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Author(s): PHIL HUTCHINSON

Source: *Metaphilosophy*, October 2007, Vol. 38, No. 5 (October 2007), pp. 691-713

Published by: Wiley

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24439849

WHAT'S THE POINT OF ELUCIDATION?

PHIL HUTCHINSON

Abstract: In this article I examine three ways in which one might interpret
Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*). In a partial response to Hans-
Johann Glock's article in this journal, I suggest that since publication *PI* has,
broadly speaking, been interpreted in three ways: doctrinal; elucidatory; or
therapeutic. The doctrinal interpretation is shown to be, at best, difficult to
sustain textually. The elucidatory (standard) interpretation, though seemingly
closer to the text, is shown both to implicate Wittgenstein in some unfortunate
philosophical commitments and to face a problem of "motivation." I argue that,
correctly understood, any attempt to elucidate in *PI* is undertaken only in pursuit
of the therapeutic goal. I conclude by arguing that the therapeutic interpretation is
the only interpretation that can adequately make sense of Wittgenstein's text as a
whole and the metaphilosophical remarks in particular. Furthermore, it is the
only interpretation that can demonstrate Wittgenstein's continued importance
and relevance as a philosopher.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Glock, Hacker, use-theory
of meaning, therapy, elucidation, doctrine.

In a recent article in this journal, Hans-Johann Glock (2004) reflected
upon and offered an answer to the question as to whether Wittgenstein
was an analytic philosopher. Glock's exercise made for an interesting read
and, in a manner similar to lists of top ten all-time greats (whether they be
of boxers, ballroom dancers, or philosophers), will no doubt spark much
debate. *Debate*, of course, is not new to Wittgenstein scholarship. In what
follows I shall not be too concerned with whether or not Wittgenstein was
an analytic philosopher; I am quite satisfied to let Glock's conclusion on
that matter stand, for what it is worth. However, I do want to address
some of the details of Glock's argument; in particular, I am interested in
Glock's brief taxonomy of different readings of Wittgenstein and in his
claims about Wittgenstein's method. I shall take Glock's remarks as a
platform from which to discuss Wittgenstein's method and the inter-
pretation and significance one ought to accord the metaphilosophical
remarks in *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*).[1]

[1] The metaphilsophical remarks in *PI* are to be found at roughly *PI* §§ 89–184, though
the whole book can be seen as reflection on philosophical method.

PHIL HUTCHINSON

I shall argue that only one way of reading *PI*—what I shall term here the therapeutic reading—does justice to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical remarks and avoids implicating Wittgenstein in some (to say the least) undesirable philosophical commitments. This will have implications beyond Wittgenstein exegesis. For if Wittgenstein scholarship is to be anything other than something of interest to historians of our subject, Wittgenstein must be seen to have relevance to current debates within that subject; all too often this is seen not to be the case. Arguing for a therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein is at the same time an argument for a therapeutic vision of philosophical method.

Glock begins by distinguishing between rational/analytic and irrationalist interpretations; we are then treated to a taxonomy of irrationalist interpretations: existential interpretations, therapeutic interpretations, aspect interpretations, nonsense interpretations, genre interpretations, and postmodern interpretations (2004, 422–23).[2] The list is confusing. Let me take an indicative sample; while nonsense interpretations feature in the list these are indexed only to James Conant's and Cora Diamond's ("resolute") readings of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Therapeutic interpretations are mentioned in relation to *PI*, but it is O. K. Bouwsma's reading that is cited as representative of such an interpretation. Gordon Baker's (post-1990, post–Baker and Hacker) self-proclaimed "radically therapeutic" reading of *PI* (see Baker 2004, passim) is cast by Glock not as therapeutic but as an aspect interpretation. Without dwelling for too long on Glock's taxonomy, we might note some peculiarities. First, Bouwsma is singled out as representative of the therapeutic interpretation, but he is neither the most prominent nor the most detailed exponent of such. Baker is identified as representative of the aspect interpretation,[3] and thus excluded from being a representative of the therapeutic interpretation, despite his explicit (published) remarks to the contrary.[4] Stephen Mulhall (1990, 2001a, 2001b),[5] who for fifteen years has argued for the importance of aspect seeing to an understanding of *PI* (though in a way that is different from Baker) does not feature, and neither does Stanley Cavell. Furthermore, while Baker aligns his own mature

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[2] The danger of such a taxonomy, as I think Glock's list shows, is that it can, under a little scrutiny, be seen to resemble Jorge Luis Borges's Chinese Encyclopaedia rather than useful taxonomy compiled according to established criteria.

[3] Baker does regard aspect seeing as central to understanding *PI* aright (2004, passim, esp. chaps. 1, 3, 7, and 13). See also Hutchinson and Read (forthcoming).

[4] Baker's own characterisation of his reading of *PI* is as "*radically therapeutic*" (Baker 2004, chaps. 8, 9, and 10; my emphasis). This is not to say that "aspect seeing" is not central to Baker's reading, it is. Excluding Baker from the category of therapeutic interpretations and having him categorised as an aspect interpretation indicates the far from perspicuous nature of Glock's categorisation.

[5] This is an odd oversight on Glock's part, as Mulhall's paper "Seeing Aspects" (2001b), which, unsurprisingly, is on the subject and purpose of aspect seeing in *PI*, appeared in a collection edited by Glock (2001a).

interpretation of *PI* with Conant's and Diamond's interpretations, Conant and Diamond feature in Glock's list only as interpreters of the *Tractatus*.[6] Whatever strengths Glock's taxonomy might have, it does not serve as a reliable guide either to the secondary literature or to the dominant interpretations of *PI* and the dominant renditions of those interpretations.

In what follows I shall suggest three broad ways of categorising the dominant interpretations of Wittgenstein's *PI*; I shall call these the *doctrinal, elucidatory,* and *therapeutic* readings.[7] I choose these terms because they capture adequately three ways of taking *PI*. I seek to show that:

1) The doctrinal interpretation fails as an interpretation of the text, by:
   a) failing to acknowledge the modal terms which play a significant role in Wittgenstein's writing; and
   b) failing to take seriously Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical remarks.

2) The elucidatory interpretation, while seemingly taking Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical remarks seriously, ultimately commits Wittgenstein to untenable philosophical positions. These commitments, in being shown to be implied by the elucidatory reading, are also, by extension, implied by the doctrinal.

