The "Third Man Argument" (or "TMA") was thought by Aristotle and other early critics of Platonism to pose a significant challenge to Plato's theory of Forms, and recent commentators have evidently concurred in this judgment, lavishing more attention on the TMA than on any of the other problems that Plato raises for the Forms in the first part of the Parmenides. This is in marked contrast to the most acute of Plato's ancient commentators, Plotinus, who ignores the TMA completely in his own discussion of these problems. Plotinus's silence here has not, however, deterred speculation on how he would have responded to the TMA had he deigned to consider it. Such speculation is surely no less legitimate in Plotinus's case than it is in the case of Plato himself, who also avoided giving any direct answer to the TMA in his writings. Insofar as the TMA is valid and begins with premises which are at least not wildly misrepresented of Plato's views, a satisfactory response to the argument must be regarded as a key test of the adequacy of (neo)Platonic theorizing.

I propose in this paper to review some of the resources at Plotinus's disposal for blunting the force of the TMA. The discussion which follows is largely critical, inasmuch as I focus on mistaken directions in which these resources have generally been sought. But I also mention at the end some directions that I believe to be more promising.

For expository purposes I follow Gregory Vlastos's analysis of the TMA, which adds two implicit premises to the one explicitly given in the text. The latter, positing the Form as a "one-over-many," is contained in Parmenides' opening remark: "when it seems to you that a number of things are large, there seems, I suppose, to be a certain single character which is the same when you look at them all; hence you think that Largeness is a single thing" (132a2-4). This can be generalized to

\[(OM) \text{ For any group of things possessing a common property (of the right sort), there is a unique Form which accounts for the possession of that property by each of the things in that group.}\]

If Parmenides is to lay claim to the absurd consequences he proposes to draw from this premise, it must be joined by the assumption that Forms are never identical to any of the things participating in them, so that

\[(NI) \text{ No Form which accounts for the possession of a common property by a group of things is itself a part of that group, and that Forms are self-predicative, i.e.,}\]

\[(SP) \text{ Any Form which accounts for the possession of a common property by a group of things is itself in possession of that property.}\]

Given these premises, the TMA begins by positing a set \(S_1\) of things each of which is F. According to (OM), there is a unique Form (call it \(\Phi_1'\)) which accounts for the F-ness of the members of \(S_1\). Since, by (SP), \(\Phi_1\) is F, the set \(S_2\) which is formed by adding \(\Phi_1\) to \(S_1\) is a set of things each of which is F. So according to (OM) there will be a unique Form (call it \(\Phi_2'\)) which accounts for the F-ness of the members of \(S_2\). But by (NI), \(\Phi_2\) is not a member of \(S_2\); consequently, \(\Phi_1 \neq \Phi_2\). Yet both \(\Phi_1\) and \(\Phi_2\) are generated by the original group of F-things. "So each of your Forms will no longer be one," Parmenides concludes; worse, repeated
applications of the argument show each Form to be not only plural, "but an indefinite number" (132b1-2).

The argument is clearly valid and its conclusion a major embarrassment for Platonism. One or more of its premises must therefore be rejected, and recent work on Plotinus contains critiques (explicit or implicit) of each. The least developed is NI: some accounts of Plotinus's doctrine of the immanence of Forms in particulars suggest that NI might be vulnerable to a Neoplatonic challenge, but no one has parlayed this possibility into a full-blown defense against the TMA. John H. Fielder, whose "A Plotinian View of Self-Predication and TMA" is (to my knowledge) the only English-language article on Plotinus devoted in its entirety to the Third Man Argument, pins the blame on OM; but the bulk of Prof. Fielder's discussion is directed against the critics of SP, while his brief coverage of OM leaves it unclear what is distinctively Plotinian about denying this premise, nor how Plotinus is any better positioned than Plato to make this move. I therefore propose to overlook these two premises in the following remarks and focus instead on the third.

