
The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness

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Abstract

It is widely maintained that doxastic norms that govern how people should believe can be explained by the truism that belief is governed by the correctness norm: believing p is correct if and only if p . This approach fails because it confuses two kinds of correctness norm: (1) It is *correct for S* to believe p if and only if p ; and (2) believing p is *correct qua belief* if and only if p . Only (2) can be said to be a truism about belief, but it cannot ground doxastic norms.

KEYWORDS: doxastic correctness, epistemic normativity, deliberation, norm, belief

1. Introduction

It is a truism that there are correct and incorrect beliefs. Many philosophers (Boghossian 2003; Engel 2013; Lynch 2009; McHugh 2014; Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005; Thomson 2008; Wedgwood 2002, 2013a) claim that belief is governed, even constitutively, by the *correctness norm*: *believing p is correct if and only if p is true, and incorrect if and only if p is false*. More importantly, many of them maintain that this normative fact about belief shows that belief is normative and can explain why doxastic deliberation is subject to several doxastic norms. Let me call this approach to doxastic norms the *doxastic correctness approach* (DC).

For example, DC often maintains that the reason why belief is governed by some justification or rationality norms is that conforming to those norms make us more likely to obtain correct beliefs (Bonjour 1985; Lynch 2009; Wedgwood 2002, 2013a). Similarly, DC may also argue that the fact that belief is constitutively governed by the correctness norm is the reason why only evidence can be reason for belief (Shah 2006; Thomson 2008). Moreover, DC may also maintain that from the correctness norm we can derive some prescriptive norms: for example, *believing p is obligatory or permissible if and only if p is true* (Boghossian 2003; Gibbard 2005; Kalantari and Luntley 2013; Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005; Wedgwood 2002; Whiting 2010, 2013b). DC can also maintain that the prescriptive norm can explain how our doxastic deliberation is regulated: it seems that when deliberating whether to believe p, we must aim at truth, or we must answer the question whether p is true (Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005; Wedgwood 2002; Whiting 2013c).¹

Notes

*Thanks to two anonymous reviewers, whose comments greatly help me clarify the arguments in sections 2-4, and to Daniel Whiting, Conor McHugh, Anthony Booth, and my

I accept that belief is constitutively governed by the correctness norm (though I'll modify it immediately). In this paper, I am interested in the idea that the prescriptive norm can somehow derive from the correctness norm, which would make DC a promising approach. However, I will argue that the prescriptive norm cannot derive from the correctness norm. Or, at least, the connection between them is not as close as proponents of DC like to think. Their mistake lies in the fact that they fail to distinguish two kinds of correctness norms concerning belief. Once the distinction is made, we can see that there is no easy way to derive the prescriptive norm from the correctness norm.

In arguing so, I am not claiming that belief is not normative. There may be other ways to show that belief is normative. However, DC is probably the most popular approach to doxastic norms. If my argument here is right, its prospect is dim.

2. Two Kinds of Doxastic Correctness Norm

DC maintains that “correct” in the correctness norm is a normative term. For many, it means that “correct” is somehow conceptually connected to paradigmatic prescriptive terms, such as

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¹ The claim defended by (Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005) is actually stronger, as Shah says that when doing doxastic deliberation, one must “immediately recognize that this question is settled by, *and only by*, answering the question *whether p is true*” (Shah 2003, p. 447; my italics). As Conor McHugh (2013) points out, however, the prescriptive norm allows factors irrelevant to truth coming into doxastic deliberation. Shah responds in his (Shah 2013). I discuss Shah’s response below.

“ought” or “permissible.” The following are some statements about the connection between “correct” and “ought”:

For belief, correctness is truth. Correct belief is true belief. ... Correctness, now, seems normative. ... The correct belief, if all this is right, seems to be the one she ought, in this sense, to have. (Gibbard 2005, pp. 338-339)

It seems right to say both that correctness is a normative matter, a matter of whether one ought to do what one is doing, and that the correctness conditions of one’s thought are constitutive of what one is thinking. (Boghossian 2003, pp. 35)

It is a constitutive feature of the concept “correct” that, ... [if] you make judgments about what it is correct for you to believe and what it is not, you are thereby committed to accept that you (in some sense) “ought not” to hold beliefs that are not correct. (Wedgwood 2002, pp. 269)

