant confusion has prejudiced the clearness of Platonic phraseology" (L: 316/441). To reconcile this confusion, Lotze provides four categorical determinations of validity as *Wirklichkeit* that, he contends, were unavailable to Plato: (1) The actuality of things (*Dinge*), meaning they are, or that they exist (the being of things). (2) The actuality of events (*Ereignisse*) when they "happen" or "occur." (3) The actuality of relations (*Verhältnisse*) when they "obtain." (4) The actuality of propositions (*Sätze*) when they hold or are valid (*Geltung*) (L:317-8f/442).[92] For Lotze, these modes of reality are independent and irreducible to each other. In other words, being, occurrence, subsistence, and validity are all independent forms of actuality and are in "no way derived from one another" (L: 317-8f).

Lotze emphasizes the importance of language, stating that the distinguishing aspect of thought "comes to manifestation in the organization of language" and that without language, "our train of ideas would be but a silent ... strain of music."[93] The actuality of the proposition is recognized as the same in various appearances, while the "content of truth" in the proposition is "recognized" but not "made" by us (*L*: 514–5). Recognition is to speak of a truth that "has been valid" and will be valid.[94] In other words, a proposition has its actuality in the fact that it is valid and is understood insofar as it is taken apart from changes it can undergo. In short, with help from language, when we call something actual, we "always intend to affirm it" by way of the different categorical senses the matter assumes.

3.1 Heidegger's Critique of Ideal Propositions

For Heidegger, Lotze's categorical distinctions leave much to be desired. Lotze does not determine what separates these distinctions, nor how the actuality of ideas is clarified when they are "actually" "valid."

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92 Cf. Heidegger state that: "'being' (ousia) designates for Plato not the being of a thing, but rather "presence, the always on hand" (GA21: 71); Lask, 13f; Logical investigation II, 2/132.

93 Lotze, *M,* 623; The logical thought becomes most distinctly apparent because in "almost all languages the whole stock of the content of ideas is divided into definite, formally distinct classes" and language "must separate the simple elements of thought, by whose employment and combination all the more refined and elevated offices of thought are fulfilled, in forms that make such employment possible."

94 Plato uses the expression true being, or actual being (ὄντως ὄν) when making the distinction between an "actually valid truth and an alleged truth" (L: 514). For Lotze, the idea as being actual (οὐσία) opened the door to a misunderstanding where being (οὐσία) means the "out-there-ness" of an existing thing or substance (ὑπόστασις). Yet, ideas are not things, therefore, Lotze is speaking here on the presupposition that being (Οὐσία) means substance and even essence (ὑπόστασις). For Heidegger, "Οὐσία does not mean substance, thing, something "real" in Lotze's sense, or entity,' Being (Οὐσία) is what is present and/or its presentness, that which is always there." GA24: 59). Heidegger reads Plato's ὄντως ὄν closer to "what something always has been" (τὸ τί ἦν τίνι εἶναι) in the sense of "what it essentially is [ἦν] to be something," or "the essence (of something)" (SZ: 114). Thus, ὄντως ὄν means that which is according to the full measure of being; that which is in the full sense of being "is" in such a way as to fully suffice for being and for the possibility of being. ὄντως ὄν, therefore, signifies that which exists in its entirety, and the being "is" in a manner only achievable by something truly existing in a manner that satisfies the condition of its possibility for existence. For Plato, so Heidegger posits, the word Οὐσία is what is present and/or its presentness, that which is always there. So, the word is entirely and supremely adequate to what Plato meant (GA24: 59).

Heidegger states, "the distinctions overlap" (L: 74f; GA56/57: 199). Likewise, Dahlstrom asks: "Is a sentence, not in a certain respect, a relation? How is a thing to be distinguished from an event? Can't a relation 'happen'?"[95] The most striking conclusion of Lotze's conception of actuality, however, is the naturalistic orientation of actuality as something which *ist*, meaning "to be" pertaining to things. When Lotze declares that the actuality of being "could only be ascribed to an enduring thing" and that it is proper to "the individual thing alone," he asserts that being "real" pertains to "sensory or material things." (L: 516ff).[96] For Heidegger, this implies that when ideas are "actually" referring to a thing, the being is merely present – not the dynamic character of ἀποφαίνεσθαι. In §44 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger reiterates his concern about the relationship between ideal validity and the actuality of things as merely present (SZ: 216). He implicitly recounts Lotze's position, stating that "the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship of agreement … thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the Real Thing as that which is judged about" (SZ: 216). However, Heidegger asks, "How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal entity and something that is real and present-at-hand?" In factical judgments, a relation between the content of judgment and the real object subsists; however, "what does such 'subsisting' [*Bestand*] mean ontologically?" (SZ: 216). Heidegger poses these questions rhetorically to cast doubt on the once widely accepted logic of validity. This approach aligns with Heidegger's deconstructive methodology, which must precede the presentation of his solution: the Greek conception of truth with its proper ontological foundations. When the functioning λόγος points something out, Heidegger claims, "representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the Real Thing," nor is there a demonstration of "an agreement of knowing with its object" or an "agreement between 'contents of consciousness' among themselves." (SZ: 227). On the contrary, what is to be demonstrated is the entity itself, in the way in which (i.e., "how") it is uncovered (SZ: 218).[97]

