The Expertise Defense and Experimental Philosophy of Free Will

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Abstract

This paper aims to vindicate the expertise defense in light of the experimental philosophy of free will. My central argument is that the analogy strategy between philosophy and other domains is defensible, at least in the free will debate, because philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuition by enabling expert philosophers to understand philosophical issues correctly and to have philosophical intuitions about them. This paper will begin by deriving two requirements on the expertise defense from major criticisms of it. First, precisely how philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions requires explanation (Contribution); second, it must be explained how philosophical training immunizes philosophical intuitions from distorting factors (Immunity). I shall argue that the Contribution requirement is crucial for the expertise defense and that this requirement can be satisfied at least in the domain of free will: recent research shows that most novices are unable to understand determinism correctly, suggesting that having intuitions about determinism requires philosophical expertise. I then discuss how this proposal can be applied to other philosophical disciplines.

Keywords: Comprehension Error, Philosophical Intuition, Metaphilosophy, Moral Judgment, Philosophical Expertise

1. Introduction

In recent years, many studies have shown that philosophical intuitions are sensitive to factors unrelated to philosophical truth. Some theorists, such as Weinberg et al. (2001) and Sinnott-Armstrong (2008), have argued that philosophical intuitions are therefore unreliable and should not be used in philosophy. One response to these criticisms is the so-called "expertise defense," according to which the intuitions of expert philosophers are not sensitive to such factors, and, thus, experts' intuitions, unlike novices', are still reliable. For example, Williamson (2007), drawing on the analogy between philosophers and lawyers, argues that the unreliability of folk intuitions does not provide sufficient reason to believe that expert intuitions are also unreliable.

However, the expertise defense faces several difficulties. Some critics, such as Weinberg et al. (2010) and Ryberg (2013), contend that the analogy between philosophy and other domains of knowledge fails. They argue that, unlike other domains, it is unclear how experience improves judgment in philosophy. In addition, other critics such as Mizrahi (2015) note that empirical studies have shown that the intuitions of well-trained philosophers are, in fact, influenced by the same irrelevant factors as are those of novices.

This paper aims to defend the expert defense against these criticisms. Rather than providing direct evidence that the intuitions of professional philosophers track philosophical truth better than novices' intuitions, my focus is on defending the analogy between experts in philosophy and experts in other disciplines. I begin with a general explanation of the expertise defense and summarize the two kinds of criticisms of it. I then present two requirements for the expertise

defense that follow from these criticisms: Contribution and Immunity. I shall argue that Contribution is both crucial for the expertise defense and can be satisfied, at least in the free will debate, because philosophical training improves understanding of the philosophical issue of determinism. I canvas empirical support for this argument from recent experimental philosophical research on free will, particularly the work of Nadelhoffer et al. (2021). My argument does not show that this defense of the analogy strategy generalizes to every philosophical issue; rather, I discuss the plausible possibility that my argument will hold for at least some other issues. Finally, I address some objections.

2. The Expertise Defense and Its Problems

2.1. What Is the Expertise Defense?

In contemporary philosophy, intuition has been considered usable evidence for philosophical theories. For example, in the debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism, many philosophers have used thought experiments to show that our intuitions are compatibilist or incompatibilist. One of the most famous experiments is the "Frankfurt-style cases," first proposed by Frankfurt (1969), which aims to show that there are some cases in which we intuitively admit the attribution of moral responsibility to those who committed immoral acts, even when they could not have acted otherwise. This thought experiment is intended to provide intuitive support for compatibilist theories, especially those that deny the necessity of alternative possibilities for free will and moral responsibility.

However, in recent years, numerous studies have shown that our philosophical intuitions are influenced by distorting factors, such as order, framing, emotions, and cultural differences. For example, take the Mr. Truetemp case, in which a man named Mr. Truetemp, who is unaware that his brain is wired to always be absolutely correct in estimating the temperature where he is, correctly estimates and believes that the temperature in his room is 71 degrees: Weinberg et al. (2001) found that East Asians were more likely than Westerners to attribute knowledge to Mr. Truetemp. Swain et al. (2008) show that our intuitions about this case are sensitive to order effects. Participants who were presented with a clear case of knowledge in advance were more likely not to attribute knowledge to Mr. Truetemp than those who were presented in advance with a clear case of non-knowledge. In addition, as Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) points out, a number of studies show that our moral intuitions are influenced by the way in which a situation is framed; for example, our intuitive moral judgments vary depending on whether the behavior in question is described as an action or an omission of action (e.g., Haidt & Baron, 1996). These factors are considered distorting because factors such as order of presentation are, and ought to be understood as, irrelevant to whether one's belief counts as knowledge or whether one's action is morally good. In light of these empirical findings, some theorists have criticized the use of intuitions in philosophy, arguing that philosophical intuitions are unreliable.

