7

Synthesis in the imagination: psychoanalysis, infantile experience and the concept of an object

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In recent decades infancy has been the subject of two quite different kinds of psychological research. In experimental psychology the observations and theories of Piaget have been the main stimulus and organizing focus for a large and rapidly growing body of work on children and babies. And a striking development in psychoanalysis since Freud has been the analysis, by methods closely related to his, of very young children. As Freud had put forward new descriptions of childhood to explain what he had found in analysing adults, so Melanie Klein, one of the first and most influential child analysts, advanced new and detailed hypotheses about early infancy to account for the further data which emerged in treating children.[1]

Although very different, and based on different observations, Klein's and Piaget's accounts of infantile development share a central idea which is plausible and powerful. This is, that the infant's use of the concept of identity – the application of the idea of a single, enduring object of perception, emotion and action – plays a pivotal role in both cognitive and emotional development. In what follows both theories will be discussed in light of this, and an attempt made to show that both philosophical arguments and experimental results indicate that they should be regarded as complementary. Although these considerations are not conclusive, it is hoped they suggest that concentration on the concept of identity may help in understanding issues in development in infancy.

The discussion falls into three main parts. Familiarity with Klein's work has not been assumed, so in the first section some relevant aspects of this will be sketched, with a brief attempt at indicating some relations of her concepts to Freud's, and to analytic data. The second section considers Piaget's account of infantile conceptions of self and object, and argues for an alternative which, although somewhat different, is still close to the

original. The third relates this, via the concept of identity, to the aspects of Kleinian theory under discussion, and also to some results of experiment.

Obviously both analysts and experimental psychologists will know their literature, concepts, and procedures better than I do. Still I hope that a philosophically informed comparative discussion may be useful, and that the overall line of argument will remain intact despite errors in understanding.

I

Psychoanalytic theory is continuous with the common-sense psychology in terms of which we understand one another in daily life. In this we constantly interpret behaviour as action derived from motives. Although such interpretations are intuitive, they cohere in a system of explanation for behaviour which we take to be, in the main, cogent. This is partly because the way we fit individual interpretations with one another into our overall account of motive ensures that that they are continually cross-checked and revised in light of one another, and so can be seen to form a mutually interlocking and confirming group[2] (see Wilkes, this volume).

Freud discovered that many things persons do – including many dreams, symptoms, and slips – could be understood not (or not only) as actions, but also as wish-fulfilments. Such events in behaviour could be seen to involve imaginative *representations*, with content which was sensitive to underlying motive. In these the motives were not realistically acted on, but rather – as in the day-dreaming or wishful thinking – merely imagined or represented as fulfilled.

This greatly enlarged the field of data which could be seen as relevant to framing and checking accounts of motive, and hence enabled Freud to extend radically common-sense psychology itself. By interpreting dreams and symptoms together with free association, memory, and transference, he was able to see much of the mental life of his analysands as derived from motives which had originated in early childhood.

Now of course children, and especially very young ones, cannot put into words the kind of material connected with their symptoms and difficulties which Freud had used. They do, however, constantly and spontaneously represent things – with dolls, toys, clay, paints, games of make-believe – in play. Klein (1975) realized that these representations too could be seen as constantly reflecting motive and mental state, and as embodying wish-fulfilling fantasy. To take some examples from a girl of six:

> Erna began her play by taking a small carriage which stood on the table among the other toys and letting it run towards me. She declared she had come to

> fetch me. But she put a toy woman in the carriage instead and added a toy man. The two loved and kissed one another and drove up and down all the time. Then a toy man in another carriage collided with them, ran over them and killed them, and then roasted them and ate them up. (vol. II, p. 40)

Here the toy couple killed and eaten, apparently for loving one another and driving up and down all the time, could be taken as representing the parents, and the third figure as Erna herself. Closely related motives came out quite explicitly in other play, which worked over themes introduced in the first. Thus when Erna

> as queen, had celebrated her marriage to the king, she lay down on the sofa and wanted me, as the king, to lie down beside her. As I refused to do this I had to sit on a little chair by her side and knock at the sofa with my fist. This she called 'churning' . . . immediately after this she announced that a child was creeping out of her, and she represented the scene in a quite realistic way, writhing about and groaning. Her imaginary child then had to share its parents' bedroom and had to be a spectator of sexual intercourse between them. If it interrupted, it was beaten. . . . If she, as the mother, put the child to bed, it was only in order to get rid of it and to be able to be united with the father all the sooner. (vol. II, p. 40)

Both these games apparently concerned the child's feelings about her parents loving each other. The representations of their relations – as one of loving and kissing, and driving up and down all the time, or again as lying together with something knocking something, 'churning' – have elements which could be taken as sexual symbolism in adult dreams. There such elements could be connected by association to articulate adult sexual thoughts, which could in turn be seen to have influenced other features of the dream. Here the referent of a representation was shown by the structure of the play (e.g. the fact that the knocking or 'churning' took place after the couple lay down together, and was followed by the birth of the child).

Matters might, however, be shown more explicitly, or in ways which combined modes of representation. When Erna masturbated (as she did both at home and in her sessions) she would play what she called 'the cupboard game' in which she pulled at her clitoris, saying she 'wanted to pull out something very long'. She also played that a small piece of paper in a basin was a sea-captain, whose ship had gone down. He was able to save himself because he had something 'long and golden' which held him in the water. She then tore off his head and announced 'His head's gone, now he's drowned' (vol. II, pp. 50, 38).[3]

Children played out many fantasies related to their psychological problems or conditions particularly clearly. For example,

> Erna often made me be a child, while she was the mother or a teacher. I then had to undergo fantastic tortures and humiliations. If in the game anyone treated me kindly, it generally turned out that the kindness was only simulated. The paranoic traits showed in the fact that I was constantly spied upon, people divined my thoughts, and the father or teacher allied with the mother against me – in fact, I was always surrounded by persecutors. I myself, in the role of the child, had constantly to spy on and torment the others. Often Erna herself played the child. Then the game generally ended in her escaping the persecutions (on these occasions the 'child' was good), becoming rich and powerful, being made a queen and taking a cruel revenge on her persecutors. (vol. I, p. 200)

Sometimes the emnity and persecution was particularly secret and insidious, and disguised as love. The mother and father in Erna's fantasies ate marvellous foods made of whipped cream or a special milk, but gave the child semolina which made it sick. In other games Erna would sell fish, which were clearly connected in her mind with faeces, since she called them 'Kakelfish' – 'Kaki' being her word for faeces – and would have an urge to defecate when playing at cutting them up. In other games she and Klein would exchange such goods, apparently with love; but her depression afterwards showed that these 'good' anal presents were actually felt as poisonous. So the deep content of the representations was that figures representing her mother and herself were constantly poisoning one another (vol. II, p. 46).

In general the child's play could be seen to involve very persecuting 'bad' figures, very idealized 'good' ones, and others, such as that of the queen, or again the poisoning mother, in which very good or bad features seemed confusedly combined. These could be seen as images which reflected and governed many of the child's feelings and fantasies about the parents, although of course they were very different from those consciously held. (Erna regarded her real mother as fond of her, never criticized her, and was, if anything, overly affectionate to her.)

Sometimes the 'bad' parents seemed the result of various sorts of projections of the child's own feelings; and sometimes they were made bad by envious or jealous attacks. For example a little boy of 3 years 9 months

> phantisized that he cut off papa's 'popochen' (his word for penis) with a knife, and that the latter sawed his off with a saw. The outcome, however, was that he had his papa's. Then he cut off his father's head, after which the latter could do no more to him because he could not see – but the eyes in the head saw him, nevertheless. (vol. I, p. 65)

Again, a little girl of just under 4 years would play make-believe that it was night-time and she and the analyst were asleep. She would then come

from her own bedroom and attack the analyst in bed in various ways. In one episode she

> wanted to hit me in the stomach and declared that she was taking out my 'A – A's (stool) and was making me poor. She then seized the cushions, which she repeatedly called children, and hid herself with them behind the sofa. There she crouched in the corner with an intense expression of fear, covered herself up, sucked her fingers, and wetted herself ... [This behaviour] corresponded in every detail with the way she had behaved when, at a time she was not yet two, she had begun to have night terrors. (vol. II, p. 5)

Erna, similarly, had fears of a 'robber woman' who would 'take out everything inside her', and she could not sleep at night for fear of burglars (vol. II, pp. 39, 214).

