

# The Times of Desire, Hope and Fear: On the Temporality of Concrete Subjectivity in Hegel's Encyclopaedia

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**Abstract:** The aim of this article is to show that the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in Hegel's mature *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* contains the outlines of a philosophically rich notion of the constitutive *temporality* of subjectivity. The temporality of the being of Hegel's concrete subject is intimately connected with embodiment and sociality, and is thus an essential element of its fully detranscendentalized inner-worldly nature.

**Keywords:** embodiment; Hegel; Heidegger; sociality; subjectivity; temporality

## Introduction

The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in Hegel's Berlin *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* is *the* systematic place in Hegel's mature system for discussing the constitution of the concrete subject of knowledge and action, the human person that is.<sup>1</sup> Knowing the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is thus essential for a comprehension of Hegel's project of "detranscendentalization"<sup>2</sup> – of locating the subject of knowledge and

1. "Human person" is not Hegel's term, but it is well suited for grasping what Hegel is talking about. In Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Hegel mostly talks simply of "humans"; yet he focuses on aspects that distinguish humans from non-human animals, or on humans as persons. Another term Hegel repeatedly uses in Subjective Spirit is "concrete subject", or "concrete I" – emphasizing that he is not talking about subjectivity as a transcendental structure, but as a structure of organic beings in space, time and social relations. Thus, in what follows, I will talk of "human persons" as the "concrete subjects" of knowledge and action.
2. See J. Habermas, "From Kant to Hegel and Back – The Move Towards Detranscendentalization", *European Journal of Philosophy* 7, no. 2 (1999): 129–57.

action in the world as a concrete, embodied, social being. An influential view has been that Hegel was committed to such a project in his early system-sketches in Jena, but gave it up later in his mature *Encyclopaedia* where the role of the concrete human subject is taken over by a monolithic super-subject called “the Spirit”.<sup>3</sup>

In what follows I wish to contribute to the critique of this view of Hegel’s development by showing that the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit contains elements of a philosophically rich notion of the constitutive *temporality* of concrete subjectivity. The temporality of the being of Hegel’s concrete subject is intimately connected with embodiment and sociality, and is thus an essential element of its fully detranscendentalized inner-worldly nature.

I begin by recalling Heidegger’s critique of Hegel in *Being and Time* according to which Hegel has no conception of the constitutive temporality of concrete innerworldly subjectivity or *Dasein*. Heidegger’s critique is worth revisiting since it still is probably the best known interpretation of Hegel’s concept of time and one which, though it has been challenged by critics, has not really been confronted by readings that take a close look not only at the passages that Heidegger reads in Hegel, but also at other places in Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia* that Hegel refers to in those passages.

I will, secondly, draw attention to Hegel’s explicit statements in the passages that Heidegger is reading where Hegel makes it clear that his full conception of time or temporality is *not* to be found where Heidegger thinks it is, namely in the Philosophy of Nature, but rather in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Acknowledging this fact leads to a fundamental re-focusing of attention to the latter text as the real locus of Hegel’s theory of temporality.

The rest of the article reconstructs central moments of Hegel’s conception of the temporality of the concrete innerworldly subject of knowledge and action in his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. The reconstruction centres on the notions of intuition (*Anschauung*) and representation (*Vorstellung*), which Hegel explicitly puts at the centre of an adequate conception of time or temporality in the paragraphs of his Philosophy of Nature that Heidegger comments on. This, as I will show, points at a multilayered conception of the temporal constitution of concrete subjectivity in Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia* in which both embodiment and sociality are given their due.

3. See Habermas, “From Kant to Hegel and Back”. For critiques, see R. Williams *Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); and H. Ikäheimo, “On the Role of Intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Encyclopaedic Phenomenology and Psychology”, *The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* 49-50 (2004): 73–95.

## 1. Hegel's Abstract Conception of Time According to Heidegger

Heidegger's thesis in *Being and Time* is famously that since Aristotle the history of metaphysics has covered from view the structure, or "sense" of being by conceiving it in terms of unmediated presence or "being-at-hand" (*Vorhandenheit*). At the same time, time or temporality has been conceived "vulgarly", as a chain or series of punctual moments at hand. On Heidegger's own view time or temporality is essential to the structure of being, but it has to be though in a very different manner – dimensionally or "extatically".<sup>4</sup>

In §82 of *Being and Time* Heidegger aims to show that Hegel's conception of time repeats the misconception of time inherited from Aristotle. Hegel, like all adherents to the vulgar conception of time, is incapable of grasping the true structure of temporality, the constitutive stretching out of *Dasein* in the "extasis" of past, present and future and the structuration of the world in the extatic-temporal horizon of care (*Sorge*).

It is important to note where Heidegger reads what he understands as Hegel's conception of time. He starts with a sentence fraction in Georg Lasson's edition of the Introduction to Hegel's lectures on Philosophy of History,<sup>5</sup> cites in passing a few sentences in the *Science of Logic*<sup>6</sup> and *Phenomenology of Spirit*,<sup>7</sup> as well as in a footnote made famous by Jacques Derrida a manuscript on logic from Hegel's Jena period.<sup>8</sup> For the most part, however, Heidegger focuses on Hegel's discussion of time in §§258–59 in the Philosophy of Nature of his mature *Encyclopaedia*.

In Heidegger's view, Hegel is "true to the [Aristotelian] tradition" in that his "analysis of time has its locus" in the ontology or philosophy of nature.<sup>9</sup> This claim already has a critical meaning since for Heidegger it implies that Hegel has no conception of the authentic or fundamental meaning of time as the extatic structure of *Dasein*.

4. See also R. Sinnerbrink, "Sein und Geist: Heidegger's Confrontation with Hegel's Phenomenology", *Cosmos and History* 3(2-3) (2007), especially 134–38.

5. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1994 [1927]), 428. (Abbreviated below as "SZ". The original page numbering that I follow is reproduced in the margins of the English translation: M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, J. Macquarrie and Edward Robinson [trans.] [Oxford, Blackwell, 1962]. I have consulted the Macquarrie and Robinson translation, but modified sentences where this seemed appropriate.)

