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Epistemology and Depth Psychology: Critical Notes on *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis*

(background)

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Adolf Grünbaum's recent work is widely acknowledged as a significant contribution to understanding and assessing Freud.[1] His argument – dense and complex, but logical and forceful – combines the methodological perspective and sophistication of a leading philosopher of science with intelligent and thorough attention to Freud's text and the related literature.

As well as recognition such work merits criticism, and I concentrate on this below. I hope this focus will not obscure my appreciation of the high standards of Grünbaum's argumentation, nor my admiration for his willingness and ability to engage the full range and complexity of Freud's thought with rigour and scholarship. In this field, as Grünbaum's own discussion of the literature points up, such qualities are rare.

I

Grünbaum seeks to assess the 'epistemologic' foundations (xi) of psychoanalysis, and uses certain methodological canons. In particular he holds that 'the establishment of a causal connection in psychoanalysis, no less than in "academic psychology" or medicine, has to rely on modes of inquiry that are refined from time-honored canons of causal interference pioneered by Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill' (46). The canons fix 'demands for the validation of causal claims' (128), including 'the sort of

controls that are needed to attest *causal relevance*' (185), as satisfied, for example, in 'experimental or epidemiological findings' (189).

Reference to these canons pervades Grünbaum's discussion, as emerges if we sketch how many sections of his argument can be related to them.

1 Roughly the first third of the book is a critique of hermeneutic treatments of psychoanalysis. A main point is that authors under discussion seek to evade inductivist assessment of psychoanalytic claims, either by holding that the claims are not causal, or again that they can be supported by means other than Grünbaum allows.

Here Grünbaum states his particular opposition to the idea that claims as to a causal connection between mental items can be cogently supported by a connection in content – a 'thematic affinity' – between them. He speaks of 'what might be dubbed "the thematic affinity fallacy"', and appears to reject the basing of causal claims on connection in content 'no matter how strong the *thematic affinity*'. For, he stresses, 'thematic affinity alone does not vouch for etiologic linkage in the absence of further evidence' (55). The evidence in point seems inductivist.

2 One of Grünbaum's noteworthy contributions is to have explicated Freud's 'Tally Argument'. Concerning the effect of suggestion or transference, Freud acknowleged that an analyst could make a patient 'a supporter of some particular theory and thus . . . share some possible error of his own'. Still, he held, 'this only affects [the patient's] intelligence, not his illness. After all, his conflicts will only be successfully solved and his resistances overcome if the anticipatory ideas [interpretations] he is given tally with what is real in him' (S.E. 1917, XVI: 452).

Grünbaum takes this to claim that psychoanalytic interpretation is causally indispensable for the cure of neurosis, which he dubs the necessary condition thesis, or NCT. This can be tested inductively, and would provide a significant justification for psychoanalytic theory and data.

A way of bringing this out – which may not reflect Grünbaum's thought – is as follows: psychoanalytic interpretation specifies causes of neurosis, in the context of a theory which describes how information about these causes may remove them. So if interpretation were the only means of relieving neurosis, the best explanation of this would surely be the accuracy of the interpretations and associated theory. (The idea of suggestion or placebo, for instance, would leave the differential efficacy of psychoanalytic interpretation unexplained.) Presumed accuracy, in turn, would certify both psychoanalytic data and inferences.

In light of his discussion Grünbaum urges that 'the epistemological considerations that prompted Freud to enunciate his Tally Argument make him a sophisticated scientific methodologist, far superior than is allowed' by either friendly or hostile critics (128). However, the success of therapies other than psychoanalysis makes it 'quite reasonable – though *not* compelling – to interpret [psychoanalytic] therapeutic successes as placebo effects' (161). And this and the fact of untreated remission now makes it reasonable to judge that the empirical claim (NCT) which forms the main premise of this argument has not been borne out.

Thus as matters stand the presumption that suggestion or transference distorts psychoanalytic inquiry and provides an alternative explanation of cure is not refuted. So, as Grünbaum summarizes matters, 'Freud unswervingly, brilliantly, but *unsuccessfully tackled* the contamination issues . . . though he failed pathetically for *empirical* reasons rather than for want of methodological sophistication' (284).

3 Popper has long argued against psychoanalysis and inductivism together, claiming the latter lends spurious credibility to the former. Grünbaum takes Popper to caricature both inductivism and psychoanalysis. He argues as 'one central thesis' that 'epistemic defects bedeviling the Freudian etiologies' are not exhibited by Popper's criterion of falsifiability, but rather by 'time-honored inductivist canons for the validation of causal claims' (125).

Grünbaum argues that psychoanalytic hypotheses are falsifiable, and hence, so far as Popper's criterion goes, scientific. He gives a number of examples, and points out that Popper has actually offered no argument of any weight to the contrary. (What Popper gives instead, as Grünbaum indicates, includes description of an imaginary case, 'deplorable neglect' of telling textual evidence as regards Freud's theory and practice (282), 'exegetical legerdemain', and truncated citation which 'borders on sheer travesty' (284).)

None the less, according to Grünbaum, psychoanalysis is methodologically defective, as 'Freud's theory is challenged by neo-Baconian inductivism to furnish a collation of positive instances from *both* experimental and control groups, if there are to be inductively *supportive* instances.' Psychoanalytic method, lacking appropriate controls, cannot do this. Hence 'to this day analysts have not furnished the kinds of instances from controlled inquiries that are *inductively required* to lend genuine support' (280). So if, as Popper says, he formulated his criterion of falsifiability to elucidate what was wrong with psychoanalysis, Grünbaum can reply that in this task in particular, Popper would have done better to attend to traditional inductivism.

Grünbaum's reasons for holding that psychoanalytic theory is as yet unsupported are consistent with the view, which he also takes, that Freud's explanations may in future be confirmed, and that, in any case, the psychoanalytic method is of distinct heuristic value. He stresses that he emphatically allows

> for a weighty possibility: Future *extra*clinical evidence *may* turn out to reveal after all that Freud's brilliant intellectual imagination was quite serendipitous for psychopathology and other facets of human conduct. . . Neither I nor many of the other critics I know gainsay that psychoanalytic method equips its practitioners with a *heuristically* fecund basis for propounding hypotheses, especially in the hands of a soaring mind like Freud's.
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> (189)

4 Although Grünbaum rejects many methodological criticisms made against Freud, certain inductivist strictures flow naturally from his own account.

Freud and Breuer based their original conception of the causal role of the repressed on what they took to be the lasting removal of symptoms, in a process in which each symptom was removed separately by recovering (and reliving) memories, emotions, etc., associated with events which occasioned that symptom. Here the regular link between symptom, memory of occasioning trauma and therapeutic result can be regarded as providing inductive evidence bearing on their claims.

In his later work, however, Freud drew conclusions without this sort of evidential basis, and, according to Grünbaum, supported them defectively – by questionable causal reasoning and misextrapolation.

(a) Freud sought to trace repressed mental life beyond occasioning traumas – and hence to repressed sexual material of early origin – partly because his early therapeutic results were dependent on transference and not durable. For Grünbaum the early therapeutic results were the core of Freud's evidence for the causal role of the repressed. So he wonders why Freud kept to this. 'Why, I ask, did Freud adamantly retain the generic repression etiology instead of allowing that this etiology itself had simply become baseless?' (184). And he criticizes Freud for failing here to keep his causal claims in accord with his and Breuer's early inductive standards of evidence.