Now these observations both fit with, and extend, Freud's theories of illness and personality, and the account of childhood mental life he had reconstructed. Freud had understood his patients' symptoms as largely determined by fantastic childhood hostilities and fears, focused on the parents, and had uncovered both childhood neuroses such as Klein's patients had and unconscious childhood images and fantasies such as they displayed in play and transference.[4] Thus Klein's patients showed such Freudian phenomena as childhood preoccupation with sexual rivalry, castration, and so on; and they did so in accord with what Freud had described as the sexual theories of children, as seen, for example, in the equations made in play above, between faeces and babies, faeces and food, and so on.

Also, Klein saw that the roles which the children assigned to different figures in play could be taken as personifying the agencies which Freud had described in terms of the ego, super-ego, and id (Klein, 1975, vol. I, pp. 199ff). Thus one figure would have as its purpose to satisfy some repressed or split-off desire, while another would serve to prevent this, so that a compromise was reached; or the other would punish the first, cause him anxiety, and so forth (the eyes that see none the less, above). This meant that in their play the children could be seen as externalizing the working of these agencies, or projecting the images of figures involved in them on to figures in the outside world, and this could be studied further.

Klein found such representations in the play of even the smallest children, which indicated that such fantasies and images were well established by the time a child could speak, and had a history before that. This meant that they could not be accounted for by frustrations, threats, or punishments in childhood. So the sorts of sexual and aggressive feelings which Freud had assigned to childhood, as well as the development of agencies like the punishing super-ego, had to be seen as originating even earlier than he had been willing to suppose, and indeed as being rooted in

infancy. Such conclusions were of course very controversial; in one way they may be less so now, since psychologists are more willing to take things shown in early childhood as having a prior or innate basis.

Klein found many additional fantasies and preoccupations concerning for example devouring and being devoured, robbing the mother's body and being robbed oneself, and poisoning and being poisoned. This went with the fact that the main themes of the children's fantasies seemed to turn on activities involving bodily parts and substances – breasts, genitals, milk, urine, faeces – which could, like the figures in the child's world, be very good or very bad.

Such significant bodily parts or substances were themselves represented as animate creatures, which played attacking or avenging roles comparable to those assigned to whole persons. Thus one little girl had ritually to be tucked up at bedtime, lest a 'mouse or a Butzen' [her word for genitals] would get in and bite off her own 'Butzen'. In analysis her doll was likewise tucked up, and she had her toy elephant to keep it from getting out of bed, lest it get into the parents' bedroom and 'do something to them or take something away from them'. Again, Erna had fantasies of 'a flea which was "black and yellow mixed", and which she herself at once recognized as a bit of faeces – dangerous, poisoned faeces ... [which] came out of [Klein's] anus and forced its way into hers and injured her' (vol. II, pp. 6, 44).

This meant that such partial or incomplete figures also played roles analogous to those of the super-ego, ego and id, as described above. They could serve as imaginary embodiments of unacknowledged or disowned aggressive impulses, and so as split-off, 'bad' parts of the self;[5] or again as other selves, which were vengeful, controlling, or whatever. Klein also found that parts of one self were fantasized not only to enter another, but also to do various things inside – take the other over, control it, become a parasite,and so on.[6] And since such a role could be played by something as primitive as a piece of faeces, a representation of a faecal attack could at the same time be that of a projective one, in which a bad part of one self was put into another, as in the example of the faecal flea above.

Freud had taken a person's image of himself and others as built up through both projection and introjection. In projection, roughly speaking, a person alters his representation of someone else by putting into it something which originates from himself. In introjection, by contrast, a person changes his representation of himself, by putting into it something originating from another.

Freud had described these mechanisms as interacting, on roughly the following lines. A person built up his self-image, and so his ego and super-ego, by modelling himself on others, and by representing himself as in relation to them. A boy, for example, both identified with his father, and also felt himself to be set standards and criticized by an internal agency

derived from his parents. The images set up in introjection would, however, depend upon what had been projected. So the punishing severity of the super-ego, for example, was usually not to be explained by the actual severity of the parents, but rather by the child's own perception of them, which was distorted by projection.

Klein found introjective representations which paralleled the projective ones already described. Just as projective fantasies could be effected by the explusion of something from the body, so introjective ones could be implemented by taking something into it. Thus if, as frequently happened, a child enacted the eating of some figure in play, this could result in his feeling that he had inside him a presence related to that figure. The internal figure might help him or be assimilated to himself, so that he could in fact do things better; or the figure might condemn, attack him, and so forth, and so inhibit or disable him. This extended to part as well as whole objects, so that a child might represent the eating of a penis or breast as creating an internal source of fullness or potency, faeces as making something horrible inside, and so on. The nature of the internal figure or presence depended upon the fantasy in which it was taken in. So, for example, the sort of aggressive eating of the parental couple which Erna played out in the instance quoted above would not have enabled her to feel she had taken in the desirable qualities she envied, but rather only things which were bad.[7]

In this also Klein was extending Freud's observations. He had held that introjection and identification, and the formation of the ego and super-ego, were bound up with bodily images. Thus Freud said that the ego was first and foremost a bodily Ego' (vol. XIX. pp. 25–6), involving an image of the body surface, as felt from inside. And he linked introjection itself with fantasies of taking the introjected object into the body, connecting the origin of the super-ego, for example, with innate fantasies of devouring a primitive father.

Abraham (1973) has carried Freud's work on this topic further, and distinguished between relations to a whole object and what he called 'partial object relations'. Abraham had noticed how frequently patients represented others by parts of the body, and in doing so adopted correspondingly primitive ways of relating to them. A mother, for example, could be represented only by a breast, which would be eaten up; or again a persecuting enemy by a bit of faeces, which the patient would try to expel (pp. 418ff). Abraham took these partial relations to originate in an early stage of life, in which particular parts or products of the bodies of others, or its own, were especially salient to the child, and in which introjection and projection operated on such part-objects.

Klein's account of early introjective and projective representations thus enabled her to consolidate Freud's and Abraham's descriptions of these matters. The earliest projective and introjective fantasies could simply be

taken as those which arose while the infant did not yet think of its mother or itself in terms of whole bodies, and also while it represented things most concretely, and hence in terms of bodily takings in and puttings out. This seemed to correspond with a layering which emerged in the analysis of a given image of an object. Conscious and relatively realistic images seemed underpinned and shaped by others which were progressively less realistic, less anatomically and psychologically complete, more concrete and physical, and more sharply divided as between good and bad. So the infant's construction of his own image by introjection, and his alteration of his image of the object of his experience and action by projection, could be taken as starting in his first relation with the mother, and in particular with her breast.

Klein took projection and introjection to operate together with another mechanism, which she called 'splitting'. It was this which accounted for the division between 'bad' and 'good' images so marked in the children's fantasies. The working of this, and its hypothesized role in development, can be illustrated by reference to some further material.

It could be observed that children were commonly faced with deep uncertainty about someone with whom they had a relationship. In such a case, a child was liable to split the figure concerned – that is, to form or keep one representation of the figure as good and in close relation to itself, and at the same time to form another representation, also derived from the uncertain figure, of someone bad and to be kept away.

For example many of the difficulties of Klein's patient Richard could be traced to paranoid fears, which he first expressed as relating to two figures in his household, the cook and the maid.

> Suddenly and with determination he said that he wanted to tell Mrs. K. something which was worrying him very much. He was afraid of being poisoned by Cook or Bessie. They would do this because he was often horrid or cheeky to them. From time to time he had a good look at the food, to find out whether it was poisoned. He looked into bottles in the kitchen to see what they contained: they might have poison in them which Cook would mix with his food. Sometimes he thought that Bessie, the maid, was a German spy. He occasionally listened at the key-hole to find out whether Cook and Bessie were speaking German together. (Both Cook and Bessie were British and did not know a word of German, as I subsequently ascertained.) . . . He obviously forced himself to tell all this, looking tortured and worried. He said that these fears made him very unhappy and asked if Mrs. K. could help him with them. (vol. IV, p. 128)

Klein took these fears to originate in the child's relation to his mother. They also showed in a number of ways in his transference to her. Among other things, he felt what she said to him as both good and giving him the sort of help he needed, and also as bad and making him sick. He seemed to

maintain his good relation with her by repeatedly splitting off what he felt to be bad into images of others.

