Anaximander (Schürmann, p. 248); and Schürmann rightfully says that willing not to will, i.e. "letting," is more than some acting or some call to love (p. 250).

At one point he remarks that cybernetics and the synchronicity of its self-regulation exercised a genuine fascination over Heidegger, as if it embodied the eternal recurrence of the same. It must have appeared to Heidegger as the forgetting of being, radicalized to its extreme. To this corresponds the provocative note in the essay on Nietzsche from 1953.[2] On the other hand, it remains true for Heidegger that if there were no art and no "whiling" and dwelling at least in art, a thinking other than the calculative would hardly be imaginable. The converse is true, too. Therefore I am not quite able to tell what Schürmann means by "existing authentically [authentisch]" (p. 287). Existing may always be in the non-proper as well. Even a thinking that inquires about what makes metaphysics possible cannot be articulated without metaphysical thinking and the language of the concept. Heidegger's linguistic needfulness [Sprachnot] is in truth the most impressive testimony to his power of thought.

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NOTES

1. Translated from *Philosophische Rundschau* 32 (1985), pp. 18–20, with page references adjusted to the English language edition, by Ian Maslowski.

2. "What is the essence of the modern power engine other than *one* configuration of the eternal recurrence of the same? . . ." M. Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?," translated by Bernd Magnus (modified), *The Review of Metaphysics* XX (1967), p. 431.

The Invention of Culture, by Roy Wagner. Revised and Expanded Edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981, 168 pp.

Symbols That Stand for Themselves, by Roy Wagner. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986, 150 pp.

The central concern that unites these two works is the constitution of cultural phenomena, or as Wagner himself says: "how people create their own realities, and how they create themselves and their societies *through* them" (*Invention*, p. 127). Although the notion that human beings invent or create their own realities has a long and well established tradition, Wagner is not content with a mere description of the process. Rather, he attempts the more

difficult task "of introducing this idea to an anthropology and a culture that wants very much to control its own realities" as, he is quick to add, all cultures want to do (*Invention*, p. ix).

Wagner's work belongs to the current discussion in symbolic anthropology. Although he credits the pioneers in the field (Boas, Kroeber, Levi-Strauss, Dumont, Leach, Geertz, and Schneider among anthropologists; Husserl, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Ricoeur among philosophers), Wagner's theoretical contribution intends to go beyond these thinkers by challenging the reification of the notion of 'culture' and the related terms of 'self' and 'society' within the discipline of anthropology. Thus he not only calls the entire history of anthropology into question, but also all related disciplines which rely on these concepts.

Wagner distinguishes between " 'opera-house' culture"— what most of us think as 'high culture', including cultural institutions, museums, concert halls, etc.—and the way in which the anthropologist employs the term, "culture" (*Invention*, p. 21). The anthropologist conceives of culture as the storehouse of all cultural lore; it is "the sum of our ways of doing things, and the sum of 'knowl-edge' as we know it" (*Invention*, p. 22). Not only does this accumulation of cultural lore constitute the productive and creative activity of a culture, it also forms the context against which all cultural productivity takes place. It is the context in which productivity has any meaning at all.

Wagner locates the dialectic between convention and invention at the core of the anthropologist's notion of culture. Cultural conventions are the store of cultural lore, some of which are recognized by participants in the culture as conventional. Others are more fundamental, and their conventional character is masked. To the extent that the latter conventions are thought to represent objective reality, they are considered natural or "innate." Although their conventional character is not recognized by the participants in the culture, Wagner maintains that *culture*, including what is considered natural, is composed of nothing but strata of convention which are constituted by the relation between individuals and their conventional symbols. There are no fundamental conventions (*Invention*, p. 41).

However, since cultural convention is never entirely adequate to every situation, Wagner introduces invention to

account for the way conventional modes of symbolization are extended to the particular and the individual as well as to new and different events. In contrast to cultural convention, invention integrates diverse contexts.

> Invention, which has the effect of continually differentiating acts and events from the conventional, continually puts together ("metaphorizes") and integrates disparate contexts. . . . Invention changes things, and convention resolves those changes into a recognizable world (*Invention, p. 53*).

Thus, Wagner contends that the dialectic between convention and invention accounts for both the continuity of culture and the changes in culture.

Corresponding to the dialectical relation between convention and invention is the relation between "conventional symbolizations" and the "differentiating, or nonconventional mode" of symbolization (*Invention,* p. 43). Traditionally, conventional symbolizations have been defined as being about something; they 'stand for' or refer to something. This mode of symbolization provides an ordered universe by "giving the world a center, a pattern, and an organization" (*Invention,* p. 43).

> Conventional symbolizations . . . relate to one another within the field of discourse (language and mathematics are the obvious examples) and form cultural 'sets', like sentences, equations, tool kits, suits of clothes, or city streets (*Invention,* p. 42).

