Part IV

EPISTEMIC IN/JUSTICE, VICE, AND VIRTUE
In most US states, it’s illegal to drive without wearing one’s seatbelt. Many recreational drugs are outlawed, even if used alone on one’s own property. I enforce a strict no-technology policy for students in my classes. A public beach may disallow swimming without the presence of a lifeguard. These are all examples of paternalism, the practice of limiting the free choices of agents, without their consent, for the sake of promoting their best interests. Paternalism is frequently discussed in legal, ethical, and social contexts.¹

A practice that has received less attention, however, is a strand of paternalism in the epistemic realm.² So-called epistemic paternalism is the practice of (i) interfering with someone’s inquiry, (ii) without their consent, (iii) and for their own epistemic good.³ Conditions (i) and (iii) are unique to epistemic paternalism: you can engage in paternalism without interfering with someone’s inquiry, and without having a distinctly epistemic motivation for doing so, as in many of the opening examples. Nonetheless, epistemic paternalism is a strand of general paternalism.

In this chapter, I concern myself with the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified. First, I discuss the definition of epistemic paternalism in more detail and clarify this question about its justification. Then, I explore how two recent epistemological theses—epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology—answer this question. I argue they provide a sufficient condition for unjustified epistemic paternalism. Further, I note some remarkable parallels between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I conclude that epistemic paternalism is unjustified in a certain class of cases, and, in general, we ought to exercise caution before engaging in epistemically paternalistic practices.
DEFINING EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM

Recall our definition:

Epistemic Paternalism: the practice of

(i) interfering with someone’s inquiry,
(ii) without their consent, and
(iii) for their own epistemic good.

Let’s consider each condition in more detail. Condition (i) refers to interfering with inquiry. I take inquiry to include both evidence-gathering and belief-forming practices. A common example of interference involves withholding evidence. For instance, juries aren’t allowed to consider certain kinds of evidence because it is considered “inadmissible,” for example, evidence of a suspect’s past crimes. If evidence is inadmissible or the jury is unlikely to weigh it properly, it is withheld, even though it is relevant—in the sense that, if properly weighed, it could make the jury’s final verdict more accurate. Another example of withholding evidence involves a professor who doesn’t give her class an argument for moral relativism, knowing many of her students have relativist tendencies. Giving them this argument would likely reinforce those, and it might be epistemically better for them to instead see reasons why moral relativism is problematic.

One can also interfere with another’s inquiry by manipulating the way they interpret or weigh their evidence. This enables one to influence another’s beliefs without changing their evidence (or, in some cases, their evidence that bears on the target proposition). So, for example, if you are deciding which hypothesis best explains the evidence, I might make a particular hypothesis salient and not mention other possible explanations, to bias you toward my preferred explanation of the evidence. Or, when teaching, I might give the class a philosophical argument for \( p \), but then strongly emphasize simplicity while purposefully leaving out discussion of the value of explanatory power. This could influence the students’ conclusion about \( p \) without influencing their evidence that bears on \( p \). Generally, then, one can engage in epistemic paternalism without attempting to change another’s evidence.

Condition (ii) is the non-consent condition, which is the same in both general and epistemic paternalism. This condition is relatively straightforward: one engages in the practice without consulting with the inquiring party. Alternatively, one might interfere explicitly against another’s will.

Condition (iii) involves the motivation for epistemic paternalism—that is, for the inquirer’s own epistemic good. This raises the question: What is epistemically good? In the epistemic paternalism literature thus far, there has been a strong emphasis on true belief. However, this emphasis strikes me as relatively narrow when considering the myriad of things epistemologists...
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value (see DePaul 2001). For one, rational or justified beliefs, even if false, intuitively carry some epistemic value. In fact, Feldman (2000: 686) claims there is nothing epistemically valuable about true, unjustified beliefs. This is a strong claim. We can settle for a weaker one: epistemic justification confers epistemic value to beliefs, even to false beliefs (consider: a justified false belief seems epistemically better than an unjustified false belief). Thus, a potential motivation for epistemic paternalism involves increasing an inquirer’s rational/justified beliefs.