Thus at one point, when it seemed his fears were rising, he began behaving with particular fondness towards Mrs Klein, singing to her, telling her about a sweet little puppy, and so on. He put his arm around her, saying 'I am very happy and I am very fond of you'. But his attention was attracted by an old, neglected-looking woman passing by, who he said was horrid, and spat awful yellow stuff out of her mouth. Here, apparently, was an alternative, split-off image of Mrs Klein, and perhaps of her analysis as awful stuff, like urine, which had to be spat out. Thus, it seems, he kept his anxieties about being poisoned out of his image of his relations with Mrs Klein, but not entirely out of his mind. And by the next session he was physically ill, and worried that mucous behind his nose was poison, and that Bessie and Cook had actually poisoned him.[8]

Now the mechanism thus illustrated as operating in a session could be hypothesized to play a similar role in development. The conscious images which Richard had built up included an unambiguously good one of his mother, but others of figures who fed and looked after him, and might well be persecutors. His unconscious images of his mother, as shown in his drawings and other play, seemed to contain all these elements. So the various images he had could be explained on the supposition that he had early on been inclined to feel uncertain about his mother, particularly with respect to feeding, and that when he felt this he had split her into good and bad feeding figures, with the former kept close and in good relation with him and the latter at greater distance. The former images were more salient in his conscious representation of his mother, and the latter were, so to speak, now inherited by Cook and Bessie.

Klein took Richard's uncertainty towards his mother as a feeding figure to be rooted in attacks on his mother, or his mother's breasts, which he also played out in analysis. In these, as Klein interpreted them, he put faeces and urine into his mother, and also the bad parts of himself, which he characteristically represented in terms of Hitler and the Germans. By doing this he made his mother bad and poisonous. The same structure can perhaps be seen in the example of Erna's fantasies above, where the parent-figure and child are exchanging bad substances, and thereby making one another bad.

In general, the images which Klein's patients produced in analysis could be understood as built up in this way, through the systemtic use of projection, introjection, and splitting. The mechanisms could, in fact, be seen as integral to one another. Thus if a bad part of one self was represented as put in another, as in projection, this would result on a further representation of the other, as with the bad part inside. So the other was now split, and partly bad. The original self, however, would now be represented as lacking the part; so it too was split (and diminished) but

good. Good parts could also be split off and projected, thus creating good or idealized objects. The representations of figures and relations partly determined by projection would be introjected, so that a new layer was acquired in the representation of the self and its inner world. This would form the basis for new projections, and so on.

The overall effect of such interacting fantasies was to build up a picture of the world as divided into good and bad figures, in contrasting relations with the self. The 'good' figures were closely identified with the self, shared its perspective, and were in helpful and co-operative relations with it. The 'bad' figures were kept out of consciousness, or in one way or another represented as distanced or alien. So the pattern was in effect that of good us/bad them. But since the bad figures contained what the self felt as most intimately bad or threatening, they could seem to confront, impinge upon, or invade it with mirroring directness.

Very roughly, the symptoms of the children Klein analysed could be seen as arising because they had early 'bad' images of their parents which were so divorced from the 'good' ones that the parents had constantly to be feared, and attacked in the imagination, as extremely bad. But since these fears and attacks were also, at another level, felt as affecting the parents the patients loved and depended upon, such imaginings miscarried, or were distressing, in a variety of ways.

It could, therefore, be supposed that at an early or primitive level the child took differing images derived from experience with the same person as if they corresponded to distinct objects. Such early images were overlain by others, which served progressively to integrate them into representations of whole persons, and one person. But if this process were only partly successful – if some images, as it were, failed to dovetail fully with their successors – various sorts of disfunction, including the sort of misdirected fear and aggression described above, could result.

These were the images which emerged in analysis and became focused on the analyst, and so could be worked through in light of more mature ones, and better connected with them. In dealing with them, the analysand would attempt to identify with the good figures and obliterate the bad or keep them away. However, as it became clearer that diverse images in fact related to single objects, and in particular the mother, a number of connected and far-reaching changes could be observed, and could be hypothesized to occur in normal development.

Grasping that apparently incompatible good and bad images related to one object accompanied recognition that the good might be harmed by measures taken against what was felt to be bad. This was all the more serious, because it also went with realizing that there were not many 'good' mother-figures but only one; who was, therefore, unique and irreplaceable. Hence the mother was now pictured not only as good, but also as indispensible and under threat from a self which might misconceive and

harm or lose her. So there arose feelings of concern for this mother, pining for her, desires to make good damage done to her, and so on. A whole new range of feelings, that is, seemed to be consequent on recognizing that the object was a whole, single, and correspondingly complex.

Synthesizing the disparate images of the object required working through these feelings, and this was in turn required for introjecting a whole object and forming a coherent self-image as well. This process could, however, be impeded by various defences against the painful feelings of dependency, depression, and so forth, which were involved. These included: the 'manic' defences of exerting imaginary control over the object; denying its uniqueness or complexity by re-splitting it; denying that any damage had been done in the imagination, or alternatively, that everything could be put right magically; and so on.

Since Klein held that responding to depression was one of the most important aspects of this phase, and that the constellation of feelings, problems, defences, and so on in it were of importance throughout life, she called it the depressive position.[9] She hypothesized that the infant began to take its mother as a whole person, and so to enter this position, in the fourth or fifth month of life (vol. I, pp. 285–6; cf., however, the modification in vol. III, p. 35).

In the previous phase, apparently, the infant started from relations to parts of the mother's body and worked up representations of these, with 'bad' and 'good' aspects sharply separated, until he began to unite the aspects and then the parts. The conception of the depressive position enabled Klein to distinguish the depressive anxieties consequent on unification from those endemic to relations with such incomplete objects. Since the latter anxieties were of a paranoid nature, and the earliest representations of self and objects both ununified and liable to radical distortion by splitting and projection, she called this first phase the 'paranoid–schizoid position'.

Working through the depressive position meant a dimunition in splitting and projection, which served to maintain the division between good and bad. It seemed, however, that the unification of these aspects could not take place unless the person already possessed the requisite images of good and bad objects in contrasting relations to the self. In many instances, however, these were unavailable. If the most basic good or idealized figures were felt to contain too much that was bad – if, say, the mother or breast represented as feeding was also inevitably represented as poisoning – they could not be represented as in a stable good relation to the self, but had rather to be subjected to repeated splitting and projection to keep the bad out and away.

This was itself a source of instability, and the process had to be carried on until a more realistic and lasting division between good and bad was finally achieved. This, however, meant that making a proper division between good and bad was itself to be taken as an early accomplishment, effected mainly by splitting and projection. So Klein was able to see the mechanisms of splitting and projection as serving to organize the first phase of mental life in such a way that it, and their use, could be partly superseded.

Finally, Klein concluded that a main cause of the failure to form a stable representation of a good object was the use of projective identification, which both eroded the primitive distinction between self and object and made the object bad. She took this to be the expression of a primitive form of envy, which, as it were, would not tolerate anything to be both good and distinct from the self. This emotion she took as one of the fundamental causes of pathology.

Having before us this sketch of some of Klein's ideas, let us now turn to the work of Piaget.

II

As is well known, Piaget's account of cognitive and emotional development turns on the concept of an enduring object. To describe the world-picture of the infant who has yet to use this concept, Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969) introduces the term 'tableau':

> The universe of the young baby is a world without objects, consisting only of shifting and unsubstantial 'tableaux' which appear and are then reabsorbed, either without returning, or reappearing in a modified or analogous form. (p. 25)

Piaget's account of the infant's coming to understand his experience is thus one of progress from representation in terms of such tableaux, or episodic objects, to representations in terms of enduring ones. As he summarizes

> When the little child ceases to relate everything to his states and to his own action, and begins to substitute for a world of fluctuating tableaux without spatio-temporal consistency or external physical causality a universe of permanent objects structured according to its own groups of spatio-temporal displacements and according to an objectified and spatialized causality, then his affectivity will also be attached to these localizable permanent objects and sources of causality which persons come to be. Whence the formation of 'object relations' [marking the double formation of a self differentiated from other people and other people becoming objects of affectivity] in close connection with the scheme of permanent objects. (pp. 25–6)

Piaget's use of 'object relations' here – and his definition in terms of a 'double formation' – is an explicit reference to Freudian theory, acknowledging coincidence of explanatory aims. But it is plain that there is also a clear comparison to be made with the work of Klein – hers is, precisely, a theory of the mental development of the infant as it moves from the world of the partial and episodic objects of the paranoid–schizoid position to that of the enduring and whole objects of the depressive position.