And some other proponents of DC think that “correct” somehow implies “permissible”:

The norm implicit in the concept of belief is that of being correct if and only if true. Holding a false belief is contrary to this norm: it’s not permissible, because incorrect. (Shah and Velleman 2005, pp. 512)

[First], the statement that an act is correct implies without further ado that one may perform it (but not that one ought to do so) and, second, that the statement that an act is incorrect implies without further ado that one ought not to perform it (and not merely that it is not the case that one ought to do so). (Whiting 2010, pp. 215)

So, proponents of DC seems to maintain that since “correct” conceptually implies “ought” or “permissible,” we can directly derive from the correctness norm some prescriptive norms about belief, such as S ought to believe p if and only if p is true, or S may believe p if and only if p is true (“S” stands for a person). Since the obligatory norm receives several

criticisms (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007; Whiting 2010), the following discussion will focus only on the connection between the correctness norm and the permissive norm.² If one prefers obligatory norms, one can replace “permissible” with “obligatory.” None of my arguments will be thus affected.

However, the correctness norm, as formulated above, is ambiguous between two kinds of the correctness norm concerning belief:

(C-PERSON) It is *correct for S* to believe p if and only if p is true, and *incorrect for S* if and only if p is false;

(C-STATE) S’s belief that p is *correct qua belief* if and only if p is true, and *incorrect qua belief* if and only if p is false;

If correctness implies permissibility, we may derive two prescriptive norms respectively:

(P-PERSON) It is *permissible for S* to believe p if and only if p is true, and *impermissible for S* if and only if p is false;

(P-STATE) S’s belief that p is *permissible qua belief* if and only if p is true, and *impermissible qua belief* if and only if p is false.

It seems right that C-PERSON implies P-PERSON, which I grant as true. It is clear that P-PERSON is genuinely normative: it prohibits us to have false beliefs. P-PERSON can explain why our doxastic deliberation must answer whether the belief is true because it is impermissible for us to have false beliefs, as Shah and Velleman say above.

² Wedgwood (2013b) seems to argue from the permissive norm to some obligatory norm. His argument is, roughly, that since incorrectness implies impermissibility and true beliefs are the least incorrect doxastic states (compared to false beliefs and suspension of beliefs), one ought to have true belief when considering whether to believe.

Hence, if C-PERSON is the correctness norm DC can have, then DC succeeds. But the problem is that the correctness norm is held as a constitutive norm *of belief*. For example, Shah and Velleman claim that it is a conceptual truth that belief is constitutively governed by the correctness norm:

In our view, being regulated for truth is part of the very concept of belief: to conceive of an attitude as a belief is to conceive of it as a cognition regulated for truth, at least in some sense and to some extent. But we think that the concept of belief must include more than the manner in which the attitude is actually regulated. Also part of the concept is a standard of correctness. Classifying an attitude as a belief entails applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. (Shah and Velleman 2005, pp. 498)

According to Shah and Velleman, when we conceive our attitude *qua belief*, we must consider our attitude *qua belief* as governed by the correctness norm. Clearly, the doxastic correctness norm should be read as C-STATE.³

Furthermore, the correctness norm is widely regarded as a truism. DC attempts to start with a truism about belief to explain some normative facts about belief. However, C-PERSON, unlike C-STATE, should not be taken as a truism. Indeed, C-PERSON is exactly what is in need of explanation. DC is the approach that attempts to explain why it is incorrect (hence impermissible) for us to have a false belief in terms of a normative fact that is constitutive of belief. So DC needs to start with C-STATE.

³ Besides Shah and Velleman, Wedgewood (2002) also considers the correctness norm as a truth about the concept of belief. Other proponents of DC, like Thomson (2008) and McHugh (2014), regard it as a truth about the nature of belief. This difference does not affect my argument here.

Can C-STATE imply P-STATE, which somehow explain doxastic norms? Unfortunately, P-STATE is *false*. The fact that C-STATE cannot imply something like P-STATE means that proponents of DC cannot explain doxastic norms by appealing to C-STATE. I explain why P-STATE is false in this section and discuss the problem of C-STATE in the next section.

