**Archytas: Author and Authenticator of Pythagoreanism**

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It is well known that Archytas of Tarentum was assumed in Antiquity to play an important role in Pythagorean philosophy – whether we are speaking of the historical Archytas of Tarentum (*ca* 435/10 – *ca* 360/50), for whom only four substantial authentic fragments survive[[1]](#footnote-1), or the author/s of a number of pseudepigraphical treatises ascribed to ‘Archytas the Pythagorean’ (as he is often called)[[2]](#footnote-2), which comprise no less than 47 pages in the most complete modern edition[[3]](#footnote-3). Until very recently, however, scholars have not thought much about what makes Archytas, whether we mean the historical Archytas of Tarentum or the figure we often call ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, so central to the Pythagorean tradition – what is it about Archytas *specifically* that captured the imaginations of ancient philosophers and historians of philosophy? Was it something having to do with his polymath learning, related to his innovative theory and practice of science[[4]](#footnote-4)? Or perhaps his success as a philosopher-statesman in democratic Tarentum[[5]](#footnote-5)? Or could it relate to his role as a bridge between Plato and Pythagoreanism within the later traditions which linked these two ‘schools’ together[[6]](#footnote-6)?

To my mind, all these seem to be plausible reasons, but the problem is that they don’t reduce to one neat and all-encompassing explanation for why Archytas lies at the heart of the Pythagorean tradition. Rather, there would seem to be a plethora of possibilities, each of which may reflect the specific circumstances of the reception of Archytas at particular moments, historical periods, geographic locations, or even personal preferences on the part of our sources. What lies at the root of this proliferation, I would argue, is a core issue about what it means to speak of Archytas as an ‘author’ and an ‘authority’ within the Pythagorean tradition. Indeed, as this essay will demonstrate, Archytas plays a dual role in the authorship of Pythagorean philosophical views (in the form of *purportedly* authentic ‘Archytan’ texts) and the authorization of certain texts not ascribed to him being genuinely Pythagorean (according to the ancient authorities). For it is in the single name ‘Archytas’ that both the author- and the authority-functions converge. Hence, one approach to the problem of explaining the central significance of Archytas in the Pythagorean tradition would be to approach the surviving evidence by dividing it according to whether it avails of the author- or the authority-functions of Archytas, in order to at least arrive at a better differentiated understanding of the cluster of Archytases that are preserved in Antiquity[[7]](#footnote-7). To put it more succinctly, one way to properly differentiate the many ‘Archytases’ would be to arrive at a foundational set of categories under which his many possible functions, viz. the Pythagorean tradition, could be taxonomized: Archytas the ‘author’, and Archytas the ‘authority’. This will of course require us to investigate what it means to speak of Archytas of Tarentum’s later namesake, the purported author of the pseudepigrapha, as ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, with whom our study commences.

**1 ‘Author-Inflected’ Approaches to Archytas: Some Methodological Concerns with ‘Pseudo-Archytas’**

Generally, scholars tend to associate the name ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ with authorship of a set of philosophical treatises passed down in the corpus of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha with the name of ‘Archytas’ attached to them[[8]](#footnote-8). The modern collection of fragments and testimonia was published by Holger Thesleff in 1965 and still remains, despite some points of disagreement (especially in textual editing[[9]](#footnote-9)), the authoritative edition and collection of these materials. But ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ is really an invention of the 19th Century, when scholars such as Eduard Zeller sought to assign a designation to texts that were passed down under the name ‘Archytas’, but which were clearly not written by the historical figure Archytas of Tarentum[[10]](#footnote-10). This is not to say that there haven’t been many ‘Archytases’ posited throughout the history of ancient Pythagoreanism[[11]](#footnote-11). Indeed, Themistius (*ca* 317 – *ca* 385 CE) is the first person on record to cast doubt on the equivocation of the figure *we* call ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ with Archytas of Tarentum – prior to Themistius, there is simply no evidence that anyone doubted that the texts coming down under the name ‘Archytas’ were indeed the genuine works of the great Pythagorean philosopher[[12]](#footnote-12). But Themistius does not call this figure ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, and instead he offers a more carefully differentiated philosophical lineage, as we see preserved by Boethius (*ca* 480 – *ca* 524 CE):

Archytas also wrote two books, which he entitled *Universal Logoi*; in the first of these, he laid out these ten categories. Hence, certain later scholars suspected that Aristotle was not the inventor of this division, because a Pythagorean man had already composed them, and this is the opinion of Iamblichus, no mean philosopher. Themistius did not agree with him in believing that this was the same Archytas as the Pythagorean from Tarentum who spent a little time with Plato, but a certain Peripatetic Archytas, who established the authority for a new work based on the antiquity of the name (*qui novo operi auctoritatem vetustate nominis conderet*)[[13]](#footnote-13).

Boethius suggests that Themistius disagreed with Iamblichus, who thought the works ascribed to Archytas – notably *On the Universal Logos* or *On the Ten Categories* – were unquestionably of the Tarentine philosopher[[14]](#footnote-14). Themistius maintained that they were composed by another Archytas, “a certain Peripatetic”, who, according to him, grounded the ‘auctoritas’ he needed to legitimate his work by taking the name ‘Archytas’[[15]](#footnote-15). So, if we are referring to this individual as ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, the work that is being done by ‘Pseudo-’ refers to the fact that a Peripatetic took the name ‘Archytas’ in order to lend literary and philosophical authority to a new work. The activity of ‘forgery’ – whatever that is taken to mean[[16]](#footnote-16) – is never mentioned or implied by Themistius[[17]](#footnote-17); and indeed Boethius elsewhere shows agreement with the consensus position (including Iamblichus and Simplicius) in believing that Archytas did indeed write a work on the categories prior to Aristotle, which originated in a Pythagorean division whose influence upon not just Aristotle, but also Plato, was paramount[[18]](#footnote-18).

All of this may stimulate us to wonder what interpretive work is being done when scholars adjoin the ‘Pseudo-’ to the name ‘Archytas’[[19]](#footnote-19). Some worrying implications have been drawn from what is, at least *prima facie*, most usefully employed as a *heuristic* *qualification*, rather than a mark of distinctive *authorial identity*: scholars have inferred from Themistius’ comment that ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ was an ‘imposter’[[20]](#footnote-20); that his philosophy was ‘banal’[[21]](#footnote-21) and a ‘pious fraud’, ‘like almost all Pythagorean writings’[[22]](#footnote-22); and, perhaps most widely accepted, that ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ was a *single* *figure* responsible for authorship not simply of the work *On the Universal Logos*/*On the Ten Categories* (the only work to which Themistius actually refers), but of those other puzzling treatises ascribed to Archytas which scholars have, with good reason, conjectured to have been written between the 1st century BCE – 1st century CE[[23]](#footnote-23). Let us, for the moment, refer to this as the ***‘author-inflected’*** approach to the use of the name Archytas, which plays a crucial role in defining what the moniker ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ is supposed to represent. The ‘author-inflection’ holds traction for many of the authors within Thesleff’s collection of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha whose works show signs of adapting the texts of Aristotle and Plato, including figures such as Ps.-Timaeus of Locri (also called Timaeus Locrus)[[24]](#footnote-24), who, apart from being presented as the ‘real’ source behind the Platonic *Timaeus*, was thought by the Neopythagorean Nicomachus of Gerasa to have passed on to Plato (via Philolaus and Archytas) the discovery of the musical scale that reached up to the twenty-seventh multiple in their written texts[[25]](#footnote-25). But Pseudo-Archytas assumed a significant place in terms of importance to the later Pythagorean tradition, and in terms of the range, length, and variety of pseudepigrapha that survive[[26]](#footnote-26). Some scholars have plausibly imagined that these texts were collected into a Corpus Archyteum[[27]](#footnote-27), and we could even conjecture a list of them, based on what Porphyry (likely) and Iamblichus (almost certainly) had at their disposal[[28]](#footnote-28): in addition to the four genuine fragments of Archytas of Tarentum[[29]](#footnote-29), there would have been, among the pseudepigrapha, *On the Universal Logos* / *On the Ten Categories*[[30]](#footnote-30), *On Opposites*[[31]](#footnote-31), *On First Principles*[[32]](#footnote-32), *On Being*[[33]](#footnote-33), *On Law and Justice*[[34]](#footnote-34), *On Wisdom*[[35]](#footnote-35), *On Intellect and Perception*[[36]](#footnote-36), *On the Good and Happy Man*, and *On Moral Education*[[37]](#footnote-37). The pseudepigraphic texts alone comprise 47 pages of Greek in Thesleff’s volume – 47 pages that could easily be relegated to the bin if they are uncritically taken to be “bald and didactic”, or part of a Pythagorean philosophy that “occurred on the non-philosophical, or at least sub-philosophical level”[[38]](#footnote-38). Other alternative scholarly accounts that are more sensitive to the content of the materials, and the social and intellectual contexts for their production, can and should be sought. Indeed, to state the obvious, it makes at least some difference if we choose to organize these texts under the umbrella of a single author, whom we call ‘Pseudo-Archytas’.

