Chapter 5x
Holism and Normative Essentialism in Hegel's Social Ontology
Heikki Ikaheimo

Introduction

"If you say that collective intentionality is primitive, then it seems you are in a very bad company. It seems you are postulating some kind of Hegelian Weltgeist that is floating around overhead, or something like that."

Hegel is rarely mentioned in contemporary English-language social ontology, and when he is, then mostly in jokes or hand-waves towards something one should in any case avoid if one is to do serious philosophical work. A repertoire of standard jokes is part of the tradition of 'received views' to which new student generations are socialised in philosophy departments, and which forms the sea of default prejudices upon which the inquisitive mind sails. In Hegel’s case, jokes and caricatures about his philosophy have tended to linger on as received views, and reproduce themselves, even in the pages of textbooks, long after their reasonable use by date. Certainly, it would be surprising if this
would have been helpful in spreading knowledge and learning about what Hegel actually wrote.

As a consequence, although in Hegel-scholarship and philosophy explicitly drawing on Hegel’s texts most caricatures and simplifications about Hegel’s philosophy have long since been exorcised; it is still a task to be accomplished ever anew to convince colleagues less acquainted with Hegel’s work that it contains insights and innovations that are at least worth a serious study, and some of which might even turn out to be useful, for instance in social ontology.

In this article, we shall put aside the jokes and take a look at some of the central ingredients in what Hegel’s own social ontology, as it is presented in his mature work, is actually made of. I proceed as follows. I will first (I) draw attention to a lacuna in contemporary Anglophone social ontology, where Hegel’s work holds promise for remedy: the almost complete lack of theorising about the social constitution of human persons and its intertwining with the constitution of the rest of the social and institutional world. What I call Hegel’s holism is exactly his attempt to grasp the constitution of persons and the constitution of the rest of the social and institutional world as an interconnected whole. Secondly (II), as a preparation for taking a look at what Hegel actually writes, I will take up three sources of complexity that a reader of the central texts of his mature social ontology—The Philosophies of Subjective and Objective Spirit—is inevitably faced with. I shall also hint at prospects that these open for philosophical work that utilises Hegel’s basic innovations without agreeing with him on details of ideal institutional design. The third of these sources of complexity is Hegel’s normative essentialism.

This requires making a short excursion to the question whether normative essentialism of roughly Aristotelian kind that Hegel subscribes to is an option that can be taken seriously in social ontology at all (III). I argue that at least in certain issues relevant to social ontology normative essentialism is both common sense and impossible for social ontology respectively not to take seriously. This, however, does not do away with the radicality of Hegel’s normative essentialism, and the rest of the article consists of a rational reconstruction of this feature of his social ontology, together with its holism.

This will be done by first (IV) thematising three basic principles of Hegel’s social ontology—concrete freedom, self-consciousness, and interpersonal recognition—and proposing how they are related. The rest of the paper will then concentrate on the most concrete one of these principles—interpersonal recognition—by discussing what it does according to Hegel (V), what it is not (VI), and what exactly it is (VII). In the last section (VIII) we shall return to perhaps the most controversial element of Hegel’s social ontology—the idea that the essential structures constitutive of human sociality have a tendency towards self-actualisation.

I will conclude with a few notes about how one social theorist strongly influenced by Hegel, Marx, used some of the basic innovations of Hegel’s social ontology, albeit in a rather one-sided way, and without agreeing with him on details of ideal institutional design. The possibility for such creative utilisations of Hegel’s insights and innovations, whatever the details, are what constitutes the lasting relevance of his social ontology.

I. A Hegelian solution to a contemporary problem in social ontology?

What is the object of social ontology? A relatively uncontroversial answer to this question would seem go along the lines of “the social world, in the sense of the world of those entities, facts, features, relations, processes etc. that are socially constituted”. But what about what it is that does the constituting? Assuming that ‘constituting’ in the relevant sense is or involves some form of activity by suitable kinds of subjects, it would seems quite relevant for social ontology to be interested in such subjects as well.3 The only kinds of subjects we know of that constitute social worlds are relatively complex animals, among which—a particular kind stands out: us humans. Even if sociality broadly understood is not an exclusively human phenomenon and even if non-human social worlds are therefore a legitimate object of social ontology, no other animals constitute social worlds that come close to even the most primitive known human societies in term of complexity and depth of social constitution. In terms of what we mean by ‘sociality’, the paradigmatic general object of social ontology would certainly seem to be the human life-form.

Talking of individual members of this life-form, human persons that is, not only are they the paradigmatic constitutors of social worlds, they themselves
are in many ways the paradigmatic socially constituted entities. Among all partly or wholly socially constituted entities that we can single out in human social worlds, human persons are surely the ones in whose constitution sociality plays the most multifarious and complex role. In thus not only being the subject or agent of social constitution but also its central object or result, the human person would seem to have a rightful place as the paradigmatic single object of social ontology.

And yet the fact is that persons and their social constitution have received very little attention in contemporary international—which means Anglophone—social ontology, and practically none by some of its most celebrated philosopher-practitioners. On the contrary, a typical move in the contemporary landscape of philosophical social ontology is to take more or less full-fledged persons as given and discuss the rest of social reality as constituted by them. This, it seems, leaves only two options:

- Either persons are thought of as not part of the social and institutional world at all, but related to it only externally,
- or, alternatively, it is admitted that persons are indeed part of the social and institutional world in the sense of being (partly or wholly) socially constituted themselves, but the task-description of social ontology is limited to only those aspects or elements of the social and institutional world that can be conceived of as constituted by already full-fledged persons.

Following the first option, persons are hence thought of as external to the world that is the object of social ontology, and therefore quite unlike the kinds of creatures we know we are: social beings not merely in the sense of subjects, but also in the sense of objects of social constitution. The second option avoids this awkward predicament, yet it produces another. That is, if it is admitted that persons themselves are partly or wholly socially constituted entities, but decided that social ontology only arrives on the scene when fully constituted persons are already given, then it is accepted that social ontology does not address the most fundamental levels or processes of social constitution at all. Even if many social phenomena—such as carrying furniture upstairs or going for a walk together, founding clubs, acting as the executive board of a business corporation, and so forth (to borrow typical examples from the literature)—actually can be accounted for by presupposing more or less full-fledged persons as given, the ones that can are surely not the ontologically most foundational ones. To the extent that social ontology resorts to such a drastic shrinking down of its task-description, it also remains of relatively limited use to anthropology, social sciences, pedagogy, and other disciplines where the social constitution of persons is an unavoidable topic.

To seriously thematise the very foundations of the social and institutional world, it would thus seem necessary to focus on social processes and structures that are constitutive of human persons themselves. One way to do this, one might suggest, would be by way of the opposite stage-setting: explicating the constitution of persons by assuming the (rest of the) social and institutional world as given. Yet, to use a familiar metaphor, this would be merely replacing the ontological egg with the ontological chicken. Assuming that in a philosophical account of the human life-form that intends to get at the bottom of its social constitution it is as illegitimate to assume as given a society devoid of persons, as it is to assume as given persons independently of society, it seems that the only remaining strategy is to account for the constitution of persons and the rest of the social world together.

Why Hegel?

So what, if anything, does Hegel have to offer to the serious minds of busy people working in the field of social ontology? Perhaps most importantly, his philosophy involves a sustained attempt at systematically conceiving the constitution of human persons and the constitution of the rest of the social and institutional world as internally interconnected. The catchword here is, perhaps prima facie notoriously, 'Geist', or 'spirit' as it is mostly translated in English. However, rather than thinking of 'spirit' as a name for an ethereal entity floating around or above human societies, or a cosmic principle steering the actions of humans behind their backs, as is still often done, a scrutiny of what Hegel actually writes in the part of his mature system titled 'Philosophy of Spirit' has the best chance to start on the right foot when one thinks of 'spirit' as nothing more than a 'headline' or 'title-word'—to borrow Pirmir Stekeler-Weithofer's simple but in my view very insightful suggestion—for the human life-form.

More precisely, 'spirit' is best thought of as a title-word for three closely interrelated themes: first, for everything that distinguishes humans as persons...
from simpler animals, secondly for everything that distinguishes the social and institutional structures of human life-worlds from simpler animal environments and forms of interaction, and thirdly the collective human practices of reflecting on the human form of life and its position in the whole of what there is, namely art, religion and philosophy itself. It is these three interrelated topics that are explicitly at issue in the three main parts of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit—Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Philosophy of Objective Spirit and Philosophy of Absolute Spirit—respectively.

Understanding ‘spirit’ as a mere title-word has the simple virtue of avoiding a burdening of one’s encounter with Hegel’s text, from the start, with the back-breaking ballast of obscure associations and received views that it has been burdened with since Hegel’s death. Whether a serious study will eventually lead one to affirm some such view of Hegel or not, it is a sound methodological rule that one should initially assume ‘spirit’ to mean exactly what is in fact discussed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit. And that, as said, is the human person, the human society (and its history), and the human reflection-forms of art, religion and philosophy.

Saying that ‘spirit’ is a title-word for these topics is not saying that it names a mere collection of this and that having to do with, or belonging to, the human life-form. On Hegel’s account, the distinction between subjective and objective spirit, or personhood and social and institutional structures, is “not to be regarded as a rigid one,” but these are rather to be seen as aspects or moments of a closely interconnected whole, and the same is true of absolute spirit, or the self-reflective activities that human persons collectively engage in. Not only are these issues interrelated in all the myriad of ways that we know they are. Hegel also claims that there are certain overarching principles governing them together. In what follows, we shall start working our way towards them by clarifying first some of the complexities that a reader of Hegel is faced with.

II. Some complexities of reading Hegel, and prospects they open for a critical utilisation of his thoughts

There is unfortunately no denying the fact that Hegel is not an easy philosopher to read, and that there are plenty of reasons why even the most skilled readers of Hegel have to struggle to discern what exactly the basic principles of his text are and how exactly they play out in his discussion of particular themes. These are reasons to do with the structure of his system, his methodology, and his manner of expression. For our purposes it suffices to point out three sources of complexity.

Different levels of conceptualisation and the relation between them

First, there is an inbuilt ‘necessary contingency’ involved in the interplay of concepts and considerations with different levels of abstraction in Hegel’s philosophical system. Even if each higher level of conceptuality provides structuring principles for each lower level, each descending step in levels of abstraction introduces a new layer of contingency untamed by the governing, higher or more abstract concepts and principles. This is clearly true of how the pure concepts or categories that are at issue in the first part of his three-partite system, the Logic, apply to the spatiotemporal world of real phenomena at issue in the two ‘Real-philosophical’ parts of the system, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit that is. Even if Hegel is a conceptual realist in that in his view the basic categorical structure discussed in the Logic is “out there,” not merely in subjective minds (and Hegel does not postulate a transcendental mind or subject in singular), this does not mean that the details of the world can be simply deduced from the logic. Yet, the pure concepts or categories are structures of reality and they are at play in Hegel’s description of the various realms of what there is. The same is true of how Hegel applies less abstract, that is, not purely logical, philosophical concepts or principles to particular object-realms: the higher levels provide structuring principles for, yet do not reduce the complexity and contingency of, the lower levels.

The problem for the reader is that it is often extremely difficult to discern how exactly the pure concepts mingle with the less abstract ‘Real-philosophical’ concepts, or, going down in levels of abstraction, with scientific and everyday concepts, in Hegel’s structural descriptions of this or that particular region of nature or spirit. This difficulty is well known among readers of the Philosophy of Right, which is, in principle, an extended version of the Philosophy of Objective Spirit. Yet, it is as much true of all the other parts of his Real-philosophy.
It is a consequence of the fact that structures of reality, as Hegel conceives of them, cannot be simply deduced from higher structures or principles, or that these principles cannot be applied to reality in any mechanical way, that Hegel’s structural descriptions of the different realms and phenomena of nature and spirit are, by their nature, painstaking handiwork in trying to conceptualise each phenomena in ways that seem to get them right or do justice to them, all things considered. Since Hegel is far from explicit about the exact manner in which he utilises concepts and principles of different levels of abstraction in his often extremely intricate conceptualisations of this or that particular realm or structure of reality, following his thought requires painstaking effort from the reader as well.

Interestingly for those who are interested in utilising Hegel for contemporary philosophical purposes, the ‘necessary contingency’, or necessary degree of indeterminacy in the application of higher level structures at lower levels also means that it should be possible, by Hegel’s own standards, to come up with descriptions that differ somewhat from his own by utilising his own higher order conceptual principles. This is so due to the fact that the more concrete level of concepts is in question, the more description is dependent on perspectivity and situationality. Even if Hegel did think that at the highly abstract level of the Logic pure thinking free of situationality is a meaningful ideal, he never thought this to be possible at the level of everyday concepts, nor even at the level of most scientific concepts, where interest, situation and perspective are necessary elements of anything deserving the name of knowledge.16 In other words, one should not let the details of Hegel’s own concrete levels of conceptualisation get in the way of reconstruction, or creative utilisation of his higher level principles.

Concentration of meaning and changing focus

The second source of difficulty for any reading of Hegel’s work is the enormous breadth of his philosophical concerns, together with the in comparison extreme brevity of the body of text that comprises his mature philosophical system. These factors together result in a level of concentration of meaning that may be matched by no other body of texts in Western philosophy. One aspect of this is that Hegel usually has many different goals in mind in writing any given passage included in his system.17

Furthermore, and this is most relevant for our theme, even if in principle everything in the system is somehow related to everything else, the different Real-philosophical parts of the system actually sometimes focus on partly unrelated concerns, and proceed on partly different levels of abstraction. That is to say that Hegel may have a certain set of issues in mind in a particular part of the system, but then drop some of the issues and take up new ones in a related part of the system—even though each of the issues should be discussed in both parts were they to be clarified systematically.

Importantly for us, this is in fact the case with the two most directly relevant parts of Hegel’s system for social ontology, the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and the Philosophy of Objective Spirit: Even if they are elements of an interconnected whole, it is difficult to grasp exactly this interconnection due to differences in focus and level of abstraction between these two parts. What I mean is that Hegel’s interest and focus in Philosophy of Objective Spirit is on a significantly more concrete level of issues and considerations and thereby proceeds at a more concrete level of conceptualisation than is the case with Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Part of what ‘more concrete’ means is ‘more bound to Hegel’s own particular time and place’. Whereas Hegel’s structural description of the human person in Subjective Spirit contains relatively few claims that are at least obviously only reasonable about human being in a particular cultural and historical situation but not in others, his structural description of the social and institutional whole that he calls the state and describes in Objective Spirit contains a great number of details that are best described as Hegel’s “own time [and place] comprehended in thoughts”.

Not mere description, but ideal description

But there is a further complication. Namely, what is at issue is not merely to what extent Hegel’s structural description of the human person or of the social and institutional world accurately describe existing human beings or societies in a simple observational sense. (Even if in this sense too it does seem quite obvious that the former is much more readily universalisable.) This is so because these descriptions are, as a rule, geared towards an ideal mode of existence of the phenomena in question. Thus, empirical humans or societies only conform to the descriptions to the extent that they conform to the ideal. On the other hand, Hegel means the ideals not to be external to the
phenomena, but immanent to each phenomenon as their essence or essential structure.