One response to these concerns is the expertise defense, according to which the intuitions of expert philosophers are not sensitive to these irrelevant factors and are still reliable, even if folk intuitions are distortable and unreliable. Most arguments for the expert defense are based on

analogies between philosophy and other domains; for example, Williamson suggests an analogy between training in philosophy and law:[1]

> Philosophy students have to learn how to apply general concepts to specific examples with careful attention to the relevant subtleties, just as law students have to learn how to analyze hypothetical cases. (Williamson 2007, 191)

Williamson also suggests an analogy between philosophy and physics:

> After all, we do not expect physicists to suspend their current projects in order to carry out psychological investigations of their capacity as laboratory experimentalists, on the basis of evidence that undergraduates untrained in physics are bad at conducting laboratory experiments. Standards of laboratory experimentation in physics are doubtless higher than standards of thought experimentation in philosophy; nevertheless, in both cases the point remains that it would be foolish to change a well-established methodology without serious evidence that doing so would make the discipline better rather than worse. (Williamson 2011, 217)

Even if the judgments of novices may prove unreliable in fields such as law or physics, we do not therefore posit that judgments made by expert lawyers or physicists are too. The central argument of the expertise defense asserts that the same principle applies to philosophical expertise. That is, the unreliability of novices' intuitions does not provide substantial grounds to deem intuitions derived from philosophical expertise as equally unreliable. In order to claim that the physicists' experiments and judgments are unreliable, one must demonstrate their lack of reliability; likewise, proponents of the expertise defense argue that if one asserts the unreliability of thought experiments and intuitions in philosophy, then one should provide evidence substantiating this claim. Consequently, according to the expertise defense, the burden of proof lies with the critics of philosophical intuitions, who should present positive evidence indicating the unreliability of intuitions held by expert philosophers.

These arguments of the expertise defense can be reconstructed as follows:

> Premise 1: There are significant analogies between the judgments of experts in philosophy and those of experts in other domains.
>
> Premise 2: In domains other than philosophy, the unreliability of folk judgments does not warrant the conclusion that expert judgments are similarly unreliable.
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> Conclusion: Therefore, the unreliability of folk intuitions does not provide sufficient grounds to deem the intuitions of expert philosophers unreliable.

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[1] Other theorists such as Hales (2006) and Ludwig (2007), who favor the expertise defense, note the similarities between philosophy and other areas such as physics and mathematics.

If this argument is valid, it implies that empirical evidence demonstrating the influence of distorting factors on folk intuitions is not sufficient to establish the general unreliability of philosophical intuitions. However, the expertise defense is not without issues. In the following sections, I shall outline two types of criticism and propose two requirements for this argument: Contribution and Immunity.

2.2. The Problem with the Expertise Defense

Criticisms of the expertise defense can be divided into two types. The first type challenges Premise 1 by arguing that the analogy between philosophy and other domains fails because there are no expert skills in philosophy that increase the reliability of expert judgments. For instance, Ryberg (2013) criticizes the expertise defense, particularly in moral philosophy, by highlighting a disanalogy between philosophy and domains like mathematics:

> […] if the intuitions are the result of prior experience then it is no surprise that the novice and the amateur have only very vague intuitions—if any—compared to the trained mathematician or chess player. (Ryberg 2013, 6)

Novices in chess or mathematics have only vague intuitions owing to their lack of experience, whereas even novices in moral philosophy can have intuitions similar to expert philosophers'. For example, in the trolley problem, even novices can intuitively judge whether one should press the lever or not. According to Ryberg, if philosophical training does not contribute to the generation of intuitions, it is unclear why the intuitions of philosophical experts should be considered more reliable.

Ryberg also points out that no clear parameters exist for evaluating the quality of philosophical intuitions. In particular, he notes that ethics is unlike mathematics or chess in that "there exists an intuition-independent criterion for the assessment of mathematical proofs and success in chess" (Ryberg 2013, 8); philosophical intuitions, however, seem to have no parameters for evaluating their quality aside from further intuitions. Therefore, Ryberg claims that one cannot argue that one intuition is superior to another, and therefore the expertise involved in producing philosophical intuitions itself is dubious. He concludes that it is doubtful whether there is anything that can be rightfully called "expert intuition" in philosophy.