Grünbaum also seems to regard Freud's practice in determining whether material was causally linked to symptoms as both questionable and puzzling. He notes in particular an assumption that the causal role of psychic material in relation to symptoms is sometimes *directly identifiable*. As he says, Freud seemed to take it for granted that 'the concrete features

of a repressed trauma can collectively vouch for its pathogenic potency, *independently* of any *therapeutic benefit* engendered by its mnemic restoration to the patient's consciousness.' Grünbaum notes that if this were so, the methodological points he stresses would be otiose: 'if such direct etiologic identifiability were indeed granted, then Freud could have spared himself the circuitous detour of trying to validate it via NCT' (152).

(b) Freud held that associations led to causes of symptoms, dreams and slips. Again sticking with the inductive evidence, Grünbaum urges that '*the attribution of therapeutic success to the removal of repressions not only was but remains to this day the sole epistemic underwriter of the purported ability of the patients' free associations to certify causes*' (185). Hence, he urges, 'it is unavailing to extol the method of clinical investigation by free association as a trustworthy resource of etiologic inquiry' (186) in the absence of further epistemic underpinning. Further, analysis does not cure dreams or slips, so there can be no 'counterpart to the *therapeutic* support . . . for the *investigative cogency* of lifting repressions via free associations to fathom the pathogens' (231). Since the claim that associations locate causes of dreams or slips lacks such inductive support, Grünbaum takes Freud to have misextrapolated from the case of symptoms in making it (194).

II

Grünbaum's use of neo-Baconian canons prompts an objection. In commonsense psychological practice we already establish causal connections (in particular concerning the role of motives) interpretively, in ways that are autonomous, cogent, and prior to such canons. So it seems wrong to hold generally that cogency in a psychology of motive must satisfy them; indeed, for motives, it is unclear how such canons could be used, or how inductive methods could replicate commonsense interpretation.

Further, psychoanalytic theory seems an extension of commonsense understanding of motives, by interpretive means internal to it. So psychoanalytic theory may also be cogent, but related to inductive methods no more closely than commonsense psychology itself. This is a natural view, and probably that of many advocates of psychoanalysis, but it gives a perspective very different from Grünbaum's.

Grünbaum himself stresses that we know motives to have a causal role, which he does not claim that we establish by neo-Baconian means: 'if an agent is actually moved to do A by having a certain reason or motive M . . .

the agent's having M qualified as being *causally relevant* to what he did, *regardless of whether M is conscious or repressed*' (72). Still he invokes this same notion, causal relevance, in claiming that a psychoanalytic view that repression is pathological 'lacks the sort of controls that are needed to establish *causal relevance*' (185). So the question arises as to why controls should be required for psychoanalytic but not commonsense judgements on the role of motives. If commonsense cogency as to causal relevance is in question, then surely, it seems, commonsense practices (or their extension) might suffice for it.

Since we interpret in commonsense terms naturally, and take the understanding so registered for granted, we have little explicit account of how the process works or what renders it cogent. Still, there are some things to be said about hypothesis and confirmation in commonsense psychology, and these seem to bear directly on psychoanalytic theory. As Freud's procedure was to interpret what people said and did, it is not surprising that commonsense and psychoanalytic interpretation and theory should fit in this way. The fit, however, gives some reason for holding that a mode of verification already regarded as cogent in one case has claim to weight in the other.[2]

Everyday psychological practice seems based, among other things, on our natural ability to take bodily movement as informed by intention, and to relate this to motive – belief, desire, emotion, and so on. Even a young child, for example, is able to discern patterns of intention in the consecutive movements of persons, and so to relate distinct movements to one another by relating them to a structure of motive. (Thus Augustine appropriately calls such movement 'as it were the natural language of all peoples'.)

Since we take the motives we discern in this way as causes of the movements, we can represent ourselves as making interpretive hypotheses as to causes (motives) on the basis of effects (sequences of apparently motivated movements). These hypotheses are based upon the apparent intentional content of the effects, and serve to specify this content more fully, in terms of that of the causes.

Thus by taking someone's moving a glass towards a tap as deriving from a desire so to move it, and this from a desire to get a drink and a belief that this is a way of doing so, we interpret him as intentionally moving the glass that way, and, deepening the account to cover more movements, intentionally getting a drink. The effect, thus explained, inherits the descriptions of the causes from which, if the explanation is correct, it derives. So the hypotheses are that the effects are derived from certain causes, so as to give them coincident content.

This illustrates how commonsense description of motives already displays their causal and explanatory role. Further, since the truth of interpretive hypotheses entails a coincidence in content between *explanans* and *explanadum*, or again between cause and effect, this is a field in which good explanation achieves a maximum of derivational descriptive fit, or connection in content, as between cause and effect. So quite generally, connection in psychological content is a mark of causal, and so potentially of explanatory, connection.

Our understanding relates movement to movement, and hence action to action and motive to motive, as interpretation proceeds. In effect we constantly integrate the explanation we are inclined to give for one action with that we are inclined to give for others, revising as we go. As we gain and apply further knowledge of motive, we relate our tentative understanding of each course of action with that of others more deeply and extensively. So, as the range of effects which we seek to bring into the pattern of coinciding content we have so far hypothetically understood broadens, we hypothesize further explanatory causes, which are deeper and therefore of wider explanatory scope.

So far as our efforts are successful, we will be able to employ a system of causes whose descriptions enjoy maximum derivational fit with those of the effects, and in which the integration of causes with one another will be shown in relations of psychological coherence. Relations of this kind hold among the desires and beliefs in the example above, as well as the further elements (e.g. beliefs about the behaviour of water, glasses, and so on) upon which the example implicitly draws. This again is a consequence of the way commonsense description shows causal role. Where explanation consists in assembling and relating elements (motives) whose explanatory and causal role is displayed in their contents, causal and explanatory connection is shown in connection of content, depth and scope of explanation in the range of such connection, and co-operation of causes in coherence of the content.

Beliefs and desires serve as reasons, and as reasons for reasons. Each reason must cohere with everything it serves to explain and everything which fits with it in explanation. We sometimes relate whole patterns of planning and action to a few sources of motive – deep desires, traits of character, and the like; and the ascription of beliefs and desires goes with that of concepts, and so further beliefs and desires, in co-determining patterns. The field of coherence, therefore, is dense, deep and extensive. In such a field commonsense understanding projects for each ascription a pattern of expectation and constraint, which further ascriptions will fit or fail to fit.[3]

This is a source of verification and cogency in commonsense psychology. Just as we can take ourselves to make hypotheses about motives, so we can take ourselves to confirm, disconfirm and modify these in light of the way our account for one action fits that for others. Roughly, as we proceed, an explanatory ascription of motive in one case is confirmed by coherence with those in others, and disconfirmed by dissonance or lack of expected coherence. So each intuitive ascription we register as we build up our picture of persons can be taken as answerable to, and as ultimately forming a cohering and mutually supporting network with, the many others with which it is integrated.

Now it seems that psychoanalysis is aimed at extending this kind of understanding, and in ways which use the sort of confirmation and disconfirmation that goes with it. This emerges clearly if we consider the key psychoanalytic claim that many dreams, slips and symptoms can be seen as wish-fulfilling.