II

The most common line on the TMA, with respect to Plotinus as well as Plato, is that SP forms the weak link in the argument. A simple rejection of SP does not look especially promising, however, since self-predication appears to be well attested in the Plotinian corpus. Plotinus holds, for example, that "there is no finding anything truer than the true" (V.5.2); that the Intellectual-Principle is "the veritably intellectual, wise without intermission" (V.9.2); that "the cause of fire here is a certain Life of fiery character" (VI.7.11). Some of the clearest passages concern Beauty, e.g.:

This then is Beauty primally: it is entire and omnipresent as an entirety; and therefore in none of its parts or members lacking in beauty; beautiful thus beyond denial. . . . If this principle were not beautiful, what other could be? Its prior does not deign to be beautiful; that which is the first to manifest itself--Form and object of vision to the intellect--cannot but be lovely to see. (V.8.8)

The overt contrast here between its appropriateness in the case of Beauty and its inappropriateness in the case of the One makes it difficult to maintain that Plotinus is just being sloppy when he engages in self-predication talk and that he wouldn't want us to take such talk at all seriously.

In light of this textual evidence, the most common criticism of SP is not that it is unplotinian, but that its usefulness for the TMA can be undermined by interpreting self-predication as somehow equivocal. If 'F' means one thing when said of a sensible F and another thing when said of the Form of F-ness, it will fail to unite Form and particular around a common property in the way required if OM is to generate a new Form of F-ness. Plotinus's critique of the Aristotelian categories at VI.1-3 is a particularly rich source of "proof-texts" for the view that he regarded 'F' as equivocal in just this way. "It would be absurd to assign Being to the same genus as non-Being," he argues--just as absurd as "to make one genus of Socrates and his portrait" (VI.2.1). For this reason, "new genera must be sought for this [sensible] Universe--genera distinct from those of the Intellectual, inasmuch as this realm is different from that, analogous indeed but never identical, a mere image of the higher" (VI.3.1). Given the difference between these two realms, if features of sensible substance "apply also in some degree to the True Substance of the Intellectual, the coincidence is, doubtless, to be attributed to analogy and ambiguity of terms" (VI.3.5). The same is true of the categories other than Substance. In the chapter on Quantity, for example, Plotinus avers that "the other numbers (those inherent in objects) can have nothing in common with [abstract numbers] but the name" (VI.1.4). And he is equally blunt about Quality: "This [bodily] beauty . . . is identical in name only with Intellectual Beauty: it follows that the term 'Quality' as applied to the Sensible and the Intellectual is necessarily equivocal; even blackness and whiteness are different in the two spheres" (VI.3.16).
It is hardly surprising that scholars have found in such passages a doctrine of equivocal predication sufficient to wreck the TMA. J.M. Rist, for example, writes that "the predicate 'true', when attributed to the Form Truth and to particular truths, has a different ontological significance," so that even "the meaning would be different" in the two cases. Steven K. Strange, in an analysis of VI.1-3, reaches the same conclusion: "No term can be synonymously predicated of items in both the sensible and the intelligible realms, for sensibles and intelligibles are so ontologically disparate that language cannot apply to them in the same way." He then spells out what he takes to be the implications for the TMA: "The Third Man Argument against the existence of the Forms cannot even get off the ground, since it requires that the term F be synonymously predicated of the Form F and sensible F's, but we have seen that according to Plotinus this is impossible." Unfortunately, there are at least a couple of problems with any effort to address the TMA on Plotinus's behalf via an "equivocation strategy." One is that the evidence for equivocation in the Enneads is itself equivocal, and it's far from clear that the text supports the kind of equivocation required by the "equivocation strategy"; the other is that sufficient equivocation to avoid the TMA appears to undercut the Forms' explanatory value, making this victory over the Third Man a Pyrrhic one.

