**<AT>A Phenomenology of the Work of Attention**

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**<abs>Abstract:** With the aim of showing what it takes to see the world and others as they are, this article provides a phenomenological account of what Iris Murdoch has memorably called “the work of attention.” I first show that Aron Gurwitsch’s analyses of attention provide a basis on which to reject a voluntaristic account of attention according to which seeing things as they are is as simple as directing one’s attention to something. Then, in order to elucidate the work that is involved in paying attention, I draw on Edmund Husserl’s descriptions of the activity characteristic of attentive consciousness. I then show how a Husserlian account of the work of attention can help make sense of Murdoch’s pessimistic claim that our consciousness is not “a transparent glass through which it views the world” while also indicating how we, by paying attention, can do better. </abs>

**<ky>Keywords:** attention, self, phenomenology, Iris Murdoch, Aron Gurwitsch, Edmund Husserl </ky>

In *The Sovereignty of Good*, Iris Murdoch memorably describes the example of a mother-in-law coming to regard her daughter-in-law in a more positive and truthful way through “careful and just attention.”[[1]](#endnote-1) In Murdoch’s example, which is clearly generalizable to many other situations and contexts, the mother-in-law slowly and gradually comes to experience her daughter-in-law differently—no longer seen as “a vulgar girl,” the daughter-in-law now appears “not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on.”[[2]](#endnote-2) And Murdoch crucially points out that this change is not the result of a choice, or “jump of the will.”[[3]](#endnote-3) However, this change in the way the mother-in-law experiences her daughter-in-law is also not simply passive. As Murdoch puts it, the mother-in-law “has in the interim been *active*, she has been *doing* something.”[[4]](#endnote-4) And Murdoch names this activity “the work of attention.”[[5]](#endnote-5)

In her discussion of what she calls the work of attention, Murdoch provides what she describes as a “rigorous and perhaps pessimistic account” of “that in us which attends to the real.”[[6]](#endnote-6) And she describes how, among other things, paying attention is a morally significant activity that is not as easily accomplished as one might think. This is because, on Murdoch’s pessimistic view, the self gets in the way of paying attention. As she writes: “we are not free in the sense of being able suddenly to alter ourselves since we cannot suddenly alter what we can see and ergo what we desire and are compelled by.”[[7]](#endnote-7) But, Murdoch adds: “this does not imply that we are not free.”[[8]](#endnote-8) The exercise of our freedom just takes work, which is what Murdoch calls the work of attention and which she also describes as “a *task* to come to see the world as it is.”[[9]](#endnote-9) But Murdoch herself does not further elucidate what exactly this task consists in. That is, what is it about attention that allows us to experience the world differently and perhaps more truthfully?

In this article, without following the contours of Murdoch’s own metaphysical project, I aim to articulate in phenomenological terms what the work of attention precisely consists in.[[10]](#endnote-10) First, drawing on Aron Gurwitsch’s phenomenological analyses of the theme in relation to its thematic field, I demonstrate why a voluntaristic conception of attention, according to which paying attention to something is as simple as turning toward what was previously not attended to, is insufficient. I then suggest that, even though Gurwitsch shows we should reject such a voluntaristic conception, Gurwitsch’s own account does not allow us to appreciate the sense in which attending in the sort of example Murdoch describes could be an activity that takes work. To elucidate the role of the self and its activity in the work of attention, I turn to Edmund Husserl’s account of the activity involved in attentive receptivity. I suggest that Husserl’s descriptions of the activity characteristic of attentive receptivity can help us understand what kind of activity is involved in the work of attention and why our consciousness is not, as Murdoch claims, “a transparent glass through which it views the world.”[[11]](#endnote-11)

**<1>Gurwitsch on Attention, Theme, and Thematic Field**

Already in his dissertation, “Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation between Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology” (1929), Gurwitsch builds on insights from both Gestalt psychology and phenomenology to account for the structure of what is experienced. Rejecting a view according to which what is experienced is a bundle of contents that stand in a “mere ‘and-connection,’” Gurwitsch points out that what is experienced are structured totalities, which is to say they have their “distribution of emphasis” and “centers of gravity.”[[12]](#endnote-12)

