Attitudes, Objects, and Norms: Replies to Drucker, Schleifer McCormick, and Richard

David Hunter
Philosophy Department
Toronto Metropolitan University
David.hunter@torontomu.ca

I am extremely grateful for the very thoughtful and stimulating comments by Daniel Drucker, Miriam Schleifer McCormick[1], and Mark Richard, and for the close attention they gave my book (Hunter 2022). Drucker's focus is on the nature of belief itself, and on my view that believing is being in a certain rational position. Most of Richard's focus is on the individuation of belief and on my view that the objects of belief are possibilities. He ends with some comments about the normativity of belief, which is the primary focus of Schleifer's comments. But they both also question my view that believing is not a representational state. Since these are the main topics and themes in my book, I thank them for showing me what I need to clarify and where I need to elaborate. I can't answer every question and address every criticism, but I hope that what follows partially repays them for the work they did in studying my book.

1. Daniel Drucker argues that my view of believing does not generalise to certain other attitudes, in particular to fearing and hoping. But it should, he thinks, because believing, fearing and hoping are, he says, species of a single genus, and so should have a shared common core. His discussion is rich and nuanced and I can't address every bit of it. But I think I want to reject the common core idea. Believing is not in the same genus as hoping and fearing. And I think Drucker's own discussion can help us see why.

[1] Miriam asked that I refer to her in what follows using the name "Schleifer."

Here is my thought, put as a slogan: while fearing and hoping are responses to reasons, believing is having reasons to respond to. Believing is not an attitude to the world, at least not in the ways that fearing, hoping, admiring, resenting and the rest are attitudes to it. Believing, and even more so knowing, is rather what makes having such an attitude to the world possible at all. In believing one is right or wrong and this, as Frege put it, is what "secures an environment for oneself." (Frege 1956, 306) Frege's remark can seem puzzling because in one sense one is born into an environment. Having an environment is not a cognitive achievement. But having an environment to respond to rationally—having reasons—*is* a cognitive achievement. It comes in the step by which one exposes oneself to being wrong. And that step is believing. In that sense, believing is having an environment for oneself. In my book, I tried to put this by saying that believing is being in a *position* to do, think, and feel things in light of a possibility whose obtaining would make one right. Drucker says it would be good to better understand what I mean by "in a position" and "in the light of". Because Schleifer also questions those ideas, I will start with that.

The idea that believing is 'being in a position' was meant to reveal an alternative to the more standard view that believing is a disposition. All can agree that knowing and believing make a difference to what a person can do. When a person knows that P they can act on that fact. Belief is more complex because one can believe something without knowing it, either because one lacks evidence or because one is mistaken. In the book, I said that a person who merely believes that P can act in light of the possibility that P. But how are we to understand the 'can' in these claims? A standard view is that to know that P is to be capable of acting in light of it while merely believing that P is to be disposed to act in light of it. Acting in the knowledge that P would be exercising that capacity while acting in the mere belief that P would be manifesting

that disposition. My use of "position", and the analogy with spatial position, was meant to show what I think is wrong in that standard view and to reveal an alternative.

The idea that beliefs are dispositions is attractive for at least two reasons. Most think that believing contrasts with the things that go on in our streams of consciousness, things like pains and tickles. Unlike a pain, believing is not an event or a happening, it is not something that occurs. And it is not a conscious matter. Believing has no phenomenological feel. Some drew this contrast by saying that while conscious phenomena are occurrent, believing is dispositional. But that is a bad way to draw the contrast. For a state can be non-occurrent and also not dispositional. The spatial analogy can help us see this. Being in Toronto is not an occurrent state, but nor is it dispositional. It is a non-occurrent but categorical state. Occurrent contrasts with non-occurrent, whereas dispositional contrasts with categorical. So the fact that believing is not occurrent is no reason to think it is dispositional.