This is what is at stake in Hegel’s famous “Doppelsatz” in the Philosophy of Right, according to which “what is actual is rational, and what is rational is actual”.19 Put very briefly, the point is, first, that everything has a conceptual structure, and secondly, that it is possible for anything to actualise its own conceptual structure more or less. The degree of something’s being “actual” (wirklich) is the degree of its actualising its own conceptual structure and thus the degree of its being “rational” (vernünftig).

There is more to unpack in the Doppelsatz (we have only unpacked the first of its two sub-sentences), but the important point for us is that Hegel clearly subscribes to some form of Aristotelian normative essentialism according to which things can correspond to their essence or essential structure in different degrees and according to which the essence is somehow an immanent ideal in them. That is to say that both Hegel’s description of the human person, and his description of the social and institutional structures of the state are ‘idealising’ or ‘essential’ descriptions and thus the question of their generalisability does not merely concern the question whether or to what extent all human beings or all states accurately correspond to the description (or rather the other way around), but rather how steady a foothold there is to argue that the descriptions describe ideals that are somehow immanent in humans in general, or societies in general, as their essential structure.

There is a marked difference between the first and the second case, so that chances to pull the argument through seem better in the first case than in the second. This is for the reason already mentioned—namely that Hegel’s ideal description of the essential structures of human personhood in Subjective Spirit remain at a significantly more abstract level than his ideal description of the essential social and institutional structures of human society or ‘the state’ in Objective Spirit. This means that one may end up in endorsing (with some set of good reasons) Hegel’s ideal of human personhood, without being able to endorse (with good reasons) the details of his institutional design. Importantly, this is compatible with subscribing to Hegel’s general project of conceiving personhood and social structures as constitutively intertwined, since this project may still make good sense when one abstracts from (whatever one thinks are) the questionable details of Philosophy of Objective Spirit, and stays at the higher level of abstraction on which Philosophy of Subjective Spirit proceeds—and does this in reading both the Subjective and the Objective Spirit.20

But what about the philosophical credibility of conceiving essences or essential structures as immanent ideals for beings whose structures they are? Can such an idea be taken seriously today? And is it of any relevance to social ontology?

### III. Hegel’s normative essentialism—sound common sense about something

Whereas the attempt at systematically conceiving the constitution of human persons and the constitution of the rest of the social and institutional world as internally interconnected—let us call this Hegel’s holism21—sounds like something that recommends Hegel’s work for serious attention, normative essentialism has a ring to it that is not likely to win friends in many corners of the philosophical world today.22 To see clearly what is at stake here, and thus to be able to make a balanced judgment about Hegel’s position, two issues need to be clarified: first, what is ‘essentialism’ in general, and secondly, what is ‘normative essentialism’ in particular?

So what is essentialism? Let us agree that on the most liberal formulation essentialism is the view according to which it is possible, and, on a less liberal version, actually the case that some features of a thing are ‘essential’ to it, or (synonymously) that it ‘has them essentially’. Let us call these two versions of essentialism the ‘potentialist’ and the ‘actualist’ version respectively. It is, further, possible to be a global potentialist or actualist essentialist and hence to claim that it is true of all things that some of their features either may be, or actually are essential to them. Alternatively, one may be a local potentialist or actualist essentialist and hence claim that it is true of some things that they either may have or actually have some of their features essentially. The same distinctions apply to anti-essentialism.23

In social ontology, essentialism is, as such, a perfectly normal position to take. To start with, to the extent that social ontology has as its primary general
object the human life-form in general, and thus not merely these or those particu-
lar people or societies, it is a universalising enterprise. And since it is not an 
empirical enterprise in any simple observational sense, but ontology, its 
generalisations are not merely empirical generalisations focused on actually, 
yet contingently, universal features of humans or human societies. What social 
ontology tries to grasp are essential and thus necessarily universal features or 
structures of the human life-form, or to borrow again John Searle again, "the 
structure of human civilization". If one is to do social ontology in this sense 
at all, one cannot help being an essentialist about something at least, namely 
the human life-form—and not only in the 'potentialist' sense of accepting that 
it is possible that some features or structures are essential to the human life-
form, but also in the committed 'actualist' sense of proposing some particular 
features or structures as actually essential to it. That Hegel is an essentialist 
on the human life-form in these senses therefore in no way distinguishes him 
from the contemporary mainstream of social ontology exemplified by, say, 
John Searle.

But what about the fact that Hegel's essentialism is of an Aristotelian, norma-
tive variant? What is normative essentialism? Let us agree that normative 
essentialism is essentialism on the above definition (so that the distinctions 
between the potentialist and actualist senses of essentialism, as well as 
between global and local essentialism apply to it), but with two added ele-
ments: that it is possible for a thing to instantiate the features or structures 
esential to it in different degrees, and that the more it does the better, in some 
sense relevant sense of goodness. Let us add to these a third element which is 
as much a feature of Hegel's version of normative essentialism as it is of 
Aristotle's: essences have some kind of tendency towards actualisation.

There is a strong tendency, shared across very different philosophical schools, 
towards judging such a view out of hand as a mere metaphysical museum 
piece that no-one (after Newton, Kant, Darwin, Wittgenstein, Foucault, or 
whoever one's favourite hero of anti-essentialism is) should take seriously. 
Yet, such a sweeping judgment involves an element of self-deception, since in 
fact we do take actualist normative essentialism perfectly seriously in some 
issues, and it is arguably very difficult not to do so. Indeed, normative essen-
tialism is part of common sense—that is, of the kind of default-thinking that 
is at work in structuring actual human practices—about certain very 
important elements of the human life-form, elements that are in various ways 
involved in practically everything that humans do. I mean usable artefacts.

Think of, say, chairs. It makes perfectly good sense to ask what is the essence 
of a chair, or in more colloquial terms, what is it that makes something a chair. 
A rather workable general answer would seem to be something like 'sittabil-
ity'. Sittability, it seems, is an example of essence in the normative sense, 
meaning that the more or better a chair instantiates this general functional 
(and clearly relational, since chairs should fit human backsides) property—or 
to use another term, practical significance—that makes it a chair in the first 
place, the better a chair it is.

When something exemplifies this feature or significance to a very high degree, 
it inspires essentialist judgments in satisfied sitters of the kind "now this is 
what I call a chair". At the other end of the scale, something's being abso-
lutely horrible to sit on means that it is likely not to be taken as a chair at all, 
but either as an object with some other function or then just junk. Of course 
what exactly are the more precise features that comprise the general essential 
feature of sittability, or in other words what are the more precise features that 
makes a chair good to sit (for an average human backside), is a matter of fur-
ther debate, but people designing chairs are expected to have a good enough 
answer.

Indeed, it belongs to the essence of chair designers that they are actualist 
essentialists on chairs: to stay in the business of chair-designing and thus to 
be a chair-designer one not only needs to have a good enough idea of the 
more exact constituents of sittability, but also to accept sittability as an essen-
tial feature of chairs, and not just as an accidental feature of them such as, say, 
colour. This, of course, assumes that chair-consumers too are essentialists on 
the sittability of chairs, which is likely for obvious reasons: sit on really bad 
chairs long enough and you will become unable to sit at all. In short, it is 
normatively essential to chairs that they are good to sit.

Hence, chairs easily fit the first two bills that make Hegel's essentialism nor-
mative: they can instantiate the features, structures or significances that are 
essential to them in different degrees, and the more they do the better—in a 
functional or instrumental sense of goodness. As to the third element of 
Hegel's normative essentialism—self-actualisation—focusing merely on the
practice of sitting (and thus abstracting from intervening factors such as, say, the practice of capitalist economy), there clearly is a tendency towards chairs exemplifying their general essential feature of sittability well and thus being good chairs. This tendency is immanent to chairs in the sense that it is immanent to the practice where chairs are constituted as chairs: between sitting on better or worse chairs, people tend to choose the better ones if they can. To say that we should not be talking about self-actualisation of the essence of chairs because it is actually a social practice that does the actualising is to miss the point that this social practice is not external to chairs, but constitutive of their being chairs in the first place.

All of this, it seems, is not only true of chairs, but of usable artefacts in general. Three points can be made here. First, actualist normative essentialism about chairs and other usable artefacts is common sense. Secondly, it is common sense in the practical sense of being at work in, and indeed constitutive of, the practices in which usable artefacts are what they are. Thirdly, it therefore would make little sense to suggest that although common sense may be normatively essentialist on chairs, in fact it is wrong to be so; or to suggest that common sense only grasps how this area of social reality "appears," but not how it is "in itself". How common sense takes or regards usable artefacts in social practices is constitutive of how they really are as entities of the social world. This is to say that common sense is not merely 'in the heads' of people but also 'out there' structuring the social and institutional world—or in Hegel’s terms, not merely 'subjective' but also 'objective spirit'.

As to the philosophical discourse of social ontology, given that social ontology is interested in the structure and constituting processes of the social world (and not, say, in the atom-structure of physical objects), and assuming that normative essentialism itself is an essential feature of the attitudes and practices that make usable objects such objects, and thus of these objects themselves, it follows that social ontology must accept normative essentialism itself as an ontologically accurate view of this part of our life-world. Common sense normative essentialism is true about usable artefacts because it is constitutive of them.

All in all, normative essentialism of the Aristotelian-Hegelian variant is thus both common sense and ontologically true of at least something very important to the human life-form. Hence the fact that Hegel is a normative essentialist on the human life-form is at least not as obviously damning of him as sweeping—and in their sweepingness self-deceptive—rejections of normative essentialism would suggest. However, merely pointing out that normative essentialism is common sense about something of central importance to the human life-form, namely usable artefacts, does not alone do away with the radicality of Hegel’s normative essentialism. His claim is namely that actualist normative essentialism is not merely true of particular elements of human life-worlds, such as chairs or other usable artefacts, but somehow of ‘spirit’ in singular—or in other words, of the human life-form as a whole. To be absolutely clear about what this means, let us unfold it in terms of the four claims which we have agreed that normative essentialism consists of:

a) On Hegel’s view some features or structures of the human life-form are essential to it,
b) these essential features of the human life-form can be actualised in different degrees,
c) the more they are actualised the better, in some relevant sense (or senses) of goodness, and
d) they have an immanent tendency towards actualisation.

What could Hegel possibly have in mind in promoting such an idea? In what follows, we shall try to make sense of this in terms of how Hegel conceptualises the human life-form in his Philosophy of Spirit.

IV. Basic principles of Hegel’s social ontology

So far I have pointed out two general features of Hegel’s social ontology. First, it is holistic in that it involves an attempt at conceiving the constitution of human persons and the constitution of the rest of the social and institutional world as internally interconnected, or in other words at conceiving human persons and their life-world as mutually constitutive. Secondly, it involves a commitment to a normative and teleological kind of essentialism about the human life-form taken as a whole. Let us now take a look at how these features play out in Hegel’s social ontology by clarifying its basic principles.

When one asks for the basic principles of Hegel’s social ontology, any answer will be selective since basically every single logical concept and principle
developed in the logic is somehow at play in Hegel’s structural descriptions of the different regions of what there is, even though some are more important than others in particular regions. This also means that the interpreter can make different selections among the logical, real-philosophical and other principles at play in Hegel’s text, which will illuminate the whole somewhat differently. To the extent that Hegel’s overall conception is coherent, these need not be mutually exclusive.

In what follows, I will mention three closely interrelated principles that are undeniably central for Hegel’s social ontology and therefore deserve to be called basic principles. Each of them is a principle of different level of abstraction (or concreteness) so that presented in a descending order of abstraction (or ascending order of concreteness) the second principle is an instantiation of the first, and the third is an instantiation of the second (and thereby also the first). Both the second and the third principle introduce elements that are not determined by the higher levels (remember the ‘necessary contingency’-point). Yet, on a plausible interpretive hypothesis the more abstract principles function as ‘essences’ of the more concrete ones in the sense of providing a norm or ideal for them. As will be seen, this hypothesis can be rather easily verified in the application of the first principle to the second, whereas in the application of the second principle to the third things get slightly more complicated.

The principles can be called

(1) the principle of absolute negation, or of being with oneself in otherness,
(2) the principle of self-consciousness, or of consciousness of oneself in otherness
(3) the principle of interpersonal recognition.

It is best said immediately that one should not put too much weight on the names of the principles, especially in the first two cases, but rather (again) understand them as title-words for something that could be called with other names as well.

(1) As to the first principle, it could also be called—as Hegel himself often does—simply freedom. What is at stake is a structure involving two (or more) relata that are defined as what they are through each other, and are thus determined by each other without being alien or inimical to each other. Each relatum is thus ‘with itself in the other’. Such a structure involves two ‘negations’, the first of which consists of the fact that the one relatum is not the other relatum. Yet as relata both are determined by each other. This determination by otherness is overcome by a second negation, which is the negation of the alienness or inimicality of the relata to each other. ‘Absolute negation’ means just this structure involving a first negation, and a second negation, as it were negating the first negation. As such, no temporal succession is meant; yet it is possible that one of the two negations of the absolute negation temporally precedes the other. To the extent that this is the case, the structure of absolute negation is (yet) deficiently unfolded.

Without concretisation this is of course abstract to the extreme, but some hint of its usefulness derive from the fact that Hegel, as said, often calls it simply ‘freedom’. Generally speaking, what is meant by freedom here is not freedom from something, but freedom with something. Hegel never tires emphasising that freedom from something, or “abstract freedom,” is a self-undermining illusion in that attempts to realise it cannot escape from some form of dependence on, or determination by, that from which the attempt to be free is made. For Hegel, real or “concrete freedom” is not the impossibility of freedom from factors that necessarily determine one, but some form of reconciliation or state of mutual affirmation with them. Concrete freedom thus has the formal structure of ‘absolute negation’. What this means more concretely, will only become clear at the more concrete levels of discussion.

The principle of absolute negation applies in Hegel’s view to many things and structures of both nature and spirit. As to the realm of spirit which is the home ground of freedom, it does not merely apply where issues of freedom are usually discussed, namely in the practical dimension of actions, opportunities for action, motivations and so on, but more generally in the realm of intentionality in general. Here intentionality is the central added element of concreteness, which is in no way deducible from any logical principles, but is a given phenomenon of the spatio-temporal world that has to be conceptualised adequately as such.

(2) Thereby we come to the second principle. Hegel himself does not use the word ‘intentionality’, but calls the phenomenon or structure in question consciousness (Bewusstsein). Consciousness, which is Hegel’s general topic in the second part of Philosophy of Subjective Spirit titled ‘Phenomenology’, is a structure involving a subject and an object, where both relata can only be...
what they are in virtue of each other. It is a structure defining what Hegel calls the “I” (Ich). The I, just as its pre-intentional predecessor ‘self’ (Selbst) that Hegel discusses in the Anthropology, is not a separate entity, but a structural feature of the being of concrete flesh and blood subjects. There are two basic modifications of consciousness or ‘conscious-being’ (Bewusst-Sein): the theoretical and the practical, or in other words the epistemic and the volitional. Hegel discusses the first of these in a chapter titled ‘Consciousness as such’, and the second in a chapter titled ‘Self-consciousness’, both within ‘Phenomenology’.

These particular titles should be given particularly little systematic importance as titles of the chapters in question since they are rather misleading in giving the impression that what Hegel means by ‘self-consciousness’ only relates to the practical dimension of intentionality. There is also another source of confusion, namely the fact that what Hegel actually means by ‘self-consciousness’—that is, in philosophical usage and not merely as the title of a chapter—is something quite different from how this term is usually understood in philosophy. Even if the usual sense of this term—some sort of second order consciousness or awareness of one’s own mental states—is not irrelevant for Hegel, it is far from being its only or even paradigmatic usage for him.

