

Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's
Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra
– Essence of the Jaina *Nyāya*

आचार्य माणिक्यनन्दि विरचित
परीक्षामुख सूत्र



Divine Blessings:
Ācārya 108 Viśuddhasāgara Muni

VIJAY K. JAIN

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– **Essence of the Jaina Nyāya**


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विकल्प

Front cover:

As the story goes, the learned *Brāhmaṇa* Pātrakesarī was highly restive when after listening to the '*Devāgama-stotra*' from the mouth of a *Digambara* ascetic he failed to comprehend the true mark (*lakṣaṇa*) of the kind of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that is termed the inference (*anumāna*). *Devī* Padmāvatī came to his rescue and told him that when he visits the temple next morning he shall find the answer.

The image depicts the verse (*śloka*) that Pātrakesarī found etched on the hood of the serpent that adorned the idol of Lord Pārśvanātha. (see also, p. 2 of the book)



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
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DIVINE BLESSINGS

मंगल आशीर्वाद -

परम पूज्य दिगम्बराचार्य १०८ श्री विशुद्धसागर जी मुनिराज



प्रमाण और नय के द्वारा वस्तु के वस्तुत्व की सिद्धि होती है। मात्र प्रमाण से अथवा नय से वस्तु तत्त्व की सिद्धि असंभव है, इसलिए प्रमाण एवं नय का विशद अभ्यास करना प्रत्येक सुधी पुरुष का कर्तव्य है। नय-प्रमाणात्मक वचन-व्यवहार, वस्तुत्व समझाने व समझने की पद्धति न्याय है। 'न्याय-विद्या' विश्व की विशिष्ट विद्या है। इसके बिना समीचीन सत्यार्थ-बोध संभव नहीं है।

वस्तु का वस्तुत्व विशाल है; इसे समझने के लिए शब्दागम, तर्कागम और परमागम का ज्ञान अनिवार्य है। सम्यक् श्रद्धा का उद्घाटन तर्कागम के अभ्यास से संभव है। वस्तु के सकलार्थ को जो ग्रहण करता है वह 'प्रमाण' है और जो वस्तु के अंश को ग्रहण करता है वह 'नय' है। प्रमाण के अंश-का-अंश ही नय है। नय न प्रमाण है, न अप्रमाण; वह तो प्रमाण-अंश ही है।

जैन वाङ्मय विश्व में विशदता को प्राप्त है। न्याय, सिद्धान्त, व्याकरण, अध्यात्म, भूगोल, खगोल, ज्योतिष, तंत्र-मंत्र, नीतिशास्त्र, अर्थशास्त्रादि से पूर्ण है। जिस दर्शन के

.....

पास प्रचुर साहित्य-सम्पदा एवं पुरातत्त्व नहीं उसका जीवन अल्प है। सनातन काल से जैन दर्शन उभय सम्पत्ति के बल पर ही विश्व में जीवित है तथा अखण्ड-विद्या 'अध्यात्म-विद्या' के कारण विश्व-गुरुता को प्राप्त है। भारत देश अध्यात्म-विद्या के बल से ही तो विश्व-गुरु है।

जैन दर्शन में 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' न्याय-शास्त्र श्रेष्ठ एवं प्रधान सूत्र-शास्त्र है जिसमें प्रमाण एवं प्रमाणाभास की विशद विवेचना की गई है। स्वापूर्वार्थग्राही सम्यक्-ज्ञान प्रमाण है। जिससे हित की प्राप्ति एवं अहित का परिहार होता है ऐसा सत्यार्थ-बोधक सम्यक्-ज्ञान ही प्रमाण है। जो प्रमाण से भिन्न मिथ्या-ज्ञान है वह प्रमाणाभास है। आचार्यप्रवर माणिक्यनन्दि स्वामी ने प्रमाण एवं प्रमाणाभास की विशद व्याख्या 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' जी ग्रंथ में की है। सम्प्रति न्याय-विद्या विशारदों के लिए 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' ग्रंथ प्रधान-ग्रंथ है। इस ग्रंथ पर आचार्यप्रवर श्री प्रभाचन्द्र स्वामी ने विशाल 'प्रमेयकमल मार्तण्ड' नामक टीका-ग्रंथ लिख कर न्याय-जगत् का महान् उपकार किया है।

बालबोध के लिए सरलता से प्रमाण-प्रमाणाभास का अधिगम हो जाए, इसलिए आचार्यप्रवर श्री लघु अनन्तवीर्य स्वामी ने 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' पर 'प्रमेयरत्नमाला' नाम की गूढ़ टीका लिखी है। अन्य लघु टीकायें भी उपलब्ध हैं।

सम्प्रति जैन न्याय विषयक जिज्ञासा की पूर्ति हेतु विश्व में अहिन्दी-भाषी आंग्ल-प्रिय जनों के प्रतिबोध हेतु सरल-हृदयी, जिनागम-भक्त, निर्ग्रन्थ गुरु-श्रीचरण आराधक, जिनदेव वचन प्रमाण मानने वाले विद्वान श्री विजय जैन (देहरादून) ने 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' पर जो आंग्ल-भाषा में विवेचना की है वह प्रशंसनीय है। आपका यह पुरुषार्थ भव्यों के अज्ञान-अविद्या जन्य तम-हरण के लिए दिव्य-आदित्य प्रकाशवत कार्य करेगा। आपके श्रुत-संवेग भाव के लिए मंगल आशीष...।

आप इसी प्रकार जिनशासन, नमोऽस्तुशासन का उद्योतन करते रहें।

'इति शुभम् भूयात्'।

ग्रीष्म वाचना, तीर्थराज श्री सम्मेद शिखरजी

श्रमणाचार्य विशुद्धसागर

मधुबन, झारखण्ड (भारत)

13 अप्रैल 2021



P R E F A C E

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra:

एकान्तदृष्टिप्रतिषेधि तत्त्वं प्रमाणसिद्धं तदतत्त्वभावम् ।

त्वया प्रणीतं सुविधे स्वधाम्ना नैतत्समालीढपदं त्वदन्यैः ॥ (९-१-४१)

हे सुविधिनाथ (श्री पुष्पदन्त) भगवन्! आपने अपने केवलज्ञान-रूप तेज से यथार्थ जानकर जो जीवादि पदार्थों के स्वभाव का प्रतिपादन किया वह एकान्त दर्शन का निषेधक अर्थात् अनेकान्त दर्शन का पोषक है। प्रत्यक्ष-परोक्ष प्रमाणों से सिद्ध है। तत् (विधि) तथा अतत् (निषेध) स्वरूप अर्थात् किसी अपेक्षा से तत्स्वरूप है, किसी अपेक्षा से अतत्स्वरूप है। आपसे अन्य, जो सर्वज्ञ व वीतराग नहीं हैं, उन्होंने इस प्रकार तत्त्व का अनुभव प्राप्त नहीं किया है।

O Lord Suvidhinātha! With the light of your omniscience you had promulgated the nature of the reality in a manner which contradicts the absolutist (*ekānta*) point-of-view, well-founded, and incorporates the principle of predication involving both, the affirmation (*tat*) and the negation (*atat*), depending on the point-of-view. Others have not been able to view the nature of the reality in such light.



The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) ascertains the true nature of objects while the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) does the opposite. *Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra* describes both these (*pramāṇa* and *pramāṇābhāsa*) for the benefit of the uninitiated learners.

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the definitive (*vyavasāyātmaka*) knowledge of the self (*sva*) and of the things not ascertained earlier (*apūrvārtha*). Since *pramāṇa* (valid-knowledge) enables one to acquire things favorable and relinquish things unfavorable, therefore, it can be nothing but knowledge (*jñāna*).

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is of two kinds: the direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the indirect (*parokṣa*).

.....

The knowledge that is ‘*viśada*’ – unambiguous (*nirmala*, *spaṣṭa*) – is the direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The knowledge obtained with the help of the senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*mana*) is partially (*ekadeśa*) unambiguous (*viśada*) – with respect to some part only – and is called the mundane-direct (*sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa*) knowledge.

That which is different from the direct (*pratyakṣa*) is the indirect (*parokṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge is that which is caused by direct (*pratyakṣa*), etc., and has these divisions: remembrance (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), inductive-reasoning (*tarka*), inference (*anumāna*), and the Scripture (*āgama*).

The two kinds of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) – the direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the indirect (*parokṣa*) – are described now in some detail.

The supreme-direct (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

Omniscience (*kevalajñāna*)

Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra:

उवओगविसुद्धो जो विगदावरणंतरायमोहरओ ।

भूदो सयमेवादा जादि परं णेयभूदाणं ॥१-१५॥

जो आत्मा शुद्धोपयोग से निर्मल हो गया है, अर्थात् जो शुद्धोपयोगी जीव है वही तीनकालवर्ती समस्त पदार्थों के जानने वाले केवलज्ञान को प्राप्त होता है। कैसा होता हुआ? दूर हुई है ज्ञानावरण, दर्शनावरण, अन्तराय तथा मोहनीय कर्मरूप धूलि (मल) जिससे – ऐसा आप ही होता हुआ।

The soul that has become pristine through pure-cognition (*śuddhopayoga*), and has washed away, by own effort, the dirt of the obscuring – knowledge-obscuring (*jñānavaraṇīya*) and faith-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇīya*) – along with the obstructive (*antarāya*) and the deluding (*mohanīya*) karmas, comprehends fully all objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*).

The soul established in pure-cognition (*śuddhopayoga*) attains, on destruction of the four inimical karmas, omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) that

knows fully all objects of the three times (the past, the present, and the future). The nature of the soul is knowledge, and knowledge is coextensive with the objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*); knowledge pervades the objects-of-knowledge. Since the objects-of-knowledge are all objects of the three worlds and the three times, it follows that omniscience, the fruit of pure-cognition (*śuddhopayoga*), knows all objects of the three worlds and the three times.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायेषु केवलस्य ॥ (१-२९)

केवलज्ञान का विषय-सम्बन्ध सर्व द्रव्य और सर्व पर्याय हैं, अर्थात् केवलज्ञान एक ही साथ सभी पदार्थों को और उनकी सभी पर्यायों को जानता है।

Omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) extends to all substances (*dravya*) and all their modes (*paryāya*) simultaneously.

The attributive 'sarva' – all – is added to both, 'dravya' – substance, and 'paryāya' – mode.

The soul-substances (*jīva dravya*) are infinite-times-infinite (*anantānanta*). The forms of matter (*pudgala dravya*) are infinite-times-infinite of these. Atoms (*aṇu*) and molecules (*skandha*) are the divisions of matter. The medium of motion (*dharma dravya*), the medium of rest (*adharma dravya*) and the space (*ākāśa dravya*) are three. The substance of time (*kāla dravya*) is innumerable (*asaṃkhyāta*). Each of these substances has infinite-times-infinite modes (*paryāya*), extending through the past, the present and the future. There is nothing, either substance (*dravya*) or mode (*paryāya*), which does not come within the purview of omniscience (*kevalajñāna*). The fact that omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) encompasses all substances (*dravya*) and all modes (*paryāya*) highlights its boundless virtue.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

मोहक्षयाज्ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायक्षयाच्च केवलम् ॥ (१०-१)

मोह का क्षय होने से (अन्तर्मुहूर्त पर्यन्त क्षीणकषाय नामक गुणस्थान प्राप्त करने के बाद) और ज्ञानावरण, दर्शनावरण तथा अन्तराय इन तीन कर्मों का एक साथ क्षय होने से केवलज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है।

Omniscience or perfect knowledge – *kevalajñāna* – is attained on destruction of delusion (*moha*), and on destruction of knowledge-covering (*jñānāvaraṇa*), perception-covering (*darśanāvaraṇa*) and obstructive (*antarāya*) karmas.

Ācārya Amṛtacandra's *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*:

तज्जयति परं ज्योतिः समं समस्तैरनन्तपर्यायैः ।

दर्पणतल इव सकला प्रतिफलति पदार्थमालिका यत्र ॥१॥

जिसमें सम्पूर्ण अनन्त पर्यायों से सहित समस्त पदार्थों की माला अर्थात् समूह दर्पण के तल-भाग के समान झलकती है, वह उत्कृष्ट ज्योति अर्थात् केवलज्ञानरूपी प्रकाश जयवन्त हो।

Victory to the Supreme Effulgence (omniscience – the infinite and all-embracing knowledge) that images, as it were in a mirror, all substances and their infinite modes, extending through the past, the present, and the future.

The soul established in its Pure Self (through *śuddhopayoga*) attains omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) without the help of or reliance on any outside agency (such a soul is appropriately termed self-dependent or *svayambhū*). Intrinsically possessed of infinite knowledge and energy, the soul, depending on the self, performs the activity of attaining its infinite knowledge-character and, therefore, the soul is the doer (*kartā*). The soul's concentration on its own knowledge-character is the activity; the soul, therefore, is the activity (*karma*). Through its own knowledge-character the soul attains omniscience and, therefore, the soul is the instrument (*karaṇa*). The soul engrossed in pure consciousness imparts pure consciousness to self; the soul, therefore, is the bestowal (*saṃpradāna*). As the soul gets established in its pure nature, at the same time, destruction of impure subsidential knowledge, etc., takes place and, therefore, the soul is the dislodgement (*apādāna*). The attributes of infinite knowledge and energy are manifested in the soul itself; the soul, therefore, is the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*). This way, from the transcendental point-of-view, the soul itself, without the help of others, is the sixfold factors-of-action (*niścaya ṣaṭkāraka*) in the attainment of omniscience through pure-cognition (*śuddhopayoga*).

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On destruction of the four inimical (*ghātī*) karmas, the self-dependent soul – ‘*svayambhū*’ – attains infinite knowledge (that illumines the self as well as all other objects) and indestructible happiness, both beyond the five senses (as such, termed *atīndriya*). It then is characterized by infinite knowledge – *kevalajñāna* (on destruction of the *jñānāvaraṇīya* karma), infinite perception – *kevaladarśana* (on destruction of the *darśanāvaraṇīya* karma), infinite faith or belief in the essential principles of the reality – *kṣāyika-samyaktva* (on destruction of the *mohanīya* karma), and infinite power – *anantavīrya* (on destruction of the *antarāya* karma). The own-nature (*svabhāva*) of the soul is knowledge-bliss (*jñānānanda*), manifested on attainment of its pure state of perfection, rid of all external influence. Just as the brightness of the sun gets diffused on emergence of the clouds but regains intensity as the clouds fade away, similarly, on destruction of the inimical (*ghātī*) karmas, the soul regains its own-nature of infinite knowledge-bliss (*jñānānanda*).

The Omniscient Lord (*kevalajñānī*) attains the light of knowledge that is steady like the light of the jewel. It neither accepts nor rejects the objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*) and the objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*) do not cause transformation in the soul. The soul experiences only the nature of own soul by own soul, utterly indifferent to all external objects. As objects like the pot and the board get reflected in the mirror without the mirror wanting to reflect these, all objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*) of the three times get reflected in the knowledge of the Omniscient Lord without him having any desire to know these. He is just the knower (*jñātā*) and the seer (*dṛṣṭā*). The knowing soul is utterly different from all foreign objects; only empirically, there is the relationship of the knower (*jñāyaka*) and the known (*jñeya*).

Omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) is direct, sense-independent knowledge. It is without anxiety; therefore, it is perfect happiness.

Ācārya Kundakunda’s *Pravacanasāra*:

जादं सयं समत्तं णाणमणंतत्थवित्थडं विमलं ।

रहिदं तु ओग्गहादिहिं सुहं ति एगंतियं भणिदं ॥१-५१॥

अपने आप से ही उत्पन्न, सम्पूर्ण पदार्थों में फैला हुआ, निर्मल, और अवग्रहादि से रहित, ऐसा ज्ञान निश्चय (अतीन्द्रिय) सुख है; ऐसा सर्वज्ञदेव ने कहा है।

The Omniscient Lord has proclaimed that the knowledge that is self-born, perfect, spread over every object, stainless, and free from stages – including apprehension (*avagraha*) and speculation (*īhā*) – is certainly the absolute (pure) happiness.

Omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) is complete and without envelopment as it pervades every space-point (*pradeśa*) of the soul with its infinite energy. It encompasses all objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*). Rid of the karmic dirt that hinders infinite energy and causes of imperfections like doubt (*saṁśaya*), it is pristine (*nirmala*). It knows without stages; it knows simultaneously the whole range of objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*) in the universe and beyond, covering the three times. Direct, sense-independent knowledge is without-anxiety (*nirāṅkula*); it is the natural state of the soul and, therefore, absolute happiness.

Clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*) and telepathy (*manahpariyaya-jñāna*) also comprise the supreme (*mukhya*) and direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge. Although not encompassing all objects of the three-worlds and the three-times, these are partially (*ekadeśa*) direct (*pratyakṣa*) and are absolutely unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*) in respect of their respective subject-matter.

Clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*)

Clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*) is of two kinds according to the nature of its origin. The first is due to birth – *bhavapratyaya*, and the second owes its origin to destruction-cum-subsidence of the particular karmic veil – *kṣayopaśamanimittaka*.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

भवप्रत्ययोऽवधिर्देवनारकाणाम् ॥ (१-२१)

भवप्रत्यय नामक अवधिज्ञान देव और नारकियों के होता है।

Clairvoyance based on birth – *bhavapratyaya avadhijñāna* – is possessed by the celestial and the infernal beings.

What is the state of existence '*bhava*'? The mode (*paryāya*) of the soul is the state of its existence; it is caused by the life- and name-karmas (*āyu*,

nāmakarma). 'Pratyaya' means cause (*kāraṇa*) or instrumental cause (*nimitta*). The *avadhijñāna* that has the state of existence (*bhava*) for its cause or origin is the *bhavapratyaya avadhijñāna*. It is possessed by the deva and the infernal beings. In that case, there would be no destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of the karmic veil in this type of clairvoyance. No, it is not so. In case of these beings, the karmic veil disappears and subsides due to their state of being (*bhava*). So the state of being (*bhava*) is mentioned as the main cause. Birds fly by instinct (inborn tendency) and not because of teaching. So also clairvoyance arises in these beings not because of any special merit such as observance of vows or restraint, but by reason of their state of existence (*bhava*). The state of existence being common to all, it would mean that all are endowed with the same degree of clairvoyance. But differences in the degree of clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*) possessed by these beings are admitted. Though the beings in heaven and hell are mentioned in general, only those endowed with right faith among them are implied. This is clear from the term 'avadhi' used in the *sūtra*. In case of wrong believers, it is called *vibhaṅga* (erroneous) clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*) as it is vitiated by their wrong belief. The degree of clairvoyance among them can be ascertained from the Scripture.

If clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*) based on birth arises in celestial and infernal beings, in whom does clairvoyance arise due to destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of karmas?

क्षयोपशमनिमित्तः षड्विकल्पः शेषाणाम् ॥ (१-२२)

क्षयोपशमनैमित्तक अवधिज्ञान छह भेद वाला है और वह शेष अर्थात् मनुष्यों तथा तिर्यचों के होता है।

Clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*) due to destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) is of six kinds. It is acquired by the rest, namely, human beings, and animals.

When there is no rise for the present and quiescence (*upśama*) for the future in their present state, of the totally-obscuring (*sarvaghātī*) karmic-molecules (*spardhaka*) of clairvoyance-obscuring (*avadhijñānāvaraṇīya*) karmas, but there is the rise of the partially-obscuring (*deśaghātī*) karmic-molecules (*spardhaka*) of clairvoyance-obscuring (*avadhijñānā-*

varaṇīya) karmas, that state is called destruction (*kṣaya*). Where these karmas do not attain to the stage of rise but are merely existent, that state is called subsidence or quiescence (*upśama*). That which arises owing to these two causes is called clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*) due to destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopśama*). This must be understood to occur in case of the rest. Who are the rest? The rest are human beings (*manuṣya*) and animals (*tiryāṇca*). Even among them, it must be understood to arise only in case of those who have the necessary capacity. That capacity is not present in those who are without mind – *asaṃjñī* – and who have not attained completion – called *aparyāptaka*. And even among those with mind and completion, it does not arise in all. If so, in whom does it arise? It arises in case of those in whom right faith, etc., are present, and in whom the concerned karmas are quiescent or destroyed. Though clairvoyance arises owing to destruction-cum-subsidence in all cases, the specific mention of ‘due to destruction-cum-subsidence’ is intended for determination, namely, depending on destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopśama*) only and not on the state of existence or birth (*bhava*).

This clairvoyance is of six kinds: *anugāmī*, *ananugāmī*, *vardhamāna*, *hīyamāna*, *avasthita* and *anavasthita* (accompanying, unaccompanying, increasing, decreasing, steady and unsteady, respectively) according to particular characteristics. Just as light accompanies the sun, the first kind – *anugāmī* – accompanies the individual possessing it wherever he goes. The second kind – *ananugāmī* – does not accompany the individual. It passes away then and there, like the reply given to the question of an indifferent person. The third variety – *vardhamāna* – expands rapidly like the fire in the forest caused by friction, which spreads rapidly by means of dried leaves and fuel. It develops from its original degree up to the extent of knowing innumerable universes, owing to the purity of right faith, etc., of the individual. The fourth variety – *hīyamāna* – decreases up to a very small fraction of an *aṅgula* (a very small measure) from its original degree, owing to the decline of right faith and the consequent increase of impure thoughts. The fifth type – *avasthita* – neither decreases nor increases. It is like the mole. It is steadfast at the same level at which it originates, as right faith, etc., continue in the same condition. It is so till death or till the attainment of omniscience. The sixth type – *anavasthita* – is unsteady like the waves in the water caused by the wind. It develops as

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well as deteriorates in accordance with the growth or decline of right faith, etc.

Three other classifications of clairvoyance (*avadhiññāna*) due to destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) – *kṣayopaśamanimittaka* – have been mentioned: *deśāvadhi*, *paramāvadhi* and *sarvāvadhi*. The first kind – *deśāvadhi* – is obtained by animals and human beings. However, for the human beings, it is possible to obtain *paramāvadhi* and *sarvāvadhi* clairvoyance (*avadhiññāna*) in their state of spiritual discipline (*saṃyama*). In the fourth and the fifth *guṇasthāna*, *deśāvadhi* clairvoyance is possible. In higher *guṇasthāna*, all three kinds of clairvoyance are possible. Clairvoyance based on the state of existence – *bhavapratyaya avadhiññāna* – is of the nature of *deśāvadhi*.

रूपिष्ववधेः ॥ (१-२७)

अवधिज्ञान का विषय-सम्बन्ध रूपी द्रव्यों में है, अर्थात् अवधिज्ञान रूपी पदार्थों को जानता है।

The subject matter (*viṣaya*) of clairvoyance (*avadhiññāna*) is substances with form (*rūpī*).

The range or the subject matter (*viṣaya*) is supplied from the previous *sūtra*. The term ‘*rūpī*’ implies forms of the matter (*pudgala*) and embodied souls – bonded souls. The *sūtra* lays down that the scope of clairvoyance (*avadhiññāna*) is restricted to ‘*rūpī*’ substances only and does not extend to non-material substances. Even with regard to ‘*rūpī*’ substances, the range of clairvoyance is limited to certain modes (*paryāya*) only according to its potency and does not extend to all modes of the matter. In order to determine this ‘*asarvaparyāyeṣu*’ (from the previous *sūtra*) should be brought together.

Telepathy (*manahparyayaññāna*)

The marks and subdivisions of telepathy (*manahparyayaññāna*) are described now.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi’s *Tattvārthasūtra*:

ऋजुविपुलमती मनःपर्ययः ॥ (१-२३)

मनःपर्ययज्ञान ऋजुमति और विपुलमति दो प्रकार का है।

The two kinds of telepathy (*manahparyaya-jñāna*) are *ṛjumati* and *vipulamati*.

The word ‘*ṛju*’ means produced and straight. Whereby is it produced? It is produced by the knowledge of objects of speech, body and mind located in the minds of others. He who has straight telepathy is called *ṛjumati*. ‘*Vipula*’ means not produced and curved or winding. How is it not produced? It is not produced by the knowledge of objects of speech, body and mind in the minds of others. He who has complex telepathy is called *vipulamati*. Thus, telepathy is of two kinds – *ṛjumati* and *vipulamati*.

Now that the divisions of telepathy have been mentioned, it must be defined. Telepathy (*manahparyaya-jñāna*) is that knowledge which knows the objects thought of by the minds of others, owing to the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of the energy-obstructing (*viryāntarāya*) and the telepathy-knowledge-obscuring (*manahparyaya-jñānāvaraṇīya*) karmas and depending on the attainment of the name-karmas (*nāmakarma*) of limbs and minor limbs (*aṅgopāṅga*). It may be argued that it is nothing but sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) since it happens in the mind (*mana*). This has already been refuted. The mind is merely for reference as the background. The object located in the mind of another is ascertained by telepathy; the mind is intended only as a background.

Of these two varieties, *ṛjumati* can extend from two or three births of oneself and of others, up to a maximum of seven or eight past or future births. It can extend in space from one *gavyūti* (a measure of length = 2 *krośa*) up to one *yojana* (a measure of length = 4 *krośa*) but not beyond it. The latter – *vipulamati* – can extend from seven or eight births up to innumerable births in the past and in the future. In space it can extend from one *yojana* up to the entire abode of human beings (i.e., up to the mountain range of Mānuśottara) and not beyond that.

Other particulars regarding these two varieties of *manahparyaya-jñānā* are described next.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi’s *Tattvārthasūtra*:

विशुद्ध्यप्रतिपाताभ्यां तद्विशेषः ॥ (१-२४)

परिणामों की विशुद्धि और अप्रतिपात, अर्थात् केवलज्ञान होने से पूर्व न छूटना, इन दो बातों से ऋजुमति और विपुलमति ज्ञान में विशेषता (अन्तर) है।

The differences between the two are due to purity (*viśuddhi*) and infallibility (*apratipāta*).

The state of the soul on destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of the karmic veil covering telepathy is purity. '*Pratipāta*' is fall. Its opposite is infallibility (*apratipāta*). The ascetic whose karmic veil has only subsided (*upaśāntakaṣāya*) but has not been destroyed sometimes falls from his spiritual height in the presence of powerful conduct-deluding (*cāritramohanīya*) karmas. But such a fall does not occur in case of the ascetic whose conduct-deluding (*cāritramohanīya*) karmas have been completely destroyed (*kṣīṇakaṣāya*). And the excellence of telepathy depends upon purity – *viśuddhi* – and absence of fall – *apratipāta*. First, with regard to purity. *Vipulamati* is purer than *ṛjumati* with regard to the object (*dravya*), space (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and nature or condition (*bhāva*). How? The infinitesimal part of karmic matter is ascertained by perfect-clairvoyance (*sarvāvadhiḥjñāna*); its infinitesimal part is the province of *ṛjumati*. And the infinitesimal part of what is known to *ṛjumati* is within the reach of *vipulamati*. Thus the latter knows the infinitesimal part of infinitesimal. Its purity with regard to object (*dravya*), space (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) has thus been mentioned. Purity in regard to nature or condition (*bhāva*) must also be understood from the fact that still subtler or minute forms of matter come within the range of *vipulamati* than *ṛjumati* as it is accompanied by greater destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of karmas. *Vipulamati* is superior to *ṛjumati* also owing to the absence of downfall or deterioration as it is possessed by those with ascending-conduct (*pravardhamāna cāritra*). *Ṛjumati* undergoes downfall or deterioration as it is possessed by those with descending-conduct, owing to the rise of the passions (*kaṣāya*).

What is the scope of telepathy (*manaḥparyayaḥjñāna*)?

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

तदनन्तभागे मनःपर्ययस्य ॥ (१-२८)

(सर्वाविधिज्ञान के विषयभूत) रूपी द्रव्य के अनन्तवें भाग में मनःपर्ययज्ञान का

विषय-सम्बन्ध है।

The scope of telepathy (*manahpariyayañāna*) is the infinitesimal part of the matter ascertained by clairvoyance (*avadhiñāna*).

As mentioned already, telepathy (*manahpariyayañāna*) makes its subject matter one infinitesimal part of the matter ascertained by the highest form of clairvoyance, i.e., *sarvāavadhiñāna*.

The mundane-direct (*sāṃvyaavahārika-pratyakṣa*)
valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

Sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*)

Owing to the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of the karmas which obscure sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*), that which reflects on the objects-of-knowledge through the senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*mana*), or that through which the objects-of-knowledge are reflected upon, or just reflection, is the sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*).

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

तदिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तम् ॥ (१-१४)

इन्द्रियाँ और मन उस मतिज्ञान के निमित्त हैं।

That – sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) – is caused by the senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*mana*).

He who is invested with lordship and wealth is 'indra'. Here the word means the soul. The soul is of the nature of knowledge. However, when there is the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of knowledge-obscuring karmas, the soul, by itself, is unable to know the objects. And that which acts as the instrument for acquisition of knowledge by the soul is the sense (*indriya*). Or that which causes the knowledge of hidden objects is the sign (*liṅga*). Accordingly, that which promotes the knowledge of the subtle soul, is the sense (*indriya*). For instance, smoke is the cause of the knowledge of the fire. Similarly, the senses, such as touch, etc., cannot exist without the soul. Hence by means of those senses the existence of the soul is inferred. Or, 'indra' is the word denoting the name-

karma (*nāmakarma*). The senses (*indriya*) are built by that. ‘*Anindriya*’, ‘*mana*’, ‘*antaḥkaraṇa*’ are synonyms.

The word ‘*anindriya*’ is the negation of ‘*indriya*’ – sense. How then can it be used to denote the mind which is also a sign of the soul? The negative sign ‘*a*’ is used in the sense of slight or a little. A quasi-sense is called ‘*anindriya*’. For instance there is the usage ‘*anudarā kanyā*’ – the girl ‘without’ the belly. Here the meaning of ‘without’ is taken as ‘slight’ or ‘thin’. How is the meaning ‘slight’ applied to the mind? The sense-organs perceive objects within a limited range, and these last for a long time. But the mind is not like these. Objects that are perceived by the senses as well as those not perceived by the senses are subject to mental cognition. Though the mind is also the sign (*liṅga*) of the soul (*indra*), it neither cognizes objects within a limited range nor remains for long (the mental attitude changes quickly).

The mind is described as an internal sense. In investigating good and evil and in remembrance, etc., the mind is not dependent on the senses. Nor is the mind seen outwardly like the eyes, etc. So it is called the internal sense.

What for is ‘*tad*’ – ‘that’ – used? ‘That’ is used for denoting the sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*). Now sensory-knowledge has just been mentioned. It is argued that a rule or an exception refers to what has just been described. So this *sūtra* would refer to the sensory-knowledge only even without the word ‘that’. The answer is, ‘that’ is intended to refer to this (previous) *sūtra* as well as the following *sūtra*. The knowledge that has synonyms like ‘*mati*’ is caused by the senses and the mind. And the same has four stages – impression (*avagraha*), inquisitiveness (*īhā*), comprehension (*avāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*). If ‘that’ were not used, the synonyms such as ‘*mati*’ would refer to the sensory-knowledge, and the kind of knowledge caused by the senses and the mind, would refer to the scriptural-knowledge with the four stages mentioned in the next *sūtra*. Thus it would lead to a faulty interpretation.

