WITTGENSTEIN AND BEYOND
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS-JOHANN GLOCK

Edited by
Christoph C. Pfisterer, Nicole Rathgeb, and Eva Schmidt
This volume celebrates the work of Hans-Johann Glock, a philosopher renowned for both his exegesis of Wittgenstein and his many contributions to debates in contemporary philosophy. It brings together 16 new essays by up-and-coming and distinguished philosophers engaging with Glock’s work, and it concludes with a “Reflections and Replies” chapter in which Glock responds to his interlocutors.

Glock’s distinctive philosophical voice features a rare combination of a Wittgenstein-inspired approach with a willingness to break away from Wittgenstein to tackle problems in an open-minded manner. The broad selection of essays included in this volume reflects Glock’s wide-ranging philosophical interests and demonstrates the potential of applying Wittgensteinian insights to advance current systematic debates in philosophy. The chapters discuss Wittgenstein’s philosophy, metaphilosophy, truth and language, animal minds and agency, reasons, and normativity.

_Wittgenstein and Beyond_ will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein, metaphilosophy, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

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The present anthology is a festschrift and festschrifts are usually published no earlier than the occasion of the 60th birthday of well-known, influential, and seasoned intellectuals to honour their academic work. This collection celebrates the work of Hans-Johann Glock, and we still find it hard to believe that he has reached this milestone. Anyone who has ever dealt with Hanjo professionally or privately will know him as that lively, humorous, and thoughtful person who is always on his toes, never shies away from philosophical debate, never turns down an offer, provided others also benefit from his effort to make the impossible possible, and has an incredibly big heart in every respect. However, numbers do not lie, and even a hasty glance at his extensive list of publications allows the only reasonable conclusion that, for all his hustle and bustle, the man must have a few years under his belt to have achieved all this—happy birthday!

When we started work on the present volume, we were simply overwhelmed by the unanimously approving responses from Glock’s former and current colleagues, mentors, students, and friends. They all agreed without hesitation to contribute to the festschrift, and it was a palpably emotional moment for all who, after nearly two years of the pandemic, gathered at a three-day symposium in September 2021 in Zurich to discuss the papers published here. The circle of intellectual friends reaches further than what could be fitted between two book covers. However, as editors, we are not only pleased by the many outstanding contributions written especially for this collection, but also deeply impressed by the broad scope of topics and by the dedication with which the authors engage with Glock’s work. The selection of essays included in this volume reflects Glock’s wide-ranging philosophical interests and demonstrates the potential of applying Wittgenstein’s insights to advance current debates in philosophy. Glock’s rare combination of a Wittgenstein-inspired approach with a willingness to break away from Wittgenstein to tackle problems in an open-minded way makes his a distinctive voice in contemporary philosophy.

Before giving an overview of the individual contributions, we will briefly sketch some stages in the jubilarian’s academic career and touch
on the main areas of his philosophical research. Born and raised in the Black Forest in Germany, Glock initially planned to study physics and mathematics. His interest in philosophy was first sparked by a long-distance radio course _Praktische Philosophie/Ethik_ by Karl-Otto Apel, and by a summer school of the German Academic Scholarship Foundation that he attended while still serving as a conscientious objector in the local hospital. There he was assigned to a group of young prize-winning mathematicians working on p-adic numbers. Soon he found himself gravitating towards another group of students discussing Aristotle’s _Topoi_. To his delight, he discovered not only that philosophy is just as fascinating as mathematics, but also that he might be better at it. Glock went to study philosophy at Tübingen, where he would have had to choose between the right-wing Hegelians and the left-wing Hegelians, unless he wanted to risk being considered an intellectually backward Kantian. Due to his interest in natural science, he was more attracted to logical positivism and analytic philosophy, and had the good fortune to fall in with a dissident group of analytic philosophers who were secretly reading Tugendhat. His philosophical preferences were shaped since his school days by the physicist and philosopher Walter R. Fuchs, who characterises analytic philosophy as follows: ‘a [not the] pretty reasonable kind of philosophising, which is quite suited to the needs of a society shaped by _natural science_ and _technology_’ (Fuchs 1972, 10; trans. HG).