Ideally, self-consciousness for Hegel is being conscious of something about oneself in an object of consciousness. This—consciousness of oneself in objects, or put in another way conscious-being with oneself in otherness—is a particular instantiation of the structure of being with oneself in otherness. Hegel calls this often also ‘knowing’ (Wissen) or ‘finding’ (finden) oneself in what is other to oneself. The structure of being, in the more concrete sense of conscious-being, with oneself in objects is on Hegel’s account an immanent ideal or norm both for theoretical and practical object-relations.

As to the theoretical dimension, theoretical consciousness involves by its nature a separation of objects from the subject for the subject or I. This is what it means to be conscious in the theoretical or epistemic sense. To the extent that the subject cannot grasp the objects in thought, cannot organise them or conceive their constitution and connections, what is at hand is only the first of the two negations of ‘absolute negation’. This means that the subject is determined by an objectivity that is from its point of view alien to it. The ideal immanent to theoretical intentionality is, unsurprisingly, to cognise objectivity and thereby overcome its alienness. Common sense familiarity with the world, the sciences, and philosophy are thus the concrete practices (with different levels of abstraction) whereby the essential structure of self-consciousness or conscious-being in otherness is actualised in the theoretical or epistemic dimension. They are forms of self-consciousness in otherness in that the subject grasps independent objects in terms of conceptual structures with which it is familiar and with which it can operate in thought.

In other words, as the subject becomes familiar with the world and internalises its constitution in thought, it gradually finds the world instantiating structures that are also structures of its own thinking. There is no hint of subjective idealism in all of this since all of the structures in terms of which subjects successfully grasp the world are really structures of the world (that is, not merely structures of how the world appears as organised by subjectivity) and they become structures of the subject’s thinking only in interaction with the world. The tendency of self-actualisation of the essential structure or principle is here as such nothing logical but proper to the level of concreteness at issue. It is simply whatever it is that moves humans towards a better epistemic grasp of the world—basically the need of finite human beings to overcome the hostility and alienness of the world that they are part of, by understanding it.

As to the practical dimension of intentionality, practical consciousness is a volitional relation to objects. The difference to theoretical consciousness can be put by saying that whereas in theoretical consciousness objectivity appears in light of what it is, in practical consciousness it appears in light of what it ought to or should be in the subject’s view. Thus, whereas the content of theoretical consciousness has what we might call an ‘is-form’, the content of practical consciousness has an ‘ought-form’. The most primitive form of practical consciousness is desire (Begierde) for objects that would immediately satisfy immediately felt bodily needs—a purely animal object-relation in which instinct points out certain objects in light of something like the significance of ‘must have/be’ (or ‘must avoid/not be’).

Whereas the object of theoretical consciousness is at its most primitive level (with only the absolute minimum of cognition having taken place needed to grasp anything in the subject-object-form at all) epistemically maximally alien
to the subject, the object of practical consciousness is at its most primitive level a “nullity” to the subject in the sense of maximally lacking any independence or otherness. It is reduced to, or identical with the determination that is immediately relevant for the satisfaction of the subject’s given physiological needs. In other words, whereas in theoretical consciousness there is initially too much otherness of and too little finding oneself in objects, in practical consciousness there is initially too much finding oneself in and too little otherness of objects. For the structure of self-consciousness in otherness to be actualised or fully unfolded in the practical dimension, the subject must view objects as being in accordance with its volition, yet independent from it. Again, the logical form or structure in question in no way provides or guarantees the urge or drive of the actualisation of this structure. Yet, Hegel thinks that there is something in concrete human beings that provides such a drive.

Now, Hegel is a highly systematic thinker and he thinks also of the theoretical and the practical dimensions of intentionality or consciousness in their interrelations, as dimensions of the being of concrete flesh and blood subjects. Put very briefly: the theoretical and the practical dimensions of intentionality can only take place together. Also, the actualisation of the essential structure of intentionality must happen both in the theoretical and in the practical dimension for it to happen at all: theoretical and practical cultivation are interrelated aspects of the actualisation of the essence of conscious-being, which is a form of concrete freedom in the sense of being determined by otherness with which one is ‘reconciled’ in the sense of both knowing it and willing it. As we shall see, the actualisation of this ideal of concrete freedom as reconciliation of consciousness with objectivity, both in knowing and in willing, is what the actualisation of the essence of the human life-form, or the life-form of human persons amounts to in Hegel.

There is one phenomenon that is decisive for the actualisation of this essence. What complicates matters here is that this phenomenon is on the one hand itself a concrete instantiation of the more abstract or general principle of self-consciousness in otherness, yet on the other hand it is not just one instantiation among others, but in several ways essential for its being instantiated anywhere at all. This phenomenon, one which is decisive both for the overcoming of mere animality and for the degree to which the human life-form realises its essence is (3) interpersonal recognition. The added element of concreteness or specificity here is the intentional relationship with objects of a very special kind—namely other subjects.

V. Hegelian recognition—from what it does to what it is

There is no doubt about the centrality of the concept of recognition for Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit. In one of his earlier system-sketches from 1805 Hegel puts this in simplest possible words: insofar as a human being overcomes mere naturality and thus is “spiritual” “he is recognition”. And in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit—just before the famous depiction of the figures of the master and the bondsman and the “struggle of recognition” between them—Hegel characterises spirit as “the unity of” opposite self-consciousnesses “in their complete freedom,” or as “[t]he I that is we and the we that is I.” This is an instantiation of (1) the principle of absolute negation, and (2) of the more concrete principle of self-consciousness in otherness, in the relationship of conscious subjects to each other. Further, such a relation where subjects are ‘I’s (and ‘thou’s) by forming a ‘we’, instantiation (3) the principle or structure of (mutual) interpersonal recognition.

In his mature system Hegel is not as explicit about the centrality of recognition in what makes humans spiritual beings. Yet, when one looks at the details the decisive fact remains: also in the final versions of Philosophy of Spirit recognition is the phenomenon through which the transition (a) from merely animal existence into a spiritual one is made. And as I will show, the principle of recognition is also in Hegel’s mature Philosophy of Spirit a necessary and central element in (b) the actualisation of the essential structure of spirit, or of the essence of the life-form of human persons.

In the Introduction to his mature Philosophy of Spirit Hegel makes it clear that the “essence” of spirit, as what separates humans as persons from mere nature, is freedom and that this means more exactly “concrete freedom”. It is the “vocation” (Bestimmung) of humanity to realise this essence of its own. In other words, the actualisation of features that make humans persons is the actualisation of concrete freedom and thus to become concretely free is—somehow—a vocation for them. It is clear that humans do not always heed to this vocation and thus there is no guarantee that the essence will be actualised,
Holism and Normative Essentialism in Hegel's Social Ontology

but what Hegel seems to be saying is that it is somehow built into their constitution in any case.

As we just saw, concrete freedom in the intentionality-involving mode of self-consciousness in otherness is a complex issue since it has a theoretical and practical dimension to it. Furthermore, different realms of objects of intentionality can be at issue. On the most general level, concrete freedom as self-consciousness can be either a matter of intentional relationships with nature, or then a matter of intentional relationships ‘within’ the realm of spirit. It is important to understand why the latter is the genuine home ground of concrete freedom: here the practical dimension of concrete freedom can be actualised in ways that it cannot with regard to nature in that the subject can have its own will or volition (i) affirmed by the volition of other persons, and (ii) instantiated in social institutions. In contrast, animal subjects cannot affirm anyone’s will in the relevant sense, nor can purely natural objects instantiate it.57

In other words, one’s practical intentionality can be reconciled with other persons, as well as with social institutions, as independent realities, in ways that it cannot with mere nature that neither affirms nor instantiates human volition. The two ‘directions’ (i) and (ii) of practical self-consciousness in otherness within spirit, or the social world of persons, are closely related but the first one of them—interpersonal recognition—has a certain precedence.

In order to have a clear focus on what exactly interpersonal recognition is on Hegel’s account, it is worth repeating the two important roles that it arguably has in his Philosophy of Spirit. First, it is a central factor in the overcoming of merely natural or animal existence, and, secondly, it is a central element in the actualisation of the essence of the human life-form, self-consciousness in otherness that is. With regard to recognition, the sense of goodness in which it is true that the more the essence is actualised the better has a clearly ethical dimension. To use terminology that is not Hegel’s but gets at what is at issue here, the degree of instantiation of recognition is the degree to which intersubjective relations are interpersonal relations.

As noted above, according to Hegel’s structural description of the most primitive practical subject-object-relation that he calls ‘desire’ the object in it is wholly reduced, for the subject, to its significance for the satisfaction of immediately felt need. Or as Hegel puts it, the subject sees in the object only “its own lack”.58 The primitive desiring subject has no way of accommodating in consciousness anything in the world that does not fit its solipsistic need-driven view of things here and now. What Hegel is describing is more or less Harry Frankfurt’s “wanton,”59 only thought through to its ultimate consequences. For it, there is no past and no future, no universals, and therefore no grasp of objects as transcending the immediate significances in light of which they are seen at a given moment as dictated by felt physiological needs.60 The practical intentionality of immediate desire leaves no breathing space whatsoever for theoretical processes or activities of epistemically acquainting oneself with the world more broadly.61 Hence, an extreme lack of otherness of objects in the practical dimension corresponds to their extreme otherness or alienness in the epistemic dimension with regard to anything in them that is not immediately relevant for desire.62

How do, then, full-fledged persons, or subjects with a person-making psychological composition and structure of intentionality—the kinds of subjects that contemporary social ontology takes for granted—come about in Hegel’s view? His account of the overcoming of pure wantonness and the coming about of personhood proceeds again at a level of structural description, yet with added quasi-empirical illustration—the figures of the master and bondsman. Here it is important to understand that the decisive issue are not the empirical or quasi-empirical details of Hegel’s illustration, but rather the principles and structural moments that they illustrate.

The essential factor in Hegel’s account is that subjects overcome the immediacy of natural wantonness by confronting other subjects in such a way that their structures of intentionality become mediated through each other. This is what happens in recognition, and this explains at least part of what Hegel meant in Jena by saying that the human being—as more than a mere wanton or animal—“is recognition”. However, knowing that bringing about a mediation of intentionalities through each other is what recognition does still leaves largely open the question what exactly recognition is. Hegel never gave a clear definition and it is probably not unfair to say that secondary literature has not been particularly helpful on this issue either. This general unclarity makes it possible that wildly different candidates for an answer are often proposed without considering their pros and cons in an explicit and organised way, or without contrasting them with other candidates at all.
VI. Recognition as mediation of intentionalities

Let us approach the question what exactly recognition is by first considering two candidates that have been proposed in the literature and that actually suggest themselves by parts of what Hegel writes in the relevant passages. One of these is to think of recognition as instrumentalisation of the perspective of the other to the ends determining one’s own perspective—and thereby having one’s intentionality mediated by the instrumentalised intentionality of the other. The other candidate is to think of recognition as fear for a threatening or coercing other and thereby having one’s intentionality influenced or mediated by the threatening or coercing intentionality of the other. How do such views suggest themselves by what Hegel writes?

On Hegel’s depiction, the solipsist immediacy of the desiring intentionality is initially disturbed or decreed by the fact that another subject actively resists its subsumption to the determinations dictated by the first subject’s immediate needs. Such an encounter is potentially conflictual and various consequences may follow, the most extreme and structurally primitive being the death of one party and thus the complete annihilation of the challenge that it presented to the desire-orientation of the other. A significantly more elaborate solution is the instrumentalisation of one subject by another to the latter’s desire-orientation by force: slavery. In Hegel’s illustrative depiction of the master and bondsman it is the death-threat that the stronger imposes on the weaker that creates and maintains a relationship where A instrumentalises B who fears A. The intentionality of both parties is, indeed, thereby mediated by the intentionality of the other and thus pure solipsist wantonness seems to be left behind.

Now, even if there is a long history of readers confusing recognition with the relationship of the master and bondsman in Hegel, the thought is well known and widely agreed upon upon Hegel-scholarship that this relationship does not instantiate recognition, at least not in an ideal way or in a full-fledged sense. But why not, exactly? One suggestion is that this is because of the radical dis-symmetry or inequality of the master-bondsman-relation. This suggestion thus invites one to think about what recognition is by removing the element of dis-symmetry or inequality from the picture. The question is then whether we can really grasp what Hegel means by recognition by conceiving a state of mutual instrumentalisation, or of mutual fear? Interestingly, both ways of thinking about recognition actually appear in the literature. Since we are faced with issues that are of decisive importance for understanding what exactly Hegelian recognition is, it is worth considering these ways—let us call them the instrumentalist and the phobic view of recognition—shortly one by one.

Recognition as instrumentalisation of the other

As to the instrumentalist view, instead of charting all the different variations it can take, I shall consider a particular version presented by Robert Brandom in his article ‘The Structure of Desire and Recognition’, reprinted in this collection. What grounds are there for saying that Brandom presents recogni-tion as intersubjective instrumentalisation in the article? In his terms “simply recognising” the other subject is taking it as a reliable indicator for oneself of what is food, or otherwise desire-satisfying. Focusing on the practical dimension of this, the practical significance in light of which the other subject is thereby seen in simple recognition is usefulness for finding out what one might be able to satisfy one’s desires with. As good chairs are good for sitting, good, that is, recognition-worthy other subjects are good for being informed about what is food (or something else of “the kind K”). Hence, on this account recognition does indeed involve a kind of mediation of intentionality through another intentionality in that a subject grasps another being as a subject intending the world and adjusts its own way of intending the world accordingly. Such an idea is not mere armchair-philosophical imagination, since something like this seems to be what higher apes actually do: they observe other apes looking at something and will look at the same direction with the expectation of finding something of interest to themselves.

Following Brandom’s story further, the subsequent stages of recognition (“robust,” “super-robust” and so on) are, from the point of view of practical intentionality, interlocking systems of mutual intersubjective instrumentalisation. They are motivationally driven not only by simple desire, but also by what Brandom calls the “desire for recognition”. Quite radically, the Brandomian basic level desire for recognition is, as to the practical significance that one desires to have in the eyes of others, a desire that others would see one in instrumental lights, namely as a reliable indicator of what is food, or
more generally, as a reliable “K-taker”. Clearly, this would not happen had
the others no desire for food or for “the kind K”; thus for desire for recogni-
tion to be satisfied at the basic level, the more primitive desire has to be oper-
ative as well. Whether the primitive desire becomes eventually redundant at
further levels is perhaps a moot point, but what remains is that there is a
desire—namely for recognition as instrumentalisation of oneself—and that
the others are instrumental for the subject for the satisfaction of this desire.
Thought so, mutual recognition is thus a relationship in which subjects instru-
mentalise each other for their own self-instrumentalisation.

One question that could be asked here concerns the textual plausibility of
thinking that what Brandom is talking about is what Hegel had in mind. As
far as I can see, there is not much in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature suggesting
that he would have entertained such thoughts, nor do I see signs that he
would have given them an important place in his Philosophy of Spirit. Still,
the philosophically more interesting question is whether Brandom’s recon-
struction of what recognition is could in principle make sense of what recogni-
tion does in Hegel’s view. I believe it involves two closely connected problems
in this regard that are relevant for our purposes.

