Luck, fate, and fortune: the tychic properties

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To cite this article: Marcus William Hunt (01 Apr 2024): Luck, fate, and fortune: the tychic properties, Philosophical Explorations, DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2024.2335221

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2024.2335221

Published online: 01 Apr 2024.
ABSTRACT
The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus of properties, the tychic, alert an agent to occasions on which the external world cooperates with or frustrates their goal-achievement. An agent’s sphere of competence is the set of goals that it is possible for them to reliably achieve. Luck concerns occasions on which there is a mismatch between attempt and result; in bad luck the external world thwarts goal-achievement within the agent’s sphere of competence, in good luck the external world assists goal-achievement beyond the agent’s sphere of competence. Fateful events are those where, more passively, the agent finds the external world achieving or frustrating their goals. Fortune concerns the contraction and expansion of the agent’s sphere of competence. Eight reasons are given for accepting the account; its theoretical virtues and various things it explains. Lastly, three objections are answered; that the tychic properties relate to well-being rather than agency, that there are alternative theories of fortune available in the contemporary literature, that the account draws arbitrary distinctions between synonyms.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 16 January 2023
Accepted 8 March 2024

KEYWORDS
Agency; Aristotle; fate; fortune; luck; philosophy of action

1. Introduction
Most people attribute some life-events to fate (Banerjee and Bloom 2014). From antiquity, we find Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic accounts of fate (Aphrodisias 1983; Bobzein 1998; Boeot 1970). The little contemporary philosophical attention paid to fate conceives it as a narrative device that we superimpose on life-events (Gelven 1992; Solomon 2003). It seems fair to surmise that most contemporary philosophers are anti-realists about fate – fate does not exist, no event is fateful – because they are ‘naturalists’ who take fate to be ‘supernatural’.

Similarly, many ‘think that luck is indeed a cause, but one inscrutable to human thought, because it is divine or supernatural’ (Aristotle 1970, 196b 5). Despite such associations, contemporary philosophers have paid considerable attention to luck, due to the role that it plays in our moral and epistemic practices (Engel 2011; Latus 2001). These philosophers do not depart from naturalism, but nevertheless offer realist theories of luck. Luck is not a mysterious causal-efficient force, but an evaluative
property. Luck exists and some events are lucky, just as goodness exists and some events are good (or beautiful, humorous, irritating, inscrutable, etc.). This paper offers an account, in such a vein, of luck, fate, and fortune. The account draws upon some loosely Aristotelian metaphysical assumptions, but it is not an attempt to excavate Aristotle’s own views. I use ‘tychic’ as the genus term for these three properties, since the Greek *tyche* encompasses them all.1

In the following section I show that extant analyses of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species, making them unable to distinguish luck from other tychic properties. I then outline the idea of the sphere of competence. Using it, I give my account of the tychic generally, then luck, fate, and fortune specifically. Next, I give eight reasons for accepting the account. Lastly, I discuss three objections.

2. It’s not all luck

There are three main accounts of luck (Broncano-Berrocal 2016). The control account says that an event is lucky only if its occurrence is beyond the agent’s control (Broncano-Berrocal 2015). The modal account says that an event is lucky only if there are close possible worlds in which it fails to occur (Pritchard 2005). The probability account says that an event is lucky only if there is some probability of its non-occurrence, either relative to the agent’s epistemic situation (Steglich-Petersen 2010; Stoutenburg 2015; 2019) or objectively (McKinnon 2013; Rescher 2014). Standardly included in these accounts as a second necessary condition, jointly sufficient, is that to be lucky an event must be significant (having some bearing on well-being, value, action, etc.), either subjectively or objectively (Ballantyne 2012; Hill 2022).

Consider the following vignette, *Brother*:

After discussing their different preferences as to where to spend their vacation, a husband bows to his wife’s wishes and they travel to a faraway place. Before leaving, a neighbour asks the man to purchase some equipment that is sold only by a special shop in the vacation area. The man finds the shop and discovers that the sales person is his long lost brother from whom he was separated as a child. (Pepitone and Saffiotti 1997, 26)

This event, the husband meeting his long lost brother, satisfies the conditions for luck on all three accounts. The event is significant. Its occurrence was not within the control of the husband: if he was trying to discover his long lost brother, his success was not up to him. The event displays modal fragility: there are many close possible worlds in which it does not occur (e.g. if the neighbour did not ask the husband to purchase equipment, if he had been too busy to make the purchase). Both epistemically and objectively, there was some probability of the event’s non-occurrence.