The stages of the sensory-knowledge are mentioned in the next *sūtra*.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi’s *Tattvārthasūtra*:

अवग्रहेहावायधारणाः ॥ (१-१५)

अवग्रह, ईहा, अवाय और धारणा – ये चार (उस मतिज्ञान के) भेद हैं।

Impression – *avagraha*, inquisitiveness – *īhā*, comprehension – *avāya*, and retention – *dhāraṇā*, are the four stages [of sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*)].

The first off awareness or adoption of an object as it comes in the range of the senses is impression (*avagraha*), the first stage of sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*). When there is the meeting of the sense-organ and the object, it is first perceived and that is called *darśana*. The awareness of the object immediately following it is *avagraha*. For instance, on seeing an object, the impression that it is white in colour is *avagraha*. The desire to know particulars regarding the object apprehended through *avagraha* is inquisitiveness (*īhā*). Thus, the desire to know more – ‘Is that white object a crane or a flag?’ – is inquisitiveness (*īhā*). Knowing the object, as it is, after ascertaining its particulars is the next stage – comprehension (*avāya*). By its movement up and down and by the flapping of the wings, it is ascertained that it is a crane only and not a flag. Retention (*dhāraṇā*) is the cause of not forgetting in the future what was ascertained in the past. For instance, ‘This is the same crane which I saw this morning,’ is retention (*dhāraṇā*). These are mentioned in the *sūtra* in the order in which these arise.

The indirect (*parokṣa*)
valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

Remembrance (*smṛti*)

To remember something that has been experienced earlier is remembrance (*smṛti*). This implies that for remembrance (*smṛti*) the direct (*pratyakṣa*) instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) is the retention (*dhāraṇā*) – the fourth stage of the sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) – of the earlier experience.

Remembrance (*smṛti*) is caused by bringing to the fore the earlier retention (*dhāraṇā*) and gaining the knowledge that ‘that’ – particular object – has the same form. For instance, ‘This is the same crane which I saw this morning,’ is retention. Thus, the earlier lasting impression is

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retention (*dhāraṇā*). Remembrance (*smṛti*) is bringing to the fore the earlier lasting impression, i.e., retention (*dhāraṇā*), and determining the form of the object seen.

Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*)

The knowledge based on the confluence of the present vision and remembrance (*smṛti*) of the earlier vision is recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*).

Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) is of several kinds, including:

Recognition of the same – *ekatva pratyabhijñāna* – ‘It is the same’.

Recognition of the like – *sādṛśya pratyabhijñāna* – ‘It is like that’.

Recognition of the different – *vailakṣaṇya pratyabhijñāna* – ‘It is different from that’.

Recognition of the comparative – *prātiyogika pratyabhijñāna* – ‘It is larger than that’.

Illustrations of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) are: ‘He is the same Devadatta;’ ‘This antelope (*gavaya*, *nīlagāya*) is like that cow;’ ‘This buffalo (*mahiṣa*, *bhaiṁsā*) is different from that cow;’ ‘That is far from this;’ and ‘This is a tree;’ etc.

From the word ‘etc.’ it should be known that there are other kinds of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) too. All illustrations given here rely on both, the vision of the present and the remembrance of the earlier retention (*dhāraṇā*).

Inductive-reasoning (*ūhaḥ* or *tarka*)

The knowledge of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) caused through infallible-affirmation (*upalambha*, *anvaya*) or infallible-negation (*anupalambha*, *vyatireka*) is called inductive-reasoning (*ūhaḥ* or *tarka*).

If in the presence of the instrumental-object (*sādhana*, *hetu*) the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) must be present, the relationship is called infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*). If in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the instrumental-object (*sādhana*) must be absent, the relationship is called infallible-negation (*vyatireka*).

What is infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*)? Infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) is said to exist when, invariably, in

the presence of the instrumental-object (*sādhana*, *hetu*) the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is present and in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the instrumental-object (*sādhana*) is absent. The knowledge of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) is according to the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayaopasāma*) of the knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) karmas.

Two examples of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) are: 1) 'In the presence of the fire, the smoke must be present, and in the absence of the fire, the smoke must be absent.' 2) 'In the presence of the sun, the daylight must be present, and in the absence of the sun, the daylight must be absent.'

Inference (*anumāna*)

The particular knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) obtained from the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*) is the inference (*anumāna*).

The object that has infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), i.e., it does not exist without the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), is called the means (the middle-term, *sādhana* or *hetu* or *liṅga*).

Inductive-reasoning (*tarka*) rests on the existence of infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*). With repeated observation of the smoke and the fire, through inductive-reasoning (*tarka*), one concludes that wherever there is the smoke there is the fire and where there is no fire there is no smoke.

The statement, 'Where there is no fire there is no smoke,' is sufficient to convey infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the fire (*sādhya*) and the smoke (*sādhana*). One other name for this kind of infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) is infallible-non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*).

The sure-enough determination of the fire (*sādhya*, *liṅgī*) on the hill, thus, is through the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*, *liṅga*), i.e., the smoke.

Infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) [between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*)] follows either of these two rules:

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without-gradation (*sahabhāva*, *akramabhāva*), and with-gradation (*kramabhāva*).

Statistical inference: Due to the limitation of not having access to the direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), modern researchers and analysts in fields including medicine, criminology, psychology, sociology, biometrics, computers, psephology, and manufacturing use hypothesis testing, a means of arriving at a statistical inference through empirical testing. Tests are conducted in order to determine whether or not the ‘alternative hypothesis’ concerning an observed phenomenon can be validated.

It is always assumed, by statistical convention, that the ‘alternative hypothesis’ (denoted by H_1) is wrong, and the ‘null hypothesis’ (denoted by H_0), which postulates that the observed phenomenon occurred by chance, holds true.

The notion of a statistical error is an integral part of hypothesis testing. Consider the case of judgement in a court trial. The ‘null hypothesis’ (H_0) corresponds to the position of the defendant; he is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The ‘alternative hypothesis’ (H_1) corresponds to the position against the defendant; that he has committed the crime. If the judgement of the court corresponds with the reality, then a correct decision has been made. If the judgement of the court does not correspond with the reality, then an error has been made. There are two situations in which the court decision would be correct: 1) The ‘null hypothesis’ is true and it accepts that; the court acquits the innocent defendant. 2) The ‘alternative hypothesis’ is true and it accepts that; the court convicts the guilty accused.

The court, however, is liable to make two types of error, distinguished as the type I error and the type II error.

Type I error (false positive): The court rejects the ‘null hypothesis’ when it is true. This kind of error is called the type I error (false positive) and corresponds to convicting the innocent defendant.

Type II error (false negative): The court accepts as true a false ‘null hypothesis’. This kind of error is called the type II error (false negative) and corresponds to acquitting the guilty criminal.

The two types of error are significant issues in medical testing too.

‘Alternative hypothesis’: The patient has the specific disease.

‘Null hypothesis’: The patient does not have the specific disease.

Type I error (false positive): The doctor judges, on the basis of test reports, that the patient was suffering from the specific disease when in reality he was not suffering from the said disease.

Type II error (false negative): The doctor judges, on the basis of test reports, that the patient was not suffering from the specific disease when in reality he was suffering from the said disease.

The idea behind highlighting this subject of statistical inference here is to emphasize that the worldly error-ridden inferences do not constitute the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as defined in the Scripture. Statistical inferences fail to satisfy the condition of infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*).

The Scripture (*āgama*)

The knowledge-of-the-objects (*arthajñāna*) whose instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) is the speech, etc., of the Omniscient Lord (*sarvajña* or *āpta*) is the Scripture (*āgama*).

The World-Teacher, Omniscient Lord (the *Tīrthaṅkara* or the *Arhat*, *sarvajña*, *āpta*) expounds the reality-of-substances (*tattvārtha*), as seen and known in his omniscience (*kevalajñāna*), through his divine-voice (*divyadhvani*). For the Lord’s divine discourse, the deva erect a heavenly-pavilion (*samavasaraṇa*) befitting his glory, and there the World-Teacher sits, facing the east, four fingers (*aṅgula*) above the huge gold lotus placed on a throne of heavenly gems. The Lord appears to be looking in all the four directions. His voice is without the movement of the glottis or the lips, and is, therefore, termed *anakṣarī* (without letters). The Lord’s divine voice, as a result of one of the marvels (*atīśaya*) of omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) is heard and enjoyed by all worthy (*bhavya*) living-beings-with-mind (*saṃjñī*) in their respective tongue (*ardhamāgadhi bhāṣā*), with-words or without-words. The languages include eighteen major-languages (*mahābhāṣā*) and seven hundred minor-languages

(*śudrabhāṣā*). (see, Ācārya Yatiṣabha's *Tiloyapaṇṇatī*, vol. 2, verse 910, p. 279)

The World-Teacher is the sun that blossoms the soul-lotuses of the worldly beings. His divine discourse is the rain of nectar-water that washes away the dirt of ignorance from all souls. He is the wish-fulfilling tree (*kalpavṛkṣa*) for all those aspiring for liberation. The World-Teacher is free from attachment and, therefore, delivers his discourse naturally, without desire or self-interest, for the well-being of the worthy (*bhavya*) souls. What does the drum (*mṛdaṅga*) long for as it makes sound on the touch of the drummer's hand? As the clouds, by nature and without human intervention, perform the activities of raining, thundering, and moving around, in the same way, the activities of the *Arhat* take place naturally, without volition, on fruition of auspicious karmas.

All substances (*dravya*) and their modes (*paryāya*) reflect directly (and simultaneously) in the perfect-knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) of the Omniscient Lord. He knows all substances and their modes directly and simultaneously as he does not rely on sensory-knowledge that knows substances in stages. Sensory-knowledge, being indirect, acquires knowledge of substances in four stages: apprehension (*avagraha*), speculation (*ihā*), perceptual judgement (*avāya*), and retention (*dhāraṇā*). On destruction of karmas that hinder its natural power, the soul, on its own, attains omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) – infinite, indestructible, perfect knowledge – that knows all substances of the three worlds and the three times directly and simultaneously. The knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) of the Omniscient Lord is all-pervasive (*sarvagata* or *sarva-vyāpaka*); it knows everything. It knows objects that are without space-points – *kālāṇu* or *aṇu*, with space-points – *pañcāstikāya*, with form – *puḍgala*, without form – *jīva*, etc. It knows the modes of the future that are yet to originate, and the modes of the past that have vanished.

Only a disciple of exceptional brilliance and accomplishment (*ṛddhi*) is able to fully assimilate, without doubt, delusion, or misapprehension, the irrefutable teachings of the *Tīrthaṅkara*. The presence of such a worthy disciple or the Apostle, called a *gaṇadhara*, is mandatory in the congregation before the *Tīrthaṅkara* delivers his divine discourse.

The Apostle (*gaṇadhara*) is equipped with the following eight miraculous

accomplishments (*ṛddhi*): (see, Ācārya Yaśaṣabha's *Tiloyapaṇṇatī*, vol. 2, verse 976 onwards)

1. बुद्धिऋद्धि – *buddhiṛddhi* – accomplishment of the intellect;
2. विक्रियाऋद्धि – *vikriyāṛddhi* – accomplishment of the bodily transformations;
3. क्रियाऋद्धि – *kriyāṛddhi* – accomplishment of the power to move in the air, water, fire, etc.;
4. तपऋद्धि – *tapāṛddhi* – accomplishment of the austerities;
5. बलऋद्धि – *balaṛddhi* – accomplishment of the strength of the mind, the speech and the body;
6. औषधिऋद्धि – *auśadhiṛddhi* – accomplishment of extraordinary therapeutic powers;
7. रसऋद्धि – *rasaṛddhi* – accomplishment that can cause miracles of various kinds, damaging and beneficial; and
8. क्षेत्रऋद्धि – *kṣetraṛddhi* – accomplishment that can feed innumerable beings with limited food or accommodate them in a limited space.

The *balaṛddhi* deserves special mention. It is of three kinds: the accomplishments pertaining to the mind, the speech and the body – *manobalaṛddhi*, *vacanabalaṛddhi* and *kāyabalaṛddhi*. The accomplishment pertaining to the mind, the *manobalaṛddhi*, is attained on excellent destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayaopaśama*) of the karma-types known as *śrutajñānāvaraṇa* and *vīryāntarāya*. The worthy ascetic equipped with the *manobalaṛddhi* is able to reflect on and comprehend the entire scriptural-knowledge (*śrutajñāna*) within a *muhūrta* (48 minutes). (see, Ācārya Yaśaṣabha's *Tiloyapaṇṇatī*, vol. 2, verses 1072-73, p. 318)

As per the divine discourse of the World-Teacher, the Apostle (*gaṇadhara*) composes the 'āgama' or 'dravyaśruta' or 'śrutaskandha' comprising twelve departments (*dvādaśāṅga*), also referred to as eleven *aṅga* and fourteen *pūrva* since the twelfth *aṅga* includes the fourteen *pūrva*, that contain true description of the Lord's teachings. The twelve departments (*dvādaśāṅga*) are also called *aṅgapraviṣṭa*. Then, there are fourteen miscellaneous concepts (*prakīrṇaka*), external to the twelve departments

(*dvādaśāṅga*); these are called *āṅgabāhya*.

The twelve departments (*dvādaśāṅga*) are:

- 1) आचरांग *ācarāṅga*,
- 2) सूत्रकृतांग *sūtrakṛtāṅga*,
- 3) स्थानांग *sthānāṅga*,
- 4) समवायांग *samavāyāṅga*,
- 5) व्याख्याप्रज्ञप्ति अंग *vyākhyāprajñyapti aṅga*,
- 6) ज्ञातृधर्मकथांग *jñātr̥dharmakathāṅga*,
- 7) श्रावकाध्ययनांग *śrāvakādhyaṇāṅga*,
- 8) अन्तकृद्दशांग *antakṛddaśāṅga*,
- 9) अनुत्तरोपपादिक दशांग *anuttaropapādika daśāṅga*,
- 10) प्रश्नव्याकरणांग *praśnavyākaraṇāṅga*,
- 11) विपाकसूत्रांग *vipākasūtrāṅga*, and
- 12) दृष्टिवादांग *dṛṣṭivādāṅga*.

(see, Ācārya Jinasena's *Harivaṅśapurāṇa*, chap. 2, verses 92-95)

The fourteen *āṅgabāhya* are:

- 1) सामयिक *sāmayika*,
- 2) चतुर्विंशतिस्तवन *caturviṅśatistavana*,
- 3) वन्दना *vandanā*,
- 4) प्रतिक्रमण *pratikramaṇa*,
- 5) वैनयिक *vainayika*,
- 6) कृतिकर्म *kṛtikarma*,
- 7) दशवैकालिक *daśavaikālika*,
- 8) उत्तराध्ययन *uttarādhyaṇa*,
- 9) कल्पव्यवहार *kalpavyavahāra*,
- 10) कल्पाकल्प *kalpākalpa*,
- 11) महाकल्प *mahākalpa*,
- 12) पुण्डरीक *puṇḍarīka*,
- 13) महापुण्डरीक *mahāpuṇḍarīka*, and
- 14) निषद्य *niṣadya*.

(see, Ācārya Jinasena's *Harivaṅśapurāṇa*, chap. 2, verses 101-105)

The 'āgama' as composed by the Apostle (*gaṇadhara*) is a thorough

description of the path to liberation and the true nature of all substances. It is incontrovertible as it faithfully reflects the Word of the World-Teacher. It contains the most comprehensive and accurate description of every branch of learning that one needs to know. Employing the doctrines of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) and conditional predication (*syādvāda*), the ‘āgama’ has the power to vanquish all anxieties and inquisitiveness of the knowledge-soul aspiring to tread the path to liberation. Men of ordinary intellect cannot reach the depth of the teachings contained in the ‘āgama’.



Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara (आचार्य विशुद्धसागर)

It is wholly due to the purity and power of the discourses (*pravacana*) of Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara that this composition has come into existence. My addiction for listening intently to his discourses convinced me that for an in-depth study of the Jaina Scripture, proficiency in the field of the Jaina Nyāya is imperative. As I delved into the vast literature that comprises the Jaina Nyāya, it became clear to me that Ācārya Māṇikyanandi’s *Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra* is an essential canonical text that every knowledge-seeking householder (*śrāvaka*) and ascetic (*muni*, *śramaṇa*) must try to master.

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara (born 18 December, 1971) is a *digambara* ascetic (*nirgrantha muni*) for last thirty years¹. His greatest commitment is to study the Scripture. A worthy son of ‘Mother Jinavāṇī’, he spends maximum time, during the day and at night, in her service. With dedication and extraordinary concentration (*ekāgratā*) he has brought out and assimilated profound concepts and tenets found deep in the ocean of the Scripture, with their associated five kinds of meanings – the word-meaning (*śabdārtha*), the standpoint-meaning (*nyāyārtha*), the sectarian-meaning (*matārtha*), the scriptural-meaning (*āgamārtha*) and the spiritual-meaning (*bhāvārtha*) – beyond the reach of the ordinary souls.

As the then *Muni* Viśuddhasāgara completed his period-of-study (*śikṣā-*

¹ *Digambara* Jaina-ordination (*jinadīkṣā*) – 21 November, 1991.

kāla), his *guru*, Most Worshipful Ācārya Virāgasāgara, in 2007, conferred on him the status of the Chief Preceptor (Ācārya) that carries with it the responsibility of nurturing other potential souls who wish to tread the holy path to liberation. During this period-of-nurturing (*gaṇapoṣaṇa-kāla*), Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara has, till date, accorded Jaina-ordination (*jinadīkṣā*) to some thirty-eight choicest gems among the present-day worthy souls. His clear message to his disciple-ascetics (*śiṣya muni*) is that in this '*kali*' age the greatest austerity (*tapa*) they can observe is the study of the Scripture – *svādhyāya*. He avers that the study of the Scripture, as a rule, destroys the heap of delusion (*moha*).

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara takes great delight in delivering his discourses (*pravacana*). He believes that the subject matter of the discourse (*pravacana*) of every ascetic should only be the Scripture (*āgama*), nothing else. Although individuals looking for quick-fix solutions to their worldly woes through popular, but unproven, means including palmistry (*jyotiṣa*), sacred-utterances (*mantra*), and mystical-rituals (*tantra*) may find his discourses (*pravacana*) unfathomable, but the worthy listeners who long for lasting and true happiness – an attribute of the own-soul (*ātmasvabhāva*) – find these extremely helpful and illuminating.

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara has mastered the science-of-thought (*Nyāya*), and his grip on complex concepts of Jaina metaphysics including *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda* is amazing. In his discourses (*pravacana*), he is able to shatter the absolutist (*ekānta*) views – called *durnaya* or faulty points-of-view – of the wrong-believers (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) with the sharp sword of '*syādvāda*'. His discourses are rid of these eight faults associated with the absolutist (*ekānta*) views – *durnaya*:²

1. संकर – *saṃkara* – To assume that one substance can become the other substance. 'The soul is the body.'
2. व्यतिकर – *vyatikara* – To transmute the specific quality of one substance to the other substance. 'I've heard it with my own eyes.'
3. विरोध – *virodha* – To accept the quality in a substance that is opposite to its nature. 'The matter (*pudgala*) has consciousness (*cetanā*).'

² See, Ācārya Devasena's *Ālāpapaddhati*, verse 8, *sūtra* 127, p. 158-159.

4. वैयधिकरण – *vaiyadhikaraṇa* – To assume that opposing attributes can persist in a substance at one and the same time. ‘The water in the lake is hot and cold.’
5. अनवस्था – *anavasthā* – To make a never-ending assumption. ‘Everything must have a creator; God is the creator of the world.’ Then, who is the creator of God? This goes on *ad infinitum*.
6. संशय – *saṁśaya* – To have doubt over the nature of the object. ‘It may not be true that virtuous karmas lead to birth in heaven.’ Or, ‘Is it silver or nacre?’
7. अप्रतिपत्ति – *apratipatti* – To be ignorant about the nature-of-the-object (*vastu-svabhāva*). ‘The space (*ākāśa*) assists in the motion of the soul and the matter.’
8. अभाव – *abhāva* – To assume something that does not exist. ‘The horns of the hare.’

Further, his discourses are rid of the three faults of the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) that is employed to define the object (*lakṣya*):³

1. अव्याप्ति – *avyāpti* – non-pervasiveness – The mark (*lakṣaṇa*) is not universally found in the object (*lakṣya*). ‘Cows are white (*lakṣaṇa*).’
2. अतिव्याप्ति – *ativyāpti* – over-pervasiveness – The mark (*lakṣaṇa*) is also found outside the object (*lakṣya*). ‘Milk-producing (*lakṣaṇa*) animals are cows.’
3. असंभवि – *asaṁbhavi* – impossible – The mark (*lakṣaṇa*) cannot be found in the object (*lakṣya*). ‘Winged (*lakṣaṇa*) animals are cows.’

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara expounds that right comprehension of the Scripture, in terms of the spiritualism (*adhyātma*) as well as the Doctrine (*siddhānta*), is incumbent on the knowledge of *pramāṇa* and *naya*. He recommends the study of the following scriptural texts to attain this knowledge: Śrī Samantabhadra Svāmi’s *Āptamīmāṃsā*; Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka Svāmi’s *Aṣṭaśatī*; Śrī Vidyānanda Svāmi’s *Aṣṭasahasrī*; Śrī Prabhācandra Svāmi’s *Prameyakamala Mārtaṇḍa* and *Nyāyakumudacandra*.

³ See, Ācārya Dharmabhūṣaṇayati’s *Nyāyadīpikā*, p. 143.

Further, the study of *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka Svāmi's Siddhi-viniścaya*, *Nyāya-viniścaya*, *Laghīyastrayī* and *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā*; *Śrī Vidyānanda Svāmi's Satyaśāsana-parīkṣā*; *Śrī Dharmabhūṣaṇayati's Nyāyadīpikā*; and *Ācārya Malliṣeṇa's Syādvāda-mañjarī* is recommended.

One should begin with the study of *Ācārya Śrī Māṇikyanandī's Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra*.

During the four months of the rainy season (roughly, July to October), a very large number of minute organisms evolve in the environment and to avoid injury to these, the Jaina ascetic (*muni*) restricts roaming (*vihāra*) and stays at one location (a particular town or city) during these months. Except for the period of these four months of rainy season, *Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara*, along with his congregation (*saṅgha*), walks indefatigably, through the length and breadth of India, providing thereby an opportunity to tens of thousands of souls to earn merit (*puṇya*) through mere '*darśana*' of such pious souls and also learn about the nature of the reality (*vastu svabhāva*) by listening to his discourses that are beneficial (*hitakārī*), pleasing (*madhura*) and unambiguous (*nirmala*). Neither the icy-wind of December-January nor the heat-wave of May-June has the power to deter these sky-clad and barefoot marvels of human race from pursuing what they are up to. The secret behind such feverish roaming (*vihāra*) is the belief of the Master that the true ascetic (*muni*) should neither engender in him attachment (*rāga*) for any particular town or city nor a sense-of-ownership (*mamatva*) for any temple or dwelling.

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara delivers his discourses (*pravacana*) based on particular scriptural texts (*āgama, grāṇtha*) including the *Samayasāra*, *Pravacanasāra*, *Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha*, *Niyamasāra*, *Rayasāra*, *Āptamīmāṃsā*, *Svayambhūstotra*, *Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra*, *Yogasāra*, *Tattvārthasūtra*, *Sarvārthasiddhi*, *Subhāṣita*, *Bhavanā Dvātriṃśatikā*, *Iṣṭopadeśa*, *Dravyasaṃgraha*, *Tattvānuśāsana*, *Ātmānuśāsana*, *Samādhitaṅtraṃ*, *Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvākācāra* and *Puruśārthasiddhyupāya*. As his discourses (*pravacana*) are nothing but the interpretation of the Scripture – or the nature of the reality (*vastu svabhāva*) – many of these have been transcribed and published in form of holy texts that are read by a large number of knowledge-seekers, ascetics (*muni, śramaṇa*)

and householders (*śrāvaka*).

Another task that Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara performs with great vigour is the installation of the idols of the *Tīrthaṅkara* in temples all over India, and provide, in the process, an opportunity to thousands of devotees to participate in celebrations depicting the five most auspicious events – *pañca-kalyāṇaka* – that mark the life of each *Tīrthaṅkara*.

An epitome of laudable conduct (*cāritra*), Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara has renounced, for life, the intake of salt, sugar, curd and edible-oil. Know that the *digambara* ascetic (*muni*, *śramaṇa*) accepts food (*āhāra*) that is pure, simple and free from faults only once in 24-hours. And that too he accepts only in order to maintain the steadiness of his body which he reckons as instrumental to the performance of austerities (*tapa*), self-restraint (*saṁyama*) and meditation (*dhyāna*).

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara maintains that the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) or the ‘dharma’ of the true ascetic (*muni*, *śramaṇa*) is the disposition (*bhāva*) of equanimity (*sāmya*). Since the words of the true ascetic are incontrovertible, it follows that, for him, enemy (*śatru*) and kinsfolk (*bandhu-varga*), happiness (*sukha*) and misery (*duḥkha*), praise (*praśaṁsā*) and censure (*nindā*), iron (*lohā*) and gold (*svarṇa*), and life (*prāṇa-dhāraṇa*) and death (*prāṇa-tyāga*) are alike.⁴

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara has showered me with his divine blessings in this project. His divine blessings have had wondrous effect in making both, the process and the end-result, most gratifying.

I bow my head in utter reverence to Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara and each disciple-ascetic (*śiṣya muni*) of his congregation (*saṅgha*).

My salutation with utmost devotion to Most Worshipful *śramaṇa muni* Sāmyasāgara for proofreading the Sanskrit and Hindi portion of the text.

April, 2021
Dehradun, India

Vijay K. Jain



⁴ See, Ācārya Kundakunda’s *Pravacanasāra*, verse 3-41, p. 300-301.

VIJAY K. JAIN – BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Having had his schooling from Mhow and Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh, Vijay K. Jain (b. 1951) did his graduation in Electronics Engineering from Institute of Technology, Banaras Hindu University, and Post-Graduation in Management from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.

An independent researcher, Vijay K. Jain has authored several books, and edited and translated into English a number of profound Jaina texts.

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Mr. Jain is the proprietor of Vikalp Printers, a small, high-end printing and publishing firm, based in Dehradun, India.



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
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स्वयम्भुवे नमस्तुभ्यं ॥

अर्हत्सिद्धाचार्योपाध्यायसर्वसाधुभ्यो नमः ॥

Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's
Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra
– Essence of the Jaina Nyāya

आचार्य माणिक्यनन्दि विरचित

परीक्षामुख सूत्र

अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं यत्र तत्र त्रयेण किम् ।

नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वं यत्र तत्र त्रयेण किम् ॥

– सम्यक्त्व उद्योतनी कथा (–पात्रकेसरी की कथा),
'आराधना कथा-प्रबन्धम् (कथाकोश)', पृ. 2-3

अर्थ – जहाँ अन्यथानुपपत्ति हेतु है वहाँ हेतु की त्रैरूपता –
पक्ष-धर्मत्व, सपक्ष-सत्त्व और विपक्ष-व्यावृत्ति रूप – से क्या?
और जहाँ अन्यथानुपपत्ति हेतु नहीं है वहाँ हेतु की त्रैरूपता से
क्या?

Where the means (*hetu*) of infallible-non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*)¹ is present, what purpose will the threefold-marks (*trairūpya lakṣaṇa*)² of the means (*hetu*) – attribute of the subject (*pakṣa-dharmatva*), presence in the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa-sattva*) and absence in the opposite (*vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*) – serve? Where the means (*hetu*) of infallible-non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*) is absent, what purpose will the threefold-marks (*trairūpya lakṣaṇa*) of the means (*hetu*) serve?

1 – Infallible-non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*) is defined as:
'In absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), the means (*sādhana*) must not exist.' (see, p. 47, 126)

2 – The Buddhists expound the threefold-marks (*trairūpya lakṣaṇa*) of the means (*hetu*). (see, p. 66)

प्रथमः परिच्छेदः

CHAPTER – 1

* ग्रन्थकार की प्रतिज्ञा और उद्देश्य *

* The Composer's Intent and Object *

प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासाद्विपर्ययः ।

इति वक्ष्ये तयोर्लक्ष्म सिद्धमल्पं लघीयसः ॥

अन्वयार्थ – [प्रमाणात्] प्रमाण से (अर्थात् सम्यग्ज्ञान से)
[अर्थसंसिद्धिः] अर्थ की सम्यक् प्रकार सिद्धि होती है तथा
[तदाभासात्] उसके आभास से (अर्थात् प्रमाणाभास-मिथ्याज्ञान से)
[विपर्ययः] विपरीत होता है, इष्ट की संसिद्धि नहीं होती है; [इति]
इसलिए [तयोः] उन दोनों – प्रमाण और प्रमाणाभास – के [सिद्धम्]
पूर्वाचार्यों से प्रसिद्ध एवं पूर्वापर विरोध से रहित [अल्पं] संक्षिप्त
[लक्ष्म] लक्षण को [लघीयसः] लघुजनों (अल्पबुद्धियों) के हितार्थ
[वक्ष्ये] मैं (आचार्य माणिक्यनन्दि) कहूँगा।

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) ascertains the true nature of objects while the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) does the opposite. Therefore, through this treatise, I (*Ācārya Māṇikyanandi*) shall characterize, as per the earlier authoritative expositions and in brief, both these (*pramāṇa* and *pramāṇābhāsa*) for the benefit of the uninitiated learners.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The science-of-thought (*Nyāya*) has always been an integral part of the four constituents (*anuyoga*) – *prathamānuyoga* (the study of the stories of epochal personages), *karuṇānuyoga* (the study of the universe and beyond, the time-cycle, and the stages of soul-existence), *caraṇānuyoga* (the foundation for origination, growth and protection of conduct for the householder and the ascetic), and *dravyānuyoga* (the study of the objects of the reality) – of the Jaina Scripture. However, *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka Deva* (circa 7th century A.D.) gave the science-of-thought (*Nyāya*) a distinct identity as an independent field of study through his masterpiece and profound compositions including '*Tattvārthavārtika*', '*Aṣṭaśatī*', '*Laghīyastrayī*', '*Siddhivinīścaya*', '*Nyāyavinīścaya*', and '*Pramāṇasaṃgraha*'. Even learned scholars found these treatises extremely difficult to comprehend, what to talk of the uninitiated learners!

It is accepted that *Ācārya Māṇikyanandi* based his '*Parīkṣāmukha*' on *Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka Deva*'s writings. *Ācārya Māṇikyanandi* flourished during the end of the 7th or the beginning of the 8th century A.D. [see, Ghoshal, Sarat Chandra (1940), '*Parīkṣāmukhaṃ*', pp. xl-xli].

