INTRODUCTION

An introduction to Professor Uya’s philosophy of history class starts with this caution, ‘as a historian, you must learn to think’. Put differently, you must learn to develop a critical mind for healthy scepticism. If Philosophy, is having second thought, that is thinking about the nature of some form of human thought and the implications of some body of human knowledge in the most ultimate and far-reaching way, then Professor Uya’s introductory remarks to his students of philosophy of history is not out of place. Historical judgements can be made by any student through careful and critical reading of the work of modern historians and by paying some attention to the biography, social and intellectual milieu of the author of the book he is reading. The author’s life and background will indicate his experiences and the ideas upon which he will draw in his facts and make inference. As a distinct historical field, historiography implies a systematic study of the way the historian does his work. It involves four different but closely related historical activities. The first is the reflection on the trends and patterns of historical writing and a systematic study of all the important historians; the second, is the discovery of critical analysis of historical sources; the third, is the construction and description of the past on the basis of the facts acquired; the fourth is the construction on the basis of the ascertain facts, of some general theory which gives meaning and inner logic to the known past.¹ It is useful for students because it will allow the student to see the whole sweep of historical literature and the changing assumptions and values that govern historical judgements in the modern world. Conscientious reading, research and writing which professor Uya puts his student through has not only given them this broad knowledge, of
major historical trends, the course as taught by him, has undoubtedly expedited the gaining of this insight and understanding.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: AN OVERVIEW

Two issues have dominated philosophy of history. Firstly, the argument about perspectives which is made up of the studies of the development of history as an academic discipline over time, as well as its development in different culture and epochs. Perspectives here can either be outside-in or inside-out approaches. Secondly, the study of the academic tools, methods and approaches that have been and are being used in the study otherwise known as the methodology in historical writing.

As was the case with most forms of thoughts, the great turning point in philosophy of history came at the end of the nineteenth century. Until that time, philosophers had always been concerned with the nature of the historical process. They presented various doctrines to account for the inner reality of history, the inner force that caused the development of the historical process. From the fourth to the eighteenth century, it was widely believed that divine providence moved history. With advocates like St. Augustine in his The City of God, he laid down the law of divine providence. He stated that history was a response to divine providence; hence, there was a purpose in history. History to St. Augustine led to divine blessedness-a society at peace with itself. It was a deviation from this purpose that resulted in disaster. Professor Uya exemplifies St. Augustine ideas in the motives that propelled the European colonization of Africa under three Cs’- Christianity, Commerce and Civilization. At this time, Europe saw itself as Christian Europe bringing Christianity, civilization and development to Africa.
The Italian School of Philosophy represented by Giambatista Vico’s *New Science* (1725-1744) Emmanuel Kant in his contribution in the periodical *Berlin Monthly*, in November 1784, under the title ‘Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View’, advocated a spiral view of history and they identified three stages in the historical development of mankind. The age of the gods, this was the period when the gods decided in history; the age of heroes, the period when history was linked to great men and heroes; and the age of men. In all three, we see the ideas of divine providence running through. The Greek and Roman philosophers believed that history moved in cyclical or ever recurring cycle patterns and that a process of growth and decay was the ultimate historical reality.

The early nineteenth century German thinker, G.W.F. Hegel, certainly the most influential philosopher of history of the past 200 years, found an objective causal reality inside the process of history itself. A ‘spirit’ that moved forward to the present in a dialectical pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Like Emmanuel Kant before him, he advocated the theory of change and development in the society which came largely as a result of man’s struggle to preserve his autonomy in the society. Hegel thought that society cannot develop without struggle and his ideas are known as the Hegelian Dialectics. Karl Marx and Frederich Engels entered the scene and combined Hegel’s dialectical reality to economic determinism to arrive at the conclusion that the thrust of the inevitable class struggle was the reality within the historical process. Instead of talking about groups in the society as Hegel did, Marx and Engels extended and said the most important issue that people struggle over is economic issue or control over the source of production, and in the pre-industrial age, land was the issue. They further divided the society into classes. The owners of land were the aristocrat, the middle class were the bourgeois and the landless class were the peasants. They therefore postulated the law known as historical materialism or economic determinism. Since for them, the dialectic approach was the best way to study and understand history. Marx was also
famous for postulating the idea that history is a weapon for revolution. Thus, well into the later part of the nineteenth century, philosophy assumed the real nature of an objective history and philosophers of history concerned themselves largely with creating a historical metaphysics. They portrayed in various ways the historical reality that was assumed to exist outside the minds of the historical observers and beneath the surface of facts and to impel history forward to a goal of glory or damnation.