I think that the event is lucky, but also fateful. If forced to attribute the event to either luck or fate, I would attribute it to fate. Though the event is lucky, it is an archetypal example of the fateful. My response to this vignette is not idiosyncratic. In one study, subjects were offered this vignette and asked open-ended questions such as ‘What do you think happened?’ and ‘How would you interpret it?’ Researchers coded the answers. Among US undergraduates (n = 103), 17% attributed *Brother* to luck and 41% attributed it to fate. Among Indian undergraduates (n = 156), 17% attributed luck and 52% attributed fate (Pepitone and Saffiotti 1997, 30, 33). In a similar study, subjects
were presented with 6 ‘non-material beliefs’ (fate, luck, God, reward, punishment, chance) and asked which was the best explanation of Brother. Among Dutch adults \( (n = 87) \), 7% attributed Brother to luck and 39% to fate. Among members of a Roman Catholic youth group in Italy \( (n = 41) \), 2% attributed luck and 39% fate. Among members of a communist youth group in Italy \( (n = 41) \), 3% attributed luck and 33% fate (DeRidder et al. 1999, 438–440).²

Judgments about this vignette indicate that extant accounts of luck are incomplete. Luck and fate (and fortune) seem to be distinct but closely related concepts, species of a genus. Extant accounts of luck say nothing about that genus. Granting that one of the extant accounts of luck picks out all the lucky events and no non-lucky events, it does not tell us how to distinguish lucky events from fateful events, nor locate luck in its wider theoretical context.

3. The sphere of competence

My consciousness is pervaded by feelings about the goals, types and tokens, that I can reliably achieve, the actions that I can reliably complete. There are some things that I feel sure I can do. These feelings constitute my subjective sphere of competence, and they correspond (more or less accurately) to my objective sphere of competence; the set of goals that I can in fact reliably achieve, the actions that I can in fact reliably complete.³

As examples of actions at the core of my sphere of competence; I can blow out the candle, I can pick up my glasses. Radiating out from this core are other actions that I feel I can, if not certainly, then at least very probably, complete: I can climb the ladder, I can hang the picture-frame. Further out, it seems quite doubtful that I could complete some action: perhaps I can push the loaded filing-cabinet across the room. Eventually, I pass beyond my sphere of competence, after which it seems quite unlikely, or definitely, could not complete some action: I cannot replace the decking, I cannot throw the discus 100 ft.

Though the spherical metaphor may suggest a definite boundary with homogeneity on either side, I emphasize that the marginal, penumbral, ambiguous, cases are most of the cases. An agent’s sphere of competence is a subset of a larger sphere of concern, the set of events that are significant for them, their teleological terrain in the widest sense. For example, whether there will be a recession is outside my sphere of competence but inside my sphere of concern, whether a small meteor hits Neptune is outside both.

4. The tychic

Outside an agent’s sphere of competence, too many factors intrude between initiating an action and reliably completing it. The external world, whether other agents (animal, human, social), or the indifference and unmalleability of the physical world, limit and disrupt agency. As Georg Simmel puts it:

We are exposed to and integrated into the motions of the cosmos, and yet, on the other hand, we perceive and guide our individual existence from its own centre as responsible for itself and in some way as a self-enclosed form. (Simmel 2007, 81)
Tychic properties depend on this dual perspective, between oneself as agent and oneself as patient of the world. Animals and gods are said not to be subject to tychic properties (Aristotle 1970, 197b 7; Simmel 2007, 80), the former as lacking a consciousness of themselves as agents, the latter as not being constrained and effected by an external world. Tychic properties draw the agent’s attention to the interplay between their own activity and the activities of the external world. Tychic properties alert the agent to cases in which the external world frustrates or cooperates in (syn energeia – ‘together activity’) the completion of their actions. That the external world can frustrate our actions is hopefully clear enough, but that it can cooperate in our actions may seem mysterious. I state the loosely Aristotelian assumptions that illuminate this possibility.

Form and matter are a conceptual couple. Form is goal (Aristotle 1991a, 1023a 32); matter that which is organized toward it. Form is pattern (Aristotle 1991a, 1013a 26); matter that which is patterned. Form is actuality (Aristotle 1991a, 1037a 28), matter the potential to receive actuality. For example, pieces of wood receive a new kind of being, become parts of the chair, by being patterned after the form of the chair, toward the goal that defines the chair. Actions fit within this scheme. Actions aim at goals (Aristotle 1991b, 1248b 20; 1991c, 1094a 1), patterning mere behaviour toward a goal, thereby bestowing a new kind of being upon that behaviour. For example, the activities of my lungs and legs become parts of a new whole, the action ‘running a race’, when they cooperate toward the goal that defines race-running. In the case of artefacts and organisms, all and only that matter which is patterned toward the goal, which is enformed by it, is part of the being. For example, the blu tack holding my printer’s wiring together is part of my printer, the splinter in my finger is not part of my finger. Likewise, in the case of actions, all and only that matter patterned toward the goal is part of the acting being, the agent.

Let’s reflect further on how this last claim invites the possibility of cooperation with the external world, including the possibility of this happening by accident. Consider the action of lecturing. Though a lone individual can behave in the same way as a lecturer – speak the same words aloud – a lone individual cannot lecture. Lecturing requires the participation of others as students, since it aims at the goal of transmitting knowledge. Here, the set of action-types that an individual can engage in is expanded by the cooperation of others. Lecturer and student are loci in which the goal of lecturing is expressed, in which this goal is present as form in matter. The participants cooperate toward the same goal, so, whilst their behaviours vary – one speaks aloud, the other listens – they are partners in the same action. The participants become parts of an agent that transcends each of them considered in isolation – the class acts through lecturer and students, e.g. ‘the class’ discussion Plato.