Ācārya Prabhācandra (circa, the end of the 10th or the beginning of the 11th century A.D.), who composed an exhaustive commentary '*Prameyakamala Mārtanda*' on '*Parīkṣāmukha*', salutes *Ācārya Māṇikyanandi* in following words:

शास्त्रं करोमि वरमल्पतरावबोधो
माणिक्यनन्दिपदपङ्कजसत्प्रसादात्।
अर्थं न किं स्फुटयति प्रकृतं लघीयाँ-
ल्लोकस्य भानुकरविस्फुरिताद्गवाक्षः ॥२॥

- आ. प्रभाचन्द्र, 'प्रमेयकमल मार्तण्ड'

अल्पबुद्धि वाला मैं प्रभाचन्द्राचार्य श्री माणिक्यनन्दि गुरु के चरणकमल के प्रसाद से श्रेष्ठ इस प्रमेय (अर्थात् विश्व के पदार्थ) रूपी कमल को विकसित

करने में मार्तण्ड (सूर्यस्वरूप) ऐसे इस शास्त्र को करता हूँ। ठीक ही है, देखो जगत् में छोटा सा झरोखा भी सूर्य-किरणों से दृष्टिगोचर पदार्थों को स्पष्ट नहीं करता है क्या? अर्थात् करता ही है। वैसे ही मैं अल्पबुद्धि वाला होकर भी गुरुप्रसाद से शास्त्र की रचना करने में समर्थ होऊँगा।

With the beneficence of the lotus-feet of *Ācārya* Māṇikyanandi, I (*Ācārya* Prabhācandra) having little intellect shall compose this treatise to illumine, like the sun, the objects of the reality. It is appropriate; does the sunlight that comes in through even a small opening not illumine the objects? In the same way, through the beneficence of my guru, I, with little intellect, shall succeed in composing this treatise.

Ācārya 'Laghu' Anantavīrya (circa 12th century A.D.), author of 'Prameyaratnamālā', a comparatively brief commentary on 'Parīkṣā-mukha', salutes *Ācārya* Māṇikyanandi as under:

अकलङ्कवचोऽम्भोधेरुदध्रे येन धीमता।

न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो माणिक्यनन्दिने ॥२॥

- आ. 'लघु' अनन्तवीर्य, 'प्रमेयरत्नमाला'

जिस बुद्धिमान् माणिक्यनन्दि ने भट्टअकलंक देव के वचन-रूप समुद्र से न्याय-विद्या-रूप अमृत को प्रकट किया, उन माणिक्यनन्दि आचार्य के लिए हमारा नमस्कार हो।

Salutation to *Ācārya* Māṇikyanandi who has churned the nectar of the science-of-thought (*Nyāya*) from the ocean of the words of *Bhaṭṭa* Akalaṅka Deva.

प्रमाण का लक्षण -

The meaning of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ॥१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं] स्व अर्थात् अपने-आपके तथा जिसे किसी अन्य प्रमाण से जाना नहीं है, ऐसे पदार्थ के निश्चय करने वाले [ज्ञानं] ज्ञान को [प्रमाणं] प्रमाण कहते हैं।

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the definitive (*vyavasāyātmaka*) knowledge of the self (*sva*) and of the things not ascertained earlier (*apūrvārtha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the knowledge of the self (*sva*) as well as the other objects; it illumines the self (*sva*) and the other objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*). The word '*apūrvārtha*' in the *sūtra* indicates that the nature of these had not been ascertained earlier. The word '*vyavasāyātmaka*' points to definiteness in the ascertainment of the objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*). The knowledge must be rid of the imperfections of doubt (*saṁśaya*), indefiniteness (*vimoha* or *anadhyavasāya*), and perversity (*viparyaya* or *vibhrama*).

The Doctrine expounds that the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is not the cause of knowledge but knowledge itself. This has been expounded in other Jaina texts too:

सम्यग्ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ॥१-८॥

- आ. अभिनव धर्मभूषण यति, 'न्यायदीपिका'

सम्यक् ज्ञान को प्रमाण कहते हैं - जो ज्ञान यथार्थ है, वही प्रमाण है।

Right-knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) is valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानम् ॥१:९॥

तत्प्रमाणे ॥१:१०॥

– आ. उमास्वामि ‘तत्त्वार्थसूत्र’

मतिज्ञान, श्रुतज्ञान, अवधिज्ञान, मनःपर्ययज्ञान और केवलज्ञान – ये पाँच ज्ञान हैं।
उपरोक्त पाँच प्रकार के ज्ञान ही (दो प्रकार के) प्रमाण हैं।

Knowledge is of five kinds – sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*), scriptural-knowledge (*śrutajñāna*), clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*), telepathy (*manahparyayaajñāna*), and omniscience (*kevalajñāna*).

These (five kinds of knowledge) are the two types of *pramāṇa* (valid-knowledge).

The two types of *pramāṇa* (valid-knowledge) shall be discussed later.

प्रमाण का लक्षणान्तर या ज्ञान का प्रमाणपना –

The object of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् ॥२॥

अन्वयार्थ – [हि] जिस कारण से [प्रमाणं] प्रमाण [हिताहित-
प्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं] हित (सुख) की प्राप्ति और अहित (दुःख) का
परिहार (निराकरण) करने में समर्थ है [ततः] उस कारण से [तत्]
वह (प्रमाण) [ज्ञानं] ज्ञान [एव] ही हो सकता है (अज्ञानरूप
सन्निकर्षादिक नहीं)।

Since *pramāṇa* (valid-knowledge) enables one to acquire things favorable and relinquish things unfavorable, therefore, it can be nothing but knowledge (*jñāna*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Things ‘favorable’ are the objects-of-happiness like the garland and cloth, and the causes-of-happiness like the right-knowledge (*saṃyagdarśana*). Things ‘unfavorable’ are the objects-of-misery like the thorn and the causes-of-misery like the false-knowledge (*mithyādarśana*).

Now, only the knowledge has the capacity to discern between the things favorable and unfavorable. That which does not constitute knowledge, like a pot, lacks this capacity to discern. The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) enables one to acquire things favorable and relinquish things unfavorable. Thus, *pramāṇa* is knowledge (*jñāna*) itself. Those who seek the favorable and relinquish the unfavorable rely on valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and not on their instinct or addiction.

The *sūtra* refutes the view that the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the connection of the senses (*indriya*) with the external objects, termed *sannikarṣa* by the Naiyāyika. This connection, being inanimate (*acetana*), does not have the capacity to discern between what is favorable and unfavorable or what provides happiness and misery. Only the knowledge (*jñāna*), an attribute (*guṇa*) of the animate (*cetana*) soul (*ātmā*) has the capacity to discern.

प्रमाण का निश्चयात्मकपना-

Definiteness in the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

तन्निश्चयात्मकं समारोपविरुद्धत्वादनुमानवत् ॥३॥

अन्वयार्थ – [समारोपविरुद्धत्वात्] समारोप (संशय, विपर्यय और अनध्यवसाय) का विरोधी होने से [तत्] वह (ज्ञान) [निश्चयात्मकं] निश्चयात्मक है; [अनुमानवत्] अनुमान के समान।

That [valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)] is opposed to the fallacies (*samāropa*) and has definiteness, like the inference (*anumāna*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) must be rid of the fallacies (*samāropa*) of doubt (*saṁśaya*), indefiniteness (*vimoha* or *anadhyavasāya*), and perversity (*viparyaya* or *vibhrama*).¹

Doubt (*saṁśaya*) means swaying of the mind, not being able to assert the true nature of a thing. After acquiring the belief that bondage of the virtuous karmas leads to birth in the heavens, entertaining skepticism about its validity is an instance of doubt (*saṁśaya*).

Indefiniteness (*vimoha* or *anadhyavasāya*) is vacillation about the real nature of a thing due to the shrouding of the intellect. For example, when we touch something while moving, we are conscious that we have touched something but are unable to determine, with certainty, what it was, our knowledge is enshrouded in indefiniteness. Not being able to appreciate that every substance has infinite attributes, i.e., it is ‘*anekāntātmaka*’, and even opposite attributes exist in it at the same time when viewed from different points-of-view – like its substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*) and mode (*pariāya*) – too is a case of indefiniteness.

The cognition of an object as something which is contrary to its true nature is perversity (*viparyaya* or *vibhrama*). For example, if we perceive nacre to be silver, or a rope to be a snake, we have the knowledge vitiated by perversity.

1 – see also, ‘Ācārya Māilladhavala’s *Ṇayacakko*’, verse 306, p. 151-152.

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is free from these three kinds of fallacies (*samāropa*). When vitiated by these fallacies it no more remains the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) but becomes fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*).

The *sūtra* mentions the inference (*anumāna*) as an illustration of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). To acquire the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved [the major-term, the probandum (Latin), *sādhya*, *liṅgī*] through a sound means (the middle-term, *sādhana* or *hetu* or *liṅga*) is called the inference (*anumāna*). The inference (*anumāna*) too constitutes the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), albeit indirect, as it is free from the three kinds of fallacies (*samāropa*).

अपूर्वार्थ का समर्थन या लक्षण -

The meaning and relevance of ‘not yet ascertained’
(*apūrvārtha*) –

अनिश्चितोऽपूर्वार्थः ॥४॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अनिश्चितः] जिसका निश्चय न हो (जिस पदार्थ का पहले किसी प्रमाण से निश्चय नहीं किया गया हो) उसे [अपूर्वार्थः] अपूर्वार्थ कहते हैं।

That which is ‘not yet ascertained’ means ‘*apūrvārtha*’ (the word used earlier in *sūtra* 1-1).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As mentioned in the ‘*Tattvārthasūtra*’, sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) goes through four stages while ascertaining the object-of-

.....

knowledge. As the knowledge progresses through the initial three stages, it remains 'yet to be ascertained' and, therefore, 'apūrvārtha'.

अवग्रहेहावायधारणाः ॥१:१५॥

- आ. उमास्वामि 'तत्त्वार्थसूत्र'

अवग्रह, ईहा, अवाय, और धारणा - ये चार (उस मतिज्ञान के) भेद हैं।

Impression (*avagraha*), inquisitiveness (*īhā*), comprehension (*avāya*), and retention (*dhāraṇā*), are the four stages [of sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*)].

The first awareness or adoption of an object as it comes in the range of the senses is impression (*avagraha*), the first stage of sensory knowledge (*matijñāna*). When there is the meeting of the sense-organ and the object, it is first perceived; that is *darśana*. The awareness of the object immediately following it is *avagraha*. For instance, on seeing an object, the impression that it is white in colour is *avagraha*. The desire to know particulars regarding the object apprehended through *avagraha* is inquisitiveness (*īhā*). Thus, the desire to know more - 'Is that white object a crane or a flag?' - is inquisitiveness (*īhā*). Knowing the object, as it is, after ascertaining its particulars is the next stage - comprehension (*avāya*). By its movement up and down and by the flapping of the wings, it is ascertained that it is a crane only and not a flag. Retention (*dhāraṇā*) is the cause of not forgetting in the future what was ascertained in the past. For instance, 'This is the same crane which I saw this morning,' is retention. These are mentioned in the *sūtra* in the order in which these arise.

Once the object-of-knowledge becomes known through the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), its further investigation becomes futile.

अपूर्वार्थ का दूसरा लक्षण -

Another meaning of 'not yet ascertained' (*apūrvārtha*) -

दृष्टोऽपि समारोपात्तादृक् ॥५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [दृष्टः] दृष्ट अर्थात् किसी अन्य प्रमाण से ज्ञात पदार्थ [अपि] भी [समारोपात्] समारोप हो जाने से [तादृक्] उसके समान अर्थात् अपूर्वार्थ हो जाता है।

If the knowledge of an object, known earlier through some kind of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), suffers from fallacies (*samāropa*) that object too is 'not yet ascertained' (*apūrvārtha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Not only the object 'not yet ascertained' but also that which has previously been ascertained but whose present knowledge is vitiated by fallacies (*samāropa*) falls under the category of 'not yet ascertained' (*apūrvārtha*). As the earlier valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) gets vitiated by doubt (*saṃśaya*), indefiniteness (*vimoha* or *anadhyavasāya*) or perversity (*viparyaya* or *vibhrama*), the object remains as 'not yet ascertained' (*apūrvārtha*).

The object that has never been ascertained before certainly seeks the valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). However, the object that has been ascertained before but if that ascertainment now suffers from fallacies (*samāropa*), that object too seeks fresh valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

स्वव्यवसाय का समर्थन -

The meaning of 'svavyavasāya' -

स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसायः ॥६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [स्वोन्मुखतया] स्वन्मुखता-पूर्वक (स्व के अभिमुख होकर) [स्वस्य] अपने आपको [प्रतिभासनं] जानना [व्यवसायः] यह स्वव्यवसाय है।

Knowledge of the self (*sva*) attained through directing attention on the self (*sva*) is 'svavyavasāya'.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

With each acquisition of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) one starts experiencing the own-self. The knowledge of the external objects implies the knowledge of the self; the knowledge illumines the self.

स्वव्यवसाय का दृष्टान्त -

Illustration of 'svavyavasāya' -

अर्थस्येव तदुन्मुखतया ॥७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अर्थस्य] अर्थ के [इव] समान [तदुन्मुखतया] उसके (अर्थ के) अभिमुख होने से; अर्थात् अर्थ के समान स्वयं के उन्मुख होने से जो स्वयं का ज्ञान होता है वही स्वव्यवसाय है।

As one comes to know the object-of-knowledge (*artha*) after directing attention towards it.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The word '*tad*' indicates the object-of-knowledge (*artha*). When the man directs attention toward an external object like the pot or the cloth his experience at that instant is '*arthavyavasāya*'. Similarly, when the man directs attention toward own-soul his experience at that instant is '*svavyavasāya*'.

पदार्थ को जानने के समय होने वाली प्रतीति -

The experience of knowing -

घटमहमात्मना वेद्मि ॥८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अहम्] मैं [घटम्] घट (घड़े) को [आत्मना] अपने आपके द्वारा [वेद्मि] जानता हूँ।

I know the pitcher (*ghaṭam*) through own-soul.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In this *sūtra*, the words '*aham*' – 'I' – and '*ātmanā*' – 'own-soul' – connote the self (*sva*). The word '*ghaṭam*' – the 'pitcher' – indicates the external-object (*para*).

'I' is the knower (*pramātā* or *kartā*). The 'pitcher' is the external object-of-knowledge (*prameya* or *karma*). The 'process of knowing' is the action (*pramiti* or *kriyā* or *jñapti*). 'Through own-soul' is the

instrument (*karaṇa*). 'Knowledge gained' is the (*pramāṇa*).

Thus, the process-of-knowing involves both, the self (*sva*) and the externality (*para*). Valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is, therefore, said to illumine the self (*sva*) as well as the externality (*para*).

केवल परव्यवसाय का खण्डन -

Contradiction of the view that knowledge constitutes 'only externalities' (*paravyavasāya*) -

कर्मवत् कर्तृकरणक्रियाप्रतीतेः ॥९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [कर्मवत्] कर्म के समान [कर्तृकरणक्रियाप्रतीतेः] कर्ता, करण, क्रिया की भी प्रतीति होती है।

(प्रमाण/ज्ञान कर्ता, कर्म, करण, क्रिया आदि सभी को जानता है।)

Like the object-of-knowledge (*karma*), one also experiences [knows through the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)] the knower (*kartā*), the instrument (*karaṇa*) and the process-of-knowing (*kriyā*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Through the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as one knows the object-of-knowledge (*karma* - the 'pitcher'), one also experiences the knower (*kartā* - 'I'), the instrument (*karaṇa* - 'own-soul') and the process-of-knowing (*kriyā* - 'knowledge-acquisition'). There is no contradiction in this; everyone experiences it.

It is, therefore, a fallacy to consider the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as the knower of externalities (*paravyavasāya*) only.

शब्दोच्चारण बिना ही स्वव्यवसाय का स्पष्टीकरण -

Knowledge-of-the-self (*svavyavasāya*) does not depend on words -

शब्दानुच्चारणेऽपि स्वस्यानुभवनमर्थवत् ॥१०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अर्थवत्] पदार्थ के समान [शब्दानुच्चारणे] शब्द का उच्चारण नहीं करने पर [अपि] भी [स्वस्य] अपने-आपका [अनुभवनम्] अनुभवन होता है।

The experience of the self, like the object-of-knowledge, takes place without utterance of words.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

We experience the visible (direct) or invisible (indirect) objects-of-knowledge – a pitcher or a delectable food-item – without the necessity of hearing words that connote these objects. In the same way, in thoughts like ‘I shall do this,’ or ‘I have done this,’ we experience the knowledge of ‘I’ (the *kartā*) and ‘own-soul’ (the *karaṇa*) without the necessity of hearing any words pointing to that knowledge.

शब्दोच्चारण बिना भी स्वप्रतीति की पुष्टि -

‘Knowledge-of-the-self (*svavyavasāya*) does not depend on words’ – further explanation -

को वा तत्प्रतिभासिनमर्थमध्यक्षमिच्छंस्तदेव तथा
नेच्छेत् ॥११॥

अन्वयार्थ - [कः वा] कौन ऐसा (लौकिक या परीक्षक) पुरुष है जो [तत्प्रतिभासिनम् अर्थम्] उस ज्ञान से प्रतिभासित हुए पदार्थ को [अध्यक्षम्] प्रत्यक्ष [इच्छत्] मानता हुआ [तदेव] उस ज्ञान को ही [तथा] उसी तरह प्रत्यक्ष [न] न [इच्छेत्] स्वीकार करे।

Who would not wish to see or accept knowledge itself as a real object-of-knowledge while admitting that the external objects-of-knowledge that it illumines are real?

EXPLANATORY NOTE

When knowledge has the ability to illumine the external objects-of-knowledge it must have the ability to illumine the self. If knowledge were incapable to know the self it will be incapable to know the external objects-of-knowledge; the pitcher does not know the self and, therefore, does not know the others.

स्व की प्रतीति की पुष्टि का उदाहरण -

An example of the above (the ability to illumine the self) -

प्रदीपवत् ॥१२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [प्रदीपवत्] दीपक के समान।

Like the lamp.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The lamp, if not visible and real in itself, would not be able to illumine

and make the other objects visible. If the lamp in itself were not visible, another lamp would be required to make it visible. This is not the case. Thus, the lamp illumines the self as well as the externalities.

In the same way, the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), if not real in itself, would not be able to bring about the reality or knowledge of the external objects-of-knowledge. Thus, knowledge illumines the self (*sva*) as well the others (*para*) and no externalities are needed to illumine it.

प्रमाण के प्रामाण्य का निर्णय -

Validity of the (valid) knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वतः परतश्च ॥१३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तत्प्रामाण्यं] उस प्रमाण की प्रमाणता (वास्तविकता)
 [स्वतः] अपने आप से [च] और [परतः] पर से होती है।
 (प्रमाण की वह प्रमाणता अभ्यास-दशा में अपने आप से और
 अनभ्यास-दशा में पर से होती है।)

The validity of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is through self (*sva*) and through others (*para*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

A *sūtra* consists of minimum words and, in some cases, it is essential to add contextual words in order to understand its meaning. In the present case, the meaning of the *sūtra* should be understood as: The validity of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is through self (*sva*) for the

one who is adept and through others (*para*) for the one who is untrained.

This can be further understood as follows: In the initial stage, the validity of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is through others (*para*) as the person lacks the knowledge of the particular cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) relationship. As the person becomes adept, he does not require help of others to establish the validity of his knowledge.

An example will make this clear. A thirsty man in a place that he frequents does not have to ask anyone the whereabouts of the source of drinking water. This is the state-of-adeptness (*abhyāsa daśā*); here the validity of the knowledge is established through self (*sva*). But the same thirsty man in an unfamiliar place must either ask a local person or draw inference (*anumāna*) from certain external indicators for the whereabouts of the source of drinking water. This is the untrained-state (*anabhyāsa daśā*); here the validity of the knowledge is established through others (*para*).

इति प्रथमः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः

This concludes Chapter-1.



द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

CHAPTER – 2



प्रमाण के भेद -

Kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

तदद्वेधा ॥१॥

अन्वयार्थ – [तत्] वह प्रमाण [द्वेधा] दो प्रकार का है।

That [valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)] is of two kinds.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is of two kinds. These two kinds of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) have subdivisions though.



प्रमाण के दो भेदों का स्पष्टीकरण -

Details of the two kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदात् ॥२॥

अन्वयार्थ – [प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदात्] प्रत्यक्ष और इतर (अर्थात् परोक्ष) के भेद से प्रमाण दो प्रकार का है।

.....

The divisions of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are the direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the other [called, the indirect (*parokṣa*)].

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) has two divisions: the direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the indirect (*parokṣa*).

Ācārya Umāsvāmi has mentioned the same in 'Tattvārthasūtra':

आद्ये परोक्षम् ॥१:११॥

- आ. उमास्वामि 'तत्त्वार्थसूत्र'

प्रारम्भ के दो अर्थात् मतिज्ञान और श्रुतज्ञान परोक्ष प्रमाण हैं।

The first two kinds of knowledge are indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge (*jñāna*).

प्रत्यक्षमन्यत् ॥१:१२॥

- आ. उमास्वामि 'तत्त्वार्थसूत्र'

शेष तीन अर्थात् अवधिज्ञान, मनःपर्ययज्ञान और केवलज्ञान प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण हैं।

The remaining (three) constitute direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge (*jñāna*).

Ācārya Samantabhadra, in 'Āptamīmāṃsā', has drawn another distinction between the two kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*): without-gradation (*akramabhāvī*) and with-gradation (*kramabhāvī*).

तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं ते युगपत्सर्वभासनम् ।

क्रमभावि च यज्ज्ञानं स्याद्वादनयसंस्कृतम् ॥१०१॥

- आ. समन्तभद्र 'आप्तमीमांसा'

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! आपके मत में तत्त्वज्ञान को प्रमाण कहा गया है। तत्त्वज्ञान दो प्रकार का है – अक्रमभावी और क्रमभावी। जो ज्ञान एक साथ (युगपत्) सम्पूर्ण पदार्थों को जानता है, ऐसा प्रत्यक्ष केवलज्ञान अक्रमभावी है। जो ज्ञान (मतिज्ञान आदि) क्रम से पदार्थों को जानता है वह क्रमभावी है। क्रमभावी ज्ञान स्याद्वाद और नय दोनों से संस्कृत होता है।

O Lord ! As per your teaching, that by which substances (souls and non-souls) are rightly known, or knowledge alone, is *pramāṇa* (*lit.*, the method of knowledge). *Pramāṇa* is of two kinds: first, direct (*pratyakṣa*) – omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) – which knows the whole range of objects of knowledge simultaneously, without-gradation (*akramabhāvī*), and second, indirect (*parokṣa*), which knows the objects of knowledge partially and in succession (*kramabhāvī*). Knowledge in succession features the doctrine-of-conditional-predication (*syādvāda*), and ascertainment, without contradiction, of one particular state or mode of the object, called *naya*.

प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण का लक्षण –

The mark of the direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

विशदं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥३॥

अन्वयार्थ – [विशदं] विशद अर्थात् निर्मल और स्पष्ट ज्ञान को [प्रत्यक्षं] प्रत्यक्ष (प्रमाण) कहते हैं।

The knowledge that is '*viśada*' – unambiguous (*nirmala*, *spaṣṭa*) – is the direct (*pratyakṣa*) [valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)].

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Ācārya Kundakunda, in his Invocation (*maṅgalācaraṇa*) of '*Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha*'¹ has used the adjective '*viśada*' for the Words of Lord 'Jina'. Ācārya Jayasena, in his commentary '*Tātparyavṛtti*', has explained the meaning of the word '*viśada*' briefly thus:

The Words of the 'Jina' are '*viśada*' – unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*) – as these are without the imperfections of doubt (*saṃśaya*), indefiniteness (*vimoha* or *anadhyavasāya*), and perversity (*viparyaya* or *vibhrama*).

The Words of the 'Jina' are '*viśada*' – unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*) – also because these expound the nature of the pure soul-substance (*jīvāstikāya*) which is integral to the seven realities (*tattva*), the nine objects (*padārtha*), the six substances (*dravya*), and the five substances with bodily-existence (*astikāya*).

Further, the Words of the 'Jina' are '*viśada*' – unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*) – because these do not suffer from inconsistency between an earlier and a subsequent statement (*pūrvāpara virodha*).

And, the Words of the 'Jina' are '*viśada*' – unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*) – because of the splendour of his divine discourse (*divyadhvani*).

वैशद्य का लक्षण -

The mark of unambiguity (*vaiśadya*) –

प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानेन विशेषवत्तया वा प्रतिभासनं
वैशद्यम् ॥४॥

1 – see, Jain, Vijay K. (2020), '*Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha – The Jaina Metaphysics*', p. 5-6.

अन्वयार्थ – [प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानेन] दूसरे (अन्य) ज्ञान के व्यवधान (अन्तराल) से रहित [वा] और [विशेषवत्तया] विशेषता से होने वाले [प्रतिभासनम्] प्रतिभास (जानने) को [वैशद्यम्] वैशद्य (विशदता) कहते हैं।

Unambiguity (*vaiśadya*) is the knowledge that is independent of obstruction from others, i.e., without any intermediary, and knows in entirety (*viśeṣatā*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The word ‘*pratītyantara*’ in the *sūtra* means variation in knowledge; this variation does not take place in unambiguous (*viśada*) knowledge. Unambiguous (*viśada*) knowledge, thus, is not dependent on inputs from other forms of knowledge and knows the object-of-knowledge in its entirety, like its form and colour. Unambiguous (*viśada*) knowledge is clear (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*).

The knowledge that relies on others is indirect (*parokṣa*) – including remembrance (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), induction (argument or reasoning, *tarka*), inference (*anumāna*) and the Scripture (*āgama*).

सांव्यवहारिक प्रत्यक्ष का कारण और लक्षण –

The mark of the mundane-direct (*sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa*) knowledge (*jñāna*) –

इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तं देशतः सांव्यवहारिकम् ॥५॥

अन्वयार्थ – [इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तं] इन्द्रिय और अनिन्द्रिय (मन) के

निमित्त से होने वाले [देशतः] एकदेश से (विशद) ज्ञान को [सांव्यवहारिकम्] सांव्यवहारिक प्रत्यक्ष कहते हैं।

The knowledge obtained with the help of the senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*mana*) is partially (*ekadeśa*) unambiguous (*viśada*) – with respect to some part only – and is called the mundane-direct (*sāṃvṛyavahārika-pratyakṣa*) knowledge.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As expounded in Ācārya Umāsvāmi's 'Tattvārthasūtra', sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) – is caused by the senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*mana*). (*sūtra* 1:14). In *sūtra* 1:11, Ācārya Umāsvāmi has called it indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge.

The soul is of the nature of knowledge. However, together with the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of the knowledge-obscuring karmas, the soul, by itself, is unable to know the objects. And that which acts as the instrument for acquisition of knowledge by the soul in that stage is the sense (*indriya*). Or that which causes the knowledge of hidden objects is the sign (*liṅga*). Accordingly, that which promotes the knowledge of the subtle soul, is the sense (*indriya*). For instance, smoke is the cause of the knowledge of the fire. Similarly, the senses, such as the touch (*sparśa*), etc., cannot exist without the soul. Hence by means of those senses the existence of the soul is inferred. Or, 'indra' is the word denoting name-karma (*nāmakarma*). The senses (*indriya*) are built by that. The words 'anindriya', 'mana', 'antaḥkaraṇa' are synonyms and refer to the mind.

The sense-organs perceive objects within a limited range, and the perception lasts for a long time. But the mind is not like these. Objects that are perceived by the senses as well as those not perceived by the senses are subject to mental cognition. Though the mind is also the

sign (*liṅga*) of the soul (*indra*), it neither cognizes objects within a limited range nor does the mental attitude remain for long (it changes quickly). The mind is described as an internal sense. In investigating good and evil and in remembrance, etc., the mind is not dependent on the senses. Nor is the mind seen outwardly like the eyes, etc. So it is called the internal sense.

Sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) has four stages – impression (*avagraha*), inquisitiveness (*īhā*), comprehension (*avāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*).

In the present *sūtra*, sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) has been called the mundane-direct (*sāṃvyaavahārika-pratyakṣa*) knowledge since conventionally it brings about clarity in some respects – it is partially (*ekdeśa*) unambiguous (*viśada*). In absolute terms, however, sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) is indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge.

पदार्थ और प्रकाश को ज्ञान के कारणत्व का निषेध –

The object (*artha, padārtha*) and the light (*prakāśa*) are not the causes of knowledge –

नार्थालोकौ कारणं परिच्छेद्यत्वात्तमोवत् ॥६॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अर्थालोकौ] अर्थ (पदार्थ) और आलोक (प्रकाश) ज्ञान के [कारणं] कारण [न] नहीं हैं [परिच्छेद्यत्वात्] क्योंकि ये परिच्छेद्य अर्थात् ज्ञान के विषय हैं – जानने योग्य ज्ञेय हैं। (जो ज्ञान का विषय होता है, वह ज्ञान का कारण नहीं होता) [तमोवत्] जैसे अन्धकार।

The object (*artha, padārtha*) and the light (*prakāśa*) are not the causes of knowledge; these are objects-of-

knowledge (*paricchedya, jñeya*), like the darkness (*andhakāra*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The object (*artha, padārtha*) and the light (*prakāśa*) are the subjects (*viśaya*), not the causes (*kāraṇa*), of knowledge. As an illustration, darkness (*andhakāra*) is the subject (*viśaya*) of knowledge, not its cause (*kāraṇa*). We know darkness but darkness does not help us in our knowledge of objects.

If the object (*artha, padārtha*) be considered the cause of knowledge, the scope of knowledge will get limited only to the existing objects; the objects that have vanished or are yet to originate will be out of its purview. Similarly if the light (*prakāśa*) be considered the cause of knowledge, one will be able to know nothing in darkness; darkness itself will be outside the scope of knowledge.

सूत्रोक्त इसी साध्य को सिद्ध करने के लिए दूसरी युक्तियाँ -

The above *sūtra*, explained further -

**तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानाभावाच्च
केशोण्डुकज्ञानवन्नक्तञ्चरज्ञानवच्च ॥७॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानाभावात् च] उन अर्थ (पदार्थ) और आलोक (प्रकाश) का ज्ञान के साथ अन्वय और व्यतिरेक के अनुसरण (सम्बन्ध) का अभाव होने से। [केशोण्डुकज्ञानवत्] जैसे केशों में होने वाले उण्डुक (मच्छर) के ज्ञान के समान [च] तथा [नक्तञ्चरज्ञानवत्] नक्तञ्चर (रात्रि में चलने वाले) उलूक, चमगादड़

आदि के ज्ञान के समान।

The object (*artha, padārtha*) and the light (*prakāśa*) cannot be the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the knowledge – the effect or *kārya* – as their relationship exhibits neither infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) nor infallible-negation (*vyatireka*). Illustrations are the knowledge of the mosquitoes on head-hair, and the knowledge of the nocturnal animals (like the owl and the bat) which are active at night.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

First, meaning of the terms infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) and infallible-negation (*vyatireka*):

Infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) is when in the presence of the cause (*kāraṇa*) the effect (*kārya*) must exist. Or, infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) indicates infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) with the means (*sādhana*). Illustration: ‘There is the fire (*sādhya*) on the hill because there is the smoke (*sādhana*).’

Infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) is when in the absence of the cause (*kāraṇa*) the effect (*kārya*) must not exist. Or, infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) indicates infallible-non-existence of the means (*sādhana*) in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Illustration: ‘Wherever there is no fire (absence of *sādhya*), there is no smoke (absence of *sādhana*).’

The knowledge (*jñāna*) has no such relationship, infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) and infallible-negation (*vyatireka*), with the object (*artha, padārtha*). The example given in the *sūtra* is of the flying mosquitoes on the head-hair. One can mistake the flying hair on the head for flying mosquitoes; one fails to know the true object-of-knowledge, i.e., the hair. Infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) is absent here

as in the presence of the cause (*kāraṇa*) the effect (*kārya*) has not been ascertained. On the other hand, one can mistake flying mosquitoes on head for flying hair; one fails to know the true object-of-knowledge, i.e., the mosquitoes. Infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) is absent here as in the absence of the cause (*kāraṇa*) the effect (*kārya*) has been ascertained.

The knowledge (*jñāna*) has no such relationship, infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) and infallible-negation (*vyatireka*), with the light (*prakāśa*) too. The example given in the *sūtra* is of the nocturnal animals (like the owl and the bat) which are active at night. In presence of the light of the day – the cause (*kāraṇa*) – these animals fail to know the object-of-knowledge – the effect (*kārya*). Infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*), therefore, is absent here. On the other hand, at night (in absence of the light of the day) – the cause (*kāraṇa*) – these animals are able to know the object-of-knowledge – the effect (*kārya*). Infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) is absent here as in the absence of the cause (*kāraṇa*) the effect (*kārya*) has been ascertained.

ज्ञान के अर्थजन्यता और अर्थाकारता का खण्डन -

The knowledge is neither due to the object nor does it take the form of the object -

अतज्जन्यमपि तत्प्रकाशकं प्रदीपवत् ॥८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अतज्जन्यम्] अर्थ से नहीं उत्पन्न हुआ [अपि] भी ज्ञान [तत्प्रकाशकं] उस अर्थ का प्रकाशक है; [प्रदीपवत्] दीपक के समान।

Although not produced by the object (*artha*, *padārtha*), the knowledge (*jñāna*) illumines the object; like the lamp.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The word '*atad janya*' in the *sūtra* means 'not produced by that'; the knowledge (*jñāna*) is not produced by the object (*artha, padārtha*). The phrase 'not produced by that' should also include 'does not take its form'; the knowledge does not take the form of the object (*artha, padārtha*).

In both cases, the illustration of the lamp is applicable. Just as the lamp is neither produced by the object nor does it take the form of the object but illumines the object; the knowledge too is neither produced by the object nor does it take the form of the object but knows the object.

अतज्जन्य और अतदाकार होने पर भी प्रतिनियतार्थ जानने का कारण -

The cause of knowing the object-of-knowledge -

**स्वावरणक्षयोपशमलक्षणयोग्यतया हि प्रतिनियतमर्थं
व्यवस्थापयति ॥९॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [हि] जिस कारण से (प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमाण) [स्वावरण-क्षयोपशमलक्षणयोग्यतया] अपने आवरणकर्म के क्षयोपशम लक्षण वाली योग्यता के द्वारा [प्रतिनियतमर्थम्] प्रतिनियत पदार्थों को जानने की [व्यवस्थापयति] व्यवस्था करता है।

By its own capability, whose mark is destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayaopasāma*) of the self-enveloping (*svāvaraṇa*) karmas, the direct-knowledge (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) establishes the nature of each object (*artha, padārtha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Every mundane soul is enveloped by numerous knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) and effort- or energy-obstructing (*vīryāntarāya*) karmas. As the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayaopāśama*) of these karmas takes place, the soul, on its own, attains the capability to know. As the knowledge-obscuring karma appertaining to any particular object-of-knowledge is destroyed, the knowledge of that object manifests in the soul without the help of the external means like the object (*artha, padārtha*) itself and the light (*prakāśa*). The knowledge, thus, is neither produced by the object nor takes the form of the object; it knows the object.

The destruction (*kṣaya*) and subsidence (*upāśama*) of the enveloping karmas is the real cause of the direct-knowledge (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*). The destruction (*kṣaya*) and subsidence (*upāśama*) of the karmas are the marks of the capability of the soul to attain the direct-knowledge (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*); only in this manner the nature of each object is established. The word ‘direct’ – *pratyakṣa* – is not mentioned in the *sūtra*; this needs to be inferred from the previous *sūtra*.

कारण होने से ज्ञेयरूपता मानने का निराकरण -

Refutation of the view that ‘the causes (*kāraṇa*) of knowledge are the objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*)’ –

कारणस्य च परिच्छेद्यत्वे करणादिना व्यभिचारः ॥१०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [कारणस्य] (ज्ञान का) कारण [च] और [परिच्छेद्यत्वे] ज्ञान को उत्पन्न होने रूप (ज्ञेय) विषय मानने पर [करणादिना] करणादि (इन्द्रियादि) से [व्यभिचारः] दोष आता है। (क्योंकि इन्द्रियाँ ज्ञान का कारण तो हैं परन्तु विषय नहीं है, अर्थात्

इन्द्रियाँ अपने आपको नहीं जानती हैं।)

The view that ‘the cause (*kāraṇa*) of knowledge itself is the object-of-knowledge (*jñeya*)’ carries with it the fault of transgression (*vyabhicāra*) when applied to the instruments (*karaṇa*) of knowledge. The senses (*indriya*), the instruments (*karaṇa*) of knowledge, are the cause (*kāraṇa*) of knowledge but not themselves the objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*); these do not know themselves.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Let us analyze the inference (*anumāna*) mentioned above: ‘the cause (*kāraṇa*) of knowledge itself is the object-of-knowledge (*jñeya*)’. Here, to be the cause is the means (*hetu*) and to be the object (*viśaya*) is the thing to-be-proved (*sādhya*). The senses (*indriya*) satisfy the requirement of the means (*hetu*) as these are the causes (*kāraṇa*) of knowledge. However, the senses (*indriya*) fail to satisfy the criterion of the object (*viśaya*) of knowledge since the senses are not known through own-senses. This is the reason for the fault of transgression (*vyabhicāra*). The fault of transgression (*vyabhicāra*) happens when the means (*hetu*) is present but the thing to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is absent.

मुख्य-प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण का लक्षण -

The mark of the supreme-direct (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

सामग्रीविशेषविश्लेषिताखिलावरणमतीन्द्रियमशेषतो
मुख्यम् ॥११॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सामग्रीविशेषविश्लेषिताखिलावरणम्] सामग्री-विशेष (सुद्रव्य, सुक्षेत्र, सुकाल और सुभाव) के द्वारा दूर हो गये हैं सम्पूर्ण आवरण जिसके, ऐसा वह [अतीन्द्रियम्] अतीन्द्रिय (इन्द्रियातीत) [अशेषतः] पूर्णरूप से विशद/निर्मल (ज्ञान) [मुख्यम्] मुख्य-प्रत्यक्ष है- केवलज्ञान है।

When all envelopments (*āvaraṇa*) are eliminated on the availability of special concomitances, the sense-independent (*atīndriya*) and completely unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*), supreme-direct (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*) knowledge – *kevalajñāna* – manifests.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Special concomitances are the object (*dravya*), space (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and nature or condition (*bhāva*). On availability of these concomitances the supreme-direct (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*) knowledge manifests. What is the nature of this knowledge? It is sense-independent (*atīndriya*). Without the help of the senses it is able to know all object-of-knowledge (*jñeya*). Further, it is completely unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*).

When the soul is absolutely without envelopment (*āvaraṇa*), in its perfection, the only knowledge that subsists is omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) – the supreme (*mukhya*) or soul-based (*pārmāthika*) direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge.

पारमार्थिक-प्रत्यक्ष (मुख्य-प्रत्यक्ष) के पूर्ण वैशद्य में हेतु -

The cause of total unambiguity (*nirmalatā, spaṣṭatā*) in the soul-based (*pārmārthika*) knowledge -

सावरणत्वे करणजन्यत्वे च प्रतिबन्धसम्भवात् ॥१२॥

अन्वयार्थ - (क्योंकि) [सावरणत्वे] आवरण सहित [च] और [करणजन्यत्वे] इन्द्रिय-जनित मानने पर [प्रतिबन्धसम्भवात्] (ज्ञान का) प्रतिबन्ध संभव है (ज्ञान में अविशदता संभव है)।

Because, when the knowledge is with envelopment (*āvaraṇa*) and is engendered by the senses (*karāṇa* or *indriya*) there is the possibility of its impediment (*pratibandha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

So long as the knowledge (*jñāna*) is with envelopment (*āvaraṇa*) and is produced by the senses (*karāṇa* or *indriya*) there is the possibility of its impediment (*pratibandha*). When all envelopments are removed and when there is no dependence on the senses, the sense-independent (*atīndriya*), completely unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*) knowledge manifests that reflects absolutely clearly, as if placed on own-palm, all objects – animate and inanimate – of the three-worlds and the three-times. Therefore, for the knowledge to be absolutely unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*) it is essential that it is without-envelopment (*nirāvaraṇa*) and is sense-independent (*atīndriya*).

One may raise a doubt that this definition of the supreme (*mukhya*) and direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge will exclude clairvoyance (*avadhi-jñāna*) and telepathy (*manahparyaya-jñāna*) as these do not encompass all objects of the three-worlds and the three-times. The

answer is that these two kinds of knowledge although are only partially (*ekadeśa*) direct (*pratyakṣa*) but are absolutely unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*) in respect of their own subject-matter. The definition does not suffer from the fault (*doṣa*) of under-pervasiveness (*avyāpti*)¹.

Sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) and scriptural-knowledge (*śruta-jñāna*) are not even partially (*ekadeśa*) direct (*pratyakṣa*) and, therefore, do not fall under the scope of the supreme (*mukhya*) and direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge. The definition does not suffer from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*ativyāpti*)².


Thus, the sense-independent (*atīndriya*), supreme (*mukhya*) and direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge is of three kinds – omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*), clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*) and telepathy (*manahpariyaya-jñāna*). This direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge is produced by the soul itself without the help of the externalities like the senses (*indriya*) and the light (*prakaśa*); it is, therefore, called sense-independent (*atīndriya*).

See Fig.-1 on the next page for a summary of the direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge, as described in Chapter-2.

1. Under-pervasiveness (*avyāpti*) – the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) is not universally found in the object (*lakṣya*).

2. Over-pervasiveness (*ativyāpti*) – the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) is also found outside the object (*lakṣya*).

Fig.-1

Summary of the direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

इति द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः

This concludes Chapter-2.



तृतीयः परिच्छेदः

CHAPTER – 3



परोक्ष का लक्षण और निर्णय -

The mark of the indirect (*parokṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

परोक्षमितरत् ॥१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [इतरत्] भिन्न [परोक्षम्] परोक्ष है।

(जो प्रत्यक्ष से इतर अर्थात् भिन्न है, वह परोक्ष प्रमाण है।)

That which is different from the direct (*pratyakṣa*) is the indirect (*parokṣa*) [valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)].

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The word '*itara*' in the *sūtra* means 'different'. Different from the earlier-mentioned direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge is indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge. Thus, knowledge that is ambiguous (*aviśada*) is indirect (*parokṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).



परोक्ष के कारण और भेद -

The causes and divisions of indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge –

प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तं स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागम भेदम् ॥२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तं] प्रत्यक्ष आदि जिसके निमित्त हैं तथा [स्मृति-प्रत्यभिज्ञान-तर्कानुमानागम] स्मृति, प्रत्यभिज्ञान, तर्क, अनुमान और आगम [भेदम्] (ऐसे पाँच) भेद वाला (परोक्षज्ञान है)।

The indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge is that which is caused by direct (*pratyakṣa*), etc., and has these divisions: remembrance (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), inductive-reasoning (*tarka*), inference (*anumāna*), and the Scripture (*āgama*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The knowledge that is marked by ambiguity (*aviśadatā*) is indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge. Direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge, etc., are the instrumental causes (*nimitta*) of the five divisions of indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge mentioned in the *sūtra*. This is explained below:

To remember something that has been experienced earlier is remembrance (*smṛti*). This implies that for remembrance (*smṛti*) the direct (*pratyakṣa*) instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) is the retention (*dhāraṇā*) of the earlier experience.

Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) means to note that 'It is the same thing that I had seen earlier'. Therefore, the instrumental causes of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) are the remembrance (*smṛti*), and the present vision, a kind of direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge.

Inductive-reasoning (*tarka*) rests on the existence of infallible-concomitance (*avinabhāva*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*). For inductive-reasoning (*tarka*), the instrumental causes are the direct (*pratyakṣa*), the remembrance (*smṛti*) and the recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*). On direct observance of the smoke coming out of the fire in his kitchen, a man is able to relate the smoke with the fire. When he observes the smoke somewhere else, through recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), he reasons out that there must

be the fire in the vicinity, and finds it. With repeated observation of such incidents, he forms a generalization in his mind that wherever there is the smoke there is the fire and wherever there is no fire there is no smoke. The development of this sense of infallible-concomitance (*avinabhava*) in the mind between the fire and the smoke is called the inductive-reasoning (*tarka*). In simple terms, the inductive-reasoning (*tarka*) is using specific observations to reach a broad conclusion.

The same person, later on, sees the smoke coming out from the top of a hill. With his previous inductive-reasoning (*tarka*) he infers that there must be the fire on the hill. This way, from the means (*sādhana*), i.e., the smoke, he ascertains the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), i.e., the fire. This is called the inference (*anumāna*). In the inference (*anumāna*), therefore, the instrumental causes (*nimitta*) are the direct (*pratyakṣa*), the remembrance (*smṛti*), the recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) and the inductive-reasoning (*tarka*).

The knowledge of the reality got through the Word of the Omniscient Lords (*āpta*) and its exposition, etc., is the Scripture (*āgama*). The instrumental causes of this knowledge – the Scripture (*āgama*) – are the correct interpretation of the Word of the Omniscient Lords (*āpta*) and the remembrance (*smṛti*).

स्मृति-प्रमाण का लक्षण वा कारण -

The mark of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) called remembrance (*smṛti*) -

संस्कारोद्बोधनिबन्धना तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः ॥३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [संस्कारोद्बोधनिबन्धना] धारणारूप संस्कार की प्रकटता के निमित्त से होने वाले और [तदित्याकारा] 'तत्' (वह) इस प्रकार के आकार वाले ज्ञान को [स्मृतिः] स्मृति कहते हैं।

Remembrance (*smṛti*) is caused by bringing to the fore the earlier retention (*dhāraṇā*) and gaining the knowledge that ‘that’ – particular object – has the same form.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Retention (*dhāraṇā*) is the cause of not forgetting in the future what was ascertained in the past. For instance, ‘This is the same crane which I saw this morning,’ is retention. Thus, the earlier lasting impression is retention (*dhāraṇā*). Remembrance (*smṛti*) is bringing to the fore the earlier lasting impression, i.e., retention (*dhāraṇā*), and determining the form of the object seen.

स्मृति का दृष्टान्त -

An illustration of remembrance (*smṛti*) –

स देवदत्तो यथा ॥४॥

अन्वयार्थ – [यथा] जैसे [सः] वह [देवदत्तः] देवदत्त है।

Like, ‘He is Devadatta.’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Someone had seen the man named Devadatta and retains his profile in his mind. Sometime later, his impression about the man named Devadatta comes to the fore; that is remembrance (*smṛti*). Thus, the knowledge based on past retention is remembrance (*smṛti*).

प्रत्यभिज्ञान का लक्षण वा स्वरूप -

The mark of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) called recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) -

**दर्शनस्मरणकारकं सङ्कलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं,
तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादि ॥५॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [दर्शनस्मरणकारकं] वर्तमान में पदार्थ का दर्शन और पूर्व में देखे हुए का स्मरण ऐसे [सङ्कलनं] संकलन अर्थात् अनुसन्धानरूप ज्ञान को [प्रत्यभिज्ञानं] प्रत्यभिज्ञान कहते हैं। जैसे- [इदं तदेव] यह वही है - एकत्व-प्रत्यभिज्ञान; [तत्सदृशं] उसके समान है - सादृश्य-प्रत्यभिज्ञान; [तद्विलक्षणं] उससे भिन्न है - वैलक्षण्य-प्रत्यभिज्ञान; [तत्प्रतियोगी] उसका प्रतियोगी है - प्रातियोगिक-प्रत्यभिज्ञान; [इत्यादि] इत्यादि। इस प्रकार और भी प्रत्यभिज्ञान के भेद हो सकते हैं।

The knowledge based on the confluence of the present vision and remembrance (*smṛti*) of the earlier vision is recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*). Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) is of several kinds: 'It is the same'; 'It is like that'; 'It is different from that'; 'It is larger than that'; etc.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), i.e., the knowledge based on the confluence of the present vision and remembrance (*smṛti*), is of several kinds, including:

.....

Recognition of the same – *ekatva pratyabhijñāna* – ‘It is the same’.

Recognition of the like – *sādṛśya pratyabhijñāna* – ‘It is like that’.

Recognition of the different – *vailakṣaṇya pratyabhijñāna* – ‘It is different from that’.

Recognition of the comparative – *prātiyogika pratyabhijñāna* – ‘It is larger than that’.

प्रत्यभिज्ञान के दृष्टान्त -

Illustrations of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) –

यथा स एवायं देवदत्तः, गोसदृशो गवयः, गोविलक्षणो
महिषः, इदमस्माद् दूरम्, वृक्षोऽयमित्यादि ॥६॥

अन्वयार्थ – [यथा] जैसे [सः] वह [एव] ही [अयम्] यह
[देवदत्तः] देवदत्त है; [गोसदृशः] गाय के समान [गवयः] नीलगाय
है; [गोविलक्षणः] गाय से विलक्षण (भिन्न) [महिषः] भैंसा है;
[इदम्] यह [अस्मात्] इससे [दूरम्] दूर है; [अयम्] यह [वृक्षः]
वृक्ष है; [इत्यादि] इत्यादि।

Illustrations of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) are: ‘He is the same Devadatta;’ ‘This antelope (*gavaya*, *nīlagāya*) is like that cow;’ ‘This buffalo (*mahiṣa*, *bhaiṁsā*) is different from that cow;’ ‘That is far from this;’ and ‘This is a tree;’ etc.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The first – ‘He is the same Devadatta.’ – is an example of recognition of

the same – *ekatva pratyabhijñāna*.

The second – ‘This antelope (*gavaya*, *nīlagāya*) is like that cow.’ – is an example of recognition of the like – *sādṛśya pratyabhijñāna*.

The third – ‘This buffalo (*mahiṣa*, *bhaiṁsā*) is different from that cow;’ – is an example of recognition of the different – *vailakṣaṇya pratyabhijñāna*.

The fourth – ‘That is far from this.’ – is an example of recognition of the comparative – *prātiyogika pratyabhijñāna*.

The fifth – ‘This is a tree.’ – is an example of recognition of the general – *sāmānya pratyabhijñāna*.

From the word ‘etc.’ it should be known that there are other kinds of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) too. All illustrations given here rely on both, the vision of the present and the remembrance of the earlier retention (*dhāraṇā*).

तर्क-प्रमाण का कारण वा लक्षण -

The mark of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) called inductive-reasoning (*tarka*) –

उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः ॥७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं] उपलम्भ (अन्वय) और अनुपलम्भ (व्यतिरेक) हैं कारण जिसमें ऐसे [व्याप्तिज्ञानम्] व्याप्ति के ज्ञान को [ऊहः] तर्क (तर्क-प्रमाण) कहते हैं।

The knowledge of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) caused through infallible-affirmation (*upalambha*, *anvaya*) or infallible-negation (*anupalambha*, *vyatireka*) is called inductive-reasoning (*ūhaḥ* or *tarka*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As has already been mentioned (see, *sūtra* 2-7), if in the presence of the instrumental-object (*sādhana*, *hetu*) the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) must be present, the relationship is called infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*). If in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the instrumental-object (*sādhana*) must be absent, the relationship is called infallible-negation (*vyatireka*).

What is infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*)? Infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) is said to exist when, invariably, in the presence of the instrumental-object (*sādhana*, *hetu*) the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is present and in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the instrumental-object (*sādhana*) is absent. The knowledge of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) is according to the destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopasāma*) of the knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) karmas.

व्याप्तिज्ञान की प्रवृत्ति का प्रकार -

Illustrations of the knowledge of infallible-concomitance
(*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) -

इदमस्मिन्सत्येव भवत्यसति तु न भवत्येव ॥८॥

यथाऽग्नावेव धूमस्तदभावे न भवत्येवेति च ॥९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [इदम्] यह [अस्मिन्] इसके [सति] होने पर [एव] ही [भवति] होता है [तु] किन्तु [असति] नहीं होने पर [न] नहीं [एव] ही [भवति] होता है।
[यथा] जैसे [अग्नौ] अग्नि के होने पर [एव] ही [धूमः] धुआँ

होता है [च] और [तदभावे] उसके अभाव में [न] नहीं [एव] ही [भवति] होता है, [इति] इस प्रकार (जानना)।

(यह साधनरूप वस्तु इस साध्यरूप वस्तु के होने पर ही होती है और साध्यरूप वस्तु के नहीं होने पर नहीं होती है; जैसे- अग्नि के होने पर ही धूम होता है और अग्नि के अभाव में धूम नहीं होता है।)

In the presence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the instrumental-object (*sādhana*, *hetu*) must be present, and in the absence the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the instrumental-object (*sādhana*) must be absent. As: 'In the presence of the fire, the smoke must be present, and in the absence of the fire, the smoke must be absent.'

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The *sūtra* illustrates both kinds of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*): infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) and infallible-negation (*vyatireka*).

Another example of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) is: 'In the presence of the sun, the daylight must be present, and in the absence of the sun, the daylight must be absent.'

अनुमान का कारण और स्वरूप -

The cause and nature of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) called inference (*anumāna*) -

साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥१०॥

अन्वयार्थ – [साधनात्] साधन से [साध्यविज्ञानम्] साध्य का विशिष्ट ज्ञान [अनुमानम्] अनुमान कहलाता है।

The particular knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) obtained from the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*) is the inference (*anumāna*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The acquisition of the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved [the major-term, the probandum (Latin), *sādhya* or *liṅgī*] through the means (the middle-term, *sādhana* or *hetu* or *liṅga*) is the inference (*anumāna*). This too constitutes the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), albeit indirect (*parokṣa*). The example is to see the smoke and infer the presence of the fire on the hill.

हेतु (साधन) का लक्षण –

The mark of the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*) –

साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुः ॥११॥

अन्वयार्थ – [साध्याविनाभावित्वेन] साध्य के साथ जिसका अविनाभाव [निश्चितः] निश्चित हो, अर्थात् जो साध्य के बिना न हो, उसे [हेतुः] हेतु (साधन) कहते हैं।

The object that has infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), i.e., it does not exist without the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), is called the means (the middle-term, *sādhana* or *hetu* or *liṅga*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Inductive-reasoning (*tarka*) rests on the existence of infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*). With repeated observation of the smoke and the fire, through inductive-reasoning (*tarka*), one concludes that wherever there is the smoke there is the fire and where there is no fire there is no smoke.

The statement, 'Where there is no fire there is no smoke,' is sufficient to convey infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the fire (*sādhya*) and the smoke (*sādhana*). One other name for this kind of infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) is infallible-non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*).

The sure-enough determination of the fire (*sādhya*, *liṅgī*) on the hill, thus, is through the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*, *liṅga*), i.e., the smoke.

अविनाभाव के भेद -

The divisions of infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) -

सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ॥१२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सहक्रमभावनियमः] सहभाव नियम और क्रमभाव नियम को [अविनाभावः] अविनाभाव कहते हैं।

Infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) [between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*)] follows either of these two rules: without-gradation (*sahabhāva*, *akramabhāva*), and with-gradation (*kramabhāva*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

When the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*) exist together, without a time difference, the infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) is said to be without-gradation (*sahabhāva*, *akramabhāva*). When the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*) exist with a time difference, the infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) is said to be with-gradation (*kramabhāva*).

सहभाव-नियम का लक्षण -

Infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) without-gradation (*sahabhāva*) -

सहचारिणोर्व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च सहभावः ॥१३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सहचारिणोः] सहचारी (सदा साथ रहने वाले) में [च]
और [व्याप्यव्यापकयोः] व्याप्य-व्यापक पदार्थों में [सहभावः]
सहभाव नियम होता है।

The objects that exhibit invariable-togetherness (*sahacārī*), and relationship as the object-pervaded (*vyāpya*) and the object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*), have infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) without-gradation (*sahabhāva*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Invariable-togetherness (*sahacārī*) is illustrated by the form (*rūpa*)

and the juice (*rasa*) that are found together in fruits like the lemon and the mango. The form does not exist without the juice and the juice does not exist without the form; both must exist together.

The attributes of the particular tree – *śiṅśapā* (*śiṅśapā* is a tropical tree known also as *śīśama*) – and the treeness (*vrkṣatva*) exhibit the characteristic of the object-pervaded (*vyāpya*) and the object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*). Treeness (*vrkṣatva*) is the object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*) and the attributes of the particular tree (*śiṅśapā*) is the object-pervaded (*vyāpya*). The attributes of the particular tree (*śiṅśapā*) cannot be found without the treeness (*vrkṣatva*).

क्रमभाव-नियम का लक्षण -

Infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with-gradation (*kramabhāva*) -

पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कार्यकारणयोश्च क्रमभावः ॥१४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः] पूर्वचर और उत्तरचर में [च] तथा [कार्यकारणयोः] कार्य और कारण में [क्रमभावः] क्रमभाव-नियम होता है।

The objects that exhibit relationship of appearance either before (*pūrva*) or after (*uttara*), or of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*), have infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with-gradation (*kramabhāva*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The star Kṛttikā appears forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) before

the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) and therefore, these exhibit relationship of appearance before (*pūrva*) and after (*uttara*). In regard to their appearance, the two stars exhibit infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with-gradation (*kramabhāva*). As the fire is the cause (*kāraṇa*) and the smoke is the effect (*kārya*), these, too, exhibit infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with-gradation (*kramabhāva*).

व्याप्तिज्ञान (अविनाभाव) के निर्णय का कारण -

The cause of the knowledge of infallible-concomitance
(*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) -

तर्कान्निर्णयः ॥१५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तर्कात्] तर्क प्रमाण से [तन्निर्णयः] उस अविनाभाव का निर्णय (निश्चय, परिज्ञान) होता है।

The knowledge of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) is caused through the inductive-reasoning (*ūhaḥ* or *tarka*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As mentioned under *sūtra* 3-11, inductive-reasoning (*tarka*) rests on the existence of infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*). With repeated observation of the smoke and the fire, through inductive-reasoning (*tarka*), one concludes that wherever there is the smoke there is the fire and where there is no fire there is no smoke. Inductive-reasoning (*tarka*) is the cause of the knowledge of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*).

साध्य का स्वरूप -

The nature of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) -

इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं साध्यम् ॥१६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं] इष्ट (अभिप्रेत), अबाधित (बाधा-रहित) और असिद्ध (पदार्थ) को [साध्यम्] साध्य कहते हैं।

The object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is that which is 'of-interest' (*iṣṭa*), 'undeniable' (*abādhita*) and 'unproven' (*asiddha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

That which the propounder (*vādi*) wishes to prove is called 'of-interest' (*iṣṭa*). That which is not in contravention with any existent valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is 'undeniable' (*abādhita*). That which has not yet been proven by any valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is 'unproven' (*asiddha*); there is no point in proving something that has already been proven.

साध्य के लक्षण में असिद्ध विशेषण की सार्थकता -

The reason for using 'unproven' (*asiddha*) as an adjective for the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) -

**संदिग्धविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नानां साध्यत्वं यथा
स्यादित्यसिद्धपदम् ॥१७॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [संदिग्धविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नानां] संदिग्ध, विपर्यस्त

(विपरीत), अव्युत्पन्न पदार्थों के [साध्यत्वं] साध्यपना [यथा] जिस प्रकार से [स्यात्] हो (माना जा सके) [इति] इसलिए साध्य के लक्षण में [असिद्धपदम्] असिद्ध पद दिया है।

The word ‘unproven’ (*asiddha*) has been used in respect to the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) as its knowledge has to become clear of doubt (*saṇḍigdha*, *saṁśaya*), perversity (*viparyaya*) and indefiniteness (*avyutpanna*, *anadhyavasāya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If on seeing something in twilight a person is not able to determine whether it is a stump (*sthāṇu*) or a man his knowledge in regard to the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) suffers from doubt (*saṇḍigdha*, *saṁśaya*). The cognition of an object as something which is contrary to its true nature – mistaking the nacre for the silver – is perversity (*viparyaya*). Uncertain knowledge in regard to name (*nāma*), class (*jāti*), number (*saṁkhyā*), etc., of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is indefiniteness (*avyutpanna*, *anadhyavasāya*).

The knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) has to become clear of these three imperfections.

साध्य के लक्षण में इष्ट और अबाधित पदों का सार्थक्य -

The reason for using the adjectives ‘of-interest’ (*iṣṭa*) and ‘undeniable’ (*abādhita*) for the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) -

अनिष्टाध्यक्षादिबाधितयोः साध्यत्वं मा
भूदितिष्टाबाधितवचनम् ॥१८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अनिष्टाध्यक्षादिबाधितयोः] अनिष्ट और प्रत्यक्ष आदि प्रमाणों से बाधित पदार्थों के [साध्यत्वं] साध्यपना [मा भूत्] न माना जाये, [इति] इसलिए (साध्य को) [इष्टाबाधितवचनं] इष्ट और अबाधित - ये दो वचन (विशेषण) - दिये गये हैं।

That which is not-of-interest (*aniṣṭa*) and which is deniable through direct-knowledge, etc., cannot be the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*); therefore, the adjectives 'of-interest' (*iṣṭa*) and 'undeniable' (*abādhita*) have been used.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The propounder (*vādī*) does not wish to prove that which is not-of-interest (*aniṣṭa*). His effort then is meaningless and untimely. If the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) has already been contradicted by any valid knowledge, direct or otherwise, it no longer remains an object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*); the effort is futile. The contradiction can be through the direct-knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), the inference (*anumāna*), the scriptural-injunction (*āgama*), the worldly-ways, the own-speech, etc.