Between the 1920’s and the 1960’s, the dominant issue in historiography amongst philosophers and philosophers of history was why there was nothing fixed in history. The question was initially posed in terms of whether or not history is a science or an art? If history was a science, then it shared some of the properties of science like accuracy and factuality, probability, replication and independence of cultural, environmental and other factors. For the advocates of history as science therefore, the central question was of factuality. Can history be factually written? Is a historical fact, fact indeed? Can it be proven? Can there be an absolute historical truth rather than the relative and approximate facts as we have it. One of the best scholars who became known as the father of scientific or historical objectivity was Leopold Van Ranke, who along with his students propagated the Rankean idea of objectivity in history and by the 1960’s, it became known as the Rankean School of Objectivity. His ideas were hinged on two important assumptions. Firstly, there are facts in history that cannot be disputed and a good example is the Nigerian civil war; Secondly, that the historian should recover the facts as they are. Ranke saw the historian as being neutral hence the caution that historians be past minded and not present minded in their approach to reconstructing history. The Rankean school presupposed that the past can be replicated in its fullness and accuracies.

To Ranke’s assumptions, Professor Uya argues, using the Nigerian civil war as an example that, the forces that culminated in the war did not start in 1967, so how useful is the
fact of the civil war? This brings the distinction between facts, useable facts and historical facts which are useable to the fore. To the second assumption, Professor Uya ask, can the historian be neutral in the asking of the why question, and why do two or more historians, ask the same questions but come out with different answers? The historian in Professor Uya’s thinking cannot be neutral because he is a product of his society, culture, environment and training. There is also the issue of the historical documents which are not a product of objective conditions. They are either incomplete, inaccessible or bias which affects the objectivity of the history written.³

By the end of the nineteenth century, a new doubt set in as to the ability of the human mind to get outside of itself and to focus upon a final and causal reality that stood over and against individual minds. This relativism shattered the central place metaphysics had held for a century in philosophical thinking and directed philosophers to concern themselves with epistemological problems with whether and how the human mind can know anything outside of itself. This general shift on western thought had a profound effect upon the philosophy of history. Process and causation could no longer be regarded as implicit in an objectified history itself. Rather, they were part of the historians own thinking, part of the decision-making process that led him to make judgements about history. Historical process was not an objectified reality. It was the act of thinking and writing itself. Historians did not discover history, they created it. Far from standing at the climatic point of history from which he could loftily look downwards to survey and explain what was happening outside of himself, the historian now found himself alone, recognizing that it was the synthetic power of his mind that created an integrated and meaningful historical process out of the endless confusion of the past. The historians own values were seen to be the measure of truth that was used making historical judgements about the past.
The above analysis has so far shown how various philosophers of history presented various doctrines to account for the inner reality of history, the inner forces that caused the development of the historical process. History was regarded as an objective thing, existing outside the mind of the historian. The only problem was to identify the cause that moved this historical process. Process here was regarded as intrinsic in history and no attention was paid to the historian himself, who was simply held to recognize and describe the inner reality that produced historical change. They argued that general laws or covering laws governed historical developments everywhere. These laws were also known as speculative construction of history. Elements of speculative history included the tendency to regard historical developments as a series of general ordered events and patterns which occur and repeat themselves in all stages of human development. In other words, nothing is new under the sun as history will always repeat itself. This tendency it must be noted denied uniqueness to any historical event, as for example, the idea of the universality of man was imposed; Man everywhere was seen as the same. Hence, human history was about mans fight to conquer. But we all know that over time, man fights war for other reasons apart from wants. It could be for honour, liberation etc.; the idea that every area of the globe will replicate the development of Europe in almost every stage of their historical development. In this way, Europe becomes the model for all countries to follow.