Klein's attention, of course, is not so much focused upon the conception of a physical object as that of an enduring unified object of emotion, and a counterpart unified self, and the emotional changes in the development of these. Nevertheless, in her account, as in Piaget's, development of physical and psychological representation go together. So let us consider what Piaget says about psychological development, to see how his treatment of this matter can be related to Klein's.

One part of Piaget's account is readily understandable. This concerns the links among the concept of an enduring object, the distinction between subjective experiences and objective external objects, and the location of these latter in space. These show most clearly if we consider the role of the concept of identity.

The concept of identity is part of that of an enduring object, since this is, precisely, an object which retains its identity over time. One relation of this to our concepts of subjective and objective shows in the case where we perceive an object, cease to perceive it, and later do so again, taking the object seen on the first occasion to be (identical with) that seen on the second. Here the judgement of identity implies that the twice-perceived object existed unperceived – endured – in the interval. This entails that it exists independently of our subjective perceptions or experiences of it, which did not likewise endure.

We employ this same concept of identity when we distinguish between encountering an object which resembles one previously perceived from meeting the very same object again. Our grounds for holding that we have met the same object may be that what is now perceived has an appropriate resemblance to something perceived before. In judging identity, however, we go beyond this, since such grounds are consistent with the hypothesis that we have met distinct but resembling objects, while the judgement of identity is not.

We could not oppose likeness and identity in this way if we thought of objects as episodic, as coming into or going out of existence with perception, rather than as persisting in space over time. For we could not identify an object with one previously met without holding that it had kept on being the same, while yet it had not kept on being; and this is close to contradiction. If, however, we assume that something keeps on being, we must envisage its continued existence. And if the kind of objects we are concerned with are those which can be seen, touched, or acted upon, this

means understanding them as continuing to exist in the space to which we have access in perception and action, and hence in which we ourselves are.

Thus the connection between our concept of a single (identical) enduring object of perception and action and that of the place in which it endures unperceived is intrinsic; and this extends to the conception of events or episodes involving such objects. Where concepts are connected in this way, one cannot be fully employed in the absence of others. So we can see that Piaget's investigations, which trace the co-ordinated emergence of the use of these connected concepts, have, at least in part, a clear philosophical basis.[10]

So far, as we are concerned with the infant's transition from episodic to enduring objects, we are, therefore, concerned with the notion of identity, upon which a particular differentiation of subjective and objective turns. Further, it is clear that we regard one another both as enduring physical objects and also as persons in relation; so we can take such a representation as the terminus of what Piaget describes as the 'decentering' from initial episodic subjectivity.

What is not marked in our common-sense concepts, however, is any line of development of concepts of self and other from the episodic state to this terminus. Piaget clearly holds that there is such a development; but he does not, so far as I can see, describe how it takes place. And in relation to this topic the remarks he does offer seem unsatisfactory in several connected respects.

Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder 1969) stresses that the first state is one of 'adualism', in which 'there does not yet exist any consciousness of self; that is, any boundary between between the internal or experienced world and the world of external realities' (p. 22).

We can certainly understand the claim that the infant does not distinguish as we do between states of the self which are experiences of encountering objects, and the encountered objects themselves. Our distinction includes the idea that the objects, but not the episodic states of the self, are enduring, and this is just the conception the infant lacks.

Piaget's adualism has, however, a further and more difficult aspect. He tends to describe the early episodic phase as if it contained *no element of representation whatever* related to the later distinctions between internal and external, or self and other.

It is easy to see how these two aspects of adualism might be connected in Piaget's thinking. The idea would be that just as the infant's episodic objects are not properly regarded as objective until he represents them as enduring, so his experiences are not properly regarded as subjective until he represents them as in contrast to the objects themselves. So he cannot regard his own states as 'internal' or pertaining to himself, or his objects as 'external' or other. So – finally – he registers no distinction at all which bears on that between internal and external, or self and other.

The last step does not follow. It leaves out the obvious possibility that the infant's experience may contain distinctions between self and other, inner and outer, and so forth, which are not as full as ours, but which none the less shape his 'world'. Such distinctions might be precursors of ours, while still requiring to be developed or built up.[11]

Piaget's failure to consider this possibility entails both an implausibility and an incompleteness in his account. The implausibility comes out when he describes the behaviour of babies in terms of adualism.

> Insofar as the self remains undifferentiated, and thus unconscious of itself, all affectivity is centered on the child's own body and action, since only with the dissociation of the self from the other or non-self does decentration, whether affective or cognitive, become possible. The root notion in the term 'narcissism' is valid provided we make it clear that an unconscious centering due to undifferentiation is not at all like a conscious centering of one's emotional life upon the self which can occur in later life. (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, p. 22)

This brings the reader up short. For the idea that the young infant's feelings are focused on himself and his activities sharply contradicts the sense we have, in observing babies or relating to them, that their attention, feeling, and activity is almost from the first focused also on what they in some way already take as outer and other. Here our natural impression of infant behaviour surely draws us away from Piaget's argument and towards the idea that the baby has something in the nature of forerunners of our conceptions.

This consideration holds for experimental observation too. Thus Campos et al. (1983) report that infants of three months 'express fearlike withdrawal to looming stimuli', or again that infants of four months 'specifically orient their anger expressions toward the immediate source of what is frustrating' (pp. 813–24). The natural impression of withdrawal from something, or of anger directed at it, does not fit with taking fear or anger as 'centered on the child's own body and action'. Nor, of course, does experimental or common-sense observation of the infant's complex and apparently communicative early relation with his mother fit with the idea that the infant represents nothing as in any way apart from its own body and action.

The theoretical incompleteness in Piaget's account is closely related to this. He has specified a change in how the child represents things, describing both the first and final stages in the development. But he has apparently assigned the early representations no features which might explicate why or how they yield the later ones. So he appears to render the development in representation he describes quite inexplicable in terms of representation itself.

We can begin to see how this gap might be filled by considering the distinctions between self and other, and inner and outer a little further. An important part of our distinction between self and other is that a self has its own perspective, from which it confronts and encounters things. This aspect of the distinction is not necessarily dependent upon representing objects as opposed to experiences as enduring, since it concerns, as it were, only the opposed location of subject and object in an episode of experience. Part of what seems to convince us that babies take things and people as objects seems to be that they do occupy such a perspective in relation to things. Their perspective, or their occupation of it, may be as episodic as their objects; but it seems already to constitute some distinction in experience itself, as between subject and object.

Of course we cannot assimilate infantile and adult experience. The latter is not only informed by the concept of an enduring object, as Piaget stresses, but also by conceptions as to its own nature. When we see, for example, we take ourselves to do so, and we take ourselves to use our eyes. To regard infantile experience as lacking these sophisticated overlays, however, is not to cease to regard it as an encounter with something. So experience remains a perspectival matter, and hence one which encodes the distinction we want to understand. What we need to see, it seems, is how this minimal conception of perspective can be, or become, that of a self.

In connection with this it seems useful to consider a distinction which Piaget himself makes, between what he calls 'external' and 'internal' experience. Paradigms of external experience would be sight and hearing, which are from the first co-ordinated and focused upon what comes to be taken as external objects, and guide what comes to be intentional action involving them. As Bower (1977) stresses, an infant will from the beginning look towards a source of sound, and will be surprised if there is nothing to be touched when his hands are where an object appears to be; and also, early on, will reach and grasp things he sees. Examples of internal experience, by contrast, would be sensations of pain, pleasure, and satisfaction; as well, presumably, as those derived from flexing the muscles, breathing, and the like.[12]

To state the distinction between external and internal experience is to notice far-reaching differences in their nature and role. External experience has a variety of elements, which are elaborately co-ordinated, both in the way they occur and in their structure,[13] so as to specify external objects of perception and action as having a range of properties. Internal experiences do not specify such objects, but rather guide action, by association with it and objects. These differences – and others which could be brought out if the topic were treated more systematically – seem correlatives of the way the distinction relates to the idea of the self.

