Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide

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Abstract: This is an opinionated guide to the literature on epistemic dilemmas. It discusses seven kinds of situations where epistemic dilemmas appear to arise; dilemmic, dilemmish, and non-dilemmic takes on them; and objections to dilemmic views along with dilemmist’s replies to them.

§1. INTRODUCTION

In *Existentialism Is A Humanism*, Jean-Paul Sartre’s recounts an occasion when he was approached by a student torn between leaving home to fight fascism and staying home to care for his mother, for whom he was the source of comfort and solace in life.¹ In *Sophie’s Choice*, the eponymous character, a Polish woman in Auschwitz, is ordered to select one of her children to be murdered by a Nazi doctor, otherwise he’ll murder them both.² In *Iphigenia in Aulis*, Agamemnon has to decide whether to sacrifice his daughter

¹ Forthcoming in Hughes, N. (ed.) *Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas*. Oxford University Press. This is a draft. The final version will probably be a bit different. Nevertheless, feel free to cite it.
² Sartre (1957/1946)
³ Styron (1980)
or let his army starve. Sophocles’ Antigone must choose between disobeying the king or leaving her brother’s body to decay unburied.

Situations like these, where every possible course of action appears to be morally bad, have come to be known as ‘moral dilemmas’. How should we think about them? Can there really be circumstances where one is doomed, through no fault of one’s own, to act immorally? This question divides moral philosophers. Some say ‘yes’: life is tragic, and sometimes our obligations outrun our abilities. Others maintain that genuine moral dilemmas are impossible: there is, they argue, always at least one morally acceptable course of action.

Recently, epistemologists have noticed that, just as there are circumstances where every possible course of action appears to be morally bad, so to there are circumstances where every possible course of action appears to be epistemically bad. These have come to be known as ‘epistemic dilemmas’. Epistemic dilemmas have proven to be just as divisive as moral dilemmas. Some epistemologists have argued that we should accept them. But there is no consensus about their nature. Others have argued that epistemic dilemmas are impossible in principle, or that, even if they’re possible, the situations other epistemologists have taken to be dilemmas are no such thing.

Philosophical discussion of moral dilemmas stretches back to Plato’s Republic. By contrast, interest in epistemic dilemmas is relatively new. The 15 new papers in this volume push the discussion forward. This introduction is intended as a (somewhat opinionated) guide to the burgeoning debate. §2 describes a variety of circumstances where epistemic dilemmas have been thought to arise and provides an overview of the different views that have been taken on them, from the unabashedly pro-dilemmic to the vehemently anti-dilemmic. §3 catalogues

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5 Euripides (2000)
6 Sophocles (2000)
8 Kant (1971/1797), Mill (1979/1861), Ross (1930), et al.
the various objections that have been levelled against pro-dilemmic views and
dilemmist’s responses to them. §4 briefly describes each of the chapters in the
volume.

Why care about epistemic dilemmas? There are at least two reasons.

First, one of the central goals of normative epistemology is to uncover epistemic
norms (rules, principles) governing belief-formation and related activities like
inquiry and assertion. When we’re in this business, there’s always a chance that
we’ll come across situations where it’s impossible to comply with a prima facie
plausible norm, or where two or more plausible-looking norms conflict with
each other. How should we proceed when we discover such situations? One
option is to take them as evidence against the authority of the norms in question.
The other is to hold on to the norms and think of these situations as dilemmas.
Depending on which way we go, we’re likely to end up with two very different
theories of epistemic normativity. If we go the wrong way, we’ll end up with the
wrong theory. So, answering the question of which way we should go is a crucial
task for figuring out the right theory of epistemic normativity.

Second, dilemmas are a flashpoint. It is possible to discern two general
worldviews in epistemology. On the first, the demands of epistemic norms are
always epistemically accessible, provide useful guidance, are constrained by our
abilities, and are closely tied to facts about praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness. On the second, their demands are not always epistemically
accessible, need not provide guidance, aren’t constrained by abilities, and aren’t
closely tied to facts about praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Despite their
differences, these two worldviews deliver the same verdicts about most cases.
But they give very different verdicts about dilemmas: on the first, dilemmas are
obviously impossible. On the second, they may well be possible. So, analysing
the pros and cons of different views about the situations where dilemmas appear
to arise provides us with an ideal opportunity to put these competing
worldviews to test.

Below we will look at a number of situations in which it has been suggested
epistemic dilemmas might occur. But what is an epistemic dilemma exactly?
Above I offered a rather thin definition: an epistemic dilemma is a situation
where every option is epistemically bad. You might hope a bit more detail.
Unfortunately, I can’t give it to you, as there’s no agreed upon use of the term ‘epistemic dilemma’ in the literature. Some authors use it very restrictively, others are more liberal. As a result, the very same theory may be described as positing epistemic dilemmas by one author, but as rejecting them by another. For instance, as we’ll see shortly, David Christensen argues that when you have misleading higher-order evidence indicating that your first-order belief is irrational, epistemic norms can come into conflict, with the result that you’re both rationally required to believe that p and at the same time rationally required to not believe that p. However, Christensen also thinks that in these kinds of situations it’s less bad, epistemically speaking, to not believe that p than it is to believe that p (Christensen 2021). So whilst there’s a dilemma, the norm tells you to not believe takes priority over the norm telling you to believe. By contrast, Simion (2021) explicitly rejects the label ‘dilemma’ for situations where two epistemic norms conflict but one takes priority over the other. In previous work I have also presented this kind of view as being in opposition to ‘dilemmism’ (Hughes 2019, 2021).

This is a verbal disagreement about how to use the word ‘dilemma’. As such, we could, in theory, resolve it by stipulating a precise meaning for the word. But we would need to be careful. If we stipulate in such a way that ‘epistemic dilemma’ only refers to a very specific phenomenon, and ‘dilemmism’ to a very specific theory, then we run the risk of obscuring significant commonalities between what we’ve decided to call ‘epistemic dilemmas’ and closely related phenomena, and we run a concomitant risk of obscuring significant commonalities between ‘dilemmic’ views and some ‘non-dilemmic’ views. On the other hand, if we use ‘epistemic dilemma’ and ‘dilemmism’ in too liberal a way, so that the first refers to very diverse phenomena, and the second to very different theories, then we run the risk of obscuring significant differences.

Maybe it’s possible to thread the needle, but I haven’t found a good way of doing so. Rather than taking a binary approach, I find it more help to situate different theories along a spectrum. The paradigm of an epistemic dilemma is a situation where epistemic norms prohibit every option, and where no option is any better than the others. If anything is an epistemic dilemma, that is. Epistemologists have developed a variety of theories about situations that appear to fit this description. At one end of the spectrum we have theories that take them at face value. I’ve called these theories ‘straightforwardly dilemmic’. At the other end
of the spectrum, we have theories which maintain that, contrary to appearances, there’s actually nothing dilemma-like about these situations at all. I’ve called these theories ‘non-dilemmic’. In the middle are theories that take them to have some or many characteristics of a paradigm dilemma, but not others. I’ve called these theories ‘dilemmish’. I hope readers will find this three-part taxonomy helpful. More fine-grained taxonomies could be developed, of course.

§2. KINDS OF EPISTEMIC DILEMMAS

Most of the literature to date has focused on seven kinds of situations in which epistemic dilemmas appear to arise:

1. Situations where there is a conflict between first-order epistemic norms and higher-order epistemic norms (see §2.2 for discussion)

2. Situations where there is a conflict between factive epistemic norms and non-factive epistemic norms. (see §2.3 for discussion)

3. Situations where there is a conflict between substantive norms of epistemic rationality and structural norms of epistemic rationality. (see §2.4 for discussion)

4. Situations where there is a conflict between epistemic norms that can be satisfied only by engaging in stereotyping and epistemic norms that can be satisfied only be not engaging in stereotyping. (see §2.5 for discussion)

5. Situations where your evidence appears to rule out suspending judgement at the same time as prohibiting belief and disbelief. (see §2.6 for discussion)

6. Situations where you have compelling evidence that you believe that p iff not-p. (see §2.7 for discussion)
7. Situations where there is a conflict between epistemic norms and norms of morality and practical rationality. (see §2.8 for discussion)

Each of these seven possible dilemma situations has generated a fair amount of discussion (though some more than others – for instance, more has been written about dilemmas involving higher-order evidence than about situations where your evidence appears to prohibit suspending judgement at the same time as prohibiting belief and disbelief). A brief overview of other kinds of potential dilemmas, which have received less attention to date, is provided in §2.9.

§2.1. HIGHER-ORDER CONFLICTS

§2.1.1. THE CONFLICT

Conflicts between first-order and higher-order epistemic norms, which I’ll call ‘higher-order conflicts’, arise as a result of misleading higher-order evidence – that is, misleading evidence about one’s own epistemic situation is. To see how, consider this case:

HYPOXIA: Amelia is flying from Tangier to Casablanca in an unpressurised plane, when she gets a message on the radio advising her to reroute to Marrakesh to get ahead of her onward schedule. Before she makes a decision, she needs to figure out whether she has enough fuel to cover the extra distance. She checks her fuel gauge, does some maths, and comes to the conclusion that she’s good to go. Then ground control come on the radio and tell her that, as she’s flying at 18,000 feet, there’s a very good chance that she’s suffering from hypoxia. Amelia knows that hypoxia degrades people’s ability to reliably engage in the kind of reasoning that led her to conclude that she has enough fuel to make it to Marrakesh, even whilst leaving its victims feeling fine and confident of their judgements. Indeed, she knows that it has resulted in many tragic accidents in situations just like hers. In fact, however, Amelia isn’t
hypoxic and her initial reasoning about whether she has enough fuel to reach Marrakesh was impeccable.\(^9\)

Initially, Amelia rationally believes that she has enough fuel to make it to Marrakesh. She then acquires evidence which gives her reason to doubt that her belief is rational. What should she think now?

Many epistemologists maintain that it is no longer rational for her to believe that \(p\). Instead, she ought to suspend judgement and act accordingly, sticking to her original plan of landing in Casablanca. Reflection on cases like this has lead some to endorse norms in the spirit of \textsc{Orders-from-above}:

\begin{center}
\textsc{Orders-from-above}: One’s lower-order doxastic attitudes should reflect one’s higher-order evidence about what lower-order doxastic attitudes it’s rational for one to have.
\end{center}

However, \textsc{Orders-from-above}-style norms appear to conflict with other plausible-looking epistemic norms, like \textsc{First-order evidentialism} and \textsc{logic}:

\begin{center}
\textsc{First-order evidentialism}: One’s first-order doxastic attitudes should conform to one’s first-order evidence.
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textsc{logic}: One’s first-order doxastic attitudes should obey the laws of logic.
\end{center}

The \textsc{hypoxia} case illustrate how \textsc{Orders-from-above} can come into conflict with \textsc{First-order evidentialism}. \textsc{Orders-from-above} says that Amelia should move from believing that \(p\) to suspending judgement on \(p\) when she receives the message from ground control. But Amelia’s first-order evidence – her knowledge of the fuel gauge reading, the results of her arithmetical reasoning, and so on – continues to indicate that \(p\). If so, then \textsc{First-order evidentialism} tells her to believe that \(p\). Hence, \textsc{Orders-from-above} and \textsc{First-order evidentialism} make conflicting demands on her.

For a conflict between \textsc{Orders-from-above} and \textsc{logic}, consider another case of misleading higher-order evidence, from Christensen (2010a):

\(^9\) For \textsc{hypoxia}-style cases, see Elga (2008, 2013), Christensen (2010b), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Schoenfield (2018), Horowitz (2022) and Smithies (2022), amongst others.
DRUGGED: I’m asked to be a subject in an experiment. Subjects are given a drug, and then asked to draw conclusions about simple logical puzzles. The drug has been shown to degrade people’s performance in just this type of task quite sharply. In fact, the 80% of people who are susceptible to the drug can understand the parameters of the puzzles clearly, but their logic-puzzle reasoning is so impaired that they almost invariably come up with the wrong answers. Interestingly, the drug leaves people feeling quite normal, and they don’t notice any impairment. In fact, I’m shown videos of subjects expressing extreme confidence in the patently absurd claims they’re making about the puzzle questions. This sounds like fun, so I accept the offer, and, after sipping a coffee while reading the consent form, I tell them I’m ready to begin. Before giving me any pills, they give me a practical question:

Suppose that all bulls are fierce and Ferdinand is not a fierce bull. Which of the following must be true? (a) Ferdinand is fierce; (b) Ferdinand is not fierce; (c) Ferdinand is a bull; (d) Ferdinand is not a bull

I become extremely confident that the answer is that only (d) must be true. But then I’m told that the coffee they gave me was actually laced with the drug.

In this case, ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE tells me to reduce my confidence that only (d) must be true. But (d) follows by elementary logic from the supposition that all bulls are fierce and Ferdinand isn’t a fierce bull. So, LOGIC tells me to believe that p. Once again, we have a conflict.

In HYPOXIA and DRUGGED, higher-order evidence makes a difference to what one should believe about p by casting doubt on whether one’s belief that p conforms to norms like FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM and LOGIC. But this is not the only way it can make a difference. Consider a case where there is no uncertainty about whether one’s belief conforms with a norm, but where one has misleading evidence about the authority of the norm itself:
BLOSSOM: Jack is a first-year logic student. His natural inclination is to reason by modus ponens. So, when he believes that p, and that if p then q, he is disposed to infer that q. He endorses the norm:

\[
\text{MODUS PONENS: You should: if you know that p and that if p then q, then infer that q.}
\]

However, in his first class, Jack’s logic teacher, using reasoning Jack can’t quite follow but has no cause to doubt, tells him that MODUS PONENS is false. Prior to the class, Jack had come to believe that the flowers in his garden will blossom soon, on the grounds that it will be spring soon, and that flowers blossom in spring. But now he’s not sure whether this was good reasoning.