To the speculative historians, Professor Uya has this to say, ‘for a perspective to be meaningful, it must reflect the following: a firm knowledge of the language and culture of the society; empathy and not sympathy with the culture; and finally, it must view the society from the inside-out rather than the outside-in approach.

The earlier and older philosophers of history could take the existence of facts for granted. For Hegel and Marx, history witnessed the operation of real tangible facts. They had no doubts that the historian could discover the reality in the historical process. Twentieth
century relativism however, believes that each historian selects and criticizes according to his personal values. Therefore, the modern philosophy of history has had to cope with the new and unfamiliar question ‘what is a fact?’, epistemology, rather than metaphysics, has been the central focus of the philosophy of history since 1900.

These fundamental changes in the focus and doctrine of the philosophy of history were effected by late nineteenth and early twentieth century by the philosophers of the ‘Neo-Hegelian’ school. It is true that the eighteenth century Italian philosopher Vico had already claimed that historical knowledge was heavily dependent on the historians imaginative inventions. But Vico’s original theories went unheralded, until Hegel’s’ more radical followers noticed a basic paradox and tension in Hegelian theory and by examining it closely, set the modern philosophy of history on the road to epistemological relativism. Hegel observed that history is ‘the progress of consciousness of freedom’, that is, the historical process is an intellectual structure, a refined idea of the past, giving it meaning and unity. Hegel had assumed that in constructing this historical image, the individual historian or philosopher mind was reflecting an absolute intelligence in the universe. But if this last assumption is held to be doubtful, or untenable, we are left not with an historical process controlled by an objective ‘real’ universal idea, but a process created by the insights of individual human minds.

This relativist allowed the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey in the 1880’s to stress the importance of the historians own ‘experience’ for understanding the experiences of people in the past. It led the Italian thinker Benedetto Croce in the second decades of the twentieth century to claim that the past is part of an ‘eternal present’ and history exist in the present thoughts of the historian and not in some already existing objective past. It allowed the English philosopher of history B. G. Collingwood, in the third decades of the twentieth century to note that ‘history is wholly a reasoned knowledge of what is transient and
concrete....The historians picture of his subject, whether that subject be a sequence of events or past state of things, appears as a web of imaginative construction stretched between certain fixed points provided by the statements of the authorities’. He viewed history as a product of the historians ‘imaginative construction’. And it also led the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer who sought refuge from Hitler in America to stress the way in which our understanding of the past is shaped by the connotative ‘myths’ or ‘symbolic forms’ in the period between 1930-1945.

By the 1930’s, the trend to epistemological relativism had reached extreme proportions. The distinguished American historian Carl Becker and Charles Beard were so impressed by the theories of the neo-Hegelian school that Charles Beard argued that historical objectivity was desirable but not practicable. He concluded that historical objectivity ‘is a mirage’ or ‘a noble dream’. One reason for this expression was the nature of history itself as captured by the goddess of history ‘CLOE’. The joy was the pursuit of objectivity, but not getting it. Carl Becker added another angle to the debate when he argued that ‘every man was his own historian, and that writing history was the simple act of faith’.

Since the late 1930’s, there has however, been a withdrawal from the extreme view that history is simply a branch of private myth and has nothing whatsoever to do with an objective or universal truth. The terrible consequences’ of the historical fantasies propounded by the Nazi and communist propaganda have made Western philosophers to carefully reconsider whether the historian does not after all follow some general rules of rational thinking, parallel to the kind of universal reasoning used in the natural science. The American philosophers Carl Hempel and Ernest Nagel find a middle ground between old fashioned belief in the absolute truth of history and the recent extreme relativism. They believe that historical analysis does follow ‘probabilistic’ rules about human conduct. Hear Carl Hempel, ‘historical explanation, too, aims at showing that the event in question was not a matter of
chance but was to be expected in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions. The expectation referred to is not prophecy or divination, but rational scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption of general laws\textsuperscript{13}. For example, the assumptions that people who have jobs do not like to lose them, and that the historian employs a reasonable process of explanation and logic. Consequently, the philosopher is able to place historical thinking in the category of empheral science. Some professional historian would subscribe to a middle ground view similar to the Hempel-Nagel epistemology. They would point out that:

Granted that historians examining the same era of the past may have profound differences in interpretation, may see some very different patterns of cause and effect in the events they examine, they will still agree on many things. And as history has developed as a science in the past century, historians have arrived at many common conclusions on the interpretation of the past, while still disagreeing on others. There is, therefore, a universe of discourse among historians, a hard substratum of commonly agreed-on truth about the past as well as a continuing debate on other aspects of the past upon which agreement may and probably will be reached eventually.\textsuperscript{14}

This current middle –ground belief in a universe of historical discourse does not preclude the tremendous impact of neo-Hegelian relativism, not only in the modern philosophy of history but also in the actual work of historians. Causation is no longer seen as a fixed objective theory outside the historian mind. Causation or historical explanation seeks to make intelligible the connections between what is to be explained or the \textit{explanandum}, for example the Nigerian civil war and the set of variables that are said to explain it, or the intrinsic factors called the \textit{explanands}. Causation is now widely regarded as the explanation of the relationship between the details obtained from the primary sources. Today, historians
seldom ask of a major interpretation: ‘is it true’, rather, they ask whether a particular statement of causation is ‘significant’ and ‘valid’. Because of the impact of epistemological relativism, historical truth is now seen to be probabilistic rather than absolute.

HISTORICISM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFRICAN HISTORY

The precipitous twentieth century decline of the belief in the objective historical reality raised disturbing and fundamental questions on the ethical side of the philosophy of history. Whether it is valid to exercise a moral judgement on the conduct of man in the past has probably been a more difficult and pressing issue for the practicing historian than the paradox of epistemological relativism. The moral problem can be stated simply: the historian it is held, does not discover an external reality but in a sense creates one by the synthetic power of his mind. But how can he then make moral judgements about people in the past that he is describing? If the historian does not discover an objectified reality, how can he presume to judge past ages by an objective standard of moral values?

These are not easy questions to answer, and the rise of epistemological relativism at the beginning of the twentieth century encouraged the extreme moral relativism of German historians in the 1920s’ and 1930s’. The doctrine of ‘historicism’ excluded the historian from making ethical judgements about individual or collective human conduct. The reaction against moral relativism in the writing of history during the past three decades began with emotional recoil against Nazi atrocities. The effect has been the predication of a kind of law-of nature doctrine of moral judgement in history. If past conducts transgressed universal feelings that certain acts such as mass murder, the ruthless exploitation of people through slave trade, colonization are reprehensible, then the historian has a right and a duty to discriminate between ethical light and darkness.
Historicism is the word that came into popular usage from the 1930s’ but applied with great virulence to writings by African historians between 1960s and 1980s’. Historicism implied the impact of the ‘climate of opinion’ on scholarship. To Christopher Nwodo, historicism means that the historian, in order to study the past, must empathize with the past. Besides understanding and feeling his way into the lives of the peoples under investigation, the historian must accept their view.\textsuperscript{15} Professor Uya has mentioned some factors that impede on objectivity and led to historicism. They include the prevailing perspectives of the time in which the historian is living; changing methodology; prevailing morality/norms and values of the time; prevailing ideologies; nationalism; racism/ethnic chauvinism; sexism/gender; class and audience/clientele.\textsuperscript{16} As will be shown, historicism affects the reconstruction of history be it in Europe, Africa or any where else on the globe.

One peculiar thing in the writing of history is that every generation challenges the conventional interpretation of the generation before it. This is so because as each generation ask the why question, especially, as new evidences or methodologies for the reinterpretation emerges. Initially, these were the two main accepted reasons for re-interpretation in history. But increasingly, it has been shown that concerns beyond those of new evidence and methods have shaped the quest for re-interpretation in history. The challenges of the times which question the purpose and the meaning of history have caused historians overtime to re-interpret the relevant or useable past. Most times these challenges are political, cultural, economic and nation building. The attempts at re-interpretation are always influenced by the ‘climate of opinion of the time’ in which the historian lives in.