It seems that in having external experience, we naturally direct attention outward, and take ourselves to be encountering something apart from ourselves; whereas in internal experience, we direct attention inward, and

feel something to be happening to ourselves. To look seems to be to look at what is apart, even where what is looked at is oneself. When an infant looks at his feet, for example, it seems he may at first take them as things apart from himself, and that it is only gradually, and through learning how they are sources of internal experience, that he comes to assimilate them to his perspective. Again, the connection between experiences like pain and the self seems inbuilt, and to have no intelligible presupposition. An infant has to master reaching to reach towards an aching tooth, and to learn about teeth to regard the phenomenon as toothache. But it is not clear what an infant could be supposed to have to learn to feel pain as something happening to himself. We have no conception as to how else he could feel it, nor any notion of further primitives from which this feeling could be built up.

This suggests that we may take experience itself as involving kinds of information and ways of presenting them which already serve to distinguish self and other, and inner and outer, and which determine how these distinctions are woven into the frame of a perspective. It may simply be, for example, that in having external experience the infant is inclined to take himself as encountering something as existing apart, whereas in having internal experience he feels things to be happening to himself. And granted even the barest distinction of this kind in experience, we can see how it would be in the nature of experience itself to fill it out.

External experience is a natural source of information about events outside and impinging on the body, and internal experience about events inside it. So external experiences systematically focus attention on events, objects, and places in the space around the infant's body, and internal experiences on the space inside it. The space outside his body is thus (normally) presented to the infant in ways systematically different from places within it. Since presentations of things outside form one connected field, and those of events inside another, the things outside can come to be uniformly taken as those the infant encounters as distinct, and has a perspective on; while what happens inside is presented as happening to him, and so comes to be part of the locus of the perspective itself.

Internal experience is felt as located in, and directs attention to, an area which extends from the centre of the body out to the skin. External experience directs attention and action in space beyond this. Tactile experience has a double focus, which marks a boundary in these fields. The feeling of tactile contact is that it is with something outer, which is a potential object of further external experience; and also that it is of something happening to the self, and so connected with internal experience originating from the place of contact. So the intrinsic nature of these experiences themselves seem to go some way towards starting, and also filling out, the delineation of what is, and is not, the self.

So far as such a bounded image is something a baby has to construct, it seems he may do so in part just by lying or wriggling and feeling contact, touching and seeing his own body, and so on. In this he may well both use and build up an image in which he is already partly distinguished from, but related to, what is not himself. Similar observations would seem to apply to basic bodily activities. like breathing, taking nourishment, and so on, in which volition is connected with external, tactile and internal experience, in a variety of ways.[14]

Although they contradict his strictest statements about adualism, these ideas about the self do not seem really opposed to most of Piaget's thought. His sensory-motor schemas can be regarded as representations in which internal and external experience play the contrasting roles mentioned. And in his descriptions of the infant's world he often implies distinctions passed over in his summarizing comments. For example, speaking of the kind of coordination of external experience stressed above, Piaget (1955) says that 'if the object thus begins to be deployed in space, this space remains delimited by the child's zone of action; space, therefore, does not yet consist in a system of relations between objects, but is only an aggregation of relations centered on the subject' (p. 118).

Here the idea is that the child inhabits, and relates to things in, an egocentric space, which he will later locate within the objective one of adult thought. This seems correct, but also to involve precisely the sort of natural distinction between self and other that we have been considering. An egocentric perspective is one in which subject and object are distinguished, with the self at the centre. Piaget's phrase 'relations centered on the subject' suggests that he takes the things related to this centre as presented as apart (from the centre), and so, in effect, as distinct from the self.

Had Piaget considered internal experience in this context he would surely have had to regard it, not as centred on the self, but rather as further determining where the centre was and what it was like there. And this would, in fact, be an area potentially marked off and bounded by tactile experience, and so relatively fully demarcated as that of the infantile bodily self.

III

In light of the above it seems that an account of infantile experience should allow for an early, if rudimentary, distinction between self and other. So let us now consider how Piaget's views might be affected, if this were taken explicitly into account.

One of Piaget's findings is that young children systematically attribute to things they encounter psychological properties related to their own: the

child who fears fire regards it as malevolent, and so on. Piaget (1929) stresses that this animism is 'a primitive property of mind' (p. 262), exercised in response to certain kinds of movement. Evidently it exists *ab initio*, and is only restricted to appropriate objects over time.

Piaget does not consider this in discussing episodic objects, presumably because he takes it that for them there is no distinction between self and other, and so no other to interpret this way. If we allow for the distinction, a natural extension of Piaget's thought would be to hold that this primitive tendency operates with respect to it. So the infant encountering the episodic as other will endow this other with feelings corresponding to its own. This, however, means in effect that it will have imagined object-relations, and with a very primitive sort of animate objects.

On this view the way we take the child to represent its episodic others will depend upon how we regard the psychology of the child itself. Both psychoanalysis and recent empirical work suggests that this should be taken as continuous with what shows later; and so as including the fundamentals of hatred, greed, envy, and so forth, as well as the more benign emotions we are used to associating with babies. In their recent survey of research on emotion, Campos et al. (1983) conclude that adult emotions are expressions of a set of differentiated core emotion states which are present throughout the lifespan and undergo development with time. So, following this view, we might assume that primitive core emotions are present in the episodic phase, and may change with it. Then it appears that early fantasized objects will be both experienced and animated in terms of very primitive feelings.

It seems that the most important objects of feeling and action for the baby include the mother's breast (or the bottle), and perhaps other parts of her body, such as her face and hands. Piaget (1955) describes the way the infant watches the breast or bottle intently, its ardour, greed, and passion in sucking it, rage when it is withheld, and so on. Observations of this kind gain further significance from the thought that the infant may endow episodic objects with feelings commensurate with its own, and also understand its relation to them in terms of its own bodily experience. Viewed this way, such ideas as that the infant may feel the breast as, say, something quite wonderful, and a source of soothing internal pleasure, or again terrible and a cause of frustration and pain, seem well within the realm of possibility.

Finally, it seems that experiences with such an object may naturally lead to its being construed in ways quite strange to adult common sense. Thus according to Piaget (1955), if a child feeds and experiences satisfaction, it should fuse 'into [the breast] the impression of effort, desire, and satisfaction which accompany the [feeding]' (pp. 42, 43). The infant will presumably also not distinguish the breast from the milk taken in, so there will be a continuous episode in which an object (or a series of related objects) is registered in external, then oral, then internal experience. In such a case it may be that the infant feels it takes in something which was external, animate, and satisfying, and that this has a fate within, or becomes assimilated to, itself. This, however, begins to approach Klein's account of the infant's internalizing the breast in fantasy, and imagining that it has good or bad things inside, which can sometimes be got rid of by defecation, and so on.

It thus appears that once we grant a distinction between self and other, and hence animism and emotion, in an episodic phase, natural extensions of Piaget's views approximate Klein's. The degree of approximation, indeed, will evidently depend in large part upon which of Piaget's views are emphasized. As we have seen, Piaget takes children to alter their psychological representations of others in accord with such Freudian mechanisms as projection, and there is no reason why these should not operate early, or be inbuilt. And the main constituents of Klein's account of the paranoid–schizoid position are the closely related mechanisms she described, together with very primitive emotions and relations to episodic objects.