P-STATE is false because it does not make sense to say that a false belief is impermissible *qua* belief. The reason why C-PERSON and C-STATE have such a difference, I think, is that what permissibility governs are mainly *agents*. Even if we do sometimes say that it is impermissible for an action or a belief to be wrong or that there are impermissible actions or beliefs, what we really mean is that it is impermissible *for us* to take wrong actions or have incorrect beliefs. This suggests that the prescriptive norm first formulated above should be read as P-PERSON, which shows that many proponents of DC, who claim that the prescriptive norm (P-PERSON) follows from the correctness norm (C-STATE), are confusing C-STATE with C-PERSON.

One may respond that some correctness norms that apply to non-agents do imply certain prescriptive norms. For example, in chess we have the following norm:

(C-CHESS) Moving a bishop is *correct qua chess move* if and only if it is moved diagonally.

From C-CHESS, we can derive:

(P-CHESS) Moving a bishop is *permissible qua chess move* if and only if it is moved diagonally.

However, C-CHESS and C-STATE, despite their apparent similarity, function differently. C-CHESS, by stating which move of bishop is correct, determines which move of bishop *counts as a move in chess*. An incorrect move of bishop, accordingly, is not a move in chess. Hence, moving a bishop diagonally is permissible *qua* chess move, whereas moving a bishop horizontally is impermissible *qua* chess move. That's why C-CHESS implies P-CHESS.

However, C-STATE does not function to determine whether incorrect beliefs counts as belief, since false beliefs undoubtedly *are* beliefs. So, it makes no sense to say that incorrect beliefs are impermissible *qua* belief. Hence, P-STATE is false.

3. The Normativity of C-STATE

Proponents of DC often maintain that the fact that beliefs are constitutively governed by C-STATE can explain how we should form or maintain beliefs. For example, here are two accounts—by Wedgwood, and Shah and Velleman—about how C-STATE regulates doxastic deliberation:

I propose that certain concepts are normative because it is a *constitutive* feature of these concepts that they play a *regulative* role in certain practices. Suppose that a certain concept “*F*” is normative for a certain practice. Then it is a constitutive feature of the concept “*F*” that if one engages in this practice, and makes judgments about which moves within the practice are *F* and which are not, one is thereby *committed* to regulating one’s moves within the practice by those judgments. Perhaps, for example, if one engages in this practice, and makes a judgment about moves that are available to one, of the form “Move *x* is *F* and move *y* is not *F*”, one is thereby committed to making move *x* rather than move *y*, if one makes either. For instance, the concept of a “legal chess move” seems to be normative for the ordinary practice of playing chess in this way. (Wedgwood 2002, pp. 268)

One can deliberate whether to believe that *p* because one can engage in reasoning that is aimed at issuing or not issuing in one's believing that *p* in accordance with the norm for believing that *p*. And one can engage in reasoning with that aim precisely by considering the question *whether p*. Considering *whether p* can

amount to reasoning aimed at issuing or not issuing in one's believing that p in accordance with the relevant norm because the relevant norm is this: believing that p is correct if and only if p is true, and hence if and only if p [C-STATE].

(Shah and Velleman 2005, pp. 502-503)

So the analogy between chess and belief seems apt.⁴ Both seem to think that C-STATE governs doxastic deliberation in the same way as C-CHESS governs *chess deliberation*: that is, when deliberating whether to move a bishop *in chess*, we must follow C-CHESS; otherwise, we are not playing chess. Similarly, given C-STATE, when deliberating whether to believe p, we must follow C-STATE; otherwise, we are not really doing doxastic deliberation.

Is it true that we are not engaging in the practice if we do not follow the correctness norm that constitutively governs that practice? Let's consider chess first. The above argument, when applying to chess, seems as follows:

C1. If one is playing chess and one plays the move ϕ , ϕ is permissible in chess;

C2. A chess move is permissible in chess, if and only if it counts as a move in chess;

C3. A chess move counts as a move in chess, if and only if it conforms to C-CHESS (covering all chess pieces);

C4. If one is playing chess and one plays the move ϕ , ϕ conforms to C-CHESS.

C1 and C2 seem right, since one is not really playing chess if one's moves do not count as moves in chess. C3 expresses the idea that C-CHESS determines what counts as a move in chess. Thus, C4 is derived. So, C-CHESS can explain why when deliberating chess move one must consider whether a move conforms to C-CHESS, for otherwise one is not playing chess.

⁴ Wedgewood (2002, p. 268) also uses chess as an analogy to argue for the same point.