But the idea that beliefs are dispositions is attractive for a second reason. Some think that one can act in light of what one believes only if the belief plays a causal role in generating it. On this view, beliefs are causes or causal properties. Thinking of beliefs as dispositions, akin to fragility and electrical charge, fits neatly with this account. In the book I argue that belief properties are not causes and not causal properties. I won't rehearse those arguments. But here too the spatial analogy is suggestive. My being in Toronto makes some things possible for me and rules out others. I can visit my favourite coffee shop and run along Lake Ontario. Those are possibilities for me so long as I am in Toronto. Swimming in the Atlantic and crossing the Golden Gate Bridge are not possible for me so long as I am in Toronto. But being in Toronto is not a disposition or a capacity, and being in Toronto is not being disposed to visit my favourite coffee shop, even though it makes that visit possible. We can say the same about believing. My

believing that P can make it possible for me to act in light of it, and so can make a difference to what I can do, without my believing that P playing a role in generating that action.

Drucker says that a person can act in light of a reason only if the reason "partly determines" the action. But what does this mean? My being in Toronto limits what I can do. Does this mean it partly determines what I do, even if it does not make what I do inevitable? What a person believes limits what it would be reasonable for them to do, by settling what reasons they have. What would it be for a person's reasons to "determine" their action? If this just means that the person acted on a reason they had, then I don't object. But if the idea is that the reason (or perhaps their belief in it?) partly caused the action, or partly caused the person to act, then I disagree, for the reasons I detail in the book.

On my view, acting in the light of how things are or might have been is not a matter of being caused to act. The book does not offer an alternative account of the springs of rational action, of how a person acts in light of how things are. This may sound like a cheat, but I'm not sure I understand well enough what such an account is meant to explain. On most weekends I suspect that understanding freedom is beyond our theoretical comprehension. In any event, one can reject a causal view of the springs of rational action, and deny that believing is a disposition, without offering a detailed alternative.[2] But considering Drucker's reasons for thinking that believing is in the same genus as fearing and hoping can be instructive.

My view is that believing is being positioned to do, think and feel things in light of how things are or might have been. Drucker argues that this account cannot generalise to other attitudes, in particular to hoping and fearing. He says that this is a difficulty for my view since

[2] In (Hunter forthcoming) I offer a new argument against the dispositional view. It turns on the fact that reasons are personal in a way that beliefs are not. The dispositional view, I argue, conflicts with this.

believing, hoping and fearing are species of a single genus. But Drucker's own discussion of what he considers similarities shows that they are not. (He also says that fear involves an affect, which if true would make fear an occurrent thing unlike belief.) Drucker identifies four alleged similarities. One is that we express these attitude in language. I won't discuss that here. Another is that all have what he calls 'original aboutness'. I take it he means that they are, in some sense, representational states. I will return to that in the final section.

A third similarity, he says, is that one can reason to all the attitudes, including beliefs, hopes and fears. (In fact, he says we can reason *only* to an attitude, which will surprise those who think we can reason our way to action.) But, as Drucker notes, we can't reason *from* fears and hopes. I am not sure why he does not consider this to be a fundamental asymmetry. Of course one can reason from the fact that one has some fear, hope, or belief. But there is no form of reasoning where fear or hope is the required attitude to one of the premises. And while it is true that one can reason to a belief, such reasoning presupposes belief. One must already have reasons in view in order for any reasoning to be possible. Believing just is having reasons in view, being in position to reason from them. Fear and hope are responses to the reasons one has in view, or anyway the reasons one thinks one has in view. They are not always a *product* of reasoning, but they are impossible unless one has reasons in view. They are impossible without belief. It seems to me this difference between belief, on the one hand, and fear and hope on the other would make them strange genus-fellows.

The fourth alleged similarity Drucker points to is related to this. Each attitude has an internal standard for rationality, Drucker says. "[F]for each type of attitude A, there's some property F-ness such that, necessarily, if S knows that x is F , then S can reasonably bear A to x based on that knowledge." In the case of fear, for instance, the relevant property might be *being*

dangerous. If a person knows that the snake is dangerous, then (according to Drucker) her fearing it can be reasonable if based on the known-to-her fact that it is dangerous. Let's assume that something analogous is true of hope, admiration, resentment, and the like. Is it true of belief?

Drucker says that the relevant property for belief is being true. The idea, I take it, is that if a person knows that a certain proposition is true, then her believing that proposition can be reasonable if based on the known-to-her fact that it is true. This can't be right, though. The fact that a proposition is true cannot be one's basis for believing it. If one does not believe that P, one cannot make one's way to it starting from knowledge that P, since knowledge that P already requires belief that P. But the point is a deeper one about reasons. Something is a reason to believe, say, that the snake is dangerous only if it is evidence that the snake is dangerous. But the fact that it is dangerous is not evidence that it is dangerous. Perhaps Drucker would reply that the relevant property, in the case of belief, is that the proposition is well-supported by evidence, not that it is true. But the same problem recurs. If I don't believe that P, I can't make my way to it starting from knowledge that P is well-supported by evidence, since if I know this then I already believe that P. The standard for reasonable belief is very unlike the standard Drucker says is true of reasonable fear, hope, admiration and the rest. Again, strange genus-fellows.