3) The therapeutic reading is the only reading that can:
   a) make sense of Wittgenstein's text as a whole; and
   b) avoid committing Wittgenstein to untenable philosophical positions.

I shall discuss the merits of each reading; by way of demonstrating the unsustainability of the elucidatory reading (and by extension the doctrinal), I shall contrast a therapeutic reading of *PI* § 1 with a prominent example of an elucidatory reading of the same passage.

Doctrine, Elucidation, Therapy

From circa 1929,[8] when Wittgenstein began dictating his newly emerging thoughts on philosophy to Friedrich Waismann, through to the remarks

[6] Baker explicitly aligned his mature reading of *PI* with those of Stanley Cavell, James Conant, Cora Diamond, and Burton Dreben (Baker 2004, 104).
[7] I agree (at least I take myself to agree) with Glock in not taking too seriously a postmodern interpretation—though much would depend on what was meant by that term.
[8] Wittgenstein had spent about ten years away from academic philosophy by this time. However, his *Tractatus* was published in English and German in the early 1920s. In the late 1920s, while still working as an elementary school teacher in Lower Austria, Wittgenstein was contacted by Friedrich Waismann, who wanted to discuss aspects of the *Tractatus* with which the Vienna Circle were concerned. Wittgenstein was contacted too by the Cambridge

on philosophy and method in *PI*, published in 1953, Wittgenstein would make reference to his methods as therapeutic.[9] That is to say, if one is to take Wittgenstein at his word the leitmotif of, and motivation for, his philosophical practice from 1929 onwards was to relieve mental disturbances brought about by struggling with philosophical problems.

The idea is that when the philosopher is faced with a seemingly insurmountable philosophical problem, that problem can often be traced to his being in the grip of a particular picture of how things must be. This picture's hold over the philosopher is unconscious or unacknowledged. The task for the philosophical therapist is to break the grip this picture has over her interlocutor, that is, to show him there are other ways of seeing things. This is effected by the Wittgensteinian philosophical therapist *facilitating* her interlocutor's realisation that other pictures are equally valid. The interlocutor then *freely* accepts the new picture (of, say, "meaning") as valid. The acceptance of new pictures serves to loosen the thought-constraining grip of the old picture, the picture that had led the philosopher to the seemingly insurmountable philosophical problem, and thus to suffering the resultant mental disturbance.

For example, if a philosopher is inclined to talk of or theorise about the mind/human mental capacities in a certain, say Fodorian, way, we might trace this myopia, with respect to other ways of speaking of the mind/mental capacities, to the philosopher's unacknowledged attachment to a particular picture of (say) explanation—for example, that explanation must always be in terms of providing a materialist-causal account of the domain in need of explanation. It is not, therefore, that such philosophers don't *know* the meaning of the word "mind" or its possible uses, it is only that they are blind to such meanings or possible uses—such aspects—because they are in thrall to a particular picture of the way things must be; in the case of the example I suggest here, they might be in thrall to a picture of explanation-as-materialist-causal. This picture might constrain the philosophers in form—explanation must always be *modelled* on it (its form): for example, a Fodorian computational theory of mind. Or the picture might constrain them in content—explanation must always be of this *type*: for example, cognitive neuroscience. By facilitating

mathematician Frank Ramsey, who also wanted to raise certain issues regarding the *Tractatus*. It appears that these discussions tempted Wittgenstein back to philosophy. For biographical details see Ray Monk's *Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (London: Vintage, 1991).

[9] In addition to *PI* § 133, see Wittgenstein 2003, 28, and 1978, § 410 (Big Typescript). Also see Waismann 1969 and Baker 2004, chaps. 8, 9, and 10. Even though the textual support for this claim is strong, some still question the centrality of therapy, on the grounds that Wittgenstein does not mention it more often. Without debating how often he might have mentioned therapy in order to have precluded these disputes, there is another response to such a qualm. For therapy to be effective one has to be somewhat covert in one's therapeutic intentions and practice; that is to say, one needs to have bad money accepted as good.

our interlocutor's realisation that other forms of explanation are valid, facilitating her acknowledgement of the viability of other pictures of explanation, we thereby facilitate her unfettering from the thought-constraining grip of the original picture.[10]

The depiction of philosophers as prone to philosophy-induced mental disturbances is apt to sound somewhat eccentric, particularly in the early twenty-first-century academic world of professionalised philosophy.[11] It might, though, seem more plausible when we consider the seriousness with which Wittgenstein and those philosophers he knew and with whom he worked closely treated philosophical problems. It is now well documented that Wittgenstein, Russell, and Frege all suffered deep mental anxieties, nagging doubts, and even, on occasion, suicidal thoughts when struggling with the problems of logic.[12] However, one need neither appeal to nor rely on biographical support here; there's another way of making this, at first glance eccentric, claim seem plausible. One should not see a philosophical problem as *causing* a mental disturbance but rather see a philosophical problem *as* a mental disturbance.[13] This ties in with Wittgenstein's claim that the problems of philosophy are problems of the will, not of the intellect; our inability to acknowledge other pictures of how things might be stems from certain pathologies. Put another way, Wittgenstein saw philosophical problems as (took them to be) existential problems; thus their treatment was to take the form of therapeutic treatment of the person and that person's mode of engagement with the world: his or her mode of being in the world. That is, it is *not* to take the form of dealing with the problem in the abstract.

The invocation of the term "therapy" or "therapeutic" tends to cause some consternation among analytic philosophers, who seem to see any allusion to Freud and/or psychoanalysis as a grave error on Wittgenstein's part. Wittgenstein's relationship to Freud initially appears extremely complicated. Throughout Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* there are many references to the father of psychoanalysis. Indeed, Wittgenstein is often disdainful of Freud's claims, though on other occasions he praises his brilliance. How does one understand these seemingly contradictory

[10] There are of course many pictures that might exercise a grip over such philosophers; at root the picture we might discern to be leading to their myopia could be a picture of the world as disenchanted—mechanistic, or even as brute Given—unconceptualised.

[11] Indeed, it might be suggested that today's professional philosopher is more likely to be prone to mental anxieties owing to the ever-increasing number of non-philosophy-related administrative duties she is asked to undertake, all the while still being expected (the pressure on her is continually increased) to demonstrate research prowess.