Weinberg et al. (2010) offer a similar criticism of the ability of philosophical training to improve the reliability of intuitions. They argue that reliable intuitions can be trained only if there is sufficient feedback indicating the truth or falsity of judgments:

> The fields in which competent experts routinely develop are those like meteorology, livestock judging, and chess. In such areas, experts are confronted with a truly vast array of cases, with clear verdicts swiftly realized across a wide range of degrees of complexity or difficulty. Philosophy rarely if ever (outside its formal subareas) provides the same ample degree of well-established cases to provide the requisite training regimen. (Weinberg et al. 2010, 241)

In short, it is unlikely that there is sufficient feedback for trainees in philosophy to develop the expert skills to make reliable judgments.

In reply, one might argue that expert philosophical intuitions are more reliable because expert philosophers have internalized philosophical theories. However, this is unlikely to solve the problem, because "there is just no good candidate for a rich, well-established body of theory the mastery of which can constitute a relevant source of expertise for philosophers" (Weinberg et al, 2010, 345). In other words, most of the philosophical problems at issue do not have a consensus theory in the first place. In physics, there are standardized theories for solving problems. However, in the philosophical domains, where case intuitions serve as evidence for a theory, almost no consensus theories exist. Weinberg et al. also point out that even where consensus theories do exist, whether the mastery of such theories frees our intuitions from irrelevant factors is an entirely empirical question. They conclude that empirical evidence is needed to support the claim that well-trained philosophers possess reliable intuitions:

> Even if philosophers do, as a matter of fact, turn out to have the right sort of cognitive differences from novices to shield them from the restrictionist's findings, this isn't any help to the cathedrists unless they are willing to do a lot more work, and the right kind of work, *to show that this really is so.* (Weinberg et al. 2010, 350)

The second type of criticism focuses on the empirical aspect of the expertise defense, suggesting that there are reasons to believe that the intuitions of expert philosophers are unreliable. Mizrahi (2015) highlights studies indicating that the intuitions of expert philosophers are influenced by distorting factors, similar to those affecting novices. For example, Schwizgebel and Cushman (2012) found that even expert philosophers' judgments were influenced by order effects, despite their familiarity with the relevant principles. Tobia, Buckwalter, and Stich (2013) conducted studies showing that moral intuitions of expert philosophers are also affected by framing effects. These studies reveal that the intuitions of expert philosophers can be influenced by factors that distort their judgments.

To summarize, the first criticism challenges the analogy between philosophy and other domains, questioning the contribution of philosophical training to intuitions and their improvement. The second criticism presents empirical evidence suggesting that the intuitions of expert philosophers are, like folk intuitions, susceptible to distorting factors.

3. Defending Expertise Defense

In this section, my aim is to defend the expertise defense by considering the experimental philosophy of free will. I shall begin by presenting two requirements that arise from the foregoing criticisms and focus on one of them: Contribution. I shall argue that Contribution is more important for the expertise defense and that it can be satisfied. Furthermore, I shall provide empirical evidence from recent experimental philosophy research on free will to support my argument.

3.1. Two Requirements for the Expertise Defense

To reiterate, there are two types of criticism directed toward the expertise defense. The first criticism revolves around the uncertainty regarding exactly how philosophical training contributes to philosophical intuitions, while the second criticism questions whether

philosophical training effectively shields expert philosophers from distorting factors. These criticisms lead us to identify two requirements for a successful version of the expertise defense.

> **Contribution:** We must explain the ways in which philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions.
>
> **Immunity:** We must explain how philosophical training protects philosophical intuitions from distorting factors.

Contribution addresses the first criticism, which challenges Premise 1 of the expertise defense, while Immunity relates to the second criticism, which challenges the conclusion of the expertise defense.

However, the primary focus of this paper will be on Contribution, for two reasons. First, there is still ongoing debate regarding whether the effects of distorting factors such as order and framing render philosophical intuitions unreliable. Studies such as those by Demaree-Cotton (2016) and Knobe (2021) suggest that the influence of distorting factors might not be as substantial as one might suspect.

Second, and more importantly, Contribution, unlike Immunity, is critical for the reliability of an expert's judgment and the existence of expertise in a specific domain: merely being influenced by certain distorting factors does not inherently discredit the reliability of an expert's judgment or the existence of expertise in that domain. For example, it is possible that professional lawyers' reliable judgments are nonetheless sensitive to distorting factors like order. Research conducted by Danziger et al. (2010) demonstrates that judges' decisions regarding parole are influenced by their hunger: the proportion of judges granting parole decreased as time passed after meal breaks. Nevertheless, many individuals still perceive the judgments of professional judges to be considerably more reliable than those of novices because the judgments of the former stem from their expertise. Therefore, in demonstrating that expert judgments are more reliable in a particular domain or defending the expertise defense in philosophy, it is crucial to satisfy the requirement of Contribution rather than Immunity.