After passing his prelims, Glock received a stipend from the German Academic Exchange Service to go to the United Kingdom and was accepted as a visiting scholar at Oxford. Coming to Oxford at the tail end of its golden age, he met people like Michael Dummett, Peter Strawson, Derek Parfit, Jennifer Hornsby, Joseph Raz, Bernard Williams, John McDowell, and Peter Hacker. To Glock, this felt like a promotion from the Conference League to the Premier League. Although the debates were challenging and competitive, people talked to each other in a manner that was civilised and often very constructive. It was the time when the ‘Davidson research programme’ hit Oxford. Many people from professors down to BPhil students believed that the philosopher’s stone consisted in resolving the issues between Dummett and Davidson over the shape of a systematic theory of meaning for natural languages. While some were desperately trying to fathom all the details of Dummett’s notoriously difficult articles on what a theory of meaning is, others were busy trying to find out what the real arguments were in Davidson’s seminal ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’.

Glock’s original plan was to work on transcendental arguments, but Strawson was unavailable for supervision in the first term. As a result, he was asked whether he would like to do something with a ‘local flavour’ and work on Wittgenstein with a certain Peter Hacker. And so it happened that in his first year at Oxford, he had weekly tutorials first with Hacker on Wittgenstein, in the second term with Strawson on Kant
and transcendental arguments, and in the final term with McDowell on Wittgensteinian themes. Next to Hacker, Strawson is the person and teacher who impressed and influenced him the most, not only because of his philosophical style, which was more conciliatory than that of other heavyweights. He also got to like him as a person and thought that Strawson was simply right (or almost right) on many issues; for example, reference, particulars, universals, categories, truth, and the proper role of formal methods in philosophy. At one time, he left his copy of Kant’s first critique in his office after a supervision, and Strawson came running after him, waving the book and shouting: ‘Mr. Glock, your Critique of Pure Reason—never leave without it!’

About Hacker, Glock says that he not only had more to teach about Wittgenstein than he could possibly have learned; he also jerked him out of his mainstream analytic thinking. Glock started out by presenting the essays on the syllabus, peddling all the orthodoxies of philosophy of language that he had imbibed through reading Tugendhat. But soon he came to realise that his elucidations would not pass muster with Hacker, who interrupted him at every juncture. Feeling like he was placed in an intellectual tumble dryer, on one occasion he argued eloquently that the meaning of a sentence consists in its truth conditions, and Hacker replied: “‘The moon is blue” is true if and only if the moon is blue.—Well, what sort of condition is that?!’ Working with Hacker meant not to flinch from questioning fashionable intellectual paradigms. After a term of feeling like a ‘complete idiot’—Glock’s own words—he was both surprised and flattered when he was asked to comment on drafts of the second volume of the commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations that Hacker was co-authoring with Gordon Baker.

Apart from his academic teachers, Glock learned a lot from his peers, some of whom are contributing to this volume. In his first year, he enjoyed stimulating discussions with David Bakhurst and Olav Gjelsvik. When he returned to Oxford as a DPhil student after completing his MA in Berlin with Tugendhat, the scene was even richer. John Hyman and Maria Alvarez became close philosophical interlocutors, and any remark over lunch could easily turn into a protracted philosophical debate. Hyman and Glock set up discussion and reading groups with a truly impressive list of members; people such as Peter Strawson, Joseph Raz, Anthony Kenny, Bede Rundle, Oswald Hanfling, Maria Alvarez, John Cottingham, Jonathan Dancy, and Hanoch Ben-Yami assembled in Glock’s office at St. John’s College to discuss philosophical papers.

After finishing his DPhil with Hacker on Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, Glock had a junior research fellowship at St. John’s College. Hacker explained to him that he would never get a fellowship at Oxford, since Hacker’s references were like the ‘kiss of death’. On his advice, Glock accepted a permanent position as a lecturer at Reading. This proved to be another stroke of luck in Glock’s academic career.
the leadership of John Cottingham, the department combined intellectual vigour, competition, and esprit de corps. Glock became friends with Brad Hooker, and towards the end of his stay the department was joined by Severin Schroeder. This further strengthened its credentials, especially yet not exclusively as regards Wittgenstein. With the personnel changes at Oxford, Reading could moult into a new centre for Wittgenstein studies, which also included John Preston and Max de Gaynesford.

