

Intensity, An Analysis Of Chaos

I: Pure Intensity

Intensity as the lived force of experience is something which is first introduced as a postulate of experience in the work of David Hume in his, "Treatise of Human Nature." The postulate of intensity that Hume introduces is that there are two different types of experiences which are underlined by a difference in intensity. For impressions are those which strike the soul with much force and vivacity, hence they are experiences of high intensity. Hume cites two types of impressions in his proposal. There are firstly, sensations, secondly, emotions. Ideas are, according to Hume's view, simply those faint images which are left in the aftermath of the experienced intensities, they are simply an experience of low intensity. Hume therefore formulates two postulates of intensity. That experiences admit of differences in degrees of intensity and that all experiences admit of an intensity. Hume does not proceed to spend much time attempting to further explain and give examples, taking it upon our sense that we would be capable of comprehending the meaning of the two postulates from a simple, immediate inspection. However, the complexity of the postulates of intensity begins to unravel themselves when we really do begin to inspect much more closely as to the meaning behind various experiences becoming more or less intense. Let us consider more closely the implications of the two postulates of intensity as applied to our lived experience of intensity, the postulates then, of magnitude and of the universality of intensity as applied to experience.

When we consider the numerous sensations in our experiences, we find that each particular degree of a sensation is firstly, fundamentally distinct from another sensation which is in appearance of lesser degree to the first sensation. For instance, when we hear sounds, sounds may either be louder or quieter. It is plain to see that the louder sounds do in fact strike the soul with a greater force than the lesser sounds, louder sounds are of a higher degree than the lesser sounds. Yet at the same time, the loud sound is of an entirely distinct sensation than the quiet sound. There is no means of dividing the loudness of the sound that we have experienced into lesser degrees without thereby changing the quality of the sound experienced. Another example we may give is temperature. We may experience a temperature as either being scorching hot or very cold. We cannot divide the degree of the temperature without transforming the real experience we have of the temperature, for two temperatures that are equal to half the degree of the hot temperature may be experienced as simply a pleasant warmth. We can push the envelope of this line

of thinking further. If each sensation which adopts different degrees creates profoundly different realities, then perhaps the postulate of intensity as magnitude is an illusion. This is the route that the philosopher Bergson participates in within the work "Time and Free Will" where he will proceed to argue exactly against the psychophysical conception of different sensations adopting truly different extents of intensity. It is precisely because sensations do not adopt any homogeneous type of experience but rather are differentiated into a multiplicity of heterogeneous terms which cannot be broken down into simple, extensive magnitude, that one must argue that instead, our sensations are qualitative multiplicities. That is, of heterogeneous continuities. We must consider the seeming increase in the intensity of a sensation only in terms of an increase in the range of sensations that are being changed within the particular experience. For instance, in anger we will experience a range of sensations that may include the clenching of jaws, muscle tension, hot headedness, agitation, our thoughts may perhaps be vengeful and violent. Another instance, when we perceive colors, though we may perceive that a vivid white light from a candle is growing dimmer, we are still equally aware that it is growing dimmer as we were aware of the vivid whiteness of the candle. Bergson's point here is that each sensation we experience impresses an equal reality upon us in our mind, such that greater and lesser degree makes sense only because the extent of the sensations we are experiencing are potentially increasing or decreasing.

Through Bergson, we have proposed a challenge in the postulate of intensity that Hume opens his comprehension of the human mind with. For intensity cannot be then of greater or lesser degrees, it is simply a leftover confused term that we have because of the way we experience different sensations each succeeding each other as though they had an order. Rather, instead of conceiving of our experiences as universally containing a continuous range of impactfulness or force upon us, as would be to commit us to a homogeneous extensive magnitude, we ought instead to see that our experiences universally are instead of a continuous heterogeneity. Hence there are two contending theories of intensities that pit Hume's comprehension and Bergson's comprehension against each other. Either intensity is a continuous homogeneity or continuous heterogeneity. Though Bergson had desired to overcome the common sense which had suggested that experiences all had the mark of degree or magnification, there is no less a force of habit being applied when he suggests that experiences are qualitative multiplicities. Both perspectives are guilty, ultimately, of applying a habitual sense to the problem of intensity. Bergson may have overcome the common sense of the understanding of his time but he had not overcome habitual sense as there appears just another intuitive appeal to determine our experiences as qualitative multiplicities just as there is intuitive appeal in determining our experiences as admitting of different,

extensive degrees of intensity. Though there is nothing incorrect with the art of intuitive appeal. It complicates matters when there are several disagreeing angles of intuitive appeal. Hence habitual sense which tends towards adopting a plurality of distinct positions based upon an intuition of distinct premises, will construct entirely distinct theories of the problem under investigation with there being no pathway to agreement. A level of intuitive appeal, however, is absolutely necessary to start with. Yet within the forces of intuitive appeal, we are always in danger of becoming most unphilosophical, to end up merely regurgitating habitual sense which we had never come back to challenge. Challenging habitual sense is what enables us to learn of the limitations of habitual sense, hence allowing us to break free from old clichés of our thinking. Now, it is that challenging of the habitual sense of the day that we must give compliments to Bergson in achieving. It provides us with new perspectives to see manifestations of intensity through.

It is undeniable in either conception of intensity of experiences however, that experiences with different intensities are themselves truly distinct experiences. Whether or not we should adopt intensity as a concept of a continuous homogeneity or continuous heterogeneity which speaks of the properties of our experiences, is now the problem we are confronted with. To embrace intensity as a continuous homogeneity means that we concede to Hume that there must be a difference we can meaningfully make in our experiences between impressions and ideas, experiences of high versus low intensity. Whether or not impressions and ideas hold the relationships that Hume claims that they hold is a different matter altogether. Under this understanding of experience, it is then possible for ideas to become impressions simply by the intensification of our ideas, hence experiences exist upon a common plane of degree. On the other hand, in Bergson's model, experiences exist simply as qualitative multiplicities which are entirely differential in kind, such that they generate the differential in degree. Hence the formulae of intensity in experience becomes entirely flipped upside-down in Bergson's case in comparison to Hume, for Hume's postulates suppose that differences in degree result in differences in kind. For impressions and ideas are two distinct kinds that experience resolves itself into. There is nothing in either philosophy that can move us towards one position or the other, except upon a discussion of empirical cases of our experience to enable us to justify our habitual sense. The trap that we can fall into here, is that due to the necessity of appealing to empirical cases, we entirely distort the very language we are using to make sense of and communicate the nature of the cases under study. Our observation language becomes as much a reflection of the habitual sense as it attempts to justify the habitual sense. In the observation language that someone who agrees with Hume's rendering of intensity may adopt, they will speak of the lower and higher intensities of different sensations, pointing out how the different sensations strike the soul

with more or less force. Someone with more Bergsonian inclinations, will instead observe that there appears to be an increased multiplicity of psychic states correlated to the seemingly more intense sensation, such that a sensation, such as a loud noise, is composed of more sensations, feelings, thoughts. Yet this Bergsonian leaning still does not grapple with the original sense of intensity of the loud sound itself, nor the sense of intensity in the emotions, content instead to a direct appeal to the fact that the sensation or feeling induces a grand variety of experiences, with the presumption already held that this grand variety is correlated directly with the intensity.

These traps in our attempts to understand intensity demonstrate that ultimately, any discussion of the nature of intensity based upon appeals to experience must inevitably trap us in a circularity of habitual sense. It is not that we are begging the question here. For we are making a claim, with our premises being our capacity to understand the nature of experiences through inspection, that we are still defending within the framework of the premise. There are still arguments based on the empirical evidence. Yet the issue is that the interpretation we have of our empirical findings are altered through our observation language such that the meaning of those experiences were already presumed within the habitual sense that articulates in the observation language. We cannot presume there are experiences given to us in a simple purity for such purity becomes invariably undermined as reliable as the observation language has already primed us with expectations as to the nature of what we really are experiencing. The circularity stems from the fact that the meaning of the experiences observation language has for us and the conclusions of the nature of the experiences presume we have already adopted the same comprehension of meaning. As this circularity always holds for any understanding of what our experiences of intensity truly are, for intensity is already embedded within our experiences. We are thus forced to comprehend the true nature of intensity without deriving our understanding of what intensity itself actually is from the particular ways we experience intensity and make sense of those experiences.