If it’s possible to rationally doubt the normative standing of MODUS PONENS, and ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is true, then it seems to follow that Jack should suspend judgement on whether the flowers will blossom soon. But the issue here isn’t whether Jack’s initial belief conformed with MODUS PONENS, he may well know that it did. Rather, what’s called into question is the normative authority of MODUS PONENS itself. If MODUS PONENS is normatively authoritative, then we have a conflict. ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE says that Jack shouldn’t infer that q. MODUS PONENS says that he should.

§2.2.2. DOGMATISM & DEFEATISM

What should we make of these apparent conflicts?

Dogmatists (as I’ll call them) maintain that FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS are authoritative, and take conflicts to show that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE isn’t. They think that the people in these cases should stick to their original beliefs.\(^\text{10}\)

Defeatists take the opposite view. They argue that in cases like HYPOXIA, DRUGGED, and BLOSSOM, one is rationally required to move from believing that p to suspending on p. They maintain that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is authoritative,

and take conflicts to show that FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS aren’t.\textsuperscript{11}

Unfortunately, dogmatism and defeatism both appear to have significant drawbacks.

One problem with dogmatism is that (as the name suggests) it licences dogmatism.\textsuperscript{12} For example, in HYPOXIA, dogmatism says that even after she learns that there’s a good chance that she’s hypoxic, it’s completely fine for Amelia to simply ignore this fact and continue believing that her reasoning was good and that she’s got enough fuel to get to Marrakesh. But that looks egregiously dogmatic. Can it really be rational?

Another problem is that dogmatism it seems to licence some very dodgy looking reasoning.\textsuperscript{13} Take the HYPOXIA case again. Suppose that Amelia sticks to her guns, continuing to believe that she reasoned well and that she’s got enough fuel. Shouldn’t she take this as evidence that she’s immune to the effects of hypoxia? There seems to be something objectionably question-begging about drawing such an inference, but it’s hard to see what the dogmatist can say against it.

In light of these problems, one might be drawn to defeatism. But there are problems with this option too.

First, defeatism leads to a kind of epistemic anarchy: it says that you can blatantly violate standards of logic, probability, and evidential support with rational impunity. For example, take the fallacy of affirming the consequent, whereby one infers $p$ from $q$ and if $p$ then $q$. According to defeatism, so long as you have strong evidence that affirming the consequent is rational, it \textit{is} rational. Many will find conclusions like this hard to stomach.\textsuperscript{14}

Secondly, it’s not clear that defeatism is a well-motivated position in the first place. For defeatists, ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is the one true epistemic norm. But

\textsuperscript{11} The \textit{locus classicus} for defeatism is Feldman (2005). See also Lord & Sylvan (2021), amongst others. Smithies (this volume) defends defeatism for cognitively non-ideal agents.

\textsuperscript{12} See Christensen (2010a) and Horowitz (2022) for discussion.

\textsuperscript{13} See Horowitz (2014) for discussion.

\textsuperscript{14} Littlejohn (2018)
suppose that you get evidence indicating that it’s false. How should you react to this evidence?

Defeatists might argue that, since ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is in fact true, you should dogmatically ignore this evidence and continue to believe that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is true. But this raises a question: if it’s fine to ignore evidence against ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE, why isn’t it fine to ignore other pieces of higher-order evidence? One may suspect that there is no good answer to this question.

Another possibility would be to argue that can’t get evidence indicating that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is false. The obvious question here is: why not? One can get evidence for the falsity of just about anything. What makes ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE the exception to the rule? One may suspect that there is no good answer to this question either.

Given how unattractive these two options are, it looks like defeatists will have to maintain that you should disbelieve ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE – that is, you should believe that your lower-order doxastic attitudes need not reflect your higher-order evidence about what lower-order doxastic attitudes it’s rational for you to have. But if ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is true, then this belief is false, and you should nevertheless continue to calibrate your lower-order beliefs to your higher-order evidence. In that case, situations will arise where you should calibrate, even whilst having evidence making it rational for you to believe that you should not calibrate. But to do that is to form beliefs in a particular way whilst having evidence making it rational for you to believe that you should not be forming beliefs in that way. And this is precisely what ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE prohibits. So if it’s fine after all, then ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE must be false. Here, the supposition that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is true leads, seemingly inexorably, to the conclusion that it’s false.

§2.2.3. DILEMMISM

In light of these problems for dogmatism and defeatism, a third option might seem desirable. This is where epistemic dilemmas come in. Some authors, most

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15 Titelbaum (2015) argues that, whatever the true requirements of rationality are, you cannot get evidence making it rational to believe that they’re false.
16 Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Horowitz (2022)
17 See Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) for more problems with defeatism.
notably Christensen, have argued that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is authoritative and that norms like FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS are authoritative.\(^\text{18}\) The result is that agents in cases like HYPOXIA, LOGIC, and BLOSSOM, both ought to believe that p (by the relevant first-order norms) and at the same time ought not believe that p (by ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE) and ought to suspend judgement instead. In other words, they find themselves in epistemic dilemmas; whatever doxastic attitude they form, they’re doomed to irrationality.

On the face of it, the dilemmic view appears to have advantages over both dogmatism and defeatism.

Unlike dogmatism, dilemmism doesn’t say that it’s fine for Amelia to be dogmatic, ignoring her higher-order evidence and continuing to believe that her reasoning was good and that she’s got enough fuel to get to Marrakesh. To do this would be to violate ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE. Nor does dilemmism licence dodgy reasoning: according to dilemmism, since it’s irrational for Amelia to believe that she’s got enough fuel and reasoned well, she can’t rationally infer that she’s not hypoxic.

Unlike defeatism, dilemmism doesn’t lead to epistemic anarchy by saying that you can blatantly violate standards of logic, probability, and evidential support with rational impunity. In a situation where you have strong evidence that affirming the consequent is rational, for instance, the dilemmist can say that, whilst you’re rationally required take heed of this evidence and fallaciously infer p from q and if p then q (on pain of dogmatism), at the same time it would be irrational for you to infer p from q and if p then q, as LOGIC prohibits it.

Dilemmism is also able to avoid the problems defeatism faces when it comes to situations where you have evidence that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is false. Defeatists have to say either, (a), that situations like this can never arise (but why not?), (b), that you should ignore such evidence (but why then can’t you ignore other pieces of higher-order evidence?), or (c), that you should respect this evidence and disbelieve ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE (which seems to lead inexorably to the conclusion that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is false). Dilemmists, on the other hand, can

\(^{18}\) Christensen (2010a, 2010b, 2016, 2021a, 2021b) and Hughes (2019a). Williamson (this volume) can also be read in this way.
avoid this trilemma. According to the dilemmic view, when you have evidence that ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is false, you’re required to go on calibrating your lower-order beliefs to your higher-order evidence, since that is what ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE requires, and at the same time required to stop calibrating, because to continue calibrating would be to dogmatically ignore your higher-order evidence, and ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE also requires you not to do that.

Dilemmism avoids many of the problems associated with dogmatism and defeatism, then. But it may face problems of its own. In §3 we will look at a number of objections to allowing epistemic dilemmas in our normative epistemology.

§2.2.4. DILEMMISH VIEWS

Dilemmism, as I’ve just presented it, is a hardline view. It says that in higher-order conflicts one should believe that p and at the same time that one should not believe that p. Some authors (including Christensen) have defended dilemmish views that soften the blow of the apparent dilemma, whilst at the same time acknowledging that there is a real normative conflict here.

Whilst Christensen (2010a, 2021a) argues that all of these norms are authoritative, and so one faces a dilemma in cases where they conflict, he also argues that if Amelia suspends judgement on p, conforming to ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE but violating FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, she is being less irrational than she would be were she to stick with her original belief. This is an example of what Leonard (2020) calls a ‘priority view’ – a view that accepts normative conflicts, but holds that one of the norms takes priority over the other.

Lasonen-Aarnio (ms) also defends a view that we might call ‘dilemmish’. She argues that higher-order conflicts are the result of applying two different, but equally legitimate, modes of epistemic evaluation: one that focuses on conformity with epistemic norms, and one that focuses on good and bad cognitive dispositions. Take Amelia in the HYPOXIA case. Were she to hang on to her belief that she has enough fuel to make it to Marrakesh, she would be conforming to FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM. From that point of view, Lasonen-Aarnio argues, she is to be positively evaluated. But in doing so she would be manifesting bad cognitive dispositions, since ignoring apparently accurate
evidence indicating that her evidence doesn’t support her first-order belief will often lead to her ignoring actually accurate evidence indicating that her evidence doesn’t support a first-order belief. And from that point of view, Lasonen-Aarnio argues, she is to be negatively evaluated. Thus, there is a conflict at the level of evaluative norms – that is, norms evaluating states as good or bad. But Lasonen-Aarnio stops short of inferring from this that Amelia also faces a conflict between prescriptive norms – that is, norms governing what one ought to do – on top of the conflict between evaluative norms. She thinks that we don’t have a good enough grasp on the evaluative norm vs prescriptive norm distinction to draw that conclusion.

§2.2.5. OTHER NON-DILEMMIC VIEWS

Dogmatism and defeatism are avowedly non-dilemmic views; they’re not even dilemmish. Other non-dilemmic positions have also been defended. Leonard (2020) and Leonard and Cariani (2021) argue that when higher-order conflicts arise, it is indeterminate what one should believe. A similar view (though to my knowledge, no-one has defended it) is that in conflict cases you are permitted to believe that p and permitted to not believe that p – the choice is yours. However, one might worry that the indeterminist and permissivist views are too liberal, failing to capture the datum that whatever you believe in conflict cases your belief will be epistemically suboptimal.

Smithies (2015, 2019) and Silva (2017) have both argued, by different routes, that higher-order conflicts can be resolved by appealing to the distinction between propositional justification and doxastic justification. Both maintain that even in the face of misleading higher-order evidence, agents like Amelia are propositionally justified in having the relevant first-order belief, but that the higher-order evidence prevents such agent’s from forming doxastically justified first-order beliefs.

DiPaolo (2019) argues that the conflicts disappear once we recognise that the epistemic norms that apply to cognitively non-ideal agents are different to those that apply to cognitively ideal agents. Cognitively ideal agents, DiPaolo argues, should ignore higher-order evidence, but cognitively non-ideal agents like ourselves must calibrate.19 Schoenfield (2018) appeals to the difference between

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19 Smithies’s (2015, 2019) approach also appeals to the ideal/non-ideal distinction.
the best plans to follow and the best plans to try to follow to defend a similar conclusion – though unlike DiPaolo she holds that it is not just non-ideal agents who should calibrate, but also anyone who rationally believes themselves to be non-ideal.

§2.2.6. DILEMMAS FOR DEFEATISTS?

Before we move on, it is worth noting that even if defeatists avoid dilemmas emerging from conflicts between ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE and other norms, they may have to accept that higher-order evidence gives rise to dilemmas in a different way. Defeatists maintain that your first-order doxastic attitudes must reflect your higher-order evidence about what first-order attitudes it’s rational for you to have – that’s what ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE says. But suppose that you get compelling higher-order evidence that every first-order attitude you can take towards p is irrational. That is, evidence indicating that it’s irrational for you to believe that p, irrational for you to disbelieve that p, and irrational for you to suspend judgement on p (and, if necessary, evidence indicating that it’s irrational for you to have no attitude at all towards p). Alexander (2013) points out that, since, by ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE, your first-order attitudes must reflect your higher-order evidence, in this situation every first-order attitude you can take towards p will be rationally prohibited. In that case, you’ll be in an epistemic dilemma with respect to p.

§2.3. FACTIVE NORM VS NON-FACTIVE NORM CONFLICTS

§2.3.1. THE CONFLICT

In higher-order conflicts, the dilemmic view says that first-order norms and higher-order perspectives on those norms both have authority. A similar view has been defended about a different set of norms. Consider a factive norm like KNOWLEDGE, and a non-factive norm like RATIONALITY:

**KNOWLEDGE**: One should not believe that p if one does not know that p

**RATIONALITY**: One should believe what it’s rational for one to believe
Some externalists think that knowledge is authoritative. The problem is that sometimes, when one has misleading evidence, it’s rational to believe things that aren’t known. When that happens, rationality conflicts knowledge. Consider this case, for example:

BRUEGHEL: The Crucifixion, a painting by Pieter Brueghel the Younger, hangs in a church in a small town in Northern Italy. A gang of thieves intends to steal it. After weeks of planning, late one March night they quietly disable the church alarm system, break in through the apse door, snatch the painting from its frame, and make their escape. Back at the boss’s house, they celebrate; they expect to negotiate a large ransom from the government for its return. Meanwhile, the local police are also celebrating. After being tipped off about the thieves’ plan, they set up a hidden camera in the church and replaced the painting with an identical-looking replica. Now they can use the camera footage to identify the thieves. The actual Brueghel is sitting in a vault in the basement of the Uffizi.

In this case, knowledge says that the thieves shouldn’t believe that p (= the thieves have a painting by Brueghel), since p is false, and so not known to be true. But at the same time, rationality seems to dictate that they should believe that p.

