‘Italic Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic Age’

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**INTRODUCTION**

For the soul is celestial, as it was drawn down from its home on highest and, as it were, buried in the earth (*demersus in terram*), a place opposite to the nature that is divine and eternal. I believe that the immortal gods have sown souls in human bodies so that there might be people to watch over the earth, and who, by contemplating the order of the heavens, might imitate it through moderation and constancy of living. Nor have I been driven to believe this by the force of reason and dialectical argumentation alone, but also by the excellence and authority of the greatest philosophers. I have learned that Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans – practically our own countrymen (*incolas paene nostros*) – who were once referred to as ‘Italic’ philosophers (*qui essent Italici philosophi quondam nominati*), never doubted that the soul we have was culled from the universal divine Mind.  
(Cato the Elder, speaking in Cicero, *De Senectute* 77-78)

Grasping what is ‘Roman’ about the philosophy in Rome that preceded his own was a project that Cicero undertook with a certain amount of energy and care. Cicero sought to pursue this project by reference to non-Roman philosophy, especially Greek philosophy. The ways in which Greek philosophy, chiefly the philosophical ideas of Plato, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the (sceptical) Academy, came to influence Roman philosophy have been thoroughly treated in scholarly literature. However, despite Cato the Elder’s assertion that the philosophy of the ‘Pythagoreans’, those ‘who were once (*quondam*) referred to as Italics’ and were ‘practically’ (*paene*) countrymen of the Romans, provided him with the proper understanding of death, modern studies on the importance of ‘Italic’ philosophy, especially figured as ‘Pythagorean’, to Roman philosophy are not easy to find. More common are unsubstantiated claims that subvert such a project: as J. G. F. Powell asserts in the

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1 Exceptions include Volk 2016; Sassi 2011; Horky 2011; Dench 1995; and Mele 1981.
“Introduction” to his edited volume *Cicero the Philosopher* (Oxford, 1995), “the Neo-Pythagoreanism of the Roman Republic is an interesting byway, but probably without major influence on the philosophy of the time.” Yet Powell’s assertion does little to explain the evidence from Cicero’s own corpus of the perceived importance of Pythagoreanism for the development of ancient intellectual cultures, both for early Greek philosophers such as Plato, and, as we will see below, for certain paradigmatic Roman heroes of the early-middle Republic. One reason why a proper assessment of the importance of Pythagoreanism for Roman philosophy has not been written is that scholars haven’t quite mapped out the parameters of the Hellenistic Pythagoreanism thought to be associated with the Italian peninsula. This chapter aims to address two problems that arise out of this observation: (a) it seeks to delineate what ‘Italic’ philosophy might have been for the Romans, especially given what ‘Italic’ or ‘Italian’ would have meant to a Roman such as Cicero, in the 1st Century BCE; and (b) it seeks to elaborate further on the relationship between ‘Italic’ philosophy, as constructed in the 1st Century BCE, and Hellenistic Pythagoreanism. The project of defining, or at least sketching the broad parameters of, Hellenistic Pythagoreanism remains beyond the scope of this piece, but we can nevertheless make use of textual evidence of and reliable testimony about Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic age, in our project of attempting to giving shape to ‘Italic’ philosophy.

It has not often been noticed that Cicero actually differentiates the Pythagoreans, whom his authoritative interlocutor Cato refers to as ‘practically our own countrymen’, from the ‘Italic’ philosophers, a name no longer used to describe the Pythagoreans – as if the old

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2 Powell 1995: 12 n. 29.
3 E.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.38, where one of Cicero’s interlocutors claims, “[Pythagoras] came to Italy when Tarquinius Superbus was king, and held what was called Magna Grecia both through the reputation of his teaching, and through his authority. And for many generations to come the name of the Pythagoreans thrived to such an extent that no others were thought to be learned.” In the following section, the interlocutor goes onto explain how Plato came to Italy to learn the Pythagorean doctrines from the Pythagoreans. Hence, Cicero’s interlocutor embraces a tradition arising out of the 7th Platonic *Epistle.*
4 Recent attempts to illuminate parts of Hellenistic Pythagoreanism include Horky and De Cesaris 2018 (Epistemology), Hatzimichali 2018 (Metaphysics), Ulacco 2017 (Metaphysics and Epistemology), and Horky 2015 (Metaphysics). For an excellent, synoptic account, see Centrone 2014.
nomenclature had lost its value. At the end of this chapter, the deep importance of this temporal qualification will become clear. A straightforward reading of this passage would of course note that Cicero has been reading the work of Aristotle, or something like it, as Aristotle rather routinely conflates Pythagoreans with 'Italian' philosophers in his treatises. But what 'Italy' was in Cicero's time was not what it had been in Aristotle's, nor yet what it eventually would become under Augustus, who confirmed Italian identity by dividing all of 'Italy', understood to include the entire peninsula from Regium to Transpadane Gaul, into eleven regions. As Emma Dench and, more recently, Grant Nelsestuen, have argued, a variety of positions about what constituted 'Italy' in the 1st Century BCE can be detected, not without ideological implications. 'Italy' was, throughout the Hellenistic and early Roman Republican ages, more of a construct than a place of firm identity, made up of various ethnic groups distributed throughout a loosely-shifting geographical space. And, indeed, from the earliest prose writings in Latin, in Cato's Origins, a robust discourse on this subject was available to Romans. Contemporaries of Cicero, such as Varro and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, could plausibly construct wholly diverse geographical orientations of 'Italy'. Thus, various

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5 Possibly Aristotle's student, Aristoxenus of Tarentum, had something to offer here. On Aristoxenus' importance to this tradition, see Sassi 2011: 26-27, Horky 2011: 137-140, and below.
6 Arist. Metaph. 1.5-6, 987a10-31 and 1.6, 988a26; Mete. 1.6, 342b30; Cael. 2.13, 293a20. See Horky 2011: 124 and Sassi 2011: 23-26.
7 On which, see Nicolet 1991: 171-183.
8 Generally, see Nelsestuen 2015: Chapter 3.
9 Dench (2005: 131) notes the difficulty with which Romans, after the enfranchisement of the Italic peoples to Roman citizenship around 90 BCE, sought to "remap" the Italian peninsula.
10 For a sensible treatment of the fragments concerning Italy and Italic peoples in Books 2 and 3 of Cato's Origins, see Cornell 2013: 205-213. He concludes: "That [Cato] saw Italy as in some sense a cultural unit, despite its ethnic and linguistic diversity, is possible, especially in view of Servius' comment (T11e) that he praised the disciplina and vita of Italy." Cicero's Cato also praises the vita exemplified by Platonist-Pythagorean philosophy at De Senectute 77 as "only worth being counted as such (sola numeranda)."
11 As noted by Nelsestuen 2015: 88-92. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.37.2) maps out 'Italy' geographically as occupying center of the Italian peninsula: there is Campania in the center-west, Messapia to the southeast, Daunia in the center-east, Sabine country in the center, Etruria to the northwest, Alba Longa in the center-west, and Falernia to the center-west, but a bit further to the south of Alba Longa. Varro (RR 1.2.1ff.), by contrast, understands 'Italy' to refer to areas in the central part of the peninsula (Campania and Apulia, and regions around Falernum and Venafrum) and those to the north, including those regions to the northeast (the Ager Gallicus) and the northwest (the Ager Faventinus) of Rome. As Nelsestuen aptly notes, Varro's configuration is Romanocentric, based on the roads that extended from the capital city (the Via Appia, Via Latina, Via Flaminia and Via Aemilia).
representations from the past or present could have informed Cicero’s sense of what it meant to speak of Pythagorean philosophy as having once been considered ‘Italic’, even though it was no longer allegedly so in his (i.e. Cicero’s) own day.

Cicero, however, understood ‘Italic’ philosophy to be neither Roman, nor Greek, but something in-between – something that could be associated with the values of Cato the Elder (whether qua Roman or qua Tuscan is unclear), and yet not unrelated to the Ionian philosophy evidenced by Pythagoras’ relocation from Samos to Croton. Cicero himself may have had particular personal reasons to revive the notion of ‘Italic’ philosophy, which he probably found in Aristotle’s works, but equally probably did not find in other works of philosophical history available to him. For ‘Italic’ philosophy as such is notable for its absence just as much as its presence: no evidence of any philosophy, including Pythagorean philosophy, being expressly called ‘Italic’ as such, is to be found from Aristotle to Cicero’s time, although interest in this notion explodes after the 1st Century BCE, and the division of philosophy into Ionian and Italian is reinvigorated by figures like Clement of Alexandria and (ps-)Hippolytus of Rome. That Cicero associated ‘Italic’ and ‘Italian’ with those peoples who were neither strictly Greek nor Roman, however, can be inferred from a passage of his De Haruspicium Responso, where, by reference to discussion of the Social Wars (which he calls the ‘Italici Belli’), Cicero differentiates Italic peoples from Greeks and Romans, while nevertheless linking them to the Latins. And he may have had good reason to do so: as a novus homo, like Cato the Elder before him (and others, as we will see), Cicero laid claim to being a dual-citizen – having both a Roman patria, to which he was to claim allegiance, and his native patria of Arpinum, which was the land of his ancestors and seat of native cults. His commitment to Rome was best explained by having one fatherland that was given by birth, and the other by law.