The first problem is that Brandom’s account does not seem to get right the
motivational transformation that in Hegel’s view is of central importance in (a)
the transition from animality or wantonness to spirituality or personhood.
What motivates Brandomian subjects before recognition, in recognition and
after recognition (to simplify the temporality involved a bit) is simply desire.
What muddies the waters here is the notion of “desire for recognition”—not
Hegel’s notion, but an invention by interpreters (most notably Alexandre
Kojève). But the main thing is that although extreme wanton solipsism is
already overcome (Brandom does not tell how) when we meet Brandom’s
subjects the first time, the excentrism of the subject’s practical perspective is
not overcome by what Brandom calls recognition at all. In short, Brandom’s
subjects remain unmoved in the egoism of their desire-orientation, whereas
arguably something quite a bit more radical happens to the motivational
structures of subjects on Hegel’s account.

The second, closely related problem is that if mutual recognition is
mutual instrumentalisation, then it is very difficult to see it as (b) an ele-
ment of the essence of life-form of human persons whose actualisation is a
“vocation” for them, or in other words as an ethical principle or ideal.
Another way to say this is to say that on Brandom’s instrumentalist
account the intersubjective relation never transforms into an interpersonal
relation where subjects are in each other’s perspectives more than mere
means and thereby form a genuine ‘we’. That seems hardly ideal, and there-
fore Brandom’s account does not seem to grasp adequately what Hegel
was after.

Recognition as fear for the other

What about the second option for thinking of recognition as mutual media-
tion of practical intentionalities—thinking of recognition as mutual fear for
the other? Such a view, even if it is not often put forth explicitly, does have a
kind of shadow life in discussions about Hegelian recognition. Read, for
instance, how Terry Pinkard depicts Hegel’s notion of concrete freedom as
mutual recognition, which in his view is a relationship or state of co-legisla-
tion of shared social norms (or “the law”) by subjects who recognize each
other as co-legislators:

[To be free is to stand in the relation of being both “master” and “slave” to
another agent (who also stands in that same relation to oneself), for each to
be both author of the law and subject to the law. Hegel generally character-
izes this status as a mode of “being in one’s own sphere” (of being bei sich
selbst, as he likes to put it).]

Pinkard certainly means “master” and “slave” here in some less than literal
sense. Yet, since he does not give a clear alternative account of the motiva-
tional aspects of mutual recognition, his depiction does suggest the view that
the decisive motivational element in Hegelian freedom is the same as what
motivates the slave or bondsman to yield under the will of the master in
Hegel’s illustration: fear. The only difference is that instead of the asymmetric
or unequal relation we thus have a relationship of mutual fear, presumably
enforced by mutual threat or coercion.

Something like this picture is germane to various ‘social pressure’ accounts
of social norms or norm-obedience, in which the motivating force that social
norms have over individuals eventually comes down to some kind of overt
or internalized threat of the sanction of others. Could it be that this is also
what Hegel had in mind—that his idea of recognising others (as co-authorities of social norms whereby one lives) motivationally equals to fear of them?

At first sight there are actually stronger textual reasons supporting this phobic view than there are for the instrumentalist view. Especially in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel puts significant emphasis on the idea that in contrast to the master who remains motivationally closer to a merely desiring subject, the bondsman has its motivational solipsism shaken off by the fear of death imposed by the threatening master. Hegel's depiction is famous for its drama:

This consciousness [of the bondsman, H.I.] has faced fear, not merely of this or that particular thing or merely at this or that moment. Rather, its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Master. In this feeling it is internally dissolved, trembled in every fibre of its being, and all that was solid in it has been shaken loose.72

It is difficult to avoid the impression that what really shakes off natural wantonness in Hegel's view is fear, and furthermore the ultimate fear of death, imposed by the other subject. Thus, following this particular clue one might think that for a general overcoming of immediate desire-orientation to take place it is necessary that all parties would feel fear for their life and would thereby have their natural solipsism "internally dissolved" or "shaken loose". This would mean that motivationally everyone would be in the situation of the bondsman. And assuming that there were no external agency of threat or coercion, and that all parties were at least largely in an equal situation, masterdom would have to be shared as well—hence the idea of everyone being both master and bondsman to everyone else. Rather than being moved by simple desire, everyone would thus be moved by the motive of self-preservation and fear, and this is what would make every one norm-obeying subjects.

But again, this does not seem to work too well as a construal of recognition that makes sense of what recognition does in Hegel's view. First, although the idea of fear for one's life might be better suited for making sense of how the kind of extreme solipsism or wantonness Hegel is after in his description of 'desire' might be overcome than Brandom's idea of instrumentalisation is, also on the phobic account the ultimate locus of motivation still remains purely egoistic: it is the motive of self-preservation without which there would be nothing to fear in a death-threat in the first place. If this is all there is to the motivational element of interpersonal recognition, then again it is quite difficult to see recognition as being a central element of the essence of the life-form of human persons whose actualisation is a vocation for them—or in other words as an ethical ideal or principle.73 Analogically with the instrumentalist view, also on the phobic view the intersubjective relation never develops into an interpersonal relation where subjects are in each other's perspectives more than mere threats, and whereby they form a genuine 'we'. Again, that seems hardly ideal, and thus the phobic account does not seem to grasp adequately what Hegel was after.

VII. Recognition as personifying mediation

What is recognition then if it is to have all of the characteristics and functions that it has for Hegel? In the final version of his Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel describes the fully unfolded state of mutual recognition that he calls "universal self-consciousness" as follows.

Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative knowing of oneself in another self, where each has absolute independence, yet, in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or desire, does not separate itself from the other. It is universal and objective and has real universality as mutuality so that it knows itself recognised in a free other, and knows this in so far as it recognizes the other and knows it free.74

In the Addition to this paragraph we can read further that this "result of the struggle of recognition" has been drawn (herbeigeführt) via the "concept of spirit". This confirms that Hegel thinks of recognition here—in the sub-chapter on "Universal self-consciousness," right after the sub-chapter on the unequal relationship illustrated by the figures of the master and bondsman—in terms of what he says about the concept of spirit in the introduction to Philosophy of Spirit.75 Three interconnected issues have to be thematised first to make sense of what exactly Hegel is after: freedom, affirmation and significance.
First, the freedom of the other is here not a pre-given object to which recognition would merely be a response. Rather, A's recognising B as free is A's making B free and only insofar as A makes B free by recognition, can B make A free by recognition. Even if it is not impossible for A or B to have the relevant recognitive attitudes towards B or A, only mutuality of recognitive attitudes establishes full-blown concrete interpersonal freedom. This involves no magical acts of giving the other new causal powers; rather, the state of mutual recognition simply is a relationship of intentionalities that instantiates concrete freedom as mutual conscious-being with oneself in one another.

Secondly, attitudes of recognition are "affirmative" of the other in ways in which neither seeing the other in instrumental lights nor fearing the other is. Whereas instrumentalisation involves a subsumation of the other's intentionality into a means for one's particular pre-given ends, and whereas fear involves a subsumation of the other's intentionality as a threat within the space of significance delimited by one's general pre-given end of self-preservation, recognition in Hegel's sense involves an affirmation of the intentionality of the other in a way in which it becomes constitutive of one's ends and thus one's practical intentionality at large. It is due to this affirmation of B's intentionality by A that B can "know" itself (meaning its intentionality) in A (meaning affirmed by A's intentionality), and vice versa. This is what Hegel means by writing that "universal self-consciousness" as mutual recognition is "affirmative knowing" of oneself in the other: one knows oneself affirmed by another whom one similarly affirms. Another way in which he puts this is that subjects "count" (gelten) for each other, which is what allows both "to realise" themselves in or through each other's consciousness.

Thirdly, the attitudes of recognition between subjects are ways of attributing the other, or seeing the other in light of, unique significances that nothing else has in their perspectives. It is through subjects mutually attributing each other such significances—in light of which they "count" to each other in ways in which nothing else does—that the intersubjective relationship instantiates concrete freedom and is an interpersonal relationship. Humans become and are, and thus "realise" themselves, as persons by having recognitive attitudes towards each other that are affirming of the other by viewing the other in light of significances whereby he counts as a person for one. It is an essential element of the 'person-making' psychological constitution of a subject that it/she sees other subjects in light of 'person-making' significances—one is not a person if one does not have others in view as persons. It is by recognising each other, in the sense of seeing each other in light of such affirmative significances that subjects are 'I's (and thou's) constituting a 'we', as Hegel put it in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. One cannot put too much emphasis on this point since for Hegel this is the basic structure of the realm of spirit.

Recognition thus equals with what we could call 'personification' and hence I call this view—which I claim to be Hegel's view—the personalist view of recognition. It is through mutual recognition as personification that human subjects actualise or "realise" themselves in the sense of actualising their essence which is personhood.

We are now in a position to start articulating in detail the core ideas of both Hegel's holism about the constitution of persons and (the rest of) their social and institutional world, as well as of his normative essentialism about the life-form of human persons as a whole. Generally speaking, it is by having attitudes of recognition towards each other that subjects develop socially mediated structures of intentionality that are both constitutive of themselves as persons, and constitutive of the social and institutional world in general. Therefore the phenomenon of interpersonal recognition is the core of Hegel's social ontological holism. Further, the degree to which the personalising interpersonal attitudes of recognition are effective in the overall intentionality of subjects is the degree that their interrelations actualise the essence of the life-form—and this is central for the essence's being actualised more generally as well. Therefore interpersonal recognition is also the core of Hegel's normative essentialism about the human life-form.

Now, interpersonal relations of recognition have two dimensions which Hegel does not distinguish very clearly from each other, but which need to be distinguished in order to grasp what exactly he is talking about. The two dimensions which I call the deontological and the axiological correspond to two different attitudes of recognition which I call respect and love, respectively. Both dimensions are present in Hegel's illustrative fable of the master and bondsman, and even if we have to be careful not to confuse the quasi-empirical details of the illustration with the structural moments that are decisive, it is probably illuminating to discuss the two dimensions partly by reference to the fable. Let us start from the deontological dimension.
Recognition as respect

In discussing the phobic view of recognition we already caught a glimpse of a currently widely spread deontological discourse about spirit and freedom in relation to recognition. For Pinkard Hegelian freedom is essentially about collective self-legislation, or co-authority, of shared social norms. Freedom is here understood as autonomy in the sense of living under laws of one's own authorisation and the idea is that this can only take place collectively among subjects who recognise each other as co-authorities. The figure of the “master” represents thus the figure of the other whose will I recognise as authoritative on me in that I live by norms of his willing; and when everyone is recognised as “master” by everyone else, everyone lives under collectively self-authorised norms. Subjects thus make themselves collectively free by recognising each other as authorities. This is an important idea since it arguably is a fundamental difference between animals that are not persons and persons that the latter’s being is thoroughly organised by social norms. Social norms are constitutive of the very ‘form’ or structure of the life of spiritual beings or persons by being constitutive of their intentionality, and more exactly of both the theoretical and the practical aspects of it.

As to the theoretical side, it is by learning to organise its experiences in terms of empirical concepts that the subject begins to grasp the world epistemically in terms of structures that transcend the immediacy of the relevance-structure determined by wanton desire. In Hegel’s terminology, this is what is at issue in the transition from mere immediate sensuous consciousness (sinnliche Bewusstsein) to perception (Wahrnehmung). In perception the world is organised in terms of empirical concepts, and it is in virtue of these that the epistemic subject can find structures of its own thinking instantiated in the world and thus ‘itself’ in the world. Importantly for us, this is a matter of interpersonality since empirical concepts are embodied in a natural language, and administered, as to their content, by a collective of language-users recognising each other as co-authorities of correct word-usage. Concrete freedom in the epistemic sense of being with oneself in objects of knowledge is hence constitutively dependent on collective norm-administration that requires recognition between administrators.

As to the practical side, shared administration of conceptually organised epistemic world-view is only possible among subjects who also pacify and organise their practical intentionalities and therefore concrete co-existence by collectively authorised and administered practical norms. This similarly requires recognition between co-authorities or -administrators. Importantly, neither the norms of theoretical nor of practical intentionality are merely external demands on subjects. Much of them are internalised or embodied through habitualisation into a “second nature” which is mostly effective in persons without explicit awareness or reflection. This means that persons on the one hand, and the normative structures—or institutions—of their shared social life on the other hand are not separate realities. Rather, persons are embodiments of social institutions. Yet, this does not mean that persons are therefore determined or unfree, since norms and institutions are dependent on persons for their authorisation and administration and since persons can, under the right circumstances, be concretely free in the norms and institutions that structure their being.

But what does respect have to do with all of this? Above we considered the possibility that it is mutual fear that represents the will of others in subjects and makes them norm-obeying beings. As we saw, although this view is not completely unmotivated it is also faced with severe problems as in account of what Hegel is after. Not only would it be very strange to think of mutual fear as a central element of the essence of the life-form in a sense in which it is also vocation or ethical ideal. Moreover, this also seems highly one-sided as an account of what makes the volition of others embodied in social norms subjectively authoritative for persons and thus distinguishes persons motivationally from mere wantons in the deontological dimension. Especially in the case of semantic and other social norms of theoretical intentionality it would seem rather simplifying to think that we take each other as authoritative of them exclusively out of fear. On the other hand, Hegel does give fear a role in the transition from nature to spirit, and it also seems unrealistic to think that fear has nothing to do with what makes humans norm-obeying creatures.

Hegel’s normative essentialism provides a solution. Both fear and the ‘person-alising’ recognitive attitude of respect can be included in an account of the right kind of mutual mediation of intentionality by thinking them as opposite ends of a scale. Whereas fear is a way of the will of another being ‘authoritative’ for a subject, which is furthest from the normative essence of the life-form, respect is the way of this being the case whereby the normative
essence is actualised in the deontological dimension of interpersonal relations. More exactly, mutual respect is the way of mutual authorisation which fully instantiates concrete freedom as mutual conscious-being in one another. Most authority-relations instantiate concrete freedom less than fully, which means that fear for others plays some motivational role in them.

What exactly is then the difference between fear and respect as intersubjective attitudes? Hegel rarely uses the word ‘respect’ (Respekt or Achtung), nor does he clarify the conceptual distinction at stake here too explicitly, but let me suggest a way of rational reconstruction. The decisive difference is that whereas one fears the other because of, or “for the sake of” something else—in the extreme case for one’s life—one does not respect the other because of something else. That is, the motivating impetus of respect does not stem from some other end, but is intrinsic to the attitude. This is the radical sense in which the recognitive attitude of respect is an affirmation of the other: it is being moved by the other’s volition intrinsically, independently of further considerations or motivations. By being intrinsically moved by each other’s will subjects mutually “affirm” each other as underived or original sources of authority. This brings about a mutual mediation of volitions in virtue of which subjects can also find themselves in each other in a way that makes them concretely free with regard to each other: I know my will as having intrinsic authority on your will, and vice versa. This is what makes our relationship genuinely interpersonal on the deontological dimension and makes us partners in a genuine ‘we’.