Regarding the first problem: Insofar as the equivocation strategy is grounded in a radical ontological difference between Forms and sensibles, passages which stress this difference must be set alongside others which downplay the difference. In the treatise "Against the Gnostics", for example, Plotinus is concerned to stress that "nothing has been left out which a beautiful representation within the physical order could include" (II.9.8), while "On the Intellectual Beauty" sees him arguing that "all this universe is Form and there is nothing that is not Ideal Form as the archetype was" (V.8.7). Of course Plotinus also recognizes that there are significant differences in the way that beauty occurs--not just between sensible and intelligible beauties, but also between one sensible beauty and another. In the treatise "On Beauty" he mentions a variety of phenomena in which beauty may be found (sights, sounds, conduct, character) and then asks whether there is "some One Principle from which all take their grace." The proposal that "the beautiful thing is essentially symmetrical, patterned" (I.6.1) is found to fall short, not just as an account of Intellectual Beauty ("how by this theory would there be beauty in the Intellectual-Principle, essentially the solitary?") but also of phenomenal beauty (the beauty of gold, light, and color is not traceable to symmetry or pattern). But instead of concluding that 'beauty' is equivocal, amounting to symmetry/pattern in certain cases and something else in others, Plotinus rejects symmetry/pattern altogether and searches for an alternative account that will cover all cases of beauty. This is not just the mark of a naïf writing his first treatise, for Plotinus shows himself well aware of the difficulties besetting a univocal account. "Is there any such likeness between the loveliness of this world and the splendours in the Supreme?" he asks. "Such a likeness in the particulars would make the two orders alike: but what is there in common between beauty here and beauty There?" (I.6.2). That this is not a rhetorical question inviting the answer "nothing" is confirmed when Plotinus goes on to offer a positive proposal for what it is that all these instances of beauty have in common: "But where the Ideal-Form has entered, it has grouped and co-ordinated what from a diversity of parts was to become a unity: it has rallied confusion into co-operation: it has made the sum one harmonious coherence" (I.6.2). Unity, unlike symmetry/pattern, makes sense as the standard for sensible and intelligible beauty alike.

Of course unity, too, comes in many different forms; nevertheless, "all are representations of the one exemplar, some quite remote, others more effective: the truer likeness is in the Intellectual; Soul is a unity, and still more is Intellect a unity and Being a unity" (VI.2.11). These are differences in degree of remoteness, effectiveness, and truth, not differences in meaning. That the higher and lower hypostases differ in degree is a common theme in Plotinus. Regarding the soul's perception of external beauty and its presentation of that beauty
"to the inner Ideal-Principle," Plotinus writes: "the joy here is like that of a good man who discerns in a youth the early signs of a virtue consonant with the achieved perfection within his own soul" (I.6.3). Juvenile virtue and mature virtue are joined by a continuum of moral development, not sundered in such a way that only an equivocal expression can span the breach. Inter-hypostatic differences of degree are often explained as "diffusion": "thus fire gives out its heat; snow is cold not merely to itself; fragrant substances are a notable instance, for, as long as they last, something is diffused from them and perceived wherever they are present" (V.1.6). Heat, cold and fragrance are the same in the surrounding air as they are in their source; diffusion brings about a loss of concentration, to be sure, but not of univocity. A variation on the diffusion metaphor is that of "mixture", which is equally inhospitable to an equivocation reading: "thus the entire aggregate of existence springs from the divine world, in greater beauty There because There unmingled but mingled here" (V.8.7); "so, too, Repose is not troubled, for there is no admixture of the unstable" (V.8.4). Even the passage, "nothing is truer than the truth," which we saw Prof. Rist citing as evidence of a Plotinian doctrine of equivocation, appears to express a comparative judgment of degree: the most natural reading, as Prof. Fielder rightly observes, is that "there is a single sense of 'true' which applies to all true things, but all other things are true to a lesser degree than Truth." Indeed, differences of degree would appear to presuppose univocity, for its absence precludes any single scale along which such differences can be ordered. It makes little sense to say of a man and the food he is eating that the one is more or less healthy than the other (to take Aristotle's famous example of pros hen equivocals).