To articulate the relation between what is emphasized in our experience and its surrounding, Gurwitsch introduces the now well-known distinction between “theme” and “thematic field.” Gurwitsch describes how, for example, when he thinks about Descartes’s theory of the union of body and mind, he is aware of this theory but also “the connection in which this problem arises in Descartes’s philosophy.”[[13]](#endnote-13) What Gurwitsch is aware of in this way belongs to his theme as its background. However—and this is what the term “thematic field,” in distinction to what Gurwitsch calls the “margin,” is meant to track in our experience—not everything in this background pertains equally to this theme. As Gurwitsch writes, “Within the domain of the co-given the fundamental *distinction must be drawn between that which ‘belongs to my theme’ and determines my attitude and that which does not belong to it*.”[[14]](#endnote-14)

To elucidate how the thematic field determines the attitude in which we are dealing with a theme, Gurwitsch further characterizes the thematic field as a “framework of sense” and the theme as the center toward which the thematic field is oriented.[[15]](#endnote-15) Gurwitsch suggests that such an orientation comes about involuntarily—for example, when he describes the orientation as having been “brought about.”[[16]](#endnote-16) And this orientation does not only organize what is experienced into a theme with a thematic field; it also excludes what is co-given but not part of the thematic field—that is, what is in the margin.[[17]](#endnote-17)

Depending on the thematic field, or framework of sense, and hence the attitude in which I experience a theme, the same theme can appear quite differently—“the theme looks different either time” or “it ‘somehow’ looks different.”[[18]](#endnote-18) What kind of modifications the theme can undergo “as a result in a change of the attitude”[[19]](#endnote-19) is something Gurwitsch discusses under the heading of what he calls thematic or attentional modifications.[[20]](#endnote-20) Focusing on one such modification is enough to show how this idea helps us descriptively capture, in part, an important characteristic of the work of attention that Murdoch discusses—that is, its nonvoluntaristic character.

The relevant thematic modification concerns what Gurwitsch terms “the enlargement and elucidation of the thematic field.”[[21]](#endnote-21) Through such a broadening, “the same thing continues being given, but it has acquired a new ‘meaning,’ a new significance for the whole of my life, it appears in a new light; I see it—the noematically same thing—in a different attitude.”[[22]](#endnote-22) What happens in such a broadening is not a turning of one’s attention toward what is co-given in the thematic field but rather a change in the thematic field so that what is experienced as the theme is experienced with a different meaning. This broadening of the thematic field is the counterpart to a narrowing of the field that can also occur where “the theme loses connecting links” and “the variety of its material relations is reduced.”[[23]](#endnote-23) In addition to a broadening or narrowing of the connecting links, there can also occur a further determination or becoming indeterminate of these links.

Gurwitsch’s descriptions of thematic modifications due to the enlargement and elucidation of the thematic field nicely capture Murdoch’s example of the mother-in-law coming to see her daughter-in-law differently. In Murdoch’s view, this change is due to the mother-in-law’s “careful and just attention” but not in the sense that she decided to see differently.[[24]](#endnote-24) The mother-in-law gradually comes to see her daughter-in-law differently because a theme (the daughter-in-law) appears with a different meaning. This change occurs while the outward behavior of the daughter-in-law remains the same. But what first appeared undignified in this behavior gradually becomes appreciated as spontaneous as new connections of relevancy are established between the theme (the daughter-in-law) and the changing thematic field (e.g., the mother-in-law’s son and their relationship).

If we interpret the change of meaning in terms of changes in the connections between the thematic field and the theme as described by Gurwitsch, we can understand how this change is not brought about by a simple redirection of attention, and we can also see how this change could be something that takes time, which is something Murdoch emphasizes. That is, for the perceived vulgarity to come across as refreshingly simple, the mother-in-law needs to come to see her daughter-in-law in a different light or with a different attitude—a change, for example, from seeing the daughter-in-law in light of certain old-fashioned conventions to seeing her in the context of other ones. And, as we can all surely appreciate, such changes are processes that may take time, which is captured by Gurwitsch’s account as it focuses on how a change in the framework of sense or thematic field changes the sense or meaning with which the theme is experienced as the thematic field is broadened and elucidated, which allows for new connections to arise in the relation between thematic field and theme.

To what extent the work of attention is still an activity, something one does, and something we can be better or worse at (and are often bad at in Murdoch’s view), however, is not something Gurwitsch gives us more insight into. For this, I suggest, we should turn to Husserl.