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13 E.g. Cic. Har. 9, where Cicero refers to the Italici ipsi ac Latini.
14 See Cic. Leg. 2.5.
But there still remains the issue of Cicero’s initial association, and subsequent
dissociation (*quondam*), of Pythagoreanism with ‘Italic’ philosophy. In the *Tusculan
Disputations*, Cicero argues that Pythagoras came from Asia Minor to Italy, bringing the
notion of the immortality of the soul, which he learned from his teacher Pherecydes of Syros,
to the Italian peninsula.\(^{15}\) Many were thought to have come to Pythagoras to become his
students, including Romans. Cicero later (*Tusc. 4.3*) ropes in some surprising figures: other
people would say that the great Roman king Numa Pompilius was disciple of Pythagoras, but
Cicero knows better – the chronology is all wrong.\(^{16}\) Even so, the great Cato the Elder, in his
*Origines*, evidenced Pythagorean tendencies, and the paradigmatic republican statesman
Appius Claudius Caecus was no less than a *bona fide* Pythagorean himself. Thus, according to
Cicero, did Pythagoreanism come to inform early philosophy of the Romans of the late 4\(^{th}\) and
3\(^{rd}\) Centuries BCE. But what about ‘Italic’ philosophy? We see this taken up in Cicero’s
presentation of the development of Roman philosophy: for, in Cato the Elder’s account of his
youth in *De Senectute* (39-41), he claims to have heard a debate, passed down through oral
traditions in Tarentum, which involved not only the famous Pythagorean statesman Archytas
of Tarentum and Plato, but also a remarkable figure known as Herennius Pontius, a *Samnite*
philosopher who was a contemporary of Archytas and Plato. How can we account for this
Samn­ite philosopher’s presence in Cicero’s text? We are encouraged to consider not only the
philosophy which flourished in the emigration of Pythagoreanism from Ionia to Italy, but also
something that Cicero would have recognized as uniquely ‘Italic’ – a philosophy that is
considered to have employed the language and concepts of Greek philosophy, but that
retained its own native genius.\(^{17}\) And, as we will see, much of what survives of ‘Italic’

\(^{15}\) Cic. *Tusc. 1.38.*
\(^{16}\) One wonders about whether or not Cicero obtained his sense of what counted as ‘Pythagorean’ from his
friend P. Nigidius Figulus, whom Cicero credits (*Timaeus 1 = Test. 9 Swoboda*) with reviving the
Pythagorean *disciplina*, which ‘thrive[d] in Italy and Sicily in another age’ (*aliquot saecula in Italia Siciliaque
vigisset*).
\(^{17}\) See Horky 2011 for a thorough analysis of Herennius Pontius the Samnite and his presentation in
Cicero, Cassius Dio, and Appian.
philosophy, in the writings associated with the Lucanians Aesara/Aresas, Occelus, and Eccelus, and in the fragments of Ennius of Rudiae, is often linked with Hellenistic Pythagoreanism, representing less of a sub-category of the Pythagoreanism known to Cicero and others, than a novel aspect that Hellenistic Pythagoreanism took on sometime before the end of the 2nd Century BCE.

Lucanian Philosophy (I): PS-ARESAS/AESARA

Lucania was an area in southern Italy that maps roughly onto modern Basilicata, forming a house-shaped space that ranged roughly from Thurii in the southeast, to Metapontum in the northeast, to Venusia in the north, Paestum in the northwest, to Laos in the southwest. This area had been substantially overcome around 420 BCE by non-Greeks who spoke a language called Oscan. A Sabellic language spoken in southern and central Italy by Lucanians and Samnites alike, Oscan is mostly known from inscriptions that predate the Social War (91-88 BCE). Oscan and Greek are understood to have coexisted for a long time in Lucania. A number of Lucanian philosophers are attested, and some texts purporting to have been written by these figures survive. Their imprint was left on Aristoxenus of Tarentum, who, writing in the late 4th Century BCE, included a number of non-Greek philosophers who hailed from Italy in his list of Pythagorean philosophers. He refers to two brothers named Occelus and Occilus of Lucania, as well as their sisters Occelo and Eccelo. Texts survive under the name of Occelus and a certain Eccelus (see below), which might have originally been an unnecessary correction of Eccelo, although nothing survives for Occilus or Occelo. Additionally, Aristoxenus refers to two other Lucanian philosophers by name: a Cerambus,

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18 On the Oscan language in Lucanian inscriptions, see Isayev 2007: 28-30 and MacDonald 2015.
19 In his catalogue of Pythagoreans at the end of Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean Life (267). On the catalogue, see Zhmud 2012: 109-119. Still, it is unclear whether the entire contents of the catalogue should be associated with Aristoxenus, or whether Iamblichus (or his source) has manipulated an original list.
otherwise totally unknown, and a certain Aresandrus, whose name might have been corrupted to become 'Aresas', a figure who is better known, and to whom a substantial fragment of a work entitled *On the Nature of the Human* has been attributed by modern scholars.\(^{20}\) The historical Aresa of Lucania was considered the last ‘diadoch’ or leader of the school that traced itself back to Pythagoras, who then imparted his learning to Diodorus of Aspendus, a heretic who was thought to have publicized the Pythagorean *acusmata/symbola* widely in Greece.\(^{21}\) Plutarch (*de Gen Socr.* 13) believed that Aresa was one of the last Pythagoreans to stay in Western Greece, remaining in Sicily after the Cylonian conspiracy tore the Pythagorean communities apart, and visiting with Gorgias of Leontini. If this information is to be trusted, it would place the historical Aresa in the early part of the second half of the 5\(^{th}\) Century BCE.

The surviving fragment of pseudo-Aresa/Aesara, from a work called *On the Nature of the Human*, features an inquiry into human nature that focuses on human psychology, by reference to law and justice:

> The nature (*phasis*) of the human being seems to me to be a standard (*kanôn*) for law and justice, and for the household and the city. For if someone were to follow the tracks in himself, he would make a discovery in his search: the law (*nomos*) is in him, and justice (*dika*) is the orderly arrangement (*diakosmasis*) of the soul. Indeed, being threefold, it has been organized for three functions: <the intellect> effects judgment (*gnôma*) and intelligence (*phronasis*); <the spirit> effects prowess and power; and desire [effects] love and kindliness. And all these [parts] of it [sc. the soul] are arranged relative to one another in such a way that what is best leads, what is worst is ruled, and what is in the middle occupies the middle place, i.e., it rules and is ruled.

Φύσις ἄνθρώπω κανών μοι δοκεῖ νόμω τε καὶ δίκας ἦμεν καὶ οἶκω τε καὶ πόλιος, ἵχνια γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ στιβαζόμενος εὑροῖτο κά τις καὶ μαστευόμενος· νόμος γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δίκα ἀ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐστὶ διακόσμασις, τριχθαδία γὰρ ὑπάρχουσα ἐπὶ τριχθαδίοις ἔργοις συνέστακε· γνώμαν καὶ φρόνισιν ἐργαζόμενος <ὁ νόος> καὶ ἄλκαν καὶ δύναμιν <ἱ θύμωσις> καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ φιλοφροσύναν ἀ ἐπιθυμία. καὶ οὕτω συντέτακται ταῦτα ποτ' ἄλλαλα πάντα, ὡστε αὐτάς τὸ μὲν κράτιστον ἄγεσθαι, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἄρχεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μέσον μέσαν ἐπέχεν τάξιν, καὶ ἄρχεν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.

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\(^{20}\) The manuscripts clearly ascribe the work to a female writer, Aesara (see Thesleff 1965: 48 with note 21). Hence, I will refer to the author of the fragment *On the Nature of the Human* as ‘pseudo-Aresa/Aesara’.

\(^{21}\) Iambl. VP 266, which appears to derive ultimately from the writings of Timaeus of Tauromenium (see Horky 2013: 127-128 with n. 5).
Ps-Aresas/Aesara expands upon the Platonic theory of the tripartition of the soul, using the same terms Plato employed in the Republic, but adding concepts and vocabulary from the Peripatetic tradition – adapting ideas that are found equally in Aristotle’s Politics and, perhaps closer to this text, the On Law and Justice attributed to the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum, which may be among the earliest of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha. Moreover, ps-Aresas/Aesara associates the gift of law and justice to humans by God, echoing similar ideas in the so-called ‘Great Speech’ of Protagoras, and the defence of law and justice in the work known as Anonymus Iamblichii, sometimes thought to be a student of Protagoras. In this way, ps-Aresas/Aesara appears to combine doctrines about the importance of law and justice, familiar from the Sophistic and Socratic traditions, with a hybrid Platonic-Pythagorean presentation of the soul.