Consider the action of training a dog. The dog cooperates in an action-type that dogs, left to their own devices, cannot engage in. Though the dog may be unable to fully understand the goal that animates its trainer, cannot participate in that goal in the way that rational minds can, the dog nevertheless becomes a locus in which that goal is expressed; its activity is directed toward, and explicable in terms of, that goal. Again, consider the lumberjack chopping wood with an axe. The motion of both is explicable in terms of the same goal. In such a case, it is as true to say ‘the axe chops the wood’ as that ‘the lumberjack chops the wood’. Again, consider sailing. It is true to say ‘the wind carried the boat back to harbor’, in that the sailor utilizes the wind to achieve a goal. In each of these cases, human and non-human activities are directed toward a goal, and so become parts of an action, and the things-active become parts of the same agent.
In the cases above, a human being intentionally, skilfully, makes the external world –
animals, artefacts, natural forces – participate in an action. Tychic properties occur in
those cases in which we find the external world participating in our actions even
without such intention,\(^4\) by accident, coincidence. Aristotle says the following in discuss-
ing *tyche*:

> Of things which come to be, some come to be for something, and some do not. Of the former,
some are in accordance with choice and some are not, but both are among things which are
for something ... Anything which might be done as an outcome of thought or nature is for
something. (Aristotle 1970, 196b 17–20)

These are cases where activities in the external world contribute to a valued outcome, are
patterned toward a goal, despite the absence of any rational superintention. For example,
a gust of wind catches my discus mid-air, carrying it to a distance I could never have
reached alone. This is a concatenation of activities that I do not intend or arrange, but
which helps me achieve my goal, and so is tychic. Luckily, the wind helps me win the
competition.

In my view, in these cases oneself and the relevant objects in the external world aggre-
gate into a temporary, ephemeral, agency. In ordinary cases of action, just one’s own body
and mind are the agent, the matter actualized toward a goal, but in tychic cases one is
sensible of being a fragment of a larger agent. In this respect, the experience of tychic
properties is similar to awareness of oneself as part of a social agent – a class, a riotous
mob, a family on a daytrip. As an analogy for understanding the agency that tychic prop-
erties alert us to, we might consider other examples of accidental, ‘emergent’, ‘organic’,
order, such as an ecosystem, a balance of power between states, or the development
of streets and squares in pre-modern cities. In these cases, we can recognize a pattern
and a goal that it tends to promote, and so a kind of agency, even though no rational
mind orchestrates them.

One might be an anti-realist about tychic properties, erecting a necessary condition on
agency that natural and accidental phenomena cannot meet. For one thing, perhaps
agency really requires the intention of the being whose goal grounds the putative
sharing of agency, that they skilfully recruit the other beings that will participate in the
action with them. It seems not. Suppose that you get into a fist-fight at the beach. Unex-
pectedly and without your solicitation, your friend throws sand in your opponent’s eyes.
Your friend has helped you win the fight, they have taken part in what you were doing.
For another thing, perhaps participating in an action, sharing in agency, requires that the
participant have some minimal teleological sensitivity, some capacity to self-orient
toward the goal in question (e.g. a capacity to intend, desire, or strive). In response, we
can point to how artefacts are used to pursue some goal toward which they are not them-
selves minimally teleologically sensitive – the hammer hammers even though it has no
desire to hammer. Again, in the case of artefacts we find that matter, in itself unoriented,
goalless, comes to participate in a goal – the marble of the statue becomes ordered
toward beauty. By analogy, then, in the case of action, activities that in themselves are
goalless, like gusts of wind, can participate toward a goal’s achievement. Again, to do X
by accident is, nevertheless, to do X.\(^5\)

In sum, the agent that completes an action just is every piece of matter actualized
toward a goal, from the intentions of rational minds, to the desires of rational or irrational
minds, to artefacts, to natural phenomena, whether cooperating by rational direction or accidentally. For example, it is the Russian state, its soldiers, their horses and weapons, the weather, and many deliberate and accidental agglomerations of these elements, that defeat the Napoleonic invasion.

I now turn to outlining the three tychic properties. In ordinary cases of action, cases in which tychic properties play no role, one completes actions inside one’s sphere of competence, and fails to complete actions outside one’s sphere of competence. In the accompanying diagrams, the origin of the line indicates the source of change and its destination indicates the location of the thing potentially changed, $\square$ indicates the realization of a goal and $X$ indicates the non-realization of a goal (Figure 1).

4.1. Luck

Here are some unlucky events: booking a transatlantic flight that departs on the day that the Icelandic volcano starts erupting, blowing out a tire on the way to the supermarket. In booking a flight or in driving to the supermarket, one attempts to achieve a goal that one can reliably achieve. By bad luck, the obstreperous external world frustrates the action’s completion. Unusually and surprisingly, a goal within one’s sphere of competence has not been achieved. Here are some examples of lucky events: to win the lottery, to get a strike the first time bowling. These are the sorts of goals that one cannot reliably achieve. In the case of good luck, the external world cooperates in the achievement of some goal beyond one’s sphere of competence. Luck alerts one to discrepancies between what one can reliably achieve and what one actually achieved on a particular occasion.