There are also some good reasons, however, for retaining use of the name ‘Pseudo-Archytas’. One justifiable rationale relates to our situating of the works that survive with ‘Archytas’ as imagined author within the tradition of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. In this case, the epithet ‘Pseudo-’ as applied to ‘Archytas’, has the value of contextualizing this figure within a sustained production over some centuries of pseudepigrapha whose paternity was asserted for various other figures more or less firmly associated with early Pythagoreanism[[39]](#footnote-39). The benefit of using this moniker, then, is that it encourages us to contextualize the pseudepigraphical treatises that survive under the name ‘Archytas’ with other such philosophical texts and posits an intelligible intellectual framework (especially Doric treatises that show affinities with the works of ‘Ps-Archytas’: among the most prominent, Ps-Ocellus of Lucania and Timaeus Locrus/Pseudo-Timaeus). Indeed, this kind of situating has positive explanatory force if it is taken with the assumption that the texts ascribed to ‘Archytas’ and other early Pythagoreans were forgeries manufactured by one forger to be purchased by wealthy clients – for one, it would explain such similarities as are found across many of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. In this case, however, we might wonder whether we’re dealing with a single forger for all (or at least many) of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. At this point, scholars who believe that these texts were ‘forged’ might point to an epistle, ascribed to Archytas and purportedly addressed to Plato:

Archytas to Plato – good health. You are doing well in ridding yourself of your ailment; for we ourselves have learned this from yourself and from Lamiscus. And concerning the matter of the notebooks (ὑπομνήματα), we attended to it and went up to Lucania, where we happened upon the progeny of Occelus. Moreover, we ourselves have obtained the works *On Law*, *On Kingship*, *On Piety*, and *On the Generation of the Universe*, which we have sent to you. We haven’t been able to discover the rest at this time, but if they should be found, you will have them[[40]](#footnote-40).

Scholars have not implausibly hypothesized that this letter could have been used as an authenticating cover letter for the pseudepigrapha ascribed to Occelus of Lucania and other purported Pythagoreans[[41]](#footnote-41), and indeed fragments of the latter’s *On Law*[[42]](#footnote-42) survive, as well as substantial passages of *On the Nature of the Universe* (an alternate title to *On the Generation of the Universe*)[[43]](#footnote-43). Within the corpus of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha, an *On Piety* ascribed to Diotogenes survives in three fragments (p. 75.18 - 77.9 Thesleff), as well as two fragments of an *On Piety and Reverence* ascribed to Cleinias of Tarentum (p. 108.2-19 Thesleff)[[44]](#footnote-44); works entitled *On Kingship* ascribed to Sthenidas in one fragment (p. 187.9 - 188.13 Thesleff), Diotogenes in two fragments (p. 71.17 - 75.16 Thesleff), and Ecphantus in four fragments (p. 79.3 - 84.8 Thesleff) are additionally extant[[45]](#footnote-45). The authentication hypothesis rests on the assumption that a forger could have produced this letter in order to legitimate the authenticity of certain works ascribed to Occelus (and possibly others), which the forger would be selling to someone willing to purchase them[[46]](#footnote-46). Legitimacy of the texts ascribed to Occelus would, then, be a function of Archytas’ activities of *collecting* the treatises and *authenticating* them, a notion that is reflected implicitly in the reference to the philosophical or familial ‘progeny’ (ἔκγονοι) of Occelus himself. That is, this Archytas would be acting as the authority who legitimates the existence of these texts[[47]](#footnote-47). A late testimonium of Censorinus[[48]](#footnote-48), who appears to have obtained his information from Varro, suggests that the writings ascribed to Pythagoras, Archytas, and Ocellus were known to have been associated with one another (perhaps collected?) in the mid-1st Century BCE[[49]](#footnote-49). And indeed, as Bruno Centrone has noted, this ‘Archytan’ tradition could be seen as paralleling a tradition that sought to credit Philolaus with divulging the writings of Pythagoras, by sending them to Plato[[50]](#footnote-50). Let us refer to this as the ***‘authority-inflected’*** approach to Archytas. Now the problem with this epistle is that, on its own, it provides insufficient evidence to explain the existence of treatises surviving with the name ‘Archytas’ attached to them – nowhere does this epistle refer to works by *Archytas himself*, and it seems that the residual effect of appealing to the authority of ‘Archytas’ has little to do with legitimating Archytas’ own writings. Or, to put it another way, it does little to explain the existence of philosophical treatises that were attributed to Archytas of Tarentum by someone such as a ‘Peripatetic’ Archytas, as Themistius refers to him.

In addition to the aforementioned concerns about hypothesizing ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ as a single forger, another negative effect is that it might encourage us to elide artificially the many texts that could have been collected into a Corpus Archyteum without attention to the possibility that diverse authors, or at least philosophical perspectives, might be contained in the works[[51]](#footnote-51). It would not be prudent to *assume* consistency across the Corpus Archyteum[[52]](#footnote-52), or even across the entirety of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha that are ‘philosophical’ (or fall under Thesleff’s Class II)[[53]](#footnote-53). It may be that we end up discovering similarities, or various types of ‘family resemblances’, across treatises[[54]](#footnote-54); and indeed it may be that the treatises can shed light on one another when coupled together, as often happens in *any* corpus of philosophical authors, or even across corpora. Another, perhaps more complementary, way of trying to make sense of the Corpus Archyteum is to try to discover what it was that might have compelled someone (a forger? a collector? a 1st Century BCE Platonist or Peripatetic?) to produce a set of treatises, all in ‘literary Doric’ and dealing with various aspects of Platonist/Peripatetic philosophical approaches, and to authenticate them by appeal to the name ‘Archytas’. Is there something about Archytas’ *name* that distinguished it from other names that could have lent legitimacy to the contents? For the rest of this essay, I will focus on the evidence that relates to an *‘authority-inflected’* approach to Archytas and the corpus of pseudepigrapha that survives with his name attached.

**2 ‘Authority-Inflected’ Approaches to Archytas: Nicomachus, Porphyry, and Olympiodorus**

In order to gain traction on the ‘authority-inflected’ usage of ‘Pseudo-Archytas’, let’s look at what is often cited, without sufficient critical analysis, as one of the most important testimonia on the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. It occurs in Olympiodorus’ *Prolegomena*, possibly composed between 530-570 CE[[55]](#footnote-55):

First [we must examine] the number of ways in which books have been misattributed[[56]](#footnote-56) and what sorts of criteria can be employed to distinguish genuine from mistakenly attributed books[[57]](#footnote-57). Well, in ancient times books were misattributed in three ways: either through (a) the vainglory of kings, (b) devotion of disciples, or (c) homonymy; and through homonymy, in three ways: homonymy (c¹) of the writer, (c²) the writings, or (c³) the commentary.

However, if it seems best, let us learn how (a) the vainglory of kings was responsible for misattribution of books. Well, one must know that the kings of old, as they were lovers of treatises, sought to collect the writings of the ancients – because of their vainglory. So, in this way, Juba, king of Libya, was so great a lover of the writings of Pythagoras, as was Ptolemy, surnamed Philadelphus, of the writings of Aristotle, and Pisistratus the tyrant of Athens of the writings of Homer – he sought to collect them, with payment in return. Hence, many people, greedy for money, set out either to write them or, to be more precise, to collect those they chanced upon and ascribe them to more ancient authors, and to present them and reap the rewards, hawking them because of this [*sc*. the kings’ vainglory]. And so it went, just as we have previously said: this is the situation in which books were misattributed because of the vainglory of kings.

And there is a situation in which books have been misattributed because of (c¹) homonymy of the writers, wherefore there wasn’t just one single Aristotle of Stagira, but also the Aristotle whose nickname was ‘Mythos’, and even the one whose nickname was ‘Gym Instructor’.

And books have been misattributed because of (c²) homonymy of the writings, wherefore not only did Aristotle compose a *Categories*, but so too did Theophrastus and Eudemus, his disciples. Hence, it has often happened that someone chancing upon the *Categories* of Theophrastus, if he does chance upon it, has believed it to be by Aristotle.

There is also a situation in which books have been misattributed neither because of homonymy of the writers, nor because of homonymy of the writings, but because of (c³) homonymy of the commentaries, wherefore often someone composes a commentary on a homonymous topic and it is thought to be of another [topic]. Hence, for example, Theophrastus too wrote a commentary on his own *Categories*, and often someone has been tricked into believing that the *Categories* of Aristotle is this commentary. And often, when someone happens upon the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on his *Categories*, he thinks this is wholly the *Categories* of Aristotle, since he is confused not only that Alexander wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, but also on Theophrastus’ *Categories*.

There is also a situation in which books have been misattributed because of (b) the gratitude of disciples towards a teacher, just like all the writings ascribed to Pythagoras. For Pythagoras did not leave behind any writing of his own, reasoning that one should not leave to posterity inanimate writings, since it is impossible for them to make a defense on their own behalf, but rather to leave to posterity animate writings, that is his students, those who have the capacity to fight together on behalf of themselves and their own teachers. Hence, his disciples, because they composed writings by devotion, ascribed the name of Pythagoras to them. And because of this reason all the writings passed on under the name Pythagoras are misattributed[[58]](#footnote-58).