[12] See Monk's two biographies of Russell: *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996) and *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness* (London: Vintage, 2001). And see his biography of Wittgenstein (see my n. 9) for biographical support.

[13] It is instructive to try to genuinely grasp what it would be to truly be an external-world sceptic (or for that matter an other-minds sceptic). Would not inhabiting such a way of being be to suffer a mental disturbance?

remarks? Well there are two, related, answers. The first is that, in a manner similar to Weininger, Wittgenstein was attracted to Freud by what was wrong, and fundamentally so, in his writings; this is an aspect of Wittgenstein's admiration for a number of figures (Goethe is another, Frege, too, might be another) who are wrong but "great," because of the way they have created myths of extraordinary power, persuasiveness, and lucidity. The second answer is that on close inspection Wittgenstein's remarks turn out not to be contradictory. What Wittgenstein deplores in Freud is his scientism, while what he sees as "brilliant" is perhaps above all Freud's devising of the therapeutic method. Freud is emblematic of the "darkness of the times" (*PI*, Preface) owing to his propensity to wrap up the therapeutic method with a metaphysics of mind for which he then claims scientific credentials. Wittgenstein, therefore, takes on none of Freud's psychological *theory*, he takes only the therapeutic *method*. The correct way of characterising the relationship of Wittgenstein to Freud might begin with noting that the analogy is between Wittgenstein's method and psycho*therapy* as an activity and not between his philosophy and psycho*analysis* as a *theory*. For an insightful discussion of the relationship see Bouveresse (1995) and Baker (2004, chaps. 9 and 10).

Despite these reasons for taking the therapy analogy seriously, since the publication of *PI* in 1953 characterisation of Wittgenstein's philosophy as therapeutic has, in the main, been downplayed. One can, broadly speaking, categorise the reception of *PI* in three ways: doctrinal, elucidatory, and therapeutic.

The doctrinal reading of *PI* claims that in *PI* Wittgenstein advances (putatively non-metaphysical)[14] doctrines, such as the use-theory of meaning, a logical-behaviourist theory of the mind, a refutation of the possibility of a private language (i.e., demonstrating the logical impossibility thereof), and in doing so refutes Cartesianism, and so on. Remarks such as *PI* §§ 109 and 126 to 133 are discounted or downplayed as merely pieces of purple prose or products of Wittgenstein's eccentricity. Saul Kripke, Norman Malcolm, and Peter Strawson are notable advocates of the doctrinal reading. The problem this reading faces as an exegesis of Wittgenstein's writings is that it simply ignores his explicit remarks concerning the offering of explanation and the advancement of theses in philosophy. It further ignores Wittgenstein's carefully chosen use of modal terms in his "substantive" remarks (about, say, "meaning") and in his remarks about the remit of the philosophical task; in the former, other possibilities are emphasised, while in the latter they are not.

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[14] This is one of the ways these readers claim *PI* differs from the *Tractatus*. It is claimed that where the *Tractatus* advances a metaphysical thesis *PI* advances non-metaphysical theses by way of criticism and correction of the former. This is a view that holds little sway among Wittgenstein exegetes now, though it was standard immediately following the publication of *PI* and is still relatively common among those who take themselves to be employing Wittgenstein in the social sciences.

Doctrine, Meaning, and Use

When doctrinal readers talk of Wittgenstein's use-theory of meaning, they fail to note two things of importance: They fail to note the modal terms employed in certain crucial passages; and they fail to note the explicit rejection of the advancement of philosophical theses. Consider Wittgenstein's remarks on his own methods in the following small indicative selection. First, *PI* § 109: "We must do away with all *explanation*. And description alone must take its place. . . . The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."[15] And § 126: "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. . . . One might give the name "philosophy" to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions." Again, § 128: "If one tried to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them." It is important to note Wittgenstein's use of modal terms in these remarks. These are not used lightly by the later Wittgenstein. For example, he is at pains, when he talks of seeing meaning as use, to guard against one taking him as making any substantive and general claim about the phenomenon of meaning. In *PI* § 43 he writes, "In a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. . . . And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*." It would pay many readers to give some attention to such distinctions, and to the last, frequently overlooked, sentence-long paragraph of the remark. Anyone who came to this remark via a reading of Strawson, Kripke, or Malcolm on "Wittgenstein's use-theory of meaning" would be apt to find the wording here very odd (eccentric, careless?).[16]

Doctrinal readers, therefore, in advancing a use-theory of meaning in Wittgenstein's name, ignore the caveats and clauses (such as those in *PI* § 43) clearly designed to guard against such a characterisation; they compound this error by ignoring the explicit rejection of the attempt to

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[15] When quoting Wittgenstein I use underlining for emphasis within direct quotations, so as not to interfere with his quite sophisticated use of single quotation marks and italics in *PI*.

[16] Others who explicitly attribute to Wittgenstein in *PI* a use-theory of meaning include the following: Alston (1964), Apel (1980, 1), Avramides (1997, 62), Davies (2003, 125), Habermas (1986, 115; 1995, 58 and 62–64), Horwich (1995, 260–61 and passim; 1998a, 69–71 and 93–94; 1998b, passim), Strawson (1971, 172), and von Savigny (1993). Some authors seem simply confused on the matter: Wilson (1998) talks throughout of Wittgenstein's use-theory of meaning while noting in the same text (45–46) that Wittgenstein does *not* propound—either intentionally or unintentionally—a use-theory of meaning; why, one might then well ask, does Wilson proceed to use the phrase throughout his book?

advance philosophical theses in *PI* § 128. A "use-theory of meaning" does not sound like a thesis that cannot be "debated" or with which everyone agrees (contra *PI* § 128); it does, however, sound like something that if it is to be a valid "theory of meaning" must apply to all classes of cases in which we employ the word "meaning" (contra *PI* § 43).

Of course, pointing to these phrasings is unlikely to win over the doctrinal reader. These remarks appeared as such in the first editions of *PI*, and so were there for all to see. However, I think that close attention to the phrasing of certain remarks, and a commitment to not dismissing out of hand those metaphilosophical remarks that do not fit our own philosophical predilections, can help open one to a more fruitful way of reading *PI*. For now I rest satisfied that highlighting such phrasings will be enough to facilitate openness to alternative ways of reading the text. As I progress, I will endeavour to provide what I consider to be the most satisfactory reading in terms of an interpretation of the text and in terms of philosophical method.