Things get more interesting philosophically a bit further down in the fragment, after ps-Aresas/Aesara has described how the various parts of the soul must relate to one another when the disposition of the soul is properly harmonized:

What is more, a certain concord and agreement accompanies this sort of arrangement. For this sort [of arrangement] could justly be said to be the ‘good law (eunomia) of the soul’ – regardless of whichever should additionally confer the strength of virtue (the better part ruling or the worse part being ruled). And friendship, love, and kindliness, cognate and kindred, will sprout from these parts. For the intellect that closely inspects persuades, desire loves, and the spirit is filled with might: [once] seething with enmity, it becomes friendly to desire. Indeed, the intellect harmonized what is pleasant with what is painful, blended the tense and impetuous with the light and dissolute part of the soul, and each part was distributed with respect to its kindred and cognate forethought (promatheia) for each thing: intellect closely inspecting and tracking things; spirit conferring impulse and might upon what is inspected; and desire, being akin to affection, adapts to the intellect, exalting pleasure as its own and surrendering circumspection to the circumspect part of the soul. By virtue of these things, the way of life (bios) seems to me to be best for humans when what is sweet is blended

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22 Since the texts from the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha are not often well known or easy to access, I include the Greek from Thesleff’s edition.
with what is good (spoudaioi), i.e., pleasure with virtue. The intellect is able to adjust these things to itself, becoming lovely for its education and virtue.

καὶ μὴν ὁμοίως τις καὶ ὀμοφροσύνα ὁπαδεὶ τὰ τοιοῦτα διετάξει. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον δικαίως καὶ λέγοιτο εὐνομία ἦμεν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀτις ἐκ τὸ ἄρχεν μὲν τὸ κάρρον, ἄρχεσθαι δὲ τὸ χέρειον κράτος ἐπιφέροιτο τὰς ἀρετὰς. καὶ φιλία δὲ καὶ ἔρως καὶ φιλοφροσύνα σύμφυλος καὶ συγγενής ἐκ τούτων ἐξεβλάστασε τὸν μερέων. συμπεθέει μὲν γὰρ ὁ νόος ὀραγούμενος, ἐραται δὲ ἐπιθυμία, ἀ δὲ θύμως ἐμπιπλαμένα μένεος, ἔχθρα ξένωσα φίλα γίγνεται τὸ ἐπιθυμία. ἀρμόσας γὰρ ὁ νόος τὸ ἀδικοπρὸ συγκατακρέομενος καὶ τὸ σύντονον καὶ σφοδρὸν τὸ κούφῳ μέρει τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ διαχυτικῶ· ἐκαστὸν τε ἐκάστω πράγματος τὰς σύμφολον καὶ συγγένεα προιμάθειαν διαμεμέρισται, ὁ μὲν νόος ὀραγούμενος καὶ στίβαξόμενος τὰ πράγματα, ἀ δὲ θύμως ορμάν καὶ ἀλκάν ποτιφερομένα τοῖς ὀραγασθείσαιν· ἀ δὲ ἐπιθυμία φιλοστοργίσα συγγενὴς ἐκαστὰ ἐφαρμόζει τὸ νόον ἰδιὸν περιποιομένα τὸ ἀδικοπρὸ καὶ τὸ σύντονον ἀποδιδοῦσα τὸ συννόφῳ μέρει τὰς ψυχὰς. ὠνπερ ἐκατι δοκέει μοι καὶ ὁ βίος ὁ κατ’ ἄνθρωπος ἀριστος ἦμεν, ὅκκα τὸ ἀδικοπρὸ τὸ σπουδαῖο συγκατακραθῇ καὶ ἀδικοπρὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς. ποικαμόξασθαι δ’ αὐτὰ ὁ νόος δύναται, παιδεύσιος καὶ ἀρετὰς ἐπήρατος γένομενος.

(ps-Aresas/Aesara of Lucania, On the Nature of the Human Fr. 1, p. 50.6-22 Thesleff)

Ps-Aresas/Aesara continues the mapping of politics onto psychology, referring to the disposition of the harmony of the parts of the soul as its eunomia, a word whose value to philosophical traditions seems to emerge from Sparta as far back as [as far back as?] the 8th Century BCE, to obtain confirmation as early as Solon, and to flourish among the Socrates, especially Xenophon and Plato, and figures arguably associated with Socrates, such as Anonymus Iamblichi.25 In ps-Aresas/Aesara’s text, however, something unique is advanced: the state of the soul being properly harmonized is called ‘well-lawed’, which is explained as the disposition in which the better element rules, and the worse is ruled. Some version of this thought is found in Plato’s Republic (462e), where Socrates and Glaucus conclude that a city-state which is well-lawed (eunomos) will, like the soul of an individual person, share in its affections. Similarly, the virtue of temperance, which is applied across the entire city-state of Callipolis and throughout the entire individual soul, is understood to be “a concord between naturally worse and naturally better as to which of them should rule” (R. 432b). There is a

catch, however, as Socrates later (R. 605b-c) clarifies: in a well-lawed city, those poets who might stimulate and arouse the worse part of the city-state to attack its ‘rational’ part should not be allowed to remain, for the reason that the rational part of the city-state, as well as the rational part of the soul, would be under threat.

Thus ps-Aresas/Aesara, the Lucanian Pythagorean, espouses a tripartite structure of the soul, without any reference to bipartition that would eventually come to be understood as the ‘truer’ version of the Platonic soul in Plutarch (de Virt. Mor. 3.441d-442a), in the late 1st Century CE, and that can be found in some parts of the corpus of Pythagorean pseudepigrapha. The notion that Pythagoras initiated the claim that the soul is tripartite is advanced by Poseidonius, writing sometime around 100 BCE, citing some writings of Pythagoras' pupils that cannot be identified with confidence. A distinct version of tripartition is also attested in a similar format by one of the best sources for Hellenistic Pythagoreanism, Alexander Polyhistor, in his Successions of the Philosophers, where he claims to have obtained the information from a work known as the Pythagorean Notebooks (Pythagorika Hypomnêmata), which also seem to date from the late 2nd-mid-1st Century BCE (D.L. 8.25, 8.30). The fragment of ps-Aresas/Aesara represents what is perhaps the most complete surviving evidence for the psychological theory of the Hellenistic Pythagoreans. Indeed, ps-Aresas/Aesara shows us a very original psychological theory, for he claims that three goods, friendship, love, and kindness, sprout from all three parts of the soul. How does this happen?

According to ps-Aresas/Aesara, the three parts of the soul, when they have been harmonized into eunomia, work quite effectively together. Each performs its own duties, preserving the ‘justice’ so defined as ‘minding one’s own business’ in Plato's Republic (433b-d).

The intellect performs preliminary inspections, and manages to persuade the other parts of

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26 Bipartite soul: Aëtius 4.7.5, Timaeus Locrus, On the Nature of the Universe and the Soul 46 (p. 218.5-11 Thesleff), Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.5.10; tripartite soul: Aëtius 4.4.1, ps-Theages, On Virtue Fr. 1 (pp. 190.1-191.21 Thesleff), ps-Metopus, On Virtue Fr. 1 (pp. 119.12-26 Thesleff).

the soul to act on its preliminary inspections; desire, persuaded to act, seeks to protect its own interests by pursuing courage, which, properly persuaded by the intellect, acts to defend the whole, and to attack the (external) enemy. How does the intellect accomplish this?

Interestingly, ps-Aresas/Aesara claims that it mixes together pleasure and pain and, by doing so, effects the adjustment of the courageous part of the soul (called ‘tense and impetuous’), where pain belongs, to the desirous part (called 'light and dissolute'), where pleasure is located. The consequence of this adjustment, which finally leads to total psychic harmonization, is that the courageous and desirous parts of the soul obtain their own peculiar types of reason, exemplified by their capacities for diverse types of ‘foresight’ (promatheia).