As previously mentioned, scholars have often taken this as *prima facie* evidence for the production, circulation, collection, and sale of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha in the 1st century BCE, usually by reference to what is interpreted to be ‘Pythagorean writings’ (Πυθαγορικὰ συγγράμματα), which were allegedly forged to satisfy the vainglory of King Juba II of Mauretania[[59]](#footnote-59). Unfortunately, two objections can be leveled against Olympiodous’ evidence being taken in any *prima facie* way: first, it is clear, as Thesleff pointed out, that the term Πυθαγορικὰ συγγράμματα in this text does not refer to the ‘Pythagorean writings’, but rather to the ‘writings of Pythagoras’, given the fact that the other two collections of writings cited are those ascribed to Homer and Aristotle (not ‘Homeric’ and ‘Aristotelian’)[[60]](#footnote-60). This is confirmed by concerns later in the passage of writings ascribed to Aristotle and Pythagoras, and the absence of references to ‘Aristotelian’ or ‘Pythagorean’ writings there. A second objection concerns the format and presentation of the evidence itself. Olympiodorus, or his source (which is unfortunately unclear)[[61]](#footnote-61), is making a transhistorical point about how ‘vainglory’ stimulates the fabrication and collection of writings ascribed to Homer, Aristotle, and Pythagoras by, respectively, Pisistratus (in the mid-6th Century), Ptolemy II Philadelphus (*ca* 309 – *ca* 246 BCE), and Juba II (48 BCE – 23 CE)[[62]](#footnote-62). This is hardly secure historical evidence for the rationale behind fabrication of books and their collection by Juba (or for the respective cases of Pisistratus or Ptolemy, for that matter)[[63]](#footnote-63). Even the reason adduced for Pythagoras’ not leaving behind writings can be reduced to a simple Platonist mask, as it employs a commonplace sentiment about writings being unable to talk back found in Plato’s *Phaedrus* (275d-276a)[[64]](#footnote-64). We might at this point inquire: what’s the use of Olympiodorus’ evidence, if it is at all useful, for our understanding the production of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha?

I suspect that it can be considered useful if it is not taken *prima facie* as the critical key that solves the problem of the production of Pythagorean forgeries, but rather in a slightly more oblique way for the transmission of Pythagorean doctrines, precepts, and methods from teacher to student within the philosophical ‘school’ (a concept that itself would require further discussion). This is at least implicit in category (b), the category of writings ascribed to Pythagoras that exemplifies the ‘gratitude’ (εὐγνωμοσύνη) or ‘devotion’ (εὔνοια) of Pythagoras’ disciples. If we exclude the *a fortiori* speculation, on Olympiodorus’ part, for the reason why Pythagoras left no writings, we are left with a basic observation that Pythagoras’ disciples passed off their writings as Pythagoras’[[65]](#footnote-65) *as a means to defend their teacher’s ideas, and their own, from external attack* (καὶ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων διδασκάλων...συμμαχεῖν). Implicit here is the notion that the Pythagoreans *were* under attack and in a philosophical dialectic with other philosophers from other schools, such as those levelled by Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics, and Early Christians[[66]](#footnote-66).

Olympiodorus’ evidence helps us to explain how, and for what reasons, Pythagorean texts were ‘misattributed’, but it does little to fix an historical account of this process or to speak about the agents of this process. In order to gain ground on those questions, we may turn to a difficult passage of Porphyry’s *Life of Pythagoras*, which appears to show some Neopythagorean inclinations:

And, on account of this chiefly [*sc*. the Pythagorean treatment of numbers], their [*sc*. the early Pythagoreans’] philosophy happened to die out – first because it was enigmatic, and next because their writings were written in Doric (a dialect that is somewhat obscure) – and, in fact, this is precisely why the doctrines recorded (ἀνιστορούμενα) in Doric were suspected of being spurious (νόθα) and misunderstood (παρηκουσμένα), due to the fact that those who published them were not Pythagoreans strictly speaking. In addition to these, as the Pythagoreans (οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι) say, Plato and Aristotle, and Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates, appropriated what was fruitful, with minor revisions; but what was superficial and inconsequential (τὰ ἐπιπόλαια καὶ ἐλαφρά), and everything that was advanced later on (ὕστερον) for refutation and mockery (πρὸς ἀνασκευὴν καὶ χλευασμόν) of the school by its malicious slanderers (βασκάνως συκοφαντούντων), they collected and recorded as the proper doctrines (ἴδια) of the sect[[67]](#footnote-67).

Porphyry’s discussion here – possibly derived from Nicomachus or Moderatus (the ‘Pythagoreans’ who are at least slightly critical of Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum in the passage[[68]](#footnote-68)) – speaks about the production of counterfeit doctrines in Doric, that were in fact misattributed *because* they were published by figures known to be ‘not Pythagoreans strictly speaking’[[69]](#footnote-69). It is due to these people that the doctrines were misunderstood, or ‘mis-heard’ (παρηκουσμένα) – likely a reference to the genuine Pythagorean *acusmata*, which were not properly grasped as such[[70]](#footnote-70). A tentative reconstruction of the progression of the story, supplemented with some extra contextual information, might be thus formulated:

1. The (legitimate) early Pythagoreans espoused an enigmatic philosophy (reflected in the *acusmata*).
2. a. Their enigmatic philosophy was written down in Doric by legitimate Pythagoreans. Likely candidates here include Archippus and Lysis[[71]](#footnote-71).

b. But some people, who were ‘not Pythagoreans strictly speaking’, by dint of not being genuine Pythagoreans or having genuine Pythagorean understanding, caused people to doubt the authenticity of these doctrines, which they made public in written form.

1. Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates read the published Doric texts (?) and appropriated what was fruitful from these to their own works, making some minor modifications.
2. They also collected what was ‘superficial and inconsequential’ (from the Doric texts?) and recorded it as the proper doctrines of the Pythagorean sect.
3. Sometime ‘later’, some unidentified ‘malicious slanderers’ read the ‘superficial or inconsequential’ material recorded as the particular doctrines of the Pythagorean sect and employed it for ‘refutation and mockery’ of the school.

It is difficult to infer on this evidence alone which texts within the corpus of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha belong to which step in the purported history of Pythagorean writings. What is relatively clear, however, is that there was an original ‘writing down’ of the enigmatic doctrines in Doric, some parts of which were appropriated by the members of the Academy and the Lyceum, and some parts of which they recorded as being distinctively Pythagorean, possibly in their doxographical works[[72]](#footnote-72); finally, sometime later on (ὕστερον), the enemies of Pythagoreanism employed these latter materials. As we saw before with the epistle to Plato, Archytas was thought to be central to the process of authenticating and transferring early Pythagorean wisdom. Would Archytas best fit into this historical process in step 2b, where people who were ‘not Pythagoreans strictly speaking’ wrote down and published the genuine Pythagorean ideas? Or is Archytas instead to be associated with those people who recorded only the superficial Pythagorean material (at least according to the ‘Pythagoreans’ who are Porphyry’s source here)? Or is there a step missing in Porphyry’s story of the Pythagorean writings, where Archytas was thought to intervene? Indeed, there is evidence to support this final hypothesis. It is found in Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a’s *Sources of Information on the Classes of Physicians*, a 13th-century biographical work which preserves two fragments derived from the larger work within which (possibly) Porphyry’s *Life of Pythagoras* was originally embedded, *On the History of the Philosophers*:

The books of Pythagoras the sage, which Archytas the philosopher from Tarentum collected by himself, are 80 [in number]. As for these books – which he [*sc*. Archytas] diligently with all his effort brought together, compiled, and made into a collection, from all the elders[[73]](#footnote-73) who were followers of Pythagoras the philosopher, men of his sect, and from those who inherited his knowledge, one by one – they were 200 [in number]. And whoever is distinguished by the purity of his intellect and sets aside those spurious books which are said to be from the mouth of the sage and which are attributed to the sage and his name, which dishonourable people created, such as *the Book of Prayers, the Book of the Description of Detestable Professions, the Book of the Science of Miracles, the Book of the Formation of Symposia, the Book of the Construction of Drums, Cymbals, and Lyres, the Book on the Generation of the Universe, the Book of Hands, the Book on Magnanimity*[[74]](#footnote-74), and many other books similar to these which have been recently created – he will attain eternal happiness[[75]](#footnote-75).

As far as those unscrupulous men who created these spurious books which we have mentioned: they are, according to the narratives that have been passed down: Aristippus the Teller[[76]](#footnote-76), Nicos who used to be called ‘one-eyed'/'truly inefficient’, a man from Crete called Conius, and Megillus, and Fūkhjwāqā[?], along with others who were worse than them. And what led them to create these spurious books and attribute them to the mouth and name of Pythagoras the philosopher was [the desire] to be well received by the moderns[[77]](#footnote-77); and because of that, they are honoured, revered, and taken as models. As far as the books of the sage which are beyond suspicion, [they are] 280 [in number]. They were forgotten until they reappeared with a group of wise men with [pure] intentions and temperance, who acquired, brought together, and made a collection of them. Before that, they were not known in Greece; however, they were stored in Italy[[78]](#footnote-78).