The structure of this can be illustrated by reference to a simple dream reported by Freud. When he had eaten anchovies or other salted food, Freud noticed, he would frequently dream that he was drinking delicious cool water. Then he would wake up thirsty and get a drink. He took it that the thirst had caused a wish to drink, which in turn had caused the dream.

Here we have two elements which are related in content – the thirst which Freud felt on waking, and the dream, which was one of slaking thirst. These are connected in content as motive and satisfaction of motive. Thirst is a motive for drinking, and the dream is of drinking. In light of this connection of content, it seems, we are inclined to regard these elements as causally related. We take it, that is, that it is no coincidence that a person would have this sort of dream when he was thirsty, and so hold that the thirst caused the dream.

This ascription of a causal connection between two elements related in content, however, requires the introduction of a third. The dream occurred while Freud was asleep, and before he was aware of thirst on waking. So something related to the thirst must have acted while Freud was asleep. Freud takes this to have been a wish, caused by the thirst, to get a drink. Since the dream represents this wish as fulfilled, the dream can be regarded as a wish-fulfilment. The whole of the material, including that hypothesized, thus takes the pattern motive: wish: represented satisfaction.

Thus in even this simple and relatively transparent example, we find a certain inferential complexity. This can be indicated by saying that the operation of the wish to drink, which is supposed to have occurred in sleep and caused the dream, is not observed but rather purely hypothetical. We

may take ourselves or Freud to have observed that he dreamt of drinking and was thirsty on waking. There is no such observable or introspectible contact with the operation of the wish, which is supposed to show solely in the occurrence of the dream itself.

In postulating this wish, Freud evidently introduces an element which coheres in content with both thirst and dream. There are two aspects of coherence – that of thirst to wish, and that of wish to dream. The wish to drink evidently coheres with the motive of thirst, as the kind of wish such a motive naturally causes. The link is simple here, but has much more complex instances. Secondly, as noted, the wish and the dream cohere as wish and representation of the fulfilment of the wish.

This second aspect of coherence thus imposes on the dream a further pattern already familiar from commonsense psychology. It is that of wishful thinking or imagining, in which someone thinks or imagines that something is the case simply because he wishes it were. In such cases wishes cause episodes of thinking or imagining that things are as wished. Freud is thirsty, and his dream represents things as a thirsty man would wish them. The situation is thus as it would be if the dream were a bit of wishful imagining. So it is natural to hypothesize the operation of a wish in sleep, and thereby to assimilate the dream to this familiar paradigm.

The explanatory inference here is thus one in which an interpretive hypothesis as to a cause is introduced, so that an effect (the dream) can be taken as derived from the cause in such a way as to have inherited content from it. The explanation is thus comparable to one in which a desire is hypothesized as a cause of action. There are, however, differences. In this case what is explained is not an apparent pattern in intentions and actions, but rather, first, an apparent pattern as between motive and dream, and secondly, the content of the dream itself. The patterns of derivation of content invoked here are also not those of rational action. In rational action motives produce willed intentions and real actions aimed at satisfaction. Here they produce wishes and mere representations of satisfaction, on the pattern of wishful imagining.

Let us now take some material from the example which Freud presented as a first specimen of his way of interpreting dreams, and which is also discussed by Grünbaum and Clark Glymour (1983). The content of part of Freud's dream was as follows:

> I said to [Irma] 'If you still get pains it's really only your fault.' She replied 'If you only knew what pains I've got now in my throat and stomach and abdomen – it's choking me.' I was alarmed and looked at her. She looked pale and puffy. I thought to myself that after all I must be missing some organic trouble . . . Not long ago, when she was feeling unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection

. . . injections of that sort ought not be made thoughtlessly . . . And probably the syringe had not been clean.

(S.E. 1900, IV: 107)

This content does not initially seem understandable on the pattern of the previous example. According to Freud, however, this is how it should be seen, in light of the background he is able to provide:

Irma was Freud's patient, and Otto a colleague. The day before the dream Otto has said to Freud that Irma was looking 'better, but not quite well'. On reflection, Freud was able to realize that he had felt some sort of reproof in this – as if Otto was saying that Freud had promised Irma too much. (This recollection evidently emerged clearly and fully only in the course of considering the dream: Freud says 'my disagreeable impression was not clear to me, and I gave no outward sign of it', whereas after the analysis he was enabled 'retrospectively to put this transient impression into words' (S.E. 1900, IV: 106, 120). He had, in fact, been writing out Irma's case history the night before, in order, as he realized, to justify himself against this imagined reproach.

Freud took it that wishes related to this desire to be justified – and for himself not to be at fault – showed in the dream and his associations to it, which he wrote down. In the case of his saying that if she still had pains, it was not his fault, he reflected that this showed that he seemed especially anxious not to be responsible for the pains she still had. The wish which he took to be operative in this part of the dream then emerged with the next association. (Freud italicizes the aspect of the dream linked with the association.)

I was alarmed at the idea that I had missed an organic illness. This, as may well be believed, is a perpetual source of anxiety to a specialist whose practice is almost limited to neurotic patients and who is in the habit of attributing to hysteria a great number of symptoms which other physicians treat as organic. On the other hand, a faint doubt crept into my mind – from where I could not tell – that my alarm was not entirely genuine. If Irma's pains had an organic basis, once again I could not be held responsible for curing them; my treatment only set out to get rid of *hysterical* pains. It occurred to me, in fact, that I was actually *wishing* that there had been a wrong diagnosis; for if so, the blame for my lack of success would have been got rid of.

(S.E. 1900, IV: 109)

The hypothesis that he had the wish which emerges here is, as Freud took it, strengthened by its coherence with the rest of the dream and what he could remember from the day before. For the dream goes on to reveal that the illness which Freud has misdiagnosed was also in fact Otto's fault.

So the reproach which Freud had felt as a fleeting and disagreeable impression on hearing Otto's remark was, in the dream, entirely deflected and put back onto Otto. As Freud puts it:

The dream fulfilled certain wishes which were started in me by the events of the previous day (the news given me by Otto and my writing out of the case history). The conclusion of the dream, that is to say, was that I was not responsible for the persistence of Irma's pains, but that Otto was. Otto had in fact annoyed me by his remarks about Irma's incomplete cure, and the dream gave me my revenge by throwing the reproach back on to him. The dream acquitted me of the responsibility for Irma's condition by showing that it was due to other factors – it produced a whole series of reasons. The dream presented a state of affairs as I should have wished it to be. *Thus its content was the fulfilment of a wish and its motive was a wish*.

(S.E. 1900, IV: 118–19)

The structure of this example is plainly that discerned in the last. Despite important differences, which we shall consider in a moment, it seems that there is good reason to take this dream too as a wish-fulfilment.

Although Grünbaum and Glymour do not discuss the particular association quoted, it would seem from their general description of the Irma dream that they would agree. Grünbaum emphasizes that this is a case where 'commonsense psychology regards a dream as patently wish fulfilling', and says that 'aggressive wishes which had remained unfulfilled by the end of the day in question are then patently acted out or realized in the manifest dream content' (221–2). Likewise Glymour says that 'the interpretation offered is enormously plausible largely because it is an almost literal reading of the contents of the dream, in which the blame for Irma's illness is placed with Otto, not Freud (1983: 63).