Lucky events do not typically lead to a change in one’s sphere of competence, subjective or objective, nor is luck about such change. Driving to the supermarket is still a goal I can reliably achieve, despite my past bad luck. That I won the lottery does not make me feel like winning the lottery is the type of goal I can reliably achieve in the future – indeed, the experience of good luck informs me that this is not the case (Figure 2).

4.2. Fate

In luck, the external world cooperates in the achievement of, or frustrates, an agent’s action. By contrast, one subject to fate has a goal within their sphere of
concern achieved or frustrated by the external world. The contrast between luck and fate is between active and passive. The one subject to luck is active, but finds their activity aided or thwarted. The one subject to fate is either entirely passive, buoyed along toward some significant event by the external world, or cooperates in what is being done to them, their own agency being a secondary factor. The lucky achievement of a goal is initiated by oneself, though its eventual completion or frustration takes place with the cooperation of the external world. By contrast, though it is because events are significant for me that events can be fateful, such events do not occur because of my agency, or my agency plays a secondary role in their occurrence. In these latter cases, one’s activity contributes to an outcome, a trajectory, already set in train by the external world; one cooperates in the external world’s activity, its driving toward some eventuality within one’s sphere of concern.

Here are some examples of the fateful: being born, dying, the collapse of civilization during one’s lifetime, getting tenure only for the department to be axed the following year, stumbling across a book highly relevant to your research at a junk-yard sale, contracting a debilitating illness. These are significant eventualities towards which circumstances drag us, eventualities that we may run toward or away from but cannot make closer or more distant.

Fateful events are significant events that we arrive at passively. Many discussions of fate counterpose it with freedom (May 1981, 95; Gelven 1992, 22; Kant 1997, 28:200; Tucker 1990, 233). In the same vein, psychological discussion of fate-attributeations associates them with having a high ‘external locus of control’ (Rotter 1966) – a sense of lacking control over life-events. Fateful events can be foreseen or unforeseen, modally fragile or robust, overwhelmingly likely or unlikely, inside or outside one’s sphere of competence. Since luck and fate are distinguished in terms of activity as against passivity, in terms of the success or failure of actions that we are engaged in as against events that happen to us, no event is both lucky and fateful in the same respect. However, a given event can be both lucky and fateful insofar as we are active in one respect and passive in another respect. For instance, if I am driving to the supermarket and die by being hit by an out-of-control oil tanker, this is bad luck *qua* disruption of active goal-pursuit, but fateful *qua* mortal being that must passively suffer death (Figure 3).
4.3 Fortune

Here are some examples of fortune and misfortune: to live in a war-torn era, to have an alcoholic parent, to attend a good school, to be born with a talent for music, to inherit from an estranged aunt. I suggest that the commonality here is that fortune concerns the size of the agent's sphere of competence, and especially changes in its size. To be in the fortunate condition is to be powerful and free, for many goods to be achievable for you, at your disposal. The unfortunate condition is to be agentially atrophied and cramped; for many important goals to be beyond your ability to reliably achieve. Fortunate events are those which expand the set of valuable goals within the agent's sphere of competence, unfortunate events those which shrink the agent's sphere of competence. Good fortune can be squandered, never made use of, but good fortune is itself good – part of our well-being is to have a wide variety of goals be achievable, even if not actually achieved.

Often, changes in fortune come about due to changes in the external world that lie beyond the agent's sphere of competence. So, some events are fortunate and lucky. For example, winning the lottery is lucky *qua* achieving a goal that one could not reliably achieve, fortunate *qua* enlarging the sphere of competence. In other cases, changes in fortune are achieved through reliable exercises of agency rather than by luck. By acting within one's sphere of competence, one slowly expands it; by working hard at school you improve your fortunes. The bounds of fortune help determine what is lucky or unlucky for a given individual: throwing the discus 100 ft would be very lucky for the less fortunate unathletic person, but not lucky for the more fortunate athletic person. An event can be both fortunate and fateful – e.g. being maimed by an unexploded WW2 bomb is a misfortune in that it diminishes one's sphere of competence, fateful in that it is an event that just befalls you. Glancing back to the vignette *Brother*, finding the long lost brother is fortunate for the husband to the extent that it puts new things of value within his reach; he can now do brotherly things. If we add to the vignette that the brothers turn out to despise each other in a way that precludes these goods, their meeting is not fortunate (Figure 4).6

5. Reasons to accept the sphere of competence account of luck, fate, and fortune

My argument for accepting the sphere of competence account of the tychic properties is that it is a good explanation; an explanation that enjoys a number of theoretical virtues (Keas 2018), and that explains a variety of things about its subject.
First, the account matches our intuitive judgments about which events are lucky, fateful, and fortunate – the virtue of evidential accuracy. I leave this claim to the reader’s scrutiny.