6. SZ, 431, 433.

7. SZ, 434, 435.

8. SZ, 432–33, footnote. See J. Derrida, "Ousia and Grammē", in *Margins of Philosophy* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982), 29–67.

9. SZ, 428–29.

According to the sentence fraction in the Lasson edition of the Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of History with which Heidegger starts his discussion "the development of history falls into time". Heidegger reads this as saying that *spirit* "fall[s] into time".<sup>10</sup> In his view Hegel's talk of "falling" remains ontologically "obscure" and is based merely on "the very emptiest [...] abstractions",<sup>11</sup> namely on the structural identity of time and spirit posited by Hegel. Namely, on Heidegger's reading Hegel conceives both the structure of spirit and of time as "negation of negation", or in other words as "absolute negation".<sup>12</sup>

As to the structure of spirit, "the essence of spirit" is "the concept" or "thinking which thinks itself", conceiving itself "as the conceiving of the not-I". The not-I is the negation of the "I" or "pure concept", and the I's conceiving of itself as conceiving the not-I is the "negation of negation". This, so Heidegger interprets, is "a logically formalized interpretation of Descartes' '*cogito me cogitare rem*'".<sup>13</sup> As to the structure of time, here negation of negation means "punctuality", or the ordering of time into a chain of externally related "nows" ("*Jetztfolge*") that are thought of as separately "present at hand".<sup>14</sup> More exactly, "negation" is the separation of "nows" from each other into separate points, and the "negation of negation" their ordering into a chain.<sup>15</sup>

All in all, Heidegger's claim is that for Hegel "the essence of time is the "now" and that Hegel's conception thus represents a privileging of abstract presence thought of as a punctual "now" that has been "levelled off"<sup>16</sup> or "reified"<sup>17</sup> by abstracting it from its constitutive relations with the extasis of past and future. Whereas on Heidegger's own view temporality is constitutive of, or internal to the finite being-in-the-world of *Dasein*, on his reading Hegel is stuck with the abstraction of spirit and time as only externally related through the highly obscure relation of one "falling" into the other, made possible by their equally abstract structural identity. Whereas Heidegger himself grasps time "concretely",<sup>18</sup> Hegel grasps it "abstractly".

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10. SZ, 428.

11. SZ, 435.

12. SZ, 433–35.

13. SZ, 433.

14. SZ, 430–32.

15. SZ, 432.

16. SZ, 431.

17. SZ, 437.

18. SZ, 435.

## 2. Time according to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature

To gain critical distance to Heidegger's interpretation of Hegel, it is enough to realize one thing: Hegel makes it clear – in the very passages in his Philosophy of Nature that Heidegger is reading – that a discussion of time in the context of a philosophy of nature *does not* grasp time or temporality in its concrete nature.<sup>19</sup> On Hegel's view this is to be done elsewhere.

### *Time as "intuited becoming"*

Firstly, in §258 Hegel calls time "intuited being" (*das angeschaute Werden*).<sup>20</sup> Intuition is a theme discussed in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and refers thus explicitly outside the nature-philosophical context. Although Heidegger does note the passage about time as intuited becoming,<sup>21</sup> he in no way acknowledges that this compromises his claim according to which time in Hegel is exclusively a theme of the Philosophy of Nature. Furthermore, Heidegger makes a curious move by interpreting the determination of time as intuited becoming to mean that "time is primarily understood in terms of the 'now'", and that "neither arising nor passing away has priority in time".<sup>22</sup> On Heidegger's reading intuition is thus for Hegel openness to a punctual "now" in whose constitution the dimensions of past and future play no role. The curiosity here, noted by Derrida, is that whereas in his Kant-interpretation Heidegger reads Kant's conception of time as a form of intuition involving exactly a liberation of time from the exclusivity of presence thought of as a punctual now, he does not draw the same conclusion from Hegel's connection of time with intuition.<sup>23</sup> As Heidegger presents no reading whatsoever of Hegel's theory of intuition, one may only speculate with the motives of this decision.<sup>24</sup>

19. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, M. J. Petry (ed. and trans.), 3 volumes (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970) (abbreviated as 'PN' below), §258, §259. (I have consulted the Petry translations of the Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and the Williams translation of the lectures on Philosophy of Subjective Spirit [1827–28], but modified the translations where this seemed appropriate.)

20. PN1, 230

21. SZ, 430–31.

22. SZ, 431.

23. Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme", 48, and M. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Gesamtausgabe 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991). See also D. Schmidt, *The Ubiquity of the Finite – Hegel, Heidegger and the Entitlements of Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), 48, who rightly questions Heidegger's reading of presence in Hegel as unmediated by past and future, yet does not present a substantial alternative reading of Hegel's concept of intuition.

24. For more on this, see Sinnerbrink, "Sein und Geist".

*Representation and the “dimensions of time”*

Secondly, in §259 Hegel explicitly introduces a dimensional conception of time consisting, not of consecutive, mutually indifferent now-points, but of mutually constitutive “dimensions of time”, of “past, present and future”.<sup>25</sup> Hegel writes further:

The *finite* present is the *now* fixed as *being*, and as the concrete unity, separated from the negative, [namely] the abstract moments of the past and the future, it is therefore the affirmative factor; yet in itself this being is merely abstract, and disappears into nothing. Incidentally, in nature where time is the *now* these dimensions do not attain a *subsistent* difference; they are necessary only in subjective representation, in memory and in fear or hope.<sup>26</sup>

Heidegger cites from this passage only the sentence “[i]ncidentally, in nature where time is the *now* these dimensions do not attain a *subsistent* difference”, and pays no attention to the next sub-sentence where Hegel talks about the dimensions of time, past, present and future that he has introduced already in the opening sentence of §259, connecting them to the experiential horizon of a concrete human person.<sup>27</sup> It could not be much clearer that Hegel is introducing here a structure of temporality that is *not* realized in mere nature.

25. The paragraph starts as follows: “The dimensions of time, the present, future, and past, constitute the becoming of externality as such and its dissolution into the differences of being as passing over into nothing, and nothing passing over into being” (PN, §259).