साध्य का इष्ट विशेषण वादी की अपेक्षा से होता है -

The adjective 'of-interest' (*iṣṭa*) refers to the propounder (*vādī*) -

न चासिद्धवदिष्टं प्रतिवादिनः ॥१९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [च] और [असिद्धवत्] असिद्ध (विशेषण) के समान

[इष्टं] इष्ट (विशेषण) [प्रतिवादिनः] प्रतिवादी की अपेक्षा से [न] नहीं है।

The adjective ‘unproven’ (*asiddha*) refers to the disputant (*prativādī*) but the adjective ‘of-interest’ (*iṣṭa*) does not refer to him; it refers to the propounder (*vādī*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The person who establishes the hypothesis is the propounder (*vādī*) and the person who objects to it is the disputant (*prativādī*). The object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) or the hypothesis is ‘unproven’ (*asiddha*) for the disputant (*prativādī*), not for the propounder (*vādī*). In contrast, the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) or the hypothesis is ‘of-interest’ (*iṣṭa*) to the propounder (*vādī*).

इष्ट विशेषण वादी की अपेक्षा होने का कारण -

The reason why the adjective ‘of-interest’ (*iṣṭa*) refers to the propounder (*vādī*) -

प्रत्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्तुरेव ॥२०॥

अन्वयार्थ - (क्योंकि) [प्रत्यायनाय] दूसरे को समझाने के लिए [हि] निश्चय से [इच्छा] इच्छा [वक्तुः] वक्ता (अर्थात् वादी) के [एव] ही होती है।

The adjective ‘of-interest’ (*iṣṭa*) refers to the propounder (*vādī*) as he only, not the disputant (*prativādī*), is interested in explaining the premise to the others.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, the person who establishes the hypothesis is the propounder (*vādī*) and the person who objects to it is the disputant (*prativādī*). Only the propounder (*vādī*) of the hypothesis is interested in explaining and establishing his premise.

साध्य का निर्णय -

The nature of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) -

साध्यं धर्मः क्वचित्तद्विशिष्टो वा धर्मी ॥२१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [क्वचित्] कहीं पर [धर्मः] धर्म [साध्यं] साध्य होता है [वा] अथवा (कहीं पर) [तद्विशिष्टः] उस धर्म से विशिष्ट (युक्त) [धर्मी] धर्मी साध्य होता है।

At places the attribute (*dharma*) and at some other places the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

When infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana* or *hetu* or *liṅga*) is used, the attribute (*dharma*) is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). But when inference (*anumāna*) is used, the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

‘Wherever there is the smoke, there is the fire and wherever there is no fire there is no smoke.’ To teach to the learner this kind of infallible-

concomitance (*vyāpti*) is known as the *vyāpti-kāla*. At such time, the attribute (*dharma*), i.e., the fire, is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). 'The hill (*dharmī*) is full of fire since it is full of smoke.' To teach to the learner this kind of application is known as the *prayoga-kāla*. At such time, the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*), i.e., the hill, is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

धर्मी का नामान्तर -

Another name for the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) -

पक्ष इति यावत् ॥२२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [पक्षः] पक्ष [इति] इस प्रकार है [यावत्] जैसा धर्मी। (उसी धर्मी को पक्ष कहते हैं। पक्ष इस प्रकार धर्मी का ही पर्यायवाची नाम है।)

The possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) itself is called the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Although only the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) has been mentioned as the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) but the idea includes the attribute (*dharma*) since both, the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) and the attribute (*dharma*), constitute the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

In the *Nyāya* terminology, the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) is also called the minor-term, the locus or the abode. The middle-term (*hetu*) is connected with it and its connection with the major-term (*sādhya*) is

to be proved. In the proposition (*pratijñā*), the subject is the minor-term (*pakṣa*), and the predicate is the major-term (*sādhya* or *liṅgī*).

पक्ष की प्रसिद्धता या लक्षण -

The possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is well-known -

प्रसिद्धो धर्मी ॥२३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [धर्मी] धर्मी [प्रसिद्धः] प्रसिद्ध अर्थात् प्रमाण से सिद्ध (काल्पनिक नहीं) होता है।

The possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is well-known, i.e., proven by valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*); it is not imaginary (*kālpanika*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) were imaginary (*kālpanika*), not proven by the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the associated object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana* or *hetu* or *liṅga*) too become imaginary. The possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is not a non-object (*avastu*) but is a real entity that is the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is known through: 1) *pramāṇa-siddha* or *pramāṇa-prasiddha* (through valid-knowledge) – ‘This hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke.’; 2) *vikalpa-siddha* (being utterly distinct) – ‘The horns of a hare are non-existent.’; and 3) *pramāṇa-vikalpa-siddha* or *ubhaya-siddha* (both, through valid-knowledge and being utterly distinct) – ‘The man is the master of his destiny because he has the power to control his actions.’

विकल्पसिद्ध धर्मी में साध्य का नियम -

Establishment of the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) in the *vikalpa-siddha* (utterly distinct) -

विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मिन् सत्तेरे साध्ये ॥२४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तस्मिन् विकल्पसिद्धे] उस विकल्पसिद्ध धर्मी में [सत्तेरे] सत्ता और इतर (असत्ता) [साध्ये] दोनों ही साध्य हैं।

In the *vikalpa-siddha* (utterly distinct) subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) [or the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*)] both, existence (*sattā*) and non-existence (*asattā*), constitute the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) [or the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*)] whose existence (*sattā*) or non-existence (*asattā*) is yet unproven is called the *vikalpa-siddha* (utterly distinct). Both, existence (*sattā*) and non-existence (*asattā*), constitute the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Existence (*sattā*) of the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) is proved on the strength of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that negates, in no uncertain terms, its non-existence. Non-existence (*asattā*) is proved on the strength of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that affirms the non-availability of any proof of its existence.

विकल्पसिद्ध धर्मी का उदाहरण -

Illustrations of the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) that is *vikalpa-siddha* (utterly distinct) -

अस्ति सर्वज्ञो नास्ति खरविषाणम् ॥२५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सर्वज्ञः] सर्वज्ञ [अस्ति] है; [खरविषाणम्]
खर-विषाण (गधे के सींग) [नास्ति] नहीं है।

[The illustrations of *vikalpa-siddha* (utterly distinct) are:] Existence (*sattā*) of the 'Omniscient' (*sarvajña*), and non-existence of the 'horns of the hare' (*khara-viṣāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The 'Omniscient' (*sarvajña*) is the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) that is *vikalpa-siddha* (utterly distinct). There is no valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that negates, in no uncertain terms, his non-existence and therefore, his existence is proved.

Non-existence of the 'horns of the hare' (*khara-viṣāṇa*), too, is the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) that is *vikalpa-siddha* (utterly distinct). The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), in this case, is that there is absolute non-availability of any proof of its existence.

Thus, both existence (*sattā*) and non-existence (*asattā*) constitute the objects-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) in the *vikalpa-siddha* (utterly distinct) possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*).

प्रमाणसिद्ध धर्मी और विकल्पसिद्ध धर्मी में साध्य -

The object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) in the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) that is *pramāṇa-siddha* or *pramāṇa-vikalpa-siddha* -

प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे तु साध्यधर्मविशिष्टता ॥२६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे] प्रमाणसिद्ध धर्मी और उभयसिद्ध (प्रमाणविकल्पसिद्ध) धर्मी में [तु] तो [साध्यधर्मविशिष्टता] साध्य धर्म से विशिष्टता अर्थात् संयुक्तता साध्य होती है।

In the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) that is *pramāṇa-siddha* or *pramāṇa-vikalpa-siddha* its particular attribute or the *dharma* is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In both kinds of the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) - *pramāṇa-siddha* and *pramāṇa-vikalpa-siddha* - the particular attribute or the *dharma* is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). It means that particular attribute(s) (*dharma*) of even an object that has been known through valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) - *pramāṇa-siddha* - may constitute the objects-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). The same is applicable to the object that has been known through both, valid-knowledge and utter distinctness - *pramāṇa-vikalpa-siddha*.

प्रमाणसिद्ध और विकल्पसिद्ध धर्मी के दृष्टान्त -

Illustrations of the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) that is *pramāṇa-siddha* and *pramāṇa-vikalpa-siddha* -

अग्निमानयं देशः परिणामी शब्द इति यथा ॥२७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [यथा] जैसे [अयम्] यह [देशः] प्रदेश [अग्निमान्]
अग्नि वाला है [इति] और इसी प्रकार [शब्दः] शब्द [परिणामी]
परिणामी है।

(The illustrations are:) ‘This region is with fire,’ and further ‘the word (*śabda*) is with-modification (*pariṇāmī*)’.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The fire in the region – *dharmī* – is known by direct valid-knowledge and, therefore, *pramāṇa-siddha*.

The modification (*pariṇāma*) in the word (*śabda*) – *dharmī* – is known both by direct valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa-siddha*) and distinctness (*vikalpa-siddha*). The modification in the word spoken in the present and in the accessible region is proven by direct valid-knowledge; it is therefore, *pramāṇa-siddha*. However, the modification in the word spoken in the past, in the present but in inaccessible region, and will be spoken in the future, is utterly distinct and, therefore, *vikalpa-siddha*. That ‘the word (*śabda*) is with-modification (*pariṇāmī*)’, thus, is *pramāṇa-vikalpa-siddha*.

व्याप्तिकाल में साध्य का नियम -

In case of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) the attribute (*dharma*) is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) -

व्याप्तौ तु साध्यं धर्म एव ॥२८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [व्याप्तौ] व्याप्तिकाल में [तु] तो [धर्मः] धर्म [एव] ही [साध्यं] साध्य होता है।

When infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) is established, only the attribute (*dharma*) is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

When infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the kind 'wherever there is the smoke, there is the fire,' is being considered, the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is the attribute (*dharma*), i.e., the fire, and not the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*), i.e., the hill.

व्याप्तिकाल में धर्मी को साध्य मानने से हानि -

The fault if the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is considered as the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) -

अन्यथा तदघटनात् ॥२९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अन्यथा] अन्यथा [तत्] वह (व्याप्ति) [अघटनात्] घटित नहीं हो सकती है (दोष आता है)।

Otherwise, the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) cannot be established.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) is between the smoke (*sādhana, hetu*) and the fire (*dharma*) and not between the smoke and the hill (*dharmī*). If the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is considered as the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) becomes faulty; not all hills have the smoke. The *pramāṇa* no more remains flawless.

पक्ष का प्रयोग करने की आवश्यकता -

The need to use the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) -

साध्यधर्माधारसन्देहापनोदाय गम्यमानस्यापि पक्षस्य

वचनम् ॥३०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [साध्यधर्माधारसन्देहापनोदाय] साध्य धर्म के आधार के विषय में सन्देह को दूर करने के लिए [गम्यमानस्य पक्षस्य] गम्यमान (स्वतः सिद्ध) पक्ष का [अपि] भी [वचनम्] वचन प्रयोग किया जाता है।

In order to remove any doubt about the substratum of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), which is the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*), the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa* – the minor-term, the locus or the abode), though self-evident, too is mentioned.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), i.e., the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*), cannot be without a substratum; therefore, it is contended that by the mention of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) is evident. This is true but in order to exclude any doubt – ‘whether the fire is on the hill or in the kitchen?’ – the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) should be mentioned.

पक्ष का प्रयोग करने की आवश्यकता का दृष्टान्त -

Illustration of the use of the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) –

साध्यधर्मिणि साधनधर्मावबोधनाय पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवत् ॥३१॥

अन्वयार्थ - (जैसे) [साध्यधर्मिणि] साध्य से युक्त धर्मी में
[साधनधर्मावबोधनाय] साधन-धर्म के ज्ञान कराने के लिए
[पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवत्] पक्षधर्म के उपसंहाररूप उपनय का प्रयोग किया जाता है।

As to associate the attribute (*dharma*) – the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) – connected with the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*), the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is mentioned together with the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) in order to make clear the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The minor-term, locus or abode (*pakṣa*) is that with which the reason or the middle-term (*hetu*) is connected, and whose connection with the major-term (*sādhya*) is to be proved. The minor-term (*pakṣa*) is related

to the major-term (*sādhya*) through their common relation to the middle-term (*hetu*). In the proposition (*pratijñā*) the subject is the minor-term (*pakṣa*), and the predicate the major-term (*sādhya* or *liṅgī*).

Conventionally, in an inference for the sake of others, the minor-term (*pakṣa*), etc., are explicitly set forth. The following is an inference (*anumāna*) for the sake of others:

1. This hill (minor-term, *pakṣa*) is full of fire (major-term, *sādhya*). – ***pratijñā*** : proposition; statement of that which is to be proved.
2. Because it is full of smoke (middle-term). – ***hetu*** : statement of the reason.
3. Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen. – ***drṣṭānta*** or ***udāharaṇa*** : statement of the general rule supported by the example.
4. So is this hill full of smoke. ***upanaya*** : application-of-the-rule to this case.
5. Therefore, the hill is full of fire. ***nigamana*** : conclusion.

The *hetu* or the reason consists in the statement of the mark or the sign (*liṅga*) which being present in the subject or the minor-term (*pakṣa*) suggests that the latter possesses a certain property predicated of it. It is the assertion of the middle-term (*hetu*) by which the relation or not of the minor-term (*pakṣa*) to the major-term (*sādhya*) is known. While the *pratijñā* is a proposition of two terms, the *hetu* is a one-term proposition.

पक्ष के प्रयोग की आवश्यकता की पुष्टि -

Validation for the use of the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) -

को वा त्रिधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानो न पक्षयति ॥३२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [वा] अथवा [कः] कौन है जो [त्रिधा] तीन प्रकार के

[हेतुम्] हेतु को [उक्त्वा] कह करके [समर्थयमानः] उसका समर्थन करता हुआ भी [पक्षयति] पक्ष का प्रयोग [न] न करे?

Who [the propunder (*vādī*) and the disputant (*prativādī*)], after mentioning and accepting the three kinds of the means or the middle-term (*hetu*), will not use the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*, the minor-term) in support?

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Both, the propunder (*vādī*) as well as the disputant (*prativādī*), after mentioning the means or the middle-term (*hetu*), will mention, although implied, the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*, the minor-term).

The Buddhists have propounded three kinds of the means or the middle-term (*hetu*): 1) natural means (*svabhāva hetu*), 2) effect means (*kārya hetu*), and 3) infallible-negation (*anupalabdhi hetu*). Each has threefold-marks (*trairūpya lakṣaṇa*): 1) attribute of the subject (*pakṣa-dharmatva*, e.g., attribute of the hill), 2) presence in the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa-sattva*, e.g., presence in the kitchen), and 3) absence in the opposite (*vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*, e.g., absence in the lake). They contend that only by accepting these threefold-marks (*trairūpya lakṣaṇa*) of the means (*hetu*) can one get rid of the fallacies like unproven (*asiddha*). [see, (2017), 'Prameyaratnamālā', p. 117]

The mention of the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*, the minor-term) facilitates the knowledge of the substratum of the major-term or the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

अनुमान के अंगों का निर्णय -

The limbs of inference (*anumāna*) -

एतद्वयमेवानुमानाङ्गं नोदाहरणम् ॥३३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [एतत्] ये [द्वयम्] दोनों - पक्ष और हेतु - [एव] ही [अनुमानाङ्गं] अनुमान के अंग हैं, [उदाहरणम्] उदाहरणादिक [न] नहीं।

These two [the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*, the minor-term) and the means or the middle-term (*hetu*)] are the limbs of inference (*anumāna*), not the example (*udāharaṇa*), etc.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Only the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*, the minor-term) and the means or the middle-term (*hetu*) are the limbs of inference (*anumāna*). Three reasons are given by others to justify the use of the example (*udāharaṇa*): 1) to provide knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), 2) to affirm the infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of the means (*hetu*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), and 3) to remind the disputant of the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*). These reasons are contradicted now.

उदाहरण का अनुमान का अंग न होने में कारण -

The example (*udāharaṇa*) is not a limb of inference (*anumāna*) -

न हि तत्साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गं तत्र यथोक्त हेतोरेव
व्यापारात् ॥३४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तत्साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गं] वह (उदाहरण) साध्य के ज्ञान में कारण [न] नहीं है [हि] क्योंकि [तत्र] वहाँ साध्य के ज्ञान में

[यथोक्त] यथोक्त (अर्थात् साध्य के साथ अविनाभावरूप से निश्चित)
[हेतोः] हेतु का [एव] ही [व्यापारात्] व्यापार होता है।

The example (*udāharaṇa*) is not a cause (*kāraṇa*) of the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) because the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) depends only on the suitable means or the middle-term (*hetu*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The example (*udāharaṇa*) is not a cause of the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). The knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) depends on the means or the middle-term (*hetu*) that establishes infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with it.

साध्य के साथ हेतु का अविनाभाव निश्चित कराने के लिये उदाहरण की आवश्यकता का खण्डन -

The example (*udāharaṇa*) does not affirm the infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of the means (*hetu*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) -

तदविनाभावनिश्चयार्थं वा विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणबलादेव
तत्सिद्धेः ॥३५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तदविनाभावनिश्चयार्थं] वह उदाहरण अविनाभाव के निश्चय के लिए भी कारण नहीं है [वा] क्योंकि [विपक्षे] विपक्ष में

[बाधकप्रमाणबलात्] बाधक-प्रमाण के बल से [एव] ही [तत्] वह (अविनाभाव) [सिद्धेः] सिद्ध हो जाता है।

The example (*udāharaṇa*) is not a cause to affirm the infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of the means (*hetu*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) because the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*, *avinābhāva*) is proved by the non-availability of any contrary valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The example (*udāharaṇa*) does not prove the infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of the means (*hetu*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*); the non-availability of any contrary valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) does.

उदाहरण के अनुमानाङ्ग न होने का प्रकारान्तर से खण्डन -

The above contention explained in another way -

व्यक्तिरूपं च निदर्शनं सामान्येन तु व्याप्तिस्तत्रापि
तद्विप्रतिपत्तावनवस्थानं स्याद् दृष्टान्तान्तरापेक्षणात् ॥३६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [निदर्शनं] निदर्शन (उदाहरण) [व्यक्तिरूपं] व्यक्तिरूप होता है [तु] परन्तु [व्याप्तिः] व्याप्ति [सामान्येन] सामान्यरूप से (सर्वदेश काल की उपसंहार वाली) होती है; [तत्रापि] उस उदाहरण में भी [च] और [तद्विप्रतिपत्तौ] उस सामान्य व्याप्ति में विवाद होने पर

[दृष्टान्तान्तरापेक्षणात्] दृष्टान्त को अन्य दृष्टान्त की अपेक्षा होने से
[अनवस्थानम्] अनवस्था दोष प्राप्त होगा।

The example (*udāharaṇa*) pertains to particularity and the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*, *avinābhāva*) is for all regions and time. In case of disagreement with the example (*udāharaṇa*) given, another example will be required and that would lead to the fault (*doṣa*) of endless-series (*anavasthā*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The example (*udāharaṇa*) pertains to particularity and its application cannot be generalized. A second example will be required to show the infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) mentioned in the first example. This goes on and on and, therefore, carries with it the fault (*doṣa*) of endless-series (*anavasthā*).

व्याप्ति के स्मरण के लिये भी उदाहरण की अनावश्यकता -

The example (*udāharaṇa*) is not necessary even to remind the disputant of the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) -

नापि व्याप्तिस्मरणार्थं तथाविधहेतुप्रयोगादेव तत्स्मृतेः ॥३७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [व्याप्तिस्मरणार्थं] व्याप्ति का स्मरण करने के लिए
[अपि] भी [न] उदाहरण की आवश्यकता नहीं है, क्योंकि
[तथाविधहेतुप्रयोगात्] उस प्रकार के (साध्य के साथ अविनाभावरूप)
हेतु के प्रयोग से [एव] ही [तत्स्मृतेः] उस (व्याप्ति का) स्मरण हो
जाता है।

The example (*udāharaṇa*) is not necessary to remind the disputant of the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) because without the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the means (*hetu*) does not exist, and the use of the means (*hetu*) is enough to remind the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The man who knows already the relationship between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*hetu*) will understand their infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) just by the mention of the appropriate means (*hetu*). The man who does not know the relationship between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*hetu*) will not understand their infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) even by giving hundreds of examples (*udāharaṇa*). The remembrance (*smṛti*) pertains to only those things that have been experienced earlier.

उपनय और निगमन के प्रयोग बिना उदाहरण-प्रयोग से हानि -

If only the example (*udāharaṇa*) is used without the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*), it results in doubt -

तत्परमभिधीयमानं साध्यधर्मिणि साध्यसाधने सन्देहयति ॥३८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तत्परमभिधीयमानं] (उपनय और निगमन के बिना) उस उदाहरण मात्र का कहा जाना [साध्यधर्मिणि] साध्यधर्म वाले धर्मी (पक्ष) में [साध्यसाधने] साध्य के सिद्ध करने में [सन्देहयति] सन्देह करा देता है।

If only the example (*udāharaṇa*) is used [without mentioning the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*)], it results in doubt in right determination of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) in the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The example (*udāharaṇa*) – ‘as in the kitchen’ – does not necessarily clear the doubt in the mind of the listener regarding the presence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) – ‘the fire’ – in the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) – ‘the hill’. As long as the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) – ‘wherever there is the smoke there is the fire’ – is not established in his mind, the doubt shall persist; the example (*udāharaṇa*) of the kitchen will not serve the purpose.

केवल उदाहरण-प्रयोग से सन्देह होने का स्पष्टीकरण -

Further explanation of the cause of doubt due to the use of only the example (*udāharaṇa*) –

कुतोऽन्यथोपनयनिगमने ॥३९॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अन्यथा] अन्यथा [उपनयनिगमने] उपनय और निगमन [कुतः] किस कारण से प्रयोग में लाये जाते?

(If this were not the case) Why would one use the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*)?

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If only the example (*udāharaṇa*) were sufficient to establish the presence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) in the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) why would anyone use the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*)? This establishes that the use of only the example (*udāharaṇa*) results in doubt.

उपनय और निगमन का अनुमानाङ्ग न होने का स्पष्टीकरण -

The application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*), too, are not the limbs of inference (*anumāna*) -

न च ते तदङ्गे, साध्यधर्मिणि
हेतुसाध्ययोर्वचनादेवासंशयात् ॥४०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [साध्यधर्मिणि] साध्यधर्म वाले धर्मी (पक्ष) में
[हेतुसाध्ययोः] हेतु और साध्य के [वचनात्] वचन से [एव] ही
[असंशयात्] संशय नहीं होने से [ते च] वे - उपनय और निगमन -
भी [तदङ्गे] उस (अनुमान के) अंग [न] नहीं हैं।

The application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*), too, are not the limbs of inference (*anumāna*) because only by the mention of the means (*hetu*) and the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the doubt in respect of the presence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) in the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is removed.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*) are not the limbs of inference (*anumāna*) because the mention of the means (*hetu*) and the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) removes the doubt in respect of the presence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) in the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*).

The application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*) will be explained later on.

अनुमान-प्रयोग में केवल हेतु की आवश्यकता और उदाहरण आदि की अनावश्यकता -

The acceptance of the means (*hetu*) is the true limb of the inference (*anumāna*) -

समर्थन वा वरं हेतुरूपमनुमानावयवो वाऽस्तु साध्ये
तदुपयोगात् ॥४१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [समर्थनं] समर्थन [वा] ही [वरं] श्रेष्ठ/वास्तविक [हेतुरूपम्] हेतु का स्वरूप है और [तत्] वही (समर्थन) [अनुमानावयवः] अनुमान का अवयव [अस्तु] होता है; [वा] क्योंकि [साध्ये] साध्य की सिद्धि में [उपयोगात्] उसी का उपयोग होता है।

The acceptance of the means (*hetu*) is the real thing; therefore, it is the necessary limb of the inference (*anumāna*). This is because only the means (*hetu*) is used in establishing the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The acceptance of the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the means (*hetu*) and the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is the essential limb of the inference (*anumāna*).

One may raise the doubt that just by using the means (*hetu*) and the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), without the use of the example (*udāharaṇa*, *dṛṣṭānta*), etc., those with little wit will not understand the meaning. Read further.

बालकों को समझाने के लिये उदाहरण, उपनय और निगमन की आवश्यकता -

Limited benefit of the use of the example (*udāharaṇa*, *dṛṣṭānta*), etc. -

**बालव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तत्रयोपगमे शास्त्र एवासौ न
वादेऽनुपयोगात् ॥४२॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [बालव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं] मंदबुद्धि वाले बालकों (अल्पज्ञानियों) की व्युत्पत्ति के लिए (ज्ञान कराने के लिए) [तत्रयोपगमे] उन तीन - उदाहरण, उपनय, निगमन - अवयवों को मान लेने पर भी [शास्त्र] शास्त्र में [एव] ही [असौ] उनकी स्वीकारता है, [वादे] वाद में [न] नहीं, क्योंकि वाद में [अनुपयोगात्] उनका उपयोग नहीं है। (वाद करने का अधिकार विद्वानों को ही होता है और वे पहले से ही व्युत्पन्न रहते हैं, इसलिए उनको उदाहरणादि का प्रयोग उपयोगी नहीं होता।)

These three, the example (*udāharaṇa*, *dṛṣṭānta*), etc., have acceptability only in imparting learning to the dim-

witted, not in scholarly-discussion; these are of no use in scholarly-discussion.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

To impart knowledge to the uninitiated learners these three, the example (*udāharaṇa*, *dṛṣṭānta*), the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*), are useful. These have no use in scholarly-discussion as only learned men have the right to participate in such discussion.

Since limited utility of these three has been accepted, their brief description follows.

दृष्टान्त के भेद -

The kinds of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) -

दृष्टान्तो द्वेधा अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् ॥४३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [दृष्टान्तः] दृष्टान्त [द्वेधा] दो प्रकार का होता है -
[अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात्] अन्वय और व्यतिरेक के भेद से।

The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is of two kinds: 1) infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*), and 2) infallible-negation (*vyatireka*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is that which exhibits either infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) or infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*).

अन्वय-दृष्टान्त का लक्षण -

The mark of the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) that exhibits infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) -

साध्यव्याप्तं साधनं यत्र प्रदर्श्यते सोऽन्वयदृष्टान्तः ॥४४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [साध्यव्याप्तं] साध्य से व्याप्त [साधनम्] साधन को [यत्र] जहाँ [प्रदर्श्यते] दिखाया जाता है, [सः] वह [अन्वयदृष्टान्तः] अन्वय-दृष्टान्त है।
(साध्य के साथ जहाँ साधन की व्याप्ति दिखलाई जाती है, वह अन्वय-दृष्टान्त है।)

The example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) which shows infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) – in presence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the means (*sādhana*) must be present – is of the infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) kind.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) of the infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) kind shows infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the means (*sādhana*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). The example: 'Where there is the smoke there is the fire; as in the kitchen.'

व्यतिरेक-दृष्टान्त का स्वरूप -

The mark of the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) that exhibits infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) -

साध्याभावे साधनाभावो यत्र कथ्यते स व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः ॥४५॥

अन्वयार्थ – [यत्र] जहाँ [साध्याभावे] साध्य के अभाव में
 [साधनाभावः] साधन का अभाव [कथ्यते] कहा जाता है, [सः] वह
 [व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः] व्यतिरेक-दृष्टान्त है।

The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) which shows infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) – in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the means (*sādhana*) must be absent – is of the infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) kind.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) of the infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) kind involves infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) – in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the means (*sādhana*) must be absent. The example: ‘Where there is no fire, there is no smoke; as in the lake.’

उपनय का लक्षण –

The mark of the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) –

हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयः ॥४६॥

अन्वयार्थ – [हेतोः] हेतु का [उपसंहारः] उपसंहार (दुहराना)
 [उपनयः] उपनय कहलाता है।
 (पक्ष में हेतु का उपसंहार उपनय कहलाता है।)

Recapitulation of the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) is called the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*), the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) is associated with the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*, also called the minor-term, the locus or the abode). 'So is this hill full of smoke,' is the example of the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*).

निगमन का स्वरूप -

The mark of the conclusion (*nigamana*) -

प्रतिज्ञायास्तु निगमनम् ॥४७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तु] दूसरी ओर [प्रतिज्ञायाः] प्रतिज्ञा के उपसंहार (दुहराने) को [निगमनम्] निगमन कहते हैं।

Recapitulation of the proposition (*pratijñā*) is called the conclusion (*nigamana*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The repetition of the proposition (*pratijñā*) – 'Therefore the hill is full of fire,' – at the end of the syllogism is the conclusion (*nigamana*).

Thus, the inference (*anumāna*) may consists of two, three, four and five limbs, depending on the particular theories. The next *sūtra* clarifies this.

अनुमान के भेद -

The kinds of inference (*anumāna*) -

तदनुमानं द्वेधा ॥४८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तत्] वह [अनुमानं] अनुमान [द्वेधा] दो प्रकार का है।

(That) Inference (*anumāna*) is of two kinds.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

This *sūtra* clarifies that the inference (*anumāna*) is of two kinds; not of three, four or five kinds.

अनुमान के दो भेदों का स्पष्टीकरण -

The two kinds of inference (*anumāna*) -

स्वार्थपरार्थभेदात् ॥४९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [स्वार्थपरार्थभेदात्] एक स्वार्थानुमान और दूसरा परार्थानुमान।

The two kinds of inference (*anumāna*) are: 1) for-self (*svārtha*) and 2) for-other (*parārtha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

To resolve dispute arising in the self and in the others is the fruit of the two kinds of inference (*anumāna*).

To resolve dispute arising in own mind is the fruit of the inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*). To resolve the dispute arising in other's mind is the fruit of the inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*).

स्वार्थानुमान का लक्षण -

The mark of the inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*) -

स्वार्थमुक्तलक्षणम् ॥५०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [स्वार्थम्] स्वार्थानुमान [उक्त] कह दिये गये

[लक्षणम्] लक्षण वाला है।

(देखें, सूत्र 3-10)

The mark of the inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*) has already been defined.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

It has been said (see, *sūtra* 3-10): The particular knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) obtained from the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*) is inference (*anumāna*). This is the nature of the inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*). The knowledge obtained from the inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*) is by the self, without the teaching of others.

परार्थानुमान का लक्षण -

The mark of the inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*) -

परार्थं तु तदर्थपरामर्शिवचनाज्जातम् ॥५१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तु] परन्तु [तदर्थपरामर्शिवचनात्] उस स्वार्थानुमान के विषयभूत अर्थ का परामर्श (निर्णय/निश्चय) करने वाले वचनों से जो ज्ञान [जातम्] उत्पन्न होता है उसे [परार्थ] परार्थानुमान कहते हैं।

The knowledge obtained from the words that determine the nature of the object – the subject of inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*) – is the inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The knowledge obtained through the inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*) – marked by the means (*sādhana, hetu*) and the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) – when conveyed to the other through words is the inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*).

