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2 **Policing**

3 Luke William Hunt

AU1 4 University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA

5 **Introduction: Who Are the Police?**

6 This entry offers an overview and analysis of
 7 policing, the area of criminal justice associated
 8 primarily with law enforcement. The study of
 9 policing spans a variety of disciplines, including
 10 criminology, law, philosophy, politics, and psy-
 11 chology, among other fields. Although research
 12 on policing is broad in scope, it has become an
 13 especially notable area of study in contemporary
 14 legal and social philosophy given recent police
 15 controversies.

16 The advent of modern policing is often traced
 17 to the formation of the London Metropolitan
 18 Police in 1829. John Kleinig characterizes the
 19 Metropolitan Police as a “legislatively mandated
 20 organization designed to provide round-the-clock
 21 service to a community confronted by diverse
 22 needs and fears” and to *prevent crime*
 23 (1996: 11). This suggests a focus on *proactive*
 24 law enforcement tactics, rather than earlier styles
 25 of policing that embraced a more *reactive* model
 26 of law enforcement. However, as Kleinig notes,
 27 law enforcement is but one of many police roles.
 28 Police also act as emergency operators
 29 (responding to emergencies such as vehicle acci-
 30 dents or natural disasters), social enforcers (using

force in situations such as crowd control), and 31
 social peacekeepers (a combination of both law 32
 enforcement and social service roles) (1996: 33
 25–29). 34

Within police culture itself, the police have 35
 embraced a range of archetypal identities (Hunt 36
 2021a). The police institution is historically asso- 37
 ciated with a heroic ethos steeped in valor. In 38
 many countries (not least the United States), the 39
 heroic ethos has evolved into a distinct warrior 40
 identity, which is marked by militaristic equip- 41
 ment (military-style rifles and armored vehicles), 42
 methods (the widespread use of specialized 43
 weapons and tactics, or “SWAT,” teams), and 44
 training (quick, reflexive use of force and “righ- 45
 teous violence”) (Stoughton 2016). Fallout from 46
 the warrior ethos has led to calls for a somewhat 47
 milder “guardian” identity, which is said to be 48
 based more evenly on principles of protection 49
 (Yankah 2019). However, researchers have 50
 argued that these shifting, individuated archetypes 51
 (a sort of “identity crisis”) can miss the central 52
 point that policing should be conceived as a *col- 53*
lective (for example, “community policing”) pur- 54
 suit of justice (Hunt 2021a). 55

Naturally, concerns about policing are more 56
 pronounced in some countries than others. Com- 57
 paring policing in, say, Denmark and the United 58
 States may not be fruitful given the vastly differ- 59
 ent populations, economies, crime rates, and other 60
 social problems – including gun ownership cul- 61
 tures. For a variety of reasons unrelated to polic- 62
 ing itself, police in many countries do not have to 63

64 contend with the same amount of poverty, home-
 65 lessness, crime, gun violence, mental illness, and
 66 racial tension as police in the United States
 67 (Shelby 2007). On the other hand, countries such
 68 as Nigeria have a much more pronounced problem
 69 of police bribery and corruption (though the
 70 police in the United States and other countries of
 71 course have their share of corruption) (Guttuschuss
 72 2010). The point is that it is important to note that
 73 there is a complex array of contemporary police
 74 roles that vary internationally, as well as domesti-
 75 cally within a single country.

76 The diversity of police roles and responsibili-
 77 ties is often organized according to both subject
 78 matter and bureaucratic jurisdiction. For instance,
 79 in the United States, most states have a “state
 80 police” (or “highway patrol”) force that has juris-
 81 diction across the entire *state* – such as the Ala-
 82 bama Highway Patrol. And there is often a police
 83 force within each state *county* (“county police” or
 84 “Sheriff’s Office”), such as the Tuscaloosa
 85 County Sheriff’s Office in Tuscaloosa County,
 86 Alabama. Moreover, the city of Tuscaloosa
 87 (within Tuscaloosa County) has its own Tusca-
 88 loosa Police Department, which has jurisdiction
 89 within the *city* of Tuscaloosa. One can also add
 90 police departments on college campuses, such as
 91 the University of Alabama Police. To make things
 92 even more complicated, there are *federal* law
 93 enforcement officers such as FBI special agents,
 94 who have jurisdiction in matters of federal law
 95 across the entire United States.