26. PN, §259.

27. SZ, 431. Heidegger adds after this citation another citation from the Addition to the same paragraph: “Thus in a positive sense one can say of time that only the present is; the ‘before’ and ‘after’ are not; but the concrete Present is the result of the past and is pregnant with the future. Thus the true Present is infinity.” (Translation after Macquarrie and Robinson, compare PN1, 235.) Strikingly, he does not comment on what Hegel says about “the concrete present”. He also neglects a passage in the same Addition two sentences earlier: “The present is only because the past is not; from another point of view the being of the now has the determination of not-being, and the not-being of its being is the future; the present is this negative unity.” Heidegger does not seem to comprehend at all what Hegel is talking about here: it is indeed possible to grasp the present as simply being and the past and future as simply not-being. This, however, is merely a one-sided, “positive” (one might also say “reifying”, SZ, 437) view of the present abstracted from its constitutive relations with past and future. Taken “concretely” or in other words in the context of its constitutive relations, “the true present” is “the result of the past and [...] pregnant with the future”. It would be useful to connect these reflections with Hegel’s discussion of the “now” in the first chapter of the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but this cannot be done here. For a thorough discussion of the chapter in question, see K. Westphal, “Hegel’s Internal Critique of Naïve Realism”, *Journal of Philosophical Research* 25 (2000): 173–229.

What is at stake is a structure that involves a subject capable of “representation”, one which is moreover a subject of practical concern and thus of “fear or hope”. It is difficult not to be reminded of Heidegger’s own conception of the temporality of the “care”-structure of *Dasein*.

Hegel’s statement that the dimensions of past, present and future attain a “subsistent difference” (*bestehende Unterschied*), i.e. are synthetized as mutually constitutive dimensions, “only” in subjective representation is by no means to be read as somehow deflating the importance of the theme: representation (*Vorstellung*) is a theme that belongs to the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and this makes it in no way less important than themes belonging to the Philosophy of Nature. If anything then the opposite. Nor is it to be read as suggesting that the dimensions of time are somehow *not real* since they are “only” in representation. Representation is for Hegel a constitutive element of concrete human subjectivity, and since the dimensions of past, present and future are in Hegel’s view “necessary” in representation, they are hence constitutive of that subjectivity on his view. Having a temporal perspective of practical concern and living towards future possibilities that have axiological values within that perspective – something to be hoped or feared for – is part of what it is to *be* the kind of subject that human persons are.

Clearly, as dimensions of the subjective perspective of the concrete subject infused with practical concern the relationship of the dimensions of past, present and future is *not* one of abstract separation, or as Hegel says an “indifference of self-externality”, but of “subsistent difference”. In other words, it is a constitutive relationship where each dimension is what it is as part of a whole that is the being of the concrete subject.

### *The Impossibility of Mathematizing Time*

Thirdly and finally, the greatest part of §259 explicitly deals with the impossibility of conceptualizing time in its concreteness in mathematical terms. Such a task would be possible were time exhaustively thinkable in terms of a chain of mutually indifferent or external now-points. Yet this is *not* possible since a comprehensive grasp of time involves accounting for the mutually constitutive, not-mutually-indifferent dimensions of past, present and future. Hegel writes:

The differences of time [i.e. past, present and future] do not have this indifference of self-externality which constitutes the immediate determination of space; therefore they are not conceivable in terms of [mathematical] figurations.

Hegel says that insofar as time is conceived purely mathematically, it is “paralysed, its negativity debased by understanding [...] into a dead unity, the extreme externality of thinking”.<sup>28</sup> Such an abstract understanding of time grasps the present as a “finite present”, reified or “fixed as being”, and separates it as a “dead unity” (*tote Eins*) from the equally abstractly understood past and future.<sup>29</sup> Understood so, the present is indeed thought of as something merely “at-hand” (*vorhandenes*), to use Heidegger’s terms, as it is in what Heidegger understands as the Aristotelian tradition as a whole.<sup>30</sup> Hegel makes it very clear that he would not see himself as part of such tradition.

### 3. Intuition, Representation, and the Temporality of Hegel’s Concrete Subject

Let us next take heed of Hegel’s statements about the connection of time to intuition and representation and see what we can make of them in light of how Hegel deals with these themes in his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. In starting to read any part of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit it is good to have some preliminary idea of what the word ‘spirit’ stands for in its title. The first requirement for any candidate for such an idea is that it helps to make sense of what Hegel actually discusses in the text. A helpful characterization that does just this – i.e. covers well the content of what the three parts of Philosophy of Spirit – Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit – are about is that it is a title-word for a particular *form of life*.<sup>31</sup> This is the life-form of human persons.

On this reading, the title “Subjective spirit” stands for the “subjective” aspects of that life-form, namely the subjective constitution of human persons, or their subjectivity; “Objective spirit” stands for the “objective” aspects of the life-form, namely social and institutional structures; and finally “Absolute spirit” stands for collective practices of reflecting on

28. PN, §259.

29. PN, §259.

30. For a critique of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle on time, see Derrida, “Ousia and Grammé”. Schmidt refers to the Preface of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where Hegel in his view presents a critique of “mathematized, empty concept of time as paralysed and abstract” (*The Ubiquity of the Finite*, 55), but does not pay notice to the fact that almost the whole of §259 in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is dedicated to such critique.

31. On “spirit” as a form of life, see P. Stekeler-Weithofer, “Persons and Practices”, in *Dimensions of Personhood*, H. Ikäheimo and A. Laitinen (eds) (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007), 174–98.



the life-form and the whole of what there is, namely the practices of art, religion and philosophy.<sup>32</sup> All three are in multiple ways internally interconnected, but what I will almost solely focus on here is the intrinsic temporality of concrete subjectivity, a theme that mostly belongs under the title “Subjective spirit”.

As we saw, two issues are important in this regard: intuition and representation. These are not to be confused with each other since they belong to distinct layers of the concrete subject’s constitution. Whereas intuition in its immediate, uncultivated form is still a basically animal function, representation is something that distinguishes human persons from mere animals. Accordingly, whereas intuition belongs to a complex of phenomena partly discussed in *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, partly in *Philosophy of Nature*, representation is part of a complex of phenomena that is exclusive a topic of *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*.