JUSTIFYING EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM

Upon understanding the nature of epistemic paternalism, it is natural to turn next to normative questions. This paper concerns the question that is the original focus of Goldman’s (1991) paper: Is epistemic paternalism epistemically justified? Note that this question is about the epistemic justification of a particular practice, namely, interfering with inquiry. In this sense, “epistemic justification” (or “epistemically justified”) is used in a somewhat non-standard way—it doesn’t pick out the thing that turns true unGettiered belief into knowledge. Here, “justification” indicates when a practice, on balance, promotes epistemic goods. This explains why most authors in the epistemic paternalism literature either implicitly or explicitly adopt a version of epistemic consequentialism.

Further, this question controversially assumes that epistemic norms can guide action. However, it is reasonable to think some epistemic norms guide certain kinds of behaviors, such as how we get evidence (e.g., inquiry and evidence gathering) and what we do with our evidence (e.g., critical reasoning and reflection on our evidence).

There are a variety of answers to the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified. Consider the following options:

A1. Epistemic paternalism is always epistemically justified.
A2. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified.
A3. Epistemic paternalism is always epistemically justified in ABC circumstances.
A4. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified in XYZ circumstances.

A1 and A2 are hard to establish, especially against a backdrop of epistemic consequentialism. Given consequentialism, whether epistemic paternalism is justified depends on relevant outcomes. Nonetheless, this doesn’t prevent us from giving an answer like A3 or A4—as others have already done. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a), for instance, gives an answer in the form of A3; he provides two jointly sufficient conditions for justified epistemic paternalism.
Here, I invoke a similar strategy, but unlike Ahlstrom-Vij, my answer is in the form of A4. I will argue that two recent theses in epistemology—epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology—provide us with a class of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified. This doesn’t amount to an answer as strong as A2, but it does give us reason to be cautious before engaging in an epistemically paternalistic practice and consider whether our situation might fall into that class of cases.

To sum up what we’ve covered so far, epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry without their consent for their own epistemic good. I’ve focused on the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified, and will argue that when a certain set of conditions are met, it is unjustified. With this background in place, I now turn to epistemic permissivism.

**EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM**

Epistemic permissivism is a thesis about epistemic rationality and evidence. Specifically, it is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. Here, *epistemic rationality* involves responding to one’s epistemic situation appropriately, and it seems like certain evidential situations allow for multiple appropriate responses. For instance, paleontologists might share evidence but disagree about what killed the dinosaurs (Rosen 2001). Peter van Inwagen and David Lewis might share evidence but disagree about the nature of free will (van Inwagen 1996). Here, I will focus on a relatively weak version of permissivism called *interpersonal permissivism*: the view that there are evidential situations in which two (or more) agents can rationally adopt more than one doxastic attitude toward a proposition.

Interpersonal permissivism is commonly motivated by the idea that agents have differing epistemic standards (Schoenfield 2014). Epistemic standards are the means by which we evaluate, weigh, interpret, and process evidence. For instance, we might share evidence but rationally disagree about what hypothesis best explains the evidence. Or consider the two Jamesian epistemic goals: believe truth and avoid error. If I emphasize the value of believing truth, I may believe $p$ with only a little evidence for $p$. If you emphasize the value of avoiding error, you might require significantly more evidence before you believe $p$. It doesn’t seem like a particular weighing of these two goals is rationally required (Kelly 2013).

What does any of this have to do with epistemic paternalism? Consider a natural reason one might engage in an epistemically paternalistic practice. I might think that my evidence $E$ supports a particular proposition $p$. 
However, I might suspect that another person, upon learning E, won’t come to believe $p$—in fact, they might even come to believe not-$p$. On this basis, I withhold E from them. However, if interpersonal permissivism is true, then the fact that someone with my evidence would come to a different conclusion than me doesn’t mean their belief is irrational or that they’ve misinterpreted the evidence. The possibility of permissive cases then undermines a reason that one might act paternalistically.

A specific example might make this point more concrete. A frequent case used in both the permissivism literature and the epistemic paternalism literature involves juries. Consider a judge who is deciding whether to act paternalistically by withholding some evidence from a jury. She is considering doing so because they would interpret evidence in a way that, to him or her, seems misguided. She suspects that, if she gave them the extra evidence, they would think it supports $p$, when she is convinced it supports not-$p$. 14 In a lot of these cases, what seems misguided to her might just be another epistemically legitimate way of interpreting the evidence. The jurors might invoke a different epistemic standard when weighing and interpreting the evidence—a standard that is epistemically acceptable, but results in a different conclusion about who is guilty (they may, for instance, conclude that another hypothesis best explains the evidence).