Of course, in this case the thieves can’t know that knowledge conflicts with rationality. But there can also be cases where one is aware of the conflict. Consider:

PREFACE: Your write down a million of the things you believe in a very long and very boring book. The book is then given to a team of expert

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20 E.g., Sutton (2007), Littlejohn (2013), Simion, Kelp & Ghijsen (2016), Hughes (2022), and Williamson (fc).
21 Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) has argued that there can be ‘unreasonable knowledge’ – cases in which one knows that p, but it’s irrational for one to believe that p. If that’s right, and there’s a norm according to which one should believe that p if one if one knows that p or one is in a position to know that p, then knowledge norms and rationality norms might also conflict in the other direction, with the knowledge norm telling you to believe that p, and the rationality norm telling you not to believe that p. See Williamson (this volume) for discussion.
fact-checkers. After some time, they come back to you and tell you that only one of the things in the book is wrong.

In this case you know that at least one of your beliefs is false, and so violates KNOWLEDGE. But you don’t know which one it is. On pain of skepticism, it ought to be possible for each of the beliefs to conform to RATIONALITY nonetheless. If so, then here we have a case where you know that KNOWLEDGE conflicts with RATIONALITY (although of course you don’t know where exactly the conflict occurs).

Notice that these conflicts will arise even given a weaker factive norm:

**TRUTH:** One ought not to believe that p if p is not true.

In BRUEGHEL and PREFACE, RATIONALITY conflicts with TRUTH (Hughes 2019a).

§2.3.3. FACTIVISM, NON-FACTIVISM, AND DILEMMISM

What should we make of these conflicts? A variety of positions are possible.

*Factivists* (as I’ll call them) will maintain that KNOWLEDGE is normatively authoritative, and take conflicts to show that RATIONALITY is wrong. *Non-Factivists* will draw the opposite conclusion, arguing that RATIONALITY is authoritative, and taking conflicts to show that KNOWLEDGE is wrong. It is fair to say that non-factivism is by far the majority position amongst epistemologists.22

The most straightforward dilemmic view, which I have defended (Hughes 2019a, 2022), is that both of KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY are bona fide prescriptive norms, and that conflicts between them are epistemic dilemmas, end of story.23

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22 See Sutton (2007), Littlejohn (2013), and Williamson (fc) for factivism. For arguments for non-factivist views that appeal explicitly to the impossibility of dilemmas, see Jackson (2011), Hughes (2017, 2019b), and Barnett (fc)

23 Williamson (this volume) also argues for a straightforwardly dilemmic view.
§2.3.4. DILEMMISH VIEWS

As with higher-order conflicts, some authors have defended dilemmish views which hold on to the idea that non-knowledgeable belief are in some sense epistemically bad or non-ideal without committing to the idea that KNOWLEDGE has the same kind of normative authority as RATIONALITY.

For instance, it has been suggested that knowledge is the aim of belief, but not a norm of belief in the way that RATIONALITY is. In a similar vein, Simion, Kelp and Ghijsen (2016) have argued that there is an evaluative norm according to which a belief is epistemically bad if non-knowledgeable, but no corresponding prescriptive norm according to which one ought not non-knowledgeable beliefs, whereas RATIONALITY is a prescriptive norm. One could also argue the opposite: that KNOWLEDGE is a prescriptive norm, and that RATIONALITY is best thought of as an evaluative norm. Another suggestion, made by Simion (2021), is that KNOWLEDGE outweighs or takes precedence over RATIONALITY. Again, one could also argue the opposite: that RATIONALITY outweighs or takes precedence over KNOWLEDGE. These are ‘priority views’. Another possibility, suggested by Littlejohn (this volume) is that KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY are both genuine authoritative norms, but that they express different kinds of ‘oughts’. So, in the BREUGHEL case the thieves ought⁶ to not believe that p, and ought⁸ to believe that p, but there is no single univocal sense in which they both ought to believe that p and ought not believe that p. I’ll call this kind of view ‘dividerism’. Finally, some proponents of KNOWLEDGE have argued that drawing a distinction between deontic and hypological norms is helpful here. The thought is that in cases like BREUGHEL, believing that p in accordance with RATIONALITY is an instance of blameless – and hence excusable – wrongdoing, and that violating RATIONALITY by disbelieving that p is a case of blameworthy rightdoing (Littlejohn fc, Williamson fc). On this view, KNOWLEDGE is a deontic norm and RATIONALITY is a hypological norm.

Notice that epistemologists interested in higher-order conflicts might take inspiration from these proposals. So, it could be argued that norms like FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS are best understood as expressing aims, goals, or ideals, and that only ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is a genuinely authoritative norm. Or it could be argued that they are evaluative

²⁴ This is how I interpret Williamson (2000). See also the literature on truth as the aim of belief.
norms, in contrast with a prescriptive ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE norm (alternatively, one might argue that it’s the other way around). Or it could be argued that when, e.g., FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM conflicts with ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE, one ought$^{\text{FOE}}$ to believe that $p$ and ought$^{\text{OFA}}$ not believe that $p$, but that there isn’t a univocal sense in which one both ought to believe that $p$ and ought not to believe that $p$. Or it could be argued that when they conflict believing that $p$ in accordance with FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM is an instance of blameworthy rightdoing, whereas suspending on $p$ in accordance with ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE is an instance of blameless wrongdoing. Finally, one might opt for permissivism or a Leonard-style indeterminism.

In the context of KNOWLEDGE vs RATIONALITY conflicts, dilemmists argue that many of these attempts to have it both ways are unsuccessful: in Hughes (this volume) I argue that priority approaches won’t work because the badness of violating RATIONALITY is incommensurable to the badness of violating KNOWLEDGE; that appealing to different kinds of ‘oughts’ doesn’t really avoid the dilemmic conclusion; that appeals to the evaluative/prescriptive distinction are unmotivated in this context; and that appeals to blamelessness and blameworthyness are insufficient to explain the data.

Others have discussed conflicts between norms analogous KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY as they arise in the epistemology of disagreement (Hawthorne & Srinivasan 2013) and the epistemologies of assertion and practical reasoning (Hughes 2019a). David Barnett (fc) discusses a similar conflict between internalist and externalist norms in the epistemology of memory.

What should we make conflicts between factive and non-factive norms? As with higher-order conflicts, what is needed is a careful weighing of the pros and cons of the competing positions.

§2.3.5. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN FACTIVE VS NON-FACTIVE CONFLICTS AND HIGHER-ORDER CONFLICTS

As mentioned, many epistemologists feel comfortable rejecting KNOWLEDGE. They maintain there is no dilemma here, because they think that only RATIONALITY is normatively authoritative. By contrast, there has been a lot more consternation about higher-order conflicts and the potential dilemmas they give
rise to. This is somewhat surprising. Whilst there is nothing inconsistent about simultaneously holding that higher-order conflicts give rise to dilemmas and that factive norm vs. non-factive norm conflicts don’t (because, the thought goes, KNOWLEDGE isn’t a genuine norm), it is much more natural to take the dilemmic views as a pair, either maintaining that higher-order conflicts give rise to dilemmas and that factive norm vs. non-factive norm conflicts do too, or denying that either kind of conflict gives rise to dilemmas.

The thinking of epistemologists who reject the idea that KNOWLEDGE is normatively authoritative usually goes something like this: We are not always in a position to know what KNOWLEDGE requires of us. In fact, our perspectives on it can be radically misleading: sometimes all the evidence indicates that p we know that p when we don’t. In such circumstances, it would be irrational not to believe that p, and we wouldn’t criticise or blame someone who believed that p; we’d praise them. We can’t be required to follow norms when we don’t know what they tell us to do, we shouldn’t be irrational, and if someone is blameless or praiseworthy, then they cannot have done anything wrong. So, KNOWLEDGE must not be a genuine, authoritative, epistemic norm. Rather, it must only express an aim, goal, or ideal, or, if it is a genuine norm, at best it is a merely evaluative norm, and not prescriptive.

Anyone who thinks that higher-order conflicts are dilemmas is committed to rejecting this reasoning. Higher-order conflicts arise when we have a misleading perspective on what norms like FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS require of us. Those norms require one doxastic attitude but that is not clear from the subject’s point of view; from the subject’s perspective, they appear to require a different attitude. Dilemmists about higher-order conflicts, then, are already committed to the possibility that we can have radically misleading evidence about what authoritative norms require of us. So, they should not take the fact that we can have misleading evidence about KNOWLEDGE to show that it isn’t authoritative either.

Furthermore, in higher-order conflicts it’s part of the dilemmist’s view that it would be irrational not to calibrate, thereby violating norms like FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS. So, dilemmists should not take the fact that sometimes it would be irrational not to violate KNOWLEDGE to show that it is not authoritative either.
Finally, it is also natural to take a praiseworthy rather than blameworthy attitude to agents who revise their lower-order attitudes in light of their higher-order evidence rather than dogmatically sticking to their guns. If so, then dilemmists about higher-order conflicts should not take the fact that someone is praiseworthy rather than blameworthy to show that they have done nothing wrong.

But once one takes on these commitments, one is already committed to rejecting the reasoning that leads most epistemologists to reject KNOWLEDGE, and hence factive vs. non-factive norm dilemmas. If so, higher-order dilemmists seem to have little reason to reject factive vs. non-factive norm dilemmas.\(^25\) (Of course, one might have some other reason for accepting the dilemmic view when it comes to higher-order conflicts but rejecting it when it comes to factive vs. non-factive conflicts. But it is not clear what that reason might be).

Going in the other direction, anyone who accepts the dilemmic view about factive vs. non-factive norm conflicts should prima facie also be sympathetic to the dilemmic view about higher-order conflicts. The reason is the same. As we just saw, the factive vs. non-factive dilemmist is already committed to rejecting the ideas that would otherwise make the dilemmic view about higher-order conflicts look unpalatable. Once those are out of the way, dilemmism is the natural view to take about higher-order conflicts (though again, it is not mandatory).

It should not surprise us that dilemmism about higher-order conflicts and dilemmism about factive vs. non-factive norm conflicts make a natural pairing, as both views subscribe to the same general picture of epistemic normativity, one on which lower-order epistemic norms and higher-order perspectives on those norms both have force, even when they conflict. In the case of higher-order conflicts, this idea is expressed by the assertion that norms like FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS (the lower-order norms) are authoritative at the same time as ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE (the higher-order perspectivist norm) is. In the case of factive vs. non-factive norm conflicts, the

\(^{25}\) Contrapositively, anyone who rejects the dilemmic view about factive vs. non-factive norm conflicts because they are impressed by the argument against KNOWLEDGE described above also has good reason to reject the dilemmic view about higher-order conflicts.
idea is expressed by the assertion that KNOWLEDGE (the lower-order norm) is authoritative at the same time as RATIONALITY (the higher-order perspectivist norm) is.

In fact, higher-order dilemmas can be seen as basically the phenomenon as factive vs. non-factive norm dilemmas, but simply occurring “one level up”. At the first order we have KNOWLEDGE. At the second order, we can have a perspective on whether we conform with KNOWLEDGE. RATIONALITY articulates the idea that this perspective is authoritative. But just as we can have a perspective on the first-order norms, so too we can have a perspective on that perspective. ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE articulates the idea that this higher-order perspective is authoritative. Dilemmas occur when there is conflict between orders: factive vs. non-factive norm dilemmas occur when the first- and second-orders conflict. Higher-order dilemmas occur when the second and third-orders conflict. If one subscribes to this picture, and one thinks that there can be forth- or fifth- or nth-order norms governing perspectives on perspectives on perspectives on perspectives and so on, then one may have no principled objection to the idea that dilemmas also arise when these even-higher-orders conflict with lower orders.

§2.4. SUBSTANTIVE NORM VS STRUCTURAL NORM CONFLICTS

§2.4.1. THE CONFLICT

We saw that higher-order evidence appears to give rise to higher-order conflicts, where ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE-style norms conflict with norms like FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS. A closely related debate focuses on a different kind of conflict that higher-order evidence might give rise to, between substantive epistemic norms, which tell us which individual beliefs to have, and structural epistemic norms, which tell us what combinations of belief are epistemically okay. Consider GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM (a substantive norm) and ENKRASIA (a structural norm):
GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM: One should believe what one’s evidence supports

ENKRASIA: One should not have akratic attitudes

Akratic attitudes are pairs where one adopts a certain doxastic attitude towards \( p \) whilst at the same time doubting the epistemic standing of that attitude. For instance, by believing that \( p \) while also believing that one should not believe that \( p \), or by suspending on \( p \) whilst believing that it’s irrational for one to suspend on \( p \), or by having a certain credence in \( p \) whilst having a high credence that the evidence doesn’t support having that credence.

Recently, several authors, most notably Worsnip (2018, 2021), have argued that when one has misleading higher-order evidence, GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM can require akratic attitudes. This happens when, for instance, one’s first-order evidence supports believing that \( p \), but one’s higher-order evidence supports believing that one’s evidence doesn’t support believing that \( p \) (or supports believing that, e.g., it’s irrational for one to believe that \( p \)). HYPOXIA might be such a case. If that’s right, then GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM and ENKRASIA sometimes conflict with one another. Yet both norms have seemed very plausible to many epistemologists. GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM is one of the most widely-accepted theories of rational belief. And, as Horowitz (2014) has shown, a strong case can be made for ENKRASIA.

It is important to recognise that whilst ENKRASIA is similar to ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE, it is not the same, and this isn’t just another instance of a higher-order conflict. Whilst ENKRASIA and ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE both prohibit combinations of beliefs like ‘\( p \), but it’s irrational for me to believe that \( p \)’, ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE also tells us that we should avoid such conflicts by revising our first-order attitudes so they align with our higher-order beliefs (so long as those higher-order beliefs are well-supported). But ENKRASIA doesn’t commit to this additional claim. So far as ENKRASIA is concerned, one might equally well avoid the conflict by revising one’s higher-order beliefs so they align with one’s first-order attitudes. All it says is that the combination is prohibited.
§2.4.2. NON-DILEMMIC VIEWS

What should we make of apparent conflicts between substantive and structural norms? Epistemologists opposed to epistemic dilemmas have four relatively straightforward options.