Now consider doxastic deliberation. Applying this argument to doxastic deliberation, we have:

D1. If one is deliberating whether to believe *p* and one believes *p*, one's belief that *p* is permissible in doxastic deliberation;

D2. A belief is permissible in doxastic deliberation, if and only if it counts as a belief;

D3. A belief counts as a belief, if and only if it conforms to C-STATE;

D4. If one is deliberating whether to believe *p*, one's belief that *p* conforms to C-STATE.

The problem with this argument, as we've seen, is that incorrect beliefs are still beliefs. So, D3 is false. Proponents of DC may be right that when deliberating whether to believe, we realize that beliefs are constitutively governed by C-STATE and thus acknowledge that our beliefs are incorrect *qua* belief if our beliefs are false. But that acknowledgement does not lead to the conclusion that we must aim at having correct beliefs in doxastic deliberation. For in violating C-STATE, one is still believing. It is in this respect that the analogy between chess and belief breaks down. Therefore, C-STATE, unlike C-CHESS, cannot explain why we should not have incorrect beliefs in doxastic deliberation.

Proponents of DC may argue that D3 is unnecessary; instead, they hold D2*: a belief is permissible in doxastic deliberation, if and only if it conforms to C-STATE. However, it is unclear why D2* should be accepted. Consider another analogy with *answering*. Arguably, answering is also governed by a correctness norm: (C-ANSWER) an answer to the question *Q* is correct *qua* answering *Q*, if and only if it gives the correct information that *Q* asks.

Suppose that a stranger asks me how much money I have in my wallet. When deliberating how to answer his question, I know that answering "None!" is an incorrect answer to his

question. However, that's all C-ANSWER does in my deliberation. It does not say that my answer is impermissible. I answer him, "None!"

Proponents of DC would have to say that if I intentionally violate C-ANSWER I am not deliberating to answer the question. However, it is difficult to see why we should accept this claim. Of course, I am deliberating how to answer his question and I give an answer to his question. It's just that my answer is an incorrect answer to his question.

In light of the above discussion, I think that we need to distinguish two kinds of correctness norm that constitutively governs a practice. The first kind of correctness norm is *prescriptive*, like C-CHESS. The prescriptive correctness norms determine what counts as a permissible act in the practice. Violating the prescriptive norms, therefore, means that one does not engage in the practice. The second kind of correctness norm is *evaluative*, like C-STATE and C-ANSWER. The evaluative correctness norms state which practice is correct or incorrect of its own kind. But a practice that violates the evaluative norms remains a practice of its own kind. So, when one engages in that kind of practice, the fact that a practice is incorrect of its own kind does not mean that one cannot engage in the practice incorrectly.

Some kinds of practice are governed by both kinds of correctness norm. For example, suppose I am to comment on your paper in a conference. I am not commenting your paper if I talk only about my own work instead of yours (hence, a prescriptive norm of conference commenting: the comment must concern the target paper). Nevertheless, it is possible that I give an incorrect comment on your paper if I misunderstand your paper. Still, I *am* commenting on your paper. It's just that my comment is incorrect in regard to my understanding of your paper.

The proponents of DC may have two responses. I leave the second response to the next section. The first response is that the proponents of DC may argue that doxastic deliberation is not just a practice *of believing*, but rather a practice *of believe correctly*. In that case, C-

STATE becomes a prescriptive norm of the practice of believing correctly, so we cannot have incorrect beliefs if we are engaging in that practice. In this way, however, the proponents of DC are introducing a new kind of doxastic practice. There is no genuine disagreement among us. As long as C-STATE is just an evaluate norm of doxastic deliberation, C-STATE is unable to explain why incorrect beliefs are impermissible in doxastic deliberation.

4. Bridging C-PERSON and C-STATE

The second response from the proponents of DC is that while C-STATE itself is not prescriptive, it may lead to a prescriptive norm, such as P-PERSON. For example, although in giving incorrect comment on your paper (due to my misunderstanding) I am still engaging in commenting, it seems true that I should not give incorrect comment on your paper. So, it appears that there is some link between the evaluative correctness norms of a practice and the prescriptive norms that govern how one should conduct the practice.