Of course, sometimes one might invoke an epistemic standard that is unlikely to produce rational beliefs. For instance, a jury might be disposed to make a basic math error or engage in a process of reasoning that is problematically biased. In these cases, the justification for epistemic paternalism is clear. However, these are also not cases of epistemic permissivism, as the jury is not invoking an epistemically legitimate standard, so the beliefs produced using that standard are not rational. The permissivist does not claim that any epistemic standard goes—merely that there are different but equally legitimate standards that can be applied to a body of evidence.

The possibility of interpersonal permissivism doesn’t merely have implications for the practice of withholding evidence; it also speaks against interfering with the way another interprets or processes evidence. Consider again our judge who worries that some members of the jury would come to a different conclusion than she. Assuming they share evidence and are in an interpersonally permissive case, the fact that the jury would disagree with her does not give her grounds to interfere with the way they process the evidence.

Not only does interference in permissive cases fail to have epistemically good effects; it also can have epistemically bad effects. Interfering may stifle the jury’s ability to think creatively and inquire freely. They might consider possible explanations of the evidence that had never occurred to the judge; for example, the judge might be convinced that Smith did it, but the jury might employ another standard that makes salient the possibility that Jones, Smith’s
butler did it (Douven 2009). Both beliefs are rational, given the evidence, but if the judge had paternalistically imposed her epistemic standard on the jurors, the latter explanation may never have been considered. Co-existing epistemic standards lead to epistemic diversity that improves our collective epistemic position in the long run. For this reason, in permissive cases, not only is there no clear justification for paternalism, but there is positive reason not to engage in a paternalistic practice. Interfering with another’s epistemic standard will often have long-term negative epistemic effects, and in permissive cases, is epistemically unjustified.

It is worth noting that certain defenders of epistemic paternalism may agree with this conclusion. For example, Ahlstrom-Vij argues that for paternalism to be justified, the one interfering needs to have good reason to believe that their interference is epistemically *pareto efficient*: it will make no one epistemically worse off and at least one person epistemically better off. Given that Ahlstrom-Vij and I are both merely arguing for sufficient conditions for justified and unjustified epistemic paternalism, respectively, it isn’t surprising that our arguments aren’t strictly inconsistent. My argument, however, provides reason to think that certain interferences that seem epistemically pareto efficient may not be—interpreting the evidence well and concluding $p$ doesn’t provide ground to interfere with another because they conclude not-$p$. Thus, even if Ahlstrom-Vij’s conditional claim is correct, my argument narrows the range of cases in which it applies—the pareto condition isn’t met in permissive cases.

I have been arguing that in permissive cases, epistemic paternalism is not epistemically permitted. One might worry that epistemic permissivism concerns epistemic *rationality*—but rationality doesn’t guarantee truth. Permissivism wouldn’t speak to epistemic paternalism concerned with promoting true beliefs, rather than rational ones. I could be in a permissive case and acknowledge that another’s beliefs are perfectly rational, but act paternalistically for the sake of promoting true beliefs.

In response, the problem here is that from the perspective of the agents in the permissive case, the evidence does not make the truth obvious. Some have likened permissive cases to cases of underdetermination in science (Jackson & Turnbull forthcoming)—in these cases, the evidence underdetermines what one ought to conclude. When I find myself in a permissive case, I’m not in a position to know whether my paternalistic action would be alethically valuable for another. Thus, permissivism also undermines the alethic justification for epistemic paternalism.

In this, my claims about the permissibility of permissivism take the agent’s perspective seriously. This raises the question: Does one have to *know* they are in a permissive case? Suppose one is in a permissive case but they have no idea; is paternalism unjustified for them? In response, while the simplest case in one in which agents know or justifiedly believe their case is
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permissive, the applicability of my argument goes beyond these straightforward cases. If the probability that the case is permissive is high enough, then the expected epistemic utility of the interference often won’t be justified on balance (depending on the expected gains and losses of the interference).