Obviously, this is a tremendously rich text, and it won’t be possible to undertake a comprehensive analysis of all of its contents here. Instead, I will use it to inform the skeletal account given in Porphyry’s *Life of Pythagoras* 53, discussed above. First, Porphyry states that the report of the ‘unscrupulous men’ is based in tradition, and has been passed down by someone else; this is in keeping with Porphyry’s passage from the *Life of Pythagoras* 53, where some ‘Pythagoreans’ (who we cannot identify with certainty) are cited for reporting that Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates appropriated what they found fruitful in the written Doric treatises, and that ‘what was superficial and inconsequential, and everything that was advanced for refutation and mockery of the school by the malicious slanderers later on, they collected and recorded as the particular doctrines of the sect.’ Given the fact that these views could be considered within an historical dialectic, it need not entail that Porphyry committed to them[[79]](#footnote-79). Second, it’s clear that Porphyry took Archytas to be central in the legitimation of genuine Pythagorean texts: not just the texts of Pythagoras, but also the texts of the ‘elder’ Pythagoreans, those who had direct inheritance of his knowledge and were purportedly of his sect. From this perspective, Porphyry would appear to disagree with Nicomachus, who believed that “there was no written work of Pythagoras”[[80]](#footnote-80), and who may indeed be the source behind Porphyry’s *Life of Pythagoras* 53[[81]](#footnote-81). Third, Porphyry invites the audience to imitate Archytas in terms of using one’s purified intellect to make proper discriminations about what texts are genuinely Pythagorean and what are spurious. Fourth, it is not obvious, as some scholars have claimed[[82]](#footnote-82), that the text contradicts itself: that only 80 books are authenticated as being ‘of Pythagoras’, and 200 books authenticated as being ‘of the elders’, does not mean that when Porphyry claims that there are 280 books ‘of the sage’, he has been in error: he is simply assuming that the books ‘of Pythagoras’ and ‘of the elders’ *all* genuinely reflect Pythagorean ideas, as authenticated by the pure intellect of Archytas of Tarentum. If this is right, then Bart Ehrman’s criticisms of Armin Baum’s hypothesis, that authentication of texts is an activity of guaranteeing the *content* of the material as being genuine, are misapplied: this text does, as Baum argues, indicate that Pythagorean forgeries are identified as genuine or spurious based on whether they descend through the proper lineage of the sect, and not simply on whether the figure in question is the author of the text[[83]](#footnote-83).

It is difficult to know who, precisely, Porphyry was attacking when he refers to the ‘unscrupulous men’ who proffered as Pythagorean their own ideas. The names, which are likely to be translated from Syriac and are almost certainly corrupt, have presented a serious challenge to decipher: [1] In Ernst and Ehrman’s text, based on al-Najjār’s edition of 2003, we have first ‘Aristotle the Younger’, whereas in Huffman’s translation of Marwan Rashed’s French version, based on Müller’s 1884 edition, we have ‘Aristippus the Young’ (presumably ‘the Younger’). We know nothing of an ‘Aristotle the Younger’ who wrote about Pythagoras, whereas it’s clear that Aristippus *the Elder*, who was often confused with his grandson, wrote, in some fashion, about Pythagoras in his *On Natural Scientists*[[84]](#footnote-84). In her 2008 article on these fragments, Emily Cottrell, who employs Müller’s text but also takes into account al-Najjār’s manuscript readings, to which Müller did not have access, agrees with Rashed in keeping ‘Aristippus’, but refers to him as ‘the rhetor’, which would again most likely indicate Aristippus the Elder[[85]](#footnote-85). Thesleff, seeking connections with the other pseudepigrapha, conjectured ‘Archippus’, and van den Waerden tried ‘Aristaeus’, but Cottrell has sufficiently ruled these out on palaeographical grounds[[86]](#footnote-86). [2] The next figure on the list is ‘Nicos’, or, if Thesleff’s conjecture is to be entertained, ‘Nearchus’, who is either described as ‘essentially erroneous’ (Ernst and Ehrman) or ‘one-eyed’ (Rashed and Cottrell)[[87]](#footnote-87). To my mind, this looks like it could possibly be an epithet. [3] Following that is the Cretan ‘Konios’, accepted by Ernst and Ehrman, Rashed, and Cottrell, but the obvious reference, as noted by Thesleff, is to Cleinias of Crete, the interlocutor of Plato’s *Laws* and the *Epinomis* who, along with Megillus of Sparta, kept pace with the Athenian Stranger. Moreover, a pseudepigraphon with the title *On Piety and Reverence* ascribed to ‘Cleinias of Tarentum’ survives in two fragments[[88]](#footnote-88). Furthermore, the Neopythagorean Cronius may remain a possibility, especially given Porphyry’s criticisms of his philosophy as insufficient elsewhere (see below)[[89]](#footnote-89). [4] Next on the list comes ‘Megalos’ (Ernst and Ehrman) or ‘Magillos’ (Rashed), which is almost certainly the aforementioned ‘Megillos’ (as Cottrell has it), for whom there is evidence of a treatise *On Numbers*[[90]](#footnote-90). The final figure, rendered Fūkhajawāqā by Ernst, F W K H J W A Q A by Rashed, and Fūkhjwāqā by Cottrell, is sadly unrecoverable[[91]](#footnote-91).

One final point about this fascinating evidence: Porphyry refers to some unknown ‘youths’ or, as I have translated it (with Rashed), ‘moderns’ whom the shameless fabricators sought to please by assigning the spurious works to Pythagoras; there is, importantly here as elsewhere, no mention of forgeries associated with Pythagoras’ early students (the ‘elders’). The identity of these ‘youths’ is ambiguous – is Porphyry referring to young men or ephebes, or to ‘recent’ people (both of which could be indicated by Greek words *neoi* and *neoteroi*)[[92]](#footnote-92)? It is interesting that Syrianus and Proclus refer to the Neopythagoreans Nicomachus and Moderatus as the ‘younger’ or ‘more recent’ Pythagoreans (*neoteroi*)[[93]](#footnote-93), and it can be conjectured from his *Life of Plotinus* (20.71-76 and 21.4-9) that Porphyry did not hold either of these figures (along with Numenius, and Cronius) in the *highest* of esteem – at least with regard to their respective descriptions of the Platonic-Pythagorean system, which, according to Porphyry, Plotinus explained with far greater precision[[94]](#footnote-94). Hence, I have adopted the translation ‘moderns’, to be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of old or ‘elders’ whose works were, according to this account, legitimate.

A new reconstruction of Porphyry’s version of the history of the Pythagorean writings, which combines the sections of *Life of Pythagoras* 53 and 57 with the Arabic fragments preserved by Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, would then be:

1. There are eighty legitimate books attributed to Pythagoras.
2. The (legitimate) early Pythagoreans espoused an enigmatic philosophy (reflected in the *acusmata*).
3. Their enigmatic philosophy was written down in Doric by legitimate Pythagoreans. Likely candidates here include Archippus and Lysis[[95]](#footnote-95).

But some people, who were ‘not Pythagoreans strictly speaking’, by dint of not being genuine Pythagoreans or having genuine Pythagorean understanding, caused people to doubt the authenticity of these doctrines.

1. Archytas of Tarentum collected the genuine writings attributed to Pythagoras and Pythagoras’ early students (including Archippus and Lysis?). He probably edited them and arranged them into some order as well. The number of books here is 280.
2. Plato, Aristotle, Speusippus, Aristoxenus, and Xenocrates read Archytas’ collection of Doric treatises and appropriated what was fruitful from these to their own works, making some minor modifications.
3. They also collected what was ‘superficial and inconsequential’ from the Doric texts and recorded it as the particular doctrines of the Pythagorean sect.
4. Other figures (like ‘Aristippus’, ‘Cleinias’, and ‘Megillus’), seeking to authorize their own illegitimate ideas as Pythagorean to posterity, assigned them to Pythagoras so that they would be honoured, but in reality these texts and their ideas were spurious. They were looking to impress the ‘moderns’, a possible reference to the Neopythagoreans (such as Moderatus, Nicomachus, Numenius, and Cronius). This would place the false association of the illegitimate texts with Pythagoreanism around the late 1st century CE.
5. Sometime ‘later’, some unidentified ‘malicious slanderers’ read the ‘superficial or inconsequential’ material recorded as the particular doctrines of the Pythagorean sect and employed it for ‘refutation and mockery’ of the school.
6. A ‘group of wise men’ emulated Archytas of Tarentum’s activities by acquiring, bringing together, and making a collection of the legitimate 280 writings, which had been lost to Greece (or dispersed?). They were kept somewhere in Italy (presumably in Tarentum).

Admittedly, this reconstruction is tentative and depends both on (a) synthesizing the accounts of Porphyry as preserved in the extant *Life of Pythagoras* with the account preserved by Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, and (b) assuming that we can sift through the levels of textual transmission in the passages with any certainty. At any rate, as Huffman correctly notes, this information “would make excellent sense as someone’s attempt to explain a corpus of pseudo-Pythagorean writings similar to that reflected in Thesleff’s collection”[[96]](#footnote-96). And it would help to explain why such a complex set of texts as the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha could have had Archytas placed so prominently at the centre of its existence. Archytas’ role would have been as authenticator of the genuine Pythagorean works, as the first and most important textual and philosophical critic of Pythagoreanism whose own progeny would extend to Late Antiquity and beyond.