Second, the sphere of competence account has the virtues of explanatory breadth and depth; it explains these three properties at once, relates them together, and grounds them in something more fundamental. Extant accounts of luck, even if they do correctly pick out the lower-level properties on which luck supervenes (e.g. ‘significant’ + ‘modally fragile’), do not explain why it is that we attach this property to these lower-level properties, nor how luck relates to the nearby notions of fortune and fate.

Third, the account has an evolutionary story for itself, providing a degree of the virtue of causal adequacy. It is important for creatures to know whether they completed an action reliably (‘don’t swim in this current again, you got back to shore, but not by your own power’); whether the achievement or frustration of their goal happened without their agency (‘after a successful hunting expedition, you are set upon by lions and lose the carcass’); and to changes in the actions that they can reliably complete (‘now that your skin is pocked with disease, you won’t achieve the attention of high-value mates’). There is a plausible story about why human beings experience these evaluative properties at all, which extant accounts of luck do not provide.

Fourth, the account explains the significance condition typically placed on luck. Whether the agent finds some action completed or thwarted, or whether their goal is realized without their agency, or whether they find their capacity to reliably achieve goals diminished or improved, is naturally significant for them. Goals that are less significant for the agent will, below some margin, not be alerted to by the tychic properties. For example, that removing a stale cornflake from beneath the refrigerator is beyond my sphere of competence is not unfortunate. The account gives us a simple way of determining degrees of intensity of these properties – the further outside one’s sphere of competence, and the more significant the goal, the luckier one is to have achieved it.

Fifth, the account explains why luck, fate, and fortune can easily be conflated into one single property (cf. Porter 2022, 13). Each tychic property bears a subtly different relation to the sphere of competence, and a single event can exhibit more than one of them.

Sixth, the account predicts that we should find people making tychic attributions wherever we find people who experience themselves as agents whose agency may be

Figure 4. Misfortune and good fortune.
augmented or constrained by the external world. This means that such attributions should be near-universal across human cultures. Though the anthropological literature is fragmentary, this seems to be what we find. Notions of luck are found in traditional cultures from Africa (Gaibazzi and Gardini 2015) to Amazonia (Gow and Margiotti 2012) to Siberia (Hamayon 2012). Similarly, notions of fate are quite universal – found in traditional cultures from China (Perkins 2008) to Mesopotamia (Lawson 1992) to Scandinavia (Daly 2010, 74). The few cultures that (it has been suggested) lack a concept of luck are ones which do not distinguish the self and the external world so sharply, e.g. positing deterministic magical relations between human actions and natural events (Howell 2012, 136, 141–142). The account explains the modern tendency toward anti-realism about tychic properties: we tend to think that our sense of ourselves as agents can be explained away (Giddens 1990).

Seventh, the account helps explain the supernatural associations of the tychic properties. Luck, fate, and fortune are often conceived as independent intelligent agents. All of them have been personified as divinities, e.g. the three Moirai, the goddess Fortuna. Our language and feelings about them are infused with interpersonal connotations; that luck has been unfair, that fate has been cruel, that fortune has been generous. These associations are noted and denounced in the literature on luck (Rescher 2001, 172–177) but not explained. On my account, tychic properties arise when we find the external world cooperating with or frustrating our agency. Tychic feelings are inherently boundary dissolving, unsettling the consciousness of oneself as a neatly delimited agent by making one a part of many ephemeral agencies. So, we readily imagine the world of external causes as populated by rational agencies with goals of their own, that they conspire with us because our goals align with their goals. Again, in a run of good luck, one confuses one’s parthood in a succession of ephemeral agencies with the notion that one’s own agency has mysteriously seeped into the external world.

Eighth, the account suggests new lines of inquiry in the discussion of moral luck, giving it the theoretical virtue of fruitfulness. Philosophical accounts of luck are often motivated by the hope that they may cast light on whether there is such a thing as moral luck (Coffman 2007; Lackey 2008; Riggs 2014; Steglich-Petersen 2010), that is, whether the blameworthiness and other ethically salient properties of agents can be determined by luck. It has been argued that within the moral luck literature ‘luck’ is used as a term of art that stipulatively means ‘factors beyond an agent’s control’ (Hartman 2017, 24; 2019, 3; Anderson 2019), regardless of what the correct philosophical account of luck may be. My account highlights that events can be beyond or within an agent’s control in different senses, and that these different senses are accompanied by different evaluative properties. If these differences colour our ethical evaluations in different ways, then the discussion of moral luck will advance by attending to philosophical accounts of luck and the other tychic properties, rather than resting on a stipulative use of ‘luck’.