Generally, many disagreements are pervasive, and open-mindedness is difficult to cultivate. It is hard to see when someone who disagrees with you is employing another, equally legitimate epistemic standard, as this often requires epistemic empathy that involves “taking on” their perspective. Because this can be so challenging, I worry that there are cases where one might think one is engaging in legitimate epistemic paternalism—helping out another epistemically. However, one is instead ruling out another adequate way of interpreting the evidence. And this could have long-term bad effects—for example, stifling new ideas and free inquiry. Thus, we have reason to exercise caution and consider whether we might be in an epistemically permissive case before engaging in epistemic paternalism.

Of course, some deny that permissive cases ever occur. While I’ve motivated interpersonal permissivism with epistemic standards, the permissivism debate is complex and has a growing literature, and I cannot fully settle it here. If one were convinced permissive cases are impossible, then this argument won’t have purchase for them (although they need a response to the argument for permissivism from epistemic standards).

Also note that there is a distinction between moderate and extreme permissivism. Extreme permissivists maintain that there are evidential situations in which all doxastic attitudes toward a proposition are permitted (e.g., belief, withholding, and disbelief; all credences between [0,1]). Moderate permissivists maintain merely that there are evidential situations in which a subset of those doxastic attitudes is permitted (e.g., only belief and withholding; only credences between [0.9, 0.7]). In moderately permissive cases, it may be justified to engage in paternalism to move others away from the impermissible attitudes. For example, if you and I are in an evidential situation that permits belief in $p$ and withholding on $p$, but not disbelief, I may be justified in paternalistically nudging you away from disbelief. Nonetheless, paternalism is unjustified when it draws others away from the permitted attitudes.

My main claim is as follows:

Strong claim: If, given their evidence and a proposition $p$, agents are in an epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes A1-An in $p$, it is always epistemically wrong for any of them to paternalistically interfere to change the other’s attitude A1-An in $p$.

I’ve provided several reasons to think this claim is true. However, the assumption of epistemic consequentialism makes it challenging to establish
in a short chapter. It requires that, in the permissive cases described, there is no epistemic good (even in the long run) that outweighs the losses associated with interfering with another’s inquiry. I’ve tried to explain earlier why I think there are serious losses associated with this kind of interference, and also why other possible epistemic goods (e.g., true beliefs) won’t outweigh these losses in permissive cases. I realize, though, that all might not be convinced. In this case, there are two weaker claims to fall back on:

Weak claim 1: If, given their evidence and a proposition $p$, agents are in an epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes $A1$-$A_n$ in $p$, then a potential justification they might have for interfering with each other’s inquiry is undermined.

Weak claim 2: If, given their evidence and a proposition $p$, agents are in an epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes $A1$-$A_n$ in $p$, it is often epistemically wrong for any of them to paternalistically interfere to change the other’s attitude $A1$-$A_n$ in $p$.

Note that the first weak claim asserts that permissivism simply undermines a potential positive justification for paternalism but doesn’t necessarily claim we have positive reason not to do it. The difference between the second weak claim and the strong claim is the scope of the cases involved. I hope I’ve at least convinced the reader of these claims.

Generally, then, the possibility of permissive cases undermine a justification for epistemic paternalism, and renders epistemic paternalism unjustified, at least in most permissive cases. Now, I turn to another epistemological thesis that also speaks against a class of paternalistic interferences—standpoint epistemology.

**STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY**

Standpoint epistemology comes in many forms. Here, I focus on a general version that states that one’s social position affects the epistemic goods that one can access. More precisely, standpoint epistemology is the view that one’s social situation gives one unique access to epistemic goods (such as information/evidence, concepts, ways of interpreting or weighing evidence, etc.) that people in other social situations cannot access. In other words, two different people can come to very different conclusions about the same matter, either because they end up having different evidence, or because they end up interpreting or weighing evidence quite differently. Standpoint epistemologists argue that one’s social situation affects both what one in fact knows
(or rationally believes), but also what is knowable (or rationally believable) for them. There are two versions of this thesis:

Global standpoint epistemology: one’s social situation affects all of their (epistemically) rational beliefs/knowledge.

Local standpoint epistemology: one’s social situation affects some of their (epistemically) rational beliefs/knowledge.

I sense that most standpoint epistemologists endorse the local thesis, rather than the global one. For example, one’s gender might not affect their beliefs about the weather tomorrow, but it may affect their views on divorce, abortion, or labor economics. The local thesis also helps with the worry that standpoint epistemology leads to a problematic global subjectivism, an objection that has been discussed extensively, especially in terms of implications for scientific objectivity and progress. Thus, I will focus on the local thesis.