Elucidation and/or Therapy

The elucidatory reading of *PI* claims that in *PI* Wittgenstein seeks to elucidate the grammar of our language, providing a perspicuous representation or overview of that grammar, that is, the grammatical rules we follow or with which we act in accord in order to make sense in and of our language. Baker and Hacker (1980, 1983), Glock (1989, 2004), P. M. S. Hacker (1986, 1996, 2001a, 2001b), Paul Johnston (1989), and Anthony Kenny (1984) are notable advocates of the elucidatory reading; Dan Hutto (2003) has argued for a delimited (one might say, less Rylean) form of elucidatory reading.

The problem elucidatory interpretations face is that they (at the least) tacitly presuppose that language is rule-governed and surveyable, in a somewhat Rylean manner.[17] This leads to two further problems: first, Wittgenstein would seem, after all, to hold, (albeit) tacitly, a theory

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[17] The predication of Wittgenstein as an ordinary language philosopher has done much to foster this view. Indeed, the term "ordinary language philosopher" has always been misleading; even were one to leave out Wittgenstein, the aligning of Ryle with Austin causes as many problems as it solves. Whatever similarities Ryle and Wittgenstein might have, Ryle's notion of logical grammar as something that is fruitful to map, like Carnap's notion of logical syntax, is not shared by the later Wittgenstein (not even under a different name). There are some sections of *Philosophical Grammar*, which is taken from an early 1930s manuscript (and the *Blue Book*), that can lend themselves to a somewhat Rylean (or Carnapian) inflected reading, but there too close attention to phrasing pays dividends. For what one finds is Wittgenstein referring to "our language" (1978, 115), not "language" *simpliciter*. Indeed, it is important to note (following Baker 2004, 52–73) that when Wittgenstein employs the term "Sprache" he does so almost always in a way best translated as "what we say" or "our language."

of "language";[18] and second, Wittgenstein becomes little more than a Rylean, though one who could just not write his thoughts in the form of a philosophical argument.[19] So is Wittgenstein wrong about advancing no theses? Is Wittgenstein's style, after all, merely a stylistic tic?

Elucidation and "Language Viewed from Sideways On"

What characterises what I am here terming the elucidatory reading of *PI* is an emphasis on providing an overview of language and the importance of "mapping" that language as something that serves a purpose distinct from the therapeutic purpose of the text. Kenny writes, "One feature of all this is important to emphasise in order to reconcile the *overview theory of philosophy* with the therapeutic theory of philosophy" (1984, 45; my emphasis). Hacker (1986, 151, 177–78; 1996, 232–38; 2001a, 23, 31, 37; 2001b, 333–41) talks of two distinct tasks being undertaken in *PI*, "therapy" and "connective analysis," where the latter is undertaken by surveying and mapping the rules of our grammar.[20] Johnston writes, "Thus for Wittgenstein, the remedy for the conceptual confusions manifested in philosophy lies in attaining an *Übersicht* of the particular segment of language concerned. Puzzled by the deceptive similarities of surface grammar, we must note grammatical differences and seek to *map out* the network of conceptual relations involved. A clearer view of the linguistic facts will dispel the fog of confusion" (1989, 7; my emphasis).

In talking of an "overview of language," our "surveying the rules of grammar," or an overview providing us with a "clear view of linguistic facts" we imply that there exists some*thing*, some bounded entity: "language." This "language" must have a discernable form that is static enough (i.e., not fluid or in flux) for us to survey and map according to certain criteria—those provided by our conception of (relatively stable) grammatical rules. And not only that; this reading also requires that such a mapping be useful in the future (thus implying the relative stability of

[18] At least it presupposes that Wittgenstein does think and/or assume it is possible to view language from a vantage point outside it, as it were. This would amount to being able to have, at least in principle, a theory of "language"; at least, if one can view language from "sideways on," what prevents and/or deters us from having a theory or an explanation of that (viewed) "language"? I make a case for elucidatory readers implying an external viewpoint on "language" below.

[19] Glock writes, "Wittgenstein scholarship and Wittgensteinian philosophy can profit from reconstructing his ideas in an analytic fashion" (2004, 420). Furthermore, *what*, one might ask, is the *Analytical Commentary on the* Philosophical Investigations for? It putatively serves to translate Wittgenstein's *PI* into the language of contemporary analytical philosophy. (See, for example, what Baker and Hacker write about their project on pp. 4–5 of their 1980.) Other good examples of this tendency are Glock 1989 and Schroeder 2001 (on the so-called Private Language Argument). All these readers seem to assume that *PI* is in need of translating into a more conventional form so that we might appreciate the *arguments* therein, hitherto unnoticed.

[20] "Connective analysis" is P. F. Strawson's term, not Wittgenstein's.

those rules into the future). The approach, further, would seem to be at
best sceptical of, and at worst proscribe, linguistic creativity and innova-
tion. In advocating a method for discerning the rules with which we must
act in accord so that we might know our way about and not transgress, on
pain of uttering nonsense and/or lapsing into metaphysics, this view also
precludes poetic innovation. The elucidatory view therefore implies both
(a) what John McDowell (1999, 44) has termed the ability to "view
language from sideways on" and (b) a (related) form of linguistic
conservatism.

    These are quite severe limitations. The only way to avoid such drastic
(and, to my mind, unwelcome) consequences is to understand (and insist
upon) recourse to "grammar" as being in the person- or purpose-relative
sense. The terms "language" and "grammar" in *PI* ought not to be read
as referring to some surveyable "entities" separable from our practices
and our lives in the world but as "what *we* say" and "what *we* are happy
to acknowledge as the rules with which *we* act in accordance," respec-
tively.[21] One can stipulate the rules of grammar, but only if one wishes to
accept the metaphysical and conservative implications; neither of these
implications is easily wedded to Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical re-
marks.