The reason for agreement is plain. As in the case of the dream of drinking, there is an apparent coincidence in content among motives and dream, in light of which we take them as causally connected. Grünbaum describes the coincidence as that of patent realization, while Glymour puts it as one content being 'an almost literal reading' of the other.

Despite its commonsense cogency, Freud's interpretation has a theoretical character, and one which goes beyond commonsense. This can partly be brought out by contrast with the previous example.

First, the dream of drinking seems plainly wishful, and would ordinarily be recognized as such. This is not so in the present example. It is not commonsense to suppose that a doctor's dreaming that he had made a kind of misdiagnosis that was a perpetual source of anxiety to him was in fact wishful, nor his dreaming that his patient was organically ill, nor that this had been caused by a colleague. Rather the wishful nature of these

representations can seem clear only if we consider them together with a context of motive emerging in memories and association which Freud was able to remember, notice the relevance of, and report.

As before we have an apparent relation in content between motives and dream, which, together with the content of the dream, is explicable on the supposition of a wish operative in sleep. Previously the motive was thirst, and the wish – to drink – a nearly inevitable and commonsensically acknowledged accompaniment of this. Here the motive is Freud's desire to justify himself against a supposed reproach, etc., and his wish that he should have misdiagnosed the case and that his patient should have in fact been made ill by the author of the reproach. We readily understand such wishes as coherent with the motives in question, and so as derivative from them. But these are plainly *not* standard commonsense correlates of such motives. Rather, surely, it is surprising that the motive should have these effects.

The surprise is not just that a motive should cause wishes which might not have been predicted. Rather it is also that the wishes themselves, and the way of thinking shown in their production, are, by commonsense standards, quite extraordinary. They are not very rational. Convicting yourself of making a sort of diagnostic blunder about which you are perpetually anxious, for example, is hardly a sensible way of escaping reproach or anxiety about a patient's condition. The best that can be said for it, so to speak, is that it fits with things as represented in the rest of the dream. Again, in the way it reverses Otto's reproach, the dream seems like a transparently childish 'It's not *me* that's bad, it's *you*.'[4] This infantile quality of thought goes with something like ruthlessness, as Freud notes, for example, in saying 'I had a sense of awkwardness at having invented such a severe illness for Irma simply in order to clear myself. It looked so cruel . . .'

In an ordinary context we should find it strange that an adult who felt reproached should evince such irrational and ruthless wishes, or attempt a reversal which was so obviously baseless and silly. It may seem more natural that wishful thinking of such a character should occur during sleep. Still it is novel, and there is a discovery in noticing it.

The psychologically remarkable character of the wishes and thinking behind the dream is a direct product of the nature of Freud's theory together with the fact – which according to Glymour renders the interpretation 'enormously plausible' – that the wishes are, in part, read from the manifest content of the dream. This is theoretically determined: since the wishes are hypothesized as derivative from certain motives precisely in order to yield this content, the wishes must enjoy a certain

coincidence with it. This, however, determines the ascription of wishes and ways of thinking that are otherwise unexpected.

In light of this it might seem that Freud should have introduced a special theoretical term – perhaps something like 'night-time motive derivative' – instead of the commonsense term 'wish'. Still, what Freud intuitively took himself to discover in the association quoted was a wish. Also it accords with commonsense to take wishes as derived from, and so to be connected in content with, motives like desire; but wishes are allowed greater detachment from reality and rationality. We do not expect someone's wishes to be entirely consistent with his actions, or, indeed, with one another. They are, so to speak, permitted as relatively unintegrated creatures of the mind of the moment. So the commonsense concept, in terms of which Freud's intuition about the dream comes, is one that admits of the extension which, in this case, it receives. Using the commonsense word, then, and accepting the implicit hypothesis in light of the context of memory and association Freud supplies, we find this surprising wishful thinking, as Grünbaum puts it, 'patently realized' in the manifest content of the dream.

Let us now take another example discussed by Grünbaum and Glymour. One of Freud's patients dreamt

> I wanted to give a supper-party, but I had nothing in the house but a little smoked salmon. It thought I would go out and buy something, but remembered it was Sunday afternoon and all the shops would be shut. Next I tried to ring up some caterers, but the telephone was out of order. So I had to abandon my wish to give a supper-party.

The patient's first associations concerned, among other things, the fact that her husband had remarked

> the day before that he was getting too stout and therefore intended to start on a course of weight-reduction. He proposed to rise early, do physical exercises, keep to a strict diet, and above all accept no more invitations to supper.

Although these associations seemed to indicate a link between going to supper-parties and being stout, they were not sufficient to interpret the dream. So Freud asked for more.

> After a short pause, which would correspond to the overcoming of a resistance, she went on to tell me that the day before she had visited a woman friend of whom she confessed she felt jealous because her (my patient's) husband was constantly singing her praises. Fortunately this friend of hers is very skinny and thin and her husband admires a plumper figure. I asked what she had talked about to her thin friend. Naturally, she replied, of that lady's wish to grow a little stouter. Her

friend had enquired, too: 'When are you going to ask us to another meal? You always feed one so well!'

(S.E. 1900, IV: 148)

This indicated an interpretation for the dream, parallel to that for the examples just considered. The dreamer's husband praised her friend, and the dreamer was jealous of her. The jealousy was mitigated by the fact that the friend was skinny. The friend had, however, just been saying that she wanted to get plumper, and that she wanted to be invited to supper to be well fed. So the dreamer had motives for wishing not to give a supper-party. This would be a wish represented in the dream.

Freud sought confirmation of this by asking about a further and as yet unconsidered detail of the dream. He says that what was now lacking

was some coincidence to confirm the solution. The smoked salmon in the dream had not yet been accounted for. 'How,' I asked, 'did you arrive at the salmon that came into your dream?' 'Oh,' she replied, 'smoked salmon is my friend's favourite dish.'

(S.E. 1900, IV: 147–8)

Freud's taking this as confirmation is readily understandable in terms of the common structure of this and the previous example. In each case the dreamer remembers events and motives from the day which are connected in content with the dream and so would seem to have played a role in bringing it about. This in turn gives reason to hyothesize something mediating the content of motives and dream, and a hypothesis which fits both contents is that a wish was derived from the motives and realized in the dream.

Since the reason for entertaining this hypothesis is connection in content between motives and the manifest content of the dream, the hypothesis is strengthened by further evidence of such connection. This is provided by the dreamer's acknowledgement that smoked salmon is her friend's favourite dish. Since this is something the dreamer knew, the information provides a further direct connection between motives and dream. Her jealousy was not just of a skinny friend, but of a skinny friend who particularly liked smoked salmon, and this latter content appears explicitly in the dream. Further, the way in which this content appears fits with the particular motive from which the content of the dream is hypothesized to derive. A jealous wish not to give a supper-party would serve to deprive the friend of an opportunity to get plumper and more attractive. That this is done while having some smoked salmon, however, adds something else which fits with jealousy. The dreamer herself has her

friend's favourite food. The dream reverses the kind of deficit felt in jealousy, and represents the dreamer herself as having what the object of her jealousy would particularly like to have.

