

differ? Of course, anyone who tries to act knows that they can differ, and this is the experience of the shapes of consciousness called 'Reason' as well.

<sup>41</sup> PS, §401.

<sup>42</sup> PS, §401.

<sup>43</sup> See PS, §417- 418 for a very colourful description of this.

<sup>44</sup> Further, the agent does not have a privilege in defining the result: for example, the art-critics and the audience have an equal say with the author on what the result in fact is. The authorial intention is not a privileged perspective on the resulting text.

<sup>45</sup> Taylor 1975, 1979.

<sup>46</sup> Taylor 1985, 89.

<sup>47</sup> In Hegel's view, the nature of intelligent beings 'is not confined to the shape it assumes in Wolff's psychology - namely that of clear representations [*Vorstellungen*]' (PR, §132A). In this, Hegel's view of agency precedes the Twentieth century phenomenological criticism of representationalism. See Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit, and compare it to e.g. Merleau-Ponty, or Dreyfus' criticism of Searle.

<sup>48</sup> Ricoeur 1970.

<sup>49</sup> Concerning the epistemic thesis, one need not choose between the extremes of constant full self-presence and all intentions being read off from actions in the public space. It is possible to have views in between. Cf. the view of Dudley Knowles: 'In saying that the agents have privileged access to their own intentions, I don't claim that they *always* have knowledge of their intentions or that such knowledge is *always* gained through the route of introspection or self-awareness. I can learn from your critical remarks that I intended to spite another, though I have somehow concealed that from myself. On the other hand, it is generally true that I know what I am doing because I generally act in full light of my intentions. I don't often observe my actions and work out the nature of my action from observance of them, but I sometimes do - as when the remarks of others force me to make reviews of them' (Knowles 2002, 352, n.7).

<sup>50</sup> But of course, the change does not concern what the intentions were to begin with.

<sup>51</sup> Pippin 2004, 72.

<sup>52</sup> There are subtleties here related to the thickness or thinness of 'true self'. If I am myself whenever I am minimally responsive to reasons, then disowning an act means admitting that one was (perhaps momentarily) unaccountable, like children or lunatics are. But in the thick sense, I can disown some things as not expressing my 'thick self' if my self-definition changes, while I admit full responsibility for the deeds.

<sup>53</sup> This is a central point of Taylor's notion of authenticity in his *Ethics of Authenticity*: authenticity presupposes shared horizons of significance and dialogues. I discuss Taylor's views in Laitinen 2003.

<sup>54</sup> Pippin RR.

## On the Role of Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Encyclopaedic Phenomenology and Psychology

Heikki Ikäheimo

According to a widely shared view, a radical change took place in the role of intersubjectivity in Hegel's philosophy somewhere between Jena and Berlin. For instance, Jürgen Habermas's judgement is that whereas in the Jena writings - in the Jena *Realphilosophien*, and perhaps still in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* - Hegel conceived of intersubjectivity as an essential element in the constitution of subjectivity and of objectivity, in Berlin Hegel's intersubjectivist conception was replaced by a metaphysics of the absolute I or absolute self-consciousness, in which intersubjectivity no longer plays any important constitutive role.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps it is due to something like this view having been mostly taken for granted even among Hegel-specialists that scholarly literature on intersubjectivity in Hegel's late Encyclopaedic system is indeed very scarce. Robert R. Williams' *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*<sup>2</sup> argues convincingly that the theme of intersubjective recognition can be seen as a central thread running through the whole of Hegel's Encyclopaedic philosophy of *objective* spirit. But very little has so far been written on the theme of intersubjectivity or intersubjective recognition in Hegel's Encyclopaedic philosophy of *subjective* spirit.<sup>3</sup> My thesis in what follows is that intersubjectivity or intersubjective mediation in recognition can and should in fact be seen as an essential constituent also of subjective spirit as Hegel conceptualises it in the 1830 Encyclopaedia.<sup>4</sup>

### I

A useful contrast to my reading is provided by Vittorio Hösle's two-volume work *Hegels System: Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität*, some 73 pages of which are dedicated to a discussion of subjective spirit.<sup>5</sup> Hösle's 73 pages belong to the very rare species of extensive treatments of intersubjectivity in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective spirit, and may be the best known exemplar of this species.

In a nutshell, Hösle's view is that in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective spirit Hegel is incapable of doing justice to intersubjectivity, since he does not have the conceptual means for distinguishing between subject-object-relations and subject-subject-relations (Hösle, 379). Whereas Habermas thinks that the absence of or deficit in intersubjectivity in the Encyclopaedia is a symptom of Hegel's more general, deliberate and politically motivated, effort in Berlin to theoretically subordinate the unstable 'reflexive mobility' of intersubjective will-formation to the stable, unconditioned authority of the absolute spirit (Habermas, 150), Hösle sees things differently. According to Hösle, Hegel in fact tried but failed to fully account for the role of intersubjectivity in the constitution of spirit. That is, although the objective and absolute spirit are intersubjective

in their constitution, the subjective spirit is not. Due to inadequate conceptual equipment, Hegel's Encyclopaedic theory of spirit thus remains vaguely oscillating 'between subjectivity and intersubjectivity' (Hösle, 272). On Hösle's reading, even though in the philosophy of subjective spirit Hegel does thematise the intersubjective encounter in the chapters *Recognitive Self-Consciousness* and *Universal Self-Consciousness*, the theme does not have any significant role in the overall architectonic of subjective spirit (see Hösle, 378-380).

In what follows, I shall try to show that Hösle is wrong. Although intersubjectivity is indeed explicit only in the sub-chapters mentioned, it takes only a small amount of patience and imagination to see that it is built into the general architectonics and thematic development of the text in a highly systematic way.

## II

Let us start by taking a look at the complicated structure or architectonics of the philosophy of subjective spirit [SEE TABLE 1]. What are the principles according to which the *realphilosophisch* material in it has been organised? From a purely formal point of view, the text has the familiar triadic structure. On the highest level we have the sections *Anthropology*, *Phenomenology* and *Psychology* indicated by the capital letters A, B, and C respectively. Each of these sections contain three chapters marked with a, b, and c, with each of the chapters marked with a and b containing three sub-chapters indicated by  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , and  $\gamma$ .

TABLE 1

### Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)

#### Erste Abteilung. Der subjektive Geist/Subjective Spirit

##### A. Anthropologie. Die Seele./Anthropology. The soul. § 388

###### a. Die natürliche Seele./The natural soul. § 391

$\alpha$ . Natürliche Qualitäten./Natural qualities. § 392

$\beta$ . Natürliche Veränderungen./Natural alterations. § 396

$\gamma$ . Empfindung./Sensation. § 399

###### b. Die fühlende Seele./The feeling soul. § 403

$\alpha$ . Die fühlende Seele in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit./The Feeling soul in its immediacy. § 405

$\beta$ . Selbstgefühl./Self-feeling. § 407

$\gamma$ . Die Gewohnheit./Habit. § 409

###### c. Die wirkliche Seele./The actual soul. § 411

##### B. Die Phänomenologie des Geistes. Das Bewußtsein./Phenomenology of spirit. Consciousness. § 413

###### a. Das Bewußtsein als solches./Consciousness as such. § 418

$\alpha$ . Das sinnliche Bewußtsein./Sensuous consciousness. § 418

$\beta$ . Das Wahrnehmen./Perception. § 420

$\gamma$ . Der Verstand./Understanding. § 422

###### b. Das Selbstbewußtsein./Self-consciousness. § 424

$\alpha$ . Die Begierde./Desire. § 426

$\beta$ . Das anerkennende Selbstbewußtsein./Recognitive self-consciousness. § 430

$\gamma$ . Das allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein./Universal self-consciousness. § 436