Yet if we cannot comprehend intensity through its particular manifestations, then intensity can neither reveal itself as either a manifested homogeneity or heterogeneity. We must take intensity as though it were existent as its own concept, outside our experiences of intensity and itself holding its own metaphysics. We could behold intensity as though it were an identifiable, universal commonality amongst all our experiences, a specific phenomenal element that can be identified as that which is intensity. In which case, we conceive intensity through the path of representation. Yet, for a key reason we shall describe, a representational theory of intensity falls apart because representation requires intensity to be formulated as a picture of a world which presumes the identity of intensity

within the postulation. Intensity could never be representationally formulated because experiences neither reveal any identity of their own homogeneity or heterogeneity. Different intensities of a sensation such as loudness is of an apparent magnitude that never reveals itself through an identity of an extensity existent outside the sensations, as each different degree of loudness is inherently different itself amongst all other degrees of loudness. Similarly with our experience of temperature, of the degrees from cold to hot, which confess no resemblance amongst each other. For resemblance requires that there are means to show elements that reveal a sameness of aspects of these temperatures, something which requires the temperature to repeat itself in a manner that it is conceivably alike to other temperatures. However, it is precisely because the temperatures are so entirely unlike each other that we run into problems. To form the picture of intensity would be to extract, somehow, a common nature of the different degrees in experience, which is fundamentally impossible because each distinct degree is a difference in kind as well. Intensity flies in the face of all representation, we can no more extract intensity as a picture that reveals resemblances as we can avoid habitual sense in investigating intensity through an extrapolation of empirical cases.

If we approach intensity through the lenses of difference, intensity becomes a differential continuity rather than a uniform continuity which is always instantiating a unique element at each point. Intensity therefore becomes a form which organizes difference. Hence intensity is expressly the very differential contained in the differences in themselves. This approach towards intensity appears much more fruitful and is the great progressive leap that Deleuze's metaphysics takes towards a full comprehension of the nature of intensity. Yet if intensity is the differential within difference, it is hence postulated as the form of the singularities of being. Intensity therefore becomes entirely tangential towards actual difference such that degree becomes only of the kind of difference and not of a difference as comprehended in a true continuum which embeds differences. Intensity adopts a differential multiplicity which simply adapts Bergson's experiential qualitative multiplicity and translates it into purely metaphysical terms. As we admit not of qualities but only of intensities, we therefore have taken it that intensities are composed solely of being differentials. When we represent intensity as a difference in degree of a quality, such as the loudness of a sound, we hence cancel out the differences of intensity as intensive quantity. Yet we should realize that by covering over intensity as an intensive quantity, we therefore form representations of the world through qualities because we can express the resemblances between those qualities. For instance, the perception of depth requires an intensive differentiation. It is only formulated because impressions further away are less intense than impressions closer, which hence one constructs an extensity of objects being either further away or closer. Note that we can approach an experience of

depth in itself through vertigo. Vertigo is an experience of depth in itself because as the world continues to move, the depths shown are of continuously shifting intensities which cannot be meaningfully reduced to a quality or an extension of measurement. It is a distortion of the senses. The Deleuzian approach to intensity enables us to escape representation. However, as a differential continuity, intensity is the tangents of the differences themselves and hence the virtual multiplicity of the gradients that differences can obtain. This tangential reasoning still does not allow us to approach intensity in itself. What we have is rather a virtualized conception of intensity that, though unreliable on deriving the meaning of intensity through particular manifestations of intensity by reflecting on empirical cases or making intensity a representational concept, still is subsumed by difference as the necessary means to uphold the concept. We can have experience of intensity itself in its pure, stripped form, yet this requires that intensity is also utterly embodied within our experiences. Intensity is of forces and affects, it cannot be a tangential form then but must also be an immanent field of gradients one exists within. Intensity cannot simply be then, a differential continuity, for it to be a differential of difference is for it to be tangential to differences which are manifest with an intensity. Intensity must be pure continuity itself, it is of continual degreeness without further compositionality. Intensity, as forces and affects, are expressions of raw intensive magnitudes that are already different points within their own continuums as estranged from difference. There is no term for intensity to be differential, it is already an immanent continuum. This has drastic ramifications.

Intensities of experience then are not principles tangentially of a principle of difference which captures intensity as a continuum of possible differential degreeness that difference can adopt but is entirely the absolute continuum itself. This makes grounding the genesis of real experience from differences deeply problematic because there is not an element in the manner by which intensity relates to difference that intensity gives a sufficient account for itself as an absolute continuum of degree that is immanent within experience. Intensity in its pure form is exhibited in experience without any genetic account based outside of intensity capable of explaining how intensity emerges, for intensity goes against any principle since it is uncapturable by either conditions of identity or difference. That is, we cannot explain intensity by any condition because such conditions only explain particular ways through which intensity can manifest. As intensity is immanent to experience, it is therefore contained within all of experience, yet it is not an element shared commonly amongst experiences, it is hence the very nature of experience itself. Hence, we cannot derive the genesis of real experience through anything outside the essence of experience, that is, anything that attempts to escape the essence of intensity, since intensity in essence stands upon its own special sense of what is the determinate. It

cannot thereby, be determinately replicated by other genetic conditions of metaphysical entities which are not intensity because intensity does not refer either to the identical and the same or the different and the novel but is its own force. Absolute continuity of degree is its own ontologically primitive force similarly to how difference in itself, determination as such, is its own primitive force. An aggressively disruptive violence against static genesis, which threatens the hope of any transcendental principles or ground, since as absolute continuity of degree, it is like the song of madness. A philosophy of sheer intensity would be an utterly mad confrontation with the truly infinite and unbounded, for pure continuity is continuous in essence and cannot be divided, broken up, discontinued. Everything then, beyond even experiences, is subsumed into this intensity, for intensity continues across all possible conceivable conditions and entities that are thinkable and unthinkable at once. As it does so, intensity must be entirely non-relational because it does not describe relations of anything or itself generate anything from relations, it is the very essence of being itself and hence the ontological primordial. The essence of intensity then, is essence which is entirely non-identical and non-differential, it is the intrinsic nature of all things as revealed to us through experience which furnishes us with the ability to conceive of intensity in itself through the force of impression that intensity has upon us.

At the very least, difference in itself has enabled a containment of the sheer power of intensity. For difference contains intensity manifested in a very particular way, in that conception, it is structured as differential, tangential continuities of degrees of singularities which admit of no spatiotemporal coordinates themselves. These singularities enable the infinite chaos of intensity to be held at bay by the use of particular conceptions we produce in philosophy to make something from the infinite chaos of endless indeterminability yet endless intensity. There is, however, an infinitely untapped potential in finally being able to reach out into the chaosmosis and learning how to productively draw from it. Though difference may be able to begin unveiling the form of chaosmosis, be capable of describing it circumventially by describing the infinite chaos of intensity by discussing how difference relates to its own unraveling in that chaos, only intensity in itself is capable of capturing the essence of this chaos. In that way, it becomes possible to have a philosophy which will seize sense from the completely senseless. Intensity is sense brought to its absolute limit and because it presents itself to us as both the essence of experience and an essence that can be reflected upon us so that it is something we can have a conception of, intensity must in any philosophical system of sense in its purest state be accounted for. Thus we must grapple with the concept.

Pure intensity is of a pure continuum of degree without further compositionality. It must be of degree because it is a continuum that is fundamentally undividable rather than a divisible continuity, for divisibility indicates the possibility that we could introduce breaks or disruptions into pure intensity. One therefore would be otherwise capable of delineating between discrete sections of intensity that demarcate exactly so and so boundary, which we are capable of doing only for homogeneous continuities that admit of no heterogeneity within each of its elemental points it contains. For instance, the real numbers are homogeneous and divisible, the nature of the real number is maintained no matter how we choose to divide up the real number line, furthermore, we can present different conditions of boundedness upon the number line. With pure intensity, there is no such divisibility, it is an indivisible continuum of distinct degrees, that is, of points which are all their own singularities. Hence, pure intensity as pure continuum of degree is an infinitely continuing force which cannot be stopped or broken through any possible determination. Therefore, it is impossible to express the nature of pure intensity through the use of analogies that correlate with pure intensity. We can only mentally approach pure intensity through our different conceptualizations of intensity, such as the homogeneous intensity of sensations adopting distinct degrees of more or less so. This incapacity to reason by analogy of any kind is a consequence of the fact pure intensity is intensity which has been conceived entirely independently of representation and hence it bears no resemblance. It can neither be reasoned about by discussing the difference that pure intensity constructs, for pure intensity to be differential, it would imply that pure intensity itself is a singularity that can be put into relation with other singularities. Yet it cannot, since pure intensity is the purest form of what is inherently non-relational. When we speak of determinations, we are therefore speaking of determinations that are of this or that, they are simply taken to mean an intensity which has become captured through a confinement of new definiteness, a definiteness that invites a discontinuity or stoppage. Furthermore, pure intensity is something which is an expression of utterly unrestricted manifestability, anything which has a manifestation of some kind is hence an intensity.