In essence, if the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) by the means (*sādhana, hetu*) is obtained through the words of the other, it is the inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*). If the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) by the means (*sādhana, hetu*) is obtained without the words of the other, it is the inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*). This is the difference between the two.

परार्थानुमान-प्रतिपदाक वचन के परार्थानुमानपना -

By convention, words that cause inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*) are called inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*) -

तद्वचनमपि तद्धेतुत्वात् ॥५२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तद्धेतुत्वात्] उस परार्थानुमान का हेतु/कारण होने से [तत्] उस (परार्थानुमान के प्रतिपादक) [वचनम्] वचन को [अपि] भी परार्थानुमान कहते हैं।

Being the cause of inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*), the words that convey the inference (*anumāna*), too, are called inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

‘Convention’ (*upacāra*), as a rule, takes place when, in the absence of the principal (*mukhya*), the purpose (*prayojana*) and the instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) are used to describe something. What the disciple gathers is the inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*) and the words that are used to convey this to him are also called the inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*), by convention. Here the words are the cause (*kāraṇa*) and imparting the knowledge of inference (*anumāna*) is the effect (*kārya*). Or, the words used by the man to communicate his inference-for-self (*svārtha-anumāna*) to the other are called inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*). In this meaning, the cause (*kāraṇa*) has been assumed, conventionally, in the effect (*kārya*). In the texts, the proposition (*pratijñā*), the statement of reason (*hetu*), the

means), etc., are conventionally called the limbs of inference (*anumāna*). The inference (*anumāna*) is solely in form of singular (*niranśa*) knowledge; the use of limbs like the proposition (*pratijñā*), the statement of reason (*hetu*), etc., is just by convention. In this context, the words, themselves inanimate, that cause inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*), are, by convention, called inference-for-other (*parārtha-anumāna*).

The general mark of the inference (*anumāna*), however, is the particular knowledge obtained from the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

हेतु के भेद -

The kinds of the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) -

स हेतुर्द्वेधोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥५३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सः] वह [हेतुः] (अविनाभाव लक्षण वाला) हेतु [द्वेधा] दो प्रकार का है- [उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिभेदात्] एक उपलब्धिरूप हेतु और दूसरा अनुपलब्धिरूप हेतु।

The means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) whose mark is infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) [between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*)] is of two kinds: 1) infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*) and 2) infallible-absence (*anupalabdhirūpa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

It is clarified that the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) of the kind infallible-

.....

presence (*upalabdhirūpa*) indicates 'infallible-existence' and of the kind infallible-absence (*anupalabdhirūpa*) indicates 'infallible-non-presence'.

उपलब्धिरूप और अनुपलब्धिरूप हेतु के विषय -

The subjects of the two kinds of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) mentioned in the previous *sūtra* -

उपलब्धिर्विधिप्रतिषेधयोरनुपलब्धिश्च ॥५४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [उपलब्धिः] उपलब्धिरूप हेतु [च] और [अनुपलब्धिः] अनुपलब्धिरूप हेतु [विधिप्रतिषेधयोः] विधि और प्रतिषेध दोनों के साधक हैं।

The means (*hetu, sādhana*) of the kind infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*) upholds both assertion (*vidhi*) and denial (*pratiṣedha*); of the kind infallible-absence (*anupalabdhirūpa*) too upholds both assertion (*vidhi*) and denial (*pratiṣedha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The means (*hetu, sādhana*) of the kind infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*) is of two kinds: one, which upholds assertion (*vidhi*) that is known as the presence-of-non-contradictory (*aviruddhopalabdhī*), and two, which upholds denial (*pratiṣedha*) that is known as the presence-of-contradictory (*viruddhopalabdhī*).

The means (*hetu, sādhana*) of the kind infallible-absence

(*anupalabdhirūpa*) is also of two kinds: one, which upholds denial (*pratiṣedha*) that is known as the absence-of-non-contradictory (*aviruddhānupalabdhi*), and two, which upholds assertion (*vidhi*) that is known as the absence-of-contradictory (*viruddhānupalabdhi*).

अविरुद्धोपलब्धि हेतु के छह भेद -

The means (*hetu, sādhanā*) of the kind infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*) that upholds assertion (*vidhi*) – *aviruddhopalabdhi* – is of six kinds –

**अविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधौ षोढा-
व्याप्यकार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तरसहचरभेदात् ॥५५॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [विधौ] विधि-साधन की दशा में [अविरुद्धोपलब्धिः] अविरुद्धोपलब्धि [षोढा] छह प्रकार की है- [व्याप्यकार्यकारण-पूर्वोत्तरसहचरभेदात्] 1) अविरुद्धव्याप्योपलब्धि, 2) अविरुद्ध-कार्योपलब्धि, 3) अविरुद्धकारणोपलब्धि, 4) अविरुद्धपूर्वचरोपलब्धि, 5) अविरुद्धोत्तरचरोपलब्धि और 6) अविरुद्धसहचरोपलब्धि।
(साध्य से व्याप्यस्वरूप, साध्य का कार्य, साध्य का कारण, साध्य से पूर्वचर, साध्य से उत्तरचर, और साध्य का सहचर।)

The means (*hetu, sādhanā*) of the kind infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*) that upholds assertion (*vidhi*) – the presence-of-non-contradictory (*aviruddhopalabdhi*) – is of six kinds:

1) presence-of-non-contradictory pervasion (*vyāpya*) –

aviruddhavyāpyopalabdhi;

- 2) presence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) –
aviruddhakāryopalabdhi;
- 3) presence-of-non-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) –
aviruddhakāraṇopalabdhi;
- 4) presence-of-non-contradictory precedence
(*pūrvacara*) – *aviruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi;*
- 5) presence-of-non-contradictory subsequence
(*uttaracara*) – *aviruddhottaracaropalabdhi;* and
- 6) presence-of-non-contradictory simultaneity
(*sahacara*) – *aviruddhasahacaropalabdhi.*

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The means (*hetu, sādhana*) that upholds assertion (*vidhi*) shows infallible-presence (*upalabdirūpa*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) in six ways: pervasion (*vyāpya*), effect (*kārya*), cause (*kāraṇa*), precedence (*pūrvacara*), subsequence (*uttaracara*), and simultaneity (*sahacara*).

The Buddhist scholars raise a doubt that the cause (*kāraṇa*) cannot be considered as a means (*hetu, sādhana*) that upholds assertion (*vidhi*). The doubt is clarified now.

कारण-हेतु के विधिसाधकपना -

The cause (*kāraṇa*), too, is a means (*hetu, sādhana*) that upholds assertion (*vidhi*) -

रसादेकसामग्र्यनुमानेन रूपानुमानमिच्छद्भिरिष्टमेव किञ्चित्
कारणं हेतुर्यत्र सामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धकारणान्तरावैकल्ये ॥५६॥

अन्वयार्थ – [यत्र] जिसमें [सामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धकारणान्तरावैकल्ये] सामर्थ्य की रुकावट नहीं है और अन्य कारणों की विकलता (कमी) नहीं है, ऐसे [रसात्] रस से [एकसामग्र्यनुमानेन] एक सामग्री के अनुमान द्वारा [रूपानुमानम्] रूप का अनुमान [इच्छद्भिः] चाहने वाले (बौद्धों के द्वारा) [किञ्चित् कारणं] कोई विशिष्ट कारणरूप [हेतुः] हेतु [इष्टं एव] स्वीकार किया गया ही है।

(रस से एक सामग्री के अनुमान द्वारा रूप का अनुमान स्वीकार करने वाले बौद्धों ने कोई विशिष्ट कारण रूप हेतु माना ही है, जिसमें सामर्थ्य का प्रतिबन्ध नहीं है और दूसरे कारणों की विकलता नहीं है।)

The Buddhists have conceded that from the juice (*rasa*) of an object its form (*rūpa*) can be inferred; this points to the fact that the cause (*kāraṇa*) is a means (*hetu*, *sādhana*), unless incapacitated in itself or inhibited by the lack of other causes (*kāraṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Suppose a person tastes a mango in pitch-darkness. By its sweet taste he infers that the mango must be yellow in colour. Thus, from the cause (*kāraṇa*), i.e., the taste (*rasa*), he has inferred its form (*rūpa*), i.e., yellow. This proves that the cause (*kāraṇa*), too, is a means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) for the inference (*anumāna*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), unless incapacitated in itself or inhibited by externalities like incantations (*mantra*) or the lack of accompanying (*sahakārī*) causes (*kāraṇa*).

पूर्वचर और उत्तरचर हेतुओं की अन्य हेतुओं से भिन्नता -

The precedence (*pūrvacara*) and the subsequence (*uttaracara*) are different from the other kinds of means (*hetu, sādhana*) -

**न च पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोस्तादात्म्यं तदुत्पत्तिर्वा कालव्यवधाने
तदनुपलब्धिः ॥५७॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः] पूर्वचर और उत्तरचर हेतुओं का साध्य के साथ [तादात्म्यं] तादात्म्य सम्बन्ध [च] और [तदुत्पत्तिः] तदुत्पत्ति सम्बन्ध [न] नहीं है [वा] क्योंकि [कालव्यवधाने] काल का व्यवधान होने पर [तदनुपलब्धिः] उन दोनों सम्बन्धों की साध्य के साथ उपलब्धि नहीं है।

(पूर्वचर और उत्तरचर हेतुओं का साध्य के साथ तादात्म्य सम्बन्ध नहीं है अतः स्वभाव हेतु में अन्तर्भाव नहीं होता। तथा तदुत्पत्ति सम्बन्ध भी नहीं है अतः कार्य हेतु और कारण हेतु में भी अन्तर्भाव नहीं होता; क्योंकि ये दोनों सम्बन्ध काल के व्यवधान (अन्तराल) में नहीं होते हैं।)

The non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*) and non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) do not exhibit invariable-togetherness (*tādātmya*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), therefore, these cannot be termed as the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that are the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of the object. Also, these do not exhibit the relationship of the cause-of-origination (*tadutpatti*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), therefore, can also not be termed the means (*hetu, sādhana*) either of its effect

(*kārya*) or of cause (*kāraṇa*). The means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) either of the effect (*kārya*) or of the cause (*kāraṇa*) do not happen with a time-lag.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

When there is the relationship of invariable-togetherness (*tādātmya*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*), the means (*hetu*) is said to be the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). The relationship between the knowledge (*jñāna*) and the soul (*ātmā*) is an example of the invariable-togetherness (*tādātmya*).

When the relationship is of the nature of the cause-of-origination (*tadutpatti*) of one by the other, it is said to be either of the effect (*kārya*) or of the cause (*kāraṇa*). The non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*) and non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) exhibit neither the relationship of invariable-togetherness (*tādātmya*) nor of the cause-of-origination (*tadutpatti*) because both these relationships do not exist with a time-lag.

The relationship of invariable-togetherness (*tādātmya*) exists when the means (*hetu*) is the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). The relationship of the effect (*kārya*) or of the cause (*kāraṇa*) is seen without a time-lag; both, the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) take place instantly. Where there is a time-lag, the relationships of neither the invariable-togetherness (*tādātmya*) nor the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) are possible.

‘The star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) shall appear after forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) since the star Kṛttikā is originating now;’ this is an example of non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*). ‘The star Bharanī had originated forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) earlier since the star Kṛttikā is originating now;’ this is an example of non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*). Both these examples show a time-lag of

forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*), therefore, these exhibit neither the relationship of the invariable-togetherness (*tādātmya*) – i.e., the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) being the own-nature (*svabhāva*) – nor of the cause-of-origination (*tadutpatti*) of one by the other – i.e., the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) being either the effect (*kārya*) or the cause (*kāraṇa*).

काल का व्यवधान होने पर भी कार्य-कारण भाव मानने का खण्डन -

Denial of the view that the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) of the effect (*kārya*) or the cause (*kāraṇa*) can happen with a time-lag -

भाव्यतीतयोर्मरणजाग्रद्बोधयोरपि नारिष्टोद्बोधौ
प्रतिहेतुत्वम् ॥५८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [भाव्यतीतयोः मरणजाग्रद्बोधयोः] भावी-मरण और अतीत-जाग्रतबोध के [अपि] भी [अरिष्टोद्बोधौ] अरिष्ट (अपशकुन) और उद्बोध के [प्रतिहेतुत्वम्] प्रति हेतुपना [न] नहीं है। [अर्थात् भावी-मरण अरिष्ट का कारण नहीं है तथा सोने के पूर्व अवस्था का ज्ञान जागने के बाद के ज्ञान (उद्बोध) का कारण नहीं है।]

The approaching-death and the knowledge-before-sleeping are not the causes (*kāraṇa*) of bad-omens (*ariṣṭa*) and knowledge-after-waking (*udbodha*), respectively.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Buddhists claim that the knowledge while going to bed at night – the effect, *kārya* – is the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the knowledge in the

morning, and the death (the effect, *kārya*) that is to happen later is the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the bad-omens (*ariṣṭa*) that happen now. This, according to them, proves that the effect (*kārya*) or the cause (*kāraṇa*) can happen with a time-lag.

The *Ācārya* clarifies here that this is not correct. The relationship of the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) is possible only when the effect (*kārya*) takes place together with the cause (*kāraṇa*). In both the examples cited above there is the time-lag; the relationship of the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) does not take place with a time-lag. Bad-omens (*ariṣṭa*) may take place but the man may or may not die. In the same way, the topic that was in the mind before-sleeping at night may or may not be retained in the mind on waking-up in the morning.

काल-व्यवधान होने पर भी कार्य-कारण-भाव मानने के खण्डन में हेतु -

The reason for the denial of the view that the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) of the effect (*kārya*) or the cause (*kāraṇa*) can happen with a time-lag -

तद्व्यापाराश्रितं हि तद्भावभावित्वम् ॥५९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [हि] क्योंकि [तद्व्यापाराश्रितं] उस कारण के व्यापार के आश्रित ही [तद्भावभावित्वम्] कार्य का व्यापार हुआ करता है।

Only the operation of the cause (*kāraṇa*) ascertains the operation of the effect (*kārya*); the operation of the effect (*kārya*) depends on the operation of the cause (*kāraṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Everywhere, the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) are known by the relationship that exhibits infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) and infallible-negation (*vyatireka*). As an example, the potter (*kumbha-kāra*) and the pot (*ghaṭa*) exhibit the relationship of infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) and infallible-negation (*vyatireka*). Only in the presence of the potter the origination of the pot takes place and in the absence of the potter the origination of the pot does not take place. The objects that have time-lag of the kind mentioned in the two examples given by the Buddhists (see the previous *sūtra*) do not exhibit the dependence of the operation of the effect (*kārya*) on the operation of the cause (*kāraṇa*).

सहचरहेतु का स्वभावहेतु और कार्यहेतु से पृथक्पन -

The means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) of simultaneity (*sahacara*), too, is not the means that can be termed as the own-nature (*svabhāva*) or having the relationship of effect (*kārya*) and cause (*kāraṇa*) -

सहचारिणोरपि परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात्सहोत्पादाच्च ॥६०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सहचारिणः] सहचारी पदार्थ के [अपि] भी [परस्पर-परिहारेण] परस्पर के परिहार से [अवस्थानात्] अवस्थित रहने से सहचरहेतु का स्वभावहेतु में अन्तर्भाव नहीं हो सकता [च] और [सहोत्पादात्] एक साथ उत्पन्न होने से कार्यहेतु और कारणहेतु में अन्तर्भाव नहीं हो सकता।

The two objects that exhibit simultaneity (*sahacara*) are different from each other, therefore, do not exhibit the relationship that is termed as the own-nature (*svabhāva*).

Although originating simultaneously, the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) does not exhibit the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) relationship.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The two objects that exhibit simultaneity (*sahacara*) are different from each other, therefore, do not exhibit the relationship of invariable-togetherness (*tādātmya*). Their relationship, therefore, does not fall under the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) that is termed as the own-nature (*svabhāva*). Although these may originate simultaneously, not being the cause-of-origination (*tadutpatti*) of one by the other, the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) does not exhibit the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) relationship. The two horns (left and right) of a cow originate simultaneously; still these do not have the relationship of the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*). In the same manner, the juice (*rasa*) and the form (*rūpa*) in a fruit appear simultaneously; still there exists no relationship of the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) between these. The examples illustrate that the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) of simultaneity (*sahacara*) is an independent means.

अविरुद्धव्याप्योपलब्धि का उदाहरण -

An illustration, for the disciple, of the presence-of-non-contradictory pervasion (*aviruddhavyāpyopalabdhi*) -

परिणामी शब्दः, कृतकत्वात्। य एवं स एवं दृष्टो यथा घटः।
 कृतकश्चायं, तस्मात्परिणामीति। यस्तु न परिणामी, स न
 कृतको दृष्टो यथा वन्ध्यास्तनन्धयः। कृतकश्चायम्,
 तस्मात्परिणामीति ॥६१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [शब्दः] शब्द [परिणामी] परिणामी है (-प्रतिज्ञा), [कृतकत्वात्] क्योंकि वह कृतक है (-हेतु)। [यः] जो [एवं] इस प्रकार कृतक होता है [सः] वह [एवं] इस प्रकार परिणामी [दृष्टः] देखा जाता है, [यथा] जैसे [घटः] घट (अन्वय दृष्टान्त)। [च] और [अयं] यह शब्द [कृतकः] कृतक है (-उपनय)। [तस्मात्] उस कारण से [परिणामीति] परिणामी है (-निगमन)।

[तु] परन्तु [यः] जो [इति] इस प्रकार [परिणामी] परिणामी [न] नहीं होता है [सः] वह [कृतकः] कृतक [न] नहीं [दृष्टः] देखा जाता है [यथा] जैसे [बन्ध्यास्तनन्धयः] बन्ध्या का पुत्र (-व्यतिरेक दृष्टान्त)। [च] और [अयं] यह शब्द [कृतकः] कृतक है (-उपनय)। [तस्मात्] इसलिए [परिणामीति] परिणामी है (-निगमन)।

The word (*śabda*) is with-modification (*pariṇāmī*) – proposition (*pratiñā*); it is with-modification (*pariṇāmī*) because it is a creation (*kṛtaka*) – means (*hetu, sādhana*); that which is a creation (*kṛtaka*) is seen with-modification (*pariṇāmī*), as a pot (*ghaṭa*) – illustration of infallible-affirmation (*anvaya drṣṭānta*). The creation (*kṛtaka*) is the word (*śabda*) – application-of-the-rule to the case (*upanaya*); therefore the word (*śabda*) is with-modification (*pariṇāmī*) – conclusion (*nigamana*).

That which is not with-modification (*pariṇāmī*) is not seen as a creation (*kṛtaka*), as the son of a barren-woman – illustration of infallible-negation (*vyatireka drṣṭānta*). The creation (*kṛtaka*) is the word (*śabda*) – application-of-the-rule to the case (*upanaya*). Therefore it is with-modification (*pariṇāmī*) – conclusion (*nigamana*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The object that depends on the other for its origination is called a creation (*kṛtaka*). This quality of being a creation is not possible in objects that exhibit either absolute-permanence (*kūṭastha nitya*) or absolute-transience (*kṣaṇika*).

The nature of the creation (*kṛtaka*) mentioned above has the relationship of the object-pervaded (*vyāpya*) and the object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*) – *vyāpya-vyāpaka* – with the quality of ‘with-modification’ (*pariṇāmitva*). That which exists in the particularity is the object-pervaded (*vyāpya*) and that which exists in the generality is the object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*). The quality of ‘being-a-creation’ (*kṛtakatva*) is seen in the substance-of-matter (*pudgala-dravya*), therefore, it is the object-pervaded (*vyāpya*). The quality of with-modification (*pariṇāmitva*) is seen in all substances (*dravya*) including the space (*ākāśa*), therefore, it is the object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*). That which undergoes modification every instant – changes from one form to the other – but maintains its own-nature (*svatva*) throughout is called the object with-modification (*pariṇāmī*). This kind of modification is possible neither in the doctrine of absolute-permanence (*kūṭastha nitya*) nor in the doctrine of absolute-transience (*kṣaṇika*) but in the Jaina Doctrine which postulates that the substance from one point-of-view shows permanence (*nitya*, *dhrauvya*) and from another point of view undergoes origination (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vyaya*). In the present *sūtra*, the means (*hetu*) of the quality of being a creation (*kṛtakatva*) has been used to prove that the word (*śabda*) is with-modification (*pariṇāmī*). The means (*hetu*) – the quality of being a creation (*kṛtakatva*) – is the object-pervaded (*vyāpya*). This means (*hetu*), the *vyāpya*, proves the quality of with-modification (*pariṇāmitva*), the *vyāpaka*, of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

अविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धि (कार्यहेतु) का उदाहरण -

**An illustration of the presence-of-non-contradictory effect
(*kārya*) – *aviruddhakāryopalabdhi* –**

अस्त्यत्र देहिनि बुद्धिव्याहारादेः ॥६२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अत्र] इस [देहिनि] देही (शरीरधारी प्राणी) में
[बुद्धिः] बुद्धि [अस्ति] है [व्याहारादेः] क्योंकि बुद्धि के कार्य
वचनादिक पाये जाते हैं।

(यहाँ पर बुद्धि के अविरुद्ध कार्य वचनादिक की उपलब्धि है, इसलिए यह
अविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धि हेतु है।)

This possessor-of-the-body (*dehī, jīva*) has the intellect
(*buddhi*) because in it are found the speech (*vacana*), etc.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The intellect (*buddhi*) is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Non-contradictory (*aviruddha*) effects (*kārya*) of the intellect (*buddhi*) are the speech (*vacana*), etc., which are the means (*hetu*). The presence-of-non-contradictory effects (*kārya*), the speech, etc., – *aviruddhakāryopalabdhi* – prove the presence of the intellect (*buddhi*), the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

Another example of the presence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *aviruddhakāryopalabdhi* – is, ‘This hill is full of fire [the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*)] because it is full of smoke [presence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*)].’

अविरुद्धकारणोपलब्धि (कारणहेतु) का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the presence-of-non-contradictory cause (kāraṇa) – aviruddhakāraṇopalabdhi –

अस्त्यत्रच्छाया छात्रात् ॥६३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अत्र] यहाँ पर [छाया] छाया [अस्ति] है, [छात्रात्] छात्र होने से।

(यहाँ पर छाया है क्योंकि छाया का अविरोधी कारण छात्र पाया जाता है।)

There is shade (*chāyā*) here because of the presence of the umbrella (*chatra*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The umbrella (*chatra*) is a non-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) of the shade (*chāyā*). In this illustration, the means (*hetu*), i.e., the presence of the umbrella (*chatra*), proves the presence of the shade (*chāyā*), the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

Another example of the presence-of-non-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) – *aviruddhakāraṇopalabdhi* – is, ‘There is light here as the sun has risen.’

अविरुद्धपूर्वचरोपलब्धि (पूर्वचरहेतु) का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the presence-of-non-contradictory precedence (pūrvacara) – aviruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi –

उदेष्यति शकटं कृत्तिकोदयात् ॥६४॥

अन्वयार्थ – [शकटं] (एक मुहूर्त के बाद) शकट (रोहिणी) नक्षत्र [उदेष्यति] उदित होगा [कृत्तिकोदयात्] (क्योंकि अभी) कृत्तिका नक्षत्र का उदय होने से।

The star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) will appear because the star Kṛttikā has arisen.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) appears forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) after the appearance of the star Kṛttikā. As the star Kṛttikā has appeared, it is inferred that the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) will appear. The appearance of the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) is the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and it is established through the presence-of-non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*) – *aviruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi* – i.e., the appearance of the star Kṛttikā, the means (*hetu*).

Another example of the presence-of-non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*) – *aviruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi* – is, ‘Tomorrow will be Monday because today is Sunday.’

अविरुद्ध उत्तरचरोपलब्धि (उत्तरचरहेतु) का उदाहरण –

An illustration of the presence-of-non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *aviruddhottaracaropalabdhi* –

उद्गाद् भरणिः प्राक्तत एव ॥६५॥

अन्वयार्थ – [भरणिः] भरणी का [उद्गाद्] उदय [प्राक्] एक मुहूर्त के पूर्व [एव] ही हो चुका है, क्योंकि [ततः] उस (कृत्तिका का) उदय पाया जाता है।

The star Bharanī had arisen [forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) earlier] because the star Kṛttikā is appearing.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The inference (*anumāna*) here is that the star Bharanī had arisen – forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) earlier – because now the star Kṛttikā is rising. The star Kṛttikā has subsequence (*uttaracara*) with the star Bharanī; this is, therefore, an example of the presence-of-non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *aviruddhottaracaropalabdhi*.

Another example of the presence-of-non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *aviruddhottaracaropalabdhi* – is, ‘Saturday has passed because today is Sunday.’

अविरुद्धसहचरोपलब्धि (सहचरहेतु) का उदाहरण –

An illustration of the presence-of-non-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *aviruddhasahacaropalabdhi* –

अस्त्यत्र मातुलिङ्गे रूपं रसात् ॥६६॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अत्र] यहाँ [मातुलिङ्गे] मातुलिङ्ग (बिजौरा फल) में [रूपं] रूप [अस्ति] है [रसात्] रस होने से।
(रस, रूप का अविरोधी सहचर है।)

This citron (fruit) has the form (*rūpa*) because it has the juice (*rasa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The juice (*rasa*) has non-contradictory (*aviruddha*) simultaneity (*sahacara*) with the form (*rūpa*); therefore, this is an example of the presence-of-non-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *aviruddha-sahacaropalabdhi*.

Another example of the presence-of-non-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *aviruddhasahacaropalabdhi* – is, ‘The Omniscient Lord is all-knowing (*sarvajña*) because he has the perfect, infinite-knowledge (*kevalajñāna*).’

प्रतिषेधरूप विरुद्धोपलब्धि हेतु के भेद -

The kinds of means (*hetu, sādhana*) that uphold denial (*pratiṣedha*) known as the presence-of-contradictory (*viruddhopalabdhi*) –

विरुद्धतदुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे तथा ॥६७॥

अन्वयार्थ – [प्रतिषेधे] प्रतिषेधरूप में [विरुद्धतदुपलब्धिः] वह विरुद्धोपलब्धिः [तथा] उसी प्रकार से (अर्थात् अविरुद्धोपलब्धि के समान) छह भेद वाली है।

The means (*hetu, sādhana*) of the kind infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*) that upholds denial (*pratiṣedha*), i.e., the presence-of-contradictory (*viruddhopalabdhi*), too, is of six kinds.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The means (*hetu*) whose presence upholds denial (*pratiṣedha*) is of six kinds:

- 1) presence-of-contradictory pervasion (*vyāpya*) –
viruddhavyāpyopalabdhi;
- 2) presence-of-contradictory effect (*kārya*) –
viruddhakāryopalabdhi;
- 3) presence-of-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) –
viruddhakāraṇopalabdhi;
- 4) presence-of-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*) –
viruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi;
- 5) presence-of-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) –
viruddhottaracaropalabdhi; and
- 6) presence-of-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) –
viruddhasahacaropalabdhi.

All the above are the means (*hetu*) whose presence (*upalabdhi*) upholds the denial (*pratiṣedha*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

विरुद्धव्याप्योपलब्धि हेतु का दृष्टान्त -

An illustration of the presence-of-contradictory pervasion (*vyāpya*) – *viruddhavyāpyopalabdhi* –

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श औष्ण्यात् ॥६८॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अत्र] यहाँ [शीतस्पर्शः] शीतस्पर्श [नास्ति] नहीं है [औष्ण्यात्] उष्णता होने से।

No touch-of-cold (*śītasparśa*) is here because of the presence-of-warmth (*uṣṇatā*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In the example, the touch-of-cold (*śītasparśa*) is the object-denied (*pratiṣedhya*). The fire (*agni*) is contradictory to the touch-of-cold (*śītasparśa*) and the presence-of-warmth (*uṣṇatā*) has pervasion (*vyāpya*) with the fire. So the presence-of-warmth (*uṣṇatā*) upholds the denial of the touch-of-cold (*śītasparśa*).

Another example of the presence-of-contradictory pervasion (*vyāpya*) – *viruddhavyāpyopalabdhi* – is, ‘This object has no knowledge (*jñāna*) because it is inanimate (*jaḍa*).’

विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the presence-of-contradictory effect
(*kārya*) – *viruddhakāryopalabdhi* –

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्शो धूमात् ॥६९॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अत्र] यहाँ पर [शीतस्पर्शः] शीतस्पर्श [नास्ति] नहीं है
[धूमात्] धूम होने से।

No touch-of-cold (*śītasparśa*) is here because of the presence of smoke (*dhūma*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Here, again, the touch-of-cold (*śītasparśa*) is the object-denied (*pratiṣedhya*). The fire (*agni*) is contradictory to the touch-of-cold (*śītasparśa*) and the smoke (*dhūma*) is its effect (*kārya*). The presence of the smoke, the effect (*kārya*) of the fire (*agni*), upholds the denial of the touch-of-cold (*śītasparśa*).

Another example of the presence-of-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *viruddhakāryopalabdhi* – is, ‘There is no anxiety (*saṃkleṣa*) in this man because he has the right faith.’

विरुद्धकारणोपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the presence-of-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) – *viruddhakāraṇopalabdhi* –

नास्मिन् शरीरिणि सुखमस्ति हृदयशल्यत् ॥७०॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अस्मिन् शरीरिणि] इस प्राणी में [सुखम्] सुख [न] नहीं [अस्ति] है [हृदयशल्यत्] हृदय में शल्य होने से।

No happiness (*sukha*) is found in this creature because of the presence of the sting (*śalya*) in heart.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The happiness (*sukha*) is the object-denied (*pratiṣedhya*) and the misery (*duḥkha*) is contradictory to the happiness (*sukha*). The sting (*śalya*) in heart is the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the misery (*duḥkha*). The presence of the sting (*śalya*) in heart, the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the misery (*duḥkha*), upholds the denial of the happiness (*sukha*).

Another example of the presence-of-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) – *viruddhakāraṇopalabdhi* – is, ‘There is no light here because the night has fallen.’

विरुद्धपूर्वचरोपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

**An illustration of the presence-of-contradictory precedence
(*pūrvacara*) – *viruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi* –**

नोदेष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं रेवत्युदयात् ॥७१॥

अन्वयार्थ – [मुहूर्तान्ते] एक मुहूर्त के पश्चात् [शकटं] शकट
(रोहिणी) नक्षत्र [न] नहीं [उदेष्यति] उदित होगा, [रेवत्युदयात्]
रेवती नक्षत्र का उदय होने से।

No rise of the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) will take place after
forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) because of the
appearance of the star Revatī now.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The rise of the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) after forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) is the object-denied (*pratiṣedhya*) and the rise of the star Revatī [which has precedence (*pūrvacara*) over the star Aśvinī]]¹ is contradictory to the rise of the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) after forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*). The star Revatī has precedence (*pūrvacara*) to the star Aśvinī. Due to the appearance of the star Revatī the rise of the star Aśvinī is indicated and not of the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī). The rise of the star Revatī, therefore, upholds the denial of the rise of the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) after forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*).