Drucker ends his paper by discussing another attitude which he says my view should extend to but doesn't. The attitude is that of suspecting that P. Drucker claims that suspecting that P is importantly like believing that P, but that it lacks the common core in my account of belief, since a person can suspect that P without being in position to do, think and feel things in light of the possibility that P. Earlier, I argued that the attitudes of fearing and hoping are fundamentally unlike belief. Here, though, I agree with Drucker that suspecting and believing are fundamentally similar. But I think my account extends naturally to it. For suspecting is a form of belief. To

suspect that P is to believe that P is more likely than not. The more likely one believes it to be, the stronger the suspicion. The likelihood of a certain possibility's obtaining is a contingent matter and can change over time. (I discuss this in Chapter 5, which is influenced by (White 1975)) As the charges pile up, the possibility that Trump is bound for jail becomes more likely. It is more likely now than it was this time last year. Certain things might happen that would make it inevitable, but others might rule it out altogether. Still, I suspect he is bound for jail. In general, if one believes that it is likely that P then one is in position to do, think, and feel things in light of its being likely that P. My account extends neatly to this case.

2. Mark Richard argues that my account of the objects of belief is too restrictive. In the book, I develop the view that the objects of belief are possibilities, ways things are or could have been, a view associated with Robert Stalnaker but with roots in Wittgenstein's early work. I don't offer an account of what possibilities there are or of what explains this. My interest is in seeing how far we can get in understanding belief if we start with a notion of possibility that is not itself defined in terms of belief.

In the book, I argue that a counterexample to this coarse-grained view would have to take a certain shape. It would have to be a case where two people agree on which possibilities obtain and yet differ in their beliefs, or where a person's beliefs changed without a change in what possibilities they took to obtain. Only such a case—what I call a 'pure case'—would show that there are more belief properties than there are possibilities. As a methodological matter, this is not a controversial demand. In the book I argue that the standard stories advanced against the coarse-grained view are not pure cases and so are not counterexamples to it, though those cases do teach us an important lesson, to which I return in a moment.

In his comments, Richard does not offer a pure case. Instead, he says that he agrees with me that the objects of belief are possibilities, but thinks there are more possibilities than my view allows. In particular, there are what he calls epistemic possibilities, and these, he says, are possible objects of belief. He says that when a person mistakenly believes, say, that George Eliot is not Mary Evans, then their belief has an epistemic possibility as its object. Now, if an epistemic possibility were a real possibility, then my view could accept them, since my view says nothing about what possibilities there are. But I think the better way to understand Richard's criticism is that he thinks the person in the George Eliot case has a belief whose object is not a real possibility at all, and that this makes the case a counterexample to my coarse-grained account.

Richard sketches the George Eliot case, but does not argue that it is a pure case. I am not sure how he'd develop the details, but a natural way to tell the story reveals that it is not. Suppose Jane is the protagonist and tells us that Eliot is not Evans. And she does this using the English sentence "Eliot is not Evans." For this to be a pure case it would have to be that she could change her mind about that without changing her mind about any contingently obtaining possibility (or that someone could disagree with her about it without disagreeing with her about any contingent matter). That would show that there is more to believe than there are contingent possibilities. But this is not plausibly the case here. Suppose Jane does change her mind, and tells us that she was mistaken and that, after all, Eliot is Evans. Before she changed her mind, Jane believed that the names "Eliot" and "Evans" did not co-refer, but after the change of mind she believes they do, and this is a change in her contingent beliefs. This is enough to show that Richard's story (as I developed it anyway) is not a counterexample to my coarse-grained view.