As inspiring as the intellectual environment was, the teaching load was high, and of all people Glock was assigned to hold the introductory lectures on Plato. In addition, there was immense pressure to publish in order to satisfy the research assessment exercise. At a time where the department was threatened with closure, Glock decided to accept the commission to write the *Wittgenstein Dictionary* (Glock 1996). About that time, Glock says: ‘I could not have worked any harder if you had put a gun to my head’—especially because he and his wife Gabi Franz also had two wonderful daughters to raise. Glock remembers one of the traditional Christmas dinners with friends at their house. In between the courses that were served, he had to complete an entry of the *Dictionary*; and we challenge our readers to find out which entry that was.

Having been promoted to a professorship at Reading, the decision to leave for the University of Zurich was not an easy one. Family reasons, a love of the great outdoors, and the prospect of a new challenge prevailed. There were losses as well as gains, however. When Glock moved to the University of Zurich in 2006, he soon found himself embroiled in three controversies (see Glock 2012). The first was a xenophobic campaign against ‘too many German professors’ at Swiss universities. The second was his own campaign for abolishing the Latin requirement at the Faculty of Philosophy; in the eyes of some, this turned Glock into ‘one of biggest threats to Western civilisation since Genghis Khan’ (Glock’s words). And the third was a lingering hostility to analytic philosophy, especially within the humanities and the educated public. Especially regarding that last point, Glock is happy to diagnose a sea-change. The University of Zurich is now a flourishing centre for broad-minded and historically informed analytic work in both theoretical and practical philosophy, where Glock not only finds himself surrounded by excellent colleagues, but also has been able to reconnect with old friends like Joachim Schulte or Katia Saporiti. Glock is also trying to make the most of the opportunities that the University affords for interdisciplinary collaboration with the life and cognitive sciences, e.g. as part of the ongoing National Centre of Competence in Research *Evolving Language*.

In terms of themes that have shaped his work in recent decades, Wittgenstein clearly remains an integral part and inspiration—the sceptic may be convinced by the bibliography printed at the end of this volume. Nevertheless, Glock is not following him faithfully on every point, as the title of this festschrift indicates. He thinks that we should hold on to
Wittgenstein’s critique both of referential conceptions of meaning and of the Cartesian or ‘inner-outer picture’ of the mind, as well as to a distinction between philosophical and scientific questions. At the same time, we should relinquish all vestiges of the idea that being exercised by philosophical questions is a sign of some kind of intellectual disease; and we should also resist Wittgenstein’s occasional anti- or irrational tendencies. There is no gainsaying the fact that Wittgenstein sold at least some of the tickets that the therapeutic interpreters and the so-called ‘New Wittgensteinians’ travel on. In Glock’s view, by contrast, one can share a critical conception of philosophy as Kant and Strawson did, without regarding philosophical questions as symptoms of a disease. He recognises philosophy as a kind of meta-enterprise, not directly continuous with empirical or formal science, but engaged in conceptual clarification as required when addressing fundamental questions about thought and reality. In the same vein, he does not share Wittgenstein’s ab initio rejection of systematic philosophising. Wittgenstein is certainly right that no standard definitions can be given for many philosophically important notions. Nevertheless, the attempt to reach definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, say for meaning, intentional action, truth, or norm, is always valuable and instructive, even when it fails.

Further points of divergence concern Wittgenstein’s views on the semantics–pragmatics distinction, as well as his take on necessary truth and religion. According to Glock, Wittgenstein rightly recognised that the rules constitutive of word meaning and the sense of sentences interact with contextual features, but some of his claims seem to blur the distinction between semantics (lexical meaning) and pragmatics (communicative purpose and implicatures) entirely. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why he was so reticent about acknowledging that a priori necessary true propositions like those of logic and mathematics are truth-apt and can be known. Wittgenstein had a lifelong problem with simply accepting the fact that ‘grammatical propositions’, as he calls them, can be true and can be known. And finally, it is difficult to appreciate why Wittgenstein thinks that it is the rationalist critics of religion like the Encyclopédistes, Kant, or Russell that are conceptually muddled, rather than the true believers and the theological fideists like Pascal, or indeed Wittgenstein himself.