My central argument revolves around the claim that the expertise defense can satisfy the Contribution requirement because philosophical training enhances one's understanding of philosophical issues. In other words, philosophical training contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions by enabling philosophers to accurately comprehend a case and develop intuitions about it. In thought experiments, a correct understanding of the case itself serves as a prerequisite for forming case intuitions. Philosophers attend philosophy lectures, delve into philosophical issues, repeatedly engage with descriptions of thought experiments, discuss philosophical matters with colleagues, and produce academic papers. Through these activities, philosophers become accustomed to understanding philosophical issues and complex thought experiments. Thanks to their philosophical training, philosophers develop a more accurate understanding than novices of the cases presented in thought experiments. Consequently, philosophical training contributes to the formation of case intuitions, thus fulfilling the requirement of Contribution.

This is not to say that expert intuitions are devoid of distorting factors thanks to their expertise—indeed, they may be just as susceptible to such factors as novices. Instead, my claim is that freedom from distorting factors is not a necessary condition for arguing in favor of the reliability of experts in a particular domain and for a meaningful analogy between philosophical expertise and expertise in other disciplines. After all, expert judgments in other domains might be similarly influenced by distorting factors. In other words, sensitivity to distorting factors does not provide sufficient evidence to suggest a disanalogy between expertise in philosophy and expertise in other domains.

However, one might argue against the existence of a substantial difference in comprehension between expert philosophers and novices and claim that expert philosophers and novices possess a similar ability to draw meaningful conclusions from thought experiments. If this were the case, the contribution of philosophical training to philosophical intuitions would be minimal. Ryberg suggests that even novices appear capable of forming case intuitions in thought experiments. The burden of proof lies with philosophers to demonstrate that novices lack the necessary comprehension for forming philosophical intuitions. In the following two sections, I shall present evidence indicating that novices often do lack a proper understanding of philosophical issues, at least in the context of the philosophy of free will. In the next section, I shall briefly introduce some representative studies from the experimental philosophy of free will and provide empirical evidence indicating that most individuals struggle to comprehend determinism.

3.2. Experimental Philosophy of Free Will and the Comprehension Problem

As discussed in the first section, intuitions have been central to the debate on free will, particularly the conflict between compatibilists and incompatibilists. While philosophers have traditionally relied on thought experiments to argue for (in)compatibilist intuitions, empirical studies in the field of experimental philosophy have focused on investigating folk moral intuitions. These studies have produced mixed results, with some supporting compatibilist intuitions (Nahmias et al. 2005; 2006) and others supporting incompatibilist intuitions (Nichols & Knobe 2007).

In the work of Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006), participants were presented with a deterministic scenario to explore folk intuitions. The subjects were undergraduate students with no prior exposure to the free will debate. They were presented with the following scenario:

> Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25, 2150 AD, 20 years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195. As always, the supercomputer's prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195. (Nahmias et al. 2005, 570)

Nahmias examined folk intuitions in both morally positive and negative conditions. Participants in the negative condition were asked whether Jeremy is morally blameworthy if he robs the bank (i.e., the example above), and participants in the positive condition were asked whether Jeremy is morally praiseworthy if he saved a child from a burning building. In negative cases, 83% judged Jeremy to be blameworthy, while in positive cases, 88% judged him to be praiseworthy. In other words, most participants showed compatibilist intuitions.

However, subsequent studies following Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006) do not consistently support the view that folk intuitions lean toward compatibilism. Nichols and Knobe (2007) conducted a study examining folk intuitions in abstract and concrete cases with the following description of determinism (Nichols & Knobe 2007, 669):

> Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so what happened in the beginning of the universe caused what happened next, and so on right up until the present. For example one day John decided to have French Fries at lunch. Like everything else, this decision was completely caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same up until John made his decision, then it *had to happen* that John would decide to have French Fries.
>
> Now imagine a universe (Universe B) in which *almost* everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it. The one exception is human decision making. For example, one day Mary decided to have French Fries at lunch. Since a person's decision in this universe is not completely caused by what happened before it, even if everything in the universe was exactly the same up until Mary made her decision, it *did not have to happen* that Mary would decide to have French Fries. She could have decided to have something different.
>
> The key difference, then, is that in Universe A every decision is completely caused by what happened before the decision—given the past, each decision *has to happen* the way that it does. By contrast, in Universe B, decisions are not completely caused by the past, and each human decision *does not have to happen* the way that it does.