As a putative example of such colouration, suppose that H urgently needs to go to the hospital. An excellent driver, their friend E, fails to get H to the hospital on time due to E’s bad luck (e.g. unpredictably bad traffic). A poor driver, their friend P, fails to get H to the hospital on time due to P’s unfortunate condition (e.g. they cannot take react quickly enough to take advantage of gaps in the flow of traffic, are too anxious to drive fast). On the face of it, our ethical appraisals and reactions toward E and P are not identical. Perhaps we blame P more than E, since P’s failure is ascribable to P alone. Perhaps we
blame P less, since there is a certain display of good will in P’s having attempted something beyond their abilities. Again, suppose that H gets to the hospital on time. If driven by E, E’s success is due to their fortunate condition, if driven by P, P’s success is due to good luck. Again, our praise might differ in these cases. Perhaps P is praised less, as the success is only partially attributable to them, or perhaps E is praised less, as having done nothing that was, for them, extraordinary.

6. Objections answered

6.1. Your account of luck, fortune, and fate relates them all to agency. Aren’t they really to do with well-being? It’s unlucky to get hit by a meteorite because it harms you, not because it interrupts your walk down the street

I answer by following Aristotle in identifying being, well-being, and agency. For a human being to exist, and for them to exist more, to flourish, just is for them to engage in the human activity, which is rational activity (Aquinas 1947, ST I Q5 A1 co, Aristotle 1991c, 1172a 1–9) ‘faring well consists in doing well’ (Aristotle 1991a, 197a 40). It is through our agency, our movement toward goals, that events can be significant for us, good or bad for us. A non-agential being, a pure patient, not oriented toward any goods that it could achieve or fail to achieve, could not be assessed in terms of well-being. So, the objection makes a false dichotomy. To say that someone has been unlucky is to say something about their well-being, through the guise of their agency. Compare the case of the expert bomb-maker who (unintentionally) blows themselves up and the case of someone who spontaneously combusts whilst asleep. Though both are unlucky, the unluckiness of the former is more prominent since they are engaging in a particular intentional action, whereas the latter suffers a frustration of the background hum of teleological success involved in continued biological life – a ‘given’ that we (wrongly) tend not to view under the guise of agency.

6.2. The literature already contains accounts of fortune. Perhaps they are better?

An objection to the modal and probability theories of luck, made by Jennifer Lackey (Lackey 2008, 261), is that some events are lucky, even though there are no close possible worlds in which they do not occur, even though their occurrence is very likely. For instance, it’s unlucky for one’s community to be ravaged by plague. Yet, for the resident of Rome in the year 1347, the possible world in which their community is untouched by plague is distant, their community being ravaged by plague was very probable. To defend modal and probability theories, some draw a distinction between luck and fortune and say that such cases are cases of fortune (Coffman 2007, 392; Levy 2009, 495; Pritchard 2014, 610; Rescher 2001, 28). In the course of such responses, fortune has been characterized in four ways, which I now state and criticize.

The first way of distinguishing fortune from luck is to say that ‘fortunate events are events beyond our control that count in our favor, but unlike lucky events, they are not chancy or modally fragile’ (Broncano-Berrocal 2016 original italics). For instance, according to E.J. Coffman, ‘You can be fortunate with respect to an event whose occurrence was extremely likely, whereas an event is lucky for you only if there was a significant chance the event wouldn’t occur’ (Coffman 2007, 392 original italics).
One way of understanding this distinction is that fortunate events are modally robust—
that fortunate events are the significant events that happen across all nearby possible
worlds, or whose occurrence is very likely. On this view, fortune is the ‘opposite’ of luck vis-à-vis modality and probability. Counterexamples to this would be cases of fortune
that are modally fragile. There are such cases. It is a misfortune to be maimed by the unex-
ploded WW2 bomb, yet there are close possible worlds in which it does not happen, and
there was some probability of its non-occurrence.

Another way of understanding this distinction is that fortune is indifferent to modality
and probability— that fortune, unlike luck, is not to be characterized in terms of modality
and probability. On this view, lucky events are a subset of fortunate events; lucky events
are the modally fragile, improbable, subset of fortunate events. Yet, there are also coun-
terexamples to this; cases of luck that are not also fortunate. Getting a strike the first time
one bowls is lucky, but not fortunate. Even granting that it is fortunate to get such a strike,
it is more clearly lucky than fortunate – which is not something that can happen if the
lucky is a subset of the fortunate, just as my golden retriever is not more clearly a
golden retriever than clearly a dog.

Second, though Duncan Pritchard and Nicholas Rescher appeal to modal fragility/chanci-
ceness in distinguishing fortune and luck, they also appeal to what we might call ‘temporal
stability’. Pritchard says that whereas luck ‘tends to be associated with particular events, the
latter [fortune] tends to be concerned with relatively long-standing and significant aspects
of one’s life, such as one’s good health or financial security’ (Pritchard 2005, 607). Rescher
says that ‘fortune relate[s] to the conditions and circumstances of our lives generally, luck to
the specifically chancy goods and evils that befall us’ (Rescher 2001, 28).