The point is not that what Jane expressed in telling us that Eliot is not Evans is a belief about words. Far from it. Jane changed her mind, not just about how her language works, but about how many objects there are in the world. She thought there were two with their own names and life histories where, after she figures things out, she sees that there was just one. Richard's example is ingenious—and fun—because Jane's mistakes and confusions are so rich. Part of the history she thought true of one of the original two people in the world as she took it to be is actually true of Jane Austen. But I don't see that this richness introduces anything new. So I will stick with a simpler version.

In the book I say that while cases like Jane's are not counter-examples to the coarse-grained view, they do teach us an important lesson about belief. They show that a person can suffer a kind of cognitive illusion, where it seems to them they have got hold of a possibility when in fact they have not. This is not unlike cases of visual illusions. Driving on the highway, Jane thinks she sees a puddle up ahead, but it is just the familiar illusion. She does see the road and the other cars and the hot sun. Her illusion is accompanied by veridical perception, which can make the illusion persistent. Something analogous is true with cognitive illusions. They involve believing a real possibility, one that is general in a certain way. Jane believed that there are two people with certain names and life histories. In believing that, she had got hold of a way things could have been, a real if relatively general possibility, though it is one that does not obtain. In the book I argue that recognising the possibility of cognitive illusions helps us to see how Jane's case essentially involves a disorder, but I won't go into the details. (I also argue that the possibility of such illusions is one price we pay for the objectivity of belief. As I see it, any account of belief will have to acknowledge it.)

That possibility that Jane grasped is relatively general in that for it to obtain, another possibility must obtain, one concerning particular individuals with those names and histories. That second possibility would witness the general one. (The term 'witness' is from Stalnaker's discussion of mere possibilities in (Stalnaker 2012)) The idea of witnessing is a familiar one, even if the term is not. The possibility that *someone* is at the bus stop can obtain, but only if a more specific possibility does, for example that *Jane* is at the bus stop or that *Simon* is at the bus stop or etc. One can correctly believe that *someone* is there but mistakenly believe it is Jane. But if one mistakenly believe that someone is there, that will be because no (relatively more) specific possibility witnessed that general one.

Richard says that an epistemic possibility is "a state of affairs when it is apprehended, grasped, or thought about in a particular way." His view is rich and thoughtful, and I can't do justice to all its details. But what I have said about general possibilities and witnesses might fit this definition. In believing that general possibility to obtain, Jane was committed to the obtaining of a witness for it. As it happens, she did not get hold of one. (For simplicity, I am assuming there are not two people who could have been such as to witness it.) That's what makes the case an illusion. The objects of Jane's beliefs, in the story as I have told it, are all real possibilities. And if my suggestion is right, we can understand Richard's idea that there are different ways to 'apprehend' a possibility in terms of the witnessing relation between possibilities. I'm not convinced we need to add epistemic possibilities. I take it that, in the case of visual illusion, we wouldn't need to say that Jane did in fact see a puddle, only it was an epistemic one. There are no epistemic puddles. Why think there are epistemic possibilities?

3. Richard and Schleifer object to some of what I say in the book about the ethics of belief. I argued that belief properties are not goodness-fixing, in the sense that no case of believing something can be a better or worse case of believing it than any other. In this way, belief properties contrast with the properties of being a chair or a soccer coach, since some chairs are better chairs than other and some soccer coaches are better soccer coaches than others. (My views on goodness are indebted to Judith Jarvis Thomson, especially (Thomson 2008).) I argued that this was true of beliefs because belief properties are qualities and not sortal properties. I then argued that any norms governing belief must have a source somewhere else than in the nature of belief itself and I discussed one possible source.

Richard and Schleifer question whether belief properties are not goodness-fixing. Richard asks whether every goodness-fixing property must provide "a scale which determines how things of the kind could be made better or worse." His example involves (I think) student assignments graded Pass/Fail instead of with a range from A+ to F. But surely the instructor could explain to a student how their failed assignment could have been made better. He also says if "a belief that p violates a norm of correctness because p is false, the thing to do is not to 'improve' it, but to get rid of it and take on a belief in not-p." I will turn in a moment to when a person ought to believe something, and so when they ought to get rid of something they believe. The book contains a developed view on this. But the claim at issue is whether one case of believing something can be a better or worse case of believing it than any other. I don't see how what Richard says touches this.

What Richard says a bit later misses the mark for a related reason.