The first is to argue that GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM isn’t a genuine authoritative norm. If it isn’t, then the conflict isn’t real because only one of the norms is authoritative. This is a popular view amongst defeatists about higher-order conflicts.²⁶

The second is to deny that ENKRASIA is an authoritative norm (Coates 2012, Weatherson 2019, Field 2021, this volume). If it isn’t, then, again, the conflict isn’t real because only one of the norms is authoritative. This is a popular view amongst dogmatists about higher-order conflicts.

The third is to deny that it’s possible to have rational false beliefs about what one’s evidence supports (c.f. Titelbaum 2015, Littlejohn 2018).²⁷ If not, then, even if both of the norms are authoritative, they never actually conflict.

The fourth is to argue that higher-order evidence need not have an influence on one’s higher-order beliefs. If not then, again, even if both of the norms are authoritative, they never actually conflict. (As far as I’m aware no-one has argued for this view).

Other non-dilemmic views are also possible. Leonard (2020) argues that when GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM and ENKRASIA conflict, it is indeterminate what you should believe. As with higher-order conflicts, Silva (2017) argues that the conflicts can be resolved by appealing to the distinction between propositional justification and doxastic justification. In cases where one’s evidence supports both ‘p’ and ‘it’s irrational for me to believe that p’, one has propositional justification to believe ‘p’, and it’s irrational for me to believe that p’, but that one can never form doxastically justified beliefs in both conjuncts simultaneously.

²⁶ Smithies (this volume) argues for this view, but only for cognitively non-ideal agents.
²⁷ Smithies (this volume) argues that cognitively ideal agents cannot have rational false beliefs about what their evidence supports, but that non-ideal agents can.
Or one might appeal to DiPaolo’s (2019) or Schoenfield’s (2018) arguments to develop a different view.

§2.4.3. DILEMMIC AND DILEMMISH VIEWS

As with the other conflicts we’ve looked at, the most straightforward dilemmic view is that GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM and ENKRASIA are both bona fide prescriptive norms, and that conflicts between them are epistemic dilemmas, end of story (Hughes 2021).

However, as before there are dilemmish views. Worsnip (2021), for instance, is a divider. He thinks that the conflict can be resolved by drawing a distinction between different senses of ‘ought’. He argues that GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM and ENKRASIA are both true, but not in the same way. Rather, the ‘ought’ associated with GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM concerns what one has most reason to do, whereas the ‘ought’ associated with ENKRASIA is about what it is rational to do. So, in conflict cases, one ought to believe ‘p, but it’s irrational for me to believe that p’, and ought not believe ‘p, but it’s irrational for me to believe that p’. But there is no single univocal sense in which one ought to have this combination of beliefs and at the same time ought not have it. Worsnip seems to suggest that drawing this distinction softens the dilemmic blow. In chapter 2 I argue that doesn’t.28

In principle, other dilemmish views are also possible. For instance, one might argue that GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM is a prescriptive norm whereas ENKRASIA is an evaluative norm, or vice versa. One might argue that conforming with GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM is an aim rather than a norm. Or one might argue that ENKRASIA takes priority over GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM or vice versa…and so on.29 To my knowledge though nobody has yet defended any of these approaches.

28 Littlejohn (this volume) suggests that dilemmists accept dividerism as a way of thinking about conflicts between RATIONALITY and TRUTH, because it enables them to accept a more powerful deontic logic than is otherwise available to them. If that’s right, the point applies equally to conflicts between GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM and ENKRASIA.

29 Worsnip (this volume) argues that at least in some cases ENKRASIA takes priority over GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM.
§2.4.5. KNOWLEDGE, RATIONALITY, AND ENKRASIA

Conflicts between substantive and structural norms also seem to emerge from conflicts between factive and non-factive norms. Take the Breughel case from earlier again. Knowledge requires the thieves not to believe that p. Rationality requires them to believe that p. Presumably rationality can also require them to believe that they should believe that p. If so, then the thieves ought to suspend judgement on p (by Knowledge) and also ought to believe that they shouldn’t suspend judgement on p (by Rationality). But this pair of attitudes conflicts with Enkrasia.

§2.5. STEREOTYPING CONFLICTS

§2.5.1. THE CONFLICT

Stereotypes are attitudes that associate certain traits more strongly with some social groups than others (Puddifoot 2021). For instance, many people associate scientific expertise more strongly with men than women (Nosek et al. 2009, Carli et al. 2016), and many people associate violent criminality more strongly with black people than with white people (Devine & Elliot 1995, Russell-Brown 1998).

As Gendler (2011) and Puddifoot (2017, 2021) have emphasised, stereotyping brings with it well-documented epistemic costs: when we stereotype we notice and remember information in a biased way; we misinterpret ambiguous behaviours as unambiguously consistent with stereotypes; we develop uninformative explanations of behaviour; and we fail to give testimony its due. Gendler also argues that stereotyping caused by implicit bias can result in stereotype threat and cross-race facial recognition errors (Gendler 2011). For these reasons (not to mention moral reasons), stereotyping is generally regarded as a vice.

However, as Gendler (2011) points out, not stereotyping also appears to come with epistemic costs. Resisting stereotyping by suppressing implicit bias is effortful and depletes our cognitive resources, resulting in errors of reasoning.
and judgement. And when stereotypes reflect social reality, forgoing stereotyping also requires base-rate neglect.

This state of affairs seems to give rise to something like an epistemic dilemma. If we stereotype, we incur one set of epistemic costs. But if we don’t stereotype, we incur a different set of epistemic costs.

Notice that if there is a dilemma here, it is different those discussed above in at least two respects. First, it is contingent in a way that higher-order dilemmas, factive norm vs. non-factive norm dilemmas, and substantive norm vs. structural norm dilemmas aren’t. Those dilemmas will arise for any minded creature that has misleading evidence. By contrast, stereotyping dilemmas only arise for creatures with a certain kind of mind – one that finds it effortful to suppress implicit bias, notices and remembers information in a biased way when it stereotypes, and so on. Second, the problem here isn’t with individual beliefs like the thieves’ belief that they have a Breughel, Amelia’s belief that she has enough fuel to get to Marrakesh, or pairs of beliefs like ‘p and I shouldn’t believe that p’. Rather, it is with the downstream epistemic consequences of engaging in a particular kind of thinking.

In the situations we’ve looked at up until now, it is clear that if there is a dilemma, it arises because two or more norms come into conflict – RATIONALITY conflicts with KNOWLEDGE, GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM conflicts with ENKRASIA, and ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE conflicts with FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM, LOGIC, and MODUS PONENS. One might wonder if the dilemma here is the result of multiple conflicting norms (below we will look at epistemic dilemmas that don’t arise from multiple norms). At first glance, it’s not entirely clear that it is. However, it is possible to view the dilemma in this way. On the one hand we have norms like ‘don’t engage in biased noticing and remembering’, ‘give testimony its due’ and the like. On the other, we have the norms ‘don’t neglect base-rates’ and ‘don’t make errors in reasoning and judgement’. The problem is that, for creatures with minds like ours, conforming with the first set of norms by not stereotyping causes us to violate the second set of norms, and conforming to the second set of norms by stereotyping causes us to violate the first set of norms.
§2.5.2. THE OPTIONS

What should we make of these conflicts? Many of the dilemmish views we’ve looked so far are unpromising here. It is hard to see how we can make headway in this context by appealing to distinctions between evaluative and prescriptive norms or deontic and hypological norms, or by appealing to different senses of ‘ought’, or by invoking the distinction between aims and norms. Some non-dilemmic view also look unpromising. It doesn’t make any sense to try to resolve the dilemma by arguing for dogmatism over defeatism or vice versa, or by drawing a distinction between propositional justification and doxastic justification.

Puddifoot (2021) argues that often (though not always) the epistemic benefits of not stereotyping sometimes outweigh the costs – a position which is reminiscent of dilemmish priority views. Beyond this, however, most of the discussion here has proceeded in a different direction. Rather than developing dilemmish views, commentators have argued either we don’t actually bear the epistemic costs Gendler and Puddifoot describe, or that, even if we do, we can lessen, and perhaps even eradicate, them through cognitive or environmental improvement. Mugg (2013) exemplifies the first approach, arguing that cognitive depletion can be epistemically beneficial in the long term, just as exercising a muscle makes it stronger over time, and that stereotype threat only affects stereotypees, not stereotypers. Madva (2016) and Lassiter & Ballantyne (2017) exemplify the second approach. Madva argue that people can learn to selectively activate stereotypes in a way that evades cognitive depletion and base-rate neglect. Lassiter & Ballantyne argue that the same result can be achieved by tailoring people’s individual social and cultural environments.

§2.6. SUSPENSION DILEMMAS

§2.6.1. THE PUZZLE

The potential epistemic dilemmas we’ve looked so far arise as a result of conflicts between two or more norms. One norm tells you to do one thing, the others tell
you to do something different. But there may also be dilemmas that don’t involve conflicts between multiple norms.

Consider the following scenario, adapted from Turri (2012):

MATHEMATICIANS: One hundred of the world’s most eminent mathematicians are gathered in a room for a meeting. In what is for them an act of extraordinary spontaneity, after finishing their official business they decide to inquire into a certain question raised by a member of their group. The question is whether a particular set of axioms, A, entails a particular claim T. Let ‘p’ name the proposition that A entails T. For hours on end they discuss whether p. They try to prove it. They try to disprove it. You wait outside, happy to perform the task assigned to you. You are to poll the mathematicians as they file out of the room… You have enough mathematical training to understand the question under consideration. But you aren’t an expert. You can’t hear what the mathematicians are saying as they deliberate. Indeed, you are completely ignorant of their deliberations. You know that their testimony will be sincere and informed by their considered judgement. The bell rings, signalling that the meeting is adjourned. The mathematicians begin filing out. You stand ready with pen and paper to record their respective verdicts. By stipulation, the mathematicians’ testimony exhausts your evidence relevant to p.

Now the case branches in two:

\textit{Branch 1:} Each mathematician reports that suspending judgement on p is the thing to do and thereby advises you to suspend. They report nothing more, nothing less.

\textit{Branch 2:} Each mathematician reports that suspending judgement on p is \textit{not} the thing to do, and thereby advises you not to suspend. They report nothing more, nothing less.

It’s clear what you should do if \textit{Branch 1} materialises: you should suspend on p. After all, none of your evidence speaks in favour of believing that p, none of it
speaks in favour of disbelieving that \( p \), and you have ample evidence that suspending is the right thing to do.

But, Turri argues, if Branch 2 materialises, you face an epistemic dilemma.\(^{30}\) Assume **GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM**. Believing that \( p \) and disbelieving that \( p \) are off the table, as none of your evidence speaks in favour of either. The remaining alternative is to suspend judgement. But you have ample evidence indicating that it’s wrong to suspend (namely, the testimony of 100 experts). So that option is ruled out too. And since your only options are to believe, to disbelieve, or to suspend, you’re snookered.\(^{31,32}\)

What should we make of cases where nothing speaks in favour of believing or disbelieving, but one also has evidence that it would be wrong to suspend? Turri considers a number of possible replies – the most obvious one being that the mathematician’s testimony cannot in fact make it irrational for you to suspend – and finds them wanting. He reluctantly settles for a dilemmic view.

Not everyone will find Turri’s arguments compelling. Flowerree (2021) argues that it’s rational to suspend judgement in these kinds of cases despite the mathematician’s testimony.

As with stereotyping dilemmas, there seems to be far fewer other options in this case compared to the conflicts we looked at above, but for a different reason. When two (or more) norms conflict, it is possible to assign them different statuses. So, as we’ve seen, one might argue that one is an aim rather than a norm, or that one is merely evaluative rather than prescriptive, or that one takes priority over the other, or that one is hypological rather than deontic, or that one only concerns propositional justification, or that one only binds cognitively ideal agents, or that the two norms express different kinds of ‘oughts’, and so on. But none of these options are available here, for the simple reason that there aren’t two norms to which we can assign different statuses generating the apparent dilemma in the first place.

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\(^{30}\) Turri calls it an ‘epistemic impasse’, reserving ‘dilemma’ for situations where you both should and shouldn’t believe that \( p \). We’ll use ‘dilemma’ to cover both kinds of situation.

\(^{31}\) Could it be okay for you to have no attitude whatsoever towards \( p \), not even suspension? No; we can further stipulate that the mathematicians have also advised against this.

\(^{32}\) Notice the similarity between this situation and the situation described by Alexander (2013) where your higher-order evidence indicates that every first-order attitude is rationally prohibited.
§2.7. REFLEXIVE DILEMMAS

§2.7.1. THE PUZZLE

Reflexive dilemmas (as I’ll call them) arise in situations where you have good evidence that p is true if and only if you don’t believe that p. Consider ANTI-EXPERT:

ANTI-EXPERT: I’ll believe that p iff not-p

What attitude should I take towards p if I have compelling evidence for ANTI-EXPERT? On the face of it, all of the options look bad. I have compelling evidence that if I don’t believe that p, it’s true. And it’s irrational not to believe something you have compelling evidence for. So, I should believe that p. But I also have compelling evidence that if I believe that p, it’s is false. And it’s irrational believe something when you have compelling evidence that it’s false. So I shouldn’t believe that p. Whatever attitude I take, then, it seems like I’ll do something I shouldn’t.