###### c. Die Vernunft./Reason. § 438

##### C. Psychologie. Der Geist./Psychology. Spirit. § 440

###### a. Der theoretische Geist./Theoretical spirit. § 445

$\alpha$ . Anschauung./Intuition. § 446

$\beta$ . Die Vorstellung./Presentation. § 451

1. Die Erinnerung./Recollection. § 452

2. Die Einbildungskraft./Imagination. § 455

3. Das Gedächtnis./Memory. § 461

$\gamma$ . Das Denken./Thinking. § 465

###### b. Der praktische Geist./Practical spirit. § 469

$\alpha$ . Das praktische Gefühl./Practical feeling. § 471

$\beta$ . Die Triebe und Die Willkür./Drives and wilfulness. § 473

$\gamma$ . Die Glückseligkeit./Happiness. § 479

###### c. Der freie Geist./Free spirit. § 481

There is ample evidence for saying that the architectonics in some way follows the three-part structure of the logic. It seems that on each level, the first member of the triad somehow exemplifies the category of being, the second that of essence and the third that of the concept. In his notes, Hegel himself says this explicitly about the whole triadic structure of the Encyclopaedia (the logic, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit), as well as about the general structure of the philosophy of subjective spirit.<sup>6</sup> But, as Dirk Stederth points out, the rule can easily be followed down to the details of the triadic architectonics (see Stederth, 57).

Yet, this is as such still relatively uninformative as regards the specifically *realphilosophisch* themes in the text. We have not learnt much about, say, understanding in *Phenomenology* (B.a. $\gamma$ ) in learning that from the point of view of the whole system it somehow instantiates Concept, from the point of view of the philosophy of spirit it instantiates Being, from the point of view of the philosophy of subjective spirit it

instantiates Essence (B.a.γ), from the point of view of Phenomenology it again instantiates Being (B.a.γ) and that from the point of view of the chapter on Consciousness as such it again instantiates Concept (B.a.γ).<sup>7</sup>

There is also another way of conceiving the architectonics that at least at first sight may seem more helpful for understanding what this or that sub-chapter is about and why it is situated in this or that particular place in the architectonics. Since the topic of the philosophy of subjective spirit is 'concrete subjectivity', the 'concrete subject' or 'concrete I' (§ 398, 400, 403, 456, 457) – that is, a human being or person, living in the world in intentional relations with the world together with others – one is tempted to look for analogies between the structure of the text and the phylo- or ontogenesis of human beings. Could it be that, passing over purely formal or logical considerations, somehow the course of the text follows the empirical developmental or cultivation process of a human person?

Certainly not in any straightforward way. The text is not a treatise in developmental psychology, and the course of the presentation does not simply follow the temporal development of the individual or the species. As Hegel puts it, the stages of the presentation are 'Momente, Zustände, [oder] Bestimmungen' of a concrete whole, where 'a higher determination can be empirically present in a lower and more abstract determination' (§ 380). An attempt to read, for instance, the whole of Anthropology as a description of the temporally earliest developmental stages of humans immediately founders on the fact that much of what Hegel discusses in the Anthropology presupposes phenomena that he will explicitly discuss in later stages of the presentation – that is, in the Phenomenology and Psychology sections.

And yet, when it comes to scrutinising the intricate connections between the topics discussed in the different sections, chapters and sub-chapters of the text, I believe that looking for something like very abstract or idealised developmental stages of the human person does in fact make good sense of the text. We should not, however, expect to find these developmental stages presented in the text in a simply linear fashion. Interestingly, Höhle tries to read the text in a straightforwardly linear manner, as if it generally followed the developmental stages of the individual or the species, or at least some kind of an idealised developmental history. This leads him to puzzles that the linear reading simply cannot resolve.

Let me mention some of the puzzles. According to Höhle it is, for instance, 'hard to accept' that Hegel discusses desire (B.b.α) on the one hand and drive (C.b.β) on the other hand in passages so far apart from each other, and that something as apparently primitive as drive is discussed so near to the end of the text (Höhle, 347). Relatedly, he asks why practical feeling (C.b.α) does not already appear in the Anthropology after sensation (A.a.γ) (Höhle, 348).

Höhle also considers it strange that Hegel discusses understanding and reason twice, first in Phenomenology (B.a.γ. and B.c.) and then again in Psychology in the sub-

chapter on Thinking (C.a.γ) (Höhle, 349). And since in Psychology understanding and reason are discussed one after the other (in C.a.γ), why is this not so in Phenomenology (B.a.γ. and B.c.) (Höhle, 387)? According to Höhle, it is also hard to understand what exactly the difference between sensuous consciousness and intuition consists of and why they are discussed in passages so far apart from each other (B.a.α. and C.a.α.) (Höhle, 349).

Further, Höhle poses the question that has often puzzled readers of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Why is it that something as primitive as 'unreflective desire' should follow understanding? Since in the *Encyclopaedia Hegel* already discusses desire in the philosophy of nature (see § 358 and 359 and their Additions), it would seem that if there was any reason to discuss it again in the philosophy of subjective spirit, then the most obvious place to do this would rather be at the very beginning (Höhle, 371).

All in all, Höhle's questions seem to be motivated by the expectation that the thematic development of the text *should* follow a linear developmental course, where a less developed moment is, as a rule, followed by a more developed one, and where phenomena that are apparently of the same level of development or complexity, or would seem to be otherwise closely connected, are situated close to each other. It is clear that the text does not live up to this expectation on the linear reading.<sup>8</sup>

### III

In his *Hegels Lehre vom Menschen*, published in 1970 but dating back to 1950, Iring Fetscher suggested that parts of the architectonics of the philosophy of subjective spirit can be seen as consisting of several parallel sequences, or, to put it another way, several parallel moments of one and the same developmental sequence (Fetscher, 105, 37, 194). I think that this suggestion is correct and further believe that it can be given a relatively clear meaning in terms of idealised developmental stages of the concrete subject. In what follows, I shall concentrate on the sections on Phenomenology and Psychology, since it is there that the point I want to make about intersubjectivity is most clearly to be seen.

Let us do a simple exercise in cutting and pasting. As seen in Table 2, I propose that we should conceive of the structures of Phenomenology and Psychology as parallel to each other. By this I mean that we should see the sequence from α through β to γ as a single developmental sequence and chapters B.a. (Consciousness as such), B.b. (Self-consciousness), C.a. (Theoretical spirit) and C.b. (Practical spirit) as presenting parallel moments of this sequence. To gain some initial plausibility for the proposal, let us return to the questions that Höhle posed, and see what we can make of them in light of the parallel scheme of Table 2.

In this parallel scheme, the expectation of finding apparently closely related phenomena close to each other and the apparently less developed functions of the spirit followed by the more developed ones in the architectonics is indeed fulfilled. Desire (B.b.α) is now a parallel stage of the presentation with practical feeling (C.b.α) and these

both represent the first stage of the sequence. Even if this still leaves open the question about the relationship of practical feeling to sensation in Anthropology, at least now, practical feeling seems to have a somewhat more appropriate place at the beginning of this sequence. In this parallel scheme, drive also (C.b.β.) comes closer to the beginning of the sequence, in that it represents a moment of the second stage of the sequence, following both desire and practical feeling.

Also, in this scheme, Reason (B.c.) does indeed follow Understanding (B.a.γ.) in Phenomenology and both of these are – even if only roughly – parallel to understanding and reason in Psychology (these do not show in the table of contents, but they are discussed in C.a.γ.). And whatever the relationship of sensuous consciousness (B.a.α.) to intuition (C.a.α.) is, at least in this scheme these apparently closely connected themes are situated as parallel moments of the first stage of the sequence.

Finally, in this ordering, desire in Self-consciousness does not follow understanding in Phenomenology, but rather represents a moment of the first stage of the sequence, whereas understanding represents a moment of the third stage. Even if the question about the relationship of the sub-chapter on desire to the connected discussion in the philosophy of nature remains unanswered, now desire does in fact represent a moment of the very beginning of the developmental sequence of Phenomenology.