The hypothesized wish again is not commonsensical. We can no more assume that the dreamer would rationally think of treating her friend this way, than that Freud would so wish a misdiagnosis on himself, or illness on Irma. Also, the reversal of jealousy over food – which might, to stress the similarity, be put as 'It isn't *you* that will have what you want. It's *me*' – is as silly and infantile as Freud's more explicit treatment of Otto. None the less it seems that the ascription of such sub-reasonable wishes does affect our sense of the content and significance of the events and motives which gave rise to the dream. We see that Freud's feelings on hearing Otto's remark were connected with motives more important than their appearance to Freud in a mere fleeting impression might suggest, and these motives in turn may seem less reasonable and mature for their connection with the wishes that gave rise to the dream; again, we have reason to suppose that the lady's conversation with her friend roused her jealousy beyond her awareness, and that this had an element which found an unreasonable expression.

So we can see that these two examples present essentially the same elements. First, there are dream contents: misdiagnosis, inability to give supper. Secondly, there are associated memories of events from the day that are connected in content with the dream: Freud's of discussing Irma, the woman's of the conversation with her friend about coming to supper. Thirdly, these are connected with motives: Freud's sense of responsibility for Irma's condition and his resentment towards Otto, the woman's jealousy of her friend. Taking these into account, we see that the content of the dream can be regarded as representing the satisfaction of wishes derived from the motives, and so as related by derivative representation of satisfaction to the motives themselves. The material in these dreams, just as in the simple one with which we began, coheres in terms of derivation on the pattern motive: wish: satisfaction.

Discerning this pattern in the more complex cases gives a further gain in explanatory coherence. More elements, and elements which are more disparate in content, are brought under the pattern, and hence become explicable as instances of it. So the overall reason for accepting the hypothesis of wish-fulfilment here is that it provides, through relatively complex processes of inference, an explanatory account of the relations of varied apparently connected elements. This is the same as the reason for accepting explanations of elements of behaviour as action. There are different patterns, and different relations of coherence involved, but

hypotheses, inferences, and relations of confirmation and disconfirmation are of broadly the same kind.

The wishes whose ascription is thus supported point beyond common sense, and in ways which require a certain effort of acknowledgement, and hence acceptance of an extended sense of self, on the dreamer's part. Freud has to admit, with a sense of awkwardness, that he entertains cruel-looking wishes; and the woman must feel that her jealousy of her friend, which she apparently finds a difficult topic, plays a certain further role in her mental life.

In both dreams this goes with something akin to self-ascriptions, in the associations, of the role of the motives in producing the dreams. Freud feels that his alarm is not quite sincere, and that he may be wishing a misdiagnosis on himself and (cruelly) illness on Irma. The woman says she arrives at the smoked salmon in the dream because it is the favourite food of her friend, and presumably thereby registers an alteration in her sense of her jealousy and its effects.

Grünbaum says of the Irma dream that 'commonsense psychology regards [it] as patently wish-fulfilling'. Still, it is the context including memory and association supplied by Freud, and not commonsense psychology alone, which yields this result.

It is possible that such contexts should be found for many other dreams, so that their interpretation would lead to the ascription of further wishes whose role and content is novel for commonsense psychology. Also the presence of many such unexpected elements might prompt further revisions – say, about the importance of such fragmentary and unintegrated mental items, the place of wishful thinking in life, or the role of what is egoistic or childish in the mind. But this is the possibility that Grünbaum does not countenance for psychoanalysis generally: that ordinary commonsense psychological inference, operating upon previously unnoticed or undiscovered material, should strongly support theoretical claims which go beyond psychological common sense.

There is of course far more to the psychoanalytic extension of commonsense psychology than figures in the examples considered so far. Nevertheless they begin to indicate something of the theoretical character of the extension, and also the sort of support it might enjoy. One of Freud's central claims was that what persons said and did in analysis – their associations, memories, transference of past feelings on to the analyst – provided a context in which many of their dreams, slips, symptoms and apparently irrational actions could be seen as wish-fulfilling. Wishes, or derivatives of motive, ascribed in this way, in turn, formed important elements of his theory. Thus Freud thought that

ordinary memory provided evidence of childhood sexual desires; but that this could be supplemented by regarding certain seeming memories – e.g. of seductive behaviour on the part of a parent – as wish-fulfilling. His psychology is thus one in which commonsense ascription of content, and further ascription based on wish-fulfilment, go hand in hand.

Although utilizing distinct explanatory patterns, the finding of desires for actions and wishes for wish-fulfilments can both be regarded as parts of the project of relating motive to behaviour, by so ascribing motive as to provide for the derivation of the contents of behaviour from it. The importance of wishes, in turn, has two aspects. Since, according to Freud, these derivatives themselves power or structure much behaviour, interpretation in terms of wish-fulfilment has significance it its own right. Such interpretation, however, may cast further and distinct light on the nature of motive.

Wishes and actions both derive from motives like desire, and so can serve as the basis for hypotheses as to their contents. In action an agent's motives are constrained by his rationality and sense of reality, and the inferences we can make on the basis of action alone are correspondingly restricted. In wishlike derivatives, however, we see the content of motives as unleashed in the absence of such constraints. (Hence the irrationality, extremity, etc., of wishes; and the light knowledge of them, when we get it, casts.) Freudian wishes thus provide an intrinsically different perspective on motivation than rational intentions and one which is potentially informative.

The additional perspective gives further scope for the kind of modification and testing of hypotheses about motives described above. Interpretation of wish-fulfilment leads to new hypotheses about motive, which bear on both action and wish-fulfilment; and the interpretation of a given action or wish-fulfilment can be tested for coherence or dissonance with the results of interpretation of other actions and other wish-fulfilments. Thus the small extensions we have been considering in our examples could be carried further, as new hypotheses about motives entered the story, and were modified and confirmed in light of very many instances of coherence or dissonance as interpretation proceeded. Such an extension might be far-reaching, but supported at each step, and cogent over all. This is, at any rate, a possibility which a methodologist must take seriously.

III

The idea that psychoanalysis can be regarded (partly) as a sound extension

of commonsense psychology leads to a number of criticisms of Grünbaum's argument.

First (see 1 above), it means that psychoanalytic accounts of motive have support which standard scientific methodology for assessing causal claims fails to register. This justifies a central contention of the hermeneutic writers Grünbaum criticizes, and indicates how causalist–hermeneutic disputation, Grünbaum's included, can rest on shared methodological error.

Schematically, Grünbaum and many he criticizes as 'hermeneuts' agree that causal claims generally cannot be supported other than in accord with scientific (e.g. inductivist) canons, and that much psychoanalytic evidence about motives is non-canonical. One party sees that psychoanalytic accounts of motive have non-canonical support and so ignores the causal role of motives, while the other keeps causality in clear view but ignores non-canonical suport. Neither draws the obvious conclusion from the fact of non-canonical evidence for the causal role of motives, namely that the canons leave evidence on certain causes – motives – out of account. This, I think, is because neither attends to the way commonsense understanding uses and displays causal information.

Grünbaum criticizes both analysts and 'hermeneuts' for using thematic affinity as a mark of causal connection. But commonsense psychology deals in causes which transmit content to effects, and so takes appropriate affinity as just such a mark. As fits this, we see in actual examples – the dream of drinking, or again that of Irma's injection or the smoked salmon – that connection in content between motives and dreams gives reason to hold that the former were causes of the latter.