ANTI-EXPERT is discussed by Sorensen (1987), Egan & Elga (2005), and Christensen (2010a), amongst others. Sometimes it appears under different guises. For instance, Odegard (2006) asks us to imagine the following scenario:

FOOTRACE: I have compelling evidence for believing that I will win a footrace. But I also know that if I believe that I’ll win, I’ll become overconfident and lose.

And Caie (2012), Raleigh (2021), Priest (2021), and Leonard (2021) ask us to consider Φ:

Φ: I don’t believe that Φ

FOOTRACE and Φ are both instance of ANTI-EXPERT. In each case, I have evidence that p (I’ll win the race, I don’t believe that Φ) is false iff I believe that p.
§2.7.2. THE OPTIONS

What should we make of reflexive dilemmas? As with suspension dilemmas, there seem to be fewer options here than there are when it comes to multiple conflicting norms, and for the same reason: because there isn’t two different norms generating a conflict, assigning them different statues isn’t an option.

Brouwer (2014) and Priest (2021) argue that they these are genuine epistemic dilemmas, where one is doomed to be irrational whatever attitude one has. Others have defended non-dilemmic views. Leonard (2021) argues that we can solve the puzzle whilst avoiding dilemmas by maintaining that it is indeterminate what doxastic attitude you should have. Caie (2012) argues that we can solve it while avoiding dilemmas by maintaining it is indeterminate what doxastic attitude you in fact have. Leonard (2021) points out problems for this view. Sorensen (1987) argues that you should refuse to believe that you’re an anti-expert about p in the first place. Leonard (2021) argues that there are ways of presenting the puzzle on which this response will not work. Conee (2006) argues that you should suspend judgement. Again, Leonard (2021) argues that there are ways of presenting the puzzle on which this reply is unavailable.

§2.8. CROSS-DOMAIN CONFLICTS

§2.8.1. THE CONFLICTS

So far, all the cases we’ve look at have been purely epistemic. They have described situations where every possible response is epistemically bad. But there may also be situations where epistemic norms conflict with non-epistemic norms of morality or prudence. Here are two crude potential examples. In the first, an epistemic norm conflicts with a moral norm. In the second, it conflicts with a norm of practical rationality:
MURDER: A kidnapper tells me that he’ll execute his captive unless I suspend judgement on whether there’s a tree growing out of the floor of my office. I can see plain as day that there isn’t.

MONEY: A wealthy eccentric approaches me with the following offer: she’ll give me $100,000 if I suspend judgement on whether there’s a tree growing out of the floor of my office. I can see plain as day that there isn’t.

Let ‘p’ = ‘There’s a tree growing out of the floor of my office’. Clearly, it’s epistemically irrational for me to suspend on p – I should disbelieve it. But, arguably, it’s immoral for me to not suspend on p in MURDER, and practically irrational for me to not suspend on p in MONEY. If so, MURDER is an example of an epistemic norm conflicting with a moral norm, and MONEY is an example of an epistemic norm conflicting with a norm of practical rationality.

Although they are unrealistic, these cases bring out the point vividly. But more realistic cases are possible. Consider, for instance, this a variation on a real-life incident discussed by Gendler (2011):

STAFF: Patricia is a member of an upper-class Washington D.C. social club. She knows that all of the staff at the club are black, and that almost all of the members are white. Sitting in the club lounge, she sees a black man enter the room. She believes that the man must be a member of staff.

Although it is not uncontroversial, some epistemologists have thought that Patricia’s statistical evidence justifies her belief.33 At the same time, Patricia’s belief seems to wrong the man in virtue of stereotyping him.34

Or consider this case from Basu and Schroeder (2019):

RECOVERING ALCOHOLIC: Suppose that you have struggled with an alcohol problem for many years, but have been sober for eight months.

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33 It’s controversial because there are reasons to think that mere statistical likelihood doesn’t suffice for rational outright belief. See Nelkin (2000), amongst others.

34 Hence, as Gendler (2011) and others have pointed out, stereotyping may give rise to epistemic-moral conflicts as well as the epistemic-epistemic conflicts discussed in §2.5.
Tonight you attend a departmental reception for a visiting colloquium speaker, and are proud of withstanding the temptation to have a drink. But when you get home, your spouse smells the wine that the colloquium speaker spilled on your sleeve while gesticulating to make a point, and you can see from her eyes that she thinks you have fallen off the wagon.

It would natural for you to feel wounded here: your spouse has wronged you with her lack of faith. But arguably her belief is epistemically justified.

Gerken (this volume) identifies another potential epistemic-moral conflict. On the epistemic side, he argues that scientific experts are subject to a norm compelling them to qualify their testimony when it trespasses beyond their area of expertise, to avoid giving a misleading impression. On the moral side, sometimes testimony will lead to better outcomes if it is left unqualified. For instance, Gerken asks us to imagine that a meteorologist being interviewed on local news is asked about the impact of global warming on aquatic life. Suppose that she remembers reading in an airline magazine something that lead her to think that there will be no fish left to eat in 50 years. If she asserts this without qualification, then she violates the epistemic norm. But making the assertion unqualified may be morally justified if it has more of an effect on people’s behaviour than it would have done had it been qualified.

For a more realistic example of an epistemic-practical conflict, consider this case:

**SELF-BELIEF:** Kelly is a boxer up against a much larger and stronger opponent. She has almost no chance of winning the fight and she knows it. But if she believes that she’ll win she’ll fight harder and her chances will improve, though she’ll still be the underdog.

In this case it’s practically rational for Kelly to believe that she’ll win, but epistemically irrational. Here, the demands of epistemic rationality and practical rationality conflict with one another.
§2.8.2. THE OPTIONS

What should we make of conflicts between epistemic norms and moral and practical norms? Gendler (2011) opts for a dilemmic view in cases like STAFF: sometimes epistemic rationality requires us to have beliefs that are morally wrong, and sometimes morality requires us to be epistemically irrational. One might also think of other epistemic-moral and epistemic-practical conflicts as dilemmas.


As with some of the other conflicts and puzzles we’ve looked at, some dilemmish and non-dilemmic approaches are unpromising here. Appeals to distinctions between propositional justification and doxastic justification, evaluative and prescriptive norms, aims and norms, and deontic and hypological norms, seem to simply have no purchase in this context. Nor does it make much sense to try to resolve the conflict by appealing to a difference between what cognitively ideal and cognitively non-ideal agents should do.

One strategy for resolving epistemic-moral conflicts that has received a lot of attention recently involves positing ‘moral encroachment’. The basic idea is that if it’s immoral for you to believe that p, it’s not epistemically rational for you to believe that p – morality “encroaches” on epistemic rationality. Basu (2018) and Basu and Schroeder (2019) defend views of this kind. As Bolinger (2020) points out, there are in fact many slightly different views that could go under the ‘moral encroachment’ label. For criticisms of moral encroachment, see Gardiner (2018).

Anyone familiar with analytic epistemology from the last 20 years will be aware of ‘pragmatic encroachment’ – the idea that pragmatic considerations, such as how (practically) bad it would be to be wrong about whether p, can make a difference to whether it’s epistemically rational for you to believe that p.35 One might think that if moral encroachment is an option for avoiding conflicts between epistemic norms and moral norms, then pragmatic encroachment must

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be an option for avoiding conflicts between epistemic norms and norms of practical rationality. In fact, however, this idea hasn’t received much uptake. Despite their similarities, moral encroachment and pragmatic encroachment are, for the most part, motivated in very different ways. Proponents of moral encroachments are motivated largely by a desire to avoid conflicts between epistemic and moral norms (Basu 2020). Proponents of pragmatic encroachment, on the other hand, are motivated by their acceptance of principles like:

**BELIEF-ACTION LINK**: If S rationally believes that p, then S may use p as a premise in practical reasoning.

Whether it’s appropriate to use p as a premise in practical reasoning depends, it seems, on how much is at stake in getting it right or wrong about p. If so, then if BELIEF-ACTION LINK is correct, whether it’s rational for one to believe that p also depends on how much is at stake. But whilst principles like BELIEF-ACTION LINK may rule out some conflicts between epistemic rationality and practical rationality (most obviously, they don’t allow there to be situations where it’s epistemically rational to believe that p, but not acceptable to use p as a premise in practical reasoning), there are many epistemic-practical conflicts that they don’t rule out. Consider the MONEY case, for instance. I’ve been offered $100,000 if I suspend judgement on whether there’s a tree growing out of the floor of my office. But I can see plain as day that there isn’t. Epistemic rationality and practical rationality seem to conflict. But BELIEF-ACTION LINK does not deliver the verdict that it’s epistemically rational for me to suspend judgement in this situation – it says nothing at all about the would-be conflict.

The irrelevance of pragmatic encroachment notwithstanding, many philosophers think that the demands of epistemic rationality and practical rationality cannot conflict. Some (e.g., Kelly 2002) appeal to the idea that ought implies can, arguing that it cannot be practically rational (or irrational) to adopt a particular doxastic attitude because it is impossible to adopt a doxastic attitude for the reason that it is practically beneficial to do so. Others (e.g., Parfit 2011) have reached the same conclusion by a different route, arguing that it cannot be practically rational or irrational to adopt a particular doxastic attitude because practical reasons are not the “right kinds of reasons” to adopt doxastic attitudes. See Howard (2020) for the opposing view.

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36 Though Fritz (2017) is an exception.
§2.9. OTHER EPISTEMIC CONFLICTS AND DILEMMAS

Most of the discussion of epistemic dilemmas in the literature has focused on the seven kinds of situations described above. However, a number of other possible dilemmas, which haven’t generated as much discussion yet, have also been suggested.

Deigan (fc) argues that if it is appropriate for you to be puzzled, then you have violated an epistemic requirement. He then argues that there are situations in which appropriate puzzlement is unavoidable, in particular when one lacks the conceptual resources needed to make sense of one’s evidence. Such situations, he argues, are best thought of as epistemic dilemmas.

As we saw above Gerken (this volume) argues that epistemic-moral dilemmas can arise in science communication. He also argues that science communication can give rise to epistemic-epistemic dilemmas. On the one hand balance requires science reporters to report opposing hypotheses in a manner that does not favour any one of them, whenever feasible. On the other hand, they should avoid reporting hypotheses that are not reliably based. Sometimes, Gerken argues, these two norms can conflict with each other, giving rise to dilemmas.

In Hughes (2023) I argue that epistemic dilemmas can arise when we engage in bad evidence gathering. Beliefs based on poorly-gathered evidence, I argue, aren’t rational. But once the evidence is in, suspending judgement would not be rational either.

Eder (this volume) shows how what appears to be an epistemic dilemma can arise for cognitively ideal agents who have evidence for the proposition ‘p, and no-one believes that p’. She argues that the apparent dilemma can be resolved by adopting a theory of evidential support according to which it is propositionally rational to believe a proposition if and only if that proposition is stably supported by one’s evidence.
Sorensen (2011) suggests that Ockham’s Razor (the injunction to accept simpler explanations over more complex explanations) may give rise to epistemic dilemmas in situations where there are infinitely many increasingly simple explanations.

Focusing on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, Ross (2010) argues that the Generalised Thirder Principle conflicts with Countable Additivity and that we should accept both principles and treat the case as an epistemic dilemma.

Finally, Daoust (2022) argues that there are situations in which jurors can improve their individual reliability only at the expense of diminishing group reliability and vice versa.

§3. OBJECTIONS TO DILEMMIC VIEWS

Some of the chapters in this volume argue that certain straightforwardly dilemmic views should be rejected because the data is better explained by a dilemmish or non-dilemmic theories. For example, Littlejohn (chapter 4) argues that we should adopt the dividers view about factive vs. non-factive norm conflicts; Lord and Sylvan (chapter 6) argue that apparent conflicts between substantive and structural norms are illusory; Smithies (chapter 7) argues that there’s no conflict between substantive and structural norms for cognitively ideal agents because there are structural constraints built in to the evidential support relation; Field (chapter 9) argues that there is no conflict between substantive and structural norms because ENKRASIA isn’t a genuine norm; Eder (chapter 10) argues for a new view about evidential support on the grounds that it resolves conflicts between substantive and structural norms; Neta (chapter 12) argues that ones we give up monolithic theories of belief, we can see that epistemic rationality and practical rationality don’t come into conflict; and Campbell-Moore (chapter 15) argues that we can avoid reflexive dilemmas by adopting the supervaluationist-based version of Kripke’s theory of truth.

These authors don’t try to show that epistemic dilemmas are impossible in principle – only that they don’t arise the situations that the author’s focuses on. However, there are also objections to, as Greco puts it, ‘the very idea of an
epistemic dilemma’. In this section, we will survey eight such objections, and dilemmist’s replies to them.

§3.1. THE NO ANGST OBJECTION

§3.1.1. THE OBJECTION

The archetypal moral dilemma is a dramatic thing. Sophie must select one of her children to be killed, otherwise both will die. Sartre’s student is torn between leaving home to fight fascism and staying home to look after his mother. Antigone must choose between disobeying the king or leaving her brother’s body to rot. Agamemmnon must choose between the life of his daughter and the lives of his soldiers. In each case, one imagines there will be considerable angst on the part of the person facing the dilemma. An argument one sometimes hears is that the situations we’ve looked at is that they cannot be genuine dilemmas, because dilemmas are angst-inducing, and people in these situations will experience little or no angst.37

The absence of angst is particularly obvious in cases where one cannot even know that one faces the dilemma. Consider BREUHEL, for instance. According to the dilemmic view, whatever the thieves believe, they’ll be doing something wrong from the epistemic point of view. If they believe that they have a painting by Breughel, they’ll violate KNOWLEDGE. If they don’t believe this, they’ll violate RATIONALITY. But they can’t know that they face a dilemma: if they knew that believing that the painting is a Breughel was prohibited by KNOWLEDGE (e.g., because they knew it was a fake) it wouldn’t be rational for them to believe that the painting is a Breughel the first place. The same goes in higher-order conflicts. Consider HYPOXIA. If Amelia knew that FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM required her to believe that she has enough fuel to make it to Marrakesh, her higher-order evidence wouldn’t indicate that it’s irrational for her to believe this, and so ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE wouldn’t require her to suspend judgement.