So there are many texts which do not fit the equivocation account of self-predication. But there are theoretical difficulties as well. There must be something in virtue of which a particular sense-object participates in one Form rather than another, just as there must be something in virtue of which a particular Form is present to this sense-object rather than that. Univocal predication of F provides an answer to the question of what connects the Form of F-ness with sensible F-particulars. If 'F' is equivocal, on the other hand, what is there to make the connection except the name 'F'? Surely Plotinus intends his metaphysical hierarchy to be knit together by something more than mere homonymity, what Aristotle referred to as "homonymity by chance."

The suggestion typically made by equivocationists is that Form and particular, though not connected by (univocal) similarity, are nevertheless linked by a pros hen unity. Just as the primary instance of health is found in the disposition of a bodily organism, and a facial complexion is said to be healthy only in virtue of being brought about by (and so serving as a sign of) this primary instance; so the Form provides the primary instance of F-ness, and sensible particulars are said to be F insofar as they are caused or explained by the Form. But there are serious difficulties with any proposal to understand the connection between intelligible model and sensible copy in terms of causal relations alone, not the least of which is that Plotinus often speaks of the connection as involving likeness as well as causality. "And it is just to say that in the Soul's becoming a good and beautiful thing is its becoming like (homoiothênai) to God, for from the Divine comes all the Beauty and all the Good in beings" (I.6.6). But the particular skin-color constituting a healthy complexion is not like the organic disposition which constitutes primary health, nor does it become more like it the healthier it becomes; organic health does not serve as the archetype for a rosy glow.

Plotinus's frequent references to likeness might be puzzling if the causal relation between Form and particular were one of Aristotelian efficient causality; but of course the relation is instead one of formal (or "eidetic") causality, and this arguably requires formal similarity between cause and effect. Prof. Strange, after concluding that "The F-itself is F" just means that the F-itself is the cause of F-ness for things that are F," admits the unsatisfactoriness of this result:
But this cannot be all that it means. This analysis of self-predications only has them attributing an external relation to the Form, its causality with respect to sensibles. But there are cases . . . where the self-predication is clearly supposed to attribute an intrinsic property to the Form . . . [T]alk about Forms, though necessarily involving metaphor, must have some content in its own right.¹⁴

That this content might include F-ness, where 'F' here is univocal with its predication of F-particulars, is of course ruled out by Prof. Strange's equivocationist reading of Plotinus. It is interesting to note the contrast with Plotinus's own treatment of the problem at V.5.2:

. . . the principle producing the beauty must be, itself, ugly, neutral, or beautiful: ugly, it could not produce the opposite; neutral, why should its product be the one rather than the other? The Nature, then, which creates things so lovely must be itself of a far earlier beauty . . .

That the exemplar is supposed to answer the question why its product is beautiful rather than ugly. It could hardly do this if 'beautiful' when said of the exemplar meant nothing more than 'productive of beauty'. For the problem at hand, pros hen unity represents only a marginal gain over "homonymity by chance," and Plotinus appears to recognize this.

In sum, it is hard to see how the kind of equivocation needed to block the TMA can be defended in the face of the textual evidence (which is far from one-sidedly equivocationist) as well as the metaphysical role assigned to the Plotinian archetypes (which appears to require a measure of univocity). The claim that Plotinus would dissolve the TMA by rejecting SP is so far unsupported.

III

One response to these difficulties with equivocationism is to embrace a univocal account of self-predication. If such an account can be defended on behalf of Plotinus, it will mean that a Neoplatonic solution to the TMA must be sought in one of the premises other than SP.

A univocal account of Plotinian self-predication is defended by Prof. Fielder. He finds evidence against equivocal SP in Plotinus's "Copy Theory," which provides for both the ontological relationship of Form and image (partaking, participation) and the epistemological connection that makes sensibles likenesses of Forms. Forms are able to be immanently present in their sensible copies, and it is the actual presence of the Form that makes a sensible individual a copy of it.¹⁵