96 Within each bureaucratic jurisdiction, officers
 97 may be generalists or specialists. There are
 98 uniformed officers who are generalists,
 99 responding to a range of issues they encounter
 100 on their shifts – from traffic accidents and viola-
 101 tions to burglaries and domestic disputes. There
 102 are also “plainclothes” detectives and other inves-
 103 tigators who become part of specialized squads
 104 that focus on a narrow range of crimes over the
 105 course of long-term investigations, such as a drug
 106 crime, white-collar crime, and violent crime (Hunt
 107 2019). Although each polity and police institution
 108 is unique, these sorts of jurisdictional and subject
 109 matter boundaries can be found in police forces
 110 around the world.

Law Enforcement: Strategies and Tactics 111

There are countless police strategies and tactics 112
 that – as noted above – vary greatly from country 113
 to country and department to department. How- 114
 ever, there are several prominent strategies and 115
 tactics that are familiar in one form or another in 116
 a wide range of police institutions. 117

Community Policing and Policing by Consent 118

Roughly, *community policing* is a philosophy and 119
 organizational strategy that promotes community 120
 empowerment and collective efficacy: policing 121
 that seeks community development through com- 122
 munity partnership (Sampson 2011). An example 123
 would be coordination between the police and a 124
 neighborhood watch group, which might increase 125
 citizen empowerment and reduce citizen fear – 126
 thereby facilitating conditions that will help 127
 solve crime problems. There are three central 128
 aspects of community policing: 129

1. Citizen involvement in identifying and 130
 addressing public safety concerns 131
2. The decentralization of decision-making to 132
 develop responses to locally defined problems 133
3. Problem solving (National Academies 2020) 134

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These aspects of community policing become 135
 manifest through a variety of activities that 136
 emphasize relationships and partnerships with 137
 the community. Accordingly, community policing 138
 can be associated with the related idea of “polic- 139
 ing by consent” (Torrible 2022), which is consis- 140
 tent with social contractarian political philosophy 141
 inasmuch as community policing promotes com- 142
 munication with community partners (rather than 143
 simply relying on force and power). Community 144
 policing is thus often associated with particular 145
 styles of political philosophy – including those 146
 steeped in democratic liberalism (Hunt 2021a). 147

Criticism of these strategies has come from two 148
 directions. First, some researchers have examined 149
 various community policing tactics and con- 150
 cluded they do not yield evidence of significant 151
 crime reduction (Sherman and Eck 2002). 152
 A second objection to community policing is 153

154 that – somewhat paradoxically – it might lead to
 155 increased bad behavior by the police. For
 156 instance, perhaps community policing increases
 157 police discretion and community engagement in a
 158 way that leads to increased illegal encounters with
 159 community members – such as expansion of
 160 police discretion to use unjustified stop and frisk
 161 tactics (Gould and Mastrofski 2004). In other
 162 words, poorly executed community policing may
 163 exacerbate both police legal noncompliance and
 164 police legitimacy. Jake Monaghan's conception of
 165 "legitimacy-risk profiles" provides insight on
 166 these points (2021).

167 In response to the second critique, researchers
 168 have suggested that community policing should
 169 be supplemented with "procedural justice polic-
 170 ing," a distinct strategy that more narrowly
 171 focuses on "giving citizens police decision pro-
 172 cesses that manifest demonstrations of police fair-
 173 ness and regard for a person's dignity" (National
 174 Academies 2018). The basic idea, then, is that
 175 procedural justice policing promotes police legit-
 176 imacy both directly (the people with whom the
 177 police interact) and indirectly (the community
 178 generally). Still, it is important to note that some
 179 scholars worry that the psychological underpin-
 180 nings of procedural justice policing (which might
 181 encourage trust and compliance) will discourage
 182 citizens from asserting their constitutional rights
 183 to contest bad policing practices (Miller 2016).