In fact Grünbaum's own claim that certain wishes are 'patently realized in the manifest content' of the Irma dream is a causal claim established hermeneutically, since it turns on the thematic affinity he sees between contents of wishes and dream. So Grünbaum's natural and correct practice in inferring connection from affinity here rightly and effectively contradicts his own methodological strictures and accusations of fallacy.

Secondly, Grünbaum's account of the role of the Tally Argument (see 2 above) and his methodological criticisms of Freud (see the last of 3, and 4 above) require qualification. Freud's practices are at least partly justified by interpretative considerations, and these support claims which Grünbaum takes to rest solely on the Tally Argument. Hence the argument itself, and the therapeutic results on which it turns, should be taken as among the parts of an interlocking structure, rather than the foundation of the whole.

This is foreshadowed in Grünbaum's text. We saw above (4a) that he objected to Freud's assumption that 'the concrete features' of something

repressed could 'vouch for its pathogenic potency' independently of therapeutic effect; and remarked that 'if such direct etiologic identifiability were indeed granted, then Freud could have spared himself the circuitous detour of trying to validate it via NCT'. Since pathogenic potency is causal role, the identification of causal role by content we have been discussing provides the direct etiologic identifiability in question; which, as Grünbaum acknowledges, can do part of the work he assigns to the NCT of the Tally Argument. Again, this is a possibility Grünbaum meant to rule out by his strictures on affinity; so naturally it returns if affinity is given a role.

Such identification comes to the fore, as we have seen, in Freud's use of wish-fulfilment. The examples we have considered instantiate a way of thinking – a process of interpretive hypothesis and testing – which locates psychological causes using the resources of commonsense psychology, and in a way which is methodologically quite distinct from the apparatus of 'collation of positive instances from *both* experimental and control groups' to which Grünbaum adheres. Hence Grünbaum's methodology and Freud's actual method partly pass one another by.

For an example of Freud's application of this way of thinking to symptoms, consider the following, from a consultation with an 'intelligent and unembarrassed-looking girl':

> She was most surprisingly dressed. For though as a rule a woman's clothes are carefully considered down to the last detail, she was wearing one of her stockings hanging down and two of the buttons on her blouse were undone. She complained of having pains in her leg and, without being asked, exposed her calf. But what she principally complained of was, to use her own words, that she had a feeling in her body as though there was something 'stuck into it' which was 'moving backwards and forwards' and was 'shaking' her through and through. Sometimes it made her whole body feel 'stiff'. My medical colleague, who was present at the examination, looked at me; he found no difficulty in understanding the meaning of her complaint.
>
> (S.E. 1900, V: 618)

Here a range of behaviour is explicable if taken as derived from sexual motives. There is, therefore, reason to hypothesize that these cause the behaviour, and the hypothesis could be supported by further information about their role in the girl's life and mind, which would be gained by further interpretation of her behaviour. Here the interpretation of action and wish-fulfilment, with their different patterns of derivation, go together. Intention presumably figures differently, for example, in her showing her calf and reporting her complaint. Since in the latter she is not engaging in intercourse but only (and unknowingly) representing herself

as doing so, this part of her behaviour is to be seen as wish-fulfilling representation rather than action willed to real satisfaction.[5] Still, the overall process of ascribing motives whose content fits and further specifies that of the behaviour to be explained, and the testing such hypotheses by relation to others of the same kind, is the same in both cases.

Grünbaum's official methodology simply excludes such interpretive reasoning. Thus he says:

> No matter how strong the *thematic affinity* between a conjectured repressed thought and a maladaptive, neurotic action, this 'meaning kinship' does not itself suffice to attest that the hypothesized repression is 'the hidden intentionality' behind the given behavior. For thematic affinity alone does not vouch for etiologic linkage, in the absense of further evidence that a thematically kindred repression actually *engendered* the behavior.
>
> (55)

So he might have argued that the 'meaning kinship' between thirst and drinking does not vouch for causal connection in the dream of drinking. In the present example it is reasonable to take sexual motives as 'the hidden intentionality' behind the girl's leaving her blouse undone or showing her calf, or again behind her symptom; and further interpretive evidence, if needed, would be forthcoming. Since such interpretation – like all interpretation – turns on the thematic affinity of presumed causes and effects, we can see that the methodology which Grünbaum here uses against Freud would, if applied, render all everyday understanding groundless.

Grünbaum's ideal seems to be the case in which the right kind of correlational relationship is shown to hold between separately identified entities, e.g. a kind of pathogen on the one hand, and a neurosis or symptom on the other (see, for example, 253ff). Here correlations – repeated instantiations – are used to show that the coinstantiation of the items or properties in question is not coincidental, but causal. Applying this generally, he holds that establishing connection in any particular case requires two stages of inquiry. First, the existence of the purportedly causative entity must be established. Secondly, and separately, the entity must be shown to have the right kind of causal role. (This, apparently, is the 'further evidence' of causal role said to be required above.) This latter stage of neo-Baconian inquiry Grünbaum takes to require controls which must go beyond the clinical situation.

Commonsense psychological reasoning about action and wish-fulfilment, by contrast, does not seek to eliminate coincidence by repetition of

instances of possible connection, but rather to explicate connection already grasped in a single instance by further causal hypothesis. Since the causes show only in their effects, they can be reached only by such hypotheses. Also, since commonsense specification of psychological entities already encodes causal information, a hypothesis as to the existence of an entity is at the same time one as to the discharge of a causal role, so that the two neo-Baconian stages are combined within interpretive (and so clinical) reasoning. Thus a hypothesis as to intention, desire or belief is introduced at a single step, as causal explanation of episodes (actions, thoughts, whatever) which can be seen as related to one another and to it in content; the case is the same for wish-fulfilment; and such hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed, as we have seen, by relation to others of the same type.

Commonsense reasoning thus suits the psychological properties of persons, which are rarely uniformly repeated but always pervasively and non-coincidentally related in content. The non-neo-Baconian nature of such reasoning enables it to establish connections cogently in a single instance or case, as in the Irma dream or any commonplace judgement of motivation, and so to go rapidly and accurately to the deeper judgements manifested in, and essential to, daily interaction. In the appropriate domain, therefore, such reasoning is more powerful than the neo-Baconian, and it is hard to envisage how the latter could function in its absence, or be brought to confirm its results fully or in detail. Intuitive and prescientific as commonsense reasoning is, it has countless indispensable and compelling instances, in which it appears as inference to the best explanation for the data it covers. It cannot be methodologically ignored.

Unsatisfactory and preliminary as these remarks about interpretive reasoning are, they enable us to see (4a) why Freud persevered with the hypothesis of repression despite the fragility of his early therapeutic results. It seems clear that he took himself to be following up connections in content which had derivational causal relevance, and he may have been right in doing so.

Since the kind of inference involved in wish-fulfilment has a degree of internal cogency, and connects the hypothesized causes of wish-fulfilments with the results of free association, Grünbaum errs (4a) in claiming that therapeutic success is the sole epistemic underwriter of the ability of associations to certify causes, and also in regarding the use of association and wish-fulfilment in explaining dreams and slips as mainly misextrapolation from the case of symptoms.