These speculations gain point from the fact that experimental evidence suggests that there is indeed such an episodic phase of representation as Klein and Piaget describe, and that it begins to be resolved in early infancy. Thus Bower (1977) describes

> a simple optical arrangement that allows one to present infants with multiple images of a single object. . . . If one presents the infant with a multiple image of its mother – say three 'mothers' – the infant of less than 5 months of age is not disturbed at all but will in fact interact with all three 'mothers' in turn. If the setup provides one mother and two strangers, the infant will preferentially interact with its mother and still show no signs of disturbance. However, past the age of 5 months (after the coordination of place and movement), the sight of three 'mothers' becomes very disturbing to the infant. At this same age a setup of one mother and two strangers has no effect. I would contend that this in fact shows that the young infant (less than five months old) thinks that it has a multiplicity of mothers, whereas the older infant knows that it has only one. (p. 217)

This surely admits interpretation along the lines Bower indicates, as showing that although at 4 months the infant takes its mother as a psychological other, it does not regard her as a single object as opposed to a multiplicity of episodic ones. But by 5 months, apparently, it opposes uniqueness to episodic multiplicity, and takes mother as one.

Also, it seems that at 4 months the infant takes distinct bodily parts, rather than a person as a whole, as the object of experiential encounters. Thus consider an observation cited by Campos et al. (1983).

> Stenberg and Campos did address the socialization of the target of a specific emotional frustration. They reported that by 4 months of age, infants specifically orient their anger expressions toward the immediate source of what is frustrating them (the experimenter's hands); by seven months of age, they direct their anger towards the social source of the frustration (the experimenter or the mother who is permitting the impediment to movement. (p. 824)

This suggests that the 4-month-old baby takes its mother's hands as things to be angry with, and so on, and hence as (part) objects. The same would presumably apply to other parts of her body, such as her face and eyes, and also and particularly her breasts. Later, apparently, the baby directs anger towards the person, a more unified representation of whom would thus seem to have been built up in the interval.

Together these experiments can be taken to indicate that in the fifth month the infant begins to move from representing its mother as a multiplicity of episodic and part objects to taking her as a single and physically unified person. If this is so then such a synthesis as Piaget assumed, and Klein described as the transition from the paranoid–schizoid to the depressive position, does indeed take place, and at the time in infancy Klein located.

Such a change must on any understanding be an important one. So it may now be of interest to consider it more abstractly. This may help us to see both how features of Klein's and Piaget's theories are related to the general notions of experience and identity involved in them, and also the sort of role these notions might be expected to play in other descriptions of this development.

Taking experiences as encounters with objects, as we naturally do, serves to integrate them and render them comprehensible, by connecting them via the concept of the object. Thus while encountering everyday things and persons we have a vast range of variety of sensory and emotional experience, and in using our everday concepts of objects, we connect these experiences in a picture of a stable and comprehensible world.

When we understand an experience as an encounter with an object of a certain kind, we assume that it is actually or potentially related to many other experiences, of the kind that would also be had in encountering such an object. This is part of the connection in question, and allows us to distinguish how things subjectively seem from how they objectively are. In the absence of appropriate further experiences we are bound to revise our original understanding, and account for it by some such means as deceptive appearance, illusion, and so on.

Now it seems natural that a phase of representing things egocentrically and episodically should precede that of representing them in a more objective way. This is because of the natural assumption that a creature

trying to understand things on the basis of a flow of data will first gain some grip on what happens in important episodes, and then extend his spatial and temporal horizons from these. A conception of episodic objects would enable him to do this. As this suggests, however, such a conception should connect fewer data, and less stringently, than one of objects as enduring.

In an episodic world, data would first be integrated in the conception of an object during an episode. In agreement with this, infants very early seem to take objects as things which can be seen, heard, tasted, and the like. Such a representation can evidently be improved in various ways. Episodes can be lengthened to encompass more data, as they apparently are. Also, episodic objects can be compared and contrasted. The ways they accompany or follow one another, the ways they are affected by strivings of various kinds, and so on, can be registered and thought about. Still, this seems likely to be logically weaker than the connections effected by conceiving the same experiences as encounters with objects which last from episode to episode. For in this case data are still linked in episodes, and these registered and compared; but in addition each episode is itself connected with others, as it was not before, as an encounter with one object met on numerous occasions. This seems to be integration of another order, as well as that which we take to correspond to reality.

Thus it seems we should expect an episodic phase to begin with objects having, as it were, the minimum of objectivity, and to work up from there. Conversely, we should expect the early episodic world to be not only unintegrated, but also subjectively deformed. There would seem little way of distinguishing what an object was like from how it seemed in an episode. Early episodic feelings, and early projections or animations, should be relatively unconstrained and unmitigated by recognition of the possibility of error, bias, or complexity in the object. Again normal control of experience, or wilful distortion of it, would seem hard to distinguish episodically from the exercise of power over objects. For example, terminating an episode by breaking off sensory contact might be confused with anihilating an object, and fantastic egocentric imagining could be conflated with experience of reality generally.

Now the shift from episodic representation, as located by Bower's experiment, seems to have a number of observable concomitants. The fifth month is, as Bower notes the time at which at which infants co-ordinate place and movement, in tracking objects in space; and they also apparently start to use visual cues that specify the structure of the human body.[15] At the same time they seem to begin to scan reliably the interior details of the face which encode emotional information, and to respond to this, and to other indications, such as tone of voice, more appropriately. Also, it seems that by six months babies move about better, and hence are better able to direct the extension their own experience.

This apparently leads to a more realistic apprehension of the mother's relation to the baby. Stenberg et al. (1983) studied the results of making babies angry by taking a biscuit away. They used both the mother and a stranger, and found that the infant's response apparently depended upon roles which it assigned to both.

> the *elicitor* of the expression of anger seems to be important, even for the 7-month-old. Although the infants reacted angrily regardless of who took the biscuit away, the magnitude of the reaction was influenced by whether the mother or stranger initiated the trials ... when the mother tested the infant after the stranger had removed the biscuit a number of times, the infant showed particularly angry expressions toward the mother. On the other hand, when the frustration was initially produced by the mother, no similar increase in anger expression to the stranger was evident ... it appeared to us that that the infant may have expected the mother to comfort him or her and to end the frustrating task; when she did not, the infant expressed the anger more intensely. (p. 181)

Concentration on the role of identity may help explain why these and other developments go together. Taking the mother as one is taking her as the same entity, physically and psychologically, from episode to episode of experience. Apparently this requires working representations of encounters with various parts of her body, first felt as episodic presences, into a representation of a person who is depended on to act in certain ways. To represent its mother's body as unified the infant must take it as a spatial whole which it can to some extent keep track of, and so represent the parts as in co-ordination and as moving in space. To take the mother as the same person from episode to episode would seem to require a comparable psychological unification. The infant would have to form a psychological image of her which included and co-ordinated information from various encounters. This would mean, in effect, representing her as something like psychologically whole – as having a range of consistent and interrelated psychological characteristics, which were displayed episodically.

Consideration of these changes suggests, among other things, that in them the infant should come to think of itself as having experiences which are distinct from their objects, and liable to error.

First, the changes bring to the fore the distinction, both as regards the physical and the psychological, between episodes of experience – which are plural and temporary – and the object of experience – which is one and lasting. Secondly, the infant will presumably not go from ideas of a range of episodic objects, each of which has certain properties, simply to an idea of an enduring object which has all the properties previously manifested in episodes. These properties would not, so to speak, all just fit together in one object. Rather, representing a new sort of object will go with assigning

it different, connected, properties, and hence with revising ascriptions from the previous phase. So after the episodic phase the infant should have reason to distinguish experience from its object, and to take it as admitting something like a distinction between appearance and reality.

The categories the infant uses for representing another should also be applicable to its own case, and vice versa. If so, it should also be able to think of itself as unified and lasting, both psychologically and physically. Thus as the infant distinguishes experiences from their object it should also be able to come to regard experiences as involving changes in itself, and to link these with its body. Also, if the infant can regard experience as potentially inveridical, it should be able to take itself as liable to respond to things and others inappropriately as well as appropriately.

