

is derived from *anêr*, 'man'). However, he also suggests (p. 184, n. 51) that Aristotle's notorious claim that a woman's deliberative faculty is "without authority" (*akuron*) need not imply that the faculty is without authority in the soul but may only mean that groups of men would scorn it coming from a woman. It is difficult to reconcile this suggestion with the fact that the claim is a premise for Aristotle's conclusion that men are *by nature* rulers over women (*Politics* 1.13.1260a8–14, cf. 1.12.1259b1–2). It would seem either that Aristotle is a sexist or that his argument is a non sequitur.

4. His argument for the relevance of Aristotle to modern liberal democracy hinges upon his claim that Aristotle's "conception of the human good is a complex one which takes account of a variety of separate interests" (p. 160). Whether Aristotle has an inclusive conception of the good (as Salkever thinks) or a narrowly intellectualist one is in fact a hotly debated issue in recent Aristotle scholarship. It is surprising that Salkever makes no reference to this ongoing controversy, which has involved J. L. Ackrill, W. F. R. Hardie, John M. Cooper, David Keyt, Richard Kraut, and others. (Ironically, the dust jacket contains a description of Richard Kraut's important new book, *Aristotle on the Human Good* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989], which defends the opposing intellectualist interpretation.)

In spite of these disputable points, however, Salkever's book contains much of value and is of particular interest to those concerned with the relevance of Aristotle to modern political philosophy.

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Hope, V. M. *Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith*.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Pp. 166. \$39.95 (cloth).

It is generally held that among the great moral philosophers David Hume (1711–76) easily towers above his Scottish contemporaries Francis Hutcheson (1694–1745) and Adam Smith (1723–90). In *Virtue by Consensus* Vincent Hope sets out to correct this "serious imbalance in the usual estimation of the relative merit of Hutcheson, Hume and Smith" (p. 3). He argues that "Hume has been given too much prominence and his importance has been exaggerated" (p. 3). Hope is especially concerned to place more emphasis on Smith who, he says, "has received far less attention than he deserves" (p. 3). Hope suggests that his claim to offer something new on the work of these thinkers rests, ultimately, on his "insights into the significance of the impartial spectator and the nature of the person he is meant to represent" (p. 2). In the final chapters of this book Hope sets out to develop "a new theory of virtue" on the basis of his critical analysis and discussion of the ideas of these three thinkers.

According to Hope, the "main idea" of Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith "is that morality, and more particularly virtue, depends on a consensus based on the similarity of pleasure and displeasure which people respectively enjoy or suffer in observing how they treat each other. They assume that people's appreciation of virtue rests on shared feelings. Because of this individuals can check their moral judgments against each other: this is the only way in which they can

confirm or correct their moral assessments" (p. 2). In relation to this matter, Hope argues that "the view which has prevailed for so long . . . that Hutcheson and Hume [and Smith] are non-cognitivists, is wrong" (p. 3). These thinkers, Hope argues, "are neither objectivists nor in the simple sense 'subjectivists'" (p. 5). They regard virtue and vice as qualities which are "subjective with respect, not to the individual, but the human species, or society, or the fair-minded" (p. 3). In other words, they advance and defend what Hope describes as "intersubjectivism" (p. 8). According to this account, our shared emotional makeup, and our capacity to take up a disinterested or impartial perspective on actions and characters, makes it possible for us to reason in this sphere and arrive at true moral judgments.

Smith, Hope maintains, provides a considerable advance on both Hutcheson and Hume. Smith's advance, it appears, is to have "reinstat[e] conscience as the source of virtue" (p. 83), as opposed to benevolence (Hutcheson) or self-interested regard for social rules (Hume). In other words, whereas Hutcheson and Hume "underemphasize the importance to virtue of the desire to do what is morally right" Smith, by contrast, shows that the "worth of acting virtuously lies in satisfying a certain kind of desire which disregards personal interest in favour of a certain kind of fairness" (p. 13; cf. pp. 8, 83, 88). "The essence of morals," Hope interprets Smith as saying, "is the duty to do what deserves the approval of the fair-minded" (p. 84). The fair-minded individual is represented by Smith's Impartial Spectator who, in turn, represents "a collective person embodying a shared sense of what is decent and fair" (p. 9).