This is thus the grave violence of intensity, for in its entirely non-relational, universal character, yet hyper-particulate in its manifestation, it is something whose conditions cannot be explained at all in terms of either a static genesis, nor the possibilities of experience for possibilities of what intensities could be. Neither can intensity even be described by discussing the logic of the possible, for such logical form implies that there is a basic sense that things must impose a relation, such as the relation imposed by an identity, A is A. As intensity disrupts and violently escapes all possible capture into logical principles, then it cannot be itself logically worked upon such that we can attain sensible derivations through any logical system outside of intensity. Yet if we do not use

any logical framework, system, methods at all, then intensity becomes entirely unworkable, we get lost in the utterly infinite without order. Reduced then, to only the chaotic and confused humming of the disorderly soul, we have not found a way to construct the mind. We have not found the means to obtain sense from complete senselessness, chaos, hence we have not yet found harmonies in this hyper-intensity which threatens the entire project of the Copernican revolution that Kant had begun centuries ago. This is because such hyper-intensity, so intense that it lights a fire across all being itself, utterly collapses any distinction of the virtual conditions towards the actual states, from principles of logic towards the establishment of possibilities of being or experience. It collapses anything the noumenon and phenomenon distinction such that there is only an immediate consciousness to be found in its wake which is experiencing intensity, as existent also immediately alongside beingness.

The only possible move left is the Hegelian move, taking intensity as its own sheer logical principle on its own, whilst simultaneously recognizing that intensity is the essence of determinateness itself. That is, the form of intensity, intensity as pure continua of degree, is also in itself, as a purity, also a contentful form, a content of form. This Hegelian move is entirely implied by the fact that intensity makes no distinction between thought and object, form and content, it exists as both form and content at once such that there is no logical separability between the two. This is because intensity in its pure state is both inherent within all of experience as its essence and hence expresses the nature of the contents of consciousness yet at the same time, when we engage in a reflection of this essence of our experiences, we attain a concept that is the form of this experience. Therefore, intensity taken in its pure state, its form, as it presents itself to the mind as the absolute continuity of degree, is itself also an experience, though merely of a different kind. As simply another experience, intensity conceived in our mind is itself also an intensity, the content of this intensity is itself exactly that which is the form of intensity, as the sense of intensity is continuity taken in its purity, coupled with a sense of degree which gives a sense of the veracity or energy of the continuity which is of experiences. As though, almost, a creative, energetic principle, we shall discuss this point later on. We see that the content of intensity as a concept in the mind exists as the very shape of the form of intensity, hence a unification of content and form that emerges naturally.

Hence the violence of intensity can resolve itself into the simple state that intensity in its form already is also a content which is the material shaped into said form. It is in this way that, to understand the implications of intensity in our conceptual analysis, we must go through the concept of intensity, just as Hegel went through concepts in his own logic.

What it means, however, to go through the concept of intensity, we will explain after we discuss what it means for intensity to be its own logical principle.

Intensity is no Platonic static essence, it is not a static form through which contents strictly conform towards, instead, it is a dynamic essence. This is because intensity, as a logical principle and hence the principle of determinateness itself, establishes precisely the entire logical nature of determinateness and how the logic of determinateness is genetically determined through intensity. That is, through what is contained within the concept of intensity, will reveal through us the contentful implications that intensity holds within itself and hence determines for us also implications of form, new logical terms beyond the basic logical term of intensity. When looking at an absolute continuity of degree, what we see is something which we do not declare as being purely indeterminate and universal, since this declaration implies an absolute singularity, an absolute convergence of thought onto an identical point. We cannot presuppose this with intensity. Intensity is in a near-paradoxical state, both universal and yet universal precisely in that it declares the singular as the universal logical principle, hence the content of intensity refers only to absolute singularity. This complete singularity is of a distinct degree that is immanent within the infinite plane of pure continuity which cannot be unbroken. The resolution of intensity through its internal conceptual discourse, the discourse we engage in as we go through the concept of intensity, reveals to us not one bit of a concept that can be expressed into a singularized state. If a concept is singularized, through the discourse of the concept, such as one that Hegelian dialectics engages in, we can unfold the concept's singularized state into revealing other singularized states, then showing how those singularized states somehow reveal the concepts self-contradictoriness and hence self-refutation, gives us a point of development to proceed from. This is exactly what Hegel does in his Science of Logic. Here, however, the concept of intensity is inherently, by its construction, non-singularizable, it converges to no identical point nor converges as to being any relational structure like difference in itself. Instead, intensity consists of a multiplicity of components which all express a properly, fully distinct aspect of the more comprehensive sense of intensity in itself taken altogether, such as the near-paradoxical state intensity in itself exists in right now. That is, intensity in itself assembles together a universal principle of singularities, which are all manifest as degrees along an infinitely sprawling and unbroken, indivisible, plane of absolute continuity, such that somehow, those singularities are also in each of their instantiated instances, referred back to the universal principle of intensity.

Since intensity does not refute itself in its fully unfolded sense but holds its own ground entirely within its internal discourse and yet branches out these discursive elements

universally and wholesale, we have no hope of using the Hegelian dialectical method in its classical state to understand how intensity unfolds itself. Instead of a reliance on the self-contradictoriness of the sense of a concept which demands unfolding the concept, to discover its negation, and then discover concepts which are higher forms due to inherent limitations within the concept, we instead must work in the opposing direction. The very concept and the reality that the concept refers to unfolds itself and generates the new through the unfolding of itself not in terms of how it refutes itself but how it behaves as the genesis for everything, including itself. Hence it is a dynamic genesis which is ever-evolving. Intensity is its own self-determining genesis as it determines itself through itself due to asserting itself through its activity, as it is a developmental genesis which always takes place between its own terms on its own terms. It is never genetically determined outside itself nor genetically determines anything outside itself. It therefore unfolds in one entire setting, the logical principles of determinateness itself which determines the scope of reality, determines the scope of consciousness as fundamentally united with reality, and finally, determines intensities of real experiences. Such intensities of the real must conform to the logical principles which give shape to the nature of the degrees of particular intensities which emerge, whilst at the same time conforming to the shapes that consciousness is capable of beholding, such as the shapes of intuited space and time. It is a fundamentally creative process which always generates new actual intensities and degrees which are entirely indeterminable by other intensities and degrees, irreplicable, by the definition of intensity as its pure, indivisible continuity consisting of an infinite array of singulars and hence unique entities. Hence our systematic philosophy will precisely be the systematic philosophy which at once completely undermines all rigid systematism in favor of entirely unpredictable, creative production, and the unfolding of the logic of the productive processes and constructed material.

Hence not from rudimentary concepts to richer universal principles, instead, a universal principle towards an increasingly enriched, creative and organic, actively producing and actively evolving series of concepts, materials, and experiences. It is not from the limitations inherent in the concept of intensity but rather, the manner by which it genetically brings about new logical principles which spur on even more complex and diverse forms, through its act of affirming a multiplicity of senses at once. This affirmation of senses which, though they appear to be dragging in entirely the opposite directions and act as the complete negative space of the other, hence constructs the positive paradox. This paradox does not undermine the concept but rather forces the concept to its very edges so that the new can be produced through the self-disrupting forces of the discourse internal to the concept itself which springs about an entirely new set of organizations or concepts produced through the discourse. We therefore take

Hegelian dialectics and turn its methods of resolution on its head, instead of a constant circularized movement which leads continuously back into the same self-perpetuating movement towards the absolute, one moves constantly towards self-complexification. That is, dialectics no longer serves the purpose here of constructing a grand arborescent tower of a hierarchy of moments towards increasingly higher concepts and realities but instead unfolds through an ever-sprawling rhizomatic outgrowth which is entirely centered around the original seed for the organic, self-generating ecology of ontology. That the paradox is an affirmative moment instead of a negative, disarming, refuting moment, means that the dialectic resolves paradox in entirely the opposite manner to the classical Hegelian logic from which we drew our method of dialectic in this analysis.

To illustrate this positive paradox, take Deleuze's analysis of becoming which showcases an example of how we intend to unfold our concept of intensity through a methodical dialectic. In *Logic and Sense*, Deleuze highlights how becoming in its logical form is a paradox for it affirms two opposing senses or directions at once. It is because, anything which is becoming, is therefore both not yet something and at the same time, attaining to the new something or quality. For instance, Alice as she grows, is larger than she was, yet smaller than she used to be, one becomes larger than one used to be yet was smaller than they were now, in one instantaneous moment. It is a simultaneity which eludes the present because becoming necessarily unites the past and future together, it unites ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be in one paradoxical assemblage. It is in this dialectical mode of thinking about affirmative paradox that intensity unfolds and develops itself.

II: Zero Intensity

Intensity in its pure form, as absolute continuity of degree, does not posit at all any definite determinateness of a particular intensity but is rather a universal logical principle of all ontology. This principle refers to the principle that there is an infinite diversity of particulars that are fundamentally not related to each other in each of their unique degree, such that all particulars are therefore both uncountable as we cannot ever enumerate the cardinal size of these singulars. Such enumeration would imply that intensities have a fundamental relationship with the plane of continuity that they define which would therefore construct limitations on that continuity, yet such limitations therefore demand that the absolute continuity of degree cancels itself out as this inherently unboundable, unlimited continuity. Furthermore, intensity cannot be entirely accounted for, that is, it is impossible to take account of all possible intensities because for this to occur, we must presume that we can have a set of all possible intensities that exist. This set of all possible degrees will therefore express a limit to the unboundedness

of continuity which is not meant to be given a bound, therefore, no matter how vast or infinite the set we propose is, it's still setting limitations on the continuity. Therefore, all possible intensities must be utterly unaccountable for and thus the true scope of the absolute continuity of degree cannot be spoken of in terms of all that it contains but can only be discussed in the profound sense that it is straightforwardly and simply the all. The infinite and unending all which, since we have a sense of through the sense of intensity, therefore establishes itself without further argument. Though we can unravel the paradoxes it introduces, such paradoxes are only fundamentally, the beating heart of the energizing moments which genetically configure the self-diversification of ontology and the introduction of the manifestations of new particular intensities.