It may be that something of this development can be seen in the behaviour of babies confronted with a 'virtual' object – an intangible visual appearance, as of an object in front of them. According to Bower (1982)

> The young infants (from 4 days) showed some considerable degree of upset when their hands arrived at the location of the seen object but contacted nothing. This upset must reflect the violation of an expectancy that seen objects will be tangible. ... If one studies the reaction of older infants to the virtual object, it is hard to see any change up to the age of approximately six months. ... The infants are still startled by the virtual object; however, their grasping behaviour is quite different. Younger infants close their hands on the virtual object and, indeed, usually end up with their hands clenched at the object focus. Older infants stop the grasp action with their hands still open. One may also observe in older infants a variety of behaviours such as prolonged hand regard, rubbing the hands together, and banging the hand on a surface – all interspersed with further single attempts to grasp the virtual object. One could say that the infants were trying to verify that their hands were really working and had not suffered a loss of sensitivity. If one persists in observing the infant in this situation, one can usually then observe a range of exploratory *visual* behaviours. For example the infant may sway its head from side to side through an extreme arc, thereby picking up the maximum amount of motion parallax. The motion parallax thus generated is the opposite of normal ... and is highly abnormal visually. The infant will usually then stop reaching for the virtual object. If presented with new objects in this situation, infants will not reach out until they have tested the parallax properties of the objects; then they will only reach for those objects that have normal parallax properties. (p. 124)

The progress charted here can be seen as a consequence of that from episodic to enduring representation. The 6-month-old baby seems to integrate a large range of experiential episodes, and to have a picture of the working of its own body in relation to various experiences taken as distinguished from, but related to, their objects. Hence, apparently, it can regard the experiences as veridical or misleading, and itself as judging

rightly or wrongly. These differences suggest that it may be in the change from episodic to enduring representation that infantile experience acquires many of the features we associate with our own.

The behaviour shown in these observations exemplifies what Freud called 'reality testing', applied to everyday physical objects. Since a system of enduring objects and persons partly constitutes what we mean by reality, and the hypothesis of such a system allows us to integrate coherently the contents of virtually every episode of normal waking experience with every other, we can see that the change from episodic to enduring representation should coincide with what Freud calls the 'establishment of the reality principle'. Klein concentrated mainly on psychological reality, but similar points should apply to this. So perhaps something like testing the feelings of others, and willingness to assign responsibility to the self when interactions go wrong, can be seen to lead to the increased understanding apparently shown at 7 months, and the better communication evident by 8 or 9 months.

Since psychoanalysis traces pathology to infantile fantasy, the opposition of fantasy and reality is taken as particularly important. As we have seen, fantasy should be relatively unconstrained in an episodic phase; and the naturally egocentric quality of fantasy should be further heightened, since while the infant does not construe its mother as one and lasting it has no need to take her as existing apart from her contact with itself, and so less reason to take her as an independent object upon whom it depends. In these circumstances, it seems, the infant is relatively free to represent itself wishfully as the centre of a world over which it exercises great power. Hence for both Klein and Piaget, the achievement of enduring representation forces a 'decentering' which is comparable to a Copernican revolution. What Klein calls the manic defences against the depressive position are a sort of Ptolemaic counter-revolution, in which the infant again tries to represent itself as at the centre of things, and controlling them. Still, her account suggests that release from responsibility for the intemperate and egocentric exercise of unbridled power more than compensates for loss of it.

Now the processes which Klein describes in terms of splitting and projection seem familiar in everyday life, in the tendency people have to see themselves, their families, clans, races, or nations as at once unrealistically good and threatened by correspondingly bad others – the familiar and ubiquitous pattern of good us/bad them. Such mechanisms may therefore be supposed to have a role in organizing people into co-operating and competing groups which is complementary to their significance for the individual, and important in its own right. For this reason I should like to conclude by considering some further observations in this light, although the connections between theory and data in them are even weaker than those above.

One notable regularity in infant behaviour seems to be the emergence of what is called stranger anxiety. Many babies seem relatively unconcerned about strangers until about 8 months, and then become notably wary or even very frightened of them, watching them closely, looking away or screaming when they approach, and so on. At about the same time there also emerges a new kind of interaction between infant and mother, which Campos et al. (1983) describe as characterized

> by the communication between infant and another becoming extended to include a whole event in the environment. During this period the infant can appreciate what in the environment is the target of the other person's emotional reaction, much as the infant at this age begins to understand the referent of the mother's pointing or gaze behaviour. . . . Accordingly, during this period social referencing begins. Social referencing is the deliberate search for emotional information in another person's face, voice, and gesture, to help disambiguate uncertainties in the environment, and is an instance of a two-person communication about a third event. (p. 825)

These phenomena can be partly related, since it is plausible that the baby seeks such information partly to cope with the approach of strangers, who may be feared. Other research (Feinman and Lewis, 1983) seems to indicate that this is so. There still seems to be no explanation, however, as to why infants should come to see strangers as particularly threatening, and at this time in particular.

I do not know whether Klein addresses this matter explicitly, but her theory seems to have a fairly clear application to it. So far as the infant does not fully work through the depressive position, maintaining a relation with a good object can require the setting up of a bad object elsewhere, as, so to speak, a receptacle for the unmitigated and inadmissable badness. So on this account the consolidation of a representation of the mother as a good object in a good relation to the child should be accompanied by the appearance of a 'bad' figure or figures, outside the circle of familiars. This would be the first obvious instance of the pattern noted above, with the infant representing the couple engaged in referencing as the good us, alert, among other things, to the possibility of 'bad' others.

This explanation would also fit the way a form of stranger anxiety can be observed in connection with separation protest, which seems to acquire particular force and specificity just before this time. As Schaffer (1971) reports

> crying or some other form of protest on termination of contact with an adult was apparent from the early months on . . . in the first half-year infants were found to cry for attention from anyone, familiar or strange, and though responsiveness to strangers tended to be somewhat less immediate and less intense than to the mother, both could quieten the infant and the departure of

> both could evoke protest. At the age of approximately seven months, however, a change took place. The infants still protested in the same situations, but now their protests were directed at solely at certain *specific* individuals. The departure of these alone elicited crying and only their renewed attention terminated the infants' distress. Strangers, quite on the contrary, upset the infant by *approaching* him. (p. 117)

Now the increase in focus on familiars here cannot be explained on the supposition that before 7 months the infants did not discriminate or remember their mothers, since they seem to have done so. Rather it seems that the mother, and her absence, came to acquire a new significance. This would be so if the infants had now worked out that she was unique, and so irreplaceable as a good partner. Such a focused image of good enduring familiars, however, seems to have as its corrollary one of potentially bad strangers, as required on the hypothesis above.

This seems to provide a picture into which the marked emergence of separation protest and stranger anxiety would both fit, and together with their precursors in earlier months. The idea would simply be that the early behaviours were episodic precursors of the later ones. The more mature versions would be more salient, both because later the objects were taken as more singular and significant, and because behaviour towards them was displayed less episodically.

Something like early stranger anxiety, in fact, seems particularly noticeable where the mother herself is presented to the infant in a way that renders her partly alien. Carpenter (1975) described how babies in the first months behave, when their mother's face is presented in strange circumstances. 'Infants would tense as they averted their gaze appearing to keep the target in peripheral view. From this position they would frequently take furtive glances. Sometimes they would turn ninety degrees and cry (p. 134). She noted that looking right away, as if to try to end the episode, was particularly frequent when infants were shown their mother's face, but speaking with another's voice. A natural explanation of this would be that the infants were taking such strange presentations of the mother as bad episodic objects which had to be watched or avoided.

Again, Cohn and Tronick (1983) observed babies of just over 3 months, comparing the way they related to their mothers in normal circumstances with their responses when the mother deliberately behaved in a 'depressed' way. The mothers gazed at the infant while keeping an expressionless face, spoke in monotone, and minimized movement and touch. Normally the infants alternated among behaviours which were interpreted as monitoring the mother, showing positive feeling towards her, and playing with her. In the abnormal circumstances, by contrast, the infants showed wariness and negative feeling, and alternated among wary watching, protesting, and looking away.

The authors took this as a response to maternal depression. It may be, however, that what most affected the infants was not the simulation of depression in particular, but rather the fact that the mother had become strange, and in a way that prompted the idea she might be bad. The observations would then be comparable with those of same sort of behaviour by Carpenter, and another instance of the way the infant shows feelings towards a strange episodic mother comparable to those later displayed towards strangers.

In the early case, on this hypothesis, the infant would have images of its mother as mutually exclusive good and bad episodic presences, and would be consolidating an episodic image linking itself and the good mother. In consequence, it would be liable to be particularly wary of something recognizable as mother-type, but strange. Later it would have an image of mother (and other familiars) and itself as persons, and more or less good. So it would now have an image of bad persons, as located outside the circle of familiars, and would be liable to be particularly wary of something recognizable as a person, but strange. Both behaviours would be instances of the familiar pattern of good us/bad them. The difference would be that early on the mother played the bad as well as the good part.