### *Immediate Intuition and Time*

In §488 of the chapter on Intuition with which *Psychology*, the third main-section of *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* starts Hegel presents intuition as the subjective activity that “projects” (*wirft hinaus*) contents given by the senses in space and time.<sup>33</sup> What this means concretely can only be

32. Absolute spirit is “absolute”, since in Hegel’s view there is no fixed limit to the capacity of philosophical grasp of the world. On a very generous reading Heidegger is thus not completely wrong in thinking of “spirit” as having the form of a (metaphysically inflated) Cartesian cogito thinking itself thinking about the world – if one understands by this merely absolute spirit, and furthermore its highest form philosophy. Philosophy is indeed essentially involved in thinking about thinking about the world. Yet, even at this level of generosity Heidegger’s reading of “spirit” is more or less useless when one tries to make sense of the largest part of what the *Philosophy of Spirit* is about. It is about a whole life-form which it would be absurd to try to reduce to a thinking ego or “the Concept”. Heidegger is also right that the essence of spirit for Hegel is indeed “absolute negation”, but what this involves is significantly more complex than Heidegger’s account makes it seem. The central concretization of the structure of absolute negation in the constitution of the “spiritual life-form” is the structure of “self-consciousness in otherness”. This has many instantiations not all of which are epistemic at all – contrary to what Heidegger’s talk of the Cartesian cogito suggests. (One such instantiation is famously work.) Being intentionally related to something *other than oneself*, yet experiencing it as *non-alien*, as something in which one can “find oneself”, is the normative essence of all specifically spiritual relations, or in other words the measure of the extent to which they are genuinely spiritual in contrast to merely natural. For details, see H. Ikäheimo, “Holism and Normative Essentialism in Hegel’s Social Ontology”, in *Recognition and Social Ontology*, H. Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (eds) (Leiden: E. J. Brill 2011).

33. All references to the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, if not otherwise notified, are to G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, M. J. Petry (trans.) (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978–79) (abbreviated as PSS).

grasped once intuition is seen in its systematic context. This context is a tightly knotted complex of issues discussed not only in the chapter C.a.α. Intuition, but also, on the one hand, in the other α.-chapter of Psychology (C.b.α. Practical feeling) and the two α.-chapters of the second main section Phenomenology (B.a.α. Sensuous consciousness, and B.b.α. Desire),<sup>34</sup> and, on the other hand, in closely related places in Philosophy of Nature (§§260–61 on place and motion and §§350–66 on the animal organism).

The first thing to comprehend here is that the subject of immediate, uncultivated intuition is an animal organism with felt needs and instinctual ways of attending to objects that can satisfy its needs. It is the practical necessities of life of an animal organism that drive the spatio-temporal synthesis of primitive intuition. In the thematically parallel chapter on “practical feeling” Hegel discusses the unpleasant felt “ought”<sup>35</sup> of practical feeling, such as the feeling of hunger which is a subjective appearance of physiological need, and its transformation into “a relationship towards outer objects”.<sup>36</sup> This need-driven form of object-relation or intentionality is the topic of the thematically parallel chapter on “desire” in Phenomenology. The object of immediate animal desire is, *for* the primitive subject, solely what in it is relevant for the instinct-driven satisfaction of need with the object. As Hegel puts it in a lecture-text, “the lack in me appears as an external object”.<sup>37</sup> Or as we can read in the Addition to §427 on desire, the subject “intuits” in the object “its own lack”.

The “projection” of contents in space and time that is the function of intuition is hence the organization or synthesis of, on the one hand, the unpleasant “inner sensations” of hunger or other physiological need, and, on the other hand, the givens of the outer senses or “outer sensations”, into an organized object-relation.<sup>38</sup> In brief, it is having objects in view as desirable. Importantly, such an object-relation is characterized by “immediacy” in the sense that it involves no capacity of abstracting from what is immediately significant from the point of view of satisfying given physiological

34. See H. Ikäheimo, “On the Role of Intersubjectivity”, and especially the table on page 79. The central claim made in the article with regard to the structure of Phenomenology and Psychology is that they are thematically parallel with each other so that Psychology discusses cognitive and volitional functions responsible for forms of object-relation or intentionality discussed in Phenomenology. Furthermore, the chapters Consciousness as such and Self-consciousness in Phenomenology are thematically parallel with each other, and so are the chapters Theoretical spirit and Practical spirit in Psychology.

35. PSS, §472.

36. PSS, §470.

37. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827–8*, R. R. Williams (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 185.

38. See PSS, §401 Addition on inner and outer sensations.

need. As Hegel writes in *Philosophy of Nature* about the animal's relation to objects in its environment: "what is present to the animal is this *specific determination* of the grass, moreover of *this* grass, this corn etc. – and *nothing else*".<sup>39</sup>

This is to say that the specific determination of an object that is subjectively present for the animal is the sensuous determination that makes it instinctively inviting: a specific smell, sound, way of moving, or some such quality, which in the animal is instinctively connected with the aim of getting rid of the feeling of "lack", or (objectively speaking) with the satisfaction of its given need. Moreover, the animal does not grasp the inviting object – blade of grass, smaller animal and so forth – as an exemplar of a genus, nor does it grasp it as having qualities which it shares with other objects. At each moment, it only ever grasps "this" object, as a singular something, and grasps it as identical with, or reduced to, whatever quality or "specific determination" in it draws the animal's instinct-guided attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*, §448) to it.

As Hegel writes in the thematically parallel chapter on "sensuous consciousness" in the *Phenomenology*, the immediate object of desire is a "being, something, existing thing, singular and so on".<sup>40</sup> The point of this list of logical determinations from the *Logic of Being* is that the immediate object is not differentiated, for the animal subject, into a being with multiple properties which it may share with other beings and which provide a plurality of affordances among which attention could freely choose which one(s) to focus on. Such a structure of objects and such an object-relation is present first with the function of *representation* which the simple animal subject is incapable of.