All that we have shown here, is simply that there is a complete nothingness in terms of the extent that we are capable of accounting for any set of all possibilities of intensities, we can only speak directly of all intensities as expressed in the form of the concept of pure intensity and have no other mode through which there is a sense to be captured. We discover the first paradoxical moment of pure intensity, in that it confers both to everything at once and nothing at once. It confers to everything insofar as it admits of the existence of the all, yet at the same time it confers to nothing because there is nothing for intensity to confer to as a universal principle that confers to an everythingness that is fundamentally unaccountable for, it is infinitely indeterminate in an almost very Hegelian way. This paradoxical moment is in fact the very moment that the sense of the infinitely indeterminate arise because infinite indetermination which yet has an utter universality to what it refers to does itself confer to everything at once, since everything is contained in the concept of Hegelian being which is entirely indeterminate. Yet it confers nothing at once, because being is not a determination of anything, there is an entirely empty content in being such that nothing can be intuited within it. In pure intensity, there is nothing either we can intuit about it as we will simply have canceled out pure intensity. The difference however, between the Hegelian scheme and the scheme of intensity, is that intensity does not tolerate any separation between the allness it confers to and the nothingness it confers to at once. The paradoxical sense of all and nothing are contained in pure intensity as the very components of the sense of pure intensity itself. In other words, pure intensity does not refute itself due to its paradoxical conference, all it does is introduce how it is the genetic force behind the ontology of true nothingness. Let us proceed to a dialogical analysis of true nothingness.

Let us consider nothingness. Nothingness means there is a complete absence of any determinateness whatsoever and hence there is an utter absence of any relationality that could possibly exist. Hence nothing is an entirely non-relational absence that cannot

admit any degree of intensity whatsoever. However, this means that nothing occurs when the degree of intensity has approached absolute zero. The existence of this true zero of intensity therefore itself is already a positive expression of intensity, as it represents a presence of zones of zero intensity. Within these zones of zero intensity, there is therefore no possible constraints that exist and no possible internal mechanisms or entities within the nothingness which provides nothingness with any specific nature, it is specifically the absence of all nature in essence. Therefore nothingness reflects both an infinitely indeterminate state in its own non-determination, which is not to say that it is negatively simply in contrast to being as though there is a dichotomous opposition of nothing and being to be made here. Being is also infinitely undetermined such that being is never further determined from itself and hence nothing can be intuited or structured about being. The dichotomy between being and nothing is a binaristically dialectical one, something which puts into contrast the non-existence of an intensity with the existence of intensity in such a way that it is as though nothing and being reveal themselves to be equivalent yet separated. However, simply because of the equivalent non-relationality that both nothing and being share, it does not provide us automatically with the logical development that we must adopt a resolution to the paraconsistency revealed in the equivalence yet non-equivalence of being and nothing. It says very little how the concepts are actually connected with the nature of thought or consciousness and therefore it does not enable us to say anything more than we have outlined here. Though thought is already connected and oriented towards the self-related consciousness that it is a part of, merely holding the concept of nothing and being does not inform us as to the real intensities that are at play here. That is, there are deeper realities within the logical categories which behave as the genetic preconditions for the dialectical binary to emerge, there are conditions behind the representations we are analyzing and the consequences of those representational pictures. We therefore will have much to say about the nature of intensity in relation to nothingness and being. This will have consequences upon how we would evaluate Hegel's philosophy and methods in the start of his "Science of Logic."

Nothingness is intensity without determination. Nothing as a concept therefore exists in a disruptive relation to thought, as nothing exists as something which must be logically outside all thought, yet when manifest in thought is expressed as a completely unrecognizable difference, an intensity which adopts no representation. Nothing is in our thought, therefore a pure degree of thought which does not have any speed, it exists as this degree of a comprehension which is entirely static and does not relate itself towards anything else. As a degree without relation or motion, it can be put binaristically in contrast with being, as being is also of degree without relation or motion. Yet the important differential here, is that being is of the degree which has adopted

representation, being is the presence of representation where nothing in our thinking of nothing would be the completely unrecognizable absence of representation. Hence nothing is dual-sided. On the side of noumena, nothing is an intensity without determination whatsoever, a zone of zero intensity which cannot be phenomenally manifested in our experiences and is something which is understood to be entirely outside ourselves or anything that can exist. It makes itself therefore, the characteristic mark of the noumenal itself, for the noumenal cannot be made manifest through any intensity whatsoever, it is then simply the delineation between what is real yet unthinkable and what is real and thinkable. Nothing is also what is found from a very close introspection into our own self, which does not exist with any representationality but is instead an entirely unrecognizable difference which is always defined in terms of the differentiating elements contained in experience and never defined in-itself. Hence, the self is an intensity which is merely felt and not captured. As nothing is intensity without determination as zones of zero intensity, it is therefore in fact, an affirmative, positive force, rather than simply a negative canceling it may initially be taken to be.

Nothing as a positively existing force, is also of a force of degree zero. It is therefore something which cannot be the causal power behind any effects, nor can it be an influencing factor that leans towards one state or another. It's rather like a phase state which is the phase state at absolute zero, an ontological vacuum which ensures that there is a complete indetermination of any causality or probabilistic mechanics. Nor can we say that there is anything which conducts random generation. However, as it is a zone of zero intensity, it is therefore a "located" singularity, the zone could alternatively be zones of new intensities with their own unique degrees. Due to this alternativity here, though the actual zone is of degree zero, the possible zones would be every possible zone outside of degree zero. We can say that nothing ensures that anything else, hence everything else, would serve as new zones which exist counterfactually compared to nothingness. Nothing therefore, as in-itself entirely non-relational, does nothing to negate the counterfactuals either because nothing is non-declarative, it is simply in its absolute essence something which is the empty zone existent within every possible zone of intensity. It is therefore the place for all determinations of intensities, as though nothing is like an empty zone, it is yet at the same time the placeless place which we can extract pure zonality through. Nothing therefore in the continuum of pure intensity, represents the singularized centre of all intensity which binds together intensity through pure zonality which describes intensities as being plotted upon nothing else other than themselves and therefore, plotted upon true nothingness in the first place. There is therefore genetically, no intensity which is a prerequisite before the existence of an intensity and therefore the genetic condition behind all intensities is simply that they are their own self-determining forces, forces

which exist in a complete disruption of any absolute stability of ontological zones. We therefore determine through nothing the transcendental ground of pure zonality which is a zonality that is acknowledged through a kind of mysticism of nothingness. The point of such mysticism of nothingness is not concerned with analysis, it's not logic, rather it is confirmed with the affirmative power of simply being capable of mystically connecting with and transforming through the power of the non-intensity of pure zonality.

As we travel across pure zonality, we are hence met with a singularization of the infinitely sprawling planes of zonality of intensity, such that the zonality becomes entirely wrapped into a kind of primordial all, an all which takes the infinite potential of pure intensity and expresses that potentiality into its form as an actuality. As this zonality contains everything, everything that is taken altogether that is contained is of the order of the absolute infinite or true infinite. George Cantor spoke of the absolute infinite as the most supreme maximum for which there can be no increase whatsoever. Since it contains all possible properties, it therefore cannot be understood to have any particular property and therefore is ineffable. As Cantor says, "the absolute can only be acknowledged and admitted, never known, not even approximately." In our conception of absolute infinity, it is something which is of all intensities which may be when we land on any particular zone that we can think of. In itself it is entirely inconceivable and only relates to everything else in the sense that any property within the infinite is held by some intensity. The absolute infinite is simply the emergent consequence of the transcendental ground that we stand upon with pure zonality, which is centered around the singularity of the zone of completely zero intensity. This relationship between nothing and the absolute infinite does not say that nothing somehow self-annihilates such that it annihilates itself so absolutely as to become the absolute infinite. Nothingness always exists as a permanently existing positive force of zero intensity, a zonality in the continuum of pure intensity that can never cancel itself out because it is always existent as a possible zone, regardless of any actual zone one finds themselves in. Furthermore, the absolute infinite relates to any particular thing with zero intensity, since if there were any degree of intensity that something was being moved via the absolute infinite, it would simply generate a motion that is absolutely infinite. That would be to simply absolutely negate the particular and submerge it entirely within the absolute infinite itself again. Yet this zero intensity that the absolute infinite interacts with anything else is a zero intensity born as though akin to a mathematical limit that is removed from its virtuality because of it being a logically necessary actuality. That is, as we approach the absolute infinite, the intensities of the interactions between those intensities must increasingly approach zero such that the original intensities being interacted via other intensities are not annihilated or transformed into those other intensities through submergence. Once we reach the

absolute infinite through the approaching limit, we get a true zero intensity of interaction. It is because of that zero intensity of interaction that makes the absolute infinite utterly ineffable, unthinkable, inconceivable, no matter the subjectivity we deal in. For to eff the absolute infinite would be to already be the absolute infinite, hence to become uncontrollably submerged within the absolute infinite.