37 See Littlejohn (this volume) for discussion.
§3.1.2. DILEMMIST REPLIES

Is this lack of angst a reason to reject dilemmic views? Dilemmists are unlikely to be impressed by the suggestion. Consider the idea that conflicts between KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY and between FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM and ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE cannot be dilemmas because no-one facing the dilemma could know that there’s a conflict. As Littlejohn (this volume) notes, this is tantamount to claiming that dilemmas are ‘luminous’: they only obtain when one is in a position to know that they obtain. But as Littlejohn points out, there are well-known reasons to think that no non-trivial condition is luminous (Williamson 2000). If not, then there will inevitably be situations where one is subject to a set of epistemic requirements, but not in a position to know it. Why should the impossible-to-satisfy requirements described by dilemmists be an exception?

Secondly, even putting luminosity aside the objection looks dubious. Often, violating an epistemic norm is of no great importance. Perhaps some of my belief about Ancient Egypt are not supported by my evidence. This isn’t, and shouldn’t be, something that keeps me awake at night. It would be a mistake to infer from this that these beliefs are not subject to a requirement to be supported by the evidence. Why should it be any different when it comes the requirements posited by dilemmism?

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38 As noted earlier, some epistemic dilemmas will not be hidden from the subject’s view in this way. In PREFACE you can know that KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY conflict; in stereotyping conflicts you can know that there will be epistemic costs whether or not you stereotype; and in suspension dilemmas and reflexive dilemmas, you can know that every doxastic option is prohibited. Nevertheless, these conflicts are hardly the sort of thing to induce unendurable angst.
§3.2. DILEMMAS AND DEONTIC LOGIC

§3.2.1. CONSEQUENCES OF DILEMMAS IN SDL

Another objection to the dilemmic view that there can be situations where you both ought to believe that $p$ and at the same time ought not to believe that $p$ is that such situations are incompatible with Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). Insofar as we have good reason to accept SDL, then, we will have good reason to reject the idea that there can be epistemic dilemmas. First, we’ll look at the different ways that this objection can be pressed. Then we’ll look some of the ways that dilemmists have responded to it.

Let ‘$O$’ = ‘One ought (i.e., is required) to’, and let ‘$\varphi$’ and ‘$\psi$’ pick out actions like judging that $p$ or asserting that $p$, or states like believing that $p$, disbelieving that $p$, suspending on $p$, or having a credence $c$ in $p$. Dilemmic views about conflicting norms claim that in some situations (1) and (2) are both true at the same time:

1. $O \varphi$
2. $O \neg \varphi$ 39

But the conjunction of (1) and (2) is incompatible with SDL in several ways.

The first problem is the conjunction of (1) and (2) leads to deontic explosions whereby everything is required. OE, AGG, and EFQ are axioms of SDL:

Ought Entailment (OE): $\vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (O \varphi \rightarrow O \psi)$
Agglomeration (AGG): $(O \varphi \& O \psi) \rightarrow O (\varphi \& \psi)$
Ex Falso Quodlibet (EFQ): $(\varphi \& \neg \varphi) \rightarrow \psi$

With OE, AGG, and EFQ we can reason as follows:

1. $O \varphi$ (assump.)
2. $O \neg \varphi$ (assump.)

39 As we’ve seen, not all of the potential dilemmas we’ve looked at have this form.
3. $O (\phi \& \neg \phi)$ (by AGG)
4. $O (\phi \& \neg \phi) \rightarrow O \psi$ (by OE and EFQ)
5. $O \psi$ (from 3 and 4)

The conclusion, (5), says that everything is required. But that is absurd. So dilemmists must reject at least one of OE, AGG, and EFQ.

The conjunction of (1) and (2) also leads to contradictions in SDL. Let ‘P’ = ‘One is permitted to’. OIM and D are axioms of SDL:

Ought-Implies-May (OIM): $O \phi \rightarrow P \phi$
Duality (D): $P \phi \equiv \neg O \neg \phi$

With OIM and D we can reason:

1. $O \phi \rightarrow P \phi$ (OIM)
2. $P \phi \equiv \neg O \neg \phi$ (D)
3. $O \phi \rightarrow \neg O \neg \phi$ (1, 2)
4. $O \phi$ (assump.)
5. $\neg O \neg \phi$ (3, 4)
6. $O \neg \phi$ (assump.)

(5) and (6) are contradictories. So the dilemmist must reject OIM or D.

We can also reach a contradiction by a different route. Let ‘C’ = ‘One can…’. AGG and OIC are axioms of SDL:

Agglomeration (AGG): $O \phi \& O \psi \rightarrow O (\phi \& \psi)$
Ought-Implies-Can (OIC): $O \phi \rightarrow C \phi$

With AGG and OIC we can reason like this:

1. $O \phi$ (assump.)
2. $O \neg \phi$ (assump.)
3. $O (\phi \& \neg \phi)$ (AGG)
4. $\neg C (\phi \& \neg \phi)$ (assump.)
5. $\neg O (\phi \& \neg \phi)$ (OIC)
(3) and (5) are contradictories. So the dilemmist must reject AGG or OIC.

Even without AGG, dilemmists face a problem with a related OIC-style principle:

\[ \text{Aggregating-Ought-Implies-Can (A-OIC): } O \varphi & O \psi \rightarrow C (\varphi & \psi) \]

With A-OIC we can reason:

1. \( O \varphi \) (assump.)
2. \( O \neg \varphi \) (assump.)
3. \( (O \varphi & O \neg \varphi) \) (&I)
4. \( \neg C (\varphi & \neg \varphi) \) (assump.)
5. \( \neg (O \varphi & O \neg \varphi) \) (A-OIC)

(3) and (5) are contradictories. So dilemmists must reject A-OIC.

§3.2.2. DILEMMIST REPLIES

The general consensus amongst dilemmists is that we should not treat SDL as sacrosanct, and that we can avoid these problems by revising it.

Some have argued that we should reject AGG (Williams 1965, van Frassen 1973, and Marcus 1980, Hughes 2019a). If we do, then we avoid the deontic explosions that arise from the OE, AGG, & EFQ reasoning, and we avoid the contradictions that arise from the AGG & OIC reasoning.

Rejecting AGG is not uncontroversial, but reflection on the preface paradox may already give us a good reason to reject it. Take the total corpus of your rational beliefs. It’s rational for you to believe that at least one of them is false. Presumably you are not \textit{also} rationally required to believe that they’re all true. But if AGG holds, then you must be. For we can reason: \( (O \varphi_1 & O \varphi_2 & O \varphi_3 & \ldots) \&
O \( q^n \) \( \rightarrow \) O (\( q^1 \ & q^2 \ & q^3 \ldots \ & q^n \)). Many will view this as an unwelcome consequence.\(^{40}\)

Goble (2009) takes a different approach to explosions. Rather than rejecting AGG, he argues that we should reject OE, and replace it with a weaker principle: 
\((P \& \vdash (\phi \rightarrow \psi)) \rightarrow (O \phi \rightarrow O \psi)\), where ‘\( P’ = ‘One is permitted to’, which avoids the problem.\(^{41}\)

OIM says that if you’re required to \( \phi \), then you’re permitted to \( \phi \). As van Frassen (1973) has pointed out, this is very close to the claim that there cannot be dilemmas, and so it is question-begging to assume it in the context of arguing against dilemmism. So, they are untroubled by observation that there cannot be dilemmas if OIM and D are both true.

This still leaves us with contradictions arising from A-OIC. However, some have argued that we should reject A-OIC (Hughes 2019a) and, indeed, OIC itself. Dilemmas and ought-implies-can principles are discussed in more detail in §3.4.


\section*{§3.3. THE GUIDANCE OBJECTION}

\subsection*{§3.3.1. THE OBJECTION}

It is often said that an adequate normative theory – whether it be moral, practical, or epistemic – must provide us with useful and usable guidance about what to do.\(^{42}\) After all, isn’t that the point of a normative theory? But on the face

\(^{40}\) Of course, it’s open to dilemmists to maintain that you both ought to believe that all your beliefs are true and at the same time ought not to believe that they are. One might be attracted to this view if one thinks that you’re required to believe the known logical consequences of what you believe.

\(^{41}\) See Littlejohn (this volume) for discussion.

of it, dilemmic views conspicuously fail at this task. They say that in some circumstances you should believe that p and at the same time should not believe that p. This is manifestly impossible. And it isn’t very useful to be told to do something you cannot do. Some philosophers have appealed to this kind of reasoning to argue that there cannot be dilemmas (whether they be moral, practical or epistemic).43

§3.3.2. DILEMMIST REPLIES

There are two ways that dilemmists might respond to the objection.

First, they might question whether the point of a normative theory is in fact to provide us with useful guidance. If it isn’t, then perhaps it isn’t a mark against dilemmic views that they fail to do so. One might press this line of thought in epistemology by pointing to the fact that, arguably, epistemic norms like KNOWLEDGE and RATIONALITY apply just as much to non-human animals as they do to us. It seems rather unlikely that a leopard, say, has the cognitive abilities required to consult the KNOWLEDGE norm when thinking about what to believe. Can it really be guided by the norm, then? If not, but the norm still applies to it, then it would appear not to be a pre-condition on an adequate normative epistemology that it provides useful guidance.

I’m not aware of anyone who has developed this line of argument in detail. The other response is to argue that in fact insofar as it is essential for normative theories to give useful guidance, dilemmic views give it. There are many ways of thinking about what constitutes useful, usable guidance. In Hughes (2022) I argue that they all fall into one of two categories. Either they are so demanding that no plausible normative epistemology, whether it is dilemmic or not, would count as providing it, or they are so undemanding that even dilemmic views provide it. Either way, guidance considerations can’t be used to argue against dilemmism.

43 See Gowans (1989), Hill (1996), Greco (2012), and Rinard (2018), amongst others.
§3.4. THE OUGHT-IMPLIES-CAN OBJECTION

Many philosophers endorse the slogan that “ought-implies-can”. The idea is that if you can’t do something, then it cannot be true that you ought to do it. Of course, there are many senses of ‘ought’, and even more senses of ‘can’, so there are many ways of interpreting the slogan, one for each possible combination of ‘oughts’ and ‘cans’.

According to the most straightforward dilemmic view there are situations where you are epistemically required to believe that p and at the same time epistemically required to not believe that p. Here the ‘ought’ we are interested in is that of an epistemic requirement. And as it’s logically impossible to both believe that p and at the same time not believe that p, the ‘can’ is that of logical possibility. In other words, dilemmism is incompatible with the idea that you cannot be epistemically required to do what is logically impossible (as we saw above in §3.2.1).

The fact that we do not have direct voluntary control over our beliefs makes some epistemologists wary of epistemic ought-implies-can principles. Others sign up to them. But is one thing to maintain that you can be required to do something even though whether or not you do it is not under your direct voluntary control, and quite another to maintain that you can be required to do something logically impossible. One might well accept the first thesis but deny the second. With that in mind, what can be said in favour of the version of ought-implies-can that is incompatible with dilemmism? We’ve already seen one kind of argument, which appeals to guidance considerations, the idea being that theories that tell you to do the impossible don’t give useful guidance. But there are others.\(^{44}\)

Perhaps the most compelling argument is an analogue to what Graham (2011) calls the ‘best explanation argument’ for a moral ought-implies-can principle. In the moral case, the argument goes like this. Consider the following pair of facts:

\(^{44}\text{See Hughes (2019a).}\)
1. I am not morally required to snap my fingers and thereby end all suffering

2. If I were able to snap my fingers and thereby end all suffering, I would be morally required to do so.

What’s the best explanation of the joint truth of (1) and (2) and pairs like them? As Graham points out, the obvious answer is that some kind of ought-implies-can principle governs morality.45 If I could, I’d be required to end suffering by snapping my fingers, but since I can’t, I’m not not required to.

For an epistemic analogue, consider (3) and (4):

3. I’m not rationally required to believe all of the logical consequences of everything I know.

4. If I were able to know all of the logical consequences of everything I know, then I would be rationally required believe them.46

What’s the best explanation of the joint truth of (3) and (4)? The obvious answer is that some kind of ought-implies-can principle governs epistemic rationality. Since I can’t know all of the logical consequences of everything I know, I’m not rationally required to believe them. But if I could know them, I would be required to believe them. This is some evidence for an epistemic ought-implies-can. Moreover, since the ‘can’ here is the ‘can’ of something like intellectual ability, and everything that is intellectually possible is logically possible, the relevant ought-implies-can principle seems to be incompatible with dilemmism.

But we also need to consider the evidence against epistemic ought-implies-can principles. For instance, imagine someone who is so paranoid that they can’t help but mistakenly interpret all the signs as indicating that a shadowy organisation is out to get them, that hardly means they’re doing nothing wrong from the epistemic point of view, even if they truly cannot do any better.

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45 Graham ultimately rejects this explanation.
46 Note that (4) might need some finessing. Even if I were able to know the logical consequences of everything I know, it might take me a considerable amount of time and effort to figure them out. If so, then it might be fine for me to not bother. To get around this, we can suppose that my cognitive abilities are so extraordinary that the consequences are as obvious to me as 1+1=2.