With respect to methodology, Glock is a proponent of conceptual analysis, to wit, connective (as opposed to reductive) analysis in the vein of Strawson (1992). With regard to concepts, Glock has defended a cognitivist view in a series of articles (2006, 2010b, 2010c, 2021). He claims that concepts are principles or rules for certain intellectual operations, in particular the operations of classification and inference. This definition sits well with the way in which the word ‘concept’ (and its counterparts in other languages) is used in logic, philosophy, psychology, and the history of ideas. Moreover, it can account for both the role concepts play
in the cognitive lives of individuals and the logical role they play as the
components of propositions that enter into inferential relations.

Glock has coined a term for the specific version of conceptual analysis he favours: ‘impure conceptual analysis’ (see Glock 2013, 2017). Its impurity comes to the fore in connection with those philosophical topics which are also of interest to scientists—such as the topic of animal minds. With regard to the questions asked in such fields, for example, ‘Do animals reason?’, we can still in principle distinguish between, on the one hand, the philosophical-cum-conceptual question of what a creature has to be able to do in order for it to count as reasoning and, on the other hand, the empirical question whether or not (certain) animals do manifest the relevant behaviour. However, Glock argues, in a fertile investigation of topics such as animal cognition, conceptual and factual issues interact dynamically. It would be wrong to think of the conceptual side of things as purely a priori: Empirical findings can guide us in the analysis of complex and highly contested concepts such as that of reasoning; and they can contribute to establishing the inadequacy or barrenness of suggested conceptual explanations. What is more, it is not always clear where exactly the line between conceptual and factual questions is to be drawn—and the same holds for the line between conceptual and methodological questions. ‘Morgan’s Canon’, for example, the principle that animal behaviour should not be explained in terms of capacities that are more demanding than necessary, is of utmost interest in the philosophical debate on animal minds, but is not reducible to a purely conceptual matter.

As evidenced by influential contributions (such as Glock 2000, 2009, 2010a), Glock has had a major impact on the philosophical debate over animal minds. However, he did not hit upon the topic through having pets. Rather, his interest is inherently theoretical, using the topic of animal minds as a starting point to get clearer on the nature of mind (is it representational?), concepts (and their relation to language), or intentional states (in what sense do they have a ‘content’?) quite generally. A distinction that lies at the heart of Glock’s thought about animal minds is that between differentialists/lingualists and assimilationists. The former tie mentality to language and consequentially argue that animals are not capable of thought; the latter regard the differences between humans and other animals as merely gradual, denying that there is a large gap between the mental capacities of humans and those of animals. Glock himself occupies a kind of middle ground between these two positions, arguing that animals can think without possessing concepts, and possess concepts without having language, but also acknowledging that non-human animals’ lack of language (or concepts) significantly limits their mental capacities, and thereby the scope of what they can desire, believe, and know.
Some of Glock’s most recent work has focused on the nature of reasons, normativity, and rationality. Glock has closely investigated the reasons for which we act, the normativity of reasons, and the nature of rational agency, both in connection with the question of animal agency (Glock 2019) and independently of that question (Glock 2014; Glock and Schmidt 2021). In an objectivist, anti-psychologist vein, Glock insists that the reasons for which we act are not our beliefs or desires, understood as mental states, but rather what we believe or desire—the facts or apparent facts (states of affairs) we believe, but also the goals we strive to achieve. He argues that such an objectivist picture can more easily accommodate the possibility that animals act for reasons. Since some non-human animals can act in pursuit of goals that they adopt for themselves, they can even be said to act rationally in a relatively demanding sense, or so Glock argues.

Each chapter of the festschrift deals with one of the topics from Glock’s research areas as outlined above. The collection is divided into four parts, the first of which is devoted to the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

In Chapter 1, Severin Schroeder discusses the idea, based on an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty*, that there is a category of seemingly empirical propositions which are, in fact, grammatical propositions and exempt from doubt due to their fundamental role in our language. He sides with Glock in disputing this interpretation, arguing that these ‘hinge propositions’ are fallible empirical propositions after all. What is fundamental to our language game, Schroeder argues, are not specific propositions, but the standards of rationality that make us regard such propositions as certain, and those standards are reflected in our everyday judgements.