How far Prof. Fielder is willing to take the "Copy Theory" in the direction of univocity is revealed in a later article, with the help of Gregory Vlastos's notion of "epsilon predication" (in which the copula's job is to place the referent of the subject-term in the extension of the predicate-term).¹⁶ "Socrates is wise," for example, is an epsilon predication because it "asserts that Socrates belongs to the class of wise individuals. . . . Many true assertions about Forms have this character, for example, 'Justice ε incorporeal' or 'Justice ε intelligible'."¹⁷ Prof. Vlastos (and many others) have thought, however, that to read "Justice is just" as "Justice ε just" is downright absurd; hence his suggestion that such statements might be read more sensibly as "Pauline predications" whose real function is to ascribe the predicate to the Form's instances rather than to the Form itself. On this view, "Justice is just (good, equitable)" is shorthand for the claim that just actions (etc.) are just (good, equitable); it is not to be understood as the assertion that Justice Itself is one of the many just things.¹⁸ Prof. Fielder, however, is prepared to defend "Justice ε just," at least on behalf of Plotinus. Whether the subject of "X is just" is Socrates or Justice, in either case "the predicate asserts the presence of Justice in the subject. . . . Although there are important differences in the two propositions that 'justice is just' and 'Socrates is just,' the predicate has the same meaning."¹⁹

Unfortunately, this position carries two liabilities which mirror the problems with equivocationism. The first is that Prof. Fielder has little to say about the texts that appear to
support equivocation. A faithful rendering of Plotinus's position on self-predication must take both his sides into account, and it's not clear that either of the extreme readings can do this. The second problem is that Prof. Fielder's interpretation raises serious difficulties for the theory it is designed to save. He maintains, for example, that Justice $\varepsilon$ just; on the same grounds, presumably, he would hold that Corporeality $\varepsilon$ corporeal. But he also holds that Justice $\varepsilon$ incorporeal; for the same reason he would have to allow that Corporeality $\varepsilon$ incorporeal. So 'corporeal' and 'incorporeal' both turn out to be epsilon predications of Corporeality. The Forms would hardly be worth saving from the TMA if they were such damaged goods to begin with. And there is a further problem. In virtue of self-predication, the Form of Rest is at rest and the Form of Identity is self-identical; but in virtue of being Forms, the Form of Rest is also self-identical and the Form of Identity at rest. If all of these are equally epsilon predications, how does the Form of Rest differ from the Form of Identity? In his critique of equivocal SP, Prof. Fielder argued that "without some kind of likeness we cannot associate the image with that of which it is an image or contrast it with other things of which it is not an image." \(^{20}\) Ironically, this turns out to be a problem with his own theory as well.

Since this defense of univocal SP, like the earlier defense of equivocal SP, leaves too many questions unresolved, it provides little guidance in divining Plotinus's answer to the TMA.

IV

Clearly we have not followed the dialectic of equivocity v. univocity as far as it is capable of going.\(^{21}\) But I think we have seen enough to motivate a look at alternative responses to the TMA. There are three that I think hold special promise, though I can do little more now than mention them. The first is to concede Parmenides' attack on the unity of the Forms, something Plotinus appears to do in any case, given his references to Nous as the one-many. Plotinus is simply not as committed as Plato to stopping the regress at the level of Nous: "since the realm to which Plato's highest genera pertain is not ultimate but derivative," writes John P. Anton, "their ontological significance cannot possibly be that which Plato assigned to them when he understood them as having ontological primacy."\(^{22}\) The concession to Parmenides is not fatal, then, because Plotinus has available to him an Absolute Unity beyond Intelligence, one that plays a more integral role in his system than it does in Plato's. With the locus of unity shifted from the Forms to the One, Plotinus can stop the regress at that point, since the One transcends unrestricted OM and univocal SP:

but amid all these things of beauty [i.e., the Forms] we cannot but ask whence they come and whence the beauty. This source can be none of the beautiful objects; it must stand above all the powers, all the patterns. The origin of all this must be the formless--formless not as lack-ing shape but as the very source of even shape Intellectual. (VI.7.32)

The manhood of Socrates and of the Form of Man do require a joint explanation, but it is to be given in terms of the One, not of a Third Man.