I agree that it is possible to argue from the evaluative correctness norms to some prescriptive norms that govern our conduct. The problem for the proponents of DC, however, is that they usually maintain that C-STATE is the most fundamental norm that explains other doxastic norms. Thus, proponents of DC should explain the prescriptive norms that govern our doxastic practice, such as P-PERSON, mainly in terms of C-STATE. Or, at least, they cannot explain other doxastic norms by appealing to norms that are more fundamental than C-STATE, or norms that do not concern correctness *qua* belief. However, I think that it is unlikely to be done.

Consider P-PERSON. How can proponents of DC derive it from C-STATE? We see that P-PERSON is implied by C-PERSON. Perhaps, proponents of DC could argue for C-PERSON from C-STATE. Presumably, there is an assumption that bridges the gap between C-STATE and C-PERSON:

(C-STATE) The belief that p is correct *qua* belief if and only if p is true, and incorrect *qua* belief if and only if p is false;

(BRIDGE) It is correct for S to believe p if and only the belief that p is correct *qua* belief, and incorrect for S to believe p if and only if the belief that p is incorrect *qua* belief.

Hence, (C-PERSON) It is correct for S to believe p if and only p is true, and incorrect for S to believe p if and only if p is false.

If BRIDGE is true, DC can have their cake and eat it. However, BRIDGE is wrong. To see why, let me turn to other kinds of mental state. Shah (2008) argues that intention and desire are governed by their own correctness norms. Thomson (2008, chap.7) holds that many kinds of mental state—such as trusting, disliking, admiring, despising—are subject to some correctness norms. Whether their views are correct is irrelevant to my concern here. My concern is that if those mental states are also governed by some correctness norms, there is no BRIDGE* that connects C-STATE* and C-PERSON* (asterisks are added to signify that they are applied to states in general, rather than to belief).

Consider *despising*. Suppose despising is governed by C-STATE*: despising x is correct *qua* despising if and only if x is despicable and incorrect *qua* despising if and only if x is not despicable. Presumably, Adolf Eichmann was despicable, so despising him is correct *qua* despising. If BRIDGE* is correct, then one can hold C-PERSON*: it is correct for S to despise x if and only if x is despicable and incorrect for S to despise x if and only if x is not despicable. It follows that we are correct to despise Adolf Eichmann.

But the above reasoning is wrong. Many people may have an ethical or religious belief, according to which it is simply incorrect for us to despise people. Jesus and Mozi taught that we should forgive and love our enemies. Buddha preached that we should get rid of negative emotions. Their followers would grant that despising Eichmann is correct *qua despising*, but

reply that it is incorrect to despise him. The fact that despising Eichmann is correct *qua despising* does not entail that we are correct to despise him. Hence, BRIDGE* should be rejected.⁵

One may respond that it remains true that, *other things being equal*, we are correct to despise Eichmann; but we also need to conform to social, ethical, or religious norms or values. Very often, the ethical or religious concerns outweigh the concern for the correctness of mental state. Thus, it remains true that, other things being equal, we are still correct to despise Eichmann.

However, I think that this response misinterprets the case. For Christians, Buddhists, or Mohists, their view is not that the ethical or religious concern should, perhaps necessarily, outweigh the concern for the correctness of mental state. Rather, their view is that the question whether despising Eichmann is correct *qua despising* should have no force in the deliberation of whether to despise him. They can agree that despising Eichmann is correct *qua despising*. But they would insist that it is irrelevant to whether one is correct to despise Eichmann. Despising people is plainly wrong or intrinsically bad, no matter whether it is correct or incorrect *qua despising*. So they reject BRIDGE*.⁶

To be clear, my argument does not rest on whether those ethical or religious teachings are correct. The example is used to illustrate the point that the correctness of a mental state does

⁵ This example also supports the above point that when deliberating whether to be in a mental state, the fact that it is an incorrect mental state of its own kind does not mean that one is impermissible to be in that mental state.

⁶ One may respond that, for them, no human is despicable, so they should never despise anyone. However, I think that this response is still a misunderstanding. They need not deny that some humans are bad. What they deny is that we can treat them badly.

not imply that it is correct for one to be in that state. The moral from the example is that being in a correct mental state could be intrinsically bad or plainly wrong, so one is not permissible to be in that state. Or being in an incorrect mental state could be intrinsically good (or value-neutral) or not wrong, so one is permissible to be in that state. In other words, BRIDGE* is wrong. So is BRIDGE.