> A person's belief**s** (note the plural) constitute a multifaceted representation of their environment, one which is continually changing as the believer acquires new

> beliefs and loses older ones. We can –we do –compare different states of a person's representations of their environment. It makes perfect sense to say that one belief state (*qua* thing which involves a multifaceted representation of the world) is better or worse than another, with the measure of goodness being one or another measure of how accurate **all told** the representation is.

It is certainly true that one theory about the world can be better than another, more accurate, more elegant, simpler, or etc. Sometimes we use the word "belief" to refer to what a person believes and not to their state of believing it. (Richard bolds the plural in "belief**s**" to draw attention to this.) A person can believe a bad theory, but that does not make their believing of it a bad believing of it. I own some bad records, but this does not make my owning of them bad ownings. There is no such thing as one owning of a record being a better or worse owning of it than any other.

Schleifer raises a related criticism. In the book, I develop the idea that believing is not a goodness-fixing property through that analogy with owning. Schleifer questions it.

> But isn't one who is better at preserving and organizing also better at owning? I know I say to myself: "Man I shouldn't own any earrings because I always lose them." Similarly, by being more careful, and reflective in inferences drawn, in making up one's mind it seems one thereby is a better believer.

One can certainly be good or bad, better or worse, at caring for or keeping track of one's earrings. Caring for and keeping track of things are actions or activities, and they are goodness-fixing ones. But owning is not an activity. It is not the sort of thing one can be better or worse at. And the same is true for believing. But one person can be better than another at tending to their

conception of the world, looking for mistakes and confusions. They can be better at critical thinking. But this is an activity, and believing is not.

A bit later, Schleifer says this.

> Hunter's account makes no mention of intellectual virtues or the recognition of mutual dependence on each other as believers. For him such talk exhibits a fundamental confusion since being a virtuous believer would be akin to being a virtuous "tall." Yet, our current political climate seems to be revealing that certain doxastic practices can be disastrous and it seems that these can be articulated independently of any particular sortal an individual may fall under.

I'm not sure why she thinks I consider it a confusion to believe in intellectual virtues or to value reasonable doxastic practices. It is true that I don't offer an account of good inquiry. But in footnote 20 I say that "I don't deny that there are intellectual virtues and defects" and in footnote 24 I say "It is a bad thing to be hasty or stubborn, since a good person is neither. But this a matter of one's critical thinking skills and dispositions, not so much a matter of what a person believes." I think what I say in the book about how some sortals are goodness-fixing ones would be a natural fit for a study of what makes someone good at inquiry. But the book under review is about believing, not about inquiry.

In the book, I argue that what a person ought to believe depends on what they ought to know to be good in their roles and positions. A streetcar driver ought to know her route. A parent ought to know about child nutrition and health. A citizen ought to know basic facts about their country's history and government. It seems to me that this is a more demanding view about what a person ought to believe than standard ones that say that what a person ought to believe is fixed by the evidence they happen to have. On my view people ought to collect evidence if that is

needed to learn the things they ought to know. Our cognitive duties extend far beyond just maintaining the set of beliefs we currently find ourselves with. But this is hard to appreciate, it seems to me, so long as we think that there are norms for belief grounded in the nature of belief itself.

4. Both Richard and Schleifer also question my view that believing is not representational. I take it that Drucker does too, since he says beliefs have an 'original aboutness'. In the book I argue that a person's believing something is not true or false. If the objects of belief are propositions, then what a person believes can be true or false. But it wouldn't follow from this that their believing it is true or false. I might own a funny book, but this doesn't make my owning funny. Richard, Schleifer (and perhaps Drucker) are not persuaded.

Schleifer notes that my aim in the book is to argue that belief states are not true or false and that I then conclude that believing is not representational. She says this.

> This idea suggests that all representations can have true values. But this cannot be right; not all representations are propositional. Of course this may depend on what counts as a proposition, and Hunter spends a lot of time discussing their nature. If an image can be a proposition then perhaps I would agree that all representations have propositional content. But does it make sense to say of a picture that it is true or false? My point is that even if Hunter is right that beliefs cannot be true or false, or that it is misguided to view them as "aiming at truth" this does not thereby show they are not representational.