Yet, fortune is not temporally stable. One’s fortunes can change in rapid succession –
fortunately you win the lottery, unfortunately this sparks a drawn-out multi-agency inves-
tigation into your finances. Fortune ‘remains constant to her inconstancy’, her wheel
‘raising men up and then dashing them down in ruin’ (Boethius 2008, II.I, 28, 31).
Again, particular, specific, discrete, events can be fortunate; you leave your keys in your
car but fortunately no one steals it, you send in your application but unfortunately it is
lost in the mail. Likewise, it seems that luck can concern long-standing and general
aspects of one’s life, e.g. it was bad luck to graduate just as the financial crisis struck,
good luck to meet your spouse.

Third, Neil Levy offers an account on which ‘fortunate events are non-lucky events with
luck in their proximate causes … fortune refers to the non-chancy, and therefore not
lucky, effects of luck’ (Levy 2009, 495–496). For instance, suppose that by bad luck I am
involved in a car crash (on Levy’s account; a bad, chancy, and uncontrolled car crash)
that disfigures my face. Suppose that I am treated badly by the people I interact with,
and that this treatment is not chancy but modally robust because I live in a ‘lookist’
society. On Levy’s account, my being badly treated is a misfortune because it has an
unlucky event as a proximate cause.

I note three problems with this account. First, not all fortunate events have lucky
events as causal antecedents. Some changes in fortune occur as a result of completing
actions within one’s sphere of competence, without luck, as in the case of improving
one’s fortunes by working hard at school. Second, as noted, some fortunate events are
chancy – being maimed by the WW2 bomb. Third, it’s not clear why there would be an
evaluative property picking out the events that have lucky causal antecedents. By
analogy, some events are not amusing, but have amusing causal antecedents. Although we can invent a category picking out such events, no obvious function is served by such a category, and there is no pre-theoretic evaluative property picking out such events.

Fourth, according to Tyler Porter, ‘fortunate events are those that are (1) significant to us, (2) outside of our control’ (Porter 2022, 9). I offer three objections.

First, there are fortunate events within our control. For example, the one who improves their fortunes by working hard at school. Porter’s response here is that the fortunate event is not the working hard at school, but getting into school at all, or other events not under the student’s control, that make it possible for them to work hard (Porter 2022, 11). Yet, it seems hard to deny that, these enabling conditions aside, working hard at school improves the student’s fortune. Porter might respond that an agent-controlled improvement in fortunes is not a fortunate event, even though it is an improvement in the agent’s fortune considered as a condition or state, that only agent-uncontrolled events that improve fortune-condition are fortune-events, since ‘where skill and control go, fortune usually seems to perish’ (Porter 2022, 10). I have two responses. For one thing, Porter offers an analysis of fortune as an event, so it’s not clear how his account captures the judgment that conditions are the sorts of things that can be fortunate. Transposing Porter’s analysis as it stands, we would get ‘fortunate conditions are those that are (1) significant to us, (2) outside of our control’. (2) seems wrong; we can change our fortune-conditions; the hardworking student, the self-destructive person who could easily destroy their fortunate condition. If fortune-conditions can be within agent-control, it’s hard to see why fortune-events must be beyond agent-control.

For another thing, though there is a difference between the improvement in fortune-condition that comes in an agent-controlled way and that which does not (e.g. working hard versus winning the lottery), it’s not clear that the difference between such cases is that only the latter involves event-fortune. Here are three other differences. Agent-uncontrolled changes in fortune tend to be more temporally compressed than agent-controlled changes in fortune, making their fortunateness more obvious. To the same effect, agent-uncontrolled changes in fortune tend to be less expected or predicted than agent-controlled changes in fortune. Lastly, agent-uncontrolled changes in fortune are often also lucky. Consider a case where these three differences are eliminated. Cupid takes advantage of a new savings product; deposit a very affordable $10 a month from ages 18–64 and receive a $100,000 payout on your 65th birthday. Otis’ family guarantees its members against the financial hardships of old age by setting up a trust that pays $100,000 to each family member on their 65th birthday. Comparing these cases, Cupid and Otis both seem fortunate, and equally fortunate, on their 65th birthdays, even though it was only within Cupid’s control to experience this fortune or not.

My second criticism of Porter’s account of fortune is that there are events outside our control, significant to us, that are lucky or fateful as well as, or instead of, fortunate – e.g. the strike when bowling, meeting the long-lost brother. In this respect, Porter’s account is susceptible to the problem with extant accounts of luck highlighted previously, that it does not identify the genus shared by luck and fortune.

Third, by giving the same conditions for fortune as the control account of luck gives for luck, Porter offers an unecumenical account of fortune. Those who accept the control account of luck have to be anti-realists about fortune. Porter acknowledges this (Porter 2022, 1), but not that it is a mark against his account. Again, those who accept his
account of fortune must reject the control account of luck. Given that there are only three major accounts of luck, a theory of fortune that requires us to reject one of them is theoretically costly.

6.3 In everyday language, luck, fortune, and fate are used as synonyms. Sure, you can give stipulative definitions of these terms that have more precise meanings, but by doing so you merely invent an idiolect.