Importantly however, despite the extreme one-track nature of simple animal intuition, or the extreme "immediacy" of the animal's view of objects, its structure of intentionality is not characterized by a completely unmediated "punctuality". That is, the animal's being in the world and the way the world or environment is structured in its perspective, already involves a *temporal* structure where the present is constitutively dependent on the future. The physiological need and the drive to satisfy it attune the animal subjectivity temporally towards a non-present state that contrasts with the unpleasant present state (of hunger etc.). And as instinct-guided

39. PN, §361 Addition, emphasis H.I.

40. PSS, §418. On what I have called Hegel's "official view" "[f]or the animal there is no something, thing, singular" (Hegel, *Lectures*, 153). Yet, arguably this is not the view that makes best possible sense of all that Hegel actually says about the relevant issues. See Ikäheimo, "Animal Consciousness in Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*", *Hegel-Jahrbuch 2010* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011), 180–85.

attention points out potentially satisfying objects as inviting, the way in which those objects are given to the animal involves a temporal dimension – the object is for the subject something “*to be* devoured”, which means “not *yet* devoured”. For as long as an object is given to the animal at all, it has this, if you want, ‘not-yet-but-to-be-devoured’ character. This is what Hegel means in the chapter on desire when he in §427 says that the object of desire “accords with the drive”, namely with the natural drive to satisfy the desire and thus to negate the felt state of need or “lack”.

This obviously has all to do with “place and movement”, which Hegel in §§260–61 of *Philosophy of Nature* conceives of as the unity of space and time and discusses in passages immediately following those read by Heidegger. Animals are distinguished from plants, among many other interconnected features, by the fact that they “determine their own place out of internal contingency”.<sup>41</sup> That is, animals move in space motivated by desires for determinate objects given in their “sensuous consciousness”. Since devouring objects requires reaching them in, or across, space, or in other words moving where they are (be they stationary plants or moving animals), movement, distance and time are essential to the structure of the animal’s being in its environment. For an animal every “place” is a “concrete point” (§260), which is to say that it is situated in a concrete context of spatio-temporal relations that are synthesized, for the animal, by the function of intuition responding to its felt needs and imperatives of practical engagement with what could satisfy the needs.<sup>42</sup>

In Hegel’s view it is constitutive of the structure or form of animal life, and thus of the being of animals as animals, that they live “toward” satisfaction. This essentially futural or, to borrow Heidegger, “extatic” mode of being structures their ego-centric universe in which place, distance, speed – and hence time – are in a very concrete sense matters of life and death. Even though animals are not capable of representing their own mortality, the temporal structure of their being is hence, in a sense, existential. This, I suggest, is the beginning of what is at stake when Hegel characterizes time as “intuited becoming”.<sup>43</sup>

41. PN, §351.

42. On the sublation of abstract time and space in “place”, see also Sinnerbrink, “Sein und Geist”, 135.

43. See also C. Malabou, *The Future of Hegel – Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic* (London: Routledge, 2005), Part I, which discusses the temporality of habit (*Gewohnheit*) in the first section of *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Anthropology*. Malabou rightly emphasizes the “anticipatory structure operating within subjectivity itself as Hegel conceived it” (Malabou, *The Future of Hegel*, 13). Yet, she confuses things by conceiving habit as an animal function, identical with “the effort in maintaining its [the organism’s, H.I.] own unity through

*Representation and Time*

It may seem surprising that I have reconstructed intuition in Hegel as an animal function, since after all it is something that Hegel discusses in *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, which is a text about the human person. This relates to one of the many complexities of that text, namely the fact that the topics of each of the  $\alpha$ -chapters of *Phenomenology and Psychology – Sensuous consciousness, Desire, Intuition and Practical feeling* – both have an immediate animal version, and a version in which they are mediated by ‘higher’ functions distinctive of human persons, such as representation. Due to the extreme compactness of the text, as well as its architectonic formality Hegel simply packs both issues in the same chapters.<sup>44</sup> Above I have discussed only the immediate animal version of these functions, one which is unmediated by the distinctively “spiritual” functions characteristic of human persons only. The upshot was that already at the level of animality the subject’s being is constitutively temporal, or has a structure in which the present is mediated (at least) by future<sup>45</sup> – albeit by a very proximate one. To the extent that animality is also an aspect of human being – and Hegel is perfectly explicit that it is – this animal structure of temporality is, as it were, an underlying infrastructure in humans. Thanks to it, even at the simplest level of organization – most importantly in early infancy – living in an unmediated punctual present is strictly impossible for humans.

Yet, it is important not to confuse this animal form of temporal being with the specifically human form.<sup>46</sup> On Hegel’s account, what is decisive

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the unity of differences” (58). Malabou even claims that “for Hegel it is not impossible to refer to a vegetative habit” (59). Here Malabou runs together two different issues: the “first natural” synthesis of organic being on the one hand, and the “second natural” phenomena of practice, habitualization and habit. Although I cannot argue this here, for Hegel habitualization requires distance to the immediacy of animal desire-orientation, and the point of calling it “second nature” (§ 410) is that it is something “not-simply-natural” becoming “as-if-natural”. Habit is part and parcel of the complex of capacities and structures distinguishing human persons from mere animals, the other elements of which involve representation and freedom of choice (*Willkür*).

44. In other words, the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* is written simultaneously from a *bottom-up* or developmental perspective, and a *top-down* perspective of the fully developed whole. From the former perspective the  $\alpha$ -chapters discuss elements of subjectivity that are not mediated by the developmentally more complex elements discussed in the  $\beta$ - and  $\gamma$ -chapters. From the latter perspective the  $\alpha$ -chapters discuss the same element, now only transformed through mediation by the further elements. I will discuss this issue in more detail in forthcoming work.
45. It is not as obvious whether, or how, the animal present is mediated by past on Hegel’s view – or in Husserl’s terms not merely by protention but also by retention. I leave this theme for another occasion.
46. Such confusion is endemic to readings influenced by Alexandre Kojève that tend to exaggerate

in the overcoming of mere animality and the coming about of a genuinely “spiritual” form of life is liberation from the kind of immediacy of engagement described above. This requires the function of representation which Hegel discusses in a chapter in *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* following the chapter on intuition.

Representation too has to be conceived in its systematic context, which is a tightly knotted complex of issues discussed not only in the chapter C.a.β. Representation, but also in the other β.-chapter of *Psychology* (C.b.β. Drives and freedom of choice), and the two β.-chapters of *Phenomenology* (B.a.β. Perception, and B.b.β. Recognitive self-consciousness, respectively). As intuition was intimately connected with the practical imperatives constitutive of animal life, representation is likewise connected with the practical dimensions of the form of life specific to human persons.