The intellect inspects and tracks objects it pursues; courage impels the soul towards things being further inspected and endure what is to come; and desire discovers its own important role in this process, which is to acquire pleasure and refer intellectual pleasures, which belong not to itself, upwards to the intellect. Ps-Aresas/Aesara claims that humans are at their best when they combine the objects of contemplation and enjoyment together in this psychic system. This is no discourse of the intellect enslaving or controlling the lower parts of the soul – the intellect’s primary role in ‘ruling’ the lower parts is to get the ball rolling in the process of inquiry, rather than to supervise at all times each part of the soul’s activity, or to chastise the other parts of the soul for being disobedient. There is no familiar moderation of emotions, nor yet their extirpation, as one would find elsewhere in Hellenistic Philosophy: the Pythagoreans of this period advocated a psychology of blending and harmonization of the parts, to achieve maximal performance across the whole system.28

LUCANIAN PHILOSOPHY (II): OCCELUS AND ECCELUS

28 Also see ps-Theages, On Virtue Fr. 2 (pp. 192.5-193.16 Thesleff). For the cosmic version of the same theory, see ps.-Damippus, On Prudence and Prosperity Fr. 1 (pp. 68.19-69.19 Thesleff).
The familiar combination of politics and ethics, which we have seen appealed to in the philosophical theory ascribed to Aresas/Aesara of Lucania above, recurs in the writings of two figures thought to be brothers: Occelus and Eccelus of Lucania. The latter figure is poorly attested, and, except for a single fragment of a work entitled On Justice, we know nothing about him except that he was a Pythagorean. This fragment from the Pythagorean pseudopigrapha expresses a complete and wholly original thought, focused on the nature of justice in relation to the other canonical virtues:

It seems to me best to address the justice (dikaiosyna) among men as the mother and nurse of the other virtues. For no [man] is able to be temperate (sôphrôn), courageous (andreios), or intelligent (phronimos) without it. Indeed, harmony is peace, with measured cadence, for the entire soul. The power of this [sc. justice] would become clearest to us if we were to examine the other states. For they offer a partial benefit, and [only] for one thing. But it [sc. justice] [offers benefit] for whole systems (systêmata), and widely. So, then, in the cosmos, forethought and harmony, justice (dika) and the intellect of one of the gods, assume the role of authority over things in their entirety, when one of the gods distributes the lots this way; in the city, it is justly called peace and good order (eunomia); in the household, it is unanimity (homophrosyna) of the husband and wife towards one another, and goodwill (eunôia) of slaves towards the master, as well as care of masters for their servants; in the body and the soul, it is life (zôa), first and most beloved to all, and health and soundness, and wisdom (sophia) among humans, which arises out of knowledge (epistama) and justice (dikaiosyna). And if it [sc. justice] educates the whole and the parts and preserves them by making them unanimous and mutually agreeable to one another, how could it not be called the mother and nurse of all and with every vote?

Δοκεῖ μοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν δικαιοσύναν ματέρα τε καὶ τιθήμαν τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀρετῶν προσεπέν· ἄτερ γὰρ τάς οὗτε σώφρονα οὗτε ἀνδρείαν οὗτε φρόνιμον οἶον τε ἦμεν. ἀρετοία γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ εἰράνα τὰς ὅλας ψυχὰς μετ᾽ εὐρυθμίας. δηλοφανέστερον δὲ καὶ γένοιτο τὸ τάς κράτος ἐτάξουσιν ὁμίν τὰς ἀλλὰς ἔξις. μερικὰν γὰρ ἔχωντι αὐτὶς τῶν ὑφέλειαν, καὶ ποθὲ ἕνα· αὶ δὲ ποθὲ ὀλὰ τὰ συστάματα, καὶ εἰν πλαθεί. ἐν κόσμῳ μὲν ὁν ἀυτὶ τῶν ὀλῶν ἁρχὰν διαστραταγοῦσα πρὸνοια τε καὶ ἀρετοία καὶ δίκα καὶ νῶς τῖνος θεοῦ οὕτω ψαφιξαμένω· ἐν πόλει δὲ εἰράνα τε καὶ εὐνομία δικαίως κέκληται· ἐν οἰκῷ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς μὲν καὶ γυναικὸς ποτ᾽ ἀλλὰς ὁμοφροσύνα, οἰκετὰν δὲ ποτὶ δεσπότας εὐνοια, δεσποτὰν δὲ ποτὶ θεράποντας καδεμονία· ἐν σώματι δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς πράττα μὲν ἀ πάσιν ἁγαπατότατα ζωά, ἀ τε ὑγεία καὶ ἀρτίτατας, σοφία τ᾽ ἐκ τὰς ἐπιστάμας τε καὶ δικαιοσύνας γενομένα ἀ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους, εἰ δ᾽ αὐτὶ τὸ ὀλὸν καὶ τὰ μέρεα οὕτω παιδαγωγεῖ τε καὶ σώξει όμοφρονα καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλὰς ἀπεργαζομένα, πῶς οὖ <κα> μέτηρ καὶ τιθήμαν πασάν τε καὶ πάντων παραφαβέ λέγοιτο;

(On Justice Fr. 1, pp. 77.16-78.16 Thesleff)

29 ‘Eccelus’ is Praechter’s emendation, where the Mss have versions of ‘From Polus’ (ἐκ πόλου). But Eccelus is clearly attested as a Pythagorean by Iamblichus (VP 267).
Ps-Eccelus’ text argues, somewhat provocatively, that justice is the chief virtue, on the grounds that the other cardinal virtues – temperance, courage, and wisdom – cannot exist apart from it. Ps-Eccelus obliquely qualifies this claim by noting that harmony, of which he must assume justice to be the cause, is the soul’s condition when it is at peace and in rhythm with the cosmos. He further elaborates by arguing that justice works at all levels of the macrocosm/microcosm, which he refers to as ‘systems’ (systêmata): its benefits are universal, guaranteeing proper rule within the cosmos, and they work in the city-state to promote eunomia (the similarity here to the fragment of ps-Aresas/Aesara of Lucania above might not be incidental); in the household to support marriage, as well as master-slave relations; and in the soul and body, to encourage health, which sustains life. Importantly, ps-Eccelus argues, justice encourages both wholes and parts to be ‘unanimous and mutually agreeable to one another’. Justice here evinces a Presocratic – one might say Anaximandrian – tenor, occupying the place of what, in other Pythagorean pseudoelephant, would be “god” or the “monad” – it is indeed interesting that ‘Eccelus’ holds that justice is the forethought, intellect, righteousness, and harmony ‘of a certain god’, whom he doesn’t quite identify. Justice thus construed appears to be an instrument of this anonymous god, which reflects his rationality.

If Eccelus’ is understood to be the brother of Occlus of Lucania, then the former’s obscurity contrasts with the high relief of his brother’s popularity within the imagination of philosophers in the late Roman Republic and early Roman Empire. Occlus is cited, for example, by Philo of Alexandria (fl. first half of the 1st Century CE) for being (according to some) one of the Pythagoreans who first advanced a theory that the universe is both ungenerated and indestructible; and Philo himself claims to have read the work On the Nature

30 Contrast, for example, Alexander Polyhistor, who claims that ‘the just’ is oath-bound, and that ‘virtue’ is ‘harmony, health, the good entire, and god’ (D.L. 8.33).
31 Compare the Stoic Cornutus (9.2), who, by reference to the many attributes of Zeus, says, “the number of such names for him being infinite, since he extends to every capacity and state and is the cause and overseer of all things. Thus he was said to be the Father of Justice as well, because it was he who brought community to the affairs of men and ordered them not to do each other wrong” (Trans. Boys-Stones).
of the Universe, which he credits with having not only stated this doctrine, but having proven it through demonstrations (δι’ ἀποδείξεων), as we will discuss below. But Occelus’ popularity is probably best exemplified by a series of letters, purported to be between Archytas and Plato, concerning the works of Occelus. The series of letters is demonstrably a forgery in which ‘Archytas’, at the behest of ‘Plato’, reports the discovery of the works of Occelus of Lucania:

We attended to the matter of the notebooks (hypomnêmata) and went up to Lucania, where we happened upon the progeny of Occelus. Moreover, we ourselves have obtained the works On Law, On Kingship, On Piety, and On the Generation of the Universe, which we have sent to you. We haven’t been able to discover the rest at this time, but if they should be found, you will have them.

(Diogenes Laertius 8.80, p. 46.1-7 Thesleff)

Interestingly, in this remarkable historical fiction, the early 4th Century BCE philosopher Archytas of Tarentum is said to have gone from Tarentum to Lucania to find the ‘notebooks’ (hypomnêmata) which the students of Occelus, who were understood to be still active in Lucania, were still preserving. Ps-Archytas’ tantalizing reference to the ‘notebooks’ recalls the works that Alexander Polyhistor apparently excerpted, the ‘Pythagorean Notebooks’ (Pythagorika Hypomnêmata), which date to before the 1st Century BCE; and, indeed, the consensus is that the work of Occelus of Lucania known to Philo of Alexandria as On the Nature of the Universe is to be dated from the mid-2nd Century BCE to the mid-1st Century BCE. It seems probable, then, that the pseudepigrapha circulating under the name ‘Occelus of Lucania’, and known to the author of the epistles between ‘Archytas’ and ‘Plato’, are to be dated to the same period, and that correspondence between ‘Archytas’ and ‘Plato’ functioned as cover letters, in an attempt to authenticate the work of Occelus as both (a) anticipating some aspects of Aristotle’s physics (it quotes and adapts parts of Aristotle’s On Generation and

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32 This would make Occelus a ‘mathematical’ Pythagorean, in contrast to those who merely ‘stated’ (ἀπεφαίνετο) the doctrine, i.e. the ‘acousmatics’. Occelus is also known by Censorinus’ source (probably Varro) to be a Pythagorean along with Archytas of Tarentum (Censorin. 4.3). For a list of testimonia, see Thesleff 1965: 125 with n. 14.