Until the 1950’s, historians, who held sway in the study of history, like G. W. Hegel in the nineteenth century, A.P. Newton in 1923 and Hugh Trevor-Roper in 1963, to mention but a few, held firmly that Africa was no part of history, hence it had no history of its own before the coming of the Europeans. The only history Africa had was that of European
activities in the continent. This assertion was influenced by the Euro-centric perspective, otherwise known as the ‘Covering Law Theory’ or The Hampel-Popper Law, made popular by Carl Hempel and Karl Popper, and the over dependence on written sources as the only acceptable method for the reconstruction of history. For the European scholars, the general belief at that time was that ‘history began when man took to writing’, so African history which was not written was a source of confusion to them. On written documents, Edward Hallet Carr has noted that: “No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought-what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought”.

What happened to Africa was a case of unjustified denigration of a people and their past by certain western scholars who did not only create an erroneous world opinion that the African continent had not made any meaningful contribution to civilization because her people are backward and low in intelligence and culture. it still did not justify the denying of Africa a future which remained an open possibility.

The earliest attempt at the explanation of the historical development of Africa was made by Muslim scholars whose activities began to impinge in African societies during the golden age of Arab expansion. Like all imperialist, they claimed that the world was created around their homeland. With this confidence, they armed themselves with a monotheistic religious ideology, and assumed that light and civilization spread from the land of their birth to other parts of the world. The propagation of this idea of the Arabs as the dominant historical cause agent in African history laid the foundation for the use, of race as the primary causative factor in history into the nineteenth century when the Europeans undertook the penetration of Africa interior. In the words of Dr Robert Knox: “Race is everything: literature, science, art- in a word, civilization depends on it.” Armed with this view, Europe gave the idea propagated by the Arabs further refinement in claiming that wherever their
influence was not felt ‘darkness reigned’. The manner in which these scholars perceived Africa historically, reflects the level to which they had fallen into their trap of historicism.

Phillip Curtin has observed that “Western historical tradition until recently was thoroughly ethnocentric and ill adapted to the investigation of other societies....” This was so because European historiography of the time, the state and political history occupied the centre of the stage, thanks to the lingering effects of the French revolution, and of Leopold Von Ranke and his school for whom the state was the embodiment of the divine idea in history. Understandably, therefore, the European authors who took an interest in the African past had their gaze focused on the same theme. At times, so anxious were they to find states in the African past that they ended up creating them on paper. A classic case was that of Lord Palmer, who created an empire of ancient Kwararafa in Nigerian history, a state which to the present day historians and archaeologists are trying to create. These explains why the early African historians dealt mainly with political developments. But the peculiar nature of African society, where political developments occur in society and economic developments shape political developments, the challenge of neutrality or of writing scientific history became difficult.

If Africa had no past, how was it possible therefore to reconstruct the history of no history? What then is history that Africans did not have? History means different things to different people and at different periods, hence, the definition can be idealist, empiricist or materialist. To the idealist, the ‘idea’ is what is real; it is the moving force of history, while experience is merely the representation. Empiricist focus on empirical instances as the essence of history. Materialist believe historical processes are rooted in material reality, from which they abstract theoretical propositions. Each definition implies a philosophical commitment, ideological orientation whether or not it is consciously articulated, for it rest on existing concepts, beliefs and values derived from complex social practises and relations,
shared memories and cultural imagination. Many historians would agree that history is not simply a representation of the past as it is in the Rankean tradition but in this context, “History involves consciously bringing the human mind or intellect to work according to certain prescribed rules and usages on the remains of the past, with a view to reconstructing the story of what happened, and perhaps also drawing certain conclusions there from, for the education or entertainment or both of the contemporaries of the historian.”

From the definition above, it is possible to entertain certain ideas and conception about the past without actually being, writing or practicing historiography. This is truer for the African situation where every work that uses information or makes references to the African past was seen as a work of history.

How was the African to handle the challenge of an inherited image? The first challenge for the Africa historian was to show that there was an African history long before the Europeans came along, and that African history was not just the history of European activities in Africa. Rather in the words of Professor Ade-Ajayi, European presence was an episode in the continuing historical process that was on going in Africa. It had to be established that African history must be consciously written from the inside-out approach as this centred on the Africans and Africa, rather than from the outside-in approach that had prevailed before the 1950’s. For African history is not simply the introduction of African materials into the discussion of the experiences, the expansion and achievement of a civilization whose soul and centre lie outside the African continent, no matter how such a civilization may have impinged on, or impacted upon some portion of Africa, or on some groups of Africa.