184 Regarding the criticism that community polic-
 185 ing may not reduce crime adequately, some
 186 researchers have responded by rejecting conse-
 187 quentialist ethics (Hunt 2021a). In other words,
 188 there are a great many policing strategies that
 189 might have the consequence of a reducing crime
 190 significantly. However, it might also be the case
 191 that states should embrace community policing
 192 because it is the right thing to do given the state's
 193 assumptions about political morality. A consensus
 194 study report put the point this way: "procedural
 195 justice reflects the behavior of police that is appro-
 196 priate in a democratic society...[it] may not
 197 change citizen attitudes, but it encourages demo-
 198 cratic policing" (National Academies 2018: 312).
 199 The idea, then, is that such strategies are needed
 200 (perhaps in conjunction with other crime reduc-
 201 tion strategies) because they promote justice by

bolstering legitimacy, autonomy, and respect for 202
 human dignity. 203

Algorithmic Policing 204

A second major policing strategy is policing by 205
 algorithm. Such strategies may be used in con- 206
 junction with community policing, procedural 207
 justice policing, and policing by consent, though 208
 there can also be tension between the various 209
 approaches. 210

Predictive policing is often categorized as 211
 person-based (targeting specific individuals 212
 based upon algorithmically generated predictions) 213
 and place-based (predicting when and where a 214
 crime will occur based upon an algorithm). 215
 Sarah Brayne describes the informal use of the 216
 term "algorithm" as the process by which com- 217
 puters make predictive, automated decisions 218
 based on a dataset (Brayne 2021). 219

One place-based technique has been referred 220
 to as "prediction box" (Hunt 2021a, 2022), which 221
 is the technique of "forecast[ing] individual 222
 crimes in the immediate future in order to direct 223
 patrol officers into 500-by-500 foot areas 224
 (i.e., boxes) that are at a higher risk of a crime 225
 occurring during a particular 8, 10, or 12 hour 226
 shift" (Santos 2019: 372). The idea is simply for 227
 an officer to report to a specific geographic box 228
 and prevent a crime from occurring in that box 229
 (Ibid.). The location of the box is based upon data 230
 regarding time, date, and location of reported 231
 crimes, but there is often no human analysis 232
 (or qualitative analysis) of the box (Santos 2017). 233

Criticism of algorithmic policing has come 234
 from a number of directions. One of the central 235
 objections is based simply on the quality of the 236
 data used in the algorithm. If a state (and its police 237
 departments) has pervasive problems with racism 238
 (Shelby 2007), sexism, and other forms of dis- 239
 crimination, then there is a worry that any algo- 240
 rithm on which the police rely will necessarily be 241
 based on such discrimination – assuming that 242
 such discrimination is present in the accumulation 243
 of the data used in the algorithm (Mayson 2019). 244

More generally, researchers have argued that 245
 the use of algorithmic policing in isolation 246
 (without being augmented by community polic- 247
 ing, for example) is dehumanizing to both the 248

249 community being policed and the police them- 296
 250 selves (Hunt 2022). Regarding the former, the 297
 251 worry is that individual members of the commu- 298
 252 nity are treated as part of an indistinguishable 299
 253 mass rather than in accordance with the respect 300
 254 each person deserves given norms of political 301
 255 morality. Regarding the latter, there is a risk that 302
 256 undue reliance on algorithms may amount to 303
 257 “agency laundering,” or stripping the police of 304
 258 their moral agency and responsibility (Rubel 305
 259 et al. 2019, 2020).

260 Deception as an Investigative Tactic

261 Moving from broad policing models and strate- 306
 262 gies to specific investigative tactics, there are sev- 307
 263 eral common practices that raise important legal, 308
 264 political, and moral questions. To what extent are 309
 265 the police justified in the use of deception and 310
 266 dishonesty as part of their law enforcement prac- 311
 267 tices? Three common police tactics involving 312
 268 investigative deception are (1) the use of infor- 313
 269 mants, (2) the use of operations giving rise to 314
 270 entrapment, and (3) the use of surveillance. 315

271 Police are trained to use informants to obtain 316
 272 useful information through a variety of authorized 317
 273 law enforcement collection activities. The infor- 318
 274 mant’s identity, information, and relationship with 319
 275 the police is confidential, allowing the informant 320
 276 to work their way into the confidence of unwitting 321
 277 suspects. Informants act as agents of the police for 322
 278 a great many reasons, but one the most common 323
 279 reasons they do so is because the police have 324
 280 leverage over them. An arrangement between a 325
 281 leveraged informant and the police is in many 326
 282 ways like a contract in that both sides voluntarily 327
 283 enter into an agreement with the intent that each 328
 284 side will assume certain obligations under the 329
 285 agreement (Hunt 2019).