**3 Conclusions**

What Porphyry’s history of the Pythagorean writings can contribute to our understanding of the ‘authority-inflected’ appeal to Archytas is, I hope, relatively clear from what I’ve argued here. Authorization of texts as being genuinely, or spuriously, Pythagorean depended on the pure intellect that Archytas exhibited in his discrimination; and the audience of Porphyry’s work is encouraged to follow Archytas and the other unnamed ‘wise men’ (possibly the Alexandrian Platonists who reacted to Pseudo-Archytas, the most prominent of which would have been Eudorus) in employing their pure intellects to understand the part they play in the drama that is the history of Pythagoreanism – likely the same ‘pure intellect’ (καθαρὸς ὁ νοῦς) that Plotinus referred to in the *Enneads* (VI.9.3) when speaking about the hyper-noetic state one embraces in the mystical experience, when one’s soul is, as Porphyry himself puts it, ‘free of affection’ (ἀπαθής) (*de Abst*. 2.61.1). In a way, however, arriving at a better understanding of the authority-inflection of Archytas circles us back where we started with the ‘author-inflection’: as remarkable as Porphyry’s account of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha is, it, like the epistle of ‘Archytas’ to ‘Plato’, doesn’t explicitly refer to writings of *Archytas himself*. The treatises ascribed to ‘Archytas’ have no role to play in Archytas’ editorial activities here. Why is this the case? It’s clear, as we mentioned above, that Porphyry took Archytas’ writings to be genuine, as did Iamblichus; and yet the surviving evidence doesn’t show them bridging the ‘author-‘ and the ‘authority-inflections’ of the name Archytas. Rather, a proliferation of Archytases evades reduction to one simple Archytas, as each Archytas plays a specific role in different parts of the ancient history of Pythagorean philosophy. There is an ‘Archytas’ the author, an ‘Archytas’ the editor and collector (is this the same as the author?), and an ‘Archytas’ the Peripatetic, who Pythagoreanized Aristotle (and was not the same as the editor/collector or the original author). The first is not mentioned alongside the second by Porphyry; and while the first is mentioned alongside the third by Themistius, he does not discuss the second. And we have not yet dealt with those many ‘Archytases’ who wrote the works that don’t survive on mechanics and other topics, nor yet the Archytas sometimes called ‘the Elder’. Moreover, I’m willing to suspend judgment at the moment about whether there might be multiple authors of the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha attributed to ‘Archytas’, even if it is not the most elegant solution; after all, dialectical discrepancies in the Doric composition of those texts (provided in the Appendix), should make us hesitate to assume that there is a single author behind their composition. I have only this deflationary conclusion to offer: ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ is a moniker that, more than a century after it was first advanced, may be losing its simple viability and its explanatory value in the context of the variety of ancient evidence and modern theoretical problems with the concept of ‘forgery’ in the history of ancient philosophy. Could we think of a possible replacement term that could do the positive work that ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ does to aid in our understanding – without the negative effects of elision of functions or illegitimation of the philosophical content of the treatises? One possibility presents itself by parallel, and it’s used all the time in modern scholarly parlance: ‘Platonism’. By ‘Platonism’ we do not generally mean the same thing as ‘Platonic’, and scholars routinely understand that what is ‘Platonic’ refers to Plato’s own writings and thoughts, whereas what is ‘Platonist’ refers to all the complex and contradictory aspects of its reception over a long period of time and by many different people. A similar move could be applied in the case: we could think about speaking of these complex historical and philosophical phenomena as ‘Archytist’, thus rendering a break between the unique historical figure ‘Archytas of Tarentum’, and the challenging and multifaceted history of the reception and reconstruction of this figure’s philosophical influence after his death. Such a term is sufficient to accommodate that thorny point that the only ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ mentioned in Antiquity is Themistius’ ‘certain Peripatetic Archytas’; and it is, I think, sufficient also to account for the range of possible functions that the name ‘Archytas’ took on throughout ancient philosophy, from the arrival of the first Archytan pseudepigrapha in the 1st century BCE to Boethius’ reception of Archytan philosophy in the 6th century CE. With the term ‘Archytist’, we might find a way to differentiate, without totally alienating, the one Archytas of Tarentum, and the multiple Archytases that followed.

**Appendix 1: The ‘Corpus Archyteum’**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Title of Work**  | **Thesleff’s Hypothesized Date** | **Dialectical Attributes** | **Description of Style**[[97]](#footnote-97) |
| Καθολικοὶ λόγοι δέκα | Late (4th CE or Later)  | Many distinctive and unusual archaizing features (see Thesleff 1961: 90); πρᾶτος for πρῶτος; τουτέων; ποτί for πρός; 3 pl. –ντι; mostly koine forms except long α.  | Manneristic/artificial (Thesleff 1961: 110) |
| Ὀψαρτυτικά | 3rd BCE | None (no texts) | None. |
| Περὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ εὐδαίμονος | 3rd BCE | Feminine participle in -οισα; dative plural of 3rd declension in –εσσι; use of ἦμεν; use of αὐταυτ-; contraction of ου to ω; use of ὅκα/ὅκκα; μεζον- for μειζον-; 3 pl. -ντι; non-contraction of εε; -μες for –μεν; ποτί for πρός; retention of primitive long α; confusion of -εω for –αω; use of α in place of ε; ρσ is not assimilated into ρρ; loss of ι in forms like ποέν; κρέσσον for κρείσσων | ‘tono scholastico’, ‘il intento espositivo conferisce al trattato un andamento piano e scorrevole’ (Centrone 1990: 47) |
| Περὶ ἀντικειμένων | 3rd BCE | use of ἦμεν; retention of primitive long α; use of ὅκα/ὅκκα; use of αἴκα; 3 pl. –ντι; contraction of ου and lengthening of ο to ω at the beginning of words (ὠνυμασμένον); υ for ο; non-contraction of εα of to η; non-contraction of εε; ποτί for πρός; μεζον- for μειζον-; ὀπτίλος for ὄμμα (πτιλῶσσον) |  |
| Περὶ ἀρχῶν | Middle or End of 4th BCE | Feminine participle in -οισα; use of αὐταυτ-; use of εἶμεν; contraction of ου to ω; use of nominative ἐστώ and μορφώ; ὥτ’ for ὥστε; use of both ὠσία and οὐσία (as distinct from ἐστώ?); κρέσσον for κρείσσων | Simple/non-archaizing (Thesleff 1961: 110) |
| Περὶ αὐλῶν | 3rd BCE | None (no texts) | None. |
| Περὶ γεωργίας | 3rd BCE | None (no texts) | None. |
| Περὶ τῆς δεκάδος | Middle or End of 4th BCE  | None (no texts) | None. |
| Περὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγου / Περὶ δέκα κατηγοριῶν | 3rd BCE | Koine extant, but some parts in Doric; in the Doric, we have: ευ for εο; contraction of ου to ω; retention of primitive long α; use of πράτα for πρῶτα; use of ὠσία (apparently equivalent to οὐσία) and μορφά; use of αὐταυτ-; thematic infinitive in –εν; -μες for –μεν; use of ὅκα; ταὶ for αἱ; non-contraction of εε |  |
| Περὶ μηχανῆς | 3rd BCE | None (no texts) | None. |
| Περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης | Middle or End of 4th BCE | αἴκα for ἐάν; use of ἦμεν; τοὶ for οἱ; contraction of ου to ω; non-contraction of εε; retention of primitive long α; πρᾶτος for πρῶτος; ταὶ for αἱ; μεζον- for μειζον-; dative plural of 3rd declension in –εσσι; thematic infinitive in –εν; ποτί for πρός; subjunctives in short-vowel –οντι; ιο = ιω; ευ = εο; non-contraction of εο to ου  | ‘Somewhat’ archaizing (Thesleff 1961: 112) |
| Περὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθάσιος | Middle or End of 4th BCE | -ηιο = -ειο; contraction of αε to η (but see Thesleff 1961: 87 n. 5); retention of primitive long α; use of εἶμεν; use of ὅκα/ὅκκα; use of γινώσκει (loss of initial γ); αι becomes α (loss of ι in σαμάνωμεν – post 2nd Century BCE?); non-contraction of οο to ου (νόος instead of νοῦς); non-contraction of εα of to η; 3rd pl. -ντι; ποτί for πρός; dative plural in –εσσιν; thematic infinitive in –εν; use of οὐσία (not ὠσία) | Simple/non-archaizing (Thesleff 1961: 110) |
| Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος | Middle or End of 4th BCE | η for ε (ναμαρτέας); retention of primitive long α; πρᾶτον for πρῶτον; use of εἶμεν; contraction of ου to ω; 3 pl. -ντι  | ‘Somewhat’ archaizing and possibly ‘authentic or at least comparatively old’ (Thesleff 1961: 112) |
| Περὶ παιδεύσεως ἠθικῆς | 3rd BCE | αἴκα for ἐάν; dative plural of 3rd declension in –εσσι; use of εἶμεν; use of αὐταυτ-; 3 pl. -ντι; ταὶ for αἱ; τοὶ for οἱ; -μες for –μεν; αἰ for εἰ (αἴτε); retention of primitive long α; contraction of αε to η; non-contraction of οο to ου (νόος instead of νοῦς); non-contraction of εε; ποτί for πρός; feminine participle in –οισα; thematic infinitive in –εν; δδ/σδ = ζ; ἐς for εἰς; υ for ο (ὀνυμαίνω); κάρρων for κρείσσων | ‘Pretenzioso nello stile’,‘tono polemico’, ‘tono moraleggiante e sentenzioso’ (Centrone 1990: 46) |
| Περὶ σοφίας | 3rd BCE | dative plural of 3rd declension in –εσσι; retention of primitive long α; non-contraction of οο to ου (νόος instead of νοῦς); non-contraction of εα of to η; contraction of ου to ω; ταὶ for αἱ; 3 pl. -ντι; thematic infinitive in –εν; use of ἦμεν; υ for ο (ὀνυμάτων);  | Archaizing (Thesleff 1961: 90) |
| Letters  | 3rd – 2nd BCE | –μειν in the athematic infinitive; retention of primitive long α; contraction of ου to ω; -μες for –μεν |  |
| Varia |  | retention of primitive long α (not across all fragments) |  |
| Genuine fragments (Huffman) | 4th BCE | use of αὐταυτ-; –μεν for –ναι in athematic infinitives; thematic infinitive in –εν; non-contraction of εα of to η; contraction of ου to ω; retention of primitive long α; crasis in ο + α becomes ω; τοὶ for οἱ; πρᾶτον for πρῶτον; ὅκκα for ὅτε ἄν; ποτί for πρός; μικκ- for μικρ-; subjunctives in short-vowel –οντι | ‘Hodgepodge of Attic, Doric, and even Lesbian and Epic forms’ (Huffman 2005: xiii) |

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1. \* Versions of this paper have been presented at the ‘Pseudopythagorica’ Seminar of the Laboratoire d’excellence Hastec, organized in partnership with the Laboratoire d’études sur les monothéismes and the Centre Jean-Pépin, CNRS, Paris; the Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh; the Department of Classical Studies, Duke University; and the Department of Classics, University College London. In addition to audiences in those venues, I want to thank, in alphabetical order, Ahmed Alwishah, Emily Cottrell, Costas Macris, and Angela Ulacco for their help in preparing this paper. All translations from original languages into English are mine, unless otherwise noted.