    There is a further problem for elucidatory readers. They wish to
sustain the claim that there are two discrete tasks that Wittgenstein
executes in *PI*, one therapeutic and the other elucidatory. While one
might question whether such an elucidatory task is, in fact, undertaken in
PI, there is another problem that Glock, Hacker, et al. face. The problem
is this: If therapy and elucidation (connective analysis, perspicuous
representation) are distinct endeavours, though both undertaken in *PI*,
then what motivates the elucidations? It is difficult, without rela-
ting—that is, subsuming—the practice of elucidating to the therapeutic
thrust of *PI*, to understand why Wittgenstein would want to engage in
such clarifications of our language. For if the clarification of our grammar
is not occasion-sensitive and is not carried out on a case-by-case basis
with a particular interlocutor, then Wittgenstein, it seems, is embroiled in
something of a performative contradiction. For if clarification per se is a
goal, then it presupposes a particular view of how language *must* be. In
clarifying language in this way Wittgenstein is taken to dissolve philoso-
phical problems by showing us (clarifying, perspicuously representing to
us) the rules of our grammar (linguistic facts). Again this raises the
prospect of Wittgenstein, at a really quite basic level, contradicting his
own metaphilosophical remarks in the very text in which he makes those
remarks—a text, we should recall, he laboured over for sixteen years.
This "problem of motivation" then throws elucidatory readers back on to

    [21] Baker makes this point well in "Some Remarks on Language and Grammar" (2004,
chap. 2). He provides ample textual and contextual evidence for such a reading.

the problem stated earlier. If they insist upon elucidation (connective analysis, perspicuous representations of our grammar) as separate and distinct from therapy, then they must (at the least) imply that Wittgenstein does have a picture (or a theory) of "language," such that we can take up a stance external to that "language" and survey it, and that these elucidations serve some non-person-relative or non-purpose-relative and non-occasion-sensitive (hence, objective) elucidatory purpose.

The problems faced by an elucidatory reading, therefore, are as follows. An elucidatory reading implies that our grammar is relatively (relative to our lives) static; this in turn implies a linguistic conservatism that makes linguistic innovation, poetic use of language, and concept change through new discoveries (at best) difficult phenomena to understand. It fails to provide an account as to what motivates the elucidations; that is, if therapy is the motivation for elucidation, then the elucidations are person-relative or purpose-relative and occasion-sensitive and are not in any meaningful sense separable from the therapeutic task—they *are* the therapeutic task. If elucidation is not motivated by therapy, then we are thrown back on to our first point regarding the relatively static, and thus conservative, nature of "Wittgensteinian" grammatical rules.[22] The third problem is what animates the first—that this reading implies that there is some discrete item, or "entity," to which we might appeal in our adjudications: "language," "grammar of *the* language." This is really the root of all the problems—or better, the problems outlined are aspects of this picture. The elucidatory reading implies our ability to view "language" from sideways on. Not only is this textually erroneous (in *PI* and in the *Tractatus*),[23] it is a thought of which it is difficult to make any sense.[24]

The way out of the exegetical conundrum (and unfortunate philosophical commitment) is to see that if anything akin to connective analysis (elucidation, perspicuous representations of our language) is in play in *PI*, it is so in order to serve the therapeutic goal of the text. This, then, puts a different spin on how one interprets the clarifications—perspicuous presentations. The clarifications offered are, when read through the

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[22] If elucidatory readers do not hold this view of grammatical rules as relatively static then how do they suppose their mappings, their elucidations of these, settle philosophical disputes, one might ask.

[23] Recall Wittgenstein's remark in the preface to the *Tractatus:* "This book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense" (1922, 3). For an exploration of the implications of this passage, and other prefatory remarks in the *Tractatus*, see Hutchinson 2006.

[24] Simply put, how can we get outside language in order to think and talk about language? This is discussed at length (in tandem with Hacker's appeal to the mapping analogy) in Hutchinson and Read 2007.

hermeneutic of therapy, clarifications in the achievement sense. That is to
say, the presentations serve only as clarifications (as perspicuous) if our
interlocutor recognises them as such and is thus led to see other pictures
as equally as valid as the one that has hitherto held her in thrall, leading to
the seemingly insurmountable philosophical problem.

   The distinction between an elucidatory and a therapeutic reading
therefore has implications for how we, as readers, make sense of
Wittgenstein's remark at *PI* § 122 that a "perspicuous presentation is of
fundamental importance for us."[25] The elucidatory reading understands
"perspicuous presentation" in this passage in the *functional* sense: that is,
a perspicuous presentation is such if it fulfils the functional criteria
identified by the philosopher. This, as already mentioned, presupposes
that the philosopher has insight into the way our language actually is. On
the other hand, the therapeutic reading understands "perspicuous pre-
sentation" in the *achievement* sense: that is, something is a perspicuous
presentation only in so much as it achieves the task of facilitating our
interlocutor's aspect shift. This presupposes no special insight into how
language works but, rather, is dialogical (or therapeutic). The philoso-
phical therapist enters into dialogue with her interlocutor and seeks to
persuade him, through the use of examples, that there are other ways to
see things (for example, other ways to see "meaning"). If our interlocutor
freely accepts that there are other ways to see things, then the lure and thus
the thought-constraining grip of the picture are dissolved. The picture that
had initially led one to the philosophical problem does so no longer. Then,
and only then, has the philosophical therapist provided a presentation that
is perspicuous, and it is so, potentially, on this occasion only. The
therapist's role is, therefore, that of facilitator, not of legislator or
policeman.

   Another point of divergence between the two readings is how one
might interpret the "us" of *PI* § 122. For the elucidatory reading the
unavoidable implication is that the "us" refers to the philosophers who
have insight into the true workings of our language. This reading then
gives more weight to the charge that Wittgenstein is advocating a
somewhat intellectualist, philosophical policing of our grammar. For
therapeutic readers, such as Baker, however, the "us" of § 122 refers to
the practitioners of "our method": that is, philosophers who share this
therapeutic vision of philosophy (see Baker 2004, chaps. 1 and 9). In so
referring, the "us" does not necessarily invoke any special skill or insight
into the workings of our language on the part of the philosopher, it

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[25] I deliberately favour the translation as "perspicuous <u>presentation</u>" (as opposed to
"representation"). In doing so I follow Pleasants (1999) and Cavell (1996). This, prima facie,
small difference in translation does much to convey what is at stake between elucidatory
readers and therapeutic readers of *PI*. The genuine significance of perspicuous presentation
(contra elucidatory renderings of that concept in *PI*) is discussed in more detail in
Hutchinson and Read forthcoming.

merely denotes those who accept this vision of philosophy and practise philosophy therapeutically.