The conventional mode of symbolization, however, distinguishes its capacity to order various cultural sets "from the things ordered, or designated, and it creates and distinguishes contexts in the process" (*Invention,* p. 43). Since symbols do not necessarily belong to that which is symbolized according to convention, "The symbols *abstract themselves* from the symbolized" (*Invention,* p. 42). They may be used metaphorically to determine new events. This process of "metaphorization" which is indicative of the nonconventional mode of symbolization, allows symbols to be extended to new and unusual circumstances as communication demands. Accordingly, Wagner contends that unlike conventional symbolizations, with the differentiating or nonconventional mode "neither [the] signified nor [the] signifier belongs to the established order of things" (*Invention,* p. 43). Rather, when the symbol is

used in new and unfamiliar circumstances, "the tension and contrast between symbol and symbolized collapse" and "an event manifests symbol and referent simultaneously" (*Invention*, p. 43). In this case, Wagner says that a " 'symbol' . . . stands for itself" (*Invention*, p. 43).

It is precisely this notion that Wagner intends to develop in his *Symbols That Stand for Themselves.* Whereas in *The Invention of Culture* Wagner was concerned with the constitution of cultural phenomena in terms of the dialectic between convention and invention, in *Symbols That Stand for Themselves* he sharpens the focus of the discussion to deal specifically with the role that metaphor or trope plays in the way in which meanings constitute and organize human culture.

Wagner intends to use the notions of metaphor and trope very broadly.

> A metaphor, and, by extension, a trope generally, equates one conventional point of reference with another, or substitutes one for another, and obliges the interpreter to draw his or her conclusions as to the consequences. It elicits analogies, as perceptions *through* language, so to speak, and these

analogies or perceptions become the intent, and the content, of the expression (*Symbols*, p. 6).

These analogies, or perceptions, are 'meanings'. Thus, according to Wagner, "meaning is a perception . . ." elicited and conveyed by metaphor or trope (*Symbols*, p. 12). This conception of meaning sets Wagner at odds with Saussure, whom he faults for suggesting that the sign is sensible and that it mediates "between concept and percept" (*Symbols*, p. 128). Unlike the science of semiotics proposed by Saussure in which signs have precise definitions and specific functions, Wagner insists that a metaphor, or a trope, can elicit meaning, but it has no definition. Rather, a trope establishes the parameters of reference.

Tropes are comparable to myths, and when functioning on a large scale, constitute "frames" or cultural contexts. According to Wagner this means that the meanings of a given culture are not fixed but, in being created and "re-created," are in a constant state of flux (*Symbols*, p. 129). It also means that the most fundamental conventions, the cultural core which mark out the reference points of any given culture, are not an arbitrary collection of

"customs, ideas, objects, institutions, words, and the like, but a coherent flow of images and analogies" (*Symbols*, p. 129). That these can be neither defined nor communicated but only sketched out and described, implies that we cannot literally translate another set of cultural meanings into our own; another culture is understood through analogy.

In keeping with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, meaning is specific to the syntax of each natural language or, as Wagner maintains in his second chapter, meanings are "Too Definite for Words" (*Symbols,* pp. 14–33). By focusing on the way in which tropes elicit meanings, Wagner attempts to overcome this problem of language. Language is simply one of the many ways that culture encodes the world; other examples include nonverbal behavior and visual inscription. By diagramming the cultural codes involved in the mythological depiction of life among the Daribi and "The Western Core Symbol" (which involves Europeans' invention of God, human beings, and the respective relation between these two terms), he argues convincingly that we human beings are indeed the shamans of our meanings (*Invention*, p. 34).

The emphasis on invention of meanings and culture, however, reminds one of the graduate student in anthropology who asked her highly esteemed professor, if everything is invented what are we anthropologists actually doing? To which the elderly gentleman replied: "There are people out there who paint their faces red; I didn't invent that."

But Wagner would answer this question quite differently. His work is not merely descriptive, it is normative and he challenges the anthropologist and, by extension, all of us

> . . . to experience our subject matter directly, as alternative meaning, rather than indirectly, through literalization or reduction to the terms of our ideologies. The issue can be phrased in practical, philosophical, or ethical language, but in any case it devolves upon the question of what we *want* to mean by the word "culture," and how we choose to resolve, and to invent, its ambiguities (*Invention*, pp. 30–31).

The problem, according to Wagner, is that much of anthropological research has been skewed in the direction of opera-house culture. The anthropologist at work in the field is creative in inventing culture. Through the initial contact with the subject culture, the field-

worker encounters obstacles which, in determining the limits of the fieldworker's own culture, make his or her culture visible. The inadequacy of one's own culture which is known as "culture shock" is experienced as "a loss of self through the loss of" the supportive cultural apparatus (*Invention*, p. 7). Since one's own culture is invisible, culture shock is very important to the fieldworker, for it not only allows his or her own culture to become visible, but it also objectifies the subject culture. The fieldworker may then construct "a set of analogies, that 'translates' one group of basic meanings into the other" (*Invention*, p. 9). Thus Wagner maintains that the fieldworker, in making his or her own culture as well as the subject culture visible, has invented them.