Heidegger's primary issue with Lotze's conception of truth is the last clause: "We call a proposition Really true [*wirklich wahr*] which holds or is valid (*gilt*) as opposed to one of which the validity is still doubtful" (L: 316/439). Heidegger claims that Lotze does not simply say, as he does analogously in the first three cases, "that a proposition is valid when it is actual, but when it is actual, it is really *true*" (GA24: 62). When attributed to propositions, actuality is a determination of truth. In Heidegger's words: "When the actuality of the true proposition gets identified with validity, and when validity is understood fundamentally as the affirmedness of a truth, then an additional determination ('true') is given to the true proposition" (GA21: 62). However, Lotze does not clarify anything about how the actuality of the supposed "true-actuality" is true (GA24: 62). Lotze merely pins something he calls "*truth*" to propositions in the affirmation of its actuality. In other words, "validity" in the distinct forms of actuality says nothing about truth *as such.* Instead, something is said about what is true, i.e., the possible form of its actuality (i.e., language can depict an idea). Despite this implication, Lotze pronounces "straightforwardly, but unclearly" that truth means validity (GA21: 62). In all cases, Lotze implies that the actuality of an idea makes it true, and the validity of all ideas is "read off the kind of actuality" that pertains to propositions (GA24: 58). Here, Lotze, so Heidegger believes, ontologically fortifies the formulaic essence of truth as "Idea = validity = proposition." (GA21: 61). Heidegger states:

> Truth, as a true proposition, is valid; but validity is the form of actuality pertaining to ideas; and the idea also has the property of being universal in contrast to the sensible particulars. So, in keeping with that, propositions—valid ones—are ideas; they are likewise the ideal in the sense of the universal for the particulars in the propositions—the "positions." (GA21: 61)

Lotze establishes a "seductive ambiguity" to regard truth as the logic of validity (GA21: 62). As such, appealing to Lotze, philosophy thereafter claims that for something "to be true" means for truth "to be valid" (GA24: 62). This ambiguity lies in what Lotze means by the expression "to be true." Since language is the only determination of actuality that can traverse the four domains, propositions are said to be valid because they are "actually

95 Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, 41.

96 Dahlstrom, Concept of truth, 41. Much of the scholarly literature pick up on this same ambiguity. However, it worth noting that Lotze also suggests the following: (L: 5/14).

97 The "how" of the discovery is a modification of Husserl's Intentionally. See amongst many places in the early Freiburg and Marburg lecture courses, GA20: 29f.

true" when they are affirmed. In Lotze's derivation, "actually-true" means the same as "the actuality *of* the true" expressed as a true proposition (GA21: 62). Lotze believes we can arrive at something "actually being true" by differentiating what the idea is from things, events, and relations; however, he cannot discuss further about what qualifies the correctness or incorrectness of these divisions.

Lotze's primary insight is that ideas, serving as the bearers of truth along with the transcendental conditions for enabling us to speak about truth and falsehood in logic, are not ontological entities. Lotze insists that the spatio-temporal world is irrelevant to questions of validity: being (*Sein*) and validity (*Geltung*) are two nondependent domains of actuality. Heidegger shows, however, that Lotze combines the two through his conception of "truth" and "actuality." In an attempt to mitigate this potential criticism, Lotze asserts:

> While it is true ... that 'blue' and 'sweet,' primarily express what appears to our first apprehension as the real property of things, every developed language knows words like 'doubtful,' 'parallel,' 'allowable,' which, as the least reflection shows, can no longer mean in the same simple sense as the former, attaching to actual things; they are abbreviated and condensed expressions of the result of all sorts of relations, and it is only for purposing of thought that we represent the contents of such adjectives as related to those of substantives in the way in which *we imagine an attribute to be related to its subject* ... All we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which are within us ... the existence of things outside us act upon our minds. They only awaken in us ideas, which are not Things. It is then this varied world of ideas within us, it matters not where they may have come from, which forms the sole material directly given to us, from which alone our knowledge can start. (L: 177, emphasis added)