The Opening of PI: *What's the Point?*

Having moved through a critique of the elucidatory reading and begun to introduce certain therapeutic alternatives, I shall now continue to illustrate that critique and shall provide further support for a therapeutic interpretation by discussing the opening remark of *PI*. I shall do so by contrasting two readings: that offered by Baker and Hacker in volume 1 of the *Analytical Commentary on* Philosophical Investigations (1980) and that suggested by Mulhall in *Inheritance and Originality* (2001a). My reading of the significance of *PI* § 1 draws to an extent on Mulhall's reading. However, I find that the error made by Baker and Hacker and the fundamental significance, for Wittgenstein, of Augustine's picture of language (that which makes it potentially *deeply* misleading) is its *relational* nature.

Wittgenstein opens *PI* with a quotation from Augustine (which I quote in full):

[a] "When they (my elders) named some object and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires." (Augustine, *Confessions*, I.8)

[b] These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects — sentences are combinations of such names.—In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. The meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

[c] Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table," "chair," "bread," and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.

[d] Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples." He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks up the word "red" in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says a series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—up to the word "five" and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.—"But

how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"—Well I assume that he *acts* as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used. (*PI*, §1)

Now, the standard reading of *PI* § 1 reads it as purely an attack on the Augustinian picture of *language*.[26] Baker and Hacker consider this "Augustine's pre-theoretical, pre-philosophical picture of the working of language which informs Augustine's own remarks on language as well as a multitude of sophisticated philosophical analyses of meaning" (1980, 61). This picture of language, they tell us (45–59), provides the paradigm within which Frege (in *Foundations of Arithmetic*), Russell (in *Principles of Mathematics*), and Wittgenstein (in the *Tractatus*) were alleged to operate.[27] Baker and Hacker claim that what is of interest to Wittgenstein in *PI* § 1 is not an "'inner' and 'outer'" theory of mind, and other concerns that may be implicit in the passage from Augustine, but merely a number of related issues relating to word meaning. They write: "[Wittgenstein] is concerned only with the points explicit in the quotation in [a].[28] (iv) Words signify or name objects. (v) Sentences are combinations of words. (vi) That a word signifies a given object consists in the intention with which the word is used. (vii) The intention with which a word is used (i.e. the intention to *mean* that object) can be seen in behaviour, bodily movement, facial expression, tone of voice, etc." (61). The trip to the grocer in paragraph [d] is taken, by Baker and Hacker, to illustrate different *types* of words (63; my emphasis). "The example is designed to stress the fact that the contention that the three words are of different

[26] I use "standard reading" interchangeably with "elucidatory," as this is the standard interpretation in Wittgenstein scholarship at present. I have in mind, primarily, that offered in the *Analytical Commentary*, vols. 1–4. Cognate readings of *PI* are offered by Glock (1989, 2001b), Hacker (1996, 2001a, 2001b), Johnston (1989), Kenny (1984), and Schroeder (2001). Hutto (2003) and McGinn (1997) could fruitfully be seen to be on the fringes of the elucidatory camp. However, they both show more sensitivity to the therapeutic nature of the work, though they both, crucially, hold on to the thought that there must be something more. As we've seen, this is a move that has really quite unfortunate implications.

[27] It is of considerably more than mere passing note (given recent exegetical disputes) to observe that while Baker and Hacker argue the case for, and take themselves explicitly to have established the case for, Frege and Russell operating within this Augustinian paradigm, they—equally explicitly—stop short of making the same claims regarding Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. They write, "It would be *absurd* even to try to give here a definitive proof that the *Tractatus* conforms to an Augustinian picture of language. Instead, we shall simply show that this is a plausible view of the book.... The exclusion of all matters of 'psychology' differentiates Wittgenstein's logical atomism from Russell's. It also makes it *pointless* to search in the *Tractatus* for many of the theses characteristic of the Augustinian picture" (2005, 58–59; my emphasis). Nevertheless, they *do* "conclude" (by *asserting*) that Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* was working within the Augustinian paradigm, following Frege and Russell.

[28] Paragraph [a] of *PI* § 1.

types rests on the differences in the operations carried out in each case, and on *the ordering* of the operations" (63; my emphasis).

This underplays the significance, and is apt to mislead as to the purpose, of *PI* § 1:[d]. In what follows, I first outline a reading of [d] that I think captures the subtlety and nuance, not to mention the philosophical import, of the example. I do this taking my inspiration from Mulhall's reading of the passage.

There is something of a conundrum presented to all who pick up Wittgenstein's *PI*, particularly for those who read the opening as Baker and Hacker do. Why did Wittgenstein choose a passage from Augustine's *Confessions* and not one from a recognised work in the philosophical canon? Indeed, having chosen to cite Augustine's *Confessions* he then chooses to cite a passage from the autobiographical sections of the text rather than from the more overtly (indeed, explicitly) metaphysical sections. Furthermore, why did he choose to illustrate the limitations of the picture he identifies at play in the quote from Augustine with a rather eccentric depiction of a trip to the grocer? The shopper appears to be dumb, and the (rather mechanical) grocer keeps apples in drawers and counts them out individually after matching the colour to a colour chart.

Is it really a satisfying conclusion to write, as Baker and Hacker do, that the grocer example is an "illustration of different types of words"? That it shows "'five', 'red', and 'apple' are words *each one of which belongs to a type the use* of which is fundamentally different from the use of words of the other types.[29] To say that 'apple' is the name of a fruit, 'red' the name of a colour, and 'five' the name of a number would mask deep differences beneath superficial similarities. Again, one might think 'apple' involves correlation with an object, 'red' with a colour, and 'five' with counting objects of a type, so all words involve correlation with *something*. The web of deception is readily woven" (63; my emphasis). Well no, it is not a satisfying conclusion. It is not satisfactory because

(a) it leaves so many questions hanging in the air, and
(b) saying that each word belongs to a different type of use implies there is a "type of use" that can be associated with each word in the language, in abstraction from words being *put to* use, on occasions, in contexts, and by speakers.

Responding to both (a) and (b) is achieved by a more subtle reading of the passage. I shall begin with (b).