33 For a useful overview, see Sandbach 1985: 63-4. It is likely that the author of the correspondence between ‘Archytas’ and ‘Plato’ knew this work as On the Generation of the Universe.
Corruption) and (b) influencing Plato’s own writings (especially, one might think, the Timaeus). Indeed, when ‘Plato’ responds to ‘Archytas’ in the 12th Epistle, he praises the works of ‘Occelus’ as being ‘been a man worthy of his ancient forebears’, those Trojans who, under compulsion by their king Laomedon, immigrated to Italy in the generation before the Trojan War.34

The first work of ‘Occelus of Lucania’ on the list given by ‘Archytas’ is On Law, which survives in one fragment quoted by Stobaeus in order to show that, for ‘Occelus’, “a cause (aition) is that through which something comes to be (di’ ho ginetai ti)”, an argument developed by Plato, elaborated and qualified by Aristotle, and assigned significant importance by the Stoics35:

For life (zôa) holds the bodies (skanea) of animals together, and its cause is soul; harmony holds the cosmos together, and its cause is God; concord (homonoia) keeps the household and city together, and its cause is law (nomos). So what is the cause and nature, whereby the cosmos is fully harmonized and never falls into disorder, and the city and household are [not] ephemeral? Well, then, those things which are generated and mortal by nature, the matter from which they are composed, have the same cause of [their] dissolution; for they are composed out of what is mutable and perpetually passive. Indeed, the destruction of generated things entails preservation of the matter that generated them. And what is eternally in motion governs, whereas what is eternally passive is governed; in capacity, the former is prior, and the latter posterior; the former is divine, possesses reason, and is intelligent (emphron), whereas the latter is generated, irrational, and mutable.

Συνέχει γὰρ τὰ μὲν σκάνεα τῶν ζώων ζωά, ταύτας δ’ αἴτιαν ψυχά· τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἀρμονία, ταύτας δ’ αἴτιας ὁ θεός· τοὺς δ’ οίκους καὶ τὰς πόλιας ὀμόνοια, ταύτας δ’ αἴτιας νόμος. τὶς ὁν αἴτια καὶ φύσις τὸν μὲν κόσμον ἁρμόξθαι διὰ παντός καὶ μηδέποτ’ ἕξ ἀκοσμίαν ἐκβάινειν, τὰς δὲ πόλιας καὶ τῶς οἰκῶς ὀλιγοχρονίως ἕμεν; ὅσα μὲν ὄν γεννατά καὶ θνατά τῶν φύσιν, ἕξ ἢς συνεσταχθέν ἔλας, τὰν αὐτὰν αἰτίαν ἔχει τὰς διαλύσιος· συνέσθη γὰρ ἐκ μεταβαλλοίσας καὶ ἀειπάθεος. ἢ γὰρ τῶν γεννωμένων ἀπογέννασις σωτηρία τὰς γεννάτορος ἔλας. τὸ δὲ ἀεικύνατον κυβερνεῖ, τὸ δ’ ἀειπάθες κυβερνεῖται· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῷ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ύστερον· καὶ τὸ θείον καὶ λόγον ἔχον καὶ ἔμφρον, τὸ δὲ γεννατόν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ μεταβάλλον.

(ps-Occelus of Lucania, On Law Fr. 1, pp. 124.18-125.7 Thesleff)

34 D.L. 8.81.
35 Differentiation of the ‘fact’ (hoti) from the ‘why’ (dioti) is fundamental to the classification of the two types of Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle. See Horky 2013: Chapter 1. The Stoics associated demonstration with Zeus (e.g. D.L. 7.147 = SVF 2.1021). For this etymologization and its roots in Plato’s Cratylus, see Horky 2013: 168-169.
Here we see some interesting examples of anti-Aristotelian claims being advanced by way of Aristotelian terminology. Soul is understood to be the cause of ‘life’ in animals, a claim that ultimately derives from a thought found in Aristotle’s *On the Soul* (1.1), where Aristotle claims that soul is ‘as it were, a principle of animals’; but note that ps-Occelus also argues that ‘life’ has a middle part to play, as what ‘holds together’ the bodies of animals teleologically. So, for ps-Occelus, ‘soul’ seems to be the efficient cause of life, and life appears to play the role of formal cause of living beings. Similarly, in a markedly anti-Aristotelian moment, ps-Occelus claims that god is the cause of harmony, and harmony functions as the formal cause that gives arrangement to the cosmos; finally, law takes on the role as cause of concord, which then renders the household and the city-state properly arranged.

One possible reason why the triad of objects compared with the cosmos, body–household–city-state, is to be found here is that it is found elsewhere in the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, in a text that comes down to us as ascribed to Archytas and entitled *On Law and Justice*: this text shows similarities to the writings of Aristoxenus and employs demonstrably Aristotelian language in order to develop a ‘Pythagorean’ account of a democratic mixed constitution.36 Law there is key as a guarantor of the success of that order, as in the *On Law* of ps-Occelus and in *On the Nature of the Human* of ps-Aresas/Aesara discussed above, as it functions to regulate what parts of the city-state, and the soul, ought to ‘rule’, and what parts ought to ‘be ruled’.37 Thus, we see that in the Hellenistic Pythagorean traditions, close relationships are drawn between the Tarentine philosopher-politician and the philosophical traditions associated with Lucanians – both intertextually, and in the fictional epistolary correspondence between ‘Archytas’ and ‘Plato’.

36 See ps-Archytas, *On Law and Justice* F 4d Horky and Johnson (p. 35.10-16 Thesleff), where the progression is body-household-army-city. On the connections to Aristoxenus, see Horky and Johnson 2020: 458-60 and 477-81.
37 Ps-Archytas, *On Law and Justice* F 1 Horky and Johnson (p. 33.9-15 Thesleff).
Ps-Occelus raises another question, however, that aims to differentiate the cosmos from household and city-state (and, presumably, body): in a Platonic vein, ps-Occelus claims that the cosmos is “universally harmonized and never falls into disorder”\(^3\), unlike the household and city-state, which are described as “short-lived”. Does this cast a negative light on law, which is supposed to be the cause of the concord that sustains both household and city-state? Not according to ps-Occelus: he claims that it is the material cause, the nature from which both household and city-state are constituted, that is responsible for their being subject to generation and corruption, unlike the cosmos. For ps-Occelus, however, it is precisely the corruption of generated things, such as households and city-states, that preserves matter as such – nature continues to function as nature so long as the objects it generates are corrupted. Ps-Occelus displays an obvious adherence to the two-principle theory that is to be found in some Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, and which may ultimately derive from the works of the Pythagoreanizing Platonist Xenocrates.\(^3\) The rational, intelligent, divine cause is mind, and the irrational, mutable, and generated cause is the receptacle. The closest comparison I can find to this description is the On Principles of ps-Archytas:

It is necessary that there be two principles of beings: one governs the column of things that are ordered and definite, and the other governs the column of disordered and indefinite things. And the former is expressible and rational, and keeps together the things that are, and it gives definition and order to all things that are not (for, in its continuous application to generated things, it reduces them rationally and with measured cadence, and it gives a share of the universal substance (ousia) and form (eidos)). The other is irrational, inexpressible, and causes damage to what has been ordered, and utterly destroys those things that arrive at generation and existence (for, in its continuous application to objects, it assimilates them to itself).

\(^3\) The mixture of the cosmic portions of the Same, Different and Being in the world-soul are given harmonic order by the demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus (36a-b). Even so, in the Timaeus, the world-soul is eternal but generated (cf. Tim. 37c-e).