We can understand that the philosophy of intensity therefore becomes a deeply mystical philosophy, a philosophy that is dealing with absolute nothingness and absolute infinity as different forms that intensity can express itself as within the pure zonal continuums that the intensities reside within. What we then end up showing is simply that there is indeed a noumenal realm, an in-itself, which exists outside the boundaries of the phenomenal. Where this noumenal resides relative to the phenomenal here is as follows. In the phenomenal we can recognise this mystical positive nothingness which is the express determining force of zero degreeeness which becomes the affirmative moment for pure zonality to emerge and ergo, the absolute infinite, as we have shown. Yet in this recognition we also witness how nothingness in its true form is a fundamentally unrecognizable difference which always escapes experience and resides outside experience as simply being the zone which experiences are embedded in which is entirely inaccessible to us and yet is the genetic bedrock behind everything else. Analogous to the Schopenhauerian will, what replaces a metaphysical, blind and incessant striving underneath the world of experience, is instead, simply a completely blind and yet utterly energizing nothingness which fuels everything. The noumena does not reside at all juxtaposed to phenomena anymore, noumena is in no sense “closest” to the phenomenal but instead the noumenal reveals itself as the deeper truth of what all of the phenomenal and all of intensity are embedded upon zonally. That is, the noumenal isn't juxtaposed to the phenomenal, it is outside the phenomenal because it entirely surrounds and engulfs the entire phenomenal whilst also being capable of its existence being cut into through the phenomenal reflecting its own essence back upon itself. They have no closeness or juxtaposition, they inhabit the same state utterly, the phenomenal is already grounded upon the noumenal as the phenomenal is embedded on pure zonality or the noumenal. The sense of the noumenal or the other outside of experience is this exact arrangement.

This is because intensity in-itself is the noumenal in-itself as we have explained that intensity in-itself is furnished with a pure zonality which is of the emptiness which all intensities are manifest through. We therefore see that the transcendental ground is at once the immanent ungroundedness of every intensity which exists. The intensities exist because they are their own genesis, which requires no other explanation through any other genesis, it is as though they were brute facts. We render, however, any philosophy

of true intensity utterly inert by thereby taking such an excuse to assert that therefore, there is no more philosophizing to be performed. All that we have pointed out is that any philosophy of intensity is always a philosophy that must work within and through intensities, of particulars and exploring the depths of singularities. Yet there is an absolute infinity of different intensities, particulars, depths to be explored, there are therefore an infinity of subject matters to discuss, constructions and creations we may make. It is impossible, therefore, to formulate a theory which purports to take into account everything such that there is a universal guidebook of principles which express the exact principles that we use to understand the natures of intensities all across the board. The philosophy of intensity therefore begins its analysis of particular intensities by simply acknowledging that the intensities that it begins with are already acceptable as the givens, that it is already apparent that we are engaging in an exploration of particular zones we had conceived of. In the exploration of these particular zones, we transfer our thinking from any sense of beingness whatsoever into an eternal middle-ness with no start or end, for we entirely overturn any element of beingness or nothingness contained in the pure becoming of particular intensities under investigation. For every degree of beingness it is of its own becoming, for it can never exist as a static being because it is upheld by a forever forceful nothingness which is ever dynamic, an intensity without determination. The being of intensity simply does not ever attain. Intensity is forever a self-determining and perpetually self-asserting becoming which is of its own character altogether and cannot be replicated by the mark of any other intensity. This becoming, we deem instead becoming, for it refers to something about intensity uncaptured by the dichotomy of being/nothing.

Being is only the condition of negating the dynamic nothingness and is therefore synonymous only with an entirely indeterminate univocity which is of the bare presence of intensity rather than the bare absence, it is henceforth a univocity without extension. The static reality of being is entirely undermined however, by being disrupted utterly by the positive intensity of nothingness. In this way, on a conceptual level, we have witnessed the real genetic conditions for the Hegelian dialectic to emerge. Nothing as intensity without determination, being as an entirely undefined intensity, both in their extensive meanings refers to absolutely no contents. Rather, it is a raw dichotomous delineation between raw presence and raw absence taken in their contrast. The dialectic strips the lived intensity from both concepts such that we are left only with the extensive emptiness of both concepts and with the basic self-inherent difference of those concepts. Hence the Hegelian nothingness is not the absolute nothing, the Hegelian being is only an affirmation which is already the negation of the absolute nothing as complete silence. Nothing as the negation of being is only a negation of the negation and was never the

negation of an affirmation simply. Becoming which sublates nothing and being due to their identity as having no extension yet their difference as inherent within the meaning of the concepts themselves, such that nothing passes over into being and being passes back over into nothing, is not becoming. Becoming is a dialectical category that emerges when we cancel out all the actual intensity of the intensive concepts and leave only the bare-bones structural aspects that the intensity naturally induces, such as the structural aspects of identity and difference. Thus becoming expresses only a structurality of representation, the logic of representation we obtain once we strip all lived, non-representational intensity from the concepts that intensity can prop up. In ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be, we have logical relations which can be ascribed only on well-specified types of intensities, yet cannot fit intensity universally. Hence intensity is something which always escapes the limited structures of any particular logic or philosophy, it will always create an overflowing remainder which can never be captured since there must be intensities that create the sphere of residues. Becoming does not reside in structuralities that intensity may bear, it resides only to state that intensity is a self-determining force that is responsible for its own genesis, emergent through a dynamic nothingness which upholds it through its zero force. That it can be withheld at any moment just as inexplicably as it emerged is an always present reality of becoming and thus in becoming the intensity must perpetually assert itself.

III: Becoming Intense

Becoming intense reveals itself as a self-determining force which is perpetually self-asserting its own existence, such that the becoming is always an active becoming. If the action were to ever cease, the intensity would cease altogether and become a nothingness. Yet, since the absolute infinite exists, then all becoming are occurring at once such that there is never a cessation of universal action as this would negate the absolute infinite. At the same time, for there to be a differentiation between the active becoming of an intensity and the cessation of that becoming, it requires there to be a cessation of action that can occur without negating the absolute infinite. This requires a secondary type of action beyond the universal action of the absolute infinite, as it requires the capacity for changes to occur despite the apparently unchangeable, immutable nature of the absolute infinite. Thus, the absolute infinite in its first sense, as an immutable form, sustains its immutability as simply the fact that there is an immutable absoluteness to the intensities which assert their own existence actively, that is, there is no reality which does not exist in some manner. At the same time, in the second sense, the paradoxical moment of becoming as applied to the absolute infinite, it must be mutable and changeable

inherently, such that we move from the universal action of a generalistic becoming to the specific action of a becoming which is capable of inducing transformations. Hence, there must be singularities of action, singularities which can only exist if the zonality of the absolute infinite was not itself a singular entity but instead a multiplicity of different zonalities. This multiplicity of zonalities being groundable only on the idea that different intensities can somehow engage in a becoming which engages in an entirely heterogeneous series of singularities of distinct becomings which enables a distinguishment between one zone and another, enabling zones to undergo changes. If we were to naively take this multiplicity of zonalities as though we introduced the existence of many distinct zonalities, many units of singularizations that is, then we would be arguing for a division of becomings so harsh that worlds would be entirely inaccessible to each other. This does not resolve the problem at all since the absolute infinite as an endlessly divided kaleidoscope of entirely separated becomings in their own zonal fragment, would become cut off from the absolute infinite for they would have to exist in this completely isolated fragment by not being embedded originally from nothingness. A nothingness which, everything is universally embedded upon and thus the shared form of pure zonality that unites everything altogether as aspects of the global absolute infinite. Therefore, there is a more nuanced modality occurring here which simplistic world relations of worlds entirely fragmented from each other cannot capture.