How does claiming that each word belongs to a type of use get us further than appealing to correlations with things, or words as names of

[29] In the second edition of the *Analytical Commentary*, revised by Hacker (2005), the use of the word "type" is replaced with the (unavoidably Rylean) term "category." Of late Hacker has explicitly argued that Wittgenstein invokes categories in this Rylean manner.

things? All we have in fact done is exchange "things" for a "*type* of use."
To come at this from one side, consider that both "five" and "red" can
name things when embedded in certain sets of practices. When playing
football I can readily name my mate Jim, the left back, "five," because
that is his number in the team, the number written on his shirt;
furthermore, it makes sense to do so, because there are two players
named Jim on our team. Similarly, Red Adair's friends were quite in
order when referring to him as (calling him by name) "red." It was his
name. The *suggestion* of an appeal to use that Wittgenstein makes in his
later work is not to show that words belong to different types of use
according to which we can classify them, replacing our crude grammatical
terms such as noun, verb, adjective, and the like. Rather, his suggestion is
that words *might* play many different sorts of roles, and the role they do
play depends on the use to which speakers put them in a context and on a
particular occasion. The point of an appeal to use is to remind us to pay
attention to how a word is being used, on a given occasion, in a given
context by a language user. Words do not belong to types of use.

The mistake, then, is the thought that what is problematic for
Wittgenstein—what he wants to critique in the opening remarks of *PI*
§ 1—is that words name things or correspond to objects, with the
emphasis laid on the *nature* of what is on the other side of the word-Φ
relationship. Rather, what I contend is problematic in the Augustinian
picture is that words *must* be *relational* at all—whether as names to the
named, words to objects, or "words" belonging to a "type of use."[30] It is
the necessarily *relational* character of the Augustinian picture that is apt
to lead us astray; Baker and Hacker, in missing this, ultimately replace it
with a picture that retains the necessary relationality, only recast. There is
no such thing as a word outside some particular use; but that is a claim
which is different from Baker and Hacker's claim that words belong to a
type of use. For a word *to be* is for a word *to be used*. Language does not
exist external to its use by us in the world. As I have already noted,
language cannot, in McDowell's phrase, be "viewed from sideways on,"
in the sense in which we cannot stand outside language in order that we
might talk about language. This is a thought that animates Wittgenstein's
thinking from the *Tractatus* onwards.[31]

The key to understanding *PI* § 1 is in reading the passage as a whole,
but with particular attention to the remark, towards the end, made by
Wittgenstein's interlocutor, and the way Wittgenstein responds. Recall, in

[30] It is important to note the "must" here. Of course, words often refer to things in a
trivial non-controversial sense; it is just that this is not a condition of their having meaning.
Also, I take it as unproblematic that "belonging" is a form of relationship. Belonging
denotes an (external) relationship holding between the possessor and the possessed. On
Baker and Hacker's account, certain words are possessed by certain types (categories) of use.
[31] See n. 24 above for Wittgenstein's prefatory remark from the *Tractatus*.

response to Wittgenstein's story, the interlocutor says, and Wittgenstein responds, as follows:

"But how does he [the grocer] know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"—Well I assume that he *acts* as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used.

The question to ask is, Why is Wittgenstein's interlocutor not satisfied with the scenario? What is it that she yearns for in asking her question? To take Baker and Hacker's line on this is to give no thought to the purpose of the interlocutor's remark and rather to interpret Wittgenstein's response to it as indicating that questions as to the genesis of "meaning" are not philosophical questions, as they are contingent and thus of no philosophical import (see 1980, 64). But Wittgenstein is the author of the interlocutor's question (it is his question, he has this yearning or he, at the least, sees it as a significant yearning to which philosophers are apt to be prone); why pose a question only to dismiss it as insignificant and inappropriate in the following sentence? A more satisfactory interpretation of the purpose of the interlocutor's question is Stephen Mulhall's.

Mulhall argues that the question invokes the notion of "meaning" coming from an inner mental process. The interlocutor is not satisfied with the explanation being given only with reference to outward criteria, or behaviour; the use of colour samples and the counting out of the apples one by one leaves her still wanting to know more about from where meaning might come. To Mulhall, "the cast of her [the interlocutor's] questions rather takes it for granted that nothing behavioural can settle the issue of understanding even in principle; only a transition to the entirely separate realm of the inner can give her the reassurance she craves" (2001a, 44).

Following Mulhall's remarks above, I contend that the grocer example in *PI* § 1 is analogous (a more profound precursor) to John Searle's (1980) Chinese Room thought experiment (or "intuition pump," in Daniel Dennett's depiction). However, rather than serving as an argument against strong artificial intelligence, Wittgenstein's scenario serves to bring to light the underlying prejudices that lead us to both behaviourism and dualism (including varieties of cognitivism).[32] Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment is designed to prompt us to question whether the processing of symbols according to rules could ever be a sufficient condition for the attribution of "understanding" to the processor. Wittgenstein sets up the grocer example in a way that is designed to lead us to crave something that will satisfy us to the extent that we would be happy to say of the grocer, "He understands."

[32] When I talk of cognitivism in this context my target is contemporary cognitive science, not necessarily work that goes by the same name in the philosophy of the emotions.

Wittgenstein's imaginary scenario is designed to tempt us into positing inner mental processes of some sort, which is what Wittgenstein's interlocutor does. However, this is only to begin to understand the reach of the imaginary scenario. For when we reflect upon what such an (inner) process might be, we find that we want to describe something very similar to the (external) behaviour that Wittgenstein's grocer exhibits. Consider: A note is passed to him—data are entered. The words on the note are related to objects—the input data are related to inner mental items (samples). More precisely: the word "apple" is matched to the object "apple"—the apple-data are related to a mental image of an apple (or the psychosemantic "concept": "apple"); the word "red" is matched to a colour sample—the colour-data are related to a mental image of red (or the psychosemantic "concept": "red"). Then, having ascertained what "a red apple" "means"—having related the data with the correct mental image of what we call "a red apple"—we count five of them—we mentally mark-off the lines in the five-bar gate, or mentally slide the beads of the abacus across.[33] The data are thus processed. The grocer retrieves five red apples and hands them to the note-bearer—he "understands" the request.[34]

Here is the point of the "eccentricity" of the scenario. The trip to the grocer is structured to mirror the form of a dominant picture of "inner mental processes." In tempting the interlocutor to ask for more, so that she might be satisfied that the grocer has *understood*, Wittgenstein tempts the interlocutor into undermining her own prejudices. Mulhall writes: "If the public, externalised versions of such procedures were not in themselves enough to establish the presence of understanding to the interlocutor's satisfaction, why should their inner counterparts?" (2001a, 45). Is it because they are inner? Surely this is not enough? However, the subtlety of Wittgenstein's example does not stop there. For, as Mulhall notes, "If Wittgenstein's shopkeeper's way with words strikes us as surreal and oddly mechanical, to the point at which we want to question the nature and even the reality of his inner life, and yet his public behaviour amounts to an externalised replica of the way we imagine the inner life of all ordinary, comprehending language-users, then our picture of the inner must be as surreal, as oddly mechanical, as Wittgenstein's depiction of the outer" (46).