The second alternative takes advantage of the fact that Parmenides is marshalling the TMA, not against the Forms per se, but against a reason for positing Forms: "I imagine your ground for believing in a single Form in each case is this," Parmenides offers by way of preface to the TMA. This ground might be undercut while leaving the Forms themselves (and other grounds for accepting them) intact. This opens up some maneuvering room for responses to the TMA, which Plotinus is again in a better position than Plato to exploit. Michael F. Wagner limns the relevant issue as follows:

Plotinus conceives of the one-over-many problem in a quite different manner from the way it is commonly presented. A common way of presenting the problem would be by the question: Given that there are many individual $F$'s, for example, how is each of them equally $F$? . . . Plotinus, however, takes the interesting and puzzling question to be a quite different one: Given that there is, say, $F$, how can there be individual $F$'s?\(^{23}\)
The TMA, however, presupposes the first way of conceiving the problem: "when it seems to you that a number of things are large, there seems, I suppose, to be a certain single character which is the same when you look at them all." Since Plotinus presupposes the second way of viewing the one-many problem, he might well find the TMA a non-starter. It's not that he would reject Parmenides' formulation; but his confidence in unity is not dependent on an argument from multiplicity like the one the TMA attributes to the Platonist. It is interesting in this regard that the only reference to a "third man" to be found in the *Enneads* is to a man who is third in order of descent from the intelligible Man, not one who is third in ascent, as would be required if the TMA is to generate a multiplicity of Forms.24

Finally, it is worth revisiting SP. When affirming that F belongs to both the Form of F-ness and to F-particulars, the options are not restricted to 'F' being equivocal, on the one hand, or belonging in the same way to Form and particular, on the other; it is also possible that 'F' is univocal but that its manner of belonging is equivocal. Plotinus, with his novel analysis of the inner structure of the Intelligences, has resources to pursue this option that Plato lacked. "[T]he unity they form is two-sided," he explains; "there is Intellectual-Principle as against Being, the intellectual agent as against the object of intellection; we consider the intellective act and we have the Intellectual-Principle; we think of the object of that act and we have Being" (V.1.4).

Intellection requires a unity with two poles: the intellectual agent (Intellectual-Principle), and the object of intellection (Being). The former gives the characteristic act of intelligible beings (the nature of Ideas, if you will); the latter their content (what distinguishes each Idea from the rest). "If, then, the Intellection is an act upon the inner content (of the Intellectual-Principle), that content is the Form, and the Form is the Idea" (V.9.8). F belongs to the Form of F-ness as its content, not as a predicate (even an essential predicate). So SP is false, even though 'F' itself is univocal.

This last is the one that I think most worth developing. To distinguish, as Plotinus appears to do, between those general terms that convey the content of a concept (as 'F' does with respect to the Form of F-ness), and those that predicate properties of the concept (as 'intelligible' does with respect to the same--or any--Form), is a signal achievement. This makes Plotinus peculiarly modern, the precursor of those who, like Prof. Vlastos, regard SP as not so much false as absurd. Inasmuch as this third alternative, unlike the first two, is a direct competitor of the equivocal and univocal readings canvassed earlier in this paper, it is perhaps a bit unfair to recommend it in passing without subjecting it to the same critical examination. I expect it would illuminate the texts better than its rivals, though some (how could it be otherwise with Plotinus?) would doubtless remain recalcitrant. Showing this satisfactorily, however, will have to be deferred until another occasion.

WORKS CITED

----. *Nichomachean Ethics*.

Plotinus. *Enneads*.