Although we have not yet learnt much about the *realphilosophisch* content of the sections, chapters and sub-chapters of Phenomenology and Psychology, we can at least already note that from the point of view of Höle's questions cited above, the parallel reading seems to make the architectonics of the text at least initially less enigmatic than the straightforwardly linear reading. Apparently closely related phenomena are now situated close to each other, and apparently less developed functions are followed by apparently more developed ones. Let us assume that this is not a mere coincidence, but that there is a point in ordering the topics in such a way that they form a relatively neat parallel structure. What could the point be? In other words, in what precise sense are the four α-β-γ-sequences parallel moments of one sequence (abstracting from the purely logical parallelism noted earlier)?

Let us begin with the question of what the general topics of Phenomenology and Psychology are and how they are related to each other. As Table 2 reveals, I believe that the best general characterisation of the content of these sections is that Phenomenology discusses intentionality (to use a term which Hegel himself did not use) or the intentional relationship of the concrete subject to objectivity. Psychology, on the other hand, discusses the various spiritual or 'cognitive' processes or activities of the concrete subject corresponding to the various types of intentionality or object-relation discussed in Phenomenology.

TABLE 2

## Parallel organisation of Phenomenology and Psychology

| <i>Theoretical moment</i>         |                            | <i>Practical moment</i>           |                           |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Intentionality</i>             | <i>Cognitive activity</i>  | <i>Intentionality</i>             | <i>Cognitive activity</i> |
| <b>B. Phenomenology of spirit</b> | <b>C Psychology</b>        | <b>B. Phenomenology of spirit</b> | <b>C. Psychology</b>      |
| a. Consciousness as such          | a. Theoretical spirit      | b. Self-consciousness             | b. Practical spirit       |
| α. Sensuous consciousness         | α. Intuition               | α. Desire                         | α. Practical feeling      |
| β. Perception                     | β. Presentation            | β. Recognitive self-consc.        | β. Drives and wilfulness  |
| γ. Understanding                  | γ. Thinking                | γ. Universal self-consc.          | γ. Happiness              |
|                                   |                            |                                   |                           |
| c. Reason                         |                            | c. Free spirit                    |                           |
|                                   |                            |                                   |                           |
|                                   | <b>Or</b>                  |                                   |                           |
| <i>Intentionality</i>             |                            | <i>Cognitive activity</i>         |                           |
| <b>B. Phenomenology of spirit</b> |                            | <b>C. Psychology</b>              |                           |
| <i>Theoretical moment</i>         | <i>Practical moment</i>    | <i>Theoretical moment</i>         | <i>Practical moment</i>   |
| a. Consciousness as such          | b. Self-consciousness      | a. Theoretical spirit             | b. Practical spirit       |
| α. Sensuous consciousness         | α. Desire                  | α. Intuition                      | α. Practical feeling      |
| β. Perception                     | β. Recognitive self-consc. | β. Presentation                   | β. Drives and wilfulness  |
| γ. Understanding                  | γ. Universal self-consc.   | γ. Thinking                       | γ. Happiness              |
|                                   |                            |                                   |                           |
| c. Reason                         |                            | c. Free spirit                    |                           |

The cognitive processes discussed in Psychology are the activities of synthesising the sensuous material of the soul into the organised intentional content of consciousness. Although the cognitive processes and intentional relations of the concrete subject discussed in the various chapters and sub-chapters form a concrete whole, we can analytically separate them from each other and show that a particular process discussed in Psychology corresponds to a particular type or moment of object-relation discussed in

Phenomenology. In this way, the cognitive activities discussed in the consecutive sub-chapters of Theoretical spirit correspond to the respective types of *theoretical* intentionality discussed in the consecutive sub-chapters of Consciousness as such, whereas the cognitive-cum-volitional activities discussed in the consecutive sub-chapters of Practical spirit correspond to the respective types of *practical* intentionality discussed in the consecutive sub-chapters of Self-consciousness.

How does this relate to the question of intersubjectivity? My thesis is that whereas all of the  $\alpha$ -sub-chapters discuss constitutive moments of the concrete subjectivity that *do not necessarily* involve intersubjective mediation, all of the  $\beta$ -sub-chapters discuss constitutive moments of the concrete subjectivity that *do necessarily* involve intersubjective mediation. That is, although intersubjectivity or intersubjective recognition is explicitly in view only in B.b. $\beta$ . Recognitive self-consciousness, it is in fact essential for the cognitive activities and types of intentional relations of the concrete subject discussed in *all of the*  $\beta$ -sub-chapters. Intersubjective recognition is furthermore constitutive of the functions of the concrete subject discussed in all of the  $\gamma$ -sub-chapters, but in these the particularity of a particular intersubjective community is ideally sublated into universality.

#### IV

Hegel is relatively explicit about the general relationship of Phenomenology and Psychology. In the first paragraph of Phenomenology (§ 413) he writes:

The pure abstract freedom for itself releases its determination, the natural life of the soul, as similarly free, as an independent object, from itself, and it is of this, to it external, that the I initially knows, and so it is consciousness.

Hegel calls the moment of the concrete subjectivity discussed in Phenomenology *consciousness* or the *I*. As consciousness or I, the concrete subject has 'the natural life of the soul', that is, its inner and outer sensations (see § 399-402 in Anthropology), organised and given to it as 'an independent object', that is, as intentional content. Hegel's general name for being related to intentional content is 'knowing' (*Wissen*). Consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) is the state of 'knowing' (*Wissen*) about objects, or, what comes to the same thing, of having intentional content.<sup>9</sup>

According to the first paragraph of Psychology (§ 440), on the other hand, 'Psychology is ... concerned with the faculties or general modes of the activity of spirit'. Whereas consciousness consists of intentional states or relationships with various types of content, cognition (*Erkennen*) (§ 445) is the *activity* of spirit as 'intelligence', which is responsible for the synthesis, or construction and cultivation of the sensations into intentional content, that is, into the content of consciousness. The development of consciousness from the most primitive stages or moments into more developed ones is the work of intelligence. This is reflected in § 415 in Phenomenology and in Boumann's

addition to § 445 in Psychology. According to the first passage 'the development of consciousness is [for the I analysed in Phenomenology] not its own activity, but is in itself and for it rather alteration of the object. Therefore consciousness appears differently determined according to the alterations of the object given to it'. According to the second passage, 'as we have seen, whereas to consciousness it seems that its development derives from the alteration of the object, ... intelligence is posited as that form of spirit in which it itself alters the object'.

In other words, the organisation and development of intentional relationships discussed in Phenomenology is the work of 'spirit' discussed in Psychology. Note that the quotations above from § 413 and 440 are from the introductions to Phenomenology and Psychology and hence we may assume that what Hegel says in them is meant to characterise *both* the theoretical *and* the practical chapters of Phenomenology and Psychology respectively.

Hegel is not always too careful in terminologically distinguishing between the genera and species of the phenomena that he discusses. Hence, on the one hand cognition seems to be a name only for the theoretical functions of spirit: 'What intelligence does as theoretical has been given the name of cognition' (§ 445). Yet, on the other hand, Hegel talks of cognition as a genus for both the theoretical and practical functions of the spirit. In the Encyclopaedia logic Hegel conceives of cognition as having as its theoretical moment 'cognition as such' (*Erkennen* als solches) and as its practical moment 'will' (see § 225, and generally §§ 223-235). If we follow the latter word usage, this provides partial terminological evidence for the analogousness of the structure of Psychology with that of Phenomenology, where consciousness has as its theoretical moment 'consciousness as such' (*Bewusstsein* als solches) and as its practical moment, 'self-consciousness'.