286 The police might indicate that they have evi- 330
 287 dence that a person committed a crime that 331
 288 exposes the person to potential punishment. The 332
 289 police make the person an offer: If she acquires 333
 290 evidence or information for the police (including 334
 291 through conduct that would otherwise be illegal), 335
 292 then the police will consider advising the prose- 336
 293 cutor (responsible for prosecuting the person’s 337
 294 alleged crime) of the person’s assistance so the 338
 295 prosecutor can consider recommending that the 339

person receive a downward department from the 296
 punishment for which she is eligible. The person 297
 accepts the offer and performs according to the 298
 terms of the bargain. 299

This sort of bargaining process raises norma- 300
 tive principles underpinning contractual relations 301
 and gives those principles weight with respect to 302
 questions about the justification of the agreement 303
 between the police and the informant. For 304
 instance, did the informant have a “real choice” 305
 given the police’s leverage? Was the substance of 306
 the agreement – what the police asked the infor- 307
 mant to do – justified from a moral perspective? 308
 (see Miller and Blackler 2005; Harfield 2012; 309
 Hunt 2019). 310

Sting and undercover operations are another 311
 common form of investigative deception. These 312
 tactics often involve the use of informants, as 313
 when the police, say, use an informant to induce 314
 businesspersons to engage in a conspiracy to bribe 315
 government officials. In addition to general moral 316
 questions about the use of false scenarios to 317
 induce people to commit crimes, the use of sting 318
 and undercover operations often raises legal ques- 319
 tions regarding entrapment. 320

Entrapment is a legal defense in the United 321
 States, and there are various legal tests used to 322
 determine when a person has been entrapped. 323
 Under the subjective test – the predominant test 324
 based upon federal precedent – a person is 325
 entrapped when the government induces the per- 326
 son to commit a crime that the person is not 327
 predisposed to commit (Jacobson v. United States 328
 1992). In other words, the government must show 329
 that the defendant would have committed the 330
 crime even if (in some possible world) the defen- 331
 dant had not been induced by the government 332
 (Hunt 2019: chapter 5). Under the objective 333
 test – embraced by the Model Penal Code and 334
 adopted in a minority of jurisdictions – a person 335
 is entrapped when the police use unreasonable 336
 tactics: “Methods of persuasion or 337
 inducement...[that] create a substantial risk 338
 that...an offense will be committed by persons 339
 other than those who are ready to commit it” 340
 (American Law Institute § 2.13). Accordingly, 341
 the subjective test is about what is in the mind of 342
 the defendant (a question of criminal law), and the 343

344 objective test is about the reasonableness of the
345 police's conduct (a question of criminal
346 procedure).

347 On the other hand, entrapment is no defense in
348 the U.K. and Australia. Although entrapment is no
349 defense in English law, a series of court opinions
350 confirm that there is a commitment in English law
351 to the principle that the state should not lure citi-
352 zens into committing legally forbidden acts and
353 then seek to prosecute them for doing so (see R. v.
354 Loosley 2001; Ashworth 2002). One of the under-
355 lying issues with the use of sting and undercover
356 operations is thus preventing coercive police tac-
357 tics through rule of law principles that shield
358 citizens from oppressive executive agents.

359 Finally, surveillance is a deceptive investiga-
360 tive tactic that is common among police depart-
361 ments around the world – a tactic that is often
362 conducted in conjunction with the police's use of
363 informants and operations that may give rise to
364 entrapment. At the most basic level, Gary Marx
365 defines surveillance “as regard or attendance to
366 others,” which often involves “gathering some
367 form of data connectable to individuals” that is
368 “tied to the goal of control” (Marx 2015:
369 734–735). Marx also describes how surveillance
370 occurs in the private, corporate sector, not just in
371 the context of state actions (Marx 2016). This is an
372 important point because the domains often con-
373 verge, as when the state relies on data from the
374 private sector to surveil and investigate its
375 citizens.