§3.5. THE RESIDUE OBJECTION

§3.5.1. THE OBJECTION

Some ethicists (e.g., Williams 1965, Marcus 1980, Tessman 2015) have suggested that the mark of a moral dilemma is unavoidable moral residue. The thought is that we can tell whether someone faces a moral dilemma by looking at whether it would be appropriate for them to feel guilt or remorse, or to be blamed or held in less esteem, no matter what they do. If it would, then it’s a dilemma. If it wouldn’t, then it isn’t. Consider, for example, Sartre’s student. It would be appropriate for him to feel guilty if he abandons his mother to join the Free French. But it would also be appropriate for him to feel guilty if he stays with his mother and doesn’t join the struggle. So according to this way of thinking the student faces a moral dilemma.

If the mark of a moral dilemma is unavoidable moral residue, one might think that the mark of an epistemic dilemma must be unavoidable epistemic residue. Greco takes (this volume) takes this idea as his starting point in an argument for the impossibility of epistemic dilemmas.

First, Greco argues that when a person violates an epistemic norm, the residue that gets left is a particular kind of epistemic blame, namely: the withdrawal of trust from the person as a reliable source of information. He then argues that if epistemic residue is understood in this way, it is impossible for it to be

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47 Note, however, that these authors are often focusing on different kinds of ought-implies-can principles.
unavoidable. If the mark of an epistemic dilemma is unavoidable epistemic residue, then it follows that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas.

Greco’s argument starts from the assumption that **REFLECTION** is a requirement of epistemic rationality:

**REFLECTION**: One’s present beliefs should be a weighted guess as to what one’s future beliefs will be.

He argues that the truth of **REFLECTION** is incompatible with the existence of unavoidable epistemic blame in the form of trust withdrawal. Since **REFLECTION** is true, then, there cannot be dilemmas.

The argument goes like this. Suppose that at time t₁ you treat Dylan as a reliable epistemic surrogate, meaning that you’re prepared to defer to her judgement on a wide range of questions. At t₁ you believe that p on Dylan’s say-so. Let’s say that p = ‘vitamin C prevents the common cold’. However, you know that at t₂ she will face what you will regard as an epistemic dilemma. As a result, whatever attitude she forms at t₂ you will judge her to be epistemically blameworthy. This means that you know at t₁ that at t₂ you will no longer be prepared to defer to Dylan’s judgement about p. But of course you don’t blame her at t₁, as she hasn’t encountered the dilemma yet, and so hasn’t yet done anything to merit blame. So, you are still prepared to defer to her at t₁ by believing that p on her say-so. But this means that you violate **REFLECTION** – you believe that p (= vitamin C prevents the common cold) on Dylan’s say-so at t₁ whilst at the same time knowing that at t₂ you’ll regard yourself as having insufficient evidence to believe this, Dylan having revealed herself to be untrustworthy. So, the existence of epistemic dilemmas is incompatible with **REFLECTION**. Since **REFLECTION** is true, it follows that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas.

§3.3.2. DILEMMIST REPLIES

In Hughes (this volume) I argue that this reasoning is problematic in three ways. First, it depends on the mistaken assumption that preemptive epistemic blame is never rational. Second, it overgenerates, leading to the conclusion that there
are no epistemic norms at all. Third, it leads us to the unwelcome conclusion that epistemic norms don’t apply to most non-human animals.

Whether or not Greco’s reasoning shows that unavoidable epistemic residue is impossible, one might reject dilemmic views about certain situations on the grounds that, as a matter of fact, it is not unavoidable in those situations. On the face of it, this is a worry for several dilemmic views.

Take factive vs. non-factive norm conflicts. Arguably it is not appropriate to withdraw trust in the thieves if they believe that they have a painting by Breughel, conforming to RATIONALITY but thereby violating KNOWLEDGE. Or take higher-order conflicts. Whilst it would be appropriate to withdraw trust in Amelia if she sticks to her guns and thereby violates ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE, one might think it is far less clear that it would be appropriate to withdraw trust in her if she calibrates, thereby violating FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM. Similar considerations seem to apply to substance vs. structure conflicts and suspension dilemmas. If the mark of an epistemic dilemma is unavoidable residue, residue is trust withdrawal, and trust withdrawal is not unavoidable in these situations, then dilemmists must be wrong about them.\(^48\)

The options for dilemmists are either to: (1), argue that contrary to appearances, trust withdrawal is unavoidable in these situations. (2), argue that unavoidable residue is not the mark of an epistemic dilemma. Or (3), accept that avoidable residue is the mark of an epistemic dilemma, but argue that some other kind of epistemic residue is unavoidable in these situations.\(^49\)

Deigan (fc) explores option (3). He argues that puzzlement is a kind of epistemic residue. He takes puzzlement to be the state of ruling out every possible answer one can think of to the question to the question at hand, and argues that it is appropriate only if one has violated an epistemic norm. He then argues that there can be cases where puzzlement is unavoidable, and concludes that, if the mark of an epistemic dilemma is unavoidable epistemic residue, there can be epistemic dilemmas.

\(^48\) In other situations, unavoidable residue in the form of trust withdrawal looks more plausible. Consider stereotyping dilemmas, for example.

\(^49\) It might be argued, for example, that the thieves should in some sense regret falsely believing that they have a painting by Breughel once this comes to light, even if it was perfectly rational for them to believe it at the time.
What would such dilemmas look like? Some of the situations we’ve looked at are unlikely to count as dilemmas on this way of thinking. It doesn’t seem appropriate for the thieves to feel puzzled about whether they have a painting by Breughel. If not, then KNOWLEDGE vs. RATIONALITY conflicts won’t be dilemmas. It also doesn’t seem obviously appropriate for Amelia to be puzzled about whether she has enough fuel when she gets her higher-order evidence – at least if puzzlement is understood as having ruled out every answer one can think of. If not, then higher-order conflicts won’t be dilemmas either, and nor will GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM vs. ENKRASIA conflicts. The same goes for conflicts between epistemic norms and moral and practical norms, for suspension dilemmas, and for stereotyping dilemmas. Reflexive dilemmas are less clear – they might fit the bill.

Deigan takes his approach to reveal a different class of dilemmas. Sometimes we lack the conceptual resources needed to make sense of our evidence. For example, children under 4 years old typically lack the concept of a false belief. In some situations, like the Sally-Anne Task, this limitation makes it impossible for them to make sense of the behaviour of others. Puzzlement, Deigan argues, is unavoidable here. Hence, the young child faces a dilemma.

In order to make more progress on the residue objection, dilemmists and anti-dilemmists should look for still more potential sources of residue, and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the idea that unavoidable residue is the mark of a dilemma.

§3.6. THE VALUE-OF-RATIONALITY OBJECTION

§3.6.1. THE OBJECTION

In the context of discussing would-be dilemmas emerging from conflicts between GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM and ENKRASIA, Smithies (this volume) presents a value-based objection to dilemmism. He argues that there is always some value in being epistemically rational but nothing of value in a logically impossible scenario. If so, then epistemic rationality cannot make demands that
it is logically impossible to satisfy. But this is precisely what dilemmism does. So, dilemmism must be false.

§3.6.2. DILEMMIST REPLIES

Christensen (2021) rejects this argument. Why, he asks, should the greater value of rational beliefs depend on whether it is in principle impossible to achieve rational perfection? Generally speaking, having more of some good thing is of greater value than having less of it, even if it’s impossible to have the maximum amount of it. For instance, more happiness is better than less even if there’s no limit to the amount of happiness possible, and a highly efficient machine is more valuable than a less efficient one, even if perfect efficiency is impossible. He concludes that dilemmists can recognise the value of greater rationality even whilst maintaining that perfect rationality is impossible.

One might wonder if Christensen’s reply really hits the mark. Smithies’s idea is that if rationality is always valuable, and nothing logically impossible is valuable, then rationality can never be logically impossible – for then, in cases where it was, it would not be valuable, which contradicts the thought that it is always valuable. As far as I can see this is perfectly compatible with Christensen’s observation that good things can be valuable even when it’s impossible to have a maximum amount of them. Smithies’s might well agree with that.

A different response to Smithies’s argument might focuses on his assumption that there is nothing of value in a logically impossible scenario. Why should we accept that? It is hardly obvious on the face of it. Health and happiness are, presumably both valuable. Some recreational drugs cause happiness at the expense of health. It’s logically impossible to both take a drug and not take it. But if there is value in taking a drug – namely, the ensuring happiness – and there is value in not taking it – namely, better health – wouldn’t there be even more value (happiness and health) to be had in both taking it and not taking it? Perhaps not, but if so this needs to be shown. It can’t just be assumed.
§3.7. THE ‘NO POSITIVE EPISTEMIC DUTIES’ OBJECTION

§3.7.1. THE OBJECTION

In some cases, dilemmists think that epistemic dilemmas arise because every option is prohibited. According to the reflexive dilemmist, when you have compelling evidence that you believe that \( p \) iff not-\( p \), believing that \( p \) and not believing that \( p \) are both forbidden. The dilemma arises because you cannot but do one of these things. In other cases, dilemmas are supposed to arise not because every option is prohibited, but because one option is, at the same time, both prohibited and required. In HYPOXIA, the dilemmic view says that Amelia shouldn’t believe that \( p \) (by ORDERS-FROM-ABOVE), but also that she should believe that \( p \) (by FIRST-ORDER EVIDENTIALISM). In BREUGHEL, the dilemmic view says that the thieves shouldn’t believe that \( p \) (by KNOWLEDGE), but also that they should believe that \( p \) (by RATIONALITY). In conflicts between epistemic norms and practical and moral norms, the dilemmic view says that you shouldn’t believe that \( p \) (for moral or practical reasons), but also that you should believe that \( p \) (epistemic rationality requires it). In each case, there is a difference between the two claims. The first claim is negative – it tells you what not to do (namely, believe that \( p \)). But the second claim is positive – it tells you what to do (believe that \( p \)) not just what not to do.

It is very plausible that there are both negative and positive moral duties. ‘Don’t cause unnecessary harm’ is a negative duty. ‘Help those in need’ is a positive duty. But it is controversial whether there are positive epistemic duties. Some authors, like Nelson (2010), have argued owing the ‘infinite justification fecundity’ of evidence, a normative epistemology that posits positive epistemic duties will be far too demanding. For any body of evidence, there are infinitely many beliefs that it justifies. Suppose I glance out of the window. My visual evidence supports believing:

1. There’s a tree outside
2. There’s a tree with green leaves outside
3. There’s a birch tree outside
4. There’s a birch tree with green leaves outside
5. There’s a tree with a squirrel in it outside
6. There's a birch tree with a squirrel in it outside
7. There's a tree with more than 10 green leaves outside
8. There's a tree with more than 100 green leaves outside
9. There's a tree with at least two branches outside
10. There's a tree with at least three branches outside
11. There's a tree near a road outside
12. There's a tree near a bench outside

And so on *ad infinitum*. If there's a positive epistemic duty to believe what one's evidence supports, then I am dutybound to form infinitely many beliefs about what's outside – a task I could never complete. That is very implausible. It's more realistic to say that, whilst I must not believe what my evidence doesn’t support, it's also fine, from the epistemic point of view, for me to have no attitude at all to things my evidence supports.

If there are no positive epistemic duties, then the dilemmic view about higher-order conflicts and factive vs. non-factive norm conflicts cannot be right. Contrary to what the dilemmist claims, there will be a permissible option in these kinds of situations: you can have no attitude at all towards p.\(^{50}\) So, Amelia could avoid epistemic wrongdoing by have no attitude at all about whether she has enough fuel to get to Marrakesh (this might not be prudent, but that’s a different matter), and the thieves could avoid epistemic wrongdoing by having no attitude at all about whether or not they have a genuine Breughel. If so, then these situations aren’t dilemmas.

§3.7.2. DILEMMIST REPLIES

What can dilemmists say about this objection? Here are three options (there may be more).

\(^{50}\) Note that the anti-dilemmist's claim should not be that it’s always epistemically okay to suspend judgement. Often, if the choice is between suspending or believing, believing is clearly the only acceptable option. If the weapon belonged to the defendant, their prints and DNA are all over the crime scene, there’s footage of them committing the murder, the body was found in their basement, and there’s no way they could have been framed, then it’s not epistemically okay to suspend on whether they did it: believing is the only rational attitude. Rather, the claim should be that there are never epistemic duties to have an attitude, whether it is believing, suspending, or disbelieving, *in the first place*. That is, having no attitude towards p (not even suspension) is always okay – at least from an epistemic point of view. (Though see Lord & Sylvan (this volume) for a view on which a certain kind of suspensive attitude is always epistemically okay).
First, they might accept that you’re not required to believe absolutely everything you have evidence to believe, but argue that when something is especially obvious, rationality requires you to believe it. According to this way of thinking, the reason rationality requires the these to believe that they have a Brueghel is not just because their evidence indicates that they do, but also because it is (or rather, appears to be) very obvious that they do. Of course, this will require an account of what makes something especially obvious, which might not be an easy task. Moreover, one might worry that even the class of especially obvious things will be too big to make positive duties plausible.

Second, they might appeal to the distinction between occurrent beliefs and dispositional beliefs, and argue that, whilst there may not be any positive epistemic duties to form occurrent beliefs, there are positive epistemic duties to dispositionally believe what one’s evidence supports. There are many things we never think about, but that we nevertheless dispositionally believe. For example, prior to reading this sentence you’d probably never thought about whether Angel Merkel’s father was more than 5 meters tall. Nevertheless, you believed it – dispositionally. Whilst it may be true that rationality does not require the thieves to occurrently believe that they have a Brueghel, because it doesn’t require them to think about the matter in the first place, it might be argued that they are rationally required to dispositionally believe it.