Although not in the 1830 Encyclopaedia, in his Nürnberg *Bewußtseinslehre für die Mittelklasse* (§ 25), Hegel explicitly denotes consciousness as such, or as he there calls it, 'genuine consciousness' (*eigentliches Bewußtsein*), as 'theoretical consciousness' and self-consciousness as 'practical consciousness'.<sup>10</sup> These then correspond to practical spirit and theoretical spirit respectively in the way pointed out above. All in all, there is enough initial plausibility for the thesis that whereas cognition as theoretical or 'as such' is responsible for the organisation of the contents of theoretical consciousness discussed in Consciousness as such, cognition as practical or as 'will' is responsible for organising the contents of practical consciousness discussed in Self-consciousness.

#### V

Let us first take a look at the theoretical moments of the  $\alpha$ -level. The sensuous content of the soul, its 'natural life' is thus now 'released' or posited as an 'independent object' (§ 413), as a 'totality corresponding to the totality of the I' and thus develops from something 'corporeal belonging to the soul into something confronting it independently, into an object (*Gegenstand*) in the proper sense of the word' (§ 413 Add.). At first,

however, the object, or objectivity in general has only a rudimentary structure that is just barely enough for intentionality. The sensational material, or *'Gefühlsbestimmungen'* are 'separated from the soul' and synthesised into rudimentary objects with the determinations of 'a being, something, an existing thing, singular etc.' (§ 418). Essential in this 'general *Urteil*' or the 'division of consciousness into a subject and object' (§ 447) is grasping the spatio-temporal structures of the environment.

Hegel writes: 'The spatial and temporal singularity, here and now, as I determined the object of sensuous consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, belongs in fact to intuition' (§ 418). Is Hegel saying here that he has somehow changed his views about spatiality and temporality since writing the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit*?<sup>11</sup> No. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, sensuous consciousness, or 'sensuous certainty', as he there calls it (*Werke* 3/82-92), is presented only from the very limited point of view of the function of the whole book, namely as an argumentative stage on the way to the standpoint of absolute knowing. Now that Hegel in the Encyclopaedia is writing the outlines of a full *realphilosophisch* theory of the spatio-temporal organisation of the world for sensuous consciousness, he simply points out that intuition is the particular activity of spirit or the moment of theoretical cognition that organises the sensuous content of outer sensations into a spatio-temporal form.<sup>12</sup> It is in this sense that spatial and temporal singularity, the here and the now, 'belong' to intuition.

Attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*) is the more exact function of intuition responsible for the spatio-temporal organisation of the contents of outer sensations, or of 'projecting them into the forms of space and time' (§ 448). This means both effectuating the general *Urteil*' of consciousness into subjectivity and objectivity and identifying objects as spatio-temporally separate from each other (or as having the form of 'being other to themselves', [§ 418]).<sup>13</sup> If I am right about the  $\alpha$ -stage being generally a stage in the development of the concrete subject that does not *necessarily* involve intersubjective mediation, then at first the spatio-temporal organisation of objectivity is still purely egocentric: identifying objects and events numerically from the point of view of a not yet socially mediated 'here' and 'now'. It is through this primitive egocentric capability of numerical identification that objects gain for the subject the determinations of 'being, something, an existing thing, singular etc.' (§ 418).

This egocentricity of sensuous consciousness is the theoretical counterpart of the egocentricity of the desire-orientation discussed in the parallel sub-chapter 'Desire'. Attention, or intuition more generally, also takes more developed forms that do involve intersubjective mediation, but I shall now turn to the practical moments of the constitution of the concrete subject at this pre-intersubjective stage.<sup>14</sup>

## VI

As in Sensuous consciousness and Intuition, also in Desire and Practical feeling we are at first confronted with the primitive sensuous givenness of the sentient soul.<sup>15</sup> Whereas on

the theoretical side Hegel discusses the 'outer sensations', or the givens of the five senses and their synthesis into 'theoretical' intentional content, on the practical side he discusses 'inner sensations' and their synthesis into practical intentional content. Hegel's differentiation between the terms 'inner sensation' (*innere Empfindung*) and 'practical feeling' (*praktische Gefühl*) is rather vague, but we can understand these as names for two interrelated aspects of motivating states or *emotions* – inner sensations as their sensational or corporeal aspect, and practical feelings as their cognitive aspect.

Emotions, and thus inner sensations and practical feelings allow for various modifications and levels of development, some of which clearly presuppose intersubjective mediation in socialisation and developed capacities of evaluation.<sup>16</sup> But it seems that the most rudimentary level is the purely animal phenomenon of being in and sensing a state of physical need of some kind. Hegel conceives of the need as a primitive form of normativity, as an *ought*. In paragraph 470 Hegel gives the following general characterisation of the initial development of spirit as practical:

Practical spirit, as initially formal or immediate, contains a double *ought* (*ein gedoppelter Sollen*). *First*, in the opposition of the determination posited from itself against the immediate being-determined that arises with the [first] mentioned determination, an opposition against its determined-being and condition (*Dasein und Zustand*). This opposition is developed simultaneously in consciousness into a relation towards outer objects. *Secondly*, in that this initial self-determination is itself immediate, it is not at first raised into the universality of thinking, which therefore, as regards the form, constitutes an ought in itself against it, and which, as regards the content may do so. – This latter opposition is initially only for us [emphasis modified].

What is Hegel saying here? He says that a certain 'double ought' belongs to the constitution of the practical spirit, that is, to the practical cognitive processes of the concrete subject, or of the human being. *Firstly*, there is a first-order ought between an immediate being-determined, such as a felt need for nourishment, and the 'determination posited from oneself', that is, the urge to satisfy this need. These opposite determinations arise together and together constitute the structure of, say, hunger or thirst. To be hungry is to feel a lack and simultaneously an urge to fill that lack with something.

This immediate ought is the minimal cognitive content of the primitive emotions. Whereas theoretical cognition is conceiving how things *are*, practical cognition is conceiving how they *ought* to be. The practical process takes the form of practical involvement with the environment in which primitive practical cognition determines or points out particular objects as feasible candidates for satisfying the need.<sup>17</sup> This is what Hegel means by saying that 'the opposition [or ought] is developed simultaneously in consciousness into a relation towards objects'. Here Hegel obviously refers to the 'practical consciousness' discussed in the Self-consciousness chapter, and more precisely

its most primitive or immediate moment: *desire* (B.b.α). It is through the activity of 'practical feeling' (C.b.α) that the mere 'inner sensations' obtain the intentional form in which outer objects function as content in the immediate or unreflected first-order ought-judgement.

Let us take a look at how Hegel conceives of the object-relation of the desiring subject in the sub-chapter, Desire (§ 426-9). The object of desire is determined as 'null' (*als ein Nichtiges*) for the subject in that in being 'selfless' it cannot resist the 'activity' of the desiring subject (§ 426). That is, even though the immediate desiring subject is already primitively conscious of things as objects as externally confronting it, they appear to it only from the point of view of their functionality for desire-fulfilment. Objects are thus determined as 'accordant with the drive' of the desiring subject to fulfil its need (§ 427).<sup>18</sup> In addition to the theoretical determinations of 'being, something, an existing thing, singular' (§ 418), the object is thus determined practically as something that 'ought to be had' or 'ought to be avoided' for the immediate desiring subject. What other determinations or features things have, is a question that simply does not arise for it. As 'selfless', i.e. as not being themselves subjects with their own 'oughts', the objects of desire cannot challenge the subjective activity of reducing them to the viewpoint determined by the 'ought' of practical feeling or desire.