Let us start with the transition from desire (B.b.α.) to recognition (B.b.β.) since this is a fairly familiar theme from a long line of readings of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. What is essential for our purposes here is the overcoming of the immediacy of the desiring animal intentionality and the form of temporality defining it, and its replacement with a genuinely “spiritual”, socially mediated form of intentionality and temporality.<sup>47</sup> Hegel describes the transition from the merely natural to a spiritual form of life in the chapters *Desire* and *Recognitive Self-consciousness* by means of a confrontation of subjects that actively resist their reduction to objects of each other’s desire, or reduction to the significances (or “specific determinations”, see §361 Addition) in light of which an immediately desire-driven subject sees its environment. In contrast to objects of desire that “cannot resist”<sup>48</sup> their subsumption into functions of desiring intentionality, the subject is now confronted with a “free object”<sup>49</sup> – namely another

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the role of the theme of *desire* in Hegel, and tend to focus exclusively on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ignoring Hegel’s systematic treatises in the *Encyclopaedia*. As an example, see Schmidt, *The Ubiquity of the Finite*, 55–59. While Schmidt is right in emphasizing the temporality of desire, following Kojève he does not differentiate clearly between the animal and the specifically human forms of subjectivity in Hegel. Nor does he in general discuss desire in its systematic context that can only be grasped through a systematic reading of the *Encyclopaedia*. Furthermore, Schmidt suggests that there is quite generally a difference between “the *Encyclopaedia* and the *Phenomenology* as frameworks for presenting Hegel’s concept of time” (Schmidt, *The Ubiquity of the Finite*, 55) and, like Heidegger, reduces what Hegel has to say about time in the *Encyclopaedia* to the few pages in *Philosophy of Nature* that Heidegger is reading. To be fair to Schmidt however, this is only one of the themes in his otherwise quite useful book.

47. The nature of the transition differs depending on whether one reads it from the bottom-up, or the top-down perspective, but here we will focus solely on the bottom-up perspective.

48. PSS, §427.

49. PSS, §429.

intentional subject. The details of this highly stylized ideal-genetic account of the transition from nature to spirit are not important for us,<sup>50</sup> but what is important is the complex interplay of external influences and inner processes at issue in the transition, and the way these amount to a new form of active engagement with the world.

The encounter with the unyielding other subject represents a decentring or unravelling of the solipsism of immediate desire-orientation, and a thematization of the subject to itself as an intentional subject with a subjective perspective to the world.<sup>51</sup> This awakening from immediate desire-orientation involves, among many other things, an emancipation of the function of attention<sup>52</sup> from determination by instinct. Such loosening of determination by nature is necessary for the capacity to attend to features in objects other than those directly relevant for the satisfaction of immediate physiological need, and thus relevant for the possibility of seeing objects as having a plurality of qualities.<sup>53</sup>

The capacity of freedom of choice (*Willkür*), discussed in the thematically parallel chapter “Drives and freedom of choice” thus has significance, not merely for the practical dimension of subjectivity, but for its epistemic dimension as well. Being able to attend with degrees of freedom to different features in objects is essential for progressing beyond mere immediate intuition and engaging in the organizing activities of the intelligence that Hegel discusses in the chapter “Representation” in Psychology.<sup>54</sup> These activities (*Tätigkeit*) are responsible for organizing the world, in the perspective of the subject, according to structures that Hegel discusses in the chapter “Perception” in Phenomenology. Whereas at the level of unmediated sensuous consciousness the object is not differentiated in terms of a

50. The modern reader is inclined to read the account as an account of species evolution, which is not a framework in terms of which Hegel was thinking about the issue. For one application of Hegelian insights to evolutionary anthropology, see H. Ikäheimo, “Is ‘Recognition’ in the Sense of Intrinsic Motivational Altruism Necessary for Pre-Linguistic Communicative Pointing”, in *ASCS09—Proceedings of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science*, W. Christensen, E. Schier and J. Sutton (eds) (Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, 2010) ([www.maccs.mq.edu.au/news/conferences/2009/ASCS2009/ikaheimo.html](http://www.maccs.mq.edu.au/news/conferences/2009/ASCS2009/ikaheimo.html)).

51. Hegel mentions the thematization of the primitive subject to itself in §449 Addition: “It is only when I reflect that it is I who have the intuition, that I enter the standpoint of presentation”. He does not say that this is the result of the encounter with another subject in this passage, but in light of the parallel argumentative structure of the text this is an obvious conjecture.

52. See PSS, §448.

53. See P. Redding, *Hegel’s Hermeneutics* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 11–17, 102–103 and 110–18.

54. PSS, §§451–64.



plurality of qualities, this is the case at the level of perception.<sup>55</sup> As the object is not anymore identical with or reduced to one single quality for the subject, but is now experienced by the subject as having many qualities, and as the subject becomes capable of more freely switching its attention not only between the different qualities of one object, but also between different objects, it starts grasping the world in terms of a multiplicity of objects that are both qualitatively similar with and different from each other. This opens up the subject's perspective for grasping the multitude of "concrete relations and connections",<sup>56</sup> which the world for us more than merely animal subjects consist of. Such a grasping is a gradual process of "experience" (*Erfahrung*)<sup>57</sup> that essentially involves "associating"<sup>58</sup> what one has seen, and "subsumption"<sup>59</sup> of the seen under empirical concepts.

As the subject is now emancipated from immediate desire-orientation, also its animal form of temporality is sublated. Yet, like the primitive subject of immediate intuition driven by physiological needs translated into "futural" desires, also the subject emancipated from animal immediacy is a living being with needs and concerns which stretch it out towards a future.<sup>60</sup> Only the structure of temporality is now significantly different. This is where the notions of *fear and hope* become important, and also where the constitutive *sociality* of the temporality of human being must be thematized.