Another example of the presence-of-contradictory precedence

1 – The sequence of the rise of the stars in the constellation is: Revatī, Aśvinī, Bharaṇī, Kṛttikā, Rohiṇī, Mṛgaśīrā, Ārdrā, Punarvasu, Puṣya, and so on. [see, (2017), 'Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra', Jain Vidyapitha, Sagar, p. 127.]

(*pūrvacara*) – *viruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi* – is, ‘Tomorrow will not be a Saturday because today is Monday.’

विरुद्धोत्तरचरोपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

**An illustration of the presence-of-contradictory
subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *viruddhottaracaropalabdhi* –**

नोद्गाद्भरणिर्मुहूर्त्तात्पूर्व पुष्योदयात् ॥७२॥

अन्वयार्थ – [मुहूर्त्तात्पूर्व] एक मुहूर्त पहले [भरणिः] भरणी नक्षत्र [न] नहीं [उद्गाद्] उदित हुआ है, [पुष्योदयात्] पुष्य नक्षत्र का उदय होने से।

No rise of the star Bharanī forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) ago because of the appearance of the star Puṣya now.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The rise of the star Puṣya takes place after the star Punarvasu and not Bharanī. Therefore, the rise of the star Puṣya contradicts the rise of the star Bharanī forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) ago. The star Bharanī must have risen much earlier. Here the object-denied (*prati-ṣedhya*) is the rise of the star Bharanī forty-eight minutes ago. The rise of the star Puṣya upholds the denial of the rise of the star Bharanī forty-eight minutes ago indicating the presence-of-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *viruddhottaracaropalabdhi*.

Another example of the presence-of-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *viruddhottaracaropalabdhi* – is, ‘Yesterday was not Monday because today is Wednesday.’

विरुद्धसहचरोपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the presence-of-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *viruddhasahacaropalabdhi* –

नास्त्यत्र भित्तौ परभागाभावोऽर्वागभागदर्शनात् ॥७३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अत्र] यहाँ [भित्तौ] दीवाल में [परभागाभावः] पीछे (उस ओर) के भाग का अभाव [नास्ति] नहीं है, क्योंकि [अर्वागभाग] आगे (इस ओर) का भाग [दर्शनात्] दिखाई दे रहा है।

There is no absence of the ‘other side’ in the wall because ‘this side’ is visible.

EXPLANATORY NOTE


Here ‘this side’ of the wall is contradictory to the ‘other side’ of the wall; still these exhibit simultaneity (*sahacara*). Since ‘this side’ is present, the ‘other side’ [which exhibits contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *viruddhasahacaropalabdhi*] with it, is ensured.

Another example of the presence-of-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *viruddhasahacaropalabdhi* – is, ‘In this soul (*ātmā*) there is no absence of the luminous-body (*aijasa-śarīra*) because it has the karmic-body (*kārmaṇa-śarīra*).’

See Fig.-2 on the next page for a summary of the kinds of the means (*hetu, sādhanā*) that exhibit ‘infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*)’.

Fig.-2

Summary of the kinds of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that exhibit
‘infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*)’



प्रतिषेध को सिद्ध करने वाली अविरोद्धानुपलब्धि के भेद -

**The kinds of the absence-of-non-contradictory
(*aviruddhānupalabdhi*) that upholds denial (*pratiṣedha*) -**

अविरोद्धानुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे सप्तधा-

स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तरसहचरानुपलम्भभेदात् ॥७४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [प्रतिषेधे] प्रतिषेध अर्थात् अभाव को सिद्ध करने वाली [अविरोद्धानुपलब्धिः] अविरोद्धानुपलब्धि [सप्तधा] सात [भेदात्] भेद वाली है- [स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तरसहचरानुपलम्भ]

- 1) अविरोद्धस्वभावानुपलब्धि, 2) अविरोद्धव्यापकानुपलब्धि,
- 3) अविरोद्धकार्यानुपलब्धि, 4) अविरोद्धकारणानुपलब्धि,
- 5) अविरोद्धपूर्वचरानुपलब्धि, 6) अविरोद्धोत्तरचरानुपलब्धि और
- 7) अविरोद्धसहचरानुपलब्धि।

The absence-of-non-contradictory (*aviruddhānupalabdhi*) that upholds denial (*pratiṣedha*) is of seven kinds:

1. absence-of-non-contradictory own-nature (*svabhāva*)
– *aviruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi*;
2. absence-of-non-contradictory object-that-pervades
(*vyāpaka*) – *aviruddhavyāpakānupalabdhi*;
3. absence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) –
aviruddhakāryānupalabdhi;
4. absence-of-non-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) –
aviruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi;
5. absence-of-non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*)
– *aviruddhapūrvacarānupalabdhi*;

6. absence-of-non-contradictory subsequence
(*uttaracara*) – *aviruddhottaracarānupalabdhi*; and
7. absence-of-non-contradictory simultaneity
(*sahacara*) – *aviruddhasahacarānupalabdhi*.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These are seven kinds of means (*hetu, sādhana*) that exhibit infallible-absence (*anupalabdirūpa*) and uphold denial (*pratiṣedha*). (see, *sūtra* 3-54)

अविरुद्धस्वभावानुपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory own-nature (*svabhāva*) – *aviruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi* –

नास्त्यत्र भूतले घटोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥७५॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अत्र] यहाँ [भूतले] भूतल (पृथ्वीतल) पर [घटः] घट [नास्ति] नहीं है, [अनुपलब्धेः] (योग्य स्वभाव के होने पर भी) उपलब्धि नहीं होने से।

There is the absence of the pot (*ghaṭa*) on this ground because it is not seen here.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

There is the absence of the pot (*ghaṭa*) on this ground because it is not seen here. The ground, i.e., the soil, has, in general, the nature of

getting transformed into a pot (*ghaṭa*). The pot (*ghaṭa*) has the nature (*svabhāva*) to be seen but since it is not seen here, its absence is established. This is, therefore, a case of the absence-of-non-contradictory own-nature (*svabhāva*) – *aviruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi*.

Another example of the absence-of-non-contradictory own-nature (*svabhāva*) – *aviruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi* – is, ‘There are no infernal-beings (*nārakī*) here because they are not to be seen here.’

अविरुद्धव्यापकानुपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*) – *aviruddhavyāpakānupalabdhi* –

नास्त्यत्र शिंशपा वृक्षानुपलब्धेः ॥७६॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अत्र] यहाँ पर [शिंशपा] शिंशपा (शीशम) [नास्ति]
 नहीं है [वृक्षानुपलब्धेः] वृक्ष की अनुपलब्धि होने से।

There is the absence of the (particular) tree *śiṁśapā* (*śīśama*) here as no tree (*vṛkṣa*) is seen here.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The particular tree *śiṁśapā* (*śīśama*) is the object-pervaded (*vyāpya*) in treeness (*vṛkṣatva*) – that is the object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*). When there is no tree here – the treeness (*vṛkṣatva*), the object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*) – the particular tree *śiṁśapā* (*śīśama*), too, is absent. The particular tree – *vyāpya* – cannot be found without the treeness – *vyāpaka*. This is an illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory

object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*) – *aviruddhavyāpakānu-palabdhi*.

Another example of the absence-of-non-contradictory object-that-pervades (*vyāpaka*) – *aviruddhavyāpakānupalabdhi* – is, ‘There is no substance-of-soul (*jīva-dravya*) in the non-universe (*alokākāśa*) because there is no medium-of-motion (*dharma-dravya*) in the non-universe.’

अविरुद्धकार्यानुपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *aviruddhakāryānupalabdhi* –

नास्त्यत्राप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्योऽग्निर्धूमानुपलब्धेः ॥७७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अत्र] यहाँ पर [अप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्यः] अप्रतिबद्ध-सामर्थ्य वाली (अबाधित-सामर्थ्य वाली) [अग्निः] अग्नि [नास्ति] नहीं है, [धूमानुपलब्धेः] धूम की उपलब्धि नहीं होने से।

There is the absence of the unconstrained fire (*agni*) here as smoke (*dhūma*) is not seen here.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The fire (*agni*) that is unconstrained must produce the effect (*kārya*) of smoke (*dhūma*). Since the smoke is not seen here it is inferred that there is the absence of the unconstrained fire (*agni*). This is an illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *aviruddhakāryānupalabdhi*.

Another example of the absence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) –

aviruddhakāryānupalabdhi – is, ‘There is no pure-cognition (*śuddhopayoga*) in this soul as there is the absence of the three-jewels (*ratnatraya*) in it.’

अविरुद्धकारणानुपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) – *aviruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi* –

नास्त्यत्र धूमोऽनग्नेः ॥७८॥

अन्वयार्थ – [अत्र] यहाँ पर [धूमः] धूम [नास्ति] नहीं है,
[अनग्नेः] अग्नि के नहीं होने से।

There is the absence of smoke (*dhūma*) here because there is no fire (*agni*) here.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The fire (*agni*) is the non-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) of the smoke (*dhūma*). Where there is no fire, there is no smoke. This is an illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) – *aviruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi*.

Another example of the absence-of-non-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) – *aviruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi* – is, ‘The ascetic does not have the three-jewels (*ratnatraya*) because of the absence of the major-vows (*mahāvratā*) in him.’

अविरुद्धपूर्वचरानुपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*) – *aviruddhapūrvacarānupalabdhi* –

न भविष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेः ॥७९॥

अन्वयार्थ – [मुहूर्तान्ते] एक मुहूर्त के पश्चात् [शकटं] शकट (रोहिणी) नक्षत्र [न] (का उदय) नहीं [भविष्यति] होगा (क्योंकि अभी) [कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेः] कृत्तिका नक्षत्र के उदय की उपलब्धता नहीं है।

The star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) shall not appear after forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) because of the absence of the rise of the star Kṛttikā.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) appears forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) after the rise of the star Kṛttikā. Thus the star Kṛttika exhibits precedence (*pūrvacara*) over the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī). In the absence of the rise of the star Kṛttikā, the star Śakaṭa (Rohiṇī) shall not appear after forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*). This is an illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*) – *aviruddhapūrvacarānupalabdhi*.

Another example of the absence-of-non-contradictory precedence (*pūrvacara*) – *aviruddhapūrvacarānupalabdhi* – is, ‘It will not be a Monday tomorrow because today is not a Sunday.’

अविरुद्धोत्तरचरानुपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

**An illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory
subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *aviruddhottaracarānupalabdhi* –**

नोद्गाद्भरणिर्मुहूर्त्तात्प्राक् तत एव ॥८०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [मुहूर्त्तात्] एक मुहूर्त से [प्राक्] पहले [भरणिः] भरणी [उद्गाद्] का उदय [न] नहीं हुआ है [ततः एव] क्योंकि अभी उसके उदय के अविरुद्धी उत्तरचर कृत्तिका का उदय नहीं पाया जाता है।

(इस सूत्र में 'तत एव' पद से कृत्तिका के उदय की अनुपलब्धि का अर्थ लिया गया है।)

The star Bharaṇī had not arisen forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) earlier because of the absence of its non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*), the star Kṛttikā.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The star Kṛttikā exhibits non-contradictory (*aviruddha*) subsequence (*uttaracara*) with the star Bharaṇī. Since the star Kṛttikā has not arisen, it is inferred that the star Bharaṇī had not arisen forty-eight minutes (one *muhūrta*) earlier. This is an illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *aviruddhottaracarānupalabdhi*.

Another example of the absence-of-non-contradictory subsequence (*uttaracara*) – *aviruddhottaracarānupalabdhi* – is, 'Yesterday was not a Saturday because today is not a Sunday.'

अविरुद्धसहचरानुपलब्धि हेतु का उदाहरण -

An illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *aviruddhasahacarānupalabdhi* –

नास्त्यत्र समतुलायामुन्नामो नामानुपलब्धेः ॥८१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अत्र] यहाँ इस [समतुलायाम्] तराजू में [उन्नामः] (एक ओर) ऊँचापन [नास्ति] नहीं है, [नामानुपलब्धेः] (दूसरी ओर) नीचापन उपलब्ध नहीं होने से।
(तराजू में एक ओर ऊँचापन का अविरोधी सहचर - दूसरी ओर नीचापन - नहीं पाये जाने से।)

One pan of the weighing-scale (*tarājū*) does not have highness because the other pan does not have lowness.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

There is the absence of lowness in one pan of the weighing-scale (*tarājū*) indicating the absence of highness in the other pan. This is an illustration of the absence-of-non-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *aviruddhasahacarānupalabdhi*.

Another example of the absence-of-non-contradictory simultaneity (*sahacara*) – *aviruddhasahacarānupalabdhi* – is, 'This soul (*ātmā*) does not have infinite-knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) because it does not have infinite-faith (*kevaladarśana*).'

विधि के सिद्ध करने में विरुद्धानुपलब्धि के भेद -

The kinds of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) of the kind infallible-absence (*anupalabdhirūpa*) that upholds assertion (*vidhi*) – *viruddhānupalabdhi* –

विरुद्धानुपलब्धिर्विधौ त्रेधा-

विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावानुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥८२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [विधौ] विधि (सद्भाव) के सिद्ध करने में [विरुद्धानुपलब्धिः] विरुद्धानुपलब्धि के [त्रेधा] तीन [भेदात्] भेद हैं- [विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावानुपलब्धि] 1) विरुद्धकार्यानुपलब्धि, 2) विरुद्धकारणानुपलब्धि और 3) विरुद्धस्वभावानुपलब्धि।

The means (*hetu, sādhana*) of the kind infallible-absence (*anupalabdhirūpa*) that upholds assertion (*vidhi*) – *viruddhānupalabdhi* – is of three kinds:

1. absence-of-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *viruddhakāryānupalabdhi*;
2. absence-of-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) – *viruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi*; and
3. absence-of-contradictory own-nature (*svabhāva*) – *viruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi*.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

All the three kinds of means (*hetu, sādhana*) mentioned above uphold assertion (*vidhi*), i.e., the absence-of-contradictory confirms the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). These are, therefore, called the asserters (*vidhisādhaka*).

विरुद्धकार्यानुपलब्धि का उदाहरण -

**An illustration of the absence-of-contradictory effect
(*kārya*) – *viruddhakāryānupalabdhi* –**

यथास्मिन्प्राणिनि व्याधिविशेषोऽस्ति
निरामयचेष्टानुपलब्धेः ॥८३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [यथा] जैसे [अस्मिन्प्राणिनि] इस प्राणी में
[व्याधि-विशेषः] व्याधि-विशेष [अस्ति] है, [निरामय-
चेष्टानुपलब्धेः] निरामय (रोग-रहित) चेष्टा की उपलब्धि नहीं होने से।

As, for instance, this man suffers from a particular disease because healthy actions are not-found (*anupalabdha*) in him.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The contradictory effect of a particular disease is its non-existence, i.e., healthiness. And, the effect (*kārya*) of healthiness is healthy actions. Healthy actions are not-found (*anupalabdha*) in the man; therefore, the man suffers from some particular disease. This is an example of the absence-of-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *viruddhakāryānupalabdhi*.

Another example of the absence-of-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *viruddhakāryānupalabdhi* – is, ‘This ascetic has self-restraint (*saṃyama*) because negligence (*pramāda*) is not-found (*anupalabdha*) in him.’

विरुद्धकारणानुपलब्धि का उदाहरण -

**An illustration of the absence-of-contradictory cause
(kāraṇa) – viruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi –**

अस्त्यत्र देहिनि दुःखमिष्टसंयोगाभावात् ॥८४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अत्र] इस [देहिनि] प्राणी में [दुःखम्] दुःख
[अस्ति] है, [इष्टसंयोगाभावात्] इष्ट-संयोग के अभाव होने से।

The man here suffers from misery because of the non-availability (non-presence) of the agreeable-objects.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The presence (*saṃyoga*) of the agreeable-objects (*iṣṭa*) is contradictory to misery and the absence (*viyoga*) of these is the cause (*kāraṇa*) of misery. Therefore, in this illustration the object to be proved (*sādhya*) – the man's misery – is established by the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that is the absence-of-contradictory cause (*kāraṇa*) – *viruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi*.

विरुद्धस्वभावानुपलब्धि का उदाहरण -

**An illustration of the absence-of-contradictory own-nature
(svabhāva) – viruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi –**

अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्वेकान्तस्वरूपानुपलब्ध्येः ॥८५॥

अन्वयार्थ – [वस्तु] वस्तु [अनेकान्तात्मकं] अनेकान्तात्मक है अर्थात् अनेक धर्म वाली है, [एकान्तस्वरूपानुपलब्धेः] एकान्तस्वरूप की उपलब्धि न होने से।

The object (*vastu*) is of manifold-nature (*anekāntātmaka*) because of the non-availability of any objects exhibiting singular-nature (*ekanta-svarūpa*).


EXPLANATORY NOTE

The manifold-nature (*anekāntātmaka*) of the object means that it exhibits, at the same time, multiple characteristics – permanence (*nitya*) and non-permanence (*anitya*), one (*eka*) and many (*aneka*), etc., – that may appear to be opposite to each other. These are established in the doctrine-of-manifold-point-of-view (*anekāntavāda*) through the multiplicity of view-points (*naya*). Those who consider the object as of the nature of a single attribute, like permanence (*nitya*) only, fail to establish it as there is non-availability (*anupalabdhī*) of such nature of objects. In the above illustration, the object to be proved (*sādhya*) – the manifold-nature (*anekāntātmaka*) of the object – is established by the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that is the absence-of-contradictory own-nature (*svabhāva*) – *viruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhī*.

See Fig.-3 on the next page for a summary of the kinds of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that exhibit ‘infallible-absence (*anupalabdhirūpa*)’.

Fig.-3

Summary of the kinds of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that exhibit
'infallible-absence (*anupalabdhirūpa*)'



परम्परा से संभव अन्य हेतुओं का पूर्वोक्त हेतुओं में ही अन्तर्भाव -

The other forms of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that find mention are included in those described here -

परम्परया सम्भवत्साधनमत्रैवान्तर्भावनीयम् ॥८६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [परम्परया] परम्परा से [सम्भवत्] संभव [साधनम्] साधनरूप हेतुओं को [अत्रैव] इन (हेतुओं) में ही [अन्तर्भावनीयम्] अन्तर्भाव करना चाहिए।

The other possible forms of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that find mention by convention should be included in those described here.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

It is possible to come across, by convention and through the teaching of the preceptors (*guru*), other forms of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) but these should be included in those described in this text.

पूर्वानुक्त हेतु का प्रथमोदाहरण -

The first example of such conventional means (*hetu, sādhana*) -

अभूदत्र चक्रे शिवकः स्थासात् ॥८७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अत्र] इस [चक्रे] चक्र (चाक) पर [शिवकः] शिवक [अभूत्] हो गया है, [स्थासात्] स्थास होने से।

On this potter's-wheel, the 'śivaka' has taken place because 'sthāsa' is seen.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The potter's process of making the pot (*ghaṭa*) has several stages or modes: *śivaka*, *chatraka*, *sthāsa*, *kośa*, *kuśūla*, etc. The mode of the pot (*ghaṭa*) appears in the end. The potter puts the mould of clay, called *śivaka*, on the wheel. It takes a hollow symmetrical shape, called *chatraka*. This shape is then turned into what is called *sthāsa*. With this sequence in view, the present *sūtra* has been made. When the mode that is called *sthāsa* is present, it is inferred that the mode that is called *śivaka* has taken place. The idea is that the effect (*kārya*) of *śivaka* is *chatraka*, and the effect (*kārya*) of *chatraka* is *sthāsa*. The effect (*kārya*) of the mode *śivaka* is the mode *sthāsa* by convention, not directly; the direct effect (*kārya*) of the mode *śivaka* is the mode *chatraka* only. This is the case of 'the effect (*kārya*) of the effect (*kārya*)'.

उक्त हेतु का अविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धि में अन्तर्भाव होता है -

The above means (*hetu*) falls under the presence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *aviruddhakāryopalabdhi* –

कार्यकार्यमविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ ॥८८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [कार्यकार्यम्] 'कार्य का कार्यरूप' हेतु - परम्परा-कार्य हेतु - का [अविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ] अविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धि में अन्तर्भाव करना चाहिए।

The above means (*hetu, sādhana*) based on 'the-effect-of-the-effect' (*kārya-kārya-rūpa*) should be included in the presence-of-non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *aviruddha-kāryopalabdhi*.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The effect (*kārya*) of *śivaka* is *chatraka*, and the effect (*kārya*) of *chatraka* is *sthāsa*. Although the direct effect (*kārya*) of *śivaka* is *chatraka* but without *chatraka* the effect (*kārya*), i.e., *sthāsa* cannot appear. Thus the presence of *sthāsa* is the non-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *aviruddhakāryopalabdhi* – of the presence of *śivaka*.

परम्परा हेतु का दूसरा उदाहरण -

The second example of such conventional means (*hetu, sādhana*) –

नास्त्यत्र गुहायां मृगक्रीडनं मृगारिसंशब्दनात्।
कारणविरुद्धकार्यं विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ यथा ॥८९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अत्र] इस [गुहायां] गुफा में [मृगक्रीडनम्] मृग की क्रीड़ा [नास्ति] नहीं है क्योंकि [मृगारिसंशब्दनात्] मृग-क्रीड़ा के विरोधी मृगारि (सिंह) का गर्जन सुनाई दे रहा है। यह [कारण-विरुद्धकार्य] कारणविरुद्धकार्यरूप हेतु है, [विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ] विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धि में इसका अन्तर्भाव करना चाहिए। [यथा] जैसे कारणविरुद्धकार्यरूप हेतु का विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धि में अन्तर्भाव है वैसे कार्यकार्यरूपहेतु का अविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धि में अन्तर्भाव है।

There is no play of the deer – the object-to-be-proved, *sādhya* – in this cave because of the presence of the roar of the lion. The roar – the effect (*kārya*) – of the lion is contradictory (*viruddha*) to the cause (*kāraṇa*), i.e., play of the deer. There is the presence of the means (*hetu*) that is of the nature (*rūpa*) of the ‘cause-with-contradictory-effect’ (*kāraṇa-viruddhakārya*). This is, thus, an illustration of the presence-of-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *viruddhakāryopalabdhi*.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The play of the deer can take place by the deer only and the presence of lion entails the absence of the deer and its play. In presence of the roar, the effect (*kārya*), of the lion, the deer does not play. So this is an example of the presence-of-contradictory effect (*kārya*) – *viruddhakāryopalabdhi*.

As the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that exhibits ‘cause-with-contradictory-effect’ (*kāraṇa-viruddhakārya*) has been included in the ‘presence-of-contradictory-effect’ (*viruddhakāryopalabdhi*), in the same way, the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that exhibits ‘the-effect-of-the-effect’ (*kārya-kārya-rūpa*) has been included in the ‘presence-of-non-contradictory effect’ (*aviruddhakāryopalabdhi*).

व्युत्पन्न जनों की अपेक्षा अनुमान के अवयवों के प्रयोग का नियम –

The five limbs of inference (*anumāna*) are used for the uninitiated; now, the rule for use by the learned –

व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्तु तथोपपत्त्याऽन्यथानुपपत्त्यैव वा ॥१०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगः] व्युत्पन्न-प्रयोग (विद्वान् पुरुषों का प्रयोग)
 [तु] तो [तथोपपत्त्या] तथोपपत्ति के द्वारा [वा] अथवा
 [अन्यथानुपपत्त्या] अन्यथानुपपत्ति के द्वारा [एव] ही है।

The application for the learned should be through
 ‘infallible-coexistence’ (*tathopapatti*) or through
 ‘infallible-non-coexistence’ (*anyathānupapatti*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In scholarly discussions, application of either ‘infallible-coexistence’ (*tathopapatti*) or ‘infallible-non-coexistence’ (*anyathānupapatti*) is sufficient to draw the inference (*anumāna*).

Infallible-coexistence (*tathopapatti*) is defined as: ‘In presence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), the means (*sādhana*) must exist.’

Infallible-non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*) is defined as: ‘In absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), the means (*sādhana*) must not exist.’

व्युत्पन्न-प्रयोग की उदाहरण द्वारा पुष्टि -

An example of the use of the above rule, meant for the learned -

**अग्निमानयं देशस्तथैव
 धूमवत्त्वोपपत्तेर्धूमवत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेर्वा ॥११॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [अयम्] यह [देशः] प्रदेश [अग्निमान्] अग्निवाला है
 [तथैव] क्योंकि तथैव (उस प्रकार अग्निवाला होने पर ही)

[धूमवत्त्वोपपत्तेः] धूमवानपने की प्राप्ति संभव होने से [वा] अथवा [धूमवत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेः] धूमवानपने की अन्य प्रकार से प्राप्ति असंभव होने से।

‘This region has the fire because only then can the smoke be found.’ Or, ‘In absence of the fire, the smoke cannot be found.’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Those who are adept in the science-of-thought (*Nyāya*), the application of the inference (*anumāna*) is through the proposition (*pratijñā*) and the means (*hetu, sādhana*) comprising either infallible-coexistence (*tathopapatti*) or infallible-non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*). For them, the use of the other limbs, like the example (*udāharaṇa*), is not required.

उदाहरणादि के बिना व्याप्ति के निश्चयाभाव की आशंका का निराकरण -

Even without the example (*udāharaṇa*) concomitance (*vyāpti*) is ascertained -

हेतुप्रयोगो हि यथा व्याप्तिग्रहणं विधीयते सा च तावन्मात्रेण
व्युत्पन्नैरवधार्यते ॥९२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [च] और [यथा] जैसे [सा] उस [व्याप्तिग्रहणं] व्याप्ति का ग्रहण होता है वैसे ही [हेतुप्रयोगः] हेतु का प्रयोग [विधीयते] किया जाता है [हि] क्योंकि [तावन्मात्रेण] उतने मात्र से

[व्युत्पन्नैः] विद्वानों के द्वारा [अवधार्यते] ज्ञान कर लिया जाता है।
 (जिसकी साध्य के साथ व्याप्ति निश्चित है, ऐसे ही हेतु का प्रयोग किया जाता है, अतः उतने मात्र से ही अर्थात् उस प्रकार के हेतु के प्रयोग से – दृष्टान्तादिक के बिना ही – व्युत्पन्न-पुरुष व्याप्ति का निश्चय कर लेते हैं।)

Only the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that has infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti, avinābhāva*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is used; this fact is sufficient for the learned to draw the conclusion.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti, avinābhāva*) of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is sufficient for the learned to draw the conclusion. He accepts the conclusion because of the non-availability of any contrary valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*); the example (*udāharaṇa*) is superfluous for him.

दृष्टान्तादिक का प्रयोग साध्य की सिद्धि के प्रति फलवान नहीं है –

The example (*udāharaṇa, dṛṣṭānta*) does not assist in establishing the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) –

तावता च साध्यसिद्धिः ॥९३॥

अन्वयार्थ – [च] और [तавता] उतने मात्र से ही [साध्यसिद्धिः] साध्य की सिद्धि हो जाती है।

Just that (above mentioned) is sufficient to establish the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

For the learned, just the use of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) whose non-existence in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) is a certainty (e.g., absence of the smoke in the lake) is sufficient to establish the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Further use of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*), etc., is futile.

उसी कारण से पक्ष का प्रयोग सफल है -

For that reason, the use of the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) is useful -

तेन पक्षस्तदाधार सूचनायोक्तः ॥१४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तेन] उसी कारण से [तदाधारः] उसका आधार अर्थात् साध्य के बिना नहीं होने वाले साधन का आधार [सूचनाय] सूचित करने के लिए [पक्षः] पक्ष [उक्तः] कहा जाता है।

Due to the same reason, to show the substratum of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) that has infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti, avinābhāva*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) – the minor-term, the locus or the abode – is used.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The application of either ‘infallible-coexistence’ (*tathopapatti*) or ‘infallible-non-coexistence’ (*anyathānupapatti*) is sufficient to establish infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*, *avinābhāva*) between the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) and the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). The subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) – the minor-term, the locus or the abode – is mentioned just to show the substratum of the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*). Where is the smoke that is used as the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) to prove the existence of the fire? On the hill or in the kitchen? In order to clarify that the reference point is the hill and not the kitchen, the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) – the minor-term, the locus or the abode – is used.

आगम का स्वरूप और कारण -

The nature and the cause of the Scripture (*āgama*) -

आप्तवचनादिनिबन्धनमर्थज्ञानमागमः ॥९५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [आप्तवचनादिनिबन्धनम्] आप्त के वचन आदि के निमित्त से होने वाले [अर्थज्ञानम्] अर्थ-ज्ञान को [आगमः] आगम कहते हैं।

The knowledge-of-the-objects (*arthajñāna*) whose instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) is the speech, etc., of the Omniscient Lord (*āpta*) is the Scripture (*āgama*). (Some texts have the phrase ‘*āptavākyādi-nibandhana*’ instead of ‘*āptavācanādi-nibandhana*’; the meaning is the same, however.)

EXPLANATORY NOTE

After the inference (*anumāna*), characteristics of the Scripture (*āgama*) are now described.

The significance of the words used in the *sūtra* is explained thus:

If the Scripture (*āgama*) be defined as, ‘The knowledge (*jñāna*) is the Scripture (*āgama*)’, the knowledge obtained from other means, including the direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge too will constitute the Scripture; the definition will suffer from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*ativyāpti*). To overcome this fault, the phrase ‘whose instrumental-cause is the speech’ (*vacana-nibandhana* or *vākya-nibandhana*), has been used.

If the Scripture (*āgama*) be defined as, ‘The knowledge (*jñāna*) whose instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) is the speech is the Scripture (*āgama*)’, the knowledge obtained from the speech of the unworthy, inebriated men too will constitute the Scripture; the definition will suffer from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*ativyāpti*). To overcome this fault, the phrase ‘of the Omniscient Lord’ (*āpta*), has been used.

If the Scripture (*āgama*) be defined as, ‘The knowledge (*jñāna*) whose instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) is the speech of the Omniscient Lord (*āpta*) is the Scripture (*āgama*)’, the sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*) – obtained by the sense-of-hearing – that falls under the mundane-direct (*sāṃvṛtyavahārika-pratyakṣa*) knowledge – too will constitute the Scripture; the definition will suffer from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*ativyāpti*). To overcome this fault, the phrase ‘of-the-objects’ (*artha*) has been used.

If the Scripture (*āgama*) be defined as, ‘The knowledge-of-the-objects (*arthajñāna*) whose instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) is the speech of the Omniscient Lord (*āpta*) is the Scripture (*āgama*)’, the inference-for-other (*parārthānumāna*) – the own-knowledge when conveyed to the other through words – too will constitute the Scripture; the definition will suffer from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*ativyāpti*). To overcome this fault, the word ‘etc.’ (*ādi*) has been used. The word ‘etc.’ (*ādi*) will include the knowledge conveyed through signals including

the movement of the head, eyes, hands, feet, etc.