On this supposition the emergence of separation protest and stranger anxiety at after 6 months would be different aspects of the same synthesis, and closely connected with social referencing. As the mother and other familiars were represented as one, the split between good and bad in their episodic images would be transformed into, and maintained as, the first such division in the social world. I do not know how much weight should be placed on such data, since they lack the fullness of content which enables psychological concepts to get a grip. But here, as well as elsewhere, Klein's theory seems to provide explanations of phenomena which seem important, and which deserve further consideration.[16]

NOTES

1 Some recent work related to experiment is surveyed in Mussen (1983). I take two articles from there as reference points: Harris, 'Infant Cognition'; and Campos, Barrett, Lamb, Goldsmith, and Stenberg, 'Socioemotional Development'.

Two full, lucid, and authoritative introductions to Klein's work have been written by Hanna Segal (1978, 1981).

Although Klein's theories remain controversial, particularly in the United States, the degree of acceptance acknowledged – as long ago, say, as in the critique in Kernberg (1969) – is in fact considerable, and apparently growing. Most of the views discussed below now seem, so far as I can determine, fairly common among Freudian (and also many Jungian) analysts.

Further work directly related to both Piaget and psychoanalysis, and touching many issues not discussed below, is reviewed in Greenspan (1979).

2 Confirmation in common-sense psychology and the relation of this to psychoanalysis are discussed in Hopkins (1986).

3 Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969) agreed with this sort of interpretation of play, stating that 'Symbolic play frequently deals with unconscious conflicts: sexual interests, defense against anxiety, phobias, aggression or identification with aggressors, withdrawal from fear of risk or competition, etc.' He refers to Klein and Anna Freud in this context, and holds that the symbolism of play resembles that of dreams, although with a difference of emphasis. 'The vague boundaries between the conscious and the unconscious as evidenced in the symbolic play of children suggests rather that the symbolism of the dream is analogous to the symbolism of play (p. 62).

4 This can be seen, for example, in his case history of the Rat Man, so called because one of his main symptoms was a propensity to imagine that his father was being tortured by rats gnawing into his anus. Freud (1975, vol. X, pp. 155ff) describes his infantile neurosis, and the derivation of his symptoms from childhood Oedipal hostility towards his father. For the emergence in transference and memory of some persecuting images of the patient's father, plausibly constitutive of his super-ego, see the episode described in Freud's notes on pp. 283–5. The 'mouse or Butzen' or the faecal flea reported from Klein's patients below were plainly similar in role to the rats in this patient's imaginings, and Klein explained them in the same way as Freud had. Some other connections between this case and Klein's theories are noted in Hopkins (1982).

5 Freud had indicated something like this in the case of the Rat Man, noting how both his falling ill and his recovery seemed to turn on his finding 'a living likeness' of himself in the rats which tortured his father (vol. X, p. 216).

6 Klein introduces the term 'projective identification' (vol. III, p. 8) for the mechanism instantiated when a person imagined part of himself entering and becoming identified with another in this sort of way. This concept became central to her later work, and has been developed in a number of important ways by her followers, particularly Bion. On this see the discussion in Segal (1978). Ogden (1982) relates this notion to some work in the United States.

7 The relation of Freudian and Kleinian accounts of introjection, fantasy, and identification to the the concept of the self as a whole is discussed philosophically in Wollheim (1984).

8 Klein (1975, vol. IV, pp. 204–6). Richard could be seen to form such images regularly: cf. his fingering Klein's frock and speaking of the 'funny old woman' (p. 219), or the appearance of the 'monster' (p. 321), and the discussion in Klein's Note II, pp. 325–6.

9 In addition to children, Klein had analysed both depressive and manic patients, in which such anxieties and defences played a particularly significant role. Thus a person's imagining that he had irreparably damaged the good object might be a source of depression, or as against this he might manically imagine that everything was wonderful, or his feelings might swing between such alternatives.

A number of Klein's pupils were able to use her concepts in the analysis of schizophrenia. Segal (1978) contains a very clear account of the interpretation of splitting, projective identification, and other phenomena in the analysis of a schizophrenic patient (p. 62ff), and notes to other work in this field.

10 There have been a number of philosophical discussions of the connection between identity and objectivity. Hume sketched the way he thought we 'unite the broken appearances' so as to take distinct but resembling perceptual impressions of the same object, and thereby postulate bodies existing continuously, and independently of our minds. Kant put the matter in the explicitly wider framework taken up by Piaget, arguing that our representations of external reality and mind were interdependent. Mental items had to be unified to be taken as related to objects, but also to be taken as parts of the subject's mind. Through one activity, which Kant called 'synthesis in the imagination', we form a representation of ourselves at once as inhabiting a world of spatio-temporally and causally ordered objects, and as possessors of united, self-conscious minds. Piaget and Klein can be seen as continuing the Kantian tradition, but in science, and partly describing the relevant synthesis in complementary ways.

An outstanding recent discussion is that of Strawson (1954), especially chap. 2.

11 The sense that Piaget has left this out is strengthened by further reflection. His description of adualism assimilates three distinct ideas. Each is consistent with the possibility that the infant uses concepts or makes distinctions which are precursors of our later ones, but his discussion obscures this.

The first idea is that the infant is not self-conscious, that he does not at first think of himself as himself, as a self, or whatever. This is clearly consistent with the idea that he does make distinctions which pave the way for, or partly constitute, his later representation of himself in this way.

The second is that for the infant there is no boundary between what is internal and external. Presumably there would be such a boundary if the infant were fully self-conscious. But lack of self-consciousness does not entail absence of a boundary, for there might be one which was not yet thought of as such. Also, there is a difference between a distinction and a boundary if the latter implies knowledge of the things bounded. For clearly a baby might distinguish, for example, between episodes of vision which we should take as pertaining to the outer, and pain, which we should take as inner, but without yet knowing what is distinguished from what, and so without taking the distinction as a boundary.

The third is that the infant does not distinguish between experiences themselves (as opposed, for example, to spatial locations) as external or internal. This is yet another point, and again not inconsistent with the idea of related precursor distinctions. For the baby could distinguish different sorts of experience, in the sense of responding (feeling or judging) differently to or because of having them, but without yet representing experience as opposed to external reality explicitly at all. This point is touched on in recent psychological work, which describes the infant's early experience as ***amodal***, that is, not yet represented by him as in one sensory mode as opposed to another, nor, again, related by him to one sense-organ or another (Harris, 1983, pp. 707ff).

12 Piaget makes this distinction only to stress that it is without significance in the context of adualism. For example he argues against 'a realism which is as

unpsychological when it deals with internal as when it deals with external experience' which would mean that 'all the impression of effort, expectation, satisfaction, etc., which intervenes in the course of the actions, should be attributed to an internal substantial subject located in the consciousness' (Piaget, 1955, p. 224). The idea of an internal substantial subject, however, is very far from that of infantile subjectivity which consists partly in having a perspective.

13 Bower (1977) illustrates the way the outer senses employ information with a common structure, and hence represent objects as in a connected field. Shape seems registered in oral (tactile) as well as visual experience, from the first (Meltzoff and Borton, 1979).

14 The idea of the self thus built up would be that of a bodily self engaged in basic physical activities, and hence, in effect, Freud's bodily ego. This seems to reflect facts about what we are. That external and internal experience should draw the boundary in this way seems a natural consequence of the information they give and the way they do so.

In connection with the sense of self, Harris (pp. 745ff) mentions observations by Gibson and Butterworth, and also data about self-recognition in mirrors. This seems to be a more complex phenonemon, involving not only a conception of the self as a body but also the ability to recognize that body as externally displaced.

Psychoanalytic work on the self and skin includes Bick (1968) and Symington (1985).

Since this section was composed I have seen Stern (1983), which, although written from an empirical perspective and directed to further conclusions, seems to me to anticipate and complement the arguments above.

15 See Bertenthal et al. (1985) and Campos et al. (1983, pp. 824–5).

16 The author would like to thank James Russell and Sharon Numa for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

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PART IV

Issues in Stage Theory