Could DC responds that there is something peculiar about belief that makes BRIDGE possible? If the above reasoning is on the right track, the prospect of this response is dim. For example, psychologists discover that many people display “self-enhancement bias”: the phenomenon that many people’s beliefs about themselves are biased in favor of positive self-images. More importantly, self-enhancement bias is correlated with high self-esteem and nondepression. (Hazlett 2013, chap.2). Very roughly, many people tend to view themselves more positively than they view other people. They tend to think that they are more likely to be successful and well-off in the future than others. Therefore, while the self-enhancement beliefs are incorrect *qua* belief, it is correct for people to have them.

Or, imagine a family of four who were seriously injured in a car accident. They were sent to the hospital, but unfortunately, all of them, except the mother, eventually died and the mother was in a coma. The doctor announced that the mother could not survive more than one week. When the mother finally awakens from the coma, she thinks that her family still be alive and says that she wants to see them. Surely, it is fine for her to have that false belief. It seems wrong to argue that it is incorrect, hence impermissible, for her to have that belief because her belief is false.⁷

⁷ Daniel Whiting (2013a) defends the view that all false beliefs are intrinsically disvaluable. Even if this view is defensible, it only shows that doxastic normativity is grounded in the intrinsic disvalue of false belief. It does not support DC.

Similarly, in some circumstances one may not have certain true beliefs. Suppose I promise you that I will trust you, so I am committed to believing that you are trustworthy.⁸ Although you are untrustworthy, because of my promise, it is incorrect for me to believe that you are untrustworthy.

Let me consider one final response. Some proponents of DC may argue that although, for example, the mother in the car accident case is *prudentially correct* in believing that her family is alive, it is nevertheless *epistemically incorrect* to believe that her family is alive simply because that belief is incorrect *qua* belief. If so, then an epistemic version of BRIDGE is possible. The proponents of DC need only to insist that what they want from C-STATE is an epistemic version of C-PERSON: it is epistemically correct to believe p if and only p is true, and epistemically incorrect to believe p if and only p is false—which then implies an epistemic version of P-PERSON.

The problem for this response is that what is epistemically correct, just like what is correct *qua* belief, may simply lack normative force on us with regard to doxastic practice. The same sort of argument can be used again in response to this response. If believing that her family is all dead is devastating to the mother, why should she regulate her doxastic states in accordance with the standards of epistemic correctness? “Because epistemic correctness is normatively important,” one must say. But why is it the case? Proponents of DC then must explain the normative importance of epistemic correctness in terms of C-STATE. The problem, then, is that correctness *qua* belief, as argued may not be normatively important at all.

⁸ Some philosophers (Baker 1987; Hieronymi 2008; Philip 1995; Thomson 2008) maintain that trust is a kind of belief or involves belief about the trustworthiness.

Of course, there can be other reasons why epistemic correctness is sometimes normatively important. Consider the example of conference commenting again. It is surely epistemically correct for me to comment on your paper correctly. The epistemic correctness of my comment is normatively important, perhaps because it is what an intellectually virtuous person would do, or because the truth about the subject matter of your paper is important. That's why I should comment on your paper correctly; it's not simply because that comment will be correct *qua* commenting.

Therefore, BRIDGE is wrong. It can be correct to have certain false beliefs and incorrect to have some true beliefs in some circumstances. Hence, DC is wrong in thinking that the doxastic prescriptive norm can derive from the correctness norm.

In conclusion, DC looks to be a promising approach to doxastic normativity. It begins with a truism that belief is correct if and only true. Given the connection between correctness and other normative properties (mainly permissibility), DC claims that it can explain doxastic norms. I have argued that the illusion of DC's promisingness lies in the confusion between C-PERSON and C-STATE. C-STATE is indeed a truism and, arguably, a constitutive fact about belief, but it does not imply the kind of normative fact that DC needs to explain doxastic norms. I only attack one line of DC's arguments: that is, from C-STATE to P-PERSON. There may be other lines of arguments that DC could use. But if my arguments here are correct, they show that the normative force of C-STATE is too weak to ground epistemic normativity. It suggests that one may need to appeal to other kinds of normative fact (namely, other than doxastic correctness) about belief, which means that DC is unlikely to succeed.

Tsung-Hsing Ho, National Chung Cheng University

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