**<1>Husserl on the Self and Attention**

Gurwitsch’s account of thematic modifications entails a critique of a spotlight account of attention, an account Gurwitsch attributes to Husserl. Such an account holds, according to Gurwitsch, that “variations in the direction of attention do not affect the material content of what is given,” for “only on this assumption does the comparison with a beam of light make any sense.”[[25]](#endnote-25) The change in illumination that attention is thought to bring about is in turn thought to be due to changes in the glance of the ego, and “it follows that in the attentional modifications the pure ego must be descriptively accessible in a special and preeminent way.”[[26]](#endnote-26) By insisting that “attentional modifications affect the material content of the noema to such an extent that a radically different noema results,”[[27]](#endnote-27) on the basis of phenomena such as the enlargement of the thematic field, Gurwitsch considers himself to be in a position to reject both Husserl’s account of attention and his account of the egoic nature of consciousness. As Gurwitsch writes: “We find no ‘pure subject of the act’ engaged in attentional modifications; the latter are not experienced as changes of ego-directedness or as shifts of the glance of the ego.”[[28]](#endnote-28)

But there is another way of understanding Husserl’s characterization of the egoic nature of attentive experience. On this interpretation, the self that attends is a self that is active insofar as it is receptive (or not) to what it experiences. And it is the activity characteristic of receptivity that we should look into if we want to understand how paying attention may take work and how we can be better or worse at it.

Husserl scholars have rightly emphasized the originality and philosophical promise of Husserl’s conception of receptivity.[[29]](#endnote-29) For an account of the phenomenon of the work of attention, the active character of the receptivity characteristic of attentive experiences is what matters. Husserl can characterize all attentive experiences, including perceptual ones, as active because he makes two distinctions where there might at first sight only appear to be one. That is, on the one hand, Husserl distinguishes the spontaneity or activity of predicative thought from what is not in this sense active (so all perceptual experiences, including attentive perception). This distinction, however, crosses, according to Husserl, with another distinction that is important in this context—namely, the distinction between the activity that characterizes intentional acts in the strict sense, which are actualized or egoic experiences, and the passivity of intentional experiences that are not actualized and remain latent. Actualized or egoic experiences are characterized by Husserl as active regardless of whether their matter is predicatively articulated. Indeed, in the manuscripts recently published in *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*, Husserl speaks of “active perceptions”—a concept that can only make sense if one does not restrict activity and spontaneity to predicative judgment.[[30]](#endnote-30) Perceptions can be active because, while perceptual synthesis or the appearance of one and the same object in a manifold of appearances occurs passively, perceptions, when they are attentive, are active in another sense—and it is for this activity that Husserl reserves the term “receptivity.” Being receptive is, for Husserl, something we do, and this receiving is characteristic of attentive experience—regardless of whether our attention is being solicited or steered in a top-down fashion. As Husserl writes:

<ext>The passively constituted unity of passive synthesis “affects” the self [*Ich*], and this means that the unity that actualizes itself is encountered in the form of an active striving, an active being directed at which takes it up [*aufgenommen*], receives [*rezipiert*] it. This can be “enforced” . . . or happen freely, in which case I am “pleased,” in a volitional interest “willingly” directed at the unity and want to acquaint myself with it.[[31]](#endnote-31)</ext>

The activity of receiving is something I do, and it is an activity that is to be distinguished from predicative synthesis. I am receptive when attentive, and my being receptive is something I do whether my attending is “enforced” or “willing.”

Differently stated, attentive consciousness actively takes up what it experiences (which as a basic doxic mode can in turn be modified in experiences of doubt). As Husserl writes:

<ext>What does the active self accomplish? It does not produce [*machen*] the objective unity, which is already constituted and available and affects it before it turns toward it. *The active self however enlivens [belebt] the intentionality in the particular way of activation [Aktivierung], of active enactment [aktiven Vollzug], and it itself becomes an enacting subjectivity [vollziehenden Subjektivität]*, which is only another expression for a subjectivity that turns toward, grasps the unity, pursues it, and becomes acquainted with it.[[32]](#endnote-32) </ext>

What the active enactment that is characteristic of receptivity accomplishes is furthermore characterized as “taking into knowledge [*Aufname . . . in die Kenntnis*] of what is already constituted.”[[33]](#endnote-33)