Grünbaum takes therapeutic success as the inductive touchstone of psychoanalysis. On the view here, by contrast, therapeutic success is to be

seen in the context of the system of interpretive reasoning of which hypotheses regarding action and wish-fulfilment are part. This system can provide and to some degree confirm a hypothesis about the cause of a symptom, as in the example above. It also gives reason to think that awareness of the cause of a symptom may alleviate it, since it is part of commonsense psychology that motives and wishes can be modified by awareness and thought. Therapeutic success, and the manner of its occurrence, may therefore constitute further data explicable in terms of, and so supporting, the original hypothesis as to the cause.

This in turn provides reason – perhaps ultimately of the kind which Grünbaum associates with the Tally Argument – for holding that therapeutic success in psychoanalysis is not due to placebo effect. Therapeutic failure, however, does not refute the hypothesis or render it groundless, since the relevant motives and wishes may not be reached or modified by awareness, and there may be independent reason to think this. Success of alternative therapy may also accord with the hypothesis, since it is part of commonsense that things other than awareness can modify motives or wishes, and there may be independent reason to hold that this has happened.

The same reasoning also bears on the question of contamination, since this again involves hypotheses as to the causes of what persons in analysis say and do, which are relevantly tested by interpretation of their behaviour. The actual behaviour of persons in psychotherapy seems to me better explained by psychoanalytic motivational hypotheses than the vague alternatives provided by suggestion, etc., although of course this cannot be argued here.

Finally, the link with commonsense psychology renders the general differences between Grünbaum and Popper (see 3 above) less significant for psychoanalysis. In Grünbaum's hands his methodology yields a description of psychoanalysis which is far more comprehensive, subtle and convincing than Popper's few flawed remarks. Still, he agrees with Popper in simply ignoring interpretive relations of confirmation and disconfirmation. Since these are central to both commonsense psychology and psychoanalysis, this may be the most important point.

As Grünbaum urges, some aspects of Freudian theory can be tested apart from complex interpretive considerations. But it seems that many cannot, and as the above remarks about interpretation suggest, this may be intrinsic to psychoanalysis as to commonsense. If we grant evidential weight to some interpretive claims, then we can use inductive methods as well; but it seems unlikely that we will be able to escape reliance upon claims for which the main evidence is ineliminably interpretive.

Regarding these Grünbaum's position seems quite similar to Popper's: they are assigned to a sort of methodological limbo. (Popper speaks of claims which are metaphysical but contain truth and may become science; Grünbaum, of those with heuristic value.) Since we already take many of these claims to be true, and know that more have systematic commonsense and theoretical support, they deserve more selective treatment. The fault here is in methodology, not commonsense psychology or its psychoanalytic extension.

IV

Grünbaum opposes the sorts of conclusion drawn above. For example, he argues that 'the attempt to reconstruct psychoanalytic explanations of conduct hermeneutically . . . is basically undercut if important classes of psychoanalytic explanations simply defy assimilation to the practical syllogism' (75).

Since the commonsense paradigm for wish-fulfilment is not rational action but wishful imagining, this objection fails. Grünbaum does, however, argue separately against Freud's use of wish-fulfilment and free association.

Freud's discussions of the Irma and smoked salmon dreams were taken above as informative, connected and plausible examples of wish-fulfilment. Freud often presents examples in series in which the first is easiest, and each draws on the information in those before and adds new. The continuity between examples provides reason for accepting each in light of earlier ones, despite the new information and complexity involved. We saw this sort of progression in the Irma and salmon examples. In the first the dream is apparently merely unwishful, whereas in the second it seems counter to a wish; the associations in the first locate wishes which can be self-ascribed more or less directly, whereas those in the second lead, more slowly, to motives which are harder to acknowledge, in light of which wishes are more hypothetical; and so on.

Grünbaum and Clark Glymour do not see the examples this way. On their account Freud's interpretation of the Irma dream is plausible, but makes no informative use of free association and excavates no wishes. The interpretation of the smoked salmon dream, by contrast, lacks cogency, but claims spurious confirmation on the basis of fallacious reasoning about free association. This Grünbaum calls Freud's fallacy of 'reverse causal inference'. He says Freud embraces this fallacy generally, and 'argues fallaciously from the confluence of associations to a causal reversal in *explicitly generalized* form (S.E. 1900, V: 528)' (233–4).

This critique of association and wish-fulfilment has three parts,

concerning the Irma dream, the salmon dream, and the explicitly generalized fallacy respectively. We shall take them in order.

First the Irma dream. Grünbaum argues that Freud's reported feelings from the day before already contain the wishes found in the interpretation. So interpretation and association here do no work: 'In sum, though the aggressive conscious wishes that Freud had on the day before the Irma dream were then patently fulfiled in its manifest content, free association played *no excavating role* in his recall of these wishes after the dream, for he had been avowedly conscious of them the evening before' (222).

Glymour agrees, saying that 'the Irma dream is one whose interpretation can be read almost on its face, and the elaborate "analysis" Freud offers us contributes virtually nothing'. Glymour says also that the thesis that dreams are wish-fulfilments in any case seems 'wholly implausible', since one thinks, for example, of 'dreams characterized by diffuse anxiety'. And he says Freud's distinction between manifest and latent contents of a dream, according to which anxiety belongs to the manifest content, while the wishes whose represented fulfilment causes anxiety belong to the latent content revealed by association and analysis, is 'a perfectly *ad hoc* hypothesis, that is, an hypothesis introduced for the purpose of reconciling a theory with apparent counter-evidence, and without sustaining evidence of its own' (Glymour 1983: 64, 66).

Grünbaum is wrong about the Irma dream, as examination of Freud's text makes clear. For example, it is not the case that a wish to have been wrong about Irma – to have misdiagnosed a severe organic illness as hysteria – is among 'the aggressive conscious wishes Freud had on the day before the Irma dream'. There is no evidence that Freud had such a conscious wish at any time, and his discussion indicates that it arose only during sleep. This wish emerged in Freud's associations. So these do play an excavating role, leading to a wish of which Freud was not aware until he entered into the process of association, and of which he would not otherwise have known. The excavation at this point is not deep, but this is a first example.[6]

Glymour misses this as well. Otherwise he could not say that Freud's interpretation is enormously plausible, but also that his distinction between manifest and latent content, as applied in the case of unpleasant affects like anxiety, is a perfectly *ad hoc* device. For the affect in the manifest content connected with Freud's wish to have misdiagnosed Irma was *alarm about a perpetual source of anxiety*: and the wish itself, as we have seen, was part of the latent content. So Freud's analysis showed clearly, among other things, how representation of the satisfaction of a latent wish could give rise to a manifest alarm, and how the connection

between these could emerge in association. This is an instance of the point Freud later makes about anxiety. So it cannot be that this interpretation is enormously plausible but the hypothesis as to a distinction between manifest and latent content in such cases perfectly *ad hoc*. Since Freud's analysis contains information Glymour does not register, his claim as to its uninformativeness must be rejected.

Let us now take the claim that Freud's analysis of the smoked salmon dream instantiates a fallacy of 'causal reversal'. Here is how the fallacy is described.