Standpoint epistemology has been linked to various other epistemological theses; for instance, Toole (forthcoming) likens it to pragmatic or moral encroachment, as she focuses on how non-epistemic social facts can affect knowledge. At the same time, it appears to have quite a bit in common with epistemic permissivism, especially the interpersonal strand of permissivism discussed earlier. One’s social situation can affect, shape, and potentially even partially constitute one’s epistemic standard, and thus the way one weighs and processes evidence. In fact, standpoints and epistemic standards might be two ways of describing the same phenomenon. Two people may share evidence, but due to their distinct social situations, process that evidence very differently and come to incompatible conclusions. In the same way, there isn’t always a unique most-rational standpoint, there isn’t a unique most-rational standard. Thus, it seems natural for advocates of standpoint epistemology to adopt a permissivist epistemology; similarly, advocates of intrapersonal permissivism might find themselves sympathetic to standpoint epistemology.

Given that standpoint epistemology and interpersonal permissivism have some notable similarities, it makes sense that standpoint epistemology would also render epistemic paternalism unjustified, at least on the matters affected by the standpoint. The basic idea is this: A might consider acting paternalistically (e.g., withholding evidence from B or interfering with the way B processes evidence) because B would come to a completely different conclusion if B had that evidence or processed that evidence according to B’s standpoint. However, if both standpoints are epistemically legitimate ways of interpreting evidence, then A can’t justify paternalism because B would have more rational beliefs if A interfered. Further, because in most of these cases, A also
won’t have access to the truth of the matter, the interference can’t be veritistically justified either. And again, the interference will often lead to epistemically bad results—stifling distinct perspectives and the values associated with epistemic diversity. So, there are epistemic negatives associated with interfering, and epistemic positives associated with not-interfering. Thus, standpoint epistemology also renders epistemic paternalism unjustified.

Here is a way to see my overall argument in this section. Standpoint epistemology is closely related to interpersonal permissivism. We’ve already seen that epistemic paternalism is unjustified in permissive cases. Thus, the same considerations apply to situations where one’s standpoint affects one’s epistemic attitudes.

One might object that it is possible to endorse standpoint epistemology but deny permissivism. Maybe a standpoint has a single purpose, that is., changing what evidence one has, and two people with different standpoints will always have different evidence. My response is twofold. First, on this view, one’s standpoint has a relatively limited function; all it does is affect what evidence one has. There is a reason to think that this is not the only function of the standpoint. A natural alternative picture is a permissivist standpoint epistemology, on which the standpoint also affects the way one weighs or processes evidence—especially given the apparent similarities between standpoints and epistemic standards.

A second reply is that standpoint epistemology might, on its own, render epistemic paternalism unjustified, whether or not permissivism is true. For example, there might be something epistemically valuable about the fact that different standpoints provide different bodies of evidence. Consider the literature on the cognitive division of labor, which supports the idea that researchers pursing a large variety of different projects is long-term epistemically best. This diversity is valuable even if, from our current perspective, some of those projects have a low probability of success (or the hypotheses they are testing have a low prior probability; see Kitcher 1990, 1993). The epistemic value of diverse perspectives is emphasized in this literature. Muldoon (2013: 123–124) summarizes, “In several of the models of the division of cognitive labor . . . diversity plays an important and positive role . . . it encourages differences in agents, and as more diversity is generated, we can make a finer-grained division of labor.” Epistemic diversity—including the diversity of various standpoints—leads to breakthroughs in the context of collective inquiry, and paternalistically interfering with others to promote a monistic way of thinking stifles this. This speaks against interfering with the inquiry of people with other standpoints, whether or not permissivism is true.

Second, one might object that standpoint epistemology is disanalogous to permissivism because standpoint epistemology privileges certain standpoints. For instance, many standpoint epistemologists would claim that the female
standpoint should be *privileged* over, not merely considered alongside of, the male standpoint when it comes to questions like abortion. In response, this is analogous to the way permissivists view epistemic standards, since permissivists don’t maintain that any epistemic standard produces rational beliefs. Their view is not that that any standard goes. At the same time, both permissivists and standpoint theorists posit that there are multiple, equally epistemically good standpoints; even if the female standpoint should sometimes be privileged over the male standpoint, we also shouldn’t assume all women have the same standpoint—not all women agree on whether and when abortion is morally permitted, for instance. As Bowell (2019: sec. 7a) says, “Feminist standpoint theories can also be misunderstood as proposing a single, monolithic feminist standpoint . . . [but they] are clearly not committed to the project of formulating a homogenous women’s or feminist standpoint.” Thus, on both views, certain viewpoints are privileged, but multiple equally good viewpoints sometimes arrive at competing verdicts.