376 Of course, this does not mean that surveillance
377 is always unjustified. In the context of policing,
378 surveillance can obviously help promote secu-
379 rity – often in a relatively unobtrusive way. This
380 might include instances in which only a specific
381 suspect is targeted for surveillance (rather than
382 vast numbers of people through mass surveil-
383 lance), as well as surveillance that does not stem
384 from investigations that deviate from rule of law
385 principles (Hunt 2019). These different perspec-
386 tives are just another way of describing how sur-
387 veillance – as with all police tactics – involves
388 competing values, with security being but one
389 value among many that must be considered.

Constraints: General and Special Moral Requirements 390 391

The complexities noted in the first two sections 392
raise a basic philosophical question about polic- 393
ing: How should the relevant legal, political, and 394
moral questions be framed given the diversity of 395
police strategies and tactics, as well as the diver- 396
sity among police departments themselves? One 397
way to approach this question is by focusing on 398
special and general moral requirements (see Hart 399
1961; Rawls 1971) of the police. 400

General moral requirements are construed as 401
nonvoluntary requirements that bind the police 402
simply by virtue of background norms regarding 403
commitments to personhood and moral equality, 404
irrespective of any special roles or relationships 405
entered. These requirements might be grounded in 406
human dignity (such as one's high-ranking, equal, 407
social status) or natural rights (such as rights that 408
are not conventional and would exist in state of 409
nature) (Simmons 2015). For instance, John 410
Locke's political philosophy is known for a com- 411
mitment to a natural right not to be coerced with- 412
out consent, giving rise to one theory of 413
legitimacy. 414

In the domain of policing, an officer may be 415
justified in treating a person in a particular way 416
based upon the person's unlawful resistance, but 417
any force used by the officer must be done in a 418
manner that does not denigrate the rights com- 419
prised by the person's high-ranking, equal, 420
socio-legal status (given the assumption that 421
there is a general moral requirement against 422
affronts to one's human dignity). In a similar 423
way, the police's use of informants is perhaps an 424
indispensable investigative tool, but there are 425
moral limits to the police's power to use persons 426
(informants) as a means to a law enforcement end 427
given one's status and value emanating from one's 428
human dignity (Hunt 2019, 2021b). 429

Special (or positional) moral requirements are 430
grounded in those special relationships that we 431
have (or freely make) with other groups (see 432
Hart 1961; Rawls 1971). This might include 433
(voluntary) promissory or contractual obligations, 434
or perhaps nonvoluntary associative obligations 435

436 owed to friends, family, and others. Accordingly,
 437 if a police officer fails to do her duty as police
 438 officer, then she is morally blameworthy because
 439 she voluntarily entered her position and undertook
 440 the duties of that position. Unlike most people,
 441 then, one of the explicit special obligations of the
 442 police is to obey the law.

443 Given recent attention to policing in the United
 444 States, consider how the police are constrained by
 445 legal obligations derived from the Constitution.
 446 The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution
 447 protects the “right of the people to be secure in
 448 their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.”
 449 A police officer’s use of force (deadly, or other-
 450 wise) constitutes a seizure and must be reasonable.
 451 Courts have construed the “reasonableness” of
 452 force based upon “the perspective of a reasonable
 453 officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
 454 vision of hindsight” *Graham v. Connor*, 490 US
 455 386 (1989).

456 George Floyd was killed by a police officer in
 457 Minneapolis, Minnesota, on May 25, 2020. The
 458 officer knelt on Floyd’s neck for over eight
 459 minutes while Floyd – who was handcuffed –
 460 exclaimed that he could not breathe. When
 461 Floyd became unresponsive, the officer continued
 462 to use his knee to pin Floyd’s neck to the asphalt
 463 street. By any standard, the officer who killed
 464 George Floyd breached his special, positional
 465 obligation to follow law and policy. There was
 466 no threat of harm (Floyd was lying flat on the
 467 ground, handcuffed), and his actions (kneeling
 468 on Floyd’s neck for over eight minutes) were
 469 clearly unreasonable and unnecessary.