> Glymour (1983) has discussed the aborted dinner party dream as an illustration of Freud's device 'to confirm an interpretation by finding two or more elements of the dream which are independently associated with a key figure in the dream.' The dream illustrates such a device, because after Freud had inferred the aim to thwart the dreamer's rival as the dream motive he said: 'All that was now lacking was some coincidence to confirm the solution' . . . When his patient reported her rival's fondness for smoked salmon, he had seized on the role of this delicacy in the manifest dream content as the confirming coincidence.
>
> Glymour challenges this claim of confirmation as spurious. As he points out, Freud's conclusion as to the motivational cause had asserted an order of cause and effect that is the *reverse* of the causal order exhibited by the free associations, for associations generated by two manifest dream elements (the dinner party and the salmon) had *each* prompted the patient to think of her rival. But Freud took this to be evidence that the affect bound to that rival was the motivational cause for the thematic occurrence of both a dinner party and salmon in the manifest dream content. Glymour objects that 'evidence for the first causal model is not necessarily evidence for the second,' a causal reversal he indicts as 'one of Freud's fallacies'. Hence Glymour . . . rejects Freud's invocation of the 'coincidence' that both a dinner party and salmon figured in the manifest dream content: 'the coincidence is manufactured: one associates, at Freud's direction, until one thinks of something which has connections with several elements in one's dream; the several elements cause the common thought, not vice-versa, and the coincidence requires no further explanation. The method of manufacture is all the explanation required.'
>
> (233–4)

Again the criticism rests on misunderstanding. The coincidence with which Freud is concerned comes in the woman's saying, in answer to his asking how she arrived at the salmon in the dream, that smoked salmon is her friend's favourite dish. This confirms the interpretation because it is further evidence of the connection of the dream with the woman's motives (beliefs), and in particular evidence of derivation which fits the motive Freud thinks the cause of the dream, jealousy.

Freud had already pointed out that the dreamer's jealousy gave her reason for not giving her friend a supper-party which would make her

plumper and more attractive to the dreamer's husband, and so would provide a motive for dreaming of not giving a supper-party. Now, and fitting with this, it could be seen that the food the dreamer represented herself as having in the dream was precisely what her friend would like. That is: the dreamer represented herself not only as not giving what the object of her jealousy would like to get, but also as having what the object of her jealousy would like to have.

This coincidence is confirming because it is explanatory, under the hypothesis already given. There has to be some derivation of the content of the dream from the dreamer's motives if Freud's hypothesis is to be correct, and the association not only provides a derivation of an as yet unexplained aspect of content, but one which coincides particularly with the motive in question. So the coincidence with which Freud is concerned is between the information provided by the new association and the already hypothesized latent content of the dream, and is significant precisely because it provides a derivation of a detail in the manifest content from this latent content, and in a way that coheres with it. This is why Freud says: 'All that was lacking was some coincidence to confirm the solution. The smoked salmon in the dream had not yet been accounted for.'

Grünbaum and Glymour do not seem to see that the coincidence concerns the derivation from hypothesized latent motives, for, as Grünbaum says, Glymour's target is the supposed coincidence that a dinner party and smoked salmon both figure in the manifest content, or again that two elements in the manifest content prompt 'a thought' of the rival. Since neither of these is the coincidence in question, the argument miscarries.

It is natural to take Grünbaum and Glymour to be saying that Freud's mistake in reasoning about this example consists in taking effects as causes – in supposing that thoughts which in fact arose after the dream were causes of it. This would be the literal meaning of the claim that the dream elements 'cause the common thought, not vice-versa', or again the idea that 'method of manufacture' can explain the connections in content among latent thoughts and dreams upon which Freud's reasoning turns. So it is worth pointing out that this cannot apply to any of the causes with which Freud is concerned. The dreamer's jealousy existed before the dream, as did her knowledge of her friend's unattractive skinniness, desire to gain weight, be fed well, be invited to supper, and so on. The same applies to the 'common thought' upon which Grünbaum and Glymour focus, that the friend's favourite dish was smoked salmon. Since the dreamer had this belief before the dream and associations, it cannot have been caused by them.

Having seen that there is no fallacy of 'causal reversal' in this dream, let us take the last part of Grünbaum's critique, the claim that Freud commits such a fallacy in explicitly generalized form. Grünbaum cites the following passage from *The Interpretation of Dreams*:

> If in fact we were met by objections such as these we could defend ourselves by appealing to the impression made by our interpretations, to the surprising connections with other elements of the dream which emerge in the course of our pursuing any one of its ideas, and to the improbability that anything which gives such an exhaustive account of the content of the dream could have been arrived at, except by following up psychical connections which had already been laid down. (S.E. 1900, V: 528)

We have already seen that associations serve to account for the content of a dream by leading to motives from which the content is explained as derived by wish-fulfilment. This, if the explanation is correct, means that the associations lead from effects to causes. In this, however, they are 'following up psychical connections which had already been laid down', that is, from causes to effects.

The case is the same for straightforward self-ascription. If someone considers his own action and gives a motive, the consideration leads from action to motive, whereas the causal order is from motive to action. This can be called 'reverse causal inference', but it is clearly not fallacious. Freud treats association as like self-ascription, in somehow drawing on information available to the agent, because of their partly parallel explanatory role.

Freud's claim about causality in this passage is therefore correct, and for the reason he states. It surely is improbable that associations should serve to explain the content of a dream, except by giving information about the causes and connections by which the content was actually formed or determined (derived). Likewise it is surely improbable that self-ascriptions could so far explain the content of actions, except by giving similar information, which of course they do more directly. Here, as in the salmon dream, we find no fallacy, but accurate reasoning on Freud's part.

So, finally, it appears that Grünbaum has made no case against the view informing this criticism of his book, that much of Freud's reasoning can be regarded as cogently extending commonsense psychology. If Grünbaum has missed something about connection in content and wish-fulfilment, and if what has been missed constitutes reason to accept Freudian claims, then his conclusions systematically understate the support for Freudian theory. The degree of support or underestimation would depend upon assessment of data we cannot here survey.

Grünbaum emphasizes that future research may prove Freud right,

saying this would show that Freud's brilliant imagination was 'serendipitous'. This implies that Freud's unexpected discoveries would, although proved true, be so by accident. If he was extending commonsense psychology this will not be so. Whatever proves his inferences true will also show them well founded, and the correct judgement will be that he had good reason for his conclusions all along, which was not acknowledged until the last.

NOTES

1 As elsewhere in this book, references to Freud's works in English are given in parentheses with the abbreviation S.E. (see Preface, p. xiv). In this chapter references to Grünbaum 1984 are simply by parenthetic page number in the text.
2 I discuss some of the issues below in the Introduction to Wollheim and Hopkins 1982.
3 Essentially the same role for content will follow on views of commonsense psychology as a system of laws of propositional content (see, e.g., Churchland 1984: esp. 56–66).
4 G. S. Klein, one of the 'hermeneuts' Grünbaum criticizes, describes the pattern of active reversal of passive experience as one which is found pervasively in analytical material. See Klein 1976: ch. 8.
5 Further examples, and the role of intention, are discussed in Wollheim and Hopkins 1982: Introduction. In some cases, such as the Rat Man's representation of his father's death and torture, the associated motives can plausibly be traced back into childhood. The role of motives is traced back, with wish-fulfilment as with reasons, through repeated, and hence chain-like, derivations. Such structured derivation is discernible in the Irma dream, since the wish for misdiagnosis subserved others.
6 In fact Freud carried the analysis deeper and found unpublishable sexual wishes. See the letter to Abraham of 9 January 1903 (Freud and Abraham 1965).

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