\(^3\) See Dillon 2003: 99-109. Also see D.L. 3.69, where Plato’s universal principles are said to be “god” and “matter”, the former of which is described as “intellect and cause”, and the latter as “shapeless and unlimited” (following Tim. 50d-51a, although “matter” is not mentioned by Plato). Diogenes returns to this claim later on, when he speaks of god-the paradigm and matter (D.L. 3.76, although there may be textual corruption – see Dorandi ad loc.) as the preouranian causes, and he introduces a third postouranian cause, the Forms (3.76-77), for the composition of natural objects.
Even despite the obvious similarities here, there are important differences: ps-Occelus argues, quite originally in my opinion, that the passive cause sustains its own existence as matter, which is subject to ordering by the motive cause by subjecting generated objects to alteration and destruction. Contrast this position with that of ps-Archytas, which, developing the traditions that stem back to Aristotle’s account of the Pythagorean Table of Contraries⁴⁰, associates matter with the ‘unlimited’ first and foremost, and says nothing about the unlimited sustaining its own existence through deformation of composite objects – although it does argue that matter assimilates generated objects to itself continuously.⁴¹

The other surviving text attributed to Occelus of Lucania, the treatise known as On the Nature (or Generation) of the Universe, is more extensive than On Law, and it shares many themes with it. There, ps-Occelus argues extensively that the universe is both ungenerated and incorruptible, taking various dialectical positions against his argument and demonstrating that they always end in contradictions. Note that while On Law does admit that god is the cause of harmony in the cosmos, it does not imply that the cosmos itself has been generated by god or any other efficient cause, and hence it is entirely plausible that the two texts are building off of one another’s arguments. In On the Nature of the Universe, ps-Occelus argues

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⁴⁰ Arist. Metaph. 1.5, 986a22-b2. Compare with Eudorus of Alexandria Fr. 5 Mazzarelli = Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics I p. 181.19-30 Diels: ‘I declare, then, that the followers of Pythagoras admit that the One is the principle of all things, but according to another mode, they introduce two highest elements. They refer to these two elements with many predicates; for, among these, the former is called ordered, definite, knowable, male, odd, to the right, and light, whereas the latter is called not-ordered, indefinite, unknowable, female, to the left, even, and dark.’

⁴¹ Aëtius (1.3.8) associates the Pythagorean material cause with the visible cosmos.
that we can draw inferences from things we perceive in order to draw conclusions about the
universe's immortality and incorruptibility, focusing on the persistence of its identity:

(7) At any rate, the totality and the universe afford no such indication of anything
[like this] to us: for we neither see it being generated, nor yet changing to the
better or the greater, nor ever becoming worse or lesser, but it always subsists in
itself, in the same way, itself both equal and similar to itself. (8) The signs and
indications of this are clear: the orders [of things] are symmetries, figures,
positions, intervals, powers, fast and slow motions relative to one another, the
circuits of numbers and temporal periods – all things of this sort admit of change
diminution in accordance with their generative nature's transition: for things
that are greater and better tend towards the prime [of life] owing to their power,
but those that are smaller and worse tend towards decay owing to their weakness.

(9) The totality and the universe are what I refer to as 'the whole cosmos'; for it is
through (dia-) this term [sc. kosmos] that this [meaning] conforms with its
denomination: adorned with everything (hapantôn diakosmêtheis). After all, the
system of the nature of the totality is self-sufficient and perfect, since nothing
exists outside the universe. For, if something exists, it is in the universe, and the
universe exists with it, and it comprehends all things within itself – some as parts,
and others as outgrowths.

(10) The things that are contained in the cosmos feature harmonization
(sunharmogê) with it, whereas the cosmos [harmonizes] with nothing else, but
[only] itself with itself. For all other things have been constructed in such a way
that they do not have a complete nature, but they require additional
harmonization with their environment, e.g. animals with air; sight with light – and
the other senses with their proper objects of sensation; plants with nutrients; the
sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars [with the cosmos] according to their allotment
of the general arrangement (koinê diakosmêsis). But the cosmos itself
[harmonizes] with nothing [else], but [only] itself with itself.

(7) τὸ δὲ γε ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν οὐδὲν ἤμιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρέχεται τεκμήριον τοιοῦτον·
οὕτε γὰρ γενόμενον αὐτὸ εἶδομεν οὕτε μὴν ἔπι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ μείζον μεταβάλλον
οὕτε χείρὸν ποτὲ ἢ μείον γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἂν κατὰ ταύτα ὑπὸ εἰσαύτως διατελεῖ καὶ
ἰσον καὶ ὁμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτό. (8) τὰ σημεῖα δὲ καὶ τεκμήρια τοιουτοῦ ἐναργῇ ἀι τάξεις
αἱ συμμετρίαι σχηματισμοὶ θέσεις διστάσεις δυνάμεις, ταχυτήτες πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ
βραδυτήτες, ἀριθμοὶ καὶ χρόνον περιοδοὶ πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιοῦτα μεταβαλλόν καὶ
μείωσιν ἐπίδεικται κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενετῆς φύσεως διέξοδον τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκμῆ διὰ τὴν
δύναμιν τὰ μείζονα καὶ τὰ βέλτιονα παρέπεπτα, τῇ δὲ φθίσει διὰ τὴν ἁσθενείαν τὰ
μείονα καὶ τὰ χειρῶνα.

(9) Τὸ δὲ γε ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὅνομαζω τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον· δι’ αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτο καὶ
τῆς προσηγορίας ἐτυχε ταύτης, ἐκ τοῦ ἀπάντων διακοσμηθείς. σύστημα γὰρ ἐστὶ
tῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τέλειον. ἐκτὸς γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς οὐδέν· εἰ γὰρ τι
ἐστιν, ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἐστὶ, καὶ σὺν τούτῳ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ σὺν τούτῳ τὰ πάντα ἔχειν, τὰ μὲν
ὡς μέρη τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπιγεννήματα.

(10) Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐμπεριεχόμενα τὸ κόσμῳ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον ἔχει τὴν συναρμογήν, ὁ
dὲ κόσμος πρὸς οὐδὲν ἔτερον ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα πάντα τὴν
Ps-Occelus' commitment to an ungenerated and incorruptible universe is confirmed by the fact that even the mathematical structures of the universe, especially the motions of the heavenly bodies, admit of irregularities, with some bodies rising higher and obtaining more precision, and other bodies achieving less impressive circuits: this, according to ps-Occelus, is a consequence of their need to adjust to the part of the cosmos to which they naturally belong. Such adjustments to, or harmonizations with, what is 'external' are similar in kind to those of other parts of the natural world: everything in nature needs to adjust to the objects by which they can successfully perform their functions: animals to breathing, senses to the perceptibles that are particular to them, and plants to their local habitats. How can such an 'adjustment' work, at least in the case of those parts of the universe that are subject to generation and corruption? In another section of the same treatise, ps-Occelus claims that it is by ascetic training of the ‘material’ elements of the compound (the ‘man’ and ‘wife’ in the family, and the ‘families’ in the city-state) that happiness is to be achieved:

(51) And in the arts (technai), too, the first principles (prôtai archai) cooperate greatly towards the good or bad completion of the whole work; for example, in the case of a building, the laying of the foundations; in the case of ship-building, the keel; in the case of harmony and lyric song, the articulation of voice and pitch; so too, then, in the case of a constitution, [whether it] have good or bad laws, the establishment and harmonization of households has the greatest effect.

(51) καὶ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις δὲ αἱ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ μεγάλα συνεργοῦσι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ἢ τὸ κακῶς τὸ ὄλον ἔργον συντελεσθῆναι· οἷον ἔπι μὲν οἰκοδομίας θεμελίου καταβολή, ἐπὶ δὲ ναυπηγίας τρόπις, ἐπὶ δὲ συναρμογῆς καὶ μελοποιίας τάσις φωνῆς καὶ λῆψις-οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ πολιτείας εὐνομομένης τῇ καὶ κακονομομένης οίκων κατάστασις καὶ συναρμογῇ μέγιστα συμβάλλεται.

(Ps-Occelus of Lucania, On the Nature of the Universe 51, pp. 136.30-137.5 Thesleff)
Ps-Occelus appears to be responding to the arguments found in Aristotle's *Parts of Animals* I.1, concerning the problem of priority and causation in the formation of generated bodies: whereas Aristotle speaks of the ‘art’ (*technê*) as the cause\(^{42}\) that acts upon the matter that receives it, giving it its proper shape and function throughout the process of its making, ps-Occelus, by contrast, considers the material parts (the ‘first principles’ from which the composite is developed) to be the most influential to the success of the composite.\(^{43}\) According to ps-Occelus earlier on in his treatise, these material parts of the familial and civic compositions advance towards perfection through ‘the law’, with the added support of ‘temperance and piety’.\(^{44}\) Close attention to the parts themselves, and especially to harmonizing them both internally, and relative to one another, contributes to the success and happiness of the family, as well as (by extension) of the city-state. Only the universe itself, by dint of its being properly ‘adorned’ as perfect and complete, is not subject to such requirements. Indeed, ps-Occelus argues that we can infer from the attributes of the universe, i.e., from its circular figure and motion, temporal infinity, and insusceptibility to change substantially, that it alone is without beginning or end.

**OSCAN/MESSAPIAN PHILOSOPHY**

It is a remarkable theory of natural physics that attaches to the final subject of our analysis, the poet Ennius. Originally from Rudiae, a Messapian city-state to the south of Tarentum (near present-day Lecce), Ennius famously obtained his Roman citizenship with the help of Q. Fulvius Nobilior, possibly in 184 BCE, and knew Latin and Greek, in addition to his native Italic language of ‘Oscan’ or ‘Messapic’. In this way, Ennius had two fatherlands, like

\(^{42}\) It isn’t entirely clear whether Aristotle is referring to the formal or the final cause here, but, given similarities with *De Gen. An.* 2.1, 734b34–735a4, we may infer that he is actually speaking about the formal cause.