What is essential for the specifically human form of temporality is the capacity to represent presently non-prevailing situations and states of affairs as possibly prevailing in the future, and the related capacity to be motivated by represented future possibilities. These capacities are as much mutually constitutive of each other as are the more primitive capacities to "intuitively" grasp the environment in terms of concrete spatio-temporal "places" on the one hand, and the desire for singular objects driven by physiological need on the other hand. In short: representing the future is a psychological activity requiring an interest in the future, and an interest in the future

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55. Thus, whereas at the level of primitive sensuous consciousness (and desire) there is a differentiation or *Urteil* between subject and object, at the level of perception (and recognition) there is also an *Urteil* between objects and their properties.

56. PSS, §420.

57. PSS, §420.

58. PSS, §455.

59. PSS, §456.

60. I suppress here a more detailed discussion of memory and thus of the dimension of past, which is explicitly present in the chapter Representation, and concentrate on what is less explicit and therefore more in need of reconstruction, namely the phenomena of hope and fear, and thus the dimension of future.



requires the capacity to have representations about it – the practical and the theoretical are thus again intertwined moments of a concrete whole.

In Hegel's illustrative story of the master and bondsman the emergence of this new layer of temporally stretched intentionality is related to an emergence of a reflective form of *self-concern*. Whereas the animal is driven by the given singular state of desire for the currently given object, the subject that has been awakened from its natural solipsism through the encounter with the other subject has become thematized for itself as a finite, mortal being. Hegel is quite sketchy about the details of how this happens and his ideal-genetic story is certainly not meant to explain in detail the empirical variations that it can take,<sup>61</sup> but clearly the moment of *fear of death* – though stressed somewhat less emphatically in *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* than in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*<sup>62</sup> – is of systematic significance as a placeholder for the general phenomenon of temporally extended concern for self. It is only for a subject with such temporally extended self-concern that there is a future as something to be hoped or feared for.

Simultaneously, as said, such a subject has to have cognitive capacities needed for representing the not immediately given. The chapter on “Representation” in *Psychology* discusses a whole range of such interrelated capacities, proceeding from simpler to the most complex ones.<sup>63</sup> Hegel starts by saying that now the intelligence frees contents given in intuition from their “immediacy” and posits them within its “own space and time”. This is the production and storing of mental “images” of what has been intuited and their more or less involuntary or mechanical recall.<sup>64</sup>

The next level of complexity, and of freedom, is “reproductive imagination”,<sup>65</sup> or the dissociation and association of the qualitative features of the stored images, the production of universals and the subsumption of singulars under them. Such activities of analysis and synthesis also require involuntary and voluntary forms of memory which give them an inherently temporal structure.

Finally, Hegel comes to discursive forms of psychological activity, to the production of signs and language in general.<sup>66</sup> On a fully developed level of

61. The theme clearly allows for many empirical variations, ranging from developmental psychology, through civilization-history to the evolution of primates.

62. Compare §§430–35 in *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, and §§194–96 in G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A. V. Miller (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

63. This development can, again, be read both from a bottom up perspective where the earlier processes or capacities are thought of as independent of the later ones, and a top-down perspective where they function together, internally interrelated with the later ones.

64. PSS, §452.

65. PSS, §455.

66. PSS, §457.

cognitive activity “we think in names”,<sup>67</sup> or that is to say, in words that are representatives of thought contents. For our purposes an especially important fact here is the following: having anything but perhaps extremely simple representations about the future requires language-based thinking, which is an inherently *social* practice. In the chapter on representation Hegel mostly abstracts from the social nature of language and linguistic productivity, but sociality, or more exactly said intersubjective mediation is explicitly present in the thematically parallel chapter on “Recognitive self-consciousness” in Phenomenology, illustrated by the figures of the master and the bondsman.

The intersubjective mediation has two dimensions, which Hegel does not distinguish too clearly but which arguably any adequate reconstruction of his position needs to distinguish – a *deontological* and an *axiological* one. The *deontological* dimension is the dimension of norms and normative authority, and it is related to having language-based representations by the fact that the semantic rules or norms of language and thus of language-based thinking are collectively instituted and administered. This is what production of signs is in concrete terms. Such collective institution and administration requires mutual attribution of authority, or mutually taking others as authoritative of the shared semantic norms.<sup>68</sup>

The relation of the master to the bondsman based on coercion and fear is an exemplification of the most primitive form of “authority-relation”, but on Hegel’s ideal-genetic account this develops into a symmetric or mutual relation of authorization between free and equal parties. This is the deontological dimension of *mutual recognition*, which, to distinguish it from the axiological dimension, we may call *mutual respect*.<sup>69</sup>

The sociality of norm-administration needed for language-based thinking is not, however, the only way in which intersubjective mediation is essential for having representations about the future. Parallel to this deontic dimension there is the *axiological* dimension of concern and value already mentioned, having to do with future mattering for the subject in the first place.

Importantly, Hegel depicts the relationship of the master and bondsman as one of *shared* concern for the future, or as he writes, a “commonality of need and concern for its satisfaction”.<sup>70</sup> Analogically with the deontological

67. PSS, §462.

68. See R. Brandom, “Some Pragmatic Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms”, *European Journal of Philosophy* 7, no. 2 (1999): 164–89.

69. For details, see Ikäheimo, “Holism and Normative Essentialism”.

70. PSS, §434.

dimension, also on the axiological dimension there is an ideal-genetic development from a crude form to a fully free or “spiritual” form of shared concern and thus future-orientation.<sup>71</sup> The crude form, analogical with that of coercion and fear on the deontic dimension, is a relationship characterized by the parties’ prudential self-concern and their mutual instrumental concern for the other.

On the one hand, the master needs the bondsman and thus has to “keep him alive”.<sup>72</sup> In the perspective of the master’s concern for his own future well-being the bondsman’s well-being has only instrumental value, and only to the extent that it is necessary for servitude. On the other hand, the bondsman is forced to *work*, to engage in practical activity that involves representing goals and means, of planning and preparing for eventualities that are relevant from the point of view of the given represented goals.<sup>73</sup> These goals, prescribed by the master in light of the demands of his own well-being or his individual horizon of fears and hopes, can only be goals for the bondsman in light of the bondsman’s own overall goal of staying alive and living as well as possible in the circumstances – or in light of his own individual horizon of hopes and fears. It is merely for prudential or instrumental reasons that the bondsman cares about the master’s life.