**CONCLUSION**

On many epistemic theories, such as permissivism and standpoint theory, there isn’t one privileged way of interpreting a body of evidence. I’ve pointed out that this shared commitment highlights a noteworthy connection between standpoint epistemology and epistemic permissivism, and suggested that prominent versions of standpoint epistemology have much in common with interpersonal permissivism.

I’ve also argued that this points us to a class of cases in which epistemic paternalism is epistemically unjustified. We might be quite confident that we are doing someone an epistemic favor, when in reality, we are imposing our own standards on them. In these cases, epistemic paternalism can have bad long-term consequences: squelching valuable perspectives and promoting a monistic way of thinking. Thus, we ought to exercise caution before engaging in epistemically paternalistic practices, and consider whether we might be in a permissive case or imposing our standpoint on another.

**NOTES**

1. For philosophical discussions of paternalism, see Mill (1869), Dworkin (2010), Grill and Hanna (2018).
3. This definition is found in Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 51) and Bullock (2018: 434).
4. This example features prominently in Goldman (1991). However, it is unclear that withholding information from a jury counts as epistemic paternalism in many real-life cases, since, upon agreeing to be on a jury, one should realize that evidence might be withheld from them, due to the relevant laws about inadmissible evidence in courtrooms. Thus, it is plausible that, upon agreeing to be a juror, one is consenting to have evidence withheld from them. Thanks to Kirk Lougheed.

5. See Jackson (forthcoming-a) and Jackson and Turnbull (forthcoming) for further discussion of the ways that one’s broader epistemic situation can affect one’s beliefs without affecting one’s evidence.

6. This raises the question: Does an action count as epistemic paternalism if it is done partially for one’s epistemic good and partially for their moral and/or practical good? This question deserves more attention but goes beyond the scope of this chapter; see Bullock (2018: 443) and Jackson (forthcoming-b) for discussion. Thanks to Seth Lazar.

7. See, for example, Goldman (1991) and Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a). Pritchard (2013) discusses ways that epistemic paternalism might promote both true beliefs and understanding.

8. Thanks to Pamela Robinson.


10. See Tidman (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019), and Jackson (forthcoming-b).


13. For further examples of ways epistemic standards might differ, see Nolan (2014) and Meacham (2014).

14. There is a question of how often judges employ this sort of reasoning to justify paternalism in real life. In the United States, for instance, the withholding of information is often formal and procedural, for example, juries cannot see a defendant’s criminal record. I don’t want to rule out the possibility, however, that judges also withhold information for non-procedural reasons, for example, because from their point of view, it will mislead the jury. Further, my points can be applied to many cases that don’t involve courtrooms; the courtroom case is merely to illustrate a more general point. Thanks to Guy Axtell. (See also note 4).


16. Thanks to Justin D’Ambrosio.


18. This distinction is found in White (2005). For a defense of moderate permissivism, see Roeber (forthcoming); for an argument against moderate permissivism, see Horowitz (2014).

19. Thanks to Klaas Kray.
20. Standpoint epistemology was developed from Marxist epistemology by Smith (1974), Hartsock (1983), Rose (1983), and Harding (1986). For recent discussions, see Wylie (2003), Kukla (2006), Solomon (2009), and Toole (forthcoming). See also the 2009 (vol. 24, no. 4) symposium on standpoint theory in *Hypatia*, introduced and summarized by Crasnow (2009).

21. Many standpoint epistemologists affirm several additional claims, for example, (a) that these epistemic goods are not merely passively received, but are often actively sought after and constitute an achievement, (b) that there is unique epistemic advantage associated with powerlessness, and, a normative claim, (c) that we ought to embrace the valuable contributions to knowledge that differing standpoints provide.


24. Thanks to Janine Jones. An interesting area for further research is whether standpoint epistemology could also be linked with diachronic *intrapersonal* permissivism, if one’s standpoint/epistemic standard changed over time.

25. Thanks to Justin D’Ambrosio.

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