Thinking of fear and respect as opposite ends of a scale enables one to think of the constitution of social norms and institutions through the practical attitudes of subjects in a way that both allows for variation in the quality of the attitudes and also grasps these constitutive attitudes as having an immanent ideal or normative essence. We can hence say that although accepting (and internalising) norms for merely prudential reasons such as the ultimate fear of death can be constitutive of (at least some) norms and institutions, in merely grudgingly accepting norms and institutions one is not concretely free in them, just as one is not concretely free in any other factors that merely present limitations on or conditions for the realisation of one’s pre-given ends.

In terms of Hegel’s illustration, although the bondsman is a norm-oriented creature, he is not concretely free in the norms that structure his existence. Concrete freedom in, or with regard to, norms and institutions requires that one has genuine authority on them and can thus relate to them as instantiations of one’s own will. Even in a state of shared mutual mastery and slavery the attitude constitutive of norm-acceptance is still fear, which does not enable subjects to be fully free with regard to each other and therefore also not with regard to the norms and institutions whereby they live. It is only to the extent that the relevant subjects have mutual respect whereby they mutually count for each other as original sources of authority (that is, as persons) that this can take place.

Recognition as love

The above account of concrete freedom and personhood as constituted by mutual recognition as respect is, however, only a partial account of Hegel’s holism and normative essentialism in social ontology. As much as the deontological dimension of norms, authority and administration has been at the centre of the recent wave of Hegel-reception in the United States—most prominently by Brandom, Pinkard and Robert Pippin—it is still a one-sided take on what Hegel is after. Indeed, the idea that Hegel’s concept of spirit could be grasped exclusively in terms of a deontological discourse of rules or norms and their collective administration is explicitly contrary to one of the most important elements of Hegel’s though running through his career: his rejection of Kantian ‘legalism’ as the exclusive framework in which to think of morals, rationality and freedom, and his supplementation or substitution of it with a fuller account including an axiological dimension as well.

The concept of recognition is at the very core of the implementation of this programmatic idea of Hegel’s in that it covers both the deontological dimension of mutual respect, and the axiological dimension of mutual love. It is often said that the concept of love had a central importance for Hegel in his early writings, and that it lost this position in his later work. This is true, yet it does not mean that love lost all of its foundational significance for the later Hegel. Strikingly, when Hegel in his late Encyclopaedia talks of “universal self-consciousness”, the state of mutual recognition that is, he always mentions love. Even if only in passing, in the relevant passages Hegel clearly uses love as an example of the actualisation of the structure of concrete freedom in intersubjective relationships—or in other words of interpersonal recognition.
My claim is that in order to make good sense of what is going on in these passages love has to be understood systematically as a recognitive attitude alongside respect, and as having an important role in fulfilling at least function (b) that recognition has for Hegel (see p. 170–171). In short: it is not enough for the full actualisation of concrete freedom that subjects respect each other as co-authors of a space of shared (epistemic and practical) norms, and it is questionable whether without the slightest degree of mutual love they could even have mutual respect (instead of just mutual fear). Further, supposing that it is unlikely that any stable system of social norms could be based on fear or other prudential motives alone, without the slightest hint of intrinsic interpersonal motivation, and supposing that the intrinsic motivating attitude of respect is, in practice, impossible in complete absence of the intrinsically motivating attitude of love, it maybe even impossible (a) to get from nature to spirit—that is, to establish a stable form of co-existence above animality—at all wholly without love. Let me try to substantiate these claims.

The inadequacy of an exclusively deontological reconstruction of what Hegel is after is rather obvious in his illustrative story of the master and the bondsman. What is very important in the story is the coming about of a care- or concern-structure in which the subject is worried about its future and prepares for it. Hegel writes:

> The crude destruction of the immediate object [defining of animal wantonness, H.I.] is replaced by the acquisition, preservation and formation of it [...—the form of universality in the satisfaction of need is an enduring means and a solicitude caring for and securing future.]

What Hegel is talking about here, is the replacement of the immediacy of wantonness by a temporally extended concern for self (or self-love, to borrow Harry Frankfurt)—a practical self-relation which is simultaneously a new kind of temporally extended practical relation to objectivity. For Hegel and many of those influenced by him such as Marx this introduces the theme of work, which Marx thought of as the essential feature of the human life-form distinguishing it from animal ones. Caring about one’s future satisfaction of needs and thus about oneself involves “acquisition, preservation and formation” of objects. Importantly, Hegel depicts this new form of future-oriented practical intentionality—involving a means-end-structure, or representations of non-present future ends and instruments for achieving or securing them—as having its origin in the intersubjective encounter.

Whereas in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel focuses almost exclusively on the cultivating effects of the master-bondsman-relation on the bondsman, in the mature Philosophy of Spirit he puts more emphasis on, or makes clearer also, the cultivating effect of the relationship on the master. Immediately before the passage quoted above Hegel writes that since also the bondsman, as “the means of masterdom,” has to “preserved alive,” the master and bondsman are united by “needs and the concern for their satisfaction.” Not only is the bondsman concerned about the well-being of the master out of fear, also the master is concerned about the well-being of the bondsman for instrumental reasons. The needs and concerns for their future satisfaction of both the master and the bondsman become thus intertwined. What Hegel does here is to describe the future-oriented practical intentionality replacing immediate wanton desire as involving an intersubjective mediation from the start. Abstracting from the quasi-empirical details of the illustrative story, what reason could Hegel possibly have to do so? That is, why should we think that a future-oriented practical intentionality requires or involves some kind of intersubjective mediation from the start?

One perfectly good reason to think this way is the fact that most likely anything but the most rudimentary capacity to represent non-prevailing states of affairs, and thereby future, is a social achievement. Why? Because it requires conceptually organised capacities of representation. ‘Representation’ (Vorstellung) is Hegel’s general name for the psychological operations responsible for the form of theoretical intentionality that he calls perception (Wahrnehmung). Essential for all of these is that they involve a subsumation of the givenness of senses under general concepts (allgemeine Vorstellung) which requires memory (for associating past and present sensations), and makes possible phenomena such as “hope and fear,” which are modes of representing future. In his mature Philosophy of Nature Hegel writes:

> [The] dimensions [of past and future, H.I.] do not occur in nature [... as substinent differences; they are necessary only in subjective representation, in memory and in fear or hope.
In other words, past and future, as “subsistent differences” which means constitutive of the present, are there only for subjects capable of cross-temporal representation and in Hegel’s view this involves a cross-temporal care-structure in which future states of affairs matter. There is any point in having representations about the future only if future is given in the present as something one can be fearful or hopeful about. This is the case within the perspective of subjects with a temporally extended concern for themselves. As to the argument for the inherent sociality of this form of intentionality the decisive issue is that it requires (save perhaps the most rudimentary modes) language as the medium and reservoir of conceptual operations, and that language is dependent on the intersubjective practice of administration of conceptual or semantic norms. Hence, the concept-language-norm-administration-involving nature of representative capacities does support Hegel’s way of describing future-oriented practical intentionality as a social phenomenon from the start.

Yet, Hegel is clearly after something more than this. If this would be the whole story about the intersubjective mediation of future-oriented intentionality characteristic of human persons, it would still leave their concern- or care-structure fundamentally egoistic and the axiological dimension of their practical intentionality with regard to each other merely prudential. In Hegel’s illustration both the master and the bondsman care intrinsically only about their own future, and merely prudentially or instrumentally about the future of the other. Both have thus love for themselves (and are therefore persons in Frankfurt’s terms)—yet they do not have love for each other.

It is through mutual love for each other whereby subjects affirm each other’s intentionality so that their care- or concern-structures become mutually constitutive in a way that is an instantiation of concrete freedom. Whereas the master and the bondsman both only care about the well-being of the other instrumentally, each for one’s own sake, mutually loving persons both care about the well-being of the other intrinsically, each for the other’s own sake. The recognitive attitude of love for the other is an unconditional affirmation of the other, not as an original source of authority, but as an irreducible perspective of concerns and thus as an original source of value. Loving the other involves a mediation or ‘triangulation’ of perspectives of concerns, analogically to how respecting the other involves a mediation or triangulation of perspectives of authority.

What happens in a state of mutual love is thus that the subjects’ temporal perspectives of “fear and hope” are mutually mediated and “caring for and securing future” becomes a joint project where I am intrinsically motivated to work also for your and therefore for our future, and the same goes for you. The ‘we’ is here not merely a bond constituted by prudential or egoistic motives, as in the relationship of the master and the bondsman, but rather a unity of practical intentionailities where the concerns of both (or all) parties are equally important in sculpting the world in axiological terms in the perspective of both. When both know that the other has (at least some) love for one, each is self-conscious in the other by finding one’s concerns affirmed by the loving other who has internalised them as constitutive of his own concerns.

Analogically with fear and respect on the deontological dimension, Hegel’s normative essentialism allows one to conceive of instrumentalisation and other prudential motives on the one hand, and love on the other hand as opposite ends of a scale of attitudes constitutive of the mediation of practical intentionalities on the axiological dimension. Thereby we can think of sociality in the constitution of the axiological features of the world for persons (their ends, constituents of ends, things and states with positive or negative instrumental value) and thus in their motivation-structures in a way that both allows for variation in the quality of the constitutive intersubjective attitudes and also grasps these as having an immanent ideal or normative essence.

As to the question whether it is possible to get from nature to spirit at all wholly without love, or in other words whether love is essential for the life-form of human persons not only (b) as an immanent ideal but also (a) as a necessary condition (see p. 170), we should acknowledge at least that there is a genuine question. Thinkers as different as George Herbert Mead and Talcott Parsons have thought that the success of a life-form driven by a purely egoistic (more than wanton) concern-structures is unlikely. One reason to think this way is the comparative cognitive complexity of mediation of care-structures (and they have to be somehow mediated in shared co-existence in any case) in exclusively prudential terms, in comparison to a mediation based at least in part on intrinsic concern for the needs and well-being of others. The latter is cognitively simpler since reduces the need for the kind of (tacit or explicit) deliberation involved in taking the concerns of others into account in one’s own concerns prudentially.
Put simply: life is immensely more complicated if anyone only helps anyone, or cooperates, when it seems all things considered the prudential thing for oneself to do, than it is if subjects are at least sometimes moved by each other’s needs intrinsically, without any further considerations. The more cognitively demanding the simplest forms of co-existence (say, between mothers and their offspring) are, the less likely they are to succeed under conditions of cognitive finitude. This does not prove the strict necessity of love for the life-form of human persons, but it does at least suggest that humans should be extremely intelligent to navigate a completely loveless social world where any motivation for interaction would be conditional, if not on explicit calculation of personal advantage, at least on trust that such calculation would favour interacting. There is, further, the question raised above whether respect or intrinsic motivation by the will of others is possible in complete lack of love or intrinsic motivation by the well-being of others. If it is not, then love is hardly any less important for the constitution of the social and institutional world of human persons than respect is.  

To be clear, the details presented above of what exactly recognition in Hegel’s sense is, based on what he thinks it does and the fact that he thinks of it as an instantiation of concrete freedom as self-consciousness in other subjects, are not something Hegel himself spells out lucidly anywhere. In the Self-consciousness-chapter of both the published and lectured versions of his mature Philosophy of Subjective Spirit he tends to talk of the deontological and the axiological dimensions without a clear distinction, even though distinguishing them is necessary for making clear sense of the totality of what he says. Similarly, he often conflates the interpersonal forms of recognition with a recognition or acknowledgement of the deontic or institutional powers of the other, which easily leads to an obfuscation of the constitutive role of interpersonal recognition for norms and institutions.

This is all symptomatic of the fact that Hegel mainly focuses on the fairly abstract structural features of concrete freedom as self-consciousness in other subjects. He is much less focused—even in the illustrative story of the master and bondsman—on clarifying what exactly the interpersonal attitudes of recognition constitutive of universal self-consciousness have to be and how exactly they relate to the closely connected intersubjective motives of fear and instrumentalisation (that is, instrumental valuing) of the other. These are issues we have just tried to clarify, drawing on Hegel’s own statements and conceptual resources.

VIII. Actualising the normative essence

We should now have a grasp of the basic ideas and principles of Hegel’s holism and normative essentialism in social ontology. Let us return to the idea that may be the most difficult of all to swallow: the self-realisation of the essence of spirit or the human life-form. What sense can we make of this idea?

A central issue here is the constitutive self-reflexivity of the life-form in question, or in other words the fact that what persons take themselves to be is partly constitutive of what they are. Applied to essentialism, the point is the answer to the question ‘what do we take ourselves to be essentially?’ is partly constitutive of the answer to the question ‘what are we essentially?’ This does not mean that anyone can individually make oneself essentially this or that by the simple act of thinking that this is what one essentially is. And even if people have collectively much greater capacities for self-definition, even collectively they do not have a magical power to make themselves essentially something simply by entertaining thoughts or beliefs about themselves. The point is rather that collectively taking something as essential to us is constitutive of what we are through being an ideal towards which we are oriented in practice. This is the sense in which the essence of the human life-form is not simply a given “determination,” but a “vocation” (the German word ‘Bestirnmung’ combines both these meanings) for humans in Hegel’s view. It is because what humans collectively take themselves to be essentially is (thereby) a vocation for them, that the essence has whatever tendency it has to self-actualisation.

The above example of using artifacts is illuminating here. The life-form in general can be thought of as the totality of all the real practices that persons engage in collectively. Or, as Hegel puts it, it is the “universal work [...] the activity of everyone”. As in the case of the particular practice focused on chairs and sitting, also in the case of the totality of all practices, ‘taking’ something as essentially something should be understood in the sense of ‘common sense’ that is not merely ‘in the heads’ of the participants,
but is an ‘objective’ form of thinking at work in practice. What works in practice is never completely up to grabs but depends on numerous factors many of which are simply unchangeable (say, the law of gravitation) or at least relatively stable and slow to change (say, the average shape of human backsides). Common sense about normative essences is constantly put to test in practice by such factors. If we are going to talk sensibly about thinking about or taking something as the essence of the human life-form as constitutive of it’s being the essence, then ‘thinking or taking’ has to be understood exactly in this sense: as common sense at work and tested in the collective life of humanity at large.

Thought so, Hegel’s global actualist normative essentialism about the human life-form involves the claim that concrete freedom is a self-actualising essence in being an immanent ideal actually at work in the totality of human practices. Hence, what he means with ‘concrete freedom’ should be part of more or less universally shared practice-constituting common sense. Can such a bold claim be validated with evidence? What kind of evidence would be appropriate? Or to put it the other way around, what kind of evidence would refute it? These are obviously large questions and I will only make a few suggestive remarks concerning them.

To start with, claiming that mutual recognition (which is the central instantiation of concrete freedom) is an immanent ideal of all interpersonal relations is perhaps not as outrageous as at least sweeping rejections of normative essentialism would make it seem. A good way of construing the claim is to say that to the extent that any human relationship or practice does not actualise interpersonal recognition it is less than ideal in ways that are accessible to normal participants, or are part of their common sense.

The common sense quality of recognition and its absence is made robust by the fact that the goodness of recognition and the badness of its absence is both functional and ethical in nature. This is what the figures of the master and the bondsman illustrate well. As to the deontological dimension, to the extent that their relationship is founded on coercion and fear, rather than on mutual authorisation of its terms or norms by both (or all) parties respecting each other as co-authorities, the relationship is inherently unstable and vulnerable to violent collapse or revolution due to contingent changes in the equation of power. Any moderately intelligent slave-owner or dictator will be able to tell this much.