What is the *second* ought of practical spirit in paragraph 470? It is a second order evaluative processing of, or point of view on, the immediate first order ought of the practical feeling. Hence, there is a formal ('as regards the form') opposition between the first and second order oughts. 'As regards the content', there may be an opposition or contradiction, but there need not be. The content of practical feeling and desire may or may not accord with the demands of the second order evaluative point of view. In any case, it *ought* to do so. Whereas the first order ought is necessarily for the subject itself, the second order ought is 'initially' only *an sich*, or 'for us', the philosophical observers. But *only initially*, since a development of a second order evaluative point of view towards the contents of one's immediate urges and desires belongs to the normal cultivation-process of every human person or concrete subject. Thus, what is initially only *an sich*, or for 'us', becomes also *für sich*, that is, for the subject analysed in the text.

## VII

How does the second order ought, or the second order evaluative practical point of view come into being as a moment of the concrete subject? Here we need to refer to the β-sub-chapter of Self-Consciousness, Recognitive self-consciousness. For objectivity to unfold for the subject as transcending the determinations of the immediate point of view, an object is required that *can* transcend or challenge it, an object that is not 'selfless' but is itself a self or a subject. The emancipation from the egocentric point of view of desire takes place in the 'consciousness of a free object' (§ 429), in confronting and experiencing another subject 'as an I that is an absolutely independent other object against me' (§ 430).

For Hegel then, the other *subject* or another I is a kind of a 'proto-object', a genuinely independent object that has the power to decentre the egocentrism of the immediate desiring viewpoint.<sup>19</sup>

In a nutshell, the process of recognition in the sub-chapter Recognitive self-consciousness is a process of *taking other subjects as subjects*. In this process the subject becomes aware of its point of view as a viewpoint among a plurality of viewpoints. Thus it gains a distance to the immediate first order oughts of its desire. Recognising the other as a subject means also including the oughts of the other among the determinants of one's own practical viewpoint. This is the birth of the second order processing or ought in the subject and for the subject.

Both of the sub-chapters, Recognitive self-consciousness and Drives and wilfulness, are all about the various initial forms of the appropriation of this second ought as a constitutive moment of the concrete subject. In the sub-chapter, Drives and wilfulness, Hegel analytically separates two moments of the second order ought, which we could call 'active reflectivity' and 'relative stability' respectively. Wilfulness, or the 'reflecting will' (§ 476) is the capacity of active reflectivity or of choosing motives of action among desires. Drive, on the other hand is subsuming singular desires under particular long term goals and as such represents a moment of relative stability. Even if the lord and the bondsman are only illustrative figures, and as such their details should not play a central role in a systematic reading, we may see some analogy between the intentionality of the bondsman and the relative stability of the drive on the one hand, and between the intentionality of the lord and the active reflectivity of wilfulness on the other.

Compare the following passages from Drives and Wilfulness and Recognitive self-consciousness: 'Drive has to be distinguished from the mere desire. Desire, as we have seen in § 426, ... is something singular, and yearns only for something singular for a singular, momentary satisfaction. Drive on the other hand...covers a series of satisfactions' (§ 473 Add.); 'Since the bondsman works for his lord, not from the exclusive interest of his own singularity, his desire acquires a *breadth* (*die Breite*) of not being only a desire for a *this* (*enes* Diesen), but also including the desire of *another*' (§ 435 Add.). In both passages Hegel talks about the general process of sublating the singular desire or practical feelings under a particular second order point of view. Although the inclusion of the practical point of view (or ought) of the other is thematic only in the second passage, we can also understand the first passage in the light of socialisation in which singular desires are subsumed under more general, in one way or another, socially mediated ends. This is the transition to work in which the world of practical encounter for the subject is determined radically differently than in the point of view of immediate desire.<sup>20</sup> Wilfulness, on the other hand, can be seen as characterising the viewpoint of the lord in that, although it involves the capacity actively to choose among desires, it still lacks criteria for this activity. Due to the insufficiency of the lord's acknowledgement of the slave's viewpoint or oughts and the resulting insufficient sublation of the lord's

egocentrism, the lord remains a somewhat indecisive and aimless figure.

Although the analogy of the details is fairly rough, in general we can understand Recognitive self-consciousness as discussing the initial forms of the intersubjectively mediated practical world-relation or intentionality, and Drives and wilfulness as discussing the corresponding 'inner' cognitive-cum-volitional processes. An essential factor here is the process of unfolding a social, second order normativity, a process which begins as subjects recognise each other as subjects by acknowledging each other's oughts, and as they begin to orient themselves in a complex web of oughts stemming from a plurality of persons. To use a commonly invoked metaphor, recognition opens a process of 'triangulation' where intersubjective relations (or 'subject-subject-relations') develop in tandem with the normative relations to the world in general (or 'subject-object-relations') and the subject's normative self-relations.<sup>21</sup> Needless to say, the modifications that this general process can undergo are innumerable.

It is worth pointing out that intersubjective mediation ~~also~~ involves a cultivation of the temporal determinations of the being in the world of concrete subjects. The references to the broadening of the temporal horizon of desire in drive (§ 426) and to 'taking care of and securing for the future' (§ 434), i.e. work, can be seen as a continuation of the discussion of temporality in the sub-chapter Intuition.

### VIII

Before going into the theoretical moments of the intersubjectively mediated  $\beta$ -stages of intentionality and cognitive activity, we need to take a brief look at how intersubjective recognition is related to what Hegel calls 'self-consciousness' in the philosophy of subjective spirit. The first paragraph (§ 424) of the chapter Self-Consciousness reads as follows:

The truth of consciousness is *self-consciousness*, and the latter is the ground of the former, so that in existence all consciousness of another object is self-consciousness; I know of the object as mine (it is my presentation), I know therefore in it of myself. — The formula of self-consciousness is I=I; — *abstract freedom*, pure ideality. — Therefore it is without reality; because it itself, which is its *object*, is not such, there being present no difference between the object and itself.

What is Hegel saying here? First of all, all consciousness is in some sense self-consciousness. At least one sense of this is that in all forms of consciousness, the subject is conscious of objects as determined by its own spiritual or cognitive activity. In this special sense, it thus 'knows of' itself in the objects ('I know therefore in it of myself'). What is important, however, is that as immediate, the subject is not yet reflectively aware of its objectivity-constituting activity, or of its viewpoint as a viewpoint.

Because the subject is not aware of its viewpoint as a viewpoint, objects for it do

not yet transcend the particular determinations of its viewpoint and are in this sense 'null' (§ 426). Self-consciousness as immediate is, as Hegel says in the last full sentence of paragraph 424, 'without reality ... there being still no difference between the object and itself', or in other words there being still no difference for the subject between the object as transcending the particular viewpoint of the subject on the one hand and as given in this viewpoint on the other.

Whereas the immediate or abstract self-consciousness is still 'pure ideality' or ideality which is not mediated through an object experienced as 'real' or independent, self-consciousness in a fuller, reflective sense is so mediated. In becoming conscious of other subjects as conscious or self-conscious, i.e. as having points of view on the world, the first subject also becomes aware of its own point of view as a point of view. It thus becomes aware of its own consciousness as self-consciousness in the immediate sense of the word and in this sense becomes reflectively self-conscious. Interestingly, Hegel refers in paragraph 424 to presentation (*Vorstellung*), which is the general topic of the  $\beta$ -sub-chapter of Theoretical spirit (C.a. $\beta$ ): 'I know the object as mine (it is my presentation)'. In its reflective form, this knowing (i.e. being conscious) of the object *as mine* involves the awareness of the difference between the givenness of the object in or *as my presentation* on the one hand, and its independent being on the other. It hence involves reflective self-consciousness or consciousness of oneself as an intentional creature in the world among other such creatures. [lacks proof here rather]

The Addition to paragraph 413 in the sub-chapter Consciousness as such reflects this nicely: on the one hand, '[o]nly when I come to grasp myself as I, does the other become objective (*gegenständlich*) for me'; on the other hand, 'the I is revealed to itself only insofar as its other is revealed to it as independent from it'. I believe this 'grasping myself as I' is the reflective moment of self-consciousness and the 'independence' of the object refers not (at least primarily) to the rudimentary independence at the  $\alpha$ -level, but rather to the fuller independence at the  $\beta$ -level. A passage from Theoretical spirit continues the same theme and has important consequences for my reading: 'It is only when I reflect that it is I who have the intuition, that I enter the standpoint of presentation' (§ 449 Add., *Werke* 10/254). Since my reflection to myself as 'an I who have the intuition', or more generally to myself as a subject with a particular viewpoint from which things appear to me, happens in intersubjective recognition, 'the standpoint of presentation' is hence intersubjectively mediated.