What we do know is that zonality, beyond its pure form, must reveal itself as a multiplicity of some kind, a multiplicity which enables a more complex relationship becoming has with the absolute infinite and nothingness. The multiplicity that zonality exhibits itself cannot be discretized at all because such discretization ensures that the condition that there are simply many zones entirely disconnected from each other is affirmed, meaning we run into the non-resolution earlier. Hence, this multiplicity must be taken to be entirely continuous by nature, in which case, intensities must have their becomings connected with all other intensities in such a way that it enables the following. It enables there to be groups of intensities which can undergo transformations such that the groups themselves can change, allowing every intensity that exists to potentially contribute to the transformation, yet at once is inscribed with the hard limit that, at the range of the absolute infinite, the degree of interaction approaches zero. That is, not all intensities interact with a group of intensities at once. These groups cannot exist in a hard, discrete manner but must emerge as continuities themselves, hence the boundaries between one group and another must be fuzzy and to some degree indefinite or indeterminate. The existence of these groups with indeterminate boundaries implies that the becoming of intensities by the nature of the group they find themselves in is entirely relative to the particular group we are looking at and not all groups. Therefore, there must

be differences between different groups of intensities in the multiplicity if one will, that is of a continuous modality, that determines the nature of a multiplicity of zones that all intensities are embedded upon through their unique becomings. Yet if the boundaries between the groups are indeterminate, it means those groups must emerge from the unique becomings that are defined within the multiplicitous zonality, in such a way as not only are the groups somehow connecting the intensities with sufficient strength, but also distinguishes itself from other intensities somehow. As we can see from our further conceptual analysis, it requires that this multiplicity that renders becomings specific modes of action must enable intensities to have some form of organization somehow. The use of groups here is simply to say that intensities need to be organized by some means so that we can recognize distinct sets of intensities altogether that have some specified, defined mode of becoming. This organization requires an organizing principle.

Yet intensity, as in itself entirely non-relational, has no organizing principle whatsoever, hence there is nothing to specify singular becomings, we can only determine the universal becoming which is the universal action of the absolute infinite. Hence the paradox of becoming is brought to its critical extreme through which something new must overflow. Through the complete disorganization and infinity of chaos itself, there must emerge from it the sheer singular organizing principle alone which enables the organization of intensities into specific becomings and thus resolves our paradox. The organizing principle is organization itself, a becoming that in its specified determination reveals relationality in itself. Relationality in itself exists always in-between intensities, and a relation an intensity has towards only itself therefore is a relation that exists between the intensity itself but never exists imminent within the intensity. This is because intensity in itself does not have an atom of relationality, relationality rather emerges as intensities which are organizing themselves uniquely in some manner. The nature of relation then, is to be virtual, that is, the non-discursive elements that exist between the intensities, as the actual is the emergent product of the discursive. Relations always are the glue that construct assemblages of intensities together and thus a plurality of something which properly obtains an actuality within its own assemblage, whilst the virtual is simply the unary connections between the intensities which simply assert their own existence without asserting anything about the manner by which other relations exist. Relationality in itself constructs relational intensity, intensity with relations to other intensities, which enables the determination of specific becomings which are singularizable into identifiable assemblages that yet have fuzzy boundaries by the nature of their emergent existence through the nature of the genesis that birthed such existence. Relation is what the intensity can enunciate outside itself, whilst intensities in themselves only enunciate

themselves. Relational thinking is required for thinking in any formal language such as logic, metalogic, mathematics, and metamathematics, and seeing structures in anything.

IV: Relational Intensity

Mathematics consists of the use of formal languages that consists of defining structures which we can express using the art of combining symbols together as a means to represent the relationships between what we consider various components of the mathematical system. In this mathematical system, which we shall call a system of relationality, we consider the formal relations between all of the components, we furthermore, also state that all the components obtain their determinateness only through their relations between each other. Therefore, as each of the components do not have any determinateness within themselves, these components in isolation cannot be responsible for the relationships they have with each other because they themselves aren't the holders of these relationships. Mathematics therefore defines zones of intensity where all intensity has been canceled out, each of the ontologies are purely metaphysically empty and all adopt a degree of zero, the difference between mathematics and simple nothingness however, is that mathematics works with multiplicities of zones of zero intensities. These multiplicities contain a multitude of zero intensities which yet produce these pure relationalities between the intensities because nothing is already intensity without determination, already a productive, affirmative force which produces and not mere absence. The question, "how do we obtain something from nothing?" dissolves entirely once we recognize that nothing itself is simply the zone of intensity when all intensities adopt a degree of zero. Since relationality emerges only between the actual intensities themselves, there is no need for these relationalities to have self-consistent behavior as such, since the contradiction will not have any consequences for any of the intensities. The intensities instead, will only construct a multiplicity which encodes or engrains the contradiction as territorialized into a mathematical form, a form which contains the sense of the original structural paradox or contradiction which enables the contradiction to be captured in a comprehensible form that can be understood and recognized. Whilst intensity in itself deals with the purely actual, actual of such violence as to engage in all possibilities of self-organization within an indescribable, unfathomable chaos, mathematics studies relation in itself. That is, it deals with the purely virtual, the complexities of the possible territorializable zonalities that intensity can construct through its capacity to encode relationships through the relationalities they construct between themselves. Hence we recognize that relation in itself is simply the form that emerges when intensities of degree zero enter into a multiplicity with each other,

constructing relations between each other, henceforth becoming intensity for itself. Intensity, which has defined its relationality, within the context of other intensities contained inside the same zone. These virtual multiplicities embody the formal order of thought.

Such mathematical structures present the ideas of how various intensities of zero degree are capable of relating with each other, such ideas provide us with an understanding of the different relationships that can exist between intensities themselves. Mathematical thinking provides us with direct access to the purely virtual, zones of intensity without degree entirely and hence we can access the realm of the true Platonic forms through mathematical thinking. These formal structures do not in themselves present us with the truth of any particular reality, they aren't the truth of reality or themselves constituting any specific reality except specific realities of zones of intensity at degree zero. Instead, the Platonic forms simply showcase what is structurally the case for specific arrangements of multiplicities and so provides us with a series of indubitable congruences about specific zones of intensity, so long as a set of premises exist and we follow them. Hence, as mathematics are contained in an idea, we can construct an infinite variety of mathematics by setting forth an infinite set of axioms or premises and discovering the consequences of those axioms and/or premises. Each sufficiently unique axiomatic system or set of premises we decide to formulate, will be opening up a new series of possibilities for development that are entirely unpredictable and unforeseeable as it will be following a logic which is irreplicable by what has gone before. Whether or not these axioms or premises will lead to anything useful cannot be said here. Furthermore, since mathematical thinking is related directly to intensities due to being about the structures that intensities can form within the zones they are embedded on, it means that any intensity can reveal characteristically mathematically expressible relationships. Thus mathematics can be constructed from zones with intensities with differing degrees, a mode of construction which enables virtualities to be grasped due to the way sets of intensities have relations between each other and so it becomes possible to represent mathematical concepts using intensive constructions. In these intensive constructions, we build the very relationality we are attempting to comprehend an abstract sense of, by rebuilding the relationality for us to experience directly.

In this way, structural thinking cannot meaningfully be said to have anything to do with being capable of delineating between various differences or differences of intensity, since within pure virtual multiplicity there is no degree of intensity to speak of and hence no possible ontological difference in itself. There is no identity to speak of either, since identity requires determinateness to establish itself, rather both difference and identity as

something an ontology can be as a type of intensity, emerges only due to specified particular relations that the ontology has. In pure intensity, there can be no difference in itself nor identity, as they presuppose that structurality is already existent. Structural thinking, though it does not delineate between difference or differential intensities which take differences in their degree, delineates specifically between the types of relations that exist between intensities of degree zero. Intensity for itself therefore stands as its own way for an ontology to be independently and irreducibly to other ways for ontologies to exist as was shown here. Mathematics is the music of logical thinking.

Before we charge ahead any further, we need to demonstrate that relationality is the universal substance behind all structural thinking, which includes mathematics, logic, metalogic, and metamathematics, without an ounce of exception. This is because we must show with clarity precisely if the consequences of the metaphysics of intensity construct implications that are consistent with developments found in other areas of knowledge. For if we were to show otherwise, this would immediately throw into question our theories as we would then have a case that escapes our basic understanding here, as it would throw light upon a presumption we made along the way. For if we can have something that intuitively, is arguably something structural, something belonging in these fields which make use of formal language, yet does not conform to our conception of relation, then we can say that indeed, we have assumed that anything that is entirely non-relational cannot also be structural. Our intuitions would be presented as straightforwardly wrong and limited.