The word 'āpta' in the *sūtra* should mean 'the Omniscient Lord' who is free-from-attachment (*vītarāga*), all-knowing (*sarvajña*), and whose speech benefits all living beings (*hitopadeśī*). The Omniscient Lord (*āpta*) is free from eighteen faults. [see, Jain, Vijay K. (2019), 'Ācārya Kundakunda's *Niyamasāra* – The Essence of Soul-adoration', p. 15]

The meaning of the *sūtra* is now clear: 'The knowledge-of-the-objects (*arthajñāna*) whose instrumental-cause is the speech and other signals of the Omniscient Lord (*āpta*) is the Scripture (*āgama* or *śrutajñāna*).'

वचन या शब्द से वास्तविक अर्थबोध होने का कारण -

The words, etc., (*śabdādi*) are means of knowledge-of-the-objects -

सहजयोग्यतासङ्केतवशाद्धि शब्दादयो
वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः ॥९६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [हि] क्योंकि [सहजयोग्यतासङ्केतवशात्] सहज (स्वभावभूत) योग्यता के होने पर और संकेत के वश से [शब्दादयः] शब्दादिक [वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः] वस्तु के ज्ञान कराने के लिए कारण हैं।

Because the words, etc., in presence of their natural ability due to the power to connote, are the causes of the knowledge-of-the-objects.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The natural ability consists in the power of the words, speech, etc., (*vācaka*) to connote objects (*vācya*). Because of this natural ability, the speech and other signals of the Omniscient Lord (*āpta*) certainly are the causes of the knowledge-of-the-objects.

शब्द से अर्थावबोध होने का दृष्टान्त -

An example of the knowledge-of-the-object through word (*śabda*) –

यथा मेर्वादयः सन्ति ॥९७॥

अन्वयार्थ – [यथा] जैसे [मेर्वादयः] मेरु आदि [सन्ति] हैं।
(जैसे मेरु आदि शब्द अपने वाच्यभूत अर्थ के ज्ञान कराने में कारण हैं।)

As for example, ‘the Meru, etc., exist’.


EXPLANATORY NOTE

The word ‘Meru’ has the natural ability to provide knowledge of the object – the mountain – that it connotes. The words – *vācaka* – lead to the knowledge of the object – *vācya*.

This third chapter establishes that remembrance (*smṛti*) is faultless (*nirdoṣa*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) is venerable (*ādarṇīya*), inductive reasoning (*tarka*) is the fruit of *pramāṇa* that rests on the

‘process of knowing’ (*pramiti*), inference (*anumāna*) provides rational-knowledge (*saṃgata-artha*), and the Scripture (*āgama*) is without-imperfections (*anavadya*).

Fig.-4
Summary of the indirect (*parokṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)



इति तृतीयः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः

This concludes Chapter-3.

* * *

चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः

CHAPTER – 4



प्रमाण के विषय का निर्णय -

**The ascertainment of the subject of the valid-knowledge
(*pramāṇa*) –**

सामान्यविशेषात्मा तदर्थो विषयः ॥१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सामान्यविशेषात्मा] सामान्य और विशेष स्वरूप वाला
[तदर्थः] पदार्थ प्रमाण का [विषयः] विषय है।

The object (*artha*, *vastu*, *padārtha*) of the nature of the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) is the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

All objects (*artha*, *vastu*) have two kinds of qualities (*guṇa*) – the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*). These – the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) – will be explained later; understand here that both these are the integral attributes of every substance and, therefore, called the soul (*ātmā*) of the object (*artha*) under reference.

The *sūtra* cautions the reader that if the object (*artha*) is considered as absolutely general (*sāmānya*), absolutely specific (*viśeṣa*), or absolutely general (*sāmānya*) and specific (*viśeṣa*), it no more remains the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

अनेकान्तात्मक वस्तु के समर्थन में दो हेतु -

The two causes (*hetu*) that the object (*artha, vastu*) is of manifold-nature (*anekāntātmaka*) -

अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तप्रत्ययगोचरत्वात् पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारावाप्ति-
स्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेनार्थक्रियोपपत्तेश्च ॥२॥

अन्वयार्थ - (वस्तु अनेकान्तात्मक है, क्योंकि) [अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्त-
प्रत्ययगोचरत्वात्] अनुवृत्त, व्यावृत्त ज्ञान का विषय होने से [च] और
[पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारावाप्तिस्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेनार्थक्रियोपपत्तेः] पूर्व
आकार का परिहार और उत्तर आकार की प्राप्ति तथा स्थिति-लक्षण
परिणाम के साथ उसमें अर्थक्रिया की उत्पत्ति होती है।

The object (*artha, vastu*) has many attributes like the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) because it is the subject of comprehension through-similarity (*anuvṛtta pratyaya*) and through-dissimilarity (*vyāvṛtta pratyaya*). Further, through the loss of the previous state (*vyaya*), the attainment of the new state (*utpāda*), and permanence (*sthiti, dhrauvya*) in existence, it exhibits activity (*arthakriyā, vastutva*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

That the object (*artha, vastu*) is of the nature of the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*), or of the nature of the substance (*dravya*) and the mode (*paryaya*), or of any other kind of multiplicity, has been illustrated through two causes (*hetu*). First, the object (*artha, vastu*) is

the subject of comprehension through-similarity (*anuvṛtta pratyaya*) and through-dissimilarity (*vyāvṛtta pratyaya*). ‘This is a cow,’ ‘This too is a cow,’ and ‘This, again, is a cow,’ – the experience of this kind of similarity is called comprehension through-similarity (*anuvṛtta pratyaya*). ‘This cow is black,’ and ‘This cow is spotted,’ – the experience of this kind of dissimilarity is called comprehension through-dissimilarity (*vyāvṛtta pratyaya*). Where both kinds of comprehension – through-similarity (*anuvṛtta pratyaya*) and through-dissimilarity (*vyāvṛtta pratyaya*) – are experienced, that is comprehension through both similarity and dissimilarity (*anuvṛtta-vyāvṛtta pratyaya*). This establishes the manifold-nature (*anekāntātmaka*) of every object (*artha, vastu*). The first, comprehension through-similarity (*anuvṛtta pratyaya*) points at the oblique-general (*tiryak-sāmānya*) and the second, comprehension through-dissimilarity (*vyāvṛtta pratyaya*) points at the distinction-specific (*vyatireka-viśeṣa*). These terms will be discussed in the following *sūtra*(s).

The loss of the previous state is called destruction (*vyaya*) and the attainment of the new state is called origination (*utpāda*). The continuity of the substance in midst of both destruction (*vyaya*) and origination (*utpāda*) is called permanence (*sthiti, dhrauvya*). These are the marks (*lakṣaṇa*) that exhibit the presence of the activity (*arthakriyā, vastutva*) in a substance (*artha, vastu*). This is the second cause (*hetu*) through which the upwardness-general (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) and mode-specific (*paryāya-viśeṣa*) have been established.

सामान्य के भेद -

The kinds of the general (*sāmānya*) objects (*artha, vastu*) –

सामान्यं द्वेधा तिर्यगूर्ध्वताभेदात् ॥३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तिर्यगूर्ध्वताभेदात्] तिर्यक् और ऊर्ध्वता के भेद से

[सामान्य] सामान्य [द्वेधा] दो प्रकार है।

(सामान्य के दो भेद हैं- तिर्यक्-सामान्य और ऊर्ध्वता-सामान्य।)

The general (*sāmānya*) is of two kinds: 1) oblique-general (*tiryak-sāmānya*) and 2) upwardness-general (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Every cow is a cow, though different from each other; still each is called a cow. Each cow has similarity (*sadṛśa*); notwithstanding this, every cow is different. This is explained now.

तिर्यक्-सामान्य का स्वरूप वा दृष्टान्त -

The nature and example of oblique-general (*tiryak-sāmānya*) -

सदृशपरिणामस्तिर्यक् खण्डमुण्डादिषु गोत्ववत् ॥४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सदृशपरिणामः] सदृश अर्थात् सामान्य परिणाम
[तिर्यक्] तिर्यक्-सामान्य है, जैसे [खण्डमुण्डादिषु] खण्डी, मुण्डी
आदि गायों में [गोत्ववत्] गौपना समानरूप से रहता है।

The oblique-general (*tiryak-sāmānya*) is expression of similarity (*sadṛśa*); as ‘cowness’ – the general attribute of being a cow – is present in all cows, black, white, etc. (The *sūtra* uses the words: ‘*khaṇḍī*’, ‘*muṇḍī*’, etc.)

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The presence of an attribute that exhibits similarity (*sadrśa*) in different objects of a class (*jāti*) is called the oblique-general (*tiryak-sāmānya*). The black cow, the white cow, or the cow of any other colour, are different from each other, still, each has this attribute of 'cowness' that brings all of them under the general (*sāmānya*) class 'cow'.

ऊर्ध्वता-सामान्य का स्वरूप और दृष्टान्त -

The nature and example of upwardness-general (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) -

परापरविवर्तव्यापिद्रव्यमूर्ध्वता मृदिव स्थासादिषु ॥५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [परापरविवर्तव्यापिद्रव्यं] पूर्व और उत्तर पर्यायों में व्याप्त होकर रहने वाले द्रव्य को [ऊर्ध्वता] ऊर्ध्वता-सामान्य कहते हैं। [इव] जैसे [स्थासादिषु] स्थास आदि (स्थास, कोश, कुशूल आदि घट की) पर्यायों में [मृद्] मिट्टी रहती है।

(यहाँ मिट्टी ऊर्ध्वता-सामान्य युक्त मानी जावेगी।)

The upwardness-general (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) is characterized by the presence of the substance (*dravya*) in its previous (*pūrva*) and subsequent (*uttara*) modes (*pariyāya*); as the clay is present in all consecutive modes in making of the pot (*ghaṭa*): *sthāsa*, *kośa*, *kuśūla*, etc.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The upwardness-general (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) is similarity in

different modes (*paryāya*) of the substance (*dravya*). The substance (*dravya*) persists in all its modes of the three-times – *trikāla-anuyāyī*. Or, that which persists in all modes of the substance in the three-times – past, present and future – is the upwardness-general (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*). The example is given of the presence of the clay (*miṭṭī*) in all stages of the making of the pot (*ghaṭa*): *sthāsa*, *kośa*, *kuśūla*, etc.

विशेष के भेद -

The kinds of the specific (*viśeṣa*) objects (*artha*, *vastu*) –

विशेषश्च ॥६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [च] और [विशेषः] विशेष भी दो प्रकार का है।

The specific (*viśeṣa*), too, is of two kinds.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Like the general (*sāmānya*), the specific (*viśeṣa*), too, is of two kinds.

विशेष के भेदों के नाम -

The two kinds of the specific (*viśeṣa*) –

पर्यायव्यतिरेकभेदात् ॥७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [पर्यायव्यतिरेकभेदात्] पर्याय और व्यतिरेक के भेद से विशेष दो प्रकार का है।

The two kinds of specific (*viśeṣa*) are: 1) mode-specific (*paryāya-viśeṣa*) and 2) distinction-specific (*vyatireka-viśeṣa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The two kinds of specific (*viśeṣa*) are mentioned: 1) mode-specific (*paryāya-viśeṣa*) and 2) distinction-specific (*vyatireka-viśeṣa*).

पर्याय-विशेष का स्वरूप वा उदाहरण -

The nature of the mode-specific (*paryāya-viśeṣa*) -

एकस्मिन् द्रव्ये क्रमभाविनः परिणामाः पर्याया आत्मनि
हर्षविषादादिवत् ॥८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [एकस्मिन् द्रव्ये] एक द्रव्य में [क्रमभाविनः] क्रम से होने वाले [परिणामाः पर्यायाः] परिणामों को पर्याय कहते हैं। [आत्मनि] आत्मा में [हर्ष विषादादिवत्] हर्ष और विषाद आदि (परिणामों) के सामान।

The modifications (*pariṇāma*) that take place consecutively in a substance (*dravya*) are its modes (*paryāya*); like the experience of happiness (*harṣa*) and misery (*viṣāda*) in the soul (*ātmā*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The substance of soul (*ātma-dravya*) experiences modifications that result consecutively in happiness (*harṣa*) and misery (*viṣāda*). These

modes (*paryāya*) of happiness and misery are called mode-specific (*paryāya-viśeṣa*) in the object (*artha, vastu*) of the soul (*ātmā*).

व्यतिरेक-विशेष का लक्षण वा उदाहरण -

The nature of the distinction-specific (*vyatireka-viśeṣa*) -

अर्थान्तरगतो विसदृशपरिणामो व्यतिरेको गोमहिषादिवत् ॥९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अर्थान्तरगतः] एक पदार्थ से दूसरे पदार्थ को प्राप्त [विसदृशपरिणामः] विसदृश (असमान) परिणाम [व्यतिरेकः] व्यतिरेक कहलाता है। [गोमहिषादिवत्] गौ (गाय), महिष (भैंस) आदि के समान।

The modification-with-distinction (*visadṛśa-pariṇāma*) that resides in another-object (*arthāntara*) is called distinction (*vyatireka*); like in the cow and the buffalo.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Although the cow and the buffalo have similarity in terms of both being animals, still the two have modification-with-distinction (*visadṛśa-pariṇāma*) and that is the nature of the distinction-specific (*vyatireka-viśeṣa*).

इति चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः

This concludes Chapter-4.



पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः

CHAPTER – 5



प्रमाण के फल का निर्णय -

**Determination of the fruit of the valid-knowledge
(*pramāṇa*) -**

अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् ॥१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अज्ञाननिवृत्तिः] अज्ञान की निवृत्ति [च] और
[हानोपादानोपेक्षाः] हान (त्याग), उपादान (ग्रहण) और उपेक्षा
(उदासीनता); ये प्रमाण के [फलम्] फल हैं।

Destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*), rejection
(*hāna*, *tyāga*), acceptance (*grahaṇa*, *ādāna*, *upādāna*) and
equanimity (*upekṣā*) are the kinds of the fruit of the
valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The fruit is of two kinds: the direct (*sākṣāta*) fruit and the
conventional (*paramparā*) fruit. Destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-*
nivṛtti) pertaining to the objects (*vastu*, *padārtha*) is the direct
(*sākṣāta*) fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The other kinds of
fruit, like rejection (*hāna*, *tyāga*), are the conventional (*paramparā*)
fruit as these take place only after destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-*
nivṛtti) pertaining to the objects (*vastu*, *padārtha*).

The fruit is of two kinds: the direct (*sākṣāta*) fruit and the conventional (*paramparā*) fruit. Destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) pertaining to the objects (*vastu, padārtha*) is the direct (*sākṣāta*) fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The other kinds of fruit, like rejection (*hāna, tyāga*), are the conventional (*paramparā*) fruit as these take place only after destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) pertaining to the objects (*vastu, padārtha*).

The conventional (*paramparā*) fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is of three kinds: rejection (*hāna, tyāga*), acceptance (*grahaṇa, ādāna, upādāna*), and equanimity (*upekṣā*). To discard the undesirable or disagreeable object (*vastu*) is called the rejection (*hāna, tyāga*). To acquire the desirable or agreeable object (*vastu*) is called the acceptance (*grahaṇa, ādāna, upādāna*). So long as the man is afflicted with attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*), he imagines objects (*vastu*) to be worth discarding or accepting. But when he acquires the state of freedom from attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) – *vītarāga* – he no more has the sense of either acceptance or rejection for the objects (*vastu*); he develops the sense of equanimity (*upekṣā*) toward all objects. This sense of equanimity (*upekṣā*), too, is the fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

Even before acquiring freedom from attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*), the knowledgeable man can have the sense of equanimity (*upekṣā*) toward objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*) which are neither of interest nor of disinterest to him.

उपेक्षाफलमाद्यस्य शेषस्याऽऽदानहानधीः ।

पूर्वा वाऽज्ञाननाशो वा सर्वस्यास्य स्वगोचरे ॥१०२॥

– आ. समन्तभद्र ‘आप्तमीमांसा’

सामान्यार्थ – प्रथम जो युगपत्सर्वभासनरूप प्रमाण (केवलज्ञान) है, उसका फल उपेक्षा है। शेष जो क्रमभावी-भासनरूप प्रमाण (मत्यादि ज्ञान-समूह) है उसका परम्परा फल आदान (ग्रहण) और हान (त्याग) की बुद्धि है। अथवा पूर्व में कही गई उपेक्षा भी उसका फल है। वास्तव में अपने विषय में अज्ञान

का नाश होना ही सब प्रमाण-रूप ज्ञानों का फल है।

The fruit of the first kind of *pramāṇa* – direct or (*pratyakṣa*) or omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) – is equanimity (*upekṣā*). The fruit of the other kinds of *pramāṇa* – indirect (*parokṣa*) – is discernment, i.e., acceptance (*grahana*) or rejection (*tyāga*); besides, of course, equanimity, as stated above. Destruction of ignorance (*ajñāna*) about the self, however, is the actual fruit of all kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

As regard the fruit of *pramāṇa*, there is satisfaction in the attainment of knowledge. The soul, whose knowledge-nature is clouded by the foreign matter of karmas, finds satisfaction in determining the nature of substances with the help of the senses. That is spoken of as the fruit of knowledge (or, of *pramāṇa*). Or the attainment of equanimity (*upekṣā*) and the destruction of ignorance (*ajñāna*) may be considered the fruit. Equanimity is freedom from attachment and aversion. Also, on destruction of the darkness, that is ignorance, the self attains the power of discrimination between what needs to be accepted and rejected.

प्रमाण के फल की व्यवस्था -

The relation of the fruit with the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

प्रमाणादभिन्नं भिन्नं च ॥२॥

अन्वयार्थ – प्रमाण का फल [प्रमाणात्] प्रमाण से [अभिन्नं] अभिन्न [च] और [भिन्नं] भिन्न है।

(वह फल प्रमाण से कथञ्चित् अभिन्न है और कथञ्चित् भिन्न है।)

The fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is indistinctive (*abhinna*) as well as distinctive (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is, from a particular standpoint (*kathañcit*), indistinctive (*abhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and, from a certain other standpoint, distinctive (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

From the points-of-view including the respective name (*saṃjñā*), number (*saṃkhyā*), own-nature (*svarūpa*), result (*pariṇāma*), purpose (*prayojana*), etc., the fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is distinctive (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

प्रमाणफल की प्रमाण से अभिन्नता का समर्थन -

The indistinctive (*abhinna*) nature of the fruit with the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

यः प्रमिमीते स एव निवृत्ताज्ञानो जहात्यादत्त उपेक्षते चेति
प्रतीतेः ॥३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [यः] जो [प्रमिमीते] जानता है [सः] वह [एव] ही [निवृत्ताज्ञानः] अज्ञान से निवृत्त होता है, वही [जहात्यादत्त] (अनिष्ट पदार्थ का) त्याग करता है, (इष्ट का) ग्रहण करता है [च] और [उपेक्षते] (जिसे अपने लिए इष्ट-अनिष्टरूप नहीं समझता है उसकी) उपेक्षा करता है, [इति] इस प्रकार [प्रतीतेः] प्रतीति होने से सिद्ध है कि प्रमाण से प्रमाण का फल अभिन्न है।

Only the acquirer-of-right-knowledge (*pramātā*) – the soul (*ātmā*) – gets freedom-from-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*), discards (the undesirable), accepts (the desirable), and develops equanimity (*upekṣā*). This kind of experience establishes that the fruit (*phala*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is indistinctive (*abhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) takes place in the acquirer-of-right-knowledge (*pramātā*), i.e., the soul (*ātmā*), which knows the object (*vastu*) through the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*); only it, the soul (*ātmā*), discards the undesirable object (*vastu*), only it accepts the desirable object (*vastu*) and only it develops equanimity (*upekṣā*) for the object (*vastu*) that is deemed to be neither desirable nor undesirable.

The soul (*ātmā*) acquires the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and gets transformed due to the fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). In this respect, the fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is indistinctive (*abhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the instrument (*karaṇa*) and the fruit is the process (*kriyā*) of transformation (*pariṇāma*) in the soul; in this respect, the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is distinctive (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

इति पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः

This concludes Chapter-5.



षष्ठः परिच्छेदः
CHAPTER – 6



प्रमाण के आभासों का वर्णन -

Description of the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) -

ततोऽन्यत्तदाभासम् ॥१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [ततः] उस (पहले कहे गए) प्रमाण से [अन्यत्] अन्य [तदाभासम्] वह प्रमाणाभास है।

Other than those (mentioned earlier) constitute the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Opposite to the own-nature (*svarūpa*), number (*saṃkhyā*), subject (*viśaya*), and fruit (*phala*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that have been mentioned earlier constitute its fallacy (*ābhāsa*).

Comprehension of the own-nature (*svarūpa*) that is contrary to the nature (*svarūpa*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-nature (*svarūpābhāsa*).

Comprehension of the number (*saṃkhyā*) that is contrary to the true number (*saṃkhyā*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*).

Comprehension of the subject (*viśaya*) that is contrary to the true subject (*viśaya*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*).

Comprehension of the fruit (*phala*) that is contrary to the true fruit (*phala*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-fruit (*phalābhāsa*).

Ācārya Māṇikyanandi describes these kinds of fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) in this chapter.

स्वरूपाभास रूप प्रमाणाभास -

The fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) that constitutes the fallacy-of-the-nature (*svarūpābhāsa*) -

अस्वसंविदितगृहीतार्थदर्शनसंशयादयः प्रमाणाभासाः ॥२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अस्वसंविदितगृहीतार्थदर्शनसंशयादयः] अस्वसंविदित, गृहीतार्थ, दर्शन, संशय आदि [प्रमाणाभासाः] प्रमाणाभास हैं।
(अस्वसंविदित, गृहीतार्थ, दर्शन, संशय, विपर्यय और अनध्यवसाय रूप ज्ञान को प्रमाणाभास कहते हैं।)

Non-cognizance-by-own-self (*asvasaṁvidita*), already-known-cognizance (*gṛhitārtha*), undifferentiated-cognizance (*darśana*), and doubt (*saṁśaya*), etc., are the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The word 'etc.' after doubt (*saṁśaya*) in the *sūtra* implies perversity (*viparyaya*) and indefiniteness (*anadhyavasāya*).

The six kinds of fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) are explained briefly below.

The knowledge that knows the nature (*svarūpa*) of the self through the self is the cognizance-by-own-self (*svasaṃvidita*). It is same as the knowledge-of-the-self (*svavyavasayātmaka*), mentioned in *sūtra* 1-1. Opposite to this is the non-cognizance-by-own-self (*asvasaṃvidita*).

The repetition of the knowledge of an object is the already-known-cognizance (*gr̥hitārtha*). It fails to satisfy the condition of ‘*apūrvārtha*’ – the things not ascertained earlier – mentioned in *sūtra* 1-1.

The word ‘*darśana*’ – undifferentiated-cognizance – in the *sūtra* refers to the Buddhists doctrine that undifferentiated (*nirvikalpa*) cognizance is the only direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). This kind of cognizance fails to differentiate between the pot (*ghaṭa*) and the board (*paṭa*).

Doubt (*saṃśaya*) means swaying of the mind, not being able to assert the true nature of a thing.

The cognition of an object as something which is contrary to its true nature is perversity (*viparyaya*).

Indefiniteness (*anadhyavasāya*) is vacillation about the real nature of a thing due to the shrouding of the intellect.

The last three kinds of the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) have been described earlier. (see, *sūtra* 1-3)

अस्वसंविदितादि के प्रमाणाभास होने में हेतु -

The reason why these are the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) -

स्वविषयोपदर्शकत्वाभावात् ॥३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [स्वविषयोपदर्शकत्वाभावात्] अपने विषय के निश्चयपने का अभाव होने से ये अस्वसंविदित आदि प्रमाणाभास हैं।

[These are fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*)–]
Because these fail to ascertain their subject-matter
(*viṣaya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These – non-cognizance-by-own-self (*asvasaṃvidita*), etc. – fail to establish their subject-matter (*viṣaya*). Therefore, these do not constitute the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and fall under the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*).

अस्वसंविदितादि प्रमाणाभासों के दृष्टान्त -

**The examples of the above-mentioned fallacious-knowledge
(*pramāṇābhāsa*) –**

पुरुषान्तरपूर्वार्थगच्छतृणस्पर्शस्थाणुपुरुषादिज्ञानवत् ॥४॥

अन्वयार्थ – (अस्वसंविदितादि ज्ञान प्रमाण नहीं हैं क्योंकि वे अपने विषय का निर्णय नहीं कराते, जैसे-)

[पुरुषान्तरपूर्वार्थगच्छतृणस्पर्शस्थाणुपुरुषादिज्ञानवत्] दूसरे पुरुष के ज्ञान की तरह – अस्वसंविदित ज्ञान। गृहीतार्थ ज्ञान (पूर्व में जाने हुए पदार्थ के ज्ञान) की तरह। चलते हुए पुरुष के तृणस्पर्शादि के ज्ञान – निर्विकल्पक दर्शन – की तरह। वह स्थाणु है या पुरुष, इस प्रकार के संशयादिक ज्ञान की तरह। इत्यादिक ज्ञान।

The (*asvasaṃvidita*) knowledge possessed by another man; the (*gṛhitārtha*) knowledge of something that is

known already; the [undifferentiated (*nirvikalpa*) 'darśana'] knowledge of the moving man who has touched 'something' like a blade-of-grass; the knowledge [with doubt (*saṁśaya*)] like whether it is a stump (*sthāṇu*) or a man; are examples of the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) as these do not lead to the ascertainment of the subject under consideration.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The terms, like *asvasaṁvidita* and *gṛhitārtha*, have already been explained in *sūtra* 6-2.

सन्निकर्ष के प्रमाणपने का दृष्टान्त से निषेध -

The example that the knowledge obtained through the 'connection (*saṁyoga*) of the sense (*indriya*) and the object (*padārtha*)' – *sannikarṣa* – is not the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

चक्षुरसयोर्द्रव्ये संयुक्तसमवायवच्च ॥५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [द्रव्ये] द्रव्य में [चक्षुरसयोः च] चक्षु और रस के [संयुक्तसमवायवत्] संयुक्त समवाय के समान।

(जिस प्रकार द्रव्य में चक्षु और रस का संयुक्त समवाय होता हुआ भी प्रमाण नहीं है, क्योंकि वह ज्ञानरूप फल को उत्पन्न नहीं करता, उसी प्रकार द्रव्य में चक्षु और रूप का संयुक्त समवाय भी प्रमाण नहीं है क्योंकि वह भी ज्ञानरूप फल को पैदा नहीं करता, इसलिए सन्निकर्ष भी प्रमाणाभास ही है।)

Like the co-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*) of the eye (*cakṣu*) and taste (*rasa*) in a substance (*dravya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As the co-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*) of the eye (*cakṣu*) and the taste (*rasa*) in a substance (*dravya*) does not produce valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), in the same way, the co-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*) of the eye (*cakṣu*) and the form (*rūpa*) in it does not produce valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Therefore, co-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*) does not have the capability to produce the fruit of knowledge; the knowledge obtained through the ‘connection of the sense (*indriya*) and the object (*padārtha*)’ – ‘*sannikarṣa*’ – is not a direct source of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

According to the Naiyāyika, there are six kinds of ‘connection of the sense (*indriya*) and the object (*padārtha*)’ – ‘*sannikarṣa*’. Of interest here are the ‘*sannikarṣa*’ of the type connection (*saṃyoga*) and co-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*). To know the pot (*ghaṭa*) through the eye is ‘*saṃyoga*’ kind of ‘*sannikarṣa*’. To know the form (*rūpa*) of the pot (*ghaṭa*) is *saṃyukta-samavāya* kind of ‘*sannikarṣa*’ because the eye has the connection (*saṃyoga*) *sannikarṣa* with the pot (*ghaṭa*) and the pot (*ghaṭa*) has the inherence (*samavāya*) with its form (*rūpa*). Now, as the pot (*ghaṭa*) has inherence (*samavāya*) with its form (*rūpa*), similarly, it has the inherence (*samavāya*) with its taste (*rasa*) too. Therefore, as the eye (*cakṣu*) is able to attain the knowledge of the form (*rūpa*) of the pot (*ghaṭa*), it should also be able to attain the knowledge of its taste (*rasa*) because the form (*rūpa*) and the taste (*rasa*) both have inherence (*samavāya*) with the pot (*ghaṭa*). But the eye (*cakṣu*) fails to attain the knowledge of the taste (*rasa*). Due to the availability of the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) outside the object (*lakṣya*), ‘*sannikarṣa*’ suffers from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*ativyāpti*).

Saying that the actual contact of the senses (*indriya*) and the object

(*padārtha*) – ‘*sannikarṣa*’ – is a direct source of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) suffers from the fault (*doṣa*) of under-pervasiveness (*avyāpti*) too as the eye (*cakṣu*) does not make actual contact with the object of knowledge; like the mind (*mana*), the eye (*cakṣu*) knows the object without actually making physical contact with it.

Since the sense-of-sight (*cakṣu-indriya*), unlike other senses (*indriya*), knows its subject without actually touching it and fails to know the subject when it comes in physical contact with it, considering its connection with the object (*padārtha*) – ‘*sannikarṣa*’ – as a direct source of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) suffers from the fault (*doṣa*) of impossibility (*asaṃbhava*) as well.

The knowledge obtained through the ‘connection (*saṃyoga*) of the sense (*indriya*) and the object (*padārtha*)’ – ‘*sannikarṣa*’ – therefore is not the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) but the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*).

प्रत्यक्षाभास का लक्षण -

The mark of the fallacy-of-the-direct (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) –

अवैशद्ये प्रत्यक्षं तदाभासं बौद्धस्याकस्माद् धूमदर्शनाद्
वह्निविज्ञानवत् ॥६॥

अन्वयार्थ – [बौद्धस्य] बौद्ध का [अवैशद्ये] अविशदरूप
(निर्विकल्प) ज्ञान को [प्रत्यक्षं] प्रत्यक्ष मानना [तदाभासं] प्रत्यक्षाभास
है, जैसे [अकस्मात्] अकस्मात् (अचानक) [धूमदर्शनात्] धूम के
देखने से [वह्निविज्ञानवत्] उत्पन्न हुआ अग्नि का ज्ञान अनुमानाभास है,
क्योंकि ये दोनों ही अपने विषयभूत पदार्थ का निश्चय नहीं कराते हैं।
(सूत्र 2-3 के अनुसार ‘विशद ज्ञान को प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण’ कहते हैं।)

The Buddhists doctrine that recognizes undifferentiated (*nirvikalpa*) cognizance (*jñāna*) as the direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge is the fallacy-of-the-direct (*pratyakṣābhāsa*); like the knowledge of the fire (*agni*) by the sudden sight of the smoke (*dhūma*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The undifferentiated-cognizance (*nirvikalpa jñāna*) is considered direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge in the Buddhists doctrine. The undifferentiated-cognizance on sudden sight of the smoke (*dhūma*) does not result in the knowledge of the fire (*agni*); this is the case of fallacious-