### IX

In the first paragraph of Perception or *Wahrnehmen* (B.a. $\beta$ ) Hegel writes

Consciousness, insofar as it has superseded sensuousness, wills to *take* the object in its *truth* (*will den Gegenstand in seiner Wahrheit nehmen*), not as merely immediate, but as mediated, as reflected in itself and universal. (§ 420)

*Wahrnehmen* is taking objects *in ihrer Wahrheit*, in other words, grasping them in terms of cognitive content with truth-claims.<sup>22</sup> The parallelism of *Wahrnehmen* with Presentation (*Vorstellung*) becomes clear when we note that the sub-chapter on *Vorstellung* is all about verification (*Bewährung*) of contents given in or for consciousness (see § 398, 406, 440 Add., 451 Add., 454, 457 Add.). The parallelism of the theoretical and practical  $\beta$ -sub-chapters means that the processes of verification or *taking objects in their truth* on the one hand, and intersubjective recognition, i.e. *taking subjects* (both oneself and others) *as subjects* are moments of a whole. Epistemic normativity *for the subject* presupposes an awareness of the formal difference between my presentations of things and things as they are independently of my presentations of them, and this comes about, as we have seen, through intersubjective recognition. Subjects now take their own presentations as well as those of others as candidates for truth to be judged intersubjectively. At the  $\beta$ -level, this process is however necessarily bound to the particularity of a particular communal viewpoint. *Wahrnehmen* is according to Hegel, 'generally the standpoint of our everyday consciousness and more or less that of the sciences' (§ 420). This implies that science is 'more or less', or in part, determined by the particular world-view or 'everyday consciousness' of the community or culture in which it is practised.

More light is shed on the necessary dependency of *Wahrnehmen* on a particular communal viewpoint in Presentation (C.a. $\beta$ ). There Hegel conceives of the activity of subsuming sensational givenness under 'general presentations' (*allgemeine Vorstellungen*), that is, under empirical concepts in the following way:

the association of presentations is ... to be conceived as the subsumption of singulars under a universal that forms their connection. The intelligence is however not only a general form, but its inwardness is an *in itself determined, concrete* subjectivity with some content, which arises from some interest, ... concepts or ideas ... The Intelligence is the power of freely connecting and subsuming the images and presentations belonging to it under its own characteristic content. (§ 456)

In brief, subsuming singulars under universals is an activity of the concrete subject and as such partly determined by its interests. The 'interests' of the concrete subject are at the  $\beta$ -level no longer those of the singular *desire*, but are socially mediated, to some necessary extent shared or common with others belonging to the same community. The system of empirical concepts, or the particular way of 'carving up the world', of a particular community reflects the specificities of its particular form of life, its *Lebensanschauung*, needs, ends, valuations – in short, its interests.

Each human infant learns initially the conceptualisations of her culture or community in learning its language. In light of my reading it would be very odd and disappointing if Hegel's theory of language in the Encyclopaedia did not account for the

intersubjective or social nature of language. Both Habermas and Hösle claim that it does not. According to Habermas, language is assimilated in the Encyclopaedia 'to the expressivist model of a body which makes manifest psychological impulses', a model in which intersubjectivity plays no important role (Habermas, 149). According to Hösle, Hegel's theory of language in the Encyclopaedia 'lacks the moment of intersubjectivity altogether' (Hösle, 404). A few considerations are enough to show that this is a superficial reading.

Although language is mostly discussed in Presentation, passages from Anthropology and Self-consciousness are also important and point to a concrete, intersubjectivist or communicative conception of language. Hegel begins his discussion of the development of signs and language in the last chapter of Anthropology, Actual Soul (A.c.). He tracks the beginning of the process to the more or less animal level of involuntary externalisation of impulses in gestures (*Gebärden*) (see § 411 Add.). He explicitly points out that in these externalisations, the primitive subject not only 'feels itself', but also 'makes itself felt' (§ 411). That is, the inner life of the subject is revealed not only to itself, but also to others in these externalisations that Hegel in paragraph 411 calls 'signs'. Paragraph 431 in Recognitive self-consciousness, in which Hegel discusses the struggle between the immediate subjects, continues the theme:

This immediacy [of the immediate subject] is however at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness, in which it has, in its signs and tools, its own self-feeling and its being for the other, and its mediation with them.

The body is the primitive tool of the immediate desiring subject and it is also its 'sign', or that in which its motives and inner life more generally are given to other similar subjects. What is interesting again is the simultaneous givenness of oneself to others as well as to oneself in the bodily 'signs'. Whereas inner sensations are a private givenness of the motivating inner forces of the individual to the individual, bodily symbolism in gestures is a public form of their givenness or appearance. Although the last sentence of the quotation is very condensed, it can be understood as pointing to the intersubjective mediation of the subject's own self-relation through a public process of meaning-giving. Whatever one makes of this, at least it is relatively clear that Hegel conceives of the birth and development of language as part of the process of intersubjective recognition and as such as a social affair from the very beginning.

In Hegel's terminology, signs differ from symbols in that whereas the relation of the symbol and the symbolised is natural or based on involuntary associations, the relation of the sign and the signified is ideally wholly conventional (see § 457-9). Taking this into account, it seems at first sight confusing that Hegel uses the word 'sign' for the givenness or externalisation of inner states in gestures to others and to the subject itself. Are these not rather natural symbols? I believe we can understand Hegel's word-usage in

light of his attempt to grasp in extremely condensed formulations the birth of communication based on conventional signs out of a natural symbolism of gestures between animals. In confronting each other and 'reading' each other's intentions in the gestures of the other, the primitive subjects have already taken the first steps along the path which in Hegel's account leads to fully-fledged conventional language.

In general, the discussion of signs in Psychology (B.a.β.) points to intersubjectivity by the simple fact that signs, as Hegel conceives them, are conventional. According to Hegel, words or 'names' are the signs with or 'in which' we think. 'In the realm of presentation', contents 'exist and are valid' in names (§ 462).<sup>23</sup> In other words, presentation, corresponding to *Wahrnehmen* in Phenomenology, involves organising the givenness of consciousness into conceptual contents crystallised in words. As such these contents are communicable and their 'validity' subject to intersubjective assessment. In this process, the subjects are in principle aware of the formal irreducibility of objectivity to the given viewpoint of any individual – and are thus in principle reflectively self-conscious. Yet, the communal process of *Wahrnehmen* bears a necessary moment of particularity in being bound to the interests, world-views and characteristic ways of carving up the world of a particular community or culture.

## X

Whereas in the  $\alpha$ -sub-chapters the *Urteil* of consciousness has unfolded only in the most rudimentary way, and whereas the  $\beta$ -sub-chapters discuss, as it were, the paradigmatic stage or moment of the subject-object-divide,<sup>24</sup> in the  $\gamma$ -sub-chapters this divide becomes ideally sublated.