We shall take a logical operator to be anything which operates on a set of terms, that is, either symbols representing particular entities or constants, or symbols representing sets of variables. The first set of logical connectives we shall consider are the Boolean constants, true and false, for they do not take any arguments and are thus zero-ary operators. Therefore, they themselves do not relate to anything, rather, they describe how something is related to them in the sense that something may either be true or false, or perhaps, consisting of some other attribute. Hence, as these zero-ary operators are attributes of terms, terms are therefore related to these operators in that we can consider terms as one set of intensities and the zero-ary operators as attributes about those intensities, that is, the term in question has a relation between itself and only itself. It can only adopt a relation between itself if we consider how the term is not itself related to anything, it cannot by itself sufficiently define any relation because it is entirely in a vacuum, however, as it can define a zone of intensity, it can already adopt a relation between itself as having a specific attribute about itself. The term is connected to itself and it connects to itself precisely by having a relation towards the zone it constructs by

being related to exactly its own mode of self-determining, hence a zero-ary operator on a term expresses the entirety of the self-determination that the term holds despite it having zero intensity in abstract form. The term is simply related to the zero-ary operator by having an attribute, say either true or false, simply by means of how the zone exists relative to the potential construction the term is said to engage in, hence this relation exists in an absolutely heterogeneous form. For the relation here admits only of the pure quality of attributability that the term holds, and admits of nothing else but the quality of attributability assignable to the given intensity or what we can say, logical term here. We can have a many-valued logic that could also include indeterminate. We can also have a fuzzy logic of truth-values between 0 and 1, each a heterogeneously qualitative assignment. The only difference with fuzzy logic however, which deals with partial truths, is that 0 and 1 admits of a homogeneity in a differential intensity of the partiality of the truth, as there can be something that is more partially true than another, such as having a truth-value of 0.9 instead of 0.254, hence the absolutely heterogeneous state of relations when we speak of the attributes of intensities, or for logic, terms, can adopt even more complex forms on-top of such. Conclusively, simply put, zero-ary operators on terms is constructing a relation that simply describes how anything A is connected to itself, A is true, hence something true is A. For every attribute X, to say A is X, already implies something X is A.

What we perceive here is how A, though a term of zero intensity, having an attribute, has a relation with itself that captures a heterogeneous “location” in the field of possible definable relations, an enfolded virtual multiplicity of only one intensity. This multiplicity can consist of an infinite possible variety of these relations with itself, denoted in an infinity of ways, all that counts here is simply that the purely heterogenic form exists. For as it adopts the form, A is X, something X is A, A is already related between itself because the relation it has with itself, the attribute X, will already implicate the corollary that what has the attribute X is A. In that way, A is connected to itself simply by both relating to itself via an attribute and “having” the attribute in the same sense. The between itself relation A has, exists because both cases of the sense are affirmed for A, if we do not affirm both cases of the sense, we argue that A does not have any attributes but is simple nothingness, hence, is entirely non-relational, hence we can only take an intensity A. Otherwise the ineffability of A in itself forces us to stay silent utterly, as though it were like an unspeakable, unknowable, and unthinkable noumenon we should stop attempting to grasp already. The meaning, however, we assign to an attribute of A, such as true or false, partially true or partially false, indeterminate, is grounded externally. A is related to another zone of intensity such that its truthness means that A is in that zone or A is not in that zone, for instance, our experiences as a zone of

intensity, may take the intensity of a color blue as existing, since there is an experience of blue in that zone. In other words, the meaning-creation here is entirely contextually reliant, a zone of intensity must perceive another zone of intensity such that a logical term A can emerge in the first place, hence it becomes possible to evaluate attributability, either its truthiness or falseness. As to what we make of what it means for A to be true or false and so on, only makes sense in relation to a specified zone within the absolute infinite, otherwise, it has no meaning, since A has no further relation with anything else for meaning to exist in in the first place. Formalistically then, A's relation to itself is simply purely relational without any atom of meaning to be assigned to A given in its own zone because A is not related to anything outside itself for interpretation to even take place to begin with. However, the moment A is related to other intensities, A therefore reflects types of relations, it becomes about something, which complexifies the potential relations.

Take logical connectives that are unary operators then. They take A and operate on A such that we connect A with the connective. We are not simply attributing A as holding a certain logical property such as being true or false. If the unary logical connective, such as the negation connective \neg , is something that changes the attribute that A has, then it is clearly a relation because it takes an attribute of A here, such as A is true, and using the connective $\neg A$, we get A is false. Hence through this change, the connective is relating itself with attributes, such as true, false, or say, indeterminate, and outputting that the original term A now has a new attribute. Hence we have made a connection with two distinct attributes or zero-ary operators using the unary operator. For other types of unary operators that function outside of changing the attribute that terms, such as A have, the unary operator relates itself to A such that there is a simple output represented by the operator and its taking of just one argument. Though there is no connection between distinct attributes, there is still a connection made between A and the operator and either the type of zone A exists on. For example, in modal logic, where we may use the modal operator $\Box A$, which means "necessarily A" then A exists on the type of zone of "necessary terms." If we say $\Diamond A$ instead, "possibly A" then A exists on the type of zone of "possible terms." Thus the modal operator is a relation A has with the modality that the operator represents, that being in this case either of the modality of necessity or possibility. Hence all zones with a specific type as determined by the intensive modality of the zone, which therefore determines further relations that necessary terms and possible terms can have with other necessary and possible terms. Zones can be made to relate to each other as well to generate more complex logical thinking in modal logic. Necessity for a zone of intensity simply says that this zone contains intensities that are

necessary and thus can have a particular relationship with other zones of necessity and possibility.

Finally, when we consider unary quantifiers such as “for all” and “there exists/for some,” that is, \forall and \exists respectively, upon A. The quantifier is something which specifies how many individuals within a domain of discourse satisfy an open formula, that is, a formula with free variables such that these variables could take on values of a number of different particular entities. This domain of discourse is the set of entities we are considering over which certain variables of some formal treatment may range. Then, for instance, when we say $\forall xP(x)$ says that everything in the domain satisfies the property denoted by P. We can also say $\exists xP(x)$, which says that something in the domain satisfies the property P. Hence the quantifiers for all and there exists upon A relates A to its defined domain of discourse and therefore quantifiers are definitely a relation without question. Take more complex relations of the form $R(a, \dots, x)$ where the number of arguments in R is indefinitely long, with an infinite series of approaches we could take in determining the range of arguments that R actually takes and what those arguments are in particular. Then there is no closer analysis needed to say that R, as an n-ary relation or arity greater than one, is a relation in the metaphysical sense we understand relationality to be. Simply because, so long as the relation operates over many terms rather than one or zero, then the relation already has to do with how an A, B, etc, to X, connects. Furthermore, for the functions, which are n-ary and map a tuple of n-entities to other entities, that is already a relation between one set of entities and another set of entities, hence the metaphysical understanding we have of relation is still intuitively consistent with the fundamentals of logic. We hence have nothing more we need to analyze in the area of the fundamentals of logic.

V: Intensive Worlds

As we have seen, intensity when given its proper systematic treatment will inevitably utterly annihilate any hope of systematically providing universal treatment of all possible existence, for we have completely shattered reality as a kind of all-pervading existence as a principle. This universal undermining of all universality is the true starting point for all philosophy of intensity and which the philosophy must develop through. Dynamic genesis at bottom is so dynamic and unpredictable that there is no philosophy that can approach the entire potential of genesis as this would be to actualize infinite potential within a finite space and time, which is an absurd aim for it is an impossible aim. We must specify the intensities we are working with and we must specify the relations we are working with. The demand that a universal principle of relationality yet infinite diversity

of relationality that intensity exhibits in its determined becomings, is that these determined becomings themselves must inherently adopt a specified character. That is, it is specified exactly how there is a determinability of becoming and what this becoming entails so that, hence we always speak of a determined and bounded set of intensities and relations when we speak meaningfully of any specified and determined becoming at all. This self-limiting of the unlimited at last brings us from the completely and absolutely infinite to the manifested and limited, we transition from determined becoming to intensive worlds. These intensive worlds are organized solely around the actual intensities and the relations they spontaneously manifest through themselves, and it is only when one captures the unique sense that the intensive world contains which is determined through the essence of the world that lies in its intensities that one can discuss these intensive worlds at all. There is an infinite diversity of intensive worlds and an infinite range of what is to be determined which specifies which intensive world we speak of. Therefore, intensive worlds will orient themselves towards having specific relationships with absolute continuities of degrees by manifesting that absolute continuity in some relational format such that the continuity becomes discontinued somehow, broken-up, through discontinuous relations in the world. To describe intensive worlds we need the concepts of actual and virtual as forms of discursivity that intensities have, with the pluralistic being of actualized intensities in these intensive worlds as they have relations between each other that manifests the true mode through which intensities will manifest in a world. The unary virtuals are entirely of relationalities in themselves that exist entirely in-between intensities and do not exist outside of this context at all.