Third, it might be argued that there are positive duties to believe, it’s just that they’re interest-dependent. According to this view, when an agent’s evidence supports believing that \( p \) and the agent is interested in whether \( p \), rationality requires them to believe that \( p \). In that case, dilemmas will still arise for agents with the relevant interests.

As far as I know nothing has been written about this objection so far, so it remains to be seen whether any of these responses is on the right track.
§3.8. THE LAST RESORT OBJECTION

An objection one sometimes hears is that dilemmism should be a theory of last resort; something we accept only if all else fails. What could motivate this attitude? By my count, there are at least two possibilities.

First, other things being equal, we should prefer simpler theories. One might, then, argue that dilemmism should be the last resort because it is less simple than the alternatives. Why think that? An answer might be: because it introduces more fundamental principles and postulates to explain the data than its rivals. For example, whereas dogmatism and defeatism only accept one requirement-generating norm in higher-order conflicts, dilemmism accepts two.51

Dilemmists might reply that it is more important for a theory to fit the data than be simple, and then argue that, even if dogmatism and defeatism are simpler, they do a worse job at fitting the data. Or they might try to argue that, contrary to first appearances, dilemmism is not in fact more complex than the alternatives (Hughes 2021).

Second, one might have methodological worries about dilemmism. If we accept dilemmas we run the risk of allowing norms to proliferate unchecked. Every time we discover that two prima facie plausible would-be norms conflict, we can declare them both to be genuine and maintaining that whenever they conflict dilemmas arise. The worry is that the likely endpoint of this method is a theory rife with superfluous unexplained and disunified fundamental principles (and hence the exact opposite of simple).52 By having dilemmism be a last resort, the argument would go, we reduce the risk of this happening.

51 Smithies (2022, this volume) presses this objection.
52 Worsnip (2018) seems to have something like this worry in mind when he writes that: “...allowing just any kind of conflict between requirements is permissive in a way that makes the methodology of arguing for particular requirements considerably more difficult. One check on our ability to posit rational requirements costlessly is the possibility that such rational requirements might conflict with other, more plausible, requirements. If we allow for rational dilemmas, then we can never show a putative requirement of rationality to be false by showing that it conflicts with some other important requirement.”
How could dilemmists respond? I have argued that whilst this is an undesirable endpoint, we don’t need to treat dilemmas as a last resort to avoid it: the risk can be mitigated by insisting that we respect theoretical virtues like simplicity, consistency, and coherence when crafting our normative epistemology (Hughes 2021).

§4. SUMMARIES OF CHAPTERS

The first three chapters in this volume, by Daniel Greco, myself, and Ralph Wedgwood, discuss epistemic dilemmas in general. Chapters 4 and 5, by Clayton Littlejohn and Timothy Williamson, focus on conflicts between factive and non-factive epistemic norms. Williamson also discusses higher-order conflicts arising from misleading higher-order evidence. Chapter 6, by Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan, focuses higher-order conflicts. Chapters 7-10, by Declan Smithies, Alex Worsnip, Claire Field, and Anna-Maria Eder, focus on conflicts between structural norms and substantive norms. Chapters 11-14, by Matthew McGrath & Juan Comensana, Ram Neta, Mikkel Gerken, and Jacob Ross, discuss conflicts between epistemic norms and norms of practical rationality (McGrath & Comesana, Ross, Neta, Gerken) and conflicts between epistemic norms and moral norms (Gerken, Ross). The final chapter, by Catrin Campbell-Moore, looks at reflexive dilemmas.

Daniel Greco (chapter 1) observes that the discussion of epistemic dilemmas has proceeded largely independently of the much more extensive literature on moral dilemmas. His aim is to extract some lessons from debates about moral dilemmas and apply them to questions about epistemic dilemmas. He argues that making sense of epistemic dilemmas is harder than epistemologists have hitherto appreciated. In the moral domain, it is common to identify moral dilemmas with unavoidable moral residue. But, Greco argues, this way of thinking carries over only awkwardly to the epistemic domain, as there are principled reasons why there cannot be unavoidable epistemic residue. He concludes that, as a result, we don’t yet have a good idea of what it would be for a case to present an epistemic dilemma.
In chapter 2, I argue that Greco’s argument against the possibility of unavoidable epistemic residue goes wrong in three ways: it mistakenly assumes that it is irrational to pre-emptively epistemically ‘blame’ people for what they believe; it overgenerates, leading inexorably to the conclusion that there are no epistemic norms whatsoever; and it cannot account for the fact that epistemic norms apply to non-human animals. I conclude that we shouldn’t identify epistemic dilemmas with unavoidable epistemic residue. I then argue that even if we did, there could still be epistemic dilemmas. In the last part of the chapter, I compare dilemmism with some dilemmish theories and argue that dilemmism is preferable to them.

Ralph Wedgwood (chapter 3), presents a general account of dilemmas, including practical dilemmas as well as epistemic dilemmas. According to Wedgwood’s account, a dilemma is a case where every available response is in some way worse than some available alternative response. Wedgwood argues that this implies a plurality of conflicting values, which disagree about how to rank these responses in relation to one another. Wedgwood argues that this account is preferable to the rival view that dilemmas are cases involving conflicting ‘oughts’. He then proposes an account of how different values differ from each other. Finally, on the basis of this account, he develops a taxonomy of dilemmas, which includes a distinction between ‘unreal’ dilemmas and ‘real’ dilemmas, and a distinction between ‘resolvable’ real dilemmas and ‘irresolvable’ real dilemmas. He argues that unreal dilemmas and real-but-resolvable dilemmas are, in a way, untroubling, but that there’s no denying the troubling character of real irresolvable dilemmas.

Clayton Littlejohn (chapter 4) focuses on conflicts between factive epistemic norms and non-factive norms. He argues that, whilst there is in some sense and genuine conflict between them, dilemmism isn’t the best theory of that conflict. Rather, we should adopt the dilemmish dividers view. Littlejohn argues that dividerism has some important explanatory virtues that the dilemmic view lacks – most notably, that the deontic logic proposed by dividerism validates plausible inferences that dilemmism must reject as invalid – whilst at the same time accounting for the intuitions that seem to support the dilemmic view.

Timothy Williamson (chapter 5) discusses dilemmas arising from conflicts between ‘local’ and ‘global’ norms cognitive norms. Local norms evaluate
individual beliefs, whereas global norms evaluate the overall functioning of a belief-formation system. Williamson draws an analogy with local and global norms for simple communication systems. He argues that dilemmas can also arise as a result of conflicts between basic norms and derivative norms of evidence that one is complying with the basic norms. He suggests that if epistemology fails to take the complexity of the normative landscape into account, it is liable to reject norms as inadequate. We must, he concludes, learn to live with epistemological ambivalence.

Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan (chapter 6) argue that dilemmas arising from higher-order conflicts and conflicts between substantive and structural norms can be avoided if we pay careful attention to the nature and variety of suspensive attitudes. Suspensive attitudes can come in stronger and weaker forms. On a strong form, you suspend when you’re in a state of mind that disposes you to treat your evidence for p as insufficient to justify belief or disbelief in p, and at the same disposes you not to evaluate the relevance of new information as to whether p. On a much weaker form, you suspend when you are in an inquisitive state of mind vis-à-vis p which merely disposes you to wonder whether p, where that involves adopting a disposition to be responsive to the reasons that bear on the question of whether p. Lord and Sylvan argue that this weaker form of suspension is always epistemically permissible, even in higher-order conflicts and conflicts between substantive and structural norms. As a result, they argue, there is no dilemma in these cases.

Declan Smithies (chapter 7) discusses dilemmas emerging from conflicts between GENERAL EVIDENTIALISM and ENKRASIA. Smithies argues that there are structural constraints on the evidentialism support relation, which guarantee that your evidence never supports akratic beliefs. So there is no dilemma after all. Intuitions suggesting otherwise can be explained away by invoking a distinction between ideal and non-ideal requirements of epistemic rationality. Smithies also objects to dilemmism on the grounds that it cannot explain the value of rationality, and argues that his non-dilemmic view is superior than dividerism, indeterminism, and priority views.

Alex Worsnip (chapter 8) also discusses conflicts between structural and substantive norms of epistemic rationality. He draws a distinction between monists, who maintain that one set of norms can be eliminated, or reduced to,
or be shown to be identical to, the other, and dualists, who argue that they pick out two distinct, *sui generis*, and possibly conflicting, kinds of rationality. In previous work, Worsnip has argued for a form of dualism by showing how the two sets of norms can come into conflict in some cases. In this chapter he does two things. First, he argues that the most promising ways of resisting his diagnosis of the cases as conflicts still end up undermining monism in different ways. Second, supposing that the cases should be understood as conflicts, he addresses the question of what we should do when such conflicts arise. He argues that, at least in a prominent kind of conflict case, the structural requirements take precedence over the substantive requirements.

Claire Field (chapter 9) argues that the conflict between *general evidentialism* and *enkrasia* doesn’t give rise to dilemmas because *enkrasia* isn’t a genuine norm of belief. According to Field’s ‘Incoherentism’, rationality doesn’t require coherence, and so doesn’t require enkratic beliefs. Field argues that incoherentism is preferable to dilemmism for two reasons. First, unlike dilemmism, incoherentism allows us to deliberate about what we ought to believe using ordinary epistemology. Second, it does a better job than dilemmism at accommodating the positive features of incoherence.

Anna-Maria Eder (chapter 10) discusses a ‘No Paradise Dilemma’, which is similar to conflicts between *general evidentialism* and *enkrasia*. The dilemma arises because, in addition to requiring one to believe what one’s evidence supports, rationality also requires one not to believe Moorean conjunctions of the form ‘*p*, and no-one believes that *p*’. Eder shows how, given plausible assumptions about evidential support and the cognitive limitations of normal people, these two requirements can come into conflict. In order to avoid the conflict, she argues, we should adopt a ‘stability’ account of evidential support.

Matthew McGrath and Juan Comesana (chapter 11) look at ongoing debate that invokes conflicts between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. According to the ‘strict evidentialist’, the only reasons for belief are evidential. According to the ‘pragmatist’, there are also practical reasons for belief. McGrath and Comesana look at what they take to be the best argument against strict evidentialism: the argument that it should be rejected because it leads to epistemic-practical dilemmas. In response, they concede that strict evidentialism
is committed to such dilemmas but maintain that this isn’t a reason to reject the view because, they argue, pragmatists are committed to them too.

Ram Neta (chapter 12) also focuses on dilemmas arising from conflicts between epistemic rationality and practical rationality, where practical rationality requires you to believe that p but epistemic rationality prohibits you from believing that p. Neta articulates what he takes to be the clearest form of the dilemma and critically assesses existing attempts to resolve it by denying one or another of the constraints that generate it. He argues that, contrary to the presuppositions of the current literature, the constraints are not inconsistent, and so we need not deny any of them in order to avoid dilemmas. The key, he argues, is recognising that “belief” picks out a wide variety of distinct doxastic attitudes rather than a single monolithic state.

Mikkel Gerken (chapter 13) articulates some epistemological and ethical dilemmas in science communication. The first dilemma is faced by science reporters such as journalists. It arises from a tension between two objectives: reporting the most reliable information whilst at the same time giving a balanced presentation of different perspectives. The second dilemma is faced by scientific expert testifiers, and arises when they engage in scientific expert trespassing testimony. Trespassing testimony – testifying outside of one’s domain of expertise – is usually epistemically problematic. However, it can also be epistemically good. As a result, scientists may face a dilemma as to whether and how to testify. Gerken provides partial resolution strategies for both kinds of dilemma, but suggests that even so residual hard dilemmas will persist. Consequently, he articulates a general unifying solution-strategy, which consists of a general norm of public scientific testimony.

Jacob Ross (chapter 14) looks at epistemic-moral dilemmas. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that, in some circumstances, prejudicial beliefs are both morally wrong and rationally required. In order to avoid this conflict, some have argued that belief is morally encroached upon – that is, the standards of epistemic rationality can shift in light of moral considerations. In assessing the moral encroachment thesis, Ross distinguishes between ‘definitive prejudice’ and ‘probabilistic prejudice’. He argues that if the ordinary norms of epistemic rationality that apply to morally neutral beliefs also applied to prejudicial beliefs, then whilst definitive prejudice would never been rationally required,
probabilistic prejudice would be. Hence, he argues, if we are to maintain that probabilistic prejudice is never rationally required, we must accept the moral encroachment thesis. In fact, we must a radical version of the thesis affecting the most fundamental rational norms.

Catrin Campbell-Moore (chapter 15) focuses on reflexive dilemmas. Sometimes, one’s beliefs impact the way the world is, and sometimes this can lead to a situation where whatever one believes, the world will make one’s belief false. Such situations appear to lead to epistemic dilemmas. Campbell-Moore provides a formal framework for analysing these cases by providing a connection with languages with self-referential predicates, as have been studied in philosophical logic. Such self-referential languages lead to similar paradoxes – most prominently the liar paradox. Campbell-Moore shows how solutions that have been proposed to the liar paradox can be applied to these dilemmas, with different solutions advising different responses to the dilemmas. She focuses on a specific solution to the liar paradox – the “supervaluationist-based version of Kripke’s theory of truth” and its application to such dilemmas. Applying the solution to belief tells us, she argues, that our representations of agent’s beliefs was too restrictive and that we should instead adopt an “imprecise probabilities” model of belief, where we represent an agent’s beliefs with a set of probability functions. Campbell-Moore suggests that this is close to saying that in the dilemmas one should always suspend judgement. She finishes by briefly outlining some alternative responses to the dilemmas that would result from applying some alternative theories of truth to the case of belief and compares them to the proposal on the table.

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