As to the practical moments, universal self-consciousness (B.b.γ.) 'knows itself recognised in a free other and knows this insofar as it recognises and knows the other as free' (§ 436). Freedom here means universality, and 'knowing' oneself recognised by a free other means knowing or believing that one's oughts are acknowledged as valid by another whose point of view one recognises as universal. In this sense, there is – in a way – no longer a plurality of particular self-consciousnesses with their particular practical oughts or claims facing each other, but only one self-consciousness with a universal validity.<sup>25</sup> Does this mean that the subjects in question have somehow mysteriously lost their individuality as well as their shared communal particularity and merged into one universal 'world-mind'? Certainly not. Hegel is only sketching the logical outlines of a communal process of testing claims as to their *universal* validity. Nothing implies that he thinks of pure universality as given once and for all. Rather, universal self-consciousness is (at least among other things<sup>26</sup>) an ideal for subjects as they negotiate the outlines of an institutional structure of communal living that is universally acceptable. As we know from Hegel's philosophy of objective spirit, the extended version of which is his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel means this institutional structure to do justice to and harmonise oughts or claims of various sorts, many of which are not at all universal as to their content.

In the parallel chapter of Practical Spirit, *Happiness* (C.b.γ.), Hegel discusses the search for a point of view which synthesises or harmonises the various ends of the individual into one overall objective, that is, happiness. The point of this sub-chapter is that this search can find its goal only in freedom, or in the viewpoint of the 'actually free will' (*wirklich freier Wille*) (§ 480). The will is actually free in that it wills itself, or as Ludwig Siep puts it, wills a 'plan' which enables the free self-determination of all subjects. For Hegel this is of course the system of 'right' or the state.<sup>27</sup> The state is the institutional structure which is ideally acceptable for 'universal self-consciousness', or in practice, for individuals who do their best to judge its acceptability from a universal point of view. That this process of judging involves and presupposes recognising others as co-judges as to the validity of claims is clear in Universal Self-Consciousness. <sup>[This is the case in the sense that the state is not just a mere result]</sup>

As to the theoretical moments, Hegel conceives of understanding in the sub-chapter Understanding (B.a.γ.) as a stage in which 'consciousness, which ... contains the independence of subject and object' has 'disappeared'. Hegel uses this as a handy transition to the chapter on Self-Consciousness, but one should not expect this particular transition to carry much systematic weight. After all, Self-consciousness begins from a stage in which the subject-object-divide has *not yet* fully unfolded (desire), whereas in Understanding it is ideally *already behind*. It is behind in the sense that laws of nature as the content of understanding in Phenomenology (§ 422-3) are in principle universal, independent of the particularity of a viewpoint, which is characteristic of *Wahrnehmen*. Again this does not mean some kind of mystical fusion of the individual into one 'world-mind' in which the singularity of individuals as well as the shared communal particularity vanish, but rather it is an ideal for a process of *attempting* to find that which is universal in phenomena. In the 1827 lectures, Hegel emphasises the difficulty of this attempt to reach, behind the viewpoint-dependent phenomena, that which in them is universal, or their laws.<sup>28</sup> The analogy with universal self-consciousness becomes clear, simply by pointing out the obvious fact that the process of finding the purely universal structures, or *theoretical laws*, of phenomena is a communal process which in principle presupposes recognising others as 'free' in the sense of being capable of raising and evaluating theoretical claims to universal validity. The same is true of universal self-consciousness as the standpoint of judging the validity of potentially universal *practical laws* that structure the state (see § 432 Add. and § 482).<sup>29</sup>

The fact that in Phenomenology understanding (B.a.γ.) and reason (B.c.) are situated in separate chapters, whereas in Theoretical spirit Hegel discusses both understanding and reason in one and the same sub-chapter, Thinking (C.a.γ.), can be seen as a problem for the parallel reading. I shall not try to solve this problem here. <sup>①</sup> I only want to point out the hardly undeniable fact that for Hegel theoretical cognition includes a universal moment. The systematic place for this in the architectonics of the subjective spirit is Thinking (C.a.γ.) in Psychology. In this regard, the analogousness of the world-relation of Understanding in Phenomenology and the activities of cognition in Thinking

① [Reason as an activity is not anymore about applying thoughts to objects, as understanding is, but working in pure thought. Therefore it does not lead to consciousness of reason as the end. 91  
Consciousness is only about the formal overcoming of the abstract S-O divide.]  
[Ehkä näin heijonella onkin järkevästi reasona finit vica kapale]

in Psychology is clear enough to support my overall thesis.

Finally, the transitional chapters, Reason (B.c) and Free spirit (C.c), are not central to my interpretation, but both can be seen as gathering together points discussed in both the theoretical and the practical chapters of Phenomenology and Psychology, and in complicated ways pointing to further stages of the text.

## XI

Let me conclude by emphasising three points to prevent possible misunderstandings. Firstly, although the parallel  $\alpha$ -,  $\beta$ - and  $\gamma$ -sub-chapters can be seen as discussing developmental stages of the concrete subject, none of these is wholly negated or left behind in the course of the development. This means that what are *first* developmental stages, will become *moments* of a whole and as such mutually mediated and determined. Part of the difficulty in interpreting the chapters and sub-chapters derives from the fact that Hegel almost without exception discusses his topics *both* from the point of view of the developmental process *and* from the point of view of the *telos* of the process. As a *stage*, for instance, intuition is not as such mediated by the later stages, but as a *moment* of the completed whole it is mediated by the other moments.

Secondly, the parallel reading does not imply the claim that there is something wrong in the architectonics of the text. It is a way of looking at the complex (and as I would say, extremely thoughtfully crafted) architectonics of the text *as it stands*. Hösle's book is evidence of the fact that by insisting on a linear reading as the only way of looking at the text one is in danger of completely overlooking, or at least seriously underestimating the systematic role of intersubjectivity in it.

Thirdly and finally, I do not claim that the parallel intersubjectivist reading, as sketched above, is wholly unproblematic as regards each and every detail of the text. It could not be, taking into account the fact that the text was a work in progress when Hegel died. It is enough if it is able seriously to question the received view according to which intersubjectivity plays no important role in Hegel's mature philosophy of subjective spirit. Much remains to be done before we can fully appreciate the central role of intersubjectivity or intersubjective recognition in Hegel's mature philosophy of spirit, and the complex ways in which its different parts – the subjective, the objective and the absolute – contribute to the full picture.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See e.g. Jürgen Habermas, 'From Kant to Hegel and Back — The Move Towards Detranscendentalization', *European Journal of Philosophy* 7:2, 1999, pp. 129-157.

<sup>2</sup> Robert R. Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> General works on the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective spirit include Iring Fetscher, *Hegels Lehre vom Menschen* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1970), Willem deVries, *Hegel's Theory*

*of Mental Activity* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), Michael Wolff, *Das Körper-Seele-Problem* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1992), Christoph Schalthorn, *Hegels enzyklopädischer Begriff von Selbstbewusstsein*, Hegel-Studien Beiheft 43 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000), Dirk Stederth, *Hegels Philosophie des Subjektiven Geistes* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), Christoph Halbig *Objektives Denken, Spekulation und Erfahrung, Abteilung II: Untersuchungen, Band 48* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2002) and the collections of articles, Dieter Henrich (ed.) *Hegels philosophische Psychologie*, Hegel-Studien Beiheft 19 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1979), Lothar Eley (ed.) *Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990), Franz Hesse & Burkhard Tuschling (eds.) *Psychologie und Anthropologie oder Philosophie des Geistes* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991).

<sup>4</sup> I shall concentrate on the 1830 version of the Encyclopaedia (Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel (eds.) *Werke in 20 Bänden* [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986ff, references to the Encyclopaedia, contained in volumes 8-10, with '§', and to other parts of *Werke* with 'X/Y' where X denotes the volume and Y page number]), except for making a few references to the Erdmann-Walter-Nachschrift on Hegel's lectures on subjective spirit from 1827 (Franz Hesse & Burkhard Tuschling (eds.) *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes* [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994, hereafter referred to as 'Erdmann']). I am responsible for all translations in this article. Many thanks to Robert Williams for letting me consult his forthcoming translation of the Erdmann-Walter-Nachschrift. I have also consulted Petry's bilingual edition of the 1830 subjective spirit (Michael John Petry [ed. & trans.] *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978-9]).