This attempt to show that Africa had a history led to the emergence of a new methodology of oral tradition in the reconstruction of African past. Being a pre-literate society at that time, oral traditions which is defined as ‘all verbal testimonies which are
reported statement concerning the past, helped to show that Africans were cultural protagonist, the creators of their own fortunes who played an important role in shaping the fortunes of their society. African historians were accused as being historicist because their works were not driven by the normal concerns of historians which is objectivity, but by considerations such as cultural, nationalism, political, nation building etc which challenged history to serve relevant and useful ends. The study of African history is unique since it cannot be studied without adopting a holistic approach, as it showed a “coherence or compatibility among all disciplines- philosophy, theology, medicine, politics, social theory, land and these find themselves logically concatenated in a system so tight that to subtract one item from the whole was to destroy the structure of the whole”. The outcome has been the inclusion of inter-disciplinary approach as a method in the study of African history.

This challenge of an inherited image which was not the historiography of Africa, helped to give birth to a true African historiography as it brought to the study of African history a subject matter, purpose, philosophy and its method. This was achieved through the vigorous documentation of Africa, and led to the autonomy of African historical reconstruction laying more emphasis on the inside-out approach as against the previous outside-in approach. On this point Thomas Hodgkin observed in 1961 that “it is clear the study of African history is only beginning to develop its proper method of inquiry, its critical standard and the authority that is the consequence of these”.

This autonomy has helped to emphasize the relevance of historical studies to the dilemma of nation building for example in Africa. The challenge raised questions in the area of epistemology, which is the use of knowledge. Do we acquire knowledge for the sake of it or do we acquire knowledge to assist us cope with and solve the problems of existence in our time? Since our work must provide a solution to the concrete problems of our time, historical scholarship must be an ally in the forging of national consciousness especially that of nation
building in Africa which is believed to be impossible because of the ethnic factor. The emergence of inter-group studies which help to identify historical roots and historical contributions to the solving of the challenges of nation building is historicism, but it is a step in the right direction to make history relevant and useable.

It is clear that despite the ambiguity inherent in historiography, its central doctrine is the idea of history as being non-determinable, open ended and depended on human decisions and choices,\(^3\) as the contemporary situation in the theory of history and culture in general is unintelligible without an appreciation of the meaning and the consequence of historicism.\(^3\) In other words, according to historicism, an element of contingency recurse in history

**CONCLUSION**

From the analysis, the problems raised by the philosophy as the case with any branch of philosophy may not indeed be soluble. Ones the student understands the terminologies and learns what the theorist are saying, the student it is hoped will know that on any issue philosophers of history debate, a plausible argument can be made for either side; that the student of history is helped in his work by having an introductory knowledge of the main trends in the modern philosophy of history as this will help the student have a critical, restrained awareness of the problems raised by the philosophy of history in connection with reality, epistemology and values. This it is hoped will make the student a better historian because the student becomes conscious of all the theoretical implications of their work. It makes the student less naive and simple minded in their assumptions and more careful and self critical in their thinking and writing; that an acquaintance with philosophy of history helps the student to understand fully books written in the historical profession in which allusions are made to theories and theorist of the philosophy of history; the student has developed a taste for what is good history and what is not; and the student should have
reached a level of expertise in the historians craft when after reading a book or listening to a lecture, can pretty well see the assumptions and values that are determining the historians structuring of the material.

Professor Uya has helped students by placing the heavy obligation upon the students to read and evaluate historical literature for themselves. Allowing them examine the historians for themselves has helped the students to gain understanding of the values and qualities of the influential historical thinkers whose works are used in the course. These introductory remarks in historiography and the philosophy of history as taught by Professor Okon Uya, it is hope, has made for a brief understanding of what the course entails, and has hopefully put an eagerness to embark on an abstract historical thinking.

End Notes


4 Professor Okon Edet Uya. Lecture Notes

5 Professor Okon Edet Uya. Lecture Notes


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