Participants in the concrete condition were asked whether a man named Bill, who has killed his wife and three children to be with his secretary, is fully morally responsible for his action, while participants in the abstract condition were asked whether it is possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions. Surprisingly, the majority (72%) answered “yes” in the concrete case, whereas the majority (86%) answered “no” in the abstract case. That is, most participants showed compatibilist intuitions in the concrete case and incompatibilist intuitions in the abstract case. This difference between intuitions for abstract and concrete cases is replicated

in other studies and confirmed by meta-analysis (Feltz & Cova 2014). Moreover, it has also been demonstrated that the description of determinism in Nichols and Knobe's (2007) study tends to lead to more incompatibilist responses (Nahmias & Murray 2010; Murray & Nahmias 2014). In other words, these studies show that people's responses depend on how determinism is described. One plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that people's understanding of determinism varies depending on the specific description used, which in turn affects their responses to compatibility questions.[2] Research by Nahmias and Murray (2010; 2014) suggests that participants with incompatibilist responses tend to make what they term "bypass judgments." "Bypass" refers to the idea that an agent's beliefs, desires, and decisions have no causal effect on their actions. Importantly, determinism itself does not imply bypassing, as an individual's actions can still be caused by their mental states even in a deterministic way. In other words, even if one's actions are ultimately determined by factors beyond her control, the direct cause of her actions still can be her mental state. However, Nahmias and Murray found that most participants with incompatibilist responses also agreed with bypass statements. For example, in their experiment, a condition using an abstract scenario from Nichols and Knobe (2007) included the following bypass statements to which participants had to respond. A correct understanding of determinism would require participants to disagree to these statements (Murray & Nahmias 2014, 29):

> **Decisions:** In Universe A, a person's decisions have no effect on what they end up doing.
> **Wants:** In Universe A, what a person wants has no effect on what they end up doing.
> **Believes:** In Universe A, what a person believes has no effect on what they end up doing.
> **No Control:** In Universe A, a person has no control over what they do.

In this condition, 73% of participants exhibited incompatibilist responses, and 66% made bypass judgments. Nahmias and Murray discovered a positive correlation between these two variables, which was also observed in other conditions. This finding suggests that most incompatibilist responses stem from a misunderstanding of determinism and are explained as merely apparent. That is, what might appear as an incompatibilist intuition is actually the intuition that actions that are caused regardless of one's mental state are not free, or that one cannot be morally responsible for such actions.

A series of experiments conducted by Nadelhoffer et al. (2020), however, have shown that many compatibilist responses can also be explained as a result of a misunderstanding of determinism. They found that a significant number of compatibilist responses are due to what they term "intrusion", the erroneous introduction of non-deterministic assumptions into the understanding of a deterministic situation. A notable aspect of their study was the incorporation of a "Chance" question as one of the comprehension checks. Participants were presented with scenarios and asked to respond to the "Chance" question corresponding to each scenario. Here is an example of the question in one condition using the supercomputer case from Nahmias et al. (2005) above:

[2] Another well-known hypothesis that focuses narrowly on the difference between intuition in concrete and abstract cases is "Performance Error Hypothesis." Nichols and Knobe (2007) suggest that compatibilist intuitions in concrete scenarios are attributable to performance errors caused by emotional reactions. However, subsequent experiments on this issue support the view that our intuitions are robust to emotional responses (e.g., Feltz & Cova 2014).

> **Chance:** What do you think the chances are that Jeremy will do something different than what the computer predicts he will do? (Slider scale ranging from 0 = very unlikely to 100 = very likely) (Nadelhoffer et al. 2020, 8)

Assigning a value greater than 0 to "Chance" indicates an incomplete comprehension of the scenario, as the scenario eliminates the possibility for Jeremy to behave differently from the prediction of the supercomputer. Nadelhoffer et al. discovered that many participants who provided compatibilist responses assigned a value greater than 0 in response to "Chance." Furthermore, when analyzing only the human cases, only 39% of participants who assigned a chance of 0 exhibited compatibilist responses. Therefore, a significant portion of participants with compatibilist responses allowed non-deterministic assumptions to influence their understanding of deterministic situations. This result suggests that a considerable number of compatibilist responses also merely apparent and stem from a misunderstanding of determinism.