This brings us back to Baker and Hacker, because now we can gain a fuller understanding of what is misleading in their account. The purpose of *PI* § 1 is not that of *replacing* Augustine's picture with another—that of

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[33] Of course I do not wish to restrict myself to pictorial mental representations here. The syntactically structured "mentalese" of Fodor's psychosemantics and Millikan's biosemantics will do just as well.
[34] This scenario's therapy is explored more fully in Hutchinson and Read 2005b in the light of a strikingly similar cinematic therapeutic scenario found in Christopher Nolan's film *Memento*.

words belonging to a type of use—but of facilitating our realisation that Augustine's picture amounts to nothing on to which we wish to hold. It is the thought of words as *essentially relational* that is holding us captive here.[35] It might lead us to yearn for inner mental processes when ultimately these can never be more satisfying than external processes. It could lead us to continue our search for some*thing* to which our words might *relate*.[36] Appealing to words belonging to a "type of use" does little to wean us off this, because we can just as well appeal to the "words" of (say) mentalese belonging to a "type of use," while arguing (comforting ourselves) that (all) we are (doing is) taking the analysis to a more fundamental level. Is that not what functionalism in the philosophy of mind claims to do? It is the view of words as essentially relational that can lead one to both dualism[37] and behaviourism.

The elucidatory (standard) reading of *PI* runs into a plethora of problems, both textually and philosophically. As we saw, it implied the possibility of viewing language from "sideways on," aspects of this implication being the proscribing of linguistic innovation and the view of relatively static grammatical rules with which we must act in accord, on pain of uttering nonsense. These are substantial problems. However, the reading also fails to overcome a simple question of motivation: What motivates the elucidations *if not therapy*? Answering this question while resisting the claim that therapy serves as the motivation throws these readers back on to the original set of problems brought about by being committed to being able to take up an external view on language. In addition to these problems (but also being aspects of the same) my reading of the opening of *PI* showed that elucidatory readers are still committed to a relational view of linguistic meaning, where words must relate to some*thing*. This brings elucidatory readers close to doctrinal readers who posit a use-theory of meaning. Elucidatory readers (in this case Baker and Hacker) talk of words belonging to types of use. While

[35] It is this thought that informs many (would-be) Wittgensteinians to appeal to a somewhat reified conception of grammar and grammatical rules as a way of settling philosophical disagreement and dissolving philosophical problems. It is this brand of "Wittgensteinianism" (what we might dub "Rylensteinianism") that has done much to marginalise Wittgenstein's work in contemporary philosophy.

[36] When I talk of "relating" and "relational," I am talking of externally relating. Of course, if we were to say that all words relate either internally or externally then there is no problem, at least in the sense that we state *nothing*. The point I am keen to emphasise is that Baker and Hacker's reading of Wittgenstein here retains the thought that it is something outside *our use* of language that gives our words their meaning. They exchange objects for categories and are thus still in thrall to a picture that holds them (and Glock) captive. My point is not that words are never related to things in the world; my point is that this aspect of our use of language is not *essential*. It is not a condition of our words having meaning that they, prior to *our* putting them to use, must relate to objects or to "types" or "categories" of use. *We* put words to use.

[37] And to dualism's sophisticated contemporary cognitivist variants. This point is explored in more detail in Hutchinson and Read 2005b.

elucidatory readers would resist the attribution to them of a use-theory of
meaning, in implicitly holding to what I am terming a relational view of
meaning they leave themselves hostage to the same (mis)fortune as their
doctrinal cousins. For they don't fully free themselves of the presupposi-
tions Wittgenstein identifies in Augustine's picture of language and thus
can all too easily find themselves led towards behaviourism or (Cartesian)
dualism and other classically philosophical dichotomous positions.[38]

Therefore, while elucidatory readers pay lip-service to the metaphilo-
sophy in *PI*, in holding out for more than therapy as the goal of
philosophy they remain committed to a view of language no different
to that implied by talking of a "use-theory of meaning." In its philoso-
phical implications the elucidatory interpretation transpires to be only
nominally different to the doctrinal.[39] Only a therapeutic reading of
PI can do justice both to the text and to Wittgenstein the philosopher.
A reading of *PI* that holds on to Wittgenstein doing more than practising
therapy (a reading like that advanced by Glock and by Baker and Hacker)
ultimately leaves Wittgenstein committed to the very commitments he was
trying to relieve us (and himself) of. This should now come as no surprise,
for the resistance to the therapeutic interpretation of *PI* is founded upon a
desire to uncover the hidden arguments in *PI* (see my n. 20); these
arguments, it seems to me, must in turn be founded upon a prior
commitment to a vision of philosophy other than therapeutic. The desire
to see Wittgenstein as an analytic (maybe *the* analytic) philosopher—
though a subject-transforming and engagingly or maddeningly eccentric
one—drives the elucidatory (and doctrinal) interpretation. Freed of this
desire, one can better understand Wittgenstein's purpose and thus his
method.[40] Baker came to see this in the late 1980s, and he argued eloquently
for it until his death in 2002; I have learnt much from reading his mature
writings. My hope is that this article might help others do the same.

Philosophy, IDS
MMU Cheshire
Crewe Green Road
Crewe CW1 5DU
United Kingdom
p.hutchinson@mmu.ac.uk

[38] These are positions that Glock takes Wittgenstein to have either eschewed or repudiated:
"He eschewed received positions and rejected traditional alternatives (realism/idealism; Carte-
sianism/behaviourism; Platonism/formalism), because of his unique ability to bring to light their
most fundamental unchallenged presuppositions" (2001b, 23).

[39] Nominal changes masquerading as substantive changes are far from uncommon.
Nominally very few philosophers now attribute to Wittgenstein a use-theory of meaning;
actually they might just as well do so, for they (covertly) commit Wittgenstein to the same
problematic positions as did explicitly saddling him with such a theory.

[40] For more on this, see Hutchinson and Read 2005a.

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