In phenomenological language, truth consists in bringing to completion the coincidence between the representational connection and objective ideal content.[98] Actuality is no longer the limit to which our knowledge must adapt because appearances are no longer the end of knowledge but the means and the cause that awakens in us, "in all its details, the spectacle of the world of representations [*das ganze Schauspiel der Vorstellungswelt*]."[99] Objective knowledge, therefore, does not lie in the unattainability of the world of things (*Welt der Dinge*) but in discovering the connections and laws governing our world of appearances (*Vorstellungswelt*).[100] Michele Vagnetti concisely recounts this point, suggesting that "the different methods by which a judgment can be reached lie in indicating the formal conditions that confer apodictic validity upon a certain content that already meets those conditions."[101] The distinctive feature of human thought lies in the production of justificatory notions which condition the form of apprehension of an object, and not in the mere correspondence of our apprehension with a fact (L: 7). Operating within a framework of validity, psychological thought entails the coherence of discovered ideas to explicate their coincidence, enabling the individual to ascertain truth and validity through their interconnections. It is only through this process that "a thing and its properties can be presented to the thinking mind ... such presentation can" ascertain that "S is P" or "S is not P."[102] Affirmedness remains affirmedness whether we are investigating real or ideal being concerning its actuality. "Sensible," "non-sensible," and "ideal" are not features of being. The affirmedness of the nonsensible says nothing about the kind of affirmedness as such. Validity has the ontological sense of the stable presence of something, and Lotze claimed that it determined the kind of being of true propositions.

Heidegger claims that truth and the meaning of truth through a proposition are identified with "being as valid." The primary instance of validity is the actuality of contents and propositions "in consciousness." Validity is the foundation on which objectivity is based, and bindingness is based on both. A proposition is not valid because it holds true of objects. Lotze avoids such a demand for measurement in correspondence with something. For Lotze, it is the other way around. The proposition is valid; therefore, it holds true of something, and because there is something in consciousness that is stable, it agrees with something. It is

98 Vagnetti, "The Logik by Rudolf Hermann Lotze," 130.
99 Ibid., 133; in the Preface to *Logical Investigations* Husserl responses directly to this Lotze stating that "proper epistemology clarifies, and something clarified is both something become understandable, and something understood – thus the extreme opposite of "wonderment" 44fs.
100 Vagnetti, "The Logik by Rudolf Hermann Lotze," 133.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., 132.

important to note that, as the earlier "derivation" indicated, validity remains primarily related to affirmation. The other two meanings of the word "validity" only corroborate the fundamental point we have already made, namely, that Lotze does not investigate the phenomenon of truth at all. Lotze presumes that the question is already answered in principle by the equation of to be valid = to be true (GA21: 62f). In Heidegger's words: "He builds validity as objectivity and validity as universal bindingness on the first concept of validity, and to that extent, these concepts lead us even further away from the central question about the essence of truth" (GA21: 70).

As a final remark, it is worth noting that in (c) §44 of *Being and Time*, the Lotzean critique takes decisive shape: Heidegger emphasizes the temporal nature of propositions when they rely on an ontologically clarified conception of truth. Heidegger maintains that the so-called "eternal truths," which refer to Lotze's "realm of validity," are "true" only as long as humans exist and can discover them. Heidegger argues, for example, that the law of "Newton's laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatever – these are true only as long as Dasein *is*" (SZ: 226). Newtonian mechanics became true through Newton, and with them, entities became accessible to us. Before Newton, his laws were neither true nor false; however, the entities that pertained to them still followed Newton's laws. Lotze aims at truth being conditional on time latent discovery and thus susceptible to a Heraclitean flux. Lotze attempts to renounce the alleged and violent subjectivism by grounding truth on an eternal and universally given set of ideas. Heidegger also rejects subjectivism, but not on the grounds of a simple consequence of being discovered by humans. Heidegger first asks: "Does this relativity signify that all truth is 'subjective'? If one Interprets 'subjective' as 'left to the subject's discretion', then it certainly does not" (SZ: 227/269). Instead of eliminating the subjectivity that supposedly infects truth, Heidegger seeks to ground it in the human capacity for "uncovering" through the ontological constitution of Dasein, which discloses truth. Heidegger states that when we uncover, we "take [truth] out of the province of 'subjective' discretion and bring the uncovering face to face with the entities themselves" (SZ: 227/269). In other words, once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities that they "beforehand already were" (SZ: 227/269). For Heidegger, "uncovering is the kind of Being which belongs to 'truth' and the so-called 'universal validity' is rooted solely in the fact that human beings uncover entities in themselves and free them" (SZ: 227/269). Only because the entities in themselves are binding, for every way of pointing them out, can they be true. If truth has been correctly understood, Heidegger states, is it in the least impaired by the fact that it is ontically possible only in the "subject." Knowledge is disclosed, discovered, and reflexively grounded in being-in-the-world. Unlike Lotze, Heidegger posits that "eternal truths" will not be adequately proved until "someone lives for eternity." So long as this "proof" is outstanding, "the principle of eternal validity remains a fanciful contention which does not gain in legitimacy" (SZ: 227/269).

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