These studies indicate the need to gather data from individuals who possess a correct comprehension of deterministic scenarios in order to investigate folk intuitions regarding determinism. However, a recent study conducted by Nadelhoffer et al. (2021) suggests that the majority of participants in previous experiments may have made comprehension errors. This study specifically examined people's intuitions after conducting a thorough check of their comprehension of determinism. In their studies, an experiment with the scenario from Nichol & Knobe (2007) found that 67% of participants in the group who completed the Intrusion comprehension check agreed with at least one Intrusion statement. On the other hand, in the group that underwent a detailed comprehension check on bypass judgments, 98% of subjects mistakenly concurred with one or more bypass statements. Furthermore, they discovered a negative correlation between bypass judgments and compatibilist responses, while a positive correlation was found between intrusion judgments and compatibilist responses. Another noteworthy experiment using a scenario similar to that employed by Nahmias et al. (2005; 2006), revealed that up to 80% of participants misinterpreted determinism in some way. Considering these outcomes, Nadelhoffer et al. emphasize the necessity to reconsider our approach to examining folk intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility.

These findings imply that the majority of ordinary people cannot have intuitions regarding the compatibility of free will and moral responsibility with determinism, primarily because of their limited comprehension of determinism. Without a proper understanding of determinism, it is impossible to form intuitions about determined actions. In contrast, expert philosophers, who possess the ability to assess the validity of the folk understanding of determinism, are capable of evaluating the conceptual implications of determinism. This enables them to correctly understand determinism and having intuitions about deterministic actions. As discussed in the following section, this disparity between novices and philosophers supports my argument that philosophical training contributes to philosophical intuitions by enabling philosophers to understand philosophical issues correctly.

3.3. Philosophical Experiences and Their Contribution to Philosophical Intuitions

Why are expert philosophers able to comprehend determinism accurately and judge its conceptual implications correctly? The reason is that their philosophical studies on free will and

determinism enhance their understanding of the subject, freeing them from misconceptions and enabling them to have intuitions. Through their study of free will, philosophers repeatedly engage with descriptions of determinism and acquire knowledge about which abilities are (in)compatible with determinism, as well as what determinism necessarily entails. Therefore, philosophical training equips philosophers with the ability to grasp determinism accurately.

Notably, empirical evidence has emerged demonstrating that philosophical training indeed contributes to the formation of philosophical intuitions. In this regard, philosophers possess expertise akin to experts in other domains. It is important to note that my argument does not suggest that philosophical training alters the content of philosophers' intuitive judgments compared with the judgments of novices. The distinction between experts and novices lies not in the intuitive judgments themselves but rather in their capacity to form intuitions about philosophical issues. As Ryberg argues, novices in fields such as physics or chess lack even vague intuitions. I contend that the same applies to the free will debate. Thus, Premise 1 of the expertise defense now receives empirical support, as Contribution has been empirically demonstrated, at least within the context of the free will debate.

However, one may object that the low comprehension rates among novices do not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that expert philosophers possess a better understanding of determinism. It is true that almost all studies involving comprehension checks on determinism have focused solely on novices. Consequently, there is no direct empirical evidence indicating that philosophers possess a superior understanding of determinism, and it remains plausible that even philosophical experts might fail comprehension checks on determinism if they were subjected to experiments. Nevertheless, even if many philosophers unfamiliar with the free will debate misunderstand determinism, those philosophers actively engaging in the debate and addressing comprehension issues must possess a significantly deeper understanding of determinism than novices. This enhanced understanding can only be attributed to philosophical training. Therefore, the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating that the majority of philosophers grasp determinism accurately does not undermine my claim that philosophical training enhances understanding of determinism.

I acknowledge that the empirical evidence supporting the proposal of this paper is limited to the free will debate. The generalizability of my defense of the expertise defense is a matter of empirical investigation, and what I have demonstrated in this paper is that my argument holds, at the very least, within the context of the free will debate. Therefore, I do not claim that my argument applies universally to all philosophical issues. However, in my view, it is plausible that my defense of the expertise defense extends to philosophical issues beyond the free will debate.