Joachim Schulte’s contribution (Chapter 2) concerns Wittgenstein’s attitude to history, and in particular the question whether Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy can be regarded as historicist. Schulte examines Glock’s claim that Wittgenstein endorses a ‘minimalist historicism’, according to which knowledge of conceptual history is useful but not essential for philosophical insight. He clarifies Wittgenstein’s use of some key terms (such as ‘spirit’ and ‘culture’) and offers a fruitful reading of some central passages in Wittgenstein’s writings.

Daniel Whiting (Chapter 3) discusses the controversial notion of nonsense that figures prominently in Wittgenstein’s work. According to one interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, nonsense can result from the improper combination of meaningful expressions; according to another, it can only ever result from privation—from a failure to assign meaning to one or more of the relevant expressions. Whiting takes issue with Glock’s defence of the view that Wittgenstein allows for combinatorial nonsense and develops his own version of the privation view, arguing that, for
Wittgenstein, nonsense results from a failure to use an expression in a way that has a point.

Constantine Sandis’s contribution (Chapter 4) discusses Wittgenstein’s perplexing remark that if a lion could talk, we could not understand it. On the most charitable reading, according to Glock, Wittgenstein’s point is not that we would be unable to understand a lion that spoke a human language, but that if lions had a feline language of growls and roars, we would be unable to learn it, since their form of life and behavioural repertoire are so different from our own. Sandis argues, however, that the issue is not what form a lion’s language might take, but whether it is possible in principle for a human to come to understand a lion’s use of language. To address this question, it is important to distinguish between understanding what the lion says and understanding the lion itself.

The second part of the festschrift is entitled ‘Metaphilosophy, Truth, and Perception’. Wittgenstein remarked that what a person says or thinks is true if, and only if, things are as she says or thinks they are. In Chapter 5, Wolfgang Künne takes this truism as his starting point in the exposition of a definition of the predicate ‘x is true’. In doing so, he avails himself of quantification into the position of a full sentence and of the concept of a proposition. He defends this account (elaborated in Künne 2003) against the objection that it is necessary to invoke the notion of truth to explain sentential quantification and the notion of a proposition, and that the definition is therefore circular. Finally, he argues that a definition of the truth predicate suffices for an explanation of the concept of truth, since the meaning of the truth predicate is contained in the meaning of the sentence prefix ‘It is true that ()’.

Ansgar Beckermann (Chapter 6) raises the question to what extent the method of ‘impure conceptual analysis’ that Glock endorses and his conception of a division of labour between philosophy and the empirical sciences can be applied to the philosophy of religion. Beckermann argues that this methodological picture does not quite fit the case of the philosophy of religion, where neither conceptual analysis nor the empirical sciences seem to play an important role. Rather, the method of this field of philosophy is to point to general facts and discuss their implications for questions such as ‘Does God exist?’

The contribution by Christian Nimtz (Chapter 7) also takes a critical look at Glock’s methodological approach. He argues that contrary to Glock’s conception, the job of philosophy is not confined to the elucidation of concepts and the theoretical assessment of scientific theories: Philosophy can also procure evidence suited to support empirical scientific hypotheses. By way of an in-depth case study of John Perry’s ‘The Essential Indexical’, Nimtz advocates the view that one important contribution of philosophy and, particularly, philosophical thought experiments consists in the acquisition of ‘known near-actual truths’.
These are propositions that we know could easily be true, and they can abductively support empirical theories.

In his contribution (Chapter 8), John Hyman traces the development of the philosophy of perception in the twentieth century away from expressly empiricist theories, such as phenomenalism and Lockean indirect realism, towards the causal theory of perception and the disjunctivism of that theory’s critics. He examines Strawson’s argument in favour of the causal theory and assesses Snowdon’s objection to it. He then presses this objection further, bringing it to bear against Snowdon’s own disjunctivist account as well, and draws the conclusion that the disjunctivist’s retreat from empiricism has not gone far enough.