This functional deficiency of relationships and practices grounded on coercion and fear, rather than shared authority, is hardly independent of their being ethically deficient or pathological in ways that are robustly commonsensical. If anything is a more or less universally comprehensible, clearly moral or ethical experience for more or less psychologically normal persons, then the experience that others do not respect one as having authority on the norms or terms of co-existence (even potentially, as adults do with regard to children), but force one to obey their will. It is the more or less universally human obviousness of this fact that explains why there is a tendency in slave-owning societies towards the often seriously self-deceptive and delusive attempt to try to imagine or discursively construe the slaves in general as by their nature less than full psychological persons in the sense of lacking a serious moral perspective, or at least as incapable of sharing authority and therefore as being in need of external control. In other words, there is a tendency among slave-owners to try to imagine or construe the slaves as either essentially different from oneself and one’s peers, or then as inherently deficient in their capacity to actualise the essence that one shares with them. It is no news that when common sense collides with strong enough interests, the former does not always prevail. Yet, abolitionists rarely need to perform particularly demanding intellectual acrobatics to point out the self-deceptive nature of such exercises of imagination or construction.

Lack of recognition and therefore concrete freedom on the deontological dimension of interpersonal relationships is tied to lack of concrete freedom with regard to norms and institutions: if I am not attributed authority on institutions by others and therefore do not have it, I do not find my will instantiated in them. On the other hand, if I am the sole authority of institutions (a slave-master or dictator), I do find my will instantiated in the institutions, but they are not properly other to, or independent of me. For me they are not made of genuine norms or laws at all, and to that extent I am therefore not a norm-governed being. Even norms and institutions based on mutual threat and fear do not actualise concrete freedom since they bind individuals mostly in the way of a hostile or alien otherness.

Somewhat analogically on the axiological dimension, to the extent that relationships and practices are characterised by no or merely instrumental concern, for the life or well-being of other participants, they are functionally unstable, and this is partly due to their being ethically deficient
in a robustly commonsensical way. There are tendencies of thinking—impressed by aspects of modern economics and related theoretical enterprises—that pure egoism is a sufficient motivational foundation for an organisation of human co-existence, but they cannot boast of a particularly wide global intuitive appeal. One reason why the idea is not convincing, when said aloud, is its commonsensical ethical reprehensibility: most people would find social life based on pure egoism as hardly worth living, and certainly not worth sacrificing much for. Again, if anything is a more or less universally comprehensible clearly moral or ethical experience, then that others do not care about one or one’s well-being at all, or care about it purely instrumentally. From another point of view, it is part of well-established common sense among humanity widely spread across cultures that life will be lonely and miserable if one has no intrinsic concern for anyone else except for oneself. If anything has been thoroughly tested in practice for as long as human memory and written record extends, then this. Whatever the details of one’s favourite theoretical account of this robustly commonsensical truth, they clearly have to do with, if not unchangeable, at least extremely slowly changing facts about the constitution of human persons.

Also on the axiological dimension, lack of recognition and therefore of concrete freedom is tied to lack of concrete freedom with regard to the socially constituted world more generally. The less people care about each other’s well-being intrinsically, the less it shows in their actions that mould and structure the social world. Since in a finite world egoists have to limit their spheres of egoistic activity with regard to each other, each will find his or her needs or claims of happiness and well-being directly met or affirmed by only that part of the world which belongs to his or her own respective sphere, whereas elsewhere they are met or affirmed only “with a price”—only if someone else gains a personal advantage by meeting them. There is a clear sense in which people can find their needs and claims of happiness affirmed by, and therefore be self-conscious in, items of the world that are built or made available to meet their needs and claims without (or at least not merely with) an expectation of compensation, a sense in which they will not find themselves affirmed in items they have to buy. The latter do not exist for my sake, but for the sake of the instrumental value I have as a needy being for the one selling.¹⁰⁶

All in all, there seem to be at least some grounds for arguing for a rather robustly universal commonsensicality of the thought that human relations and practices are non-ideal to the degree that they do not instantiate interpersonal recognition. Yet, this necessary component of the self-reflective and self-constitutive essentialism about the human life-form in Hegel’s sense of course also has to be compatible with a historical variability of human societies: not always and everywhere has it been thought that any relationship is non-ideal or deficient to the extent that it does not instantiate recognition, or that anyone’s life is non-ideal to the extent that she is not concretely free with regard to others or with regard the social and institutional world. It would probably be too simple to describe this merely in terms of collective self-deception convenient for the prevailing masters.

As Hegel puts it in the introduction to his (posthumously edited and published) lectures on philosophy of history, the Orientals “knew” only that “one is free,” the Greeks and Romans “knew” that “some are free,” and first the “German nations,” under the influence of Christianity, “attained the consciousness” that all are free, or in other words that “man, as man is free, that it is the freedom of spirit which constitutes his essence”. What is interesting in this statement are not so much the debatable historical details, but the importance of “knowing” or “consciousness” that one is free for being free. Hegel seems to be saying that it is (at least partly) because the Orientals did not know that they are all free, that they were not all free; similarly it is because the slave-owning Greeks did not know that their slaves were not free; finally it is because the German nations gained consciousness of universal freedom that they became actually free.¹⁰⁷

“Consciousness” and “knowing” (Wissen) have both very broad meanings for Hegel, standing basically for any intentional state with content in the object-form.¹⁰⁸ Thus, in this context they could in principle stand either for knowing or being conscious of (the fact) that x is free, where this is the appropriate epistemic response to the independent fact that x is free, or for willing that x is free where this can be part of making it the case that x is free. I suggest that both construals grasp an aspect of what Hegel is after.

On the one hand, “knowing” or “consciousness” of freedom as the essence of man is in Hegel’s view constitutive of humans’ becoming free through its being introduced, as he writes, as “a principle” “in worldly affairs,” by being
"applied" in the world and thereby leading slowly to a "cultivation" of states, governments and constitutions. In other words, freedom as the essence of humanity is actualised as it slowly becomes practice-constituting common sense on a broad front. In this sense it involves an aspect of willing. (Since this does not happen overnight, as if a sudden change of mind, "slavery did not cease immediately on the reception of Christianity".)

On the other hand, even if consciousness of freedom being the essence of humanity is constitutive of the actualisation of the essence, this consciousness is also responsive to independent facts about humanity that are part of what makes it the case that freedom is their essence in the sense of an immanent ideal. In short: freedom did not become the essence of the human life-form only when humans came up with (originally religious) representations that it is their essence. Again, this is something Hegel illustrates with the figures of the lord and the slave, which he uses as an ahistorical image of the dysfunc-
tionality and tendency to self-overcoming of intersubjective relations that do not actualise concrete freedom.

Hegel is very well aware of the fact that it will make a difference to social life when people become reflectively conscious about important facts about social life, or in other words when (religious or other) cultural representations of and models for thinking about them become available. Yet, even such rep-
resentations will change social life only gradually, and at least in the long run they can only do this by being responsive to partly independent and even if not unchanging, at least very slowly changing facts about what they repre-
sent. For Hegel, the actualisation of the essence of the human life-form, the core of all progress in history, is an actualisation of given potentials. These potentials need not be thought of as in some implausible sense eternal (to be traced back to the Big Bang and beyond), yet they are very slow to change and therefore fairly resistant to historical variation, including deliberate engi-
neering. No wonder, we can barely even imagine what it would mean to think of a mode of co-existence based exclusively on mutual fear and/or instrumentalisation as a practice-immanent ideal of both functionally and ethically good human societies.

On the other hand, Hegel understood perfectly well that distorting cul-
tural representations or ideologies have the capacity to obstruct common sense from grasping the essence and immanent ideal of human affairs, and therefore the capacity to support modes of social life that for outsiders or later generations are staggeringly obviously far from ideal. Sometimes, those not in the grips of the representations will judge such modes of social life 'inhuman', which is to say so far from the essence of the life-form of human persons that they approach the blurry boundaries of what belongs to that form at all.

As for the importance of Christianity for Hegel, it is illuminating to note that both authority and love are attributes of the Christian God, and that Hegel's philosophical reinterpretation, involving a systematic reduction of the Christian trinity to one of its components—'spirit'—makes authority and love essential attributes of humanity, or of human life that actualises its essence. It is not that Hegel uncritically adopts certain Christian dogmas as the back-
bone of his social ontology, but rather that he thinks they provide metaphorical representations of essential structures of the life-form of human persons, the non-metaphorical representation of which is the task of philosophy.

**Conclusion**

What is the contemporary relevance of Hegel's social ontology? As with all genuine classics in philosophy, such a question will have many answers. I have suggested that currently it might be useful in providing means for a general reorientation in social ontology towards a more holistic and in-depth approach, where the social constitution of persons and thereby the most fund-
mental levels of the constitution of the social and institutional world in general would become a serious topic of philosophical investigation.

As for Hegel's normative essentialism, I am not convinced that it has been so far understood well enough for a conclusive judgment about its viability to be passed. The main reason why I believe it too is an aspect of Hegel's social ontology that has relevance today is that it is a conceptual strategy that is aimed at getting at the most fundamental practice-immanent convictions or intuitions of common sense about what makes forms of human co-existence good. It is a haunting fact—haunting because so much in the current land-
scape of philosophy speaks against taking it seriously—that the strongest moral or ethical intuitions we arguably share about human affairs tend to be articulated in normative essentialist terms. I am referring to the expressions
that something is ‘inhuman’, ‘inhumane’, or ‘genuinely or truly human’, and so forth. If one is not at all willing to consider the possibility that there might be something serious behind such expression, something which they correctly express in normative essentialist terms, then one is unlikely to find a reassessment of the viability of normative essentialism in social philosophy very interesting. On the other hand, if one has even a nagging suspicion that there actually might be something worth a philosophical reconstruction in such expressions, or the intuitions they express, then taking a fresh look at what Hegel was really on about with his normative essentialism in social ontology is, in my view at least, not at all a bad idea.

There is of course a major (even if nowadays almost obsolete) stream of though where normative essentialism, in various, more or less well articulated guises used to be taken seriously. This is the dispersed tradition of humanist Marxism, the story of which begins with the young Karl Marx. Marx may not have read all the right texts from Hegel, and he may have read what he read idiosyncratically, but he certainly had an eye both for Hegel’s holism as well as his Aristotelian normative essentialism. In terms of how I have spelled out the fundamentals of these in this article, three facts about Marx’s own creative appropriation of Hegel are worth mentioning briefly.

1. What Marx means by ‘Entfremdung’ (variously translated as ‘alienation’ or ‘estrangement’) can be reconstructed as the opposite of what Hegel means by ‘concrete freedom’ as conscious-being in otherness. Thus, overcoming alienation means actualising the essence of humanity which is concrete freedom. In Marx’s terms this means actualising the human ‘species-being’.

2. Marx radically disagrees with the institutional details of Hegel’s Philosophy of Objective Spirit. Perhaps most importantly, whereas Hegel sees private property as an instantiation of concrete freedom, Marx sees private ownership (especially of means of production) as the main factor leading to alienation. Here the general idea of concrete freedom and its opposite does not, as such, determine which one is the right view (remember the point about ‘necessary contingency’). My discussion of how lack of recognition in the axiological dimension is conducive to the needs and claims of happiness of persons not being affirmed by the social and institutional world (since in the world of egoists most things come with a price-tag) was already a

concretization Hegel’s principle of concrete freedom that drifts to Marx’s general direction. Whether this, all things considered, is the right direction to go, and how far it is good to go, will not be decided simply on conceptual grounds, but by a myriad empirical things that depend on time and place. Social philosophy with emancipatory interest, engaged with concrete details, can only be its “own time [and place] comprehended in thoughts”.

3. Whereas those who read Hegel predominantly in light of Kantian legalism in philosophy—that is, in terms of the deontological discourse of autonomy as collective self-authorisation of norms—tend to lose sight of the axiological dimension of Hegel’s project (and thereby the recognitive aspects of what really moves or matters to persons), the young Marx one-sidedly focuses on the axiological dimension of love and loses from sight the deontological dimension. This makes his social ontology defective with regard to social norms and institutions and obstructs him from grasping clearly the difference between alienated and non-alienated relations to persons, the young Marx one-sidedly focuses on the axiological dimension of love and loses from sight the deontological dimension. This makes his social ontology defective with regard to social norms and institutions and obstructs him from grasping clearly the difference between alienated and non-alienated relations to them. Since persons themselves are embodiments of social norms and institutions, this is a serious theoretical flaw with potentially devastating practical consequences.

As the huge influence of Hegel’s thought (with all the battles, distortions and misunderstandings that belong to its reception-history) testifies, philosophy is de facto not merely descriptive of the world, but also changes it by becoming part of the reservoir of cultural representations whereby humans collectively try to articulate to themselves what they hold, or what is, essential to their being. Social ontology is therefore, by its nature, not a harmless enterprise. It depends on historically varying empirical details whether the consequences of flawed philosophical conceptualisations are more serious than the consequences of a widespread lack of philosophical articulation of the most fundamental facts about human persons and their life-form.

Notes

3. ‘Constituting’, and ‘constitution’ can of course mean many things. Here I am assuming that ‘constitution’ in the relevant sense is not merely a logical relation, as
when we say that a block of marble constitutes a statue under suitable conditions (see L. Rudder Baker, *Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000). The ‘constitution’ of the entities, relations and so forth of the social and institutional world—arguably on any plausible account—involves some kind of *activity* by suitable kinds of subjects. For instance, pieces of paper only ‘constitute’ a dollar bill (in the logical sense) when suitable kinds of subjects ‘constitute’ them (in the activity-sense) as such by treating them as such. In the case of persons this is especially clear: the relevant conditions under which something ‘constitutes’ a person include several kinds of ‘constitutive’ activities, not only by other persons, but also by the person in question. In more than one way persons are by making themselves persons. For more on this, see H. Ikäheimo, “Recognizing Persons,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, vol. 14, no. 5-6, 2007, pp. 224-247. See also A. Laitinen, “Constitution of persons,” in eds. H. Ikäheimo, J. Kotkavirta, A. Laitinen & P. Lyra *Personhood—Workshop papers of the Conference ‘Dimensions of Personhood’,* Publications in Philosophy 68, Jyväskylä, University of Jyväskylä, 2004, for a critique of the formula ‘x constitutes a person’. I basically agree with Laitinen’s critique.

4 This is not to be understood in the simple “attributivist” sense that all there is to being a person is to be attributed personhood (by attitudes, discourses or whatever). In contrast, this is all there is to being, say, money (*mutatis mutandis*). What I am saying is also meant to be compatible with the possibility that some facts about persons that are independent of sociality are constitutive of personhood.