Out of this understanding and interpretation of the significance of the Impartial Spectator Hope endeavors to develop his new theory of virtue. It is fairness which Hope identifies as the basis of morals, and this consists in "doing for another what *he* would do, thus matching his good disposition" (p. 134). That is to say, what fairness requires is that the virtuous have shared rules or principles which are beneficial to all and which have been freely endorsed by each. It is the essence of "morals as fairness," therefore, to honor and respect those who adopt and share these principles by showing them the same benevolence that they show others. According to Hope, "this repeats one aspect of Smith's conception of the Impartial Spectator" (p. 134).

*Virtue by Consensus* has at least three distinct, although overlapping, potential audiences. Some may come to this study looking for historical insight into the growth and development of this particular tradition in moral thought; others may come to this book in the hope of finding a useful survey or general introduction to the basic ideas of these three thinkers; and, finally, those who are interested in the contemporary debate will be concerned with the critical force of Hope's discussion. Judged from any of these perspectives Hope's study is, in my view, less than successful. Regarding the historical dimension of his work, Hope claims to place these thinkers and their ideas in some relevant historical context, but his account of these matters is rather thin and watery. He has, for example, little or nothing to say about figures of central importance such as Clarke, Butler, and Kames. Indeed, Kames—whose role and influence was especially significant in relation to the moral thought of Hume and Smith—is not even mentioned. Problems also arise from the other two perspectives. Hope's effort to develop and push his own independent theory of virtue rather clouds and fragments his accompanying effort to present a lucid and brief general survey of the moral ideas of these thinkers. The unhappy result of pursuing these divergent objectives

in this rather short work is that the exposition is not always as clear and accurate as one would wish, and the criticisms and the associated new theory of virtue are far too sketchy to be convincing or illuminating for those who are primarily concerned with the contemporary debate. Those philosophers whose interests focus fairly narrowly on the moral systems of Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith may find that specific aspects of Hope's discussion prove to be of some interest and value (e.g., the discussion of Hutcheson and Hume on moral approval and moral judgment, although uneven, contains some interesting insights). Nevertheless, taken as a whole, this is a project which had great potential but, unfortunately, it has not been realized.

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Mansbridge, Jane J., ed. *Beyond Self-Interest*.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. xiii+402. \$55.00 (cloth); \$15.95 (paper).

Theorists have long been puzzled by the failure of rational choice theory to account for successful collective action. Viewed strictly from the perspective of self-interested behavior such action should most often fail to materialize. Instead, it very often succeeds. Among the most common solutions to this paradox are those which depend upon motives that are moral, cooperative, altruistic, and otherwise pro-social and unselfish. However, the contention that these motivations and inclinations exist as an integral part of human nature is nearly always taken for granted and almost never explored in any great detail.

In this volume Mansbridge offers a broad selection of essays that fill this theoretical and empirical void. The audience for this volume should extend well beyond the narrow population of rational choice theorists, for Mansbridge has assiduously avoided "numbers and Greek letters" and has produced an *integrated*, interdisciplinary study which draws from normative political and legal theory, social psychology, and political economy.

The thrust of most of the essays is analytical and descriptive, examining first the inadequacies of explanations of political behavior based on self-interest and then offering a variety of empirical studies that substantiate the claim that many political actors are motivated by altruistic and cooperative considerations that reach beyond self-interest. These conclusions apply to the actions and attitudes of members of the electorate as well as to those of members of the elite.

Several of the essays are also normatively directed in the sense that they argue that a political society based on cooperation is superior to one based on competition. However, this assertion, which runs as an undercurrent throughout the entire book, first needs to be more vigorously defended. It is not clear that a political ethos which is rooted in cooperation lends itself to a better vision of society or, for example, a more adequate distribution of resources than one imbued with competition and self-interest. In fact, it emerges quite clearly from those essays arguing from the perspective of social psychology and group identity that cooperative virtues and inclinations, when they do emerge, are often constrained by the limits of the small group or parochial moral community (Robyn Dawes et al. and Peter Boyd and Robert Richerson). Because these motivations