 For these fragments and a general understanding of the life, works, and reception of Archytas of Tarentum, see C.A. Huffman (2005). For more recent bibliographical supplements, see C. Macris (2018b: 1051-1052, 1113); C.A. Huffman (20202). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This is the moniker typically used by Stobaeus in his presentation of the works usually considered inauthentic (e.g. 3.3.65, 4.50.28), but it is also sometimes applied to the fragments of the genuine Archytas of Tarentum (*e.g*. by Porphyry, *De Harm. Ptol*. 1.3 = F 1 Huffman). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. That is, H. Thesleff (1965: 3-48). *Cf*. C.A. Huffman (2005: 595-618). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For Archytas on the sciences, see C.A. Huffman (2005: 57-90); L. Zhmud (2012: *passim* – see his index). For ps-Archytas on science and wisdom, see P.S. Horky (2015); on principles and metaphysical theory, A. Ulacco (2017: 22-24) and J. Mansfeld (2019); on epistemology, A. Ulacco (2017: 107-109) and G. De Cesaris & P.S. Horky (2018); on the categories, M. Hatzimichali (2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For Archytas and democratic Tarentum, see the historical account of C.A. Huffman (2005: 8-18). On ps-Archytas’ *On Law and Justice*, see P.S. Horky & M.R. Johnson (2020); *cf*. also the contribution of Francesca Scrofani in the present volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. As argued very recently by B. Centrone (2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. On the problem of authenticity of Archytas’ works, see B. Centrone (2021), M.R. Johnson (2008), and C.A. Huffman (2005: 91-100). On the people named Archytas, see Huffman (2005: 25-30). Of particular interest is the Archytas curiously referred to as ‘the elder’ (ὁ πρεσβύτερος), mentioned by Iamblichus (*VP* 104), the Anonymous source behind Photius’ account of Pythagoreanism (p. 237.6 Thesleff), and Apuleius (*De Platone* 1.3). I will not be able to account for all these Archytases in this essay. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See E. Zeller (1923: 119-123), although we should be clear that Zeller does not refer to ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ as an individual figure, but instead refers to “pseudo-archyteische Schrift” (p. 120). O.F. Gruppe (1840) believed that no surviving fragments of Archytas are authentic. For a list of the treatises and other lost works, see Appendix 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Most notably seen in Th.A. Szlezák’s edition of *On the Universal Logos* / *On the Ten Categories* (1972). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ was made into an ‘author’, I believe, by Joseph Nolle (1914), who speaks of *Ps.-Archytae Fragmenta*. He was then followed by W. Burkert (1960: 27 n. 3) and Th.A. Szlezák (1972). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. C.A. Huffman preserves the most comprehensive list (2005: 25-30). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. There are of course other descriptions of ‘spurious’ Pythagorean texts, which I will deal with below. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Boethius, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories*, p. 162A Migne. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. On the importance accorded to Ps.-Archytas by Iamblichus, see C. Macris (2002: 93-94). Simplicius, following Iamblichus, will go on to defend the (pseudo-)Pythagorean author against Themistius (without naming the latter); see Ph. Hoffmann (1980: 310, n. 19; 312, 315), and more generally M.-A. Gavray (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Noted by E. Zeller (1923: 120). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. There is currently a debate concerning ‘forgeries’ in Antiquity, with, on the one side, A. Baum (2001 and 2017) maintaining that in Antiquity ‘forgeries’ referred to texts that came down with *content* that could not have been derived from the teachings of the authors to which the works were ascribed; and on the other side, B. Ehrman (2012) arguing that in Antiquity works that were of spurious authorship were labeled ‘forged’. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Compare H. Thesleff (1961: 76): “At any rate I cannot see why Pseudo-Archytas should be regarded as forged any more than Pseudo-Hippokrates” or C.A. Huffman (2005: 96): “What we do not find in the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises collected in Thesleff’s edition is evidence for a clever forger, who produces Pythagorean texts which use only archaic terminology and concepts which predate Plato and Aristotle”. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Boeth. *Inst. Arithm*. II.41, p. 139.13-21 Friedlein. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. I have similar worries about the term ‘Pseudopythagorean’ – what is implied by the use of the term ‘Pseudo-’ there? Are these ‘lying/false’, or ‘bastard’, or ‘counterfeit’ Pythagoreans (just to take one recent breakdown of possible ways of thinking about the social context for forgeries, in B. Ehrman [2012: 31-32]), as contrasted from ‘honest/true’, or ‘legitimate’, or ‘authentic’ Pythagoreans? Or are we to imagine that we are dealing with other, related phenomena here, such as literary fictions in *ethopoeia*, pen names, homonymity, false attributions, plagiarism, fabrications, or actual falsifications (all explored methodologically by B. Ehrman [2012: 43-67])? [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. S. Swain (2013: 125-126). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. C.H. Kahn (2001: 79). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. J. Barnes (2012: 218). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. E.g. J.M. Dillon (1996: 120-121); M. Bonazzi (2013); B. Centrone (2014: 324-326); A. Ulacco (2017: 9); L. Zhmud (2019: 77-78). Alternative datings are provided by H. Thesleff (1961), which are provided in Appendix 1. P.S. Horky & M.R. Johnson (2020) have argued that *On Law and Justice* constitutes a special case. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See C. Macris (2018d). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Iambl. *In Nic. Arithm*. p. 118.19-119.2 Pistelli (perhaps actually deriving his information from Nicomachus’ text (which he is commenting on), and Nicom. *Ench*. 11, p. 260.12-17 Jan. Also *cf*. Cic. *Rep*. I.16. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. In terms of historico-philosophical importance to the later Pythagorean tradition, probably only Ps.-Timaeus competes with Ps.-Archytas. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. H. Thesleff (1961: 76) describes the development of a Corpus Archyteum in this way: “The many writings bearing Archytas’ name are explicable as an accumulation of material on the last great name of the School. The unknown authors of these tracts felt that they were following in the path of this great teacher; and probably they did so too, because Archytas seems to have been the most ‘atticizing’ of the Western Early Pythagoreans. The process can be imagined as a similar one to the accretion of later elements to the Corpus Hippocraticum, the Corpus Democriteum, or the Corpus Platonicum; except that the process does not appear to have been continuous in the case of Archytas, and for this reason new models became more freely accepted”. W. Burkert also associates the production and collection of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha with the Pseudo-democritea (1960: 25 n. 5). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. This grouping is based on the texts that are [1] quoted by Iamblichus (*On Wisdom* and *On Intellect and Perception*), [2] referred to implicitly or by association with Iamblichus (*On the Universal Logos* / *On the Ten Categories*), or [3] found in Stobaeus’ collection, a substantial portion of which was formed from Iamblichus’ library (*On Law and Justice*; *On Being*; *On Opposites*; *On the Good and Happy Man*; *On Moral Education*). Iamblichus, of course, also preserved parts of the genuine fragments of Archytas (Frs 1, 2, and 3). For the importance of Archytas and ‘Pseudo-Archytas’ to Iamblichus, see P.S. Horky (2015), G. Staab (2002: 457-458), C. Macris (2002: 93-94), and Ph. Hoffmann (1980). On the relationship between Iamblichus’ library and Stobaeus’ collection, see Macris (2002: 97 with n. 78-79); also see the contribution of Rosa Maria Piccione in the present volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Collected and discussed extensively by C.A. Huffman (2005: 103-252). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Th.A. Szlezak (1972). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. A. Ulacco (2017: 57-98). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. A. Ulacco (2017: 19-54) and, in relation to Aëtius’ account of Pythagoras’ theory of first principles, J. Mansfeld (2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Little scholarly attention has been paid to this fragment. For the text, see p. 40.1-16 Thesleff. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. On this text, see B. Centrone (2000) and now P.S. Horky & M.R. Johnson (2020). Also see S. Minon (2018), as well as the contribution of Francesca Scrofani in the present volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. This text is discussed at P.S. Horky (2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. A. Ulacco (2017: 101-153) and G. De Cesaris & P.S. Horky (2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. On these two ethical treatises, see B. Centrone (1990: 137-191). For the latter, also see S. Giani (1993). It is worth also highlighting Pseudo-Perictione’s *On Wisdom*, since it replicates material found in the same texts ascribed to Archytas and fits into its argumentative structure; see P.S. Horky (2015: 33-35). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. J. Dillon (1996: 119). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Best evidenced in B. Centrone’s work (see especially Centrone [2014], where he demonstrates consistency in referring to ‘Ps.-Timaeus’ rather than ‘Timaeus Locrus’, as other scholars do). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. D.L. 8.80 (p. 646.10-18 Dorandi) = p. 46.8-15 Thesleff. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. On this letter, see H. Thesleff (1962) and, more recently, M. Frede in M. Burnyeat & M. Frede (2015: 15-26). See also the contribution of Luc Brisson in the present volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Stob. 1.13.2 = p. 124.15 - 125.7 Thesleff. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. The text is presented at p. 126.3 - 138.12 Thesleff. It was known as *On the Nature of the Universe* by Philo of Alexandria (*Aet. Mund*. 12). The standard edition is by R. Harder (1926), on which see the substantial review of W. Theiler (1926). More recently, see B. Centrone & C. Macris (2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. For Cleinias, see below. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. On these texts, see generally L. Delatte (1942), and more recently the studies published in A. Gangloff (2020). An exhaustive bibliography is provided at C. Macris (2018c). On Diotogenes specifically, now see G. Roskam (2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. An added implication would be that these works eventually came to influence Plato, and ‘Occelus’ is the missing link between Pythagoras and Plato. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. It is not evident from the text whether these texts are the same as the ‘notebooks’ (ὑπομνήματα) referred to earlier on in the letter. One might think that they are the ὑπομνήματα of Pythagoras, which allegedly reflected the contents of his *Sacred Account* and were passed down to Pythagoras’ daughter Damo to Telauges (Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 146, p. 164.3-12 Thesleff), who made them public (on this *Hieros logos*, see Adrien Lecerf’s contribution in the present volume; *cf*. also C. Macris [2016]). Or they could be the ὑπομνήματα associated with Lysis and Archippus by Nicomachus (Nicomachus, *FGrHist* 1063 F 2 = Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 252-253 = Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 58; Nicomachus, *FGrHist* 1063 F 3 = Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 57), which he refers to as ‘summary and symbolic’ (κεφαλαιώδη καὶ συμβολικά). On these passages, see below. At any rate, in the ‘response’ to this letter (Diogenes Laertius 8.81 = Plato’s *Letter* 12 = p. 46.8-15 Thesleff), ‘Plato’ acknowledges receipt of the texts, which he calls ‘notebooks’, and laments that he cannot send his own ‘notebooks’ (or the ‘notebooks’ in his possession) in return. One also naturally thinks of the *Pythagorean notebooks* transmitted by Alexander Polyhistor (*ap*. D.L.), on which see A. Laks (2013) and A.A. Long (2013). On the ὑπομνήματα more generally, see M. Frede’s comments in M. Burnyeat & M. Frede (2015: 24-25); C. Macris (2002: 102-103); T. Dorandi (2000: 77-101); D. Thiel (1993: 123-159). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. For Censorinus, one may consult the edition/translation of G. Freyburger & A.M. Chevallier (2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Censorin. 4.3: *sed prior illa sentential qua semper humanum genus fuisse creditor auctores habet Pythagoran Samium et Occelum Lucanum et Archytan Tarentinum omnesque adeo Pythagoricos*. See B. Centrone (2000: 448-449). Cicero (*On Ends* 5.29.87) and Valerius Maximus (*Memorable Doings and Sayings* 8.ext.2) have Archytas, Timaeus, Arion (?), and Echecrates; and a bit later, in reference to the correspondence between ‘Plato’ and ‘Archytas’, Lucian has Archytas and Occelus (*A Slip of the Tongue in Greeting* 5). *Cf*. L. Zhmud (2019: 84-85). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. B. Centrone (2000: 443-444 and 448-449). *Cf*. Iambl. *VP* 198-199. On this tradition, see most recently C. Macris (2018a: 641-642) and K.J. Fleischer (2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. That multiple authors wrote these works was assumed by Thesleff, who dated them to diverse periods according to his, if it is fair to call it this, somewhat baroque theory (I have attempted to break down Thesleff’s dating of the various texts ascribed to Archytas alongside dialectical and stylistic characteristics in the Appendix to this paper). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. It might even be imprudent to assume any Corpus Archyteum as necessarily separated from the rest of the philosophical texts among the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. An attractive alternative approach that focuses on networks of texts across the tradition is that of D. Dutsch (2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. H. Thesleff (1961: 75-77). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. As, for example, Iamblichus seems to have done, in his description of the ‘Pythagorean notebooks’ (*VP* 157), where he describes the texts as: ‘compact in all other respects; inspired through their overwhelmingly pristine and antique patina, as if it were some bloom never touched by a hand; deduced precisely, with heaven-sent knowledge; filled to the brim with good sense; especially varied and versatile in form and content; exceedingly simple while, at the same time, not lacking in style; replete with material both vivid and totally indisputable, with the accompaniment of demonstrations both scientific and complete, what is called “deductive argument”.’ On this passage, see the comments of A.C. Cassio (2000: 153-165) and C. Macris (2002: 123-128). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Text and translation into German also available in A. Baum (2001: 238-241). [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. I translate ἐνοθεύοντο as ‘have been/were misattributed’ rather than ‘forged’, because the word ‘forge’ in English might not be fit for purpose, since it intrinsically assumes intentional ‘fraudulence’ (see *OED*, *s.v*. ‘Forge (v.)’ 5a-b and 6). Other alternatives in English related to ‘spuriousness’, ‘illegitimacy’, or ‘inauthenticity’ cannot capture fully the repeated use of the same word in noun and verb forms throughout this passage. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. The terms translated ‘misattributed’ *vel sim*. all derive from the notion of ‘bastardy’. On the issue of literary ‘bastardy’, see Joyal 2014 and Regali 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* p. 13.4 - 14.4 Busse. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. C.H. Kahn (2001: 90), citing Zeller; B. Centrone (2000: 431); J.-J. Flinterman (2014: 350 n. 47); C. Macris (2018b: 1133-1134). [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. H. Thesleff (1961: 54-55). By contrast, B. Centrone (2000: 431) translates as ‘la letteratura pitagorica’ – despite his reference in n. 6 to the corresponding text of Olympiodorus’ follower ps.-Elias (p. 128.6 Busse) to τὰ Πυθαγόρου. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Possibly the same source as that of Athenaeus’ account (*Deipnosophists* 1.3a), which presents evidence of Ptolemy Philadelphus obtaining the library of Aristotle from Neleus (who had in turn obtained it from Theophrastus). That passage also mentions Pisistratus, but not Pythagoras. On this passage, see C. Natali (2013: 101). On Pisistratus, see H. D’Agostino (2007): 6-7 (Greek text), 26-27 (transl.), 61-68 (comm.), and xxiii-xxcii. On the assembling of Aristotle’s works into a corpus, see M. Hatzimichali (2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. In a similar vein, Galen (*In Hipp. De Nat. Hom*. 1.44, p. 54.26-55.14 Mewaldt) argues that it was the vainglory of the Hellenistic kings in Alexandria and Pergamum that resulted in the first pseudepigrapha, but he nowhere links this to Pythagoreanism or the works of Pythagoras. The explanation for the production of pseudepigrapha according to the ‘vainglory’ of the Hellenistic kings, then, must be a *topos*, and cannot be used to infer anything secure about the Pythagorean tradition. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Theophrastus is described as the ‘first to have collected books and taught the kings of Egypt how to arrange a library’. Other evidence concerning Juba’s collection ([Elias] *in Cat*. p. 128.5-9 = *BNJ* 275 T11) suggests that the texts of Pythagoras solicited for the ‘vainglory of kings’ were elaborately forged: ‘certain people treated the works [*sc*. of Pythagoras] they came upon, and dyed them with cedar and soaked them for the sake of the retail trade…so that they would then have a credibility because of their age’ (transl. Roller at *BNJ* 275 T11). [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Tracking the reception of these lines in later philosophical thought is beyond the remit of this paper. One relevant comparison is to be found in Plutarch’s *Life of Numa* (22.2-3), where the ‘Pythagorean’ King of Rome Numa prefers that the sacred tablets on which his doctrines are preserved should be buried with him once he himself is dead, and that the ideals should be passed down through habituation and memory. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. *Contra* L. Zhmud (2012:164-165) and B. Erhman (2013: 105-119). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Some examples would include the Stoics: Seneca, *Epist. Mor*. 108.17-21 (gentle rebuke of Q. Sextius and Sotion of Alexandria’s ethics); Epicureans: Lucretius, *DRN* 3.670-78, 776-782 and Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments 40-42 (critique of the theory of transmigration of the soul); Skeptics: Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 3.163-166 (criticism of Pythagorean metaphysics); Early Christians: Tertullian, *Apology* 48.1; *On the Testimony of the Soul* 4.1-3; *On the Soul* 28.1-2a and 31.3-6 (critique of Pythagorean metempsychosis); *On the Soul* 32.4 and 47.5-6 (critique of the Pythagorean theory that the nature of God and the human soul are derived from numbers). For Tertullian's treatment of Pythagoreanism, see R.A.L. Montoya (2014) and (2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 53 = Speusippus F 32 Isnardi Parente (T 49 Tarán) = Xenocrates T 79 Isnardi Parente2 = Aristoxenus, fr. 68 Wehrli. Text É. Des Places (CUF). On this passage, also see the extensive commentary in C. Macris (2001: 354-360) and B. Centrone (2000: 153-156). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. It is doubtful, given the structure of the presentation, that this evidence derives from Moderatus of Gades (*cf*. W. Burkert [1972: 95-96 with n. 52]; D.J. O’Meara [1989: 11 with n. 8]). For the *status quaestionis*, see C. Macris (2002: 112 n. 157). Given the fact that Porphyry is more a ‘universalizing Platonist’ than a ‘Pythagoreanizing Platonist’, it may be that Porphyry himself quoted this portion for dialectical purposes, and we should not assume simple agreement with it. On this passage, see C. Macris (2014: 398 with n. 70) and P.S. Horky (2020: 168-170). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. It is worth mentioning a somewhat parallel account in Iamblichus’ *On the Pythagorean Life* 252-53 and Porphyry’s *Life of Pythagoras* 57-58, which can be traced back to Nicomachus (*FGrHist* 1063 F 2, transl. Radicke, with modifications): “It therefore then came about that this knowledge [*sc*. the ‘original customs and sciences’ referred to at Iambl. *VP* 251] perished together with those who possessed it, because they had kept it secret in their hearts until that time, and only the difficult and unintelligible parts were remembered by those outside the sect, with the rare exception of some very faint and hardly visible sparks that had been preserved by those who had been abroad at the time [*sc*. Archippus and Lysis – see Porphyr. *VP* 57-58 = 1063 *FGrHist* F 3, next note]. And these people, isolated and very dejected about what had happened, dispersed to different places and could not bear at all to communicate with mankind in [the] future. Living anywhere in solitude and seclusion each preferred his own company to the rest of the world. They did, however, take care that the name of philosophy should not become entirely lost from mankind and that they should therefore incur the wrath of the gods because they had utterly ruined their great gift. Thus, by arranging some summary and symbolic notebooks (ὑπομνήματά τινα κεφαλαιώδη καὶ συμβολικὰ συνταξάμενοι), and by collecting the writings of the elders and what they themselves remembered (τά τε τῶν πρεσβυτέρων συγγράμματα καὶ ὧν διεμέμνητο συναγαγόντες), each one left them to posterity wherever he happened to die, instructing their sons or daughters or wives not to pass them onto anyone outside the household. And their families observed this custom for a very long time, handing down the same order from generation to generation”. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. *Cf*. Iambl. *VP* 105 = *Protr*. 21: “And unless someone, after carefully selecting the very symbols, explicates and comprehends them with an interpretation free of mockery (ἀμώκῳ ἐξηγήσει), the things said will seem to be ridiculous and trivial [*litt*. ‘old wife’s tales’] to ordinary people, full of nonsense and rambling (λήρου μεστὰ καὶ ἀδολεσχίας)”. My thanks to Costas Macris for pointing me to this passage. *Cf*. L. Graverini (2006); M. Massaro (1977). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. See Nicomachus, *FGrHist* 1063 F 3 = Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 57 (transl. after Radicke): “There was no written work of Pythagoras himself, and the members who had escaped death – Lysis and Archippus and all those who had been abroad – had only saved some faint and scarcely visible sparks of their philosophy”. Indeed, both the *Letter to Hipparchus* (p. 111.14 - 114.12 Thesleff) attributed to Lysis and *On Tranquility* attributed to Hipparchus (= Archippus?) (p. 89.6 - 91.16 Thesleff) are written in Doric. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. *Cf*. P.S. Horky (2020: 169 n. 8) and P.S. Horky & M.R. Johnson (2020: 458 with n. 20). We need to recall that Aristotle wrote several lost works on the Pythagoreans which would have included the *acusmata*, and that Speusippus wrote a work *On Pythagorean Numbers* (Fragment 28 Tarán = 122 Isnardi Parente). Aristoxenus also preserved many *acusmata* and provided an account of early Pythagorean ethics in the *Pythagorean Precepts*, on which now see the edition of C.A. Huffman (2019). It is possible that other *mirabilia* were included in the lost texts as well. *Cf*. C. Macris (2002: 111-112 with n. 158). [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. My guess is this refers to the πρεσβύτεροι, mentioned in Nicomachus’ account preserved by Porphyry (*VP* 58 = 1063 *FGrHist* F 2). Savage-Smith, Swain & van Gelder (2020: 4.3) have ‘disciples’ here. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. C. Macris (2001: 381-384) has made some suggestions regarding the identification of some of the works of this list with works attributed to Pythagoras in the Greek sources; *cf*. also C. Macris (2018b: 834-850). For works attributed to Pythagoras in the Arabic sources, A. Izdebska (2018: 860-862). [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. The original text is printed in Arabic in A. Müller (1884). Translation after E. Cottrell’s French (2008: 533-535), with extra guidance from Ahmed Alwishah. Now see Cottrell (2016: 504-505), with her brief comm. on p. 512. Compare the translations of Marwan Rashed in C.A. Huffman (2005: 616-617) and of Carl Ernst in B. Ehrman (2012: 109, 110), as well as the rather free translation into German by B.L. van der Waerden (1965: 862-863). Even more recently, see Savage-Smith, Swain & van Gelder (2020: 4.3). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Something like a ‘narrator’ or ‘storyteller’ who publicly announces the Pythagorean precepts. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. I will explain my translation of this term below. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. The latter portion disagrees with what was said in the preceding lines and might be thought to indicate either a summary of what was said in the previous statements (but which misinterprets the information?) or a marginal note that made its way into the manuscript tradition; *cf.* E. Cottrell (2008: 535 n. 47). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. *Cf*. C. Macris (2014: 386). [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Nicomachus, 1063 *FGrHist* F 3 = Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. One wonders if Nicomachus obtained this information from Posidonius (*cf*. Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 5.6.42-3, p. 334.30-33 De Lacy = Posidonius, Fr. 151 Edelstein-Kidd), who would appear to believe that the writings which survive as Pythagorean in his time (2nd-1st centuries CE) are by Pythagoras’ students, since no writing of Pythagoras himself survived. Equally, Philodemus (*De pietate* 3, Fr. 10, p. 113 Schober = col. 4b, p. 66 Gomperz) seems to have the same information, which he may have obtained from Posidonius (on which see L. Zhmud [2019: 73-74]). Alternatively, one could imagine a common source which has gone missing. For an exhaustive study of the ancient sources negating that Pythagoras has ever written anything, see C. Riedweg (1997) – although not everyone is prepared to agree with his final suggestion that Pythagoras may indeed have committed his thoughts to writing after all. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. *Contra* E. Cottrell (2008: 535 n. 47), who follows Huffman/Rashed and van den Waerden here. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. B. Ehrman (2012: 87-88 *et passim*). See A. Baum’s convincing rejoinder to Erhman’s claims concerning authenticity and content at Baum (2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Aristippus claims there that “...he was named Pythagoras because he, no less than the **Pyth**ian, **orat**ed the truth” (Πυθαγόραν αὐτὸν ὀνομασθῆναι ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἠγόρευεν οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Πυθίου: D.L. 8.21 = SSR IV A 150). Thus Aristippus etymologized Pythagoras’ name (**ἠγόρε**υεν… **Πυθ**ίου). Compare with the view of Iamblichus (*VP* 7), *contra* Eudoxus and Xenocrates, on which see P.S. Horky (2020: 187 n. 79), and more generally on the ancient and modern etymologies of Pythagoras’ name C. Macris (2021: 7-11). Several pseudepigraphical letters, written in Doric, are attested for Aristippus (*Epistolographi Graeci*, p. 617-634 Hercher). [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. E. Cottrell (2008: 534 n. 43). At Cottrell (2016: 504), she preferred ‘the rhetor/sophist’. We have translated it ‘the Teller’, in the sense of someone who announces the philosophical precepts of Pythagoras and narrates them to the public. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. E. Cottrell (2008: 534 n. 43). [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Less likely, ‘Proros’, as Cottrell ventures (2008: 534 with n. 44). [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Stob. 3.1.75 and 76 = p. 108.2-19 Thesleff. There is a text *On Numbers* ascribed to Cleinias of Tarentum ([Iambl.] *Theol. Arithm*. p. 21 de Falco and Syrian. *in Arist. Metaph*. p. 168 Kroll = p. 108.21-28 Thesleff). Furthermore, see the testimonies regarding the paradigmatic Pythagorean friendship of Cleinias with Prorus (Diod. Sic. 10.6; Iambl. *VP* 198, 239). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Very little has been written about Cronius, but good starting points would be J.M. Dillon (1996: 379-380) and J. Whittaker (1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. See the *Theologoumena arithmeticae* attributed to Iamblichus, p. 34 De Falco = p. 115.15-21 Thesleff. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. One wonders if Perictione is a possibility (initially suggested to me *per litteras* by Cottrell)? Commenting on this name, Savage-Smith, Swain & van Gelder (2020: 4.3) state: “The Arabic ductus might support a conjectural reading of this name as a deformation of f-r-kh-t-w-n-ā, Perictione (Περικτιόνη)”. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Savage-Smith, Swain & van Gelder (2020: 4.3) opt for ‘the more recent scholars’. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. As contrasted with ‘Archytas’ as an ‘old’ or ‘elder’ Pythagorean (Syrianus, *Commentary on Aristotle’s* Metaphysics p. 151.17-22 Kroll [viz. Arist. *Metaph*. 1084b13] = p. 47.27-48.2 Thesleff); Proclus, *Commentary on Plato’s* Timaeus 2.19, 3-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. To be sure, as C. Macris (2014: 393-398) argues, Porphyry’s high esteem for Plotinus does not exclude his appreciation of these Neopythagoreans. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. See Nicomachus *FGrHist* 1063 F 3 = Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 57 (transl. after Radicke): “There was no written work of Pythagoras himself, and the members who had escaped death – Lysis and Archippus and all those who had been abroad – had only saved some faint and scarcely visible sparks of their philosophy”. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. C.A. Huffman (2005: 617). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. According to Thesleff, Centrone, or Huffman. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)