5 When it comes to saying something about the kinds of individual subjects that their theories imply or require, some leading contemporary social ontologists, such as Margaret Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela, adopt the methodological abstraction of social contract theories and take the existence of fully developed and socialised persons as given. Tuomela expresses this as follows (R. Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 6): “conceptually we start with a full notion of a human being as a person”. He does say this about the constitution of persons in his most recent book: “This book relies on the conception of human beings as persons in the sense of the ‘framework of agency’ that assumes that (normal) persons are thinking, experiencing, feeling, and acting beings capable of communication, cooperation, and following rules and norms.” (ibid., p. 6); “the capacity and motivation for sharing intentional states is an evolved central aspect of being a person” (ibid., p. 231). These constitutive capacities are however not a topic, but a presupposition of Tuomela’s social ontology (or “philosophy of sociality” to use his own term). In Gilbert’s view “the concept of an individual person with his own goals, and so on, does not require for its analysis a concept of a collectivity itself unanalysable in terms of persons and their noncollectivity-involving properties.” (M. Gilbert, *On Social Facts*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 435) Gilbert’s paradigmatic example of a social phenomenon is two full-fledged persons walking together, where these can be conceived as “congenital Crusoes” (Gilbert, *On Social Facts*, p. 59; see also Gilbert, “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 15, 1990). Other leading contemporary social ontologists, such as John Searle, content themselves with the evolutionarily obvious fact that the subjective capacities of individual needed for building and maintaining a world of social and institutional facts or structures collectively have to be capacities that animals can have developed. (See Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*; see also H. Rakoczy & M. Tomasello, “The Ontogeny of Social Ontology: Steps to Shared Intentionality and Status Functions,” ed. S. Tsotzatzidis *Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology*, Berlin, Springer, 2007, pp. 113-139, for an argument that Searle reads collective phenomena much too liberally in nature, thereby neglecting fundamental differences between the social ontology of humans and other animals. I am of course not claiming that nothing useful in this regard has been written by contemporary authors. See, for instance, Philip Pettit’s *The Common Mind*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, for an argument for the (in Pettit’s view contingent) sociality of mindedness.

6 B. Preston, *The Stuff of Life: Towards a Philosophy of Material Culture*, (book-manuscript), Chapter 3, contains a thorough critique of Tuomela and Gilbert from this point of view.

7 Hegel-scholars often say that translating ‘Geist’ as ‘mind’ is misleading. The way in which Anthony Crisafi and Shaun Gallagher (“Hegel and the extended mind,” *AI and Society*, 25, 2010, pp. 123-129) use Hegel’s concept of objective *Geist* in the extended mind-debate suggests that it may be less misleading than often thought. I will use however ‘spirit’ throughout the text.


10 My usage of ‘personhood’ is not meant to follow Hegel’s usage of ‘Persönlichkeit’, but to resonate with a wide variety of classic and contemporary ways of using the term.

11 To be fair, elements of the received view of Hegel’s concept of spirit are not merely philosopher’s folklore, but also put forth in many serious interpretations of Hegel’s
philosophy. One of the most famous of such interpretations is Charles Taylor’s Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975. Taylor’s main mistake in his in many ways admirable book is to presuppose a pre-given notion of what ‘spirit’ means—in Taylor’s view a “cosmic spirit” that “posits the world” (ibid., chapter 3)—instead of simply trying to make sense, without preconceptions, of what it has to mean if it is a title for what is actually discussed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit.

Hegel’s Encyclopaedic system as a whole consists of Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit. Philosophy of Spirit consists of Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Philosophy of Objective Spirit, and Philosophy of Absolute Spirit. Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has similarly three parts: Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology.

This particular caricature of Hegel has been reproduced over and over again. A recent version is by Hans-Johann Glock in an otherwise very useful book (H.-J. Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 25): “The German idealists tried to overcome [...] tensions [inherent in Kant’s transcendental idealism] by taking idealism to extremes. The subject furnishes not just the form of cognition, but also its content. Reality is a manifestation of a spiritual principle which transcends individual minds, such as Hegel’s ‘spirit’. Since reality is itself entirely mental, it can be fully grasped by the mind. Philosophy once more turns into a super-science which encompasses all other disciplines. All genuine knowledge is a priori, since reason can derive even apparently contingent facts through the method of ‘dialectic’, which was rehabilitated in the face of Kant’s strictures.” Further: “Naturalists ‘à la Quine, Kantian or Wittgensteinian anti-naturalists and even proponents of essentialist metaphysics à la Kripke reject the ultra-rationalist Hegelian idea that philosophy can pronounce a priori on the nature of the world, independently of the special sciences.” (ibid., p. 224) Although the relation of contingency and necessity in Hegel is a matter of considerable debate, no serious Hegel-scholar who has any real knowledge about how Hegel actually goes about with his topics in the Philosophy of Nature, or Philosophy of Spirit, would claim that Hegel really tries to deduce “even apparently contingent facts” a priori. As the late Michael John Petry, one of the best experts ever on Hegel’s relation to the sciences, has shown in painstaking detail in his editions of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Subjective Spirit [HPSS], Hegel was highly erudite in the sciences of his time, and far from the stereotypical armchair-speculator who thinks he can pronounce truths about the world completely “independently of the special sciences”. There are numerous places where Hegel explicitly emphasises the importance of the sciences for a philosophical comprehension of the world, or ridicules those who demand an a priori deduction of its details. Further, even if Hegel does reject the Kantian thought that the world “in itself” is strictly in accessible to knowledge, he does not do this by postulating that “reality itself is entirely mental”. Hegel does think that spirit can grasp nature, but this does not mean that nature itself is spiritual or “mental”. Rather it means that nature is in principle knowable through disciplined scientific and philosophical inquiry. At the same time however Hegel is critical of any suggestion that the sciences could do wholly without philosophy. For him the boundary between the sciences and philosophy is more a matter of degree than one of a clear-cut demarcation. On my reading, Hegel would have been in agreement with Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic-distinction, and thereby of a clear demarcation between philosophy on the one hand and empirical sciences on the other. Against appearance, I do not think that this claim is incompatible with what Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer is after in his contribution to this volume: one can both accept that structural descriptions are not mere empirical generalisations, and also accept that they come in various degrees of abstraction.

I say “in principle,” since it is arguable that these two texts differ from each other in significant ways, not merely in the sense of the one being an extended version of the other. See D. Henrich, “Logical Form and Real Totality: The Authentic Conceptual Form of Hegel’s Concept of the State,” in R. Pippin & O. Höffe, Hegel on Ethics and Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

D. Stederoth, Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2001, chapter 2 contains a helpful discussion in this theme.

A familiar experience to readers of Hegel is that one has to struggle even to make sense of what exactly is the issue that Hegel is talking about in a given passage. This is at least partly because Hegel almost always has several things going on in a given passage.


Ibid., p. 20.

In short, one should not, and does not need to, worry about, say, the monarch, the estates, or other similar details of Hegel’s institutional design in Philosophy of Objective Spirit, but rather focus on the more abstract levels of conceptualisation where one is likely to find more generally valid insights about the interconnection of the constitution of persons and the constitution of the (rest of the) social and institutional world. One can similarly abstract from Hegel’s own idiosyncrasies of perspective, belonging to the more concrete levels of description, such as his antiquated views about the natural differences between men and women translating into differences in psychological constitution and appropriate social role (HPSS, §397, EPR, §166).

‘Holism’ is not to be read as suggesting that in Hegel’s view the individual is determined by the social ‘whole’, but merely suggesting that Hegel approaches the constitution of persons and the constitution of the (rest of the) social and institutional world as an interconnected whole. This, as such, involves yet no claim concerning to
what extent, or how one or the other element of this whole is ‘determined’ by the other. Cf. Pettit, The Common Mind, chapters 3 and 4.

22 I am thinking of political and critical theory especially. On essentialism in the beginning of the left-Hegelian tradition, see M. Quante, “Recognition as the Social Grammar of Species Being in Marx”, in this volume.

23 In heated discussions such details get easily confused so that someone may, for instance, end up defending global anti-essentialism, even though his or her real worry concerns essentialism about something in particular. In principle, there is no pressing need to extend ones commitment to anti-essentialism, say, to trees or chairs, if essentialism about humans or persons is what one in fact worried about—and mostly it is essentialism about humans or persons that raises worries. Instead of simply condemning essentialism flat out, it is usually a good advice to reflect carefully on which form of essentialism, about what exactly, and why exactly, one finds problematic, as well as which form of anti-essentialism, about what exactly, and why exactly one wants to subscribe to.


25 It is of course possible to be a normative essentialist without subscribing to this teleological idea.

26 A house would be the traditional Aristotelian example of a usable artefact. Note that not all usable things are artefacts, nor are all artefacts usable. We use natural entities as well, and we can produce things not to be used for anything.

27 Does this mean that it is strictly impossible that there are chair-designers who do not think it is essential to chairs to be good to sit on, or who do not have an idea of what makes something good to sit on? Perhaps not. The normative essentialist conceptualist strategy does not stipulate necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being x, but rather focuses on the essence or ideal of x which is determined by what works best in real practices. The question “how far” from the essence something has to be so that it ceases to be x altogether has usually no definite answer in practice. In social ontology the usefulness of conceptualising the world in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is often less than clear. See, for instance, Michael Bratman’s stipulation of what he calls “shared cooperative activity (SCA)” in M. Bratman ‘Shared Cooperative Activity’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 2, 1992, pp. 327–41. If and only if something fulfils the conditions stipulated by Bratman, it is what he calls SCA. Whether picking out exactly SCA’s in the world has much practical value is debatable. My view is that normative essentialism is, as a rule, the more useful conceptual strategy in social ontology since it grasps how the social world is actually structured.

28 Wittgensteinians might doubt that all sittable chairs have to share any single feature, but this is not a challenge to the argument since it only concerns the general feature or property of sittability, not its constituents. The real life challenge of denying that sittability is essential to chairs would be to convince people of the idea that being sittable is merely an accidental feature of chairs. Note that we are not debating whether being a chair is an essential property of all those things that are chairs. Suffice it to say that I do not believe there is a perspective-independent answer to that question. What is essential in that sense depends on what is relevant from the point of view of a particular practice such as sitting or, say, atom physics.

29 A counter-argument: Talking of chairs and other usable artifacts in essentialist terms covers from view issues of power. For instance, the fact that chairs and other usable artifacts are made for people of average size and functionality makes people of different sizes and functionality ‘disabled’ with regard to the material culture of usable artifacts which structures so much of what we are actually able to do. This is not a matter of essences but of power of some people over others, and discussing it in essentialist terms only covers up the issues of power involved. A reply: Saying that the essences of chairs and similar things are determined by social practices is perfectly compatible with the point of the counter-argument and thus it is not a counter-argument at all. The matter of power is the matter of whose authority and needs count in the structuration of the relevant practices, which determine the essences. Essentialism on items of the social and institutional world should not be confused with naturalisation or reification of them.

30 Note that there are two senses of ‘constitution’ at play here: 1. the physical construction chairs, 2. the taking or treating of chairs as chairs in real practices.

31 Let me address one further potential point of critique, which is the observation that different chairs (or, as I would rather say, different things called ‘chair’) can serve different functions. Some can be for show, some for sitting for short periods, some for maintaining good posture, some are meant to impress your friends or function as investment, and so on. But this is merely saying that actually not all of the things called ‘chairs’ have the same essential property or that sittability is essential to chairs would be to convince people of the idea that being sittable is merely a feature of chairs. Note that we are not debating whether being a chair is an essential property of all those things that are chairs. The point of the counter-argument at all. The matter of power is the matter of whose authority and needs count in the structuration of the relevant practices, which determine the essences. Essentialism on items of the social and institutional world should not be confused with naturalisation or reification of them.
on the other) to be mutually compatible enough, or to enable a sufficient degree of commonness of common sense needed for well-enough-functioning co-existence. Complex modern societies are characterized by multiple practices and essences being at work in almost any situation. Yet, there are practical limitations to how dispersed or mutually antagonist they can be so that organised, peaceful co-existence is still possible. I thank Arto Laitinen and Paul Formosa for pressing me on these issues and Formosa for examples.

Note that this is far from saying that usable artifacts are what they are simply by virtue of their creator’s intentions, as in R. Dipert, Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993.

Here (a) is a commitment to actualist essentialism in general, (b)-(c) comprise the further commitment to its normative version, and (d) the further commitment to teleology shared by Aristotle and Hegel.

Dieter Henrich (“Logical form and real totality”) argues that the principle of syllogism (understood in an ontological sense unique to Hegel) is a central structuring principle of Philosophy of Spirit. This is very clear also in Hegel’s discussion of recognition, especially in the chapter on ‘Lordship and Bondage’ in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977 [PS], §§178–196. In what follows, I will abstract from this fact, yet intend my discussion to be compatible with it.

Some interpreters view absolute negation as the basic principle of Hegel’s philosophy in general. See, for example, eds. C. Butler & C. Setler, Hegel’s Letters, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 18. On absolute negation, spirit and freedom, see HPSS, §§381–382; on absolute negation in the master and the bondsman, see PS, §§187, §191; on absolute negation as the essence of “self-consciousness,” see §194.

Hegel’s critique of negative freedom of course only bites in cases where y in the idea of ‘x’s being free from determination by y’ really is something that is not a merely contingent, but a necessary determinant of x. Think of outer and inner nature, other people and social institutions. One cannot be abstractly free from these factors and still lead a life as (and be, since for living beings being is living) an embodied, social subject, such as human persons essentially are.

One example is the solar system, where each body is determined as what it is by not being any of the others and by being influenced by each of them. The influence a heavenly bodies on another is not an alien influence since it is only by virtue of these mutual influences that the bodies are what they are as members of a system (sun, planets, moons and so forth). Similarly, in an animal organism each organ is and functions as what it is by virtue of mutual ‘non-alien’ determination by all the other organs.

With the introduction of consciousness or intentionality in Philosophy of Spirit concrete freedom gains a radically new meaning however, since there the relata in question are relata of a subject-object relation.

Note that this is far from saying that usable artifacts are what they are simply by virtue of their creator’s intentions, as in R. Dipert, Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993.

Here (a) is a commitment to actualist essentialism in general, (b)-(c) comprise the further commitment to its normative version, and (d) the further commitment to teleology shared by Aristotle and Hegel.

Dieter Henrich (“Logical form and real totality”) argues that the principle of syllogism (understood in an ontological sense unique to Hegel) is a central structuring principle of Philosophy of Spirit. This is very clear also in Hegel’s discussion of recognition, especially in the chapter on ‘Lordship and Bondage’ in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977 [PS], §§178–196. In what follows, I will abstract from this fact, yet intend my discussion to be compatible with it.

Some interpreters view absolute negation as the basic principle of Hegel’s philosophy in general. See, for example, eds. C. Butler & C. Setler, Hegel’s Letters, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 18. On absolute negation, spirit and freedom, see HPSS, §§381–382; on absolute negation in the master and the bondsman, see PS, §§187, §191; on absolute negation as the essence of “self-consciousness,” see §194.

Hegel’s critique of negative freedom of course only bites in cases where y in the idea of ‘x’s being free from determination by y’ really is something that is not a merely contingent, but a necessary determinant of x. Think of outer and inner nature, other people and social institutions. One cannot be abstractly free from these factors and still lead a life as (and be, since for living beings being is living) an embodied, social subject, such as human persons essentially are.

One example is the solar system, where each body is determined as what it is by not being any of the others and by being influenced by each of them. The influence a heavenly bodies on another is not an alien influence since it is only by virtue of these mutual influences that the bodies are what they are as members of a system (sun, planets, moons and so forth). Similarly, in an animal organism each organ is and functions as what it is by virtue of mutual ‘non-alien’ determination by all the other organs.

47 ‘Drive’ (Trieb) is Hegel’s general term for the teleological urge of the human life-form. He talks of the drive of spirit to cognize objectivity (HPSS, §416 Addition), the drive of self-consciousness to actualise what it is implicitly (ibid., §425), the drive to knowledge (ibid., §443 Add.), the drive to the good and the true (G. W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1991, §225), and so on.