What Husserl describes as the activity of receptivity seems to me a fruitful way of fleshing out what takes place in Murdoch’s example. Continued receptive activity is what allows for the mother-in-law’s appreciation of her daughter-in-law to change. It is by remaining receptive to the daughter-in-law as she appears that the mother-in-law can come to see her differently. And it is this being receptive, and continuously so, that is also presupposed by Gurwitsch’s description of the way in which the theme—in this case, the daughter-in-law—can take on another meaning due to enlargements and elucidations in the thematic field that are allowed to come forth. What Gurwitsch, in my view, describes well, is that the constitution of sense or meaning in this case is not something that occurs due to the self. However, what Husserl shows is that it is only due to this self and its activity of being receptive that these changes can continue to unfold (or not). Concretely, the mother-in-law might also have stopped being receptive to the daughter-in-law—she might have remained attached to a way of seeing her as “vulgar” and gone on with her life. Even Gurwitsch himself seems to recognize the role of the self when describing an example (reflecting on a theorem while walking down the street) and stating: “We are busy with our theme according to a well-defined attitude, and yet that is no obstacle to our having the intimation of some other attitude as possible, without, of course, *our adopting it* by abandoning the one assumed until that moment.”[[34]](#endnote-34) Whether we adopt the other attitude we intimate depends on whether we are receptive to it. This being receptive is something we do, and for Murdoch it is in our being receptive or not that we often fail. This failure consists in us being receptive or attached to the wrong kinds of things in Murdoch’s pessimistic but, at least to me, realistic view of human beings.

What I aim to do in concluding is make some phenomenological sense of this pessimism while at the same time indicating what it would take for us to do better (or worse) in this regard given this pessimistic diagnosis.

**<1>The Self and Murdoch’s Pessimism**

In his discussion of Husserl’s *Ideas* in the 1929 text I have thus far focused on, Gurwitsch explicitly brackets a consideration of Husserl’s phenomenology of reason when he states: “the problems holding our interest are far removed from those pertaining to ‘phenomenology of reason.’”[[35]](#endnote-35) The receptive activity of the self in attentive experience, however, is an epistemic phenomenon (and emphasizing this need not sideline its affective, embodied, and social dimensions). That is, the receptive activity of attentive experiences makes an epistemic difference in that it is in attending to something that I can become receptive to seeing it otherwise and more truthfully than I did before. But how could it be at all a challenge for one to be receptive in this way, and how could one be better or worse at it?

To elucidate the *actual* workof attention, we ought to appreciate the epistemic import of Husserl’s account of the ego being one of a self that is embodied, personal, and socially embedded.[[36]](#endnote-36) Our receptivity is, as a result of this, not only constrained in that it is restricted to what we attend to or are receptive to at one moment; our attentive and receptive attachments are also shaped by what social epistemologists and post-Husserlian phenomenologists have articulated as our social situatedness.[[37]](#endnote-37) What this means is that the orientation and attitudes that are available to me are not only socially shaped and constrained, but we are also attached to being receptive to certain thematic fields or frameworks of sense and not others, which in turn shapes how we experience what is the theme of our attention.

To give a rather telling example concerning Gurwitsch himself: the fact that Gurwitsch spends pages in *The Field of Consciousness* discussing William James’s example that “Columbus discovered America in 1492,” not to mention the claim that “Columbus was a daring genius,”[[38]](#endnote-38) just shows what is clearly in the margin of his consciousness (or better, which references in the thematic field remain indeterminate and curtailed)—namely, the reality of settler colonialism. For Gurwitsch, to come to see Columbus’s “discovery” differently, and for what it is, would require a change of attitude due to the broadening of, or even radical changes in, the thematic field. At the same time, one need not look far to see how this would require work and first and foremost work on one’s being attached to certain frameworks of sense. This change may be hard precisely because the receptivity of real selves is not a transparent openness but rather an always already being attached to ways of seeing, for better or, often, worse. The work of attention is therefore not just a matter of directing one’s attention; it also involves the work of changing those attachments and changing what we are receptive to. Attention hence has an inalienable affective-epistemic dimension.