\(^{43}\) *Arist.* *De Part. An.* 1.1, 640a27–b5.

\(^{44}\) *Ps-Occelus, On the Nature of the Universe* 43, p. 135.9–11 Thesleff.
Cato the Elder (who was born in Tusculum) and Cicero (who was from Arpinum). Indeed, Aulus Gellius notes that the poet himself celebrated his ‘three hearts’ (tria corda), which Gellius thought referred to his ability to speak Greek, Oscan, and Latin.\textsuperscript{45} Other evidence collected by Emily Gowers suggests that Ennius did indeed focus on the multilingualism of native Italic peoples, such as the Brutii, and that later Roman poets also embraced this tradition.\textsuperscript{46} It was also part of the popular Roman imagination to associate Ennius with Pythagoreanism, to such an extent that Horace (Epistles 2.1.50-52) claimed that Homer’s soul (anima) came into Ennius’ body (corpus) “according to the doctrine of Pythagoras” (secundum Pythagorae dogma), a commonplace thereafter adapted by Persius in his Satires (6.9-11). Thus, the association of Ennius with Pythagoras obtained by the end of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Century BCE, at the very latest, but it is not clear that it would have held before then (especially since Cicero, who makes Cato the Elder a quasi-Pythagorean, does not associate Ennius with Pythagoreanism).\textsuperscript{47}

Regardless of the historical validity of this association with Pythagoreanism, it is clear that Ennius wrote philosophical poems, including a work called Epicharmus, which was considered in antiquity to represent, perhaps to the Romans, the natural philosophy of the Greeks. A probable guess is that it was based on portions of the Pseudepicharmea, which were being produced as early as the end of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Century BCE and are mentioned by Aristoxenus of Tarentum.\textsuperscript{48} It is difficult to know with precision what Ennius’ Epicharmus looked like, but a reasonable conjecture is that, at the beginning of the poem, the poet Ennius is guided by the sage Epicharmus in his pursuit of knowledge of the natural world.\textsuperscript{49} The Epicharmus of the Hellenistic age was a suitable candidate to guide the Oscan poet through the workings of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., citing Ann. 477: “bruttace bilingui”.
\textsuperscript{47} See above, although Lucretius does (see below). For a good discussion of the problems here, see Vesperini 2012: 27-61.
\textsuperscript{48} F 45 Wehrli. See Horky 2013: 131-132, with nn. 24-5. On the gnoma of Epicharmus, which were collected in the late 4\textsuperscript{th} Century BCE, see Battezatto 2008.
\textsuperscript{49} The most recent edition of the fragments is that of Manuwald and Goldberg (2018). Also useful are Kassel-Austin (2001), Courtney (1993), Vahlen (1928), and Diels-Kranz (DK) (1952\textsuperscript{e}).
\end{flushright}
nature: he was probably considered a ‘Pythagorean’ by the beginning of the 3rd Century BCE, and the fragments that come down associated with Epicharmus, both those which are considered authentic and those which are not, show an interest in natural philosophy.\(^5^0\) In his work *Epicharmus*, mostly preserved by Varro, Ennius imagines, while asleep, that he “seemed to be dead” (*videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum*), in marked contrast to the beginning of the *Annales* where, in another dream, Ennius imagines that Homer comes to his side (*visus Homerus adesse poeta*).\(^5^1\) Varro ascribes to the *Epicharmus* four elements of the universe (*principia mundi*), which Ennius calls ‘water, earth, soul, and sun’ (*aqua terra anima sol*), a unique combination not found anywhere else in antiquity, although Vitruvius preserves something similar by reference to “Pythagoras, Empedocles, Epicharmus, and other natural scientists and philosophers” (*De Arch.* 8 Pref. 1).\(^5^2\) No other fragments concerning water per se survive, although, in another fragment of this work, we hear that nature “mixes heat with cold, dryness with moisture” (*frigori miscet calorem atque humori aritudinem*) in the process of generation (possibly of a human being) – that is, a mixture of the aspects of the sky-soul (*calor*) with that of earth-body (*frigor*), as well as those of the sun (*aritudo*) and the water (*humor*).\(^5^3\) Thus, the order ‘*aqua terra anima sol*’ would imply that the inner pair of principles in the list, *terra* and *anima*, are conjoined in the mixture, as are the outer pair, *aqua* and *sol*. Ennius has more to say about earth: also apparently called Ceres (which would correspond with the Greek goddess Demeter), the earth “produces all the people from the lands and, once again, takes them back” (*terris gentis omnis peperit et resumit denuo*), just as it appears to do

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\(^5^0\) See the association of Epicharmus with *polymathia* in P. Hibeh 1 (early 3rd Century BCE).

\(^5^1\) Ennius, *Epicharmus* Fr. 1 Manuwald and Goldberg (+ *Annals* Fr. 3) = Cicero, *Prior Academics* 2.51.

\(^5^2\) Ennius, *Epicharmus* Fr. 4 Manuwald and Goldberg = Varro, *RR* 1.4.1. In Vitruvius’ text, however, the terms in order are *aer* (instead of *soll*), *ignis*, *aqua*, *terra*. Cf. Vahlen 1927: ccxix. Ennius follows Empedocles in positing four elements, although the latter has them as (in this order) Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis, which are, according to Hippolytus (DK 31 A 33; a different account is offered by Aëtius 1.3.20) the respective names of the elements fire, earth, air, and water. Diogenes of Apollonia as ‘earth, water, aer, and fire’, in that order (DK 64 B 2).

\(^5^3\) Ennius, *Epicharmus* Fr. 2 Manuwald and Goldberg (+ *Annals* Fr. 7) = Varro, *On the Latin Language* 5.59-60. Varro interprets the passage slightly differently, understanding earth-body to be both wet and cold, and sky-soul as hot. Courtney associates *frigus* with *aer* (by reference to F 39 Courtney), but in the latter scenario *aer-anima* appears to be adopting the attributes of the other elements.
with fruit (quod gerit fruges, Ceres).\textsuperscript{54} It is also understood to be ‘body’, just as fire is ‘mind’ (terra corpus est, at mentis ignis est).\textsuperscript{55} The ‘mind-body’ dichotomy is, perhaps surprisingly, not common in ancient literature (with, for example, philosophers after Plato and Aristotle preferring the ‘rational-irrational’ modality). Ennius further suggests that mind obtained its fire from the sun (istic est de sole sumptus ignis), and that sun is ‘wholly mind’ (isque totus mentis est), implying that it is the sun that produces human intelligence, a notion that is not far from a sentiment found in ps-Archytas’ On Law and Justice.\textsuperscript{56} Hence Ennius finds multiple ways to demonstrate the interrelationships between his four elements in the introduction to his natural philosophy, appealing to the mixing of their attributes in order to demonstrate elemental change in action.

Following the precedent set especially by Empedocles, Ennius shifts to a discussion of the names of the gods that are associated with the elements of the universe. According to Varro, who quotes the following long section, sky-soul is to be identified with Jupiter, and earth with Juno:

That is this Jupiter, of whom I speak, whom the Greeks call ‘aer’ [air], who is wind and clouds, and afterwards rain, and cold out of rain, then becomes wind, aer once again. Therefore, these things that I mention to you are Jupiter; They give aid to mortals and cities, and beasts – all of them.

(Ennius, Unidentified Works Fr. 9 Manuwald and Goldberg = Varro, On the Latin Language 5.65)

Here we see the cycle that Jupiter, as ‘aer’, undertakes over time: he is first changed into winds and clouds, then becomes rain, followed by cold, which gives rise to wind, which is once again aer. Plutarch interestingly preserves some Pseudo-Epicharmean lines which attest to the same sort of process, by reference specifically to spirit (πνεῦμα in Greek, a possible translation of

\textsuperscript{54} Ennius, Unidentified Works Manuwald and Goldberg Fr. 9 = Varro, On the Latin Language 5.64-65. For a useful explanation of the etymologies, see Courtney 1993: 35-36.
\textsuperscript{55} Ennius, Epicharmus Fr. 5 Manuwald and Goldberg = Priscian, GL II, p. 341.18-22. Priscian, the source for this fragment, claims that Ennius is poetically supplementing ‘ignis mentis’ for ‘mens’.
\textsuperscript{56} Ps-Archytas, On Law and Justice F 4e Horky and Johnson = p. 35.24-27 Thesleff. On this fragment, see Horky and Johnson 2020: 481-83.
Latin \textit{anima}) and earth (γᾶ in Greek, a likely translation of \textit{terra} in Latin), leading one to speculate that Plutarch's source might have derived these lines from Ennius' account, or perhaps Ennius was reading the same Pseudepicharmean text as Plutarch:

\begin{quote}
It is combined and it is separated, and returns whence it came – earth to earth, and spirit on high; what is difficult about this? Not even one (thing)...
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
συνεκριθή καὶ διεκριθή καὶ ἅπτηθεν ὅθεν ἥγθε,
γᾶ μὲν εἰς γὰν, πνεῦμ' ᾧν- τί τὸνδε χαλεπόν; οὐδὲν
\end{quote}