48 See EPR, §4 on the connection of the “theoretical” and “practical attitude”.

49 One of the central senses of Hegel’s enigmatic phrase “all consciousness is self-consciousness” (HPSS, §424) is that self-consciousness in otherness is the essence and therefore immanent ideal of all intentionality. See also ibid., 416 Add., where Hegel talks of the “abstract certainty” that spirit has, on the one hand, of “being with itself”—in primitive practical consciousness—and of the “exactly opposite” certainty of the “otherness” of the object—in primitive theoretical consciousness. The overcoming of this contradiction in being with oneself in otherness—both in cultivated theoretical and cultivated practical consciousness—is the ideal or telos of intentionality, one which there is a “drive” to actualise.

50 One could also simply say ‘the life-form of persons’, but since Hegel did not entertain the possibility of other animal species overcoming mere naturality, and also since it nicely translates the idea of ‘humans insofar as they are not merely natural’, I use the expression ‘human persons’.


52 PS, §177.

53 The ‘I’ in this formula is often read as standing for a collective subject. This allows for two alternatives: either understanding the ‘I’ as a real thinking and willing subject (which means agreeing with the jokes about Hegel we started with), or in some ontologically less harmful, more metaphorical sense. I have nothing against the latter alternative, except that even it does not sit well with Hegel’s systemic concept of the I in the mature Encyclopedia Phenomenology, which is unambiguously a concept applying only to singular human persons. In any case, whether the ‘we’ in question is conceived of in some metaphorical sense as an ‘I’ itself or not, it consists of singular flesh and blood human subjects that are I’s and thous by recognising each other—and this is the ontologically decisive phenomenon. I am grateful to Carl-Göran Heidegren and Andrew Chitty for helpful exchanges on this issue. I borrow the idea of talking of I’s and thous from Heidegren.

54 In contrast to principles (1) and (2), this principle (3) only has this one application or instantiation—in intersubjective relationships that is.

55 Michael Theunissen, Jürgen Habermas and others have argued that this is indicative of a decisive devaluing in Hegel’s part of the concept of recognition in his later work. For critiques of this view, see R. R. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997; and Ikáheimo, “On the role of intersubjectivity”.


57 A natural object can instantiate human will by being worked on, by being made someone’s property, or receiving a function (and thus functional essence) in human practices, but then it is not a purely natural object anymore.

58 HPSS, §427, Addition.


60 In Ikáheimo, “On the role of intersubjectivity” I argue that in Philosophy of Subjective Spirit ‘desire’ as a practical mode of intentionality corresponds to ‘sensuous consciousness’ as a theoretical mode of intentionality, for which the object is an immediate “here and now” without past or future. For more on the structure of objectivity dictated by immediate desire-orientation, see Ikáheimo, ‘Consciousness before recognition’, and P. Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1996, 105.

61 Although Sensuous consciousness as the epistemic complement of desire is formally a ‘theoretical’ mode of intentionality, any more elaborate theoretical grasp of the world is obstructed by pure desire-orientation. This is what Hegel means by saying that “theoretical conduct begins with the inhibition of desire” in G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, Volume 1, ed. M. J. Petry, London, George Allen and Unwin [HPN], p. 198, line 29.

62 In other words, although the pure wanton is an epistemically extremely good tracker of what is relevant in its environment for the satisfaction of its limited needs, it is epistemically completely dumbfounded by anything else—assuming that anything else manages to penetrate into its one-track consciousness.

63 HPSS, §§429–430.


65 Mutuality, symmetry and equality are not exactly the same thing, but here it should be enough just to make a note of this.
It is not possible here to chart and scrutinise the features of a symmetric or equal intersubjective state which would combine both intersubjective instrumentalisation and intersubjective fear. I invite the reader to think through possibilities not explicitly considered here. See also Stekeler-Weithofer’s contribution to this collection, p. 103.

Saying that the significance of the other in what Brandom calls recognition in this article is “authority” seems like stretching the meaning of the word quite a bit. From the point of view of the desiring subject it is as significant to see the other desiring subject to die in agony and thereby provide information (as any objective state of event may ‘provide’ information) of what is poison as it is to see it as flourishing and thereby provide information of what is food. What is at stake in “simple recognition” is certainly informative usefulness, but it is less than clear what this has to do with authoritativeness.


Thus, on the one hand, Brandom’s primitive desiring subjects are already more complex than Hegel’s, and, on the other hand, his recognitively constituted subjects are more primitive than Hegel’s.


See, for instance, G. H. von Wright, “Determinism and the Study of Man,” in eds. J. Manninen & R. Tuomela, Essays on Explanation and Understanding, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1976. Sanctions can take many forms, but since it is agreed that humans cannot live without other humans, the virtual death-threat of social exclusion is always looming in the imaginary space of social-pressure accounts. Hence the Hegelian fear of death is a relevant figure of thought for them.

PS, §194.

That is, assuming that it is the case that Hegel’s view of a good society is decisively anti-Hobbesian. In “Natural Impurities in Spirit? Hegelianism Between Kant and Hobbes” (forthcoming in Parrhesia) I suggest that distinguishing Hegel clearly from Hobbes requires being clear about the motivational element of the attitudes of recognition. This is an issue that in my view contemporary neo-Hegelians have not focussed on adequately.

HPSS, §436. Emphasis H.I.

I do not know any discussion that clearly connects Hegel’s statements about the concept of spirit in the introduction to his mature Philosophy of Spirit with his statements about recognition in the Self-consciousness-chapter in the same text. In lack of clear awareness of this connection, the image can linger on that recognition is largely irrelevant for the constitution of spirit in Hegel’s late work.

In A. Chitty, “Hegel and Marx” recognition of the other appears as merely responsive to the freedom of the other, as if a theoretical or epistemic response to a pre-given fact. As far as I can see, my reconstruction of recognition as constitutive of concrete interpersonal freedom fits better with the rest of what Chitty says in his extremely useful article.

“Knowing” (Wissen) is a term with a very general meaning for Hegel. In Griesheim’s notes to Hegel’s lectures on Phenomenology from the summer term 1825 (in HPSS, Volume 3, p. 274) we read: “the state in which an independent object is posited as sublated is called knowing”. By “posited as sublated” Hegel means simply ‘having in view as an intentional object’. Thus, in the broadest sense “knowing” simply means having something in view as an object of one’s consciousness—whether theoretical or practical.

LPS, 194.

“The consciousness of the other is now the basis, the material, the space in which I realise myself.” (HPSS, Volume 3, p. 333.)

For more on the relationship of person-making psychological capacities and interpersonal person-making significances, see Iläheimo, “Recognizing persons.”


HPSS, §§420-421.

See R. Brandom, “Some Pragmatic Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms,” European Journal of Philosophy, 7,2, 1999, pp. 164–189. The importance of Brandom’s work in clarifying this idea is by no means diminished by the problems that his account involves with regard to the motivational issues in recognition. See also Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer’s constructive critique of Brandom, and Italo Testa’s discussion of the difference between Brandom’s earlier and more recent models of pragmatics, in their respective contributions to this volume.

See the chapter on habit in HPSS, §§409–410.

This is a parade example of a case where the concept of concrete freedom really bites. The idea of complete negative or abstract freedom from social norms reduces to the absurdity of freedom from what one is, namely a person. Real freedom with regard to social norms has to be grasped in terms of the relationship that persons have to them, which is not neutral as to the content of those norms.

Hegel’s shows no interest in the question (much discussed after Wittgenstein) whether it would be in principle possible to be a norm-oriented, or “rule-following” subject independently of others. His interest is in describing human
persons as we know them—as beings in whose being norm-orientation is a social or intersubjective matter.

87 There is a robust sense of receptivity in this: we do not attribute the significance of an original source of authority to each other willfully. Rather, the attitude that does this is itself a way of being moved by the other.

88 On Searle’s account (in Searle, Making the Social World, p. 6) the practical attitudes of “acceptance or recognition” constitutive of institutions go “all the way from enthusiastic endorsement to grudging acknowledgement, even the acknowledgement that one is simply helpless to do anything about, or reject, the institutions in which one finds oneself.” A less ‘liberal’ or more strongly social or ethical view would have it that mere helpless acceptance of power arrangements does not make them institutions at all. For one such view, see Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 194. In contrast, the Hegelian route allows one to think of strong ethicality as an immanent ideal of institutions, while simultaneously being non-committal on whether it is a necessary condition of something’s being an institution in the first place. See M. Tomasello, Why We Cooperate, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2009, p. 38 for the claim that even the earliest participation of children in norm-governed interaction involves genuine social normativity based on mutual respect and mutual authorship, rather than either simply on fear or on expectation of personal gain. Without being able to go into detail, in my view the most important elements of Hegel’s conception of ‘spirit’ or the human life-form are supported by Tomasello’s empirical work in anthropology and primatology.

89 I am not taking any stance here on whether Hegel was fair to Kant. Rather, I am suggesting that in its one-sided emphasis on norms, authority and so on much of contemporary neo-Hegelianism in fact exemplifies aspects of the kind of legalism Hegel wanted to overcome.

90 See HPSS, §436; HPSS, Volume 3, 333 (line 19: “If we speak of right, ethicity, love”; line 25: “Benevolence or love […]”); LPS, 194 (“in love and friendship”).

91 See especially LPS, p. 194. See also Robert R. Williams’ discussion of love in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit in Williams’ introduction to LPS, p. 23–24.

92 HPSS, §434.

93 idem.


95 HPN, §259, Remark, p. 233. For more on this, see my article “The Temporality of Hegel’s Concrete Subject,” forthcoming in Critical Horizons.

96 HPSS, §§457–463.

97 Hegel’s spills no ink in discussing this explicitly, but it is a rather obvious implication of his discussion of the conventionality of the relation of the signifier and signified, in ibid., §§457–459.

98 This is not to say that interpersonal attitudes are all there is to the sociality of value-structures, but only that the former is the ontological backbone of anything’s having desire-transcending value for persons.


100 In Ikaheimo, “Is ‘recognition’ in the sense of intrinsic motivational altruism necessary for pre-linguistic communicative pointing?” eds. W. Christensen, E. Schier, J. Sutton, ASCS09: Proceedings of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science, Sydney, Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, http://www.maccs.mq.edu.au/news/conferences/2009/ASCS2009/html/ikaheimo.html I present considerations for the claim that the recognition attitudes of respect and love are part of the explanation why human infants, but no other animals, are capable of engaging in the pre-linguistic communicative practice of pointing. This supports Stekeler-Weithofer’s claim (in his contribution to this volume) that shared pointing and therefore object-reference requires recognition in a strong ethical sense. If this is true, and if it is true that without learning shared object-reference in pointing-practices it is also impossible to learn symbolic communication or language, then all forms of mindedness dependent on language among humans are genetically dependent on love and/or respect. To resort to evolutionary argumentation (a mode of argumentation unavailable in Hegel’s time), a completely ‘Machiavellian’ social life-form in which not only being moved by the well-being of others but also being moved by their will or ‘authority’ rests exclusively on prudential considerations seems less likely to be viable in the long term than one in which at least part of these intersubjective motivations are intrinsic. This is because the intrinsic motivations of respect and love bring about a radical unburdening of cognitive resources to be used for collectively useful purposes. If this is so, then it would not be surprising if respect and love would not be only immanent ideals of our life-form, but also necessary for the existence of its less than ideal instantiations. It maybe that even really bad, in the sense of less ‘liberal’ or more strongly social or ethical view would have it, this is itself a way of being moved by the other.

101 Hegel’s discussion of contract in EPR, §§72–81 is especially ambiguous, if not confused in this regard: Hegel does not distinguish in it between interpersonal recognition of the other as having authority on the norms of the relationship on the one hand, and acknowledgement of the other as bearer of deontic or institutional powers (rights, duties) entailed by the norms on the other hand. On the distinction between the interpersonal and the institutional, see Ikaheimo, “Recognizing persons”.

102 See especially LPS, p. 233. For more on this, see my article “The Temporality of Hegel’s Concrete Subject,” forthcoming in Critical Horizons.
A further source of confusion is that Hegel's talk of 'love' conflates important distinctions. These include the distinction between love as a recognitive attitude on the one hand, and 'love' as a concrete interpersonal relationship instantiating that attitude on the other hand, as well as the distinction between the affective element and the cognitive content of the recognitive attitude of love.

102 See Brandom's discussion of "essentially self-conscious creatures" in "The Structure of Desire and Recognition", in this collection.

103 These thoughts are influenced by Arto Laitinen's discussion of the various senses of the question "what are we essentially?" in Laitinen, "Constitution and Persons".

104 PS, 8438. See Stekeler-Weithofer's article in this collection, p. 98.

105 See Brandom's notes on the importance of sacrifice for essentially self-conscious beings in "The Structure of Desire and Recognition", in this collection, pp. 227-230.

106 As the reader may notice, we have already started drifting to a direction that is in detail not quite Hegel's, by using his own conceptual arsenal. I shall return to this in the conclusion. See Quante, "Recognition as the Social Grammar of Species Being in Marx," section 4.2.


108 See note 77.

109 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 32.

110 Would it help to meet a representative of another culture who maintained that mutual fear and instrumentalisation are functionally and ethically good and that mutual respect and love are functionally and ethically bad for human co-existence? Only if one could make sense of what the other means by saying so.

111 It is a further question how representations according to which all is well in a society can mingle with inarticulate (because lacking cultural representations) feelings by its members that something is wrong (perhaps even horribly so). The power of ideologies is limited by the resistance of what actually works well in human practices and this is not independent of deep-rooted ethical convictions that are not infinitely malleable. I am suggesting, in the spirit of Hegel's normative essentialism, that the reason why lack of recognition in the sense of lack of respect and love tends to engender feelings of something's being wrong has to do with common sense about what is functionally and ethically good in human co-existence. Moral feelings engendered by experiences of lack of recognition are a: the centre of Axel Honneth's work on recognition. See, especially, Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition; and my constructive critique of Honneth's approach in H. Ikäheimo, "A Vital Human Need: Recognition as Inclusion in Personhood," European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 8, no. 1, 2009, 31-45.

112 This, on my reading, is the core of Hegel's cunning philosophical construal of John 4: 24: "God is essentially spirit" (HPSS, p. 58). This section of the article has been influenced by my reading of Paul Redding's and Michael Quante's contributions to this collection.

113 Raimond Gaita's work (such as R. Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love & Truth & Justice, Melbourne, Text, 1999) is one potent source of infection with such suspicions.

114 See M. Quante, "Recognition as the Social Grammar of Species Being in Marx." On the Hegel-Marx-connection, see also Chitty, "Hegel and Marx".

115 On love in the social philosophy of the young Marx, see D. Brudney, "Producing for Others," in eds. H.-C. Schmidt am Busch & C. Zurn, The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2010, 151-188. On the influences of the young Marx's understanding of Hegel, such as Feuerbach, see Quante, "Recognition as the Social Grammar of Species Being," and Chitty, "Hegel and Marx".


117 My thanks are due to Paul Formosa, Arto Laitinen, Ming-Chen Lo, Michael Monahan, Douglas Robinson and Titus Stahl for helpful comments to an earlier version of this text. This may be the right place also to acknowledge my debt to Michael Quante and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, whose influence on my thought goes much deeper than testified by the footnotes. I am of course alone responsible for everything said in this text.