470 Moreover, given basic assumptions of political
 471 morality, the officer failed to fulfill his general
 472 moral obligations regarding respect for one’s
 473 human dignity. The upshot is a natural overlap
 474 between certain human rights and certain political
 475 and civil rights – as when the police have a general
 476 moral requirement not to brutalize persons, which
 477 is also prohibited by their special, positional
 478 duties as police (Hunt 2021b).

Conclusion: Police Abolition, Reform, and Nonideal Theory

479

480

The issues that have been raised in the preceding
 sections are at the heart of one of the more press-
 ing contemporary debates about policing: Should
 states with police forces that engage in systemic
 injustices “defund” or “abolish” the police
 (Wertheimer 1975; Vitale 2017; McDowell and
 Fernandez 2018)?

“Defunding the police” can be described as
 reallocating funding away from the police to
 other government institutions funded by the state
 (Ray 2020). For example, a city might shift
 funding from the police to social services so com-
 munities can respond to mental-health crises,
 addiction, and homelessness more effectively.
 Some of these initiatives are politically possible
 (some cities have reallocated resources) and
 supported by research suggesting their efficacy
 (e.g., research suggesting that increased socioeco-
 nomic opportunity – not police – reduces crime)
 (Uggen and Shannon 2014). Researchers have
 thus argued that piecemeal reallocation is consis-
 tent with the background assumptions regarding
 the demands of justice: Core state functions (e.g.,
 socioeconomic services) are handled by state
 agents with the relevant expertise, while other
 agents of the state (the police) retain core func-
 tions relating primarily to security (Hunt 2022).

On the other hand, arguments in favor of the
 actual *abolition* of the police raise several prob-
 lems connected to the points discussed in the
 preceding sections. First is the *definitional prob-
 lem*: Who counts as the police? Given the diver-
 sity of police roles and responsibilities – as well as
 the diverse administrative and bureaucratic mani-
 festations of the police – there can be equivocation
 about which state entities count as “police” and
 which ones should be abolished. It is plausible to
 think that law enforcement – some sort of polic-
 ing – is indispensable in any actual, existing
 (nonideal, nonutopian) society. Arguments
 regarding police abolition, then, can often be
 more like debates about what is meant by the
 term “police.”

523

524 Second, police abolition raises a *socio-*
 525 *scientific problem*. As noted in the first section, it
 526 would be unusual to compare policing in the
 527 United States and Demark given the vast differ-
 528 ences between the two countries. Unlike Den-
 529 mark, the United States must contend with, say,
 530 the reality that there are more civilian-owned fire-
 531 arms (393 million) than people (326 million) in
 532 the United States. This and other important social-
 533 scientific issues raise difficult questions regarding
 534 police abolition in some countries but not others
 535 (Hunt 2022).

536 Finally, police abolition raises a *philosophical*
 537 *problem*: Would a reallocative model abolishing
 538 (or drastically limiting) the police be politically
 539 possible, effective, and morally justified given a
 540 polity's assumptions about justice? Policing
 541 scholars have embraced a variety of nonideal the-
 542 ory methodologies to evaluate philosophical
 543 problems in policing (see Hunt 2019, 2021b).
 544 For example, even if it were possible to privatize
 545 policing, reliance on private security forces would
 546 raise serious questions about the equal distribu-
 547 tion of security to which most states are commit-
 548 ted. Would efforts leading to the abolition of the
 549 police – rather than piecemeal reallocation and
 550 other reform efforts – improve the lives of those
 551 who are most in need of security (given that afflu-
 552 ent citizens could simply hire private security
 553 without the police)?

554 The upshot is that any nonideal, nonutopian
 555 account of justice must have something to say
 556 about cases of unjust actions, such as those that
 557 create emergencies of security that might require
 558 just policing. From both a practical and moral
 559 perspective, many have thus argued that it is rea-
 560 sonable to take steps toward procedural and sub-
 561 stantive police reforms that are politically
 562 possible, effective, and morally permissible
 563 given the assumption that states have a duty to
 564 promote the security of its members (Hunt 2022;
 565 Monaghan 2021).

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