Wagner extends his argument by thinking of all human beings as anthropologists or "fieldworkers." Since, Wagner argues, invention is central to the way in which the anthropologist understands those peoples he or she is investigating, we must assume that all cultures function in the same way. Wagner concludes that creativity is the core of culture itself and of all human beings: "Invention, then *is* culture" (*Invention*, p. 35).

Wagner thus enjoins anthropologists to dissociate themselves from thinking of culture in terms of opera-house culture and to resist reducing "meaning to . . . dogma, and certainty" (*Invention*, p. 30). The inability to do this forces one to choose between the meanings of one's own culture and those of the subject culture, or, as some would suppose, to choose between science and superstition. A science of this sort, however, would be one that assumes itself to be based on "fact"; it would be blind to the cultural constitution of facts. Choosing the latter would place the anthropologist in a position of complete relativity, a choice which Wagner seems eager to avoid, but choosing the former would mean that the subject culture would be relative to the anthropologist's own—all studies of other people would tend to become far too exotic.

Wagner is critical of both "naturalistic empiricism" and "semantic anthropology." Naturalistic empiricism assumes that nature is not constituted by culture, but rather that nature is "real" or given. Differences in culture, then, are merely differences in ways that various peoples have attempted to deal with "reality," i.e., nature. The naturalistic empiricists

. . . accept, virtually as an article of faith, the dogma that the arbitrary analogies, divisions, and distinctions that we have imposed upon the phenomenal world as "nature" are somehow innate and basic to it. They believe that plants, animals, colors, kinship, skin diseases are in some way "real" and self-evident *things,* rather than ways of talking about things (*Invention,* p. 146).

The semantic anthropologist is suspect for similar reasons, but instead of assuming the reality of our own conceptions about nature to be a matter of fact, the semantic anthropologist assumes that definitions of things in the world are not only possible but perfectible. Thus this kind of anthropology also holds certain ontological commitments about things in the world.

Semantic anthropology relies on a common belief in the possibility and perfectibility of definitions — definitions grounded in collective assumptions about the innate and absolute existence of a single "real" phenomenal world—and it gives verbal denotation a deterministic priority over meaningful extension as a way of asserting the primacy of the "natural" order. It controls and produces "nature" through cultural means, insofar as a uni-

versal nature is the only phenomenal basis for the exactness of definitions, and the only phenomenal basis for eliciting "equivalent" definitions—translations—from its subjects.

Exact, denotative definitions of the kind that "ethnosemantic" anthropologists postulate and require are possible only to the extent that the "things" defined already exist as discrete entities (*Invention,* p. 146–7).

The only alternative, according to Wagner, is a self-aware anthropology which always understands culture in relation to another culture, neither of which can be conceived as primary. Culture is a "mediative term" and "anthropology is always necessarily mediative, whether it is aware of the implications or not; culture . . . is a way of describing others as we would describe ourselves, and vice versa" (*Invention,* p. 30). Anthropologists must affirm "the universality of mediation" (*Invention,* p. 30). Thus a self-aware anthropology

. . . would be based on an introspective understanding of its own operations and capabilities; it would develop the relationship between technique and subject matter into a means of drawing self-knowledge from the understanding

of others, and vice versa. Finally, it would make the selection and use of explanatory "models" and analogies from our own culture obvious and understandable as part of the simultaneous extension of our own understanding and penetration of other understandings. . . .

The study of culture is culture, and an anthropology that wishes to be aware, and to develop its sense of relative objectivity, must come to terms with this fact (*Invention*, p. 16).

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Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 482 pages.

This is one of the most interesting, original, and important books on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (henceforth, *CPR*) to appear in recent years. It also aspires to, and to some degree attains, a standard of scholarship rare in English language work on Kant.

Guyer's focus is on the genesis, function and manifold elaborations of the transcendental deduction of the categories in Kant's thought. Although influenced by, among others, Man-

fred Baum and especially the Dieter Henrich of *Identität und Objektivität*, he breaks significant new ground in our understanding of the deduction. His principal thesis is that the original, and only practicable, transcendental deduction of the categories is not represented by the arguments of the sections of the *CPR* that currently bear this title, but is rather to be found in the Analytic of Principles, and specifically the Analogies of Experience and the Refutation of Idealism. To support this contention, he begins by tracing the development of Kant's thought from the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 to the first edition of the *CPR* in 1781. Relying particularly on handwritten notes, Guyer attempts to show that during this time Kant hovered between two fundamentally different "models of the mind," (p. 69) or "metaphysical pictures of the relation between mind and reality" (p. 55). According to the first, the mind is endowed with the "ability to impose its rules on a pliable or formless material, or at the very least on a material any intrinsic form of which is inaccessible to the mind and can be replaced by a form of the mind's own making" (p. 55). This *imposition* model of the mind is contrasted