It seems true that tychic terms are used as synonyms by many people in many cases. Whether someone says that winning the lottery is lucky, fateful, or fortunate they convey approximately the same sentiment, and one would be loath to correct them. Nevertheless, the overlap in ordinary use is not complete: it would be incorrect to say that getting a strike when bowling was ‘fate’ or that working hard at school improved your ‘luck’. Each of these terms is vague, and has its own semantic field; its own associations, range of use, and emphases, though those fields greatly overlap. My account does precisify – it takes vague terms and proposes more precise meanings. However, this is not an arbitrary, stipulative, exercise (e.g. defining ‘luck’ as ‘a body of water smaller than a puddle’). Rather, precisification separates out the distinctive semantic fields of terms; their different emphases, their differing cores. Well precisified terms do a better job than their vague counterparts at cutting nature at the joints; such joints as are exposed at the interfaces between one’s sphere of competence and the activities of the external world. All new thought is idiolectic.

Notes

1. The contemporary philosophical literature on luck and moral luck mentions fate in passing in a few places (Nagel 1993, 63; Thomson 1993, 204; Rescher 2001, 28) but does not offer an account of it. The Myth of Luck: Philosophy, Fate & Fortune (Hales 2020) offers no theory of fate, though does imply some claims about fate, e.g. that what is fateful cannot be lucky (Hales 2020, 16–19, 21, 39). Luck, Fate & Fortune: Antiquity & its Legacy (Eidinow 2011) unpacks classical conceptions of luck, fate, and fortune as expressed in Herodotus, Thucydides, etc. The literature contains more substantive accounts of fortune, stated and evaluated in the final section. One might pick ‘chance,’ to which tyche is also commonly translated, as the genus term. However, in the contemporary usage of the moral luck literature ‘chance’ and ‘chancy’ are used to indicate improbability or modal fragility – e.g. Neil Levy can say that fortune is ‘non-chancy’ (Levy 2009, 496). One might also pick ‘accidental’ or ‘coincidental.’ Leaving the genus term untranslated seems best.

2. A reviewer expresses the wish that these empirical studies had been done better – e.g. not allowing for possible biases in the researcher’s coding, or using a Likert scale, or not presenting luck as a ‘non-material belief.’ I share this wish. I am constrained to work with the best available empirical studies. A reviewer expresses doubt about the weight of folk intuitions. After all, most people do think of fate as a mysterious causal-efficient force, so we can’t take their judgments about it too seriously. In response, consider the analogy with ethics. Ordinary people accurately sort right-actions from wrong-actions (‘killing wrong, feeding the hungry right’), even if they have wildly mistaken views of ethical ontology (‘we evolved to,’ ‘society agrees that’).

3. The distinction between the subjective and objective sphere of competence gives rise to a corresponding distinction between a subjective and an objective sense of luck, fate, and fortune. The latter is normative for the former, since our feelings about how things are should correspond to how things are. The cocky first-timer at bowling fails to feel lucky about getting a strike even though he is lucky, the insensible teenager living in peace...
and plenty fails to feel fortunate even though she is fortunate. If to have control over X just is to have the reliable ability to achieve or prevent X, then my ‘sphere of competence’ is a ‘sphere of control,’ and my accounts of luck, fate, and fortune are ‘control accounts.’ However, control is defined in a number of different ways in the luck literature (Coffman 2009, 500; Riggs 2009; Levy 2011, 19), and more often left undefined. In some cases, we use ‘control’ where an agent has a very unreliable ability to achieve or prevent X, but actually achieves or prevents X: e.g. a rodeo newbie controls the bull, an event I would call lucky.

4. Which allows that they hope for or foresee such participation. What an agent can sensibly intend is circumscribed by their subjective sphere of competence, e.g. I can hope, but not intend, to win the lottery.

5. Nothing in the discussion requires that all action-types can be participated in accidentally, that all action-types can involve tyche. For example, if an accidental jostle pushes my pen upon the signature-line, I have not contracted accidentally or by luck. Some goals can only be expressed in, can only enform, the rational mind.

6. Other tychic terms include destiny and doom. These might be defined as types of fate. Destiny seems to have a purely positive valence and to intimate our cooperation in achieving a goal, whereas doom has a purely negative valence and intimates our total passivity. Boethius and Aquinas say that fate is providence considered as working through second causes (Aquinas 1947, ST I Q116 A1 co., Boethius 2008, IV.VI 131). Providence is not a tychic idea, as tychic properties pertain to limited agents constrained by an external world. Ideas such as dharma, maat, tao, like providence, enfold our microcosmic agency into a macrocosmic agency, rather than leaving the external world somewhat indifferent, capricious, opaque, or chaotic. These ideas have a more ethical, juridical, and order-bringing focus than luck, fate, and fortune. So far as the spatial metaphor can take us – passing out, passing in, expanding and contracting and moving – luck, fate, and fortune are the only tychic properties. Spatial metaphor seems prominent in talk about agency; ‘within her power’, ‘beyond his control.’

7. Duncan Pritchard expresses sympathy with this view in passing (Pritchard 2005, 144).

Acknowledgements
For their helpful comments, thanks to reviewers at Philosophical Psychology, Metaphilosophy, and Philosophical Explorations.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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