For instance, consider the responses of undergraduate students to the trolley problem, where they may propose solutions such as "I will shout at the people to run away" or "I will pull the lever and go to a man to save him". These individuals lack intuitions about the trolley problem because they fail to grasp the specific parameters of the thought experiment, which exclude any options other than pulling or not pulling the lever. Even in such a straightforward thought experiment, a certain degree of philosophical expertise is necessary to develop intuitions about it. As cases grow more complex, the required philosophical expertise to comprehend them becomes more intricate, and the amount of training needed to acquire such expertise increases. For

example, a mere hour and a half lecture may be insufficient for undergraduates to fully grasp the nonidentity problem. Understanding the nonidentity problem entails having intuitions such as recognizing that the identity of a child we would have under an environmentally harmful policy A differs from the identity of a child we would have under an environmentally friendly policy B. To intuit that the two children are not identical necessitates an understanding of the concept of numerical identity and the cognitive ability to apply that concept to the given scenario. In fact, recent research indicates that a significant proportion of people struggle to comprehend philosophical problems related to personal identity (Żuradzki & Dranseika, 2022).

In summary, experimental philosophy of free will indicates that the majority of ordinary individuals, unlike expert philosophers, do not possess a correct understanding of determinism and are incapable of forming intuitions about it, a deficiency that can be attributed to their lack of philosophical expertise. This need for expertise can be extended to philosophical problems in general. If philosophical training indeed contributes to the development of philosophical intuitions in this manner, it satisfies the Contribution requirement. In other words, there exists a meaningful analogy between philosophical expertise and expertise in other disciplines, which provides us with a rationale to reject the notion that the unreliability of folk intuitions is sufficient evidence to consider the intuitions of expert philosophers as unreliable as those of novices.

4. Objections

4.1. Quality Parameter

One may question whether my proposal truly satisfies the Contribution requirement. While I have argued that philosophical training enables individuals to have intuitions about cases, some may argue that this argument does not adequately address the criticisms raised by Weinberg et al. (2010) and Ryberg (2013). These critics suggest that philosophical intuitions appear to lack independent quality parameters, and they contend that the analogy between philosophy and other domains, such as physics or chess, is flawed. It is possible for someone to argue that my proposal fails to establish an analogy between philosophy and other domains, or that a satisfactory level of Contribution is insufficient to address their criticism.

In response, my proposal does offer certain quality parameters for philosophical intuitions. It is possible to assess one's understanding of a case, as demonstrated by experiments on novice understanding. This assessment is feasible because there exist conceptual truths about the case that are independent of intuitions themselves: the set of true propositions or a priori truths that conceptually entail the given case. For instance, determinism conceptually excludes alternative possibilities, and thus individuals who believe that people could have acted differently than they actually did do not possess a proper understanding of determinism. In other words, we can evaluate the comprehension of cases based on the conceptual truths pertaining to them, independent of intuitions. Moreover, it is possible to evaluate philosophical intuitions independently of the intuitions themselves. Once again, in order to have an intuition, it is essential to have a correct understanding of a case. Therefore, if it is revealed that a participant lacks a correct understanding of a case, we can interpret their intuitions as merely apparent

intuitions regarding the case. Thus, quality parameters for philosophical intuitions exist that are independent of the intuitions themselves.

One might argue that these quality parameters are not entirely free from reliance on intuitions because we must utilize our intuitions to determine whether a proposition constitutes a conceptual truth of a case or not. For instance, when we judge that being fully determined does not necessarily exclude our mental state from being the cause of our actions, we may rely on intuitions to make such a judgment. In this sense, conceptual truth alone may be insufficient to establish quality parameters independent of intuition.

However, this requirement seems to be excessive. As Rini (2014) indicates, such demand leads to broad skepticism:

> Consider perception. It seems that the only means we have for assessing the quality of a particular perceptual state are its fitting with other perceptual states. Hence perception cannot meet Ryberg's independence condition. This would appear to imply that there is no such thing as quality of perception, or that it does not "make sense" to say that one person is a better perceptual judge than another. (Rini 2014, 13)

Ultimately, when assessing a judgment based on a particular competence, it is not reasonable to demand criteria that are completely independent of that competence. Otherwise, we would need to approach all judgments in every domain with skepticism. Even in physics, the validity of an observation is evaluated in relation to other observations or physical theories that are grounded in observations. Similarly, in the realm of law, the validity of legal judgments is assessed based on their coherence with other judgments or legal principles. One could argue that the evaluation criteria for case comprehension in philosophy rely relatively more on intuitions compared to other domains. However, in such a case, the burden of proof lies with the opposing argument.

4.2. The Relation between Better Understanding and Reliability

Another concern regarding my proposal is that my argument may not be sufficient to demonstrate that the intuitions of expert philosophers, who possess a better understanding of philosophical problems, are more reliable than those of novices. As stated in the introduction, the primary objective of this paper is to defend the expertise defense by establishing the plausibility of the analogy strategy, rather than proving that the intuitions of expert philosophers are more reliable than novices' in the sense of being free from distorting factors. While the paper has thus far defended the analogy by explaining how philosophical training contributes to philosophical intuitions, it has not addressed how philosophical training enhances the reliability of these intuitions. However, I believe that there are possible explanations, directly stemming from my proposal, which account for the greater reliability of philosophers' intuitions compared to those of novices.