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1 The analysis was first offered in "The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides," *Philosophical Review* 63 (July 1954), pp. 319-349. Many alternatives to Vlastos's reading have been put forward, but all acknowledge that the jobs performed by Vlastos's three premises must get done in one way or another, even if not all are done via independent premises. This, along with the fact that the issues which divide these readings are irrelevant to the business of the present paper, is enough to justify employing the familiar Vlastos reading rather than one of its less familiar rivals.
2 I have in mind the following accounts. F.M. Schroeder, in "Representation and Reflection in Plotinus," *Dionysius* 4 (December 1980), finds in Plotinus a "doctrine of dynamic continuity" (p. 48) whose significance "lies in the proposition that the intelligible world is not merely represented by the things in the world of sense. It is truly present to them" (p. 50). John H. Fielder, commenting on Plotinus's claim that sensible substances are simply coagulations of properties in matter, argues in his essay "Plotinus on Self-Predication" in R. Baine Harris, ed., *The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach*, Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern, v. 4 (Norfolk, Virginia: International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, 1982), that such properties are the intelligible realities themselves, immanent in the sense world: "the properties that make up sensible existents are the Forms themselves" (p. 88). And Michael F. Wagner has this to say in "Plotinus' World," *Dionysius* 6 (December 1982): "I shall argue that, while intelligibles and perceptibles are distinguishable from one another as objects for different modes of apprehension, they are not separate and distinct sets of entities. That they might seem separate from one another results from our common but mistaken belief that the objects of our perceptions exist among our sense images and from our misunderstanding the nature of perceptual apprehension itself" (p. 14). Since it is already the case, on the views just quoted, that the Form which accounts for the F-ness of sensible particulars is not something above and beyond the instances of F-ness which the Form explains, it is arguably only a short step to the position that the Form which accounts for the F-ness of the set consisting of the original Form and sensible particulars is nothing above and beyond the members of this set (including the original Form), thereby stopping the regress before it can get going. For a less hospitable view of immanence, see Steven K. Strange, "Plotinus' Account of Participation in Ennead VI.4-5," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 30 (October 1992), who writes: "Immanent form is Form seen as--_falsely_ seen as--belonging to the participant . . . [It] is a misperception of the presence of a particular participation-relation" (p. 495).

4 All quotations are taken from the MacKenna-Page translation.
5 The contrast is repeated later at V.8.13: "But since that father [the Absolute or One] is too lofty to be thought of under the name of Beauty, the second God [the Authentic-Beauty of the Intellectual-Principle] remains the primally beautiful."

9Invoking unity suggests that the correct account of beauty might cover the One as well. Later (I.6.7) he provides such an account: "Anyone that has seen This [the Good], knows what I intend when I say that it is beautiful. It is desired as the goal of desire." I see no reason to regard the great difference between the desirability of the Good and the desirability of phenomenal goods as involving an equivocation on the term 'desirable'.


11Metaphysics Γ 1003a34-b5; K 1060b36-1061a7.


13Cf. Steven K. Strange, "Plotinus' Account of Participation in Ennead VI.4-5," op. cit., pp. 484-85: "The activity of the soul through its logos in shaping matter is what we might call its 'demiurgic' activity, having to do with the production of sensible properties: this would correspond to something like Aristotelian efficient causality. Participation, however, which is what Plotinus is concerned with in our treatise, corresponds rather to formal causality, that is, not to the explanation of how something comes to have a certain property, but rather to the explanation of what it is for it to have that property . . ." Prof. Strange does not, however, draw from this the moral that formal cause and effect must be similar.

14"Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the 'Categories'," op. cit., p. 973.


17"Plotinus on Self-Predication," op. cit., p. 85.

18Pauline predications are so-called after a notable practitioner, St. Paul, who writes in I Cor. 13: "Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; . . ." Prof. Strange does not, however, draw from this the moral that formal cause and effect must be similar.


21Insofar as a dialectic of thesis v. antithesis calls for a synthesis, it is worth looking at the one offered by F.M. Schroeder, who distinguishes between "attributes of similarity" and "attributes of imitation," the first of which can be predicated univocally of Forms and particulars but the second of which can only be predicated equivocally. I hope to give Prof. Schroeder's position the attention it deserves on another occasion. See his "The Platonic Parmenides and Imitation in Plotinus," Dionysius 2 (December 1978), pp. 51-73, where he addresses the TMA; also his "Representation and Reflection in Plotinus," op. cit.

22"Plotinus' Approach to Categorical Theory," op. cit., p. 84.

23"Plotinus' World," op. cit., p. 31.

24VI.7.6.