Whereas both the master and the bondsman thus care *intrinsically* about their own lives and thereby live toward represented and hoped and feared for future possibilities, both care about the other’s life and future only instrumentally. The individual hope- and fear-driven orientations towards represented future possibilities of the parties are thus indeed united into a form of “commonality of needs and concern for their satisfaction”, yet this is not the ideal form that such communal living-towards-future takes for Hegel. As fear ideally develops into respect, instrumental concern for the other’s well-being ideally develops into intrinsic concern for his/her well-being. The ideal motivational basis for, as Hegel says, “solicitude caring for and securing the future”<sup>74</sup> is a combination of intrinsic self-concern and mutual intrinsic concern or in other words *love* for the other, which is the axiological form of mutual recognition.<sup>75</sup>

71. For details, see PSS, §434.

72. See PSS, §434.

73. See PSS, §435.

74. PSS, §434.

75. When Hegel talks of “universal self-consciousness” i.e. the state of mutual recognition in his *Encyclopaedia* he always mentions love. See HPSS, §436 (“If we speak of right, ethicality, love” [...] “Benevolence or love”); LPS, 194 (“in love and friendship”). See also §7 in G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Allen Wood (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) on “friendship and love”.

*Love as Negating the Negativity of Individual Mortality*

Whereas interpersonal respect can be easily shown to be constitutive of being towards future at the level of representation – by being necessary for social norms and thus language-based thinking – there is more room to debate how essential mutual love is for it. In any case, future-orientation involving intrinsic concern or love not only for oneself but for (some) others as well has – in contrast to future-orientation based on intrinsic concern for oneself only and merely instrumental concern for others – one distinctive feature highly relevant for the Hegel-Heidegger-encounter. That is, only the former gives individuals a practical horizon of hopes and fears that reaches beyond their own death, or makes it the case that they live towards a future beyond their own individual mortality. This gives the mode of temporality unique to human persons an intergenerational structure, and it is one of the many concrete ways in which “spirit” as a life-form involves a “negation of negation”: the negation of the absoluteness of individual mortality as the limit of concrete or lived temporality.

To come back to Heidegger, this has little to do with Descartes’ “*cogito me cogitare rem*”, but it has relevance with regard to issues and problems in Heidegger’s own conception of temporality. Namely, it is questionable whether Heidegger has a clear conception of constitutive relations to others where the others are not reduced to functional or instrumental roles within the individual horizon of self-concern or *Sorge*.<sup>76</sup> To the extent that Heidegger has no clear conception of “being with”<sup>77</sup> where the concerns of others are part of the individual’s horizon of concern in a not merely instrumental or prudential manner – and arguably it is difficult to find elements of such conception in *Being and Time*<sup>78</sup> – Heidegger’s picture of the temporality of *Dasein* abstracts from the kinds of concrete interpersonal relations which, for human persons, give being much of its meaning and motivational texture. True, everyone dies singularly, but this sets an absolute limit to the individual’s concerned orientation towards the future only

76. As Stephen Mullhal writes, others are determined in Heidegger’s “*Werkwelt*” functionally as “producers, deliverers, land-owners, farmers, booksellers and sailors” (S. Mullhal, *Heidegger and Being and Time* [London: Routledge, 1996, 72]), as performers of particular tasks, as bearers of particular roles or instantiations of functional properties – not as singular, irreplaceable individuals.

77. See SZ, §§25–27.

78. See SZ, §26, where Heidegger distinguishes between inauthentic and authentic “being-with”. As Dan Zahavi points out however, Heidegger’s notion of authentic being-with has mostly a negative character, that of “not taking away” the other’s care or self-concern (D. Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity* [Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2001], 135). It is difficult to see how intrinsic concern for the well-being of the other, i.e. love, would fit Heidegger’s heroic ontological individualism.

if she/he has no love for others who may survive her/him. One can only speculate whether Heidegger's thinking about the temporal structure of *Dasein* would have taken a different course had he had the patience to read Hegel more thoughtfully.

## Conclusion

It should be clear that what has been said above of the temporal structure of concrete subjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit are only preliminaries. The next step would be to show how the layers of temporality that Hegel marks in short-hand fashion with the concepts of intuition and representation in paragraphs 258 and 259 of the Philosophy of Nature are in the case of socialized and cultivated human persons internally interconnected aspects of a whole.

Whereas above we discussed intuition and desire at the unmediated animal level, it is another matter to discuss them at the socialized and cultivated level distinctive of human persons that also involves the functions of representation and concern for well-being. One of the important factors here is that intuition of the immediately given becomes mediated by ways of conceptualizing the world that are collective and influenced by the practical concerns that individual language users and world-carvers have and share. Thus, instead of the instinctively charged animal environment, the intuited world is now one that is structured according to ends and means of human persons who have individual and collective hopes and fears for the future (as well as meaningful, motivationally charged memories of the past).

For one thing, the particular ways in which nature is carved up in a given culture, and thus intuited in conceptually mediated intuition, reflect the interests and concerns characteristic of that culture.<sup>79</sup> But furthermore, much of what is given for persons to intuit consists of items of "objective spirit". Importantly for our theme, the world of objective spirit – artifacts, institutions, social structures, economic processes and so on – has a *historical* structure that transcends the temporal horizon of any individual. Most of it was here before me, most of it would be here without me, and most

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79. According to Hegel, carving up the world in terms of empirical concepts, or as he says "universal representations" (*allgemeine Vorstellung*) is guided by "interest" (§456). See Ikäheimo, "On the Role of Intersubjectivity", 88. Although Hegel does not say this explicitly in the chapter Representation, such interests are socially mediated and in different ways shared among members of a concrete community.

of it will continue being here and developing when I'm gone. Yet, none of it would exist, and thus there would be no history, unless the "subjective" element of spirit as a life-form consisted of subjects whose being is constitutively temporal.<sup>80</sup>

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80. I am grateful to Anton Friedrich Koch for a helpful exchange on the topics of this paper and to Robert Sinnerbrink and the participants of the workshop "Nature in Spirit" at Macquarie University (1 November 2011) for comments and questions.

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