Husserl himself captures the affective dimension of attention as an epistemic phenomenon as follows: “I am more and more deeply interested the more I surrender [*hingeben*] myself, and the more I surrender myself, the more I do this, I more and more deeply appropriate [*zueignen*] the object, it impresses me more profoundly.”[[39]](#endnote-39) And Husserl immediately adds: “but I do not surrender to everything that the object solicits or brings about, since not everything pertaining to it needs to be of interest to me, needs to solicit or bring about my surrender. [. . .] It is clear that we are dealing with affective phenomena [*Gemütsphänomene*], an affective activity [*Gemütsaktivität*], modes of positive affective engagements of the self [*Gemütsverhaltens des Ich*] in surrendering, in which the I is in a particular way involved [*beteiligt*].”[[40]](#endnote-40) The work of attention, then, would involve changing what one is invested or involved (*beteiligt*) in, which has both an affective and active dimension (as rendered by the terms *Gemütsaktivität* and *Gemütsverhalten des Ich*).[[41]](#endnote-41)

It is by paying heed both to this active and affective dimension of attention as articulated by Husserl and to how this is a dimension of ourselves as embodied and socially embedded selves that we are in a position to make further phenomenological sense of Murdoch’s “pessimistic account.” That is, for Murdoch, “consciousness is not normally a transparent glass through which it views the world, but a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie designed to protect the psyche from pain.”[[42]](#endnote-42) And she further claims that “our minds are continually *active*, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying *veil* which partially conceals the world.”[[43]](#endnote-43) At the same time, however, by insisting on the active character of receptivity (as a being receptive to), we can also make sense of Murdoch’s insisting on the “very small area of ‘freedom’ that is in us which attends to the real” (or not).[[44]](#endnote-44)

The fact that Husserlian phenomenological epistemology has primarily focused on articulating the subjective conditions of our experience and knowledge of the actual world should not lead us to conclude that it could not, and should not, also provide a positive account of the ways in which we are not just a transparent glass through which the world and others appear. It is also in the context of such a phenomenological appreciation of the subjective conditions of our distorted experience and knowledge of others and the world that it may make sense, again, to consider consciousness egoic or our experience to be one of an active self that can do better or worse in how it attends to the world and others around it due to being attached to (the right or wrong) frameworks of sense.

<1>Notes

<unn>This article was first presented as the 2021 Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture at the fifty-ninth annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP). I would like to thank the organizers and those who attended for their valuable comments and suggestions.

<insert endnotes here>

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1. Iris Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good* (London: Routledge, 2001), 17. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 17. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 54. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 36. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 73. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 89. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. For an account of Murdoch’s project in contrast to a Husserlian approach, see Elisa Magrì, “Social Sensitivity and the Ethics of Attention,” *European Journal of Philosophy* (August 25, 2021): 1–15. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 77. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Aron Gurwitsch, *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch*, ed. Fred Kersten, vol. 2, *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 209. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:221. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:222, my emphasis. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:225. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:226. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:227. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:228. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 230. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:247. For an exhaustive account, see Sven Arvidson, *The Sphere of Attention: Context and Margin* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2006). [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:247. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:248. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:248. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:54. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:293. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:293. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:294. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:294. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. See, for example, Julia Jansen, “Kant’s and Husserl’s Agentive and Proprietary Accounts of Cognitive Phenomenology,” *Philosophical Explorations* 19, no. 2 (2016): 161–72; and Anthony J. Steinbock, “Affection and Attention: On the Phenomenology of Becoming Aware,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 37, no. 1 (2014): 21–43. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Edmund Husserl, *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*, ed. Thomas Vongehr and Ullrich Melle, 4 vols. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2020), 2:78. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Husserl, *Studien*, 2:192. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Husserl, *Studien*, 2:200, my emphasis. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Husserl, *Studien*, 2:200. I have more fully developed this in Hanne Jacobs, “Husserl, the Active Self, and Commitment,” *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 20 (2021): 281–98; and Hanne Jacobs, “Husserl on Epistemic Agency,” in *The Husserlian Mind*, ed. Hanne Jacobs, (London: Routledge: 2021), 340–51. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Aron Gurwitsch, *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch*, trans. and ed.Jorge García-Gómez, vol. 1, *Constitutive Phenomenology in Historical Perspective* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 334–35, my emphasis. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Gurwitsch, *Collected Works*, 2:204. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. I have more fully developed this in Hanne Jacobs “Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention,” *Research in Phenomenology* 46 (March 2016): 257–76. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. See, e.g., Gaile Polhaus, “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance,” *Hypatia* 27, no. 4 (2012): 715–35; and Linda Martín Alcoff, *Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), 316–17. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Husserl, *Studien*, 1:435. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Husserl, *Studien*, 1:436. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. On this affective dimension, see also Alia Al-Saji, “A Phenomenology of Hesitation: Interrupting Racializing Habits of Seeing,” in *Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race*, ed. Emily S. Lee (Albany: SUNY Press, 2014), 133–72. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
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43. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 82, my emphasis. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good*, 73. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)