Part III of the festschrift engages with Glock’s work on animal minds. Markus Wild (Chapter 9) examines what it takes for non-human animals to possess conative and cognitive capacities and how researchers should proceed in order to determine the contents of animal mental states. He argues that both questions can only be answered on the basis of an augmentation of Glock’s explanatory framework by what Wild calls the ‘teleosemantic capacity approach’ and ‘hydraulic ethology’. This augmentation is also needed in order for Glock’s ‘master argument for animal cognition’ to succeed and in order to dispose of a number of false dichotomies.

The chapter contributed by Maria Alvarez (Chapter 10) critically examines Glock’s defence of the thesis that animals can act for reasons. She starts by commenting on the distinction between the ‘subjectivist’ and the ‘objectivist’ conception of reasons. Then, she raises two objections against Glock’s central argument. She argues, first, that the forms of animal behaviour that Glock appeals to in his argument can be explained in a way that does not grant awareness of facts to animals, that is, awareness that things are thus-and-so. Secondly, Glock underestimates the complexity of the capacities that would have to be ascribed to animals on his preferred explanation of their behaviour.

The chapter by Albert Newen, Maja Griem, and Simone Pika (Chapter 11) focuses on empathy in human and non-human animals. It is written in support of Glock’s endeavour to change our anthropological views and thereby pave the way for a better understanding of the cognitive abilities of animals. Its topic is empathy and the extent to which the importance of empathy for humans is anchored in evolution. In order to answer this question, Newen, Griem, and Pika set out a new conceptual framework in which different stages in the ontogenetic development of empathy can be described. The authors show further how this framework can be applied to assess empathy across different species of animals.

Helen Steward (Chapter 12) approaches Glock’s work on animal minds from a more assimilationist rather than a more differentialist perspective (by contrast to Alvarez and Ben-Yami). She investigates whether
Glock may be guilty of unjustified zoocentrism in his denial of agency—and even behaviour—to plants as opposed to animals. Glock regards plants as mere information-processors. Steward argues, however, that this verdict cannot be justified given the way in which he describes and illustrates the difference between information processing on the one hand and behaviour on the other. Moreover, if Glock’s further distinction between mere behaviour and agency is spelt out in a way that is consistent with his other views, he might even have to grant the possibility that some plants are agents.

While Glock’s work has drawn attention to the intelligence of some animals and the respects in which animal mentality and agency sometimes are continuous with our own, Hanoch Ben-Yami’s contribution (Chapter 13) is an attempt to identify which mental capacities separate us from animals. He identifies the command of logical concepts as a significant difference. He then shows how many behavioural, intellectual, emotional, and moral capacities depend on this mastery and examines recent empirical research into the limitations of intelligent animals in these respects.

In Chapter 14, Julia Langkau argues that current approaches to creativity blend together two different notions of creativity which should be kept apart: product creativity and process creativity. If we distinguish these two notions, we can resolve some apparent conceptual tensions concerning creativity and better explain the sense in which exceptional humans, animals, artificial intelligence generated art and inventions, and children’s drawings can each be called ‘creative’.

Part IV of the festschrift centres on the topics of normativity and reasons. In three sections, devoted to the topics of rationality, reasons, and rules, respectively, Brad Hooker engages with various themes from Glock’s work (Chapter 15). The chapter begins with a discussion of four conceptions of rationality identified by Glock. Hooker explores how they are to be understood and what they each entail on a plausible reading. Proceeding from the conception of rationality as responsiveness to reasons, he explores the idea of reasons ‘out-weighing’ one another and assesses the extent to which different moral theories are able to accommodate the distinction between ‘pro tanto’ and ‘all things considered’ oughts. In the final section of the chapter, Hooker spells out some connections between reasons and rules and argues that neither of the two categories can be reduced to the other.

Gerhard Ernst’s contribution (Chapter 16) is concerned with reasons for emotions and the question under what circumstances emotions can be regarded as rational or irrational. On the basis of seven short case studies, he delineates various respects in which emotions (and specifically fear) may be irrational. Along the way, he expounds how two different conceptions of rationality (one according to which rationality is a
matter of consistency among mental states, and one according to which it is a matter of correctly responding to reasons) can both shed light on the way the concept applies to emotions.

The book concludes with Glock’s ‘Reflections and Replies’ to the authors’ contributions to the festschrift.

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