First, if philosophical intuitions require philosophical experiences, it inherently implies a significant difference in reliability between the intuitions of novices and philosophers. Given that novices lack comprehension of certain philosophical issues, they are unable to have intuitions about those particular issues. Consequently, their intuitions regarding such issues hold no

reliability, as they simply do not possess any intuitions in the first place. On the other hand, philosophers' intuitions carry at least some reliability because they possess an understanding of philosophical issues that novices lack, thereby enabling them to form intuitions regarding these issues. Therefore, in a trivial but crucial sense, philosophers' intuitions are inherently more reliable than those of novices.

Second, some argue that a deeper understanding of a concept corresponds to a greater recognition of a priori truth. According to "Modal Reliabilism" (Bealer 1996), our ability to recognize a priori truth about a concept depends on our level of understanding and cognitive conditions. The better we grasp the concept and the more favorable our cognitive conditions are, the more a priori truth we can identify. If we accept this perspective, it is plausible to consider that philosophers' intuitions are more reliable in the sense that they are more likely to align with the a priori truth concerning philosophical concepts. This is attributed to their enhanced comprehension of philosophical concepts and their cognitive competence, enabling accurate understanding.

However, even if we endorse the aforementioned proposition, an important question regarding reliability remains. Some novices may grasp philosophical issues correctly without any formal training, particularly in the case of straightforward thought experiments like the trolley problems. In addition, it is possible for novices to understand determinism after a few hours of instruction. In these instances, is there a disparity in reliability between the intuitions of philosophers and novices? In my view, if both philosophers and competent novices understand the trolley problem accurately, there is no significant discrepancy in reliability between their intuitions. This parallels the observation that the reliability of simple experiments in the natural sciences does not drastically differ between professional scientists and high school students. When provided with the correct instructions on how to separate water into hydrogen and oxygen, high-school students can perform the experiment as proficiently as professional chemists. Likewise, the disparity in reliability between the intuitions of students who possess a correct understanding of determinism and those of professional philosophers is minimal. This is analogous to scientific experiments conducted by university students. Some of them acquire expertise through lectures by professors, and they can conduct just as reliable experiments as professional scientists. Therefore, if the reliability of intuitions does not significantly vary between professional philosophers and competent novices, it does not undermine the analogy between philosophy and other disciplines.

5. Conclusion

Criticisms of the expertise defense lead us to derive two requirements: Contribution and Immunity. This paper contends that Contribution is crucial for the expertise defense and proposes that philosophical training contributes to the generation of philosophical intuitions, particularly in the context of the free will debate, by enabling philosophers to attain a correct understanding of philosophical issues and to have case intuitions. Thus, philosophers possess expertise akin to other domains. Consequently, even if philosophical intuitions are influenced by distorting factors to some degree, we can still argue that expert intuitions are significantly more reliable than those of novices, at least in the free will debate. Moreover, it is plausible to extend this defense of expertise to certain other philosophical issues, such as the problem of personal identity.

It is important to note that the philosophical expertise presented in this paper is just one perspective on the subject. For instance, philosophical training may contribute to the development of wisdom. According to Ryan (2012; 2013), most theorists distinguish wisdom from simply having academic skills or knowledge. Some may assert that studying ethics helps us learn how to live well and become wiser, which is crucial for philosophical expertise. Others may view philosophical expertise as primarily involved in meta-disciplinary analysis. Historically, numerous academic disciplines originated from philosophy, and even today, philosophy encompasses diverse fields such as the philosophy of biology, philosophy of physics, and philosophy of music. Philosophy enables us to engage in meta-analyses of other disciplines, suggesting that such meta-analysis constitutes a significant component of philosophical expertise.

There is an important limitation to my argument as well. This paper presents empirical evidence demonstrating that ordinary individuals often fail to grasp determinism correctly, and I provide examples where philosophical expertise is necessary to possess intuitions. However, the extent to which ordinary individuals frequently misunderstand philosophical issues in general remains an empirical question, and my argument lacks sufficient data on this matter. While I offer reasons to believe that philosophical intuitions, in general, necessitate a certain degree of philosophical expertise, further research is required to offer more direct empirical support for my claim[3].

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