<sup>5</sup> Vittorio Hösle, *Hegels System* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987, hereafter 'Hösle'), 338-411.

<sup>6</sup> Hegel writes: 'The three logical stages, 1) immediate Being, 2) ... Essence and 3) Concept ... have their concrete determinate being (*Daseyn*) as 1) the universal logical Idea itself, 2) nature in which it is only as essence and 3) as Spirit, the free Idea, the Concept existing to itself. Similarly, Idea as natural (*Naturidee*) is further as Being mechanical nature, 2) as Essence ... inorganic and as 3) Concept organic nature. Spirit is as Being the Soul, 2) as Essence or the stage of reflection Consciousness, 3) as Concept Spirit as such' ('Unveröffentlichte Diktate aus einer Enzyklopädie-Vorlesung Hegels'. Eingeleitet und hrsg. von Friedhelm Nicolin. *Hegel-Studien* 5, 1969, 21). See Hösle, 110-115, where Hösle dismisses this passage as confusion on Hegel's part. Hösle himself has a strongly 'corrective' attitude towards Hegel's architectonics and insists on a straightforwardly linear correspondence between the logic and the *Realphilosophien*. As I see it, the implications of this insistence distort Hösle's reading of subjective spirit from the beginning, but I must pass over this theme here.

<sup>7</sup> Stederth agrees. See his reconstruction of the principles according to which Hegel organises his material in the *Realphilosophie* in Stederth, chapter 2.3.

<sup>8</sup> This does not lead Hösle to question the reading. See e.g. Hösle, 387, where, after pointing out the difficulty of conceiving why reason does not appear straight after understanding in Phenomenology, he quite bluntly rejects the possibility of anything other than a purely linear way of understanding the architectonics: '*diese Reihenfolge ist rein linear*' (emphasis, Hösle).

<sup>9</sup> 'Cognition (*Erkennen*) must certainly be distinguished from mere knowing (*Wissen*), for already consciousness is knowing' (§ 445 Add.).

<sup>10</sup> *Werke* 4/117: 'Self-consciousness posits itself through the negation of otherness and is practical consciousness. When thus in consciousness proper, which is also called theoretical ...'. Although we cannot be sure, due to Rosenkranz's dubious editorial practices, whether this passage is originally from Hegel's pen, it clearly reflects one aspect of what Hegel wants to discuss under the title 'Self-consciousness'.

<sup>11</sup> This is, for instance, Michael Forster's claim in his *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 558.

<sup>12</sup> For Hegel, contra Kant, space and time are not 'merely subjective forms' of intuition, but also real forms of the world, which intuition grasps: 'things are in their truth themselves spatial and temporal' (§ 448).

<sup>13</sup> Hegel's formulations in § 418 give the misleading impression that consciousness would independently efface its own *Urteil* into subject from object: 'The object is now initially to be taken only according to the relationship that it has to consciousness, namely being external to it, and not yet as in itself external or as external to itself'; 'According to consciousness, content is only an object for it, a relative other; from spirit it receives the rational determination of being an other to itself' This impression is

contrary to Hegel's statements about the general division of labour of consciousness and spirit, as well as many of his statements in the sub-chapter Intuition (see § 447, 448 and 448 Add.).

<sup>14</sup> On the several levels of complexity or development that intuition takes, see DeVries, 108-118. I disagree with DeVries on two points. Firstly, according to DeVries attention *cannot* be responsible for the spatio-temporal organisation of the environment, since it implies 'a high degree of conscious mental activity and wilful self-control' (ibid., 112). But this ignores the fact that Hegel speaks of several developmental stages of attention, as well as the fact that the will has several layers or developmental levels, the most primitive of which is 'practical feeling', corresponding to 'desire' in Phenomenology. Secondly, accordingly to DeVries, 'the objects of consciousness in the Phenomenology do not have spatio-temporal form' (ibid., 112, note 3). But what, for instance, would perception (*Wahrnehmung*) be (B.a.β.) – 'the standpoint of our ordinary consciousness and more or less that of the sciences' (§ 420) – without spatio-temporal organisation?

<sup>15</sup> Many aspects of my discussion of desire and recognition are indebted to Paul Redding's highly illuminating discussion of these themes in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* in his *Hegel's Hermeneutics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, chapter 5).

<sup>16</sup> See the classifications of emotions in § 401 Add. and § 472 Add.

<sup>17</sup> See § 472: 'Practical feeling contains the ought, its self-determination in itself, related to existing singularity [i.e. object] that is valid only in its conformity with the practical feeling'. I believe this means that practical feeling directs the attention of the immediate subject in its function of identifying objects as separate objects or 'existing singularities'.

<sup>18</sup> Hegel uses the term 'drive' in various senses. Here for instance not exactly in the sense in which he uses it in the sub-chapter Drives and Wilfulness (C.b.β). Compare also § 225 in the Encyclopaedia logic on the 'drive of knowing towards truth' and the 'drive of the good towards realising it, the will, the practical activity of the idea' (8/378).

<sup>19</sup> This way of looking at § 429-430 was first put to me by Christoph Halbig in discussion.

<sup>20</sup> The apparent inconsistency of these passages – that in the first passage desire is purely primitive and drive represents cultivation, whereas in the second passage desire itself allows for cultivation – can be resolved by noting that although desire is in the beginning purely natural, it too will assume more cultivated forms in the process of socialisation. Desire as immediate is a developmental *stage*, but as mediated and cultivated it will become a *moment* of the concrete whole that the functions of the cultivated subjectivity form together.

<sup>21</sup> Hölsle refers to roughly similar ideas in Peirce and Apel, who replace the dyadic subject-object model with a triadic subject-object-subject model, and laments that Hegel did not do so (Hölsle, 124-5). This is a serious underestimation of the complexity of Hegel's model of intentionality. See also Franz Hesse's reading, which is close to mine and critical of Hölsle in Hesse, 'System und Funktion der Philosophie des Subjektiven Geistes' (in Hesse & Tuschling (ed.) 1991, pp. 490-521). I disagree with Hesse, however, when he says that Psychology *as a whole* discusses moments or functions of the concrete subjectivity which are intersubjectively mediated (515, note 59). This gets the  $\alpha$ -sub-chapters wrong.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Hesse 1991, 516.

<sup>23</sup> See also § 459.

<sup>24</sup> 'Since the opposition of subjective and objective is dominant at this standpoint' (§ 451 Add.).

<sup>25</sup> 'Self-consciousness reaches beyond itself, it continues into another self-consciousness, there are no more two self-consciousness opposed to each other, but rather it is one self-consciousness, and thus it is universal self-consciousness.' (Erdmann, 174)

<sup>26</sup> Things are actually more complicated, since recognising has several species: to follow Axel Honneth's analysis, those of love, respect and esteem (see Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition* [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995], and Heikki Ikäheimo, 'On the Genus and Species of Recognition' in *Inquiry*, volume 45/2000, number 4). I believe that all of these are implied in the notion of recognition in the Self-Consciousness chapter of the Encyclopaedia, but these further complexities will be ignored here.

<sup>27</sup> Ludwig Steg, 'Leiblichkeit, Selbstgefühl und Personalität in Hegels Philosophie des Geistes' (in Eley (ed.) 219).

<sup>28</sup> 'The law does not reside on the surface of phenomena, rather it takes great effort to discover it' (Erdmann, 158). 'There is an attempt to grasp the world of appearances as a realm, a system ... of laws' (Erdmann, 159).

<sup>29</sup> Of course, Hegel himself does not emphasise very strongly the importance of individual or communal

reflection on the validity of practical 'laws', but this moment is built into his theory of the rational concrete subject living with others in the state of 'being recognised' (*Anerkanntsein*).