Furthermore, for an intensive world, it is of a determined, specific world, that must still be connected somehow to all intensive worlds that are in the absolute infinite. It can only accomplish this insofar as the intensive world takes itself in its own perspective as real, whilst all other intensive worlds are simply possibilities which the intensive world in question, undergoing a specifically determined becoming, could potentially transform into. This complex relationship between the real and the possible is something that requires the concepts from Deleuze and Guattari's work, territorialization and deterritorialization, to resolve. To utilize the concept, we will need to adapt these concepts with a specific interpretation that describes how territorialization and deterritorialization relate to ontologies of intensities themselves. Territorialization is the state that intensities are embedded or encoded within a specific intensive world that makes them real relative to that determined intensive world that determines intensities as having a particular assemblage or arrangement. On the other hand, deterritorialization involves a disorganization of intensities so that they are no longer encoded within any particular arrangement, meaning that there becomes an increasingly high range of

possibilities for what intensive worlds the intensities can potentially encode themselves upon. Hence as we can see, intensive worlds entirely reconstructs Guattari's diagram in his "Schizoanalytic Cartographies" on page 54 to the extent that intensive worlds affirm entirely the ontological schemes of the territorialized, deterritorialized, discursive, and non-discursive. Since all intensive worlds have infinite specificity, it means it is impossible by any means of dialectical analysis, which attempts to draw up more and more consequences from the implications of concepts that can approach these intensive worlds. Instead, intensive worlds are the ultimate endpoint of our dialectical analysis of intensity in itself, the end-state whereby the dialectics we have been using as a method up to this point must realize its own collapse. The dialectic only works insofar as nothing needs to be infinitely specified, the dialectic as a method can never derive anything outside the implications of concepts contained within an intensive world we have already predefined before beginning our dialectical analysis. The intensive world we began with from the start of our work on intensity therefore, is simply recognizing the intensive world of pure intensity in itself and revealing the consequences of this analysis. Beyond this point, everything we construct will have to proceed by a method not solely reliant on any dialectical tricks. We must immerse ourselves within intensive worlds.

We have accomplished a much deeper understanding of chaos itself through our conceptual analysis here. What we have discovered is how intensity in itself as a concept functions, its implications, and how it utterly undermines all hopes at any kind of systematism in philosophy which attempts to assert universal principles applicable to determining the nature of all intensities and the way all relations will be structured. Conclusively, then, we have found the transcendental ground which simply reveals the ungroundedness of everything yet the sheer genetic vivacity of ontology. The purpose of the philosophy of intensity then, must be to explore subjectivities and explore different intensive worlds with their own unique realities and logics to them which can never be replicated or approached through any other reality or logic outside those worlds. A fundamentally creative, unpredictable, explorative process!

References:

Books

- 1) [L.A Selby-Bigge, University of Oxford, Treatise Of Human Nature by David Hume](#)
- 2) [1999, The Pennsylvania State University, Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke](#)
- 3) [An Introduction to Metaphysics: Henri Bergson](#)

- 4) [Time and Free Will by Henri Bergson, 1910](#)
- 5) [Translated by George Di Giovanni, McGill University, 2010, The Science of Logic by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel](#)
- 6) [Translated by E.F.J Payne, The World As Will and Representation: Arthur Schopenhauer](#)
- 7) [The Project Gutenberg, 2004, The Kybalion by Three Initiates](#)
- 8) [Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica by St. Thomas Aquinas](#)
- 9) [Springer, Understanding Complex Systems by George E. Mobus and Michael C. Kalton, 2015](#)
- 10) [An Introduction To Cybernetics by W. Ross Ashby, 1957](#)
- 11) [1994, Columbia University Press, What Is Philosophy? by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari](#)
- 12) [1987, The University of Minnesota Press, A Thousand Plateaus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari](#)
- 13) [Translated by Andrew Goffey, Schizoanalytic Cartographies by Felix Guattari](#)
- 14) [Chaosmosis by Felix Guattari](#)
- 15) [Chaosophy by Felix Guattari](#)
- 16) [Soft Subversions by Felix Guattari](#)
- 17) [Translated by Paul Patton, Difference and Repetition by Gilles Deleuze](#)
- 18) [University of Puget Sound, August 17 2020, Music Theory For The 21st Century by Robert Hutchinson](#)
- 19) [An Introduction to Set Theory by Professor William A. R. Weiss, October 2 2008](#)
- 20) [Helgoland by Carlos Rovelli, 2020](#)
- 21) [Against Method by Paul Feyerabend, 1993 | The Anarchist Library](#)
- 22) [Oxford: Blackwell, On The Plurality of Worlds, Lewis David, 1986](#)
- 23) [Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1922](#)
- 24) [The Apophenion, Peter Carroll, 2008](#)
- 25) [The Ego and His Own by Max Stirner](#)
- 26) [Translated by A. E. Kroeger, The Science of Knowledge by J. G. Fichte, 1893](#)

Encyclopedias

- 27) [The Metaphysics of Nothing: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#)
- 28) [Hegel's Dialectics: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#)
- 29) [Philosophy of Mathematics: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#)
- 30) [Logical Pluralism: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#)
- 31) [Phenomenology: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#)
- 32) [Relations: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](#)

Articles

- 33) [National Library of Medicine, Living the intensive order: Common sense and schizophrenia in Deleuze and Guattari - PMC by Julie Van der Wielen](#)
- 34) [Hegel and Deleuze on Difference by David van Putten](#)
- 35) [Wordpress, Gate Zero, 25th July 2020](#)
- 36) [In service to the mute god\(working Version\), 2020 by Ember Reed](#)

- 37) [Difference in itself | Larval Subjects](#)
- 38) [A-Signifying Semiotics | Larval Subjects .](#)
- 39) [Two Dogmas of Empiricism: Willard Van Orman Quine](#)
- 40) [Concordia.ca, Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism](#)
- 41) [Void Magick by Thomas Chaote, 2015](#)
- 42) [Occult Origins, Hakim Bey's Ontological Post-Anarchism by Joseph Christian Greer](#)
- 43) [Ontological Anarchy in a Nutshell by Hakim Bey](#)
- 44) [Cybernetic Ontology and Transjunctional Operations by Gotthard Gunther](#)
- 45) [Free University of Brussels, Cybernetics and Second-Order Cybernetics by Francis Heylighen](#)
- 46) [4: Postulates of Linguistics - A Thousand Plateaus by John Protevi](#)
- 47) [On philosophy and schizophrenia: the case of thought insertion by Jasper Feyaerts & Wouter Kusters](#)
- 48) [Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self by Louis A. Sass and Josef Parnas](#)
- 49) [University of Chicago, The poetics of bipolar disorder by James Goss](#)
- 50) [ResearchGate; The passion of will in mania: Towards a philosophy of mental disorders](#)
- 51) [ResearchGate; Chronic Mania: Diagnostic Dilemma and the Need for Addition in Nosology](#)
- 52) [Maximus as a philosophical interpreter of Dionysius: the case of Christ as manic lover](#)
- 53) [Madness into Memory: Mania and Mnēmēin Greek Culture by Yulia Ustinova](#)
- 54) [HISTORY OF MENTAL CONCEPTS, On mania by Benjamin Rush](#)
- 55) [Black Bile, Manic Depression and Melancholy: Two Pillars of Our Understanding by Jason Tipton](#)
- 56) [PhilPapers; Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences](#)
- 57) [Cognitive Benefits in Manic Depressive Illness by Magdalena Antrobus](#)
- 58) [Mental Illness, the Medical Model, and Psychiatry by Gerald L. Klerman](#)
- 59) [PhilPapers; Language, prejudice, and the aims of hermeneutic phenomenology: terminological reflections on "mania" by A.V. Fernandez](#)
- 60) [Phenomenological psychopathology and an embodied interpretation of manic bipolar experience: University of Copenhagen by Daniel Bird](#)
- 61) [Hegel's dialectical method: Michael Forster](#)
- 62) [The Conditions of the New: Daniel W. Smith](#)

YouTube Videos

- 63) [Does Subjectivity Matter? by PunishedFelix](#)
- 64) [What is Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization? by PunishedFelix](#)
- 65) [Did Fashionable Nonsense and the Sokal Affair REALLY Destroy Postmodernism? by PunishedFelix](#)
- 66) [Did Richard Dawkins REALLY Disrobe Postmodernism? by PunishedFelix](#)
- 67) [Guattari, Accessibility and Schizophrenization by PunishedFelix](#)
- 68) [Ego Death - broken down and described by Josie Kins](#)
- 69) [Blessings of Madness: Prophecy and Inspiration by Aliakai](#)
- 70) [Difference and Repetition \[part 1\] The Interstellar Conversation by Deleuze Philosophy](#)
- 71) [Difference and Repetition \[part 2\] Masks and Sacred Geometry by Deleuze Philosophy](#)
- 72) [Difference and Repetition \[part 3\] The Archaic Divinity by Deleuze Philosophy](#)

- 73) [Difference and Repetition \[part 4\] The Three Syntheses of Time by Deleuze Philosophy](#)
- 74) [Difference and Repetition \[part 5\] A Note on Deleuze's Theory of Learning And Cognition by Deleuze Philosophy](#)
- 75) [Difference and Repetition \[part 6\] The Image of Thought by Deleuze Philosophy](#)
- 76) [Difference and Repetition \[part 7\] Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference by Deleuze Philosophy](#)
- 77) [Difference and Repetition \[part 8\] Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible by Deleuze Philosophy](#)
- 78) [ENA - Auction Day by Joel G](#)
- 79) [ENA - Extinction Party by Joel G](#)
- 80) [ENA - Temptation Stairway by Joel G](#)