(Epicharmus Fr. 213 Kassel-Austin = Plut. \textit{Cons. ad Apoll.} 15, 110b)

Such changes of attributes, whereby aer (or soul-spirit) changes into various natural forces, can be associated with the mid-late 5\textsuperscript{th} Century BCE natural philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia, who understood aer to be the intelligence which is \enquote{manifold} (πολύτροπος), since it can become warmer or colder, drier or moister, more stationary or quicker in motion, among other attributes.\textsuperscript{57} Diogenes also apparently praised Homer for associating Zeus with aer, as Philodemus attests (\textit{On Piety} 6b).\textsuperscript{58} Indeed, this association of Zeus with aer among some Presocratic natural philosophers was confirmed with the publication of the Derveni Papyrus, first anonymously in 1982, and in the \enquote{official} edition of Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou in 2006.\textsuperscript{59} The Derveni Papyrus, which dates to the mid-4\textsuperscript{th} Century BCE with the text originally written in the late 5\textsuperscript{th} Century BCE, presents an allegorizing exegesis of the poem of Orpheus, focusing on the generation of the natural universe, in a mode similar to other Presocratics, especially Diogenes of Apollonia.\textsuperscript{60} There, we hear, in a description quite close to that of Ennius' Jupiter, that \enquote{all things were called Zeus} (Col. XIX). This presents a problem for the Derveni Author, since the main element of the universe, aer, along with

\textsuperscript{57} DK 64 B 5.

\textsuperscript{58} DK 64 A 8; also see B 8.

\textsuperscript{59} The most recent edition is Kotwick/Janko 2017.

\textsuperscript{60} For the date of the text and the papyrus, see Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou 2006: 8-10. One wonders whether the \textit{Epicharmus} of Ennius also featured Orphic precedents: the etymologization of Proserpina (\textit{Epicharmus} Fr. 3 = Varro, \textit{On the Latin Language} 5.68) as the moon, which creeps forward subterraneously (from \enquote{serpens}), recalls the Orphic theogony, in which Zeus and Selene give birth to Dionysus (cf. Cic. \textit{ND} 3.58 = OF 497i Bernabé).
‘Moira’ (Fate), seem to have pre-existed Zeus (Cols. XVII-XVIII). The Derveni author offers a solution: the mind of Zeus was originally called ‘Moira’ before the name ‘Zeus’ was attached to it (Col. XVIII); after the name ‘Zeus’ was attached to this immortal and ungenerated intellective force, the constituents of the universe, called the ‘beings’ (ἐόντα), were dashed together according to the will of Zeus’ intellect (i.e. ‘Fate’), effecting the construction of the universe in aer, the cosmic space which is identical to Zeus himself (Cols. XIV-XVI). Indeed, it is the sun that Zeus employs instrumentally in order to effect the striking of the ‘beings’ together, as fire is understood to be the force that keeps things separated (Col. XVI). The cosmology of the Derveni Papyrus is, to be sure, not precisely that of Ennius’ Epicharmus; but both assume that all things are called by the name of sky-god (Zeus or Jupiter), the spirit that infuses the entire universe; show similar inclinations towards etymologization of divine names and assignment of divine names to various aspects of nature; and concern themselves with how the various elements of the cosmic systems interrelated, especially the sky-soul/Zeus, and the earth/Juno.

CONCLUSIONS

Many are the aspects of our customs that have been derived from them [the Pythagoreans], which I pass over, lest we seem to have learned those things from elsewhere which we ourselves believe to have discovered. But to return to the purpose of our speech: how many great poets, how many great orators, have sprung up among us in such a short time!

(Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.4-5)

Cicero’s final historical account of Pythagoreanism in the Tusculan Disputations leaves us without a final word for its significance to the development of Roman philosophy. But it does leave us with a final word on what happened in Italy. For Cicero (Tusc. 4.6-7) laments the fact that after Pythagoreanism’s heyday, in the time of Appius Claudius Caecus and Cato the Elder,
Stoic and Peripatetic philosophy were not taken up in the Latin language. In the absence of these philosophical schools, Epicureanism, especially under the influence of C. Amafinius, took hold not just in Rome, but throughout all of Italy as well. Indeed, when Cicero goes on to claim that anonymous writings indebted to Amafinius’ watered-down version of Epicureanism ‘seized all of Italy’ (Italiam totam occupaverunt), it becomes clear why, at the end of the 2nd Century BCE, Pythagorean philosophy could no longer be called ‘Italic’: it had been superseded by a popular form of Epicureanism. Readers will here recall Lucretius’ citation of Ennius’ fame, which he obtained by propagating the notion of the transmigration of the soul, at the beginning of his De Rerum Natura. There, Lucretius lumps Ennius with those who cannot explain, nor obtain certainty about,

...whether it miraculously (divinitus) steals its way into other creatures,
As our Ennius sang, he who first brought down
From lovely Helicon a crown of perennial leafage,
To ring out his fame among throughout all theItalic peoples.

(Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.116-119)

From there, Lucretius sets out to correct Ennius, and to show his reader why his Epicurean atomism is better at explaining the nature of the soul than Ennius’ theory of transmigration, which is at odds with his eschatology. On the account given by Cicero, then, Pythagoreanism had ceased to be ‘Italic’ simply because Italy was no longer Pythagorean. If this is to be believed, we should be inclined not to assume with too much haste that Hellenistic Pythagoreanism was ‘invented’ by Poseidonius of Apamea or Eudorus of Alexandria, as is sometimes thought, but rather that their testimonies reflected an older tradition of Pythagoreanism, with roots in the earlier Hellenistic age, that had lost its significance around the beginning of the 1st Century BCE in the Italian peninsula. What better

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61 The advent of Stoic and Peripatetic philosophy in Cicero’s account are associated with the famous embassy of Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes to Rome in 155 BCE.
62 Lucretius, DRN 1.120-126. On Lucretius’ response to Ennius’ cosmos, see Nethercut 2020: 45-75 (although he does not discuss the Epicharmus).
for this tradition to do in order to survive than, in programmatic Pythagorean form (at least according to Cicero), migrate from one patch of earth to another?

Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* also shows us that the construction of an account of the history of Roman philosophy requires us to take stock of the Pythagoreanism that came before it. In order to do so, however, one is required to grasp what relationships obtained between Pythagoreanism of the sort advocated by influential Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Archytas of Tarentum, and preserved in various accounts by Pythagoreanism’s historiographers and pseudepigraphers who forged texts in their names, and the Italic peoples who were thought to have given rise to Pythagoreanism. Whatever the historical ‘truth’ of the actual lives of the Lucanians Aresas/Aesara, Occelus, and Eccelus, the Hellenistic traditions which situated their philosophical ideas within contemporary Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic views helped to create the image of a native-grown philosophical school, which was purported to have influenced the development of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy generations before these great philosophers undertook philosophical inquiry in Athens. The pseudepigrapha that were manufactured in the names of these Italic figures featured developments primarily of Platonic and Peripatetic ideas about psychology, ethics, physics, with a directed focus towards the sorts of theories about cosmic justice that were generated especially by the Presocratics. Finally, the imprint of Empedocles of Agrigentum and Diogenes of Apollonia was left on *noster Ennius*, the primogenitor of Latin poetry, philosophy and history, and paradigm of the dual-citizen that blazed a trail for the *novi homines* Cato the Elder and Cicero – although Ennius betrays no direct knowledge of the tradition of the Hellenistic Pythagorean pseudepigrapha (with the exception of the *gnomai* associated with the Syracusan Epicharmus – but this represents a special case)\(^63\). In diverse

\(^{63}\) On Epicharmus and Pythagoreanism, see Horky 2013: 131-148. A comprehensive, balanced account of Empedocles and Pythagoreanism remains to be written. In the absence of direct knowledge of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, one wonders whether most of those texts were written after Ennius’ death, but before Cicero’s life (e.g. in the last half of the 2nd Century BCE).
ways, Cicero and Lucretius express a sort of nostalgic fondness for — and substantive disagreement with — the lost native Pythagoreanism that had been celebrated by their grandparents’ generation. But, as Lucretius famously sets down as his principium, “nothing ever springs miraculously out of nothing” (nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus umquam). Pythagoreanism was, for Cicero and Lucretius, a philosophy which had had its day; and as a new sun rose over the rolling stretches of Italian terra, a new seed had taken root.

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64 Lucr. DRN 1.150.
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