I agree that pictures and maps and photographs are representations and that it seems strange to think of them as true. But I don't see how this helps us understand how believing might be

representational. Pictures, maps and photographs are objects, they are not states. The use of "beliefs" confuses things, it seems to me, because it lets us slide between what a person believes—the object of their belief—and their believing it. On standard views, propositions are the object of belief and they are by their very nature representational. But propositions are objects, just like pictures, maps and photographs. I might own an accurate map, but that doesn't make my owning of it accurate. (The number 151 is prime but weighing 151 pounds is not prime.) If a theorist wants to say that believing a true proposition makes the believing true then they need to tell us what they mean by that and why we should speak that way.

Richard says this.

> Someone who says [that believing is representational] thinks that: where there is a belief in p, there is in the neighborhood a representation of p.

Richard might be right that theorists who say that beliefs are true just mean that there is a representation somewhere in the neighborhood. That is compatible with my view that belief states are not themselves representations. But there are no representations on my view of belief. As I see it, a person is right or wrong in believing what they do. The objects of belief are possibilities, ways thing could have been. Possibilities are not true or false, they are not representations. We could *say* that a possibility is a kind of representation, but then we'd have to say that every case of a disposition—for example, the fragility of the vase on my desk—involves a representation, since a disposition involves possibility. The idea that belief is distinctively representational would be lost.

As Richard notes, in the book I allow that neurologists and cognitive scientists studying the biological bases of belief might posit representations. They might discover that whenever a person believes something there are representations inside their brain. That is an empirical matter

and I am happy to leave that to them. It would be a different matter, though, to show that believing *requires* representations. We would need a reason to think that. Richard offers one in the next bit of that passage I quoted.

> …furthermore, in explaining why the belief has the content it has –that is, in explaining why the belief is the belief that p as opposed to the belief that q –the fact that the belief involves the representation is to be invoked.

This brings us back to the idea from Schleifer that belief states might be in relevant ways like images or pictures. I take it that a picture has its representational properties contingently. Something explains how a certain painting came to be a portrait of Queen Elizabeth. Had things been different, that very painting would have been a portrait of Queen Anne or of a horse. Something must explain how that painting came by what Drucker called its aboutness properties. According to Richard, something must likewise explain how a person's believing that P came by its aboutness properties, it must explain why that believing that p is not a believing that q. Richard does not say why that explanation must invoke a representation. But in any event, I think we should reject the idea that the explanation he seeks is needed.

It is mostly contingent that a person believes the things she does. (In the book I argue that a person must believe in her own existence, if she believes anything; but set that aside.) Similarly, it is contingent that a person owns the records she does, and something explains why Janes owns *Blonde on Blonde*. Suppose Jane believes that Trump is bound for jail. It is contingent that she believes that and something explains why she does. But what Richard has in mind is that it is also contingent that Jane's believing that Trump is bound for jail is a believing that Trump is bound for jail. That very believing, he implies, might have been a believing that Biden is bound for victory, and so something must explain why it is not. But that can't be right.

Belief properties are individuated by their object. The property of believing that Trump is bound for jail could not have been the property of believing that Biden is bound for victory. So there is no such thing as explaining why it is not. Likewise, there is no such thing as explaining why Jane's owning of *Blonde on Blonde* is not an owning of *American Beauty*, or of my red Subaru.

In my reply to Drucker I said that believing differs fundamentally from attitudes such as fear and hope. Whereas fear and hope are responses to reasons, to the ways things are, believing is having (potential) reasons to respond to. Drucker's comments helped me see that my image of believing as being in position to do, think, and feel things in light of a possibility can mark this difference. But because it is easy to think of believing as representational, it is easy to think of it as an attitude to the world. And one might then think that like other attitudes it has an internal normative standard, and what else could that be but truth. But in seeing that believing is not an attitude to the world but is instead having "an environment for oneself" that one can respond to, we can see an alternative source for epistemic norms. There are things a person ought to believe because there are reasons she ought to have in view. Our cognitive requirements derive not from what it is to believe, but from what there *is* to believe, from the reasons there are.

References

Frege, Gottlob. 1956. 'The Thought: a Logical Inquiry'. *Mind,* 65(259), 289-311.

Hunter, D. 2022. *On Believing: being right in a world of possibilities.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hunter, D. Forthcoming. 'On the Nature of Believing', in Schwitzgebel, E. and Jong, J. (eds.), *What is Belief*?. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stalnaker, Robert. 2012. *Mere Possibilities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 2008. *Normativity*. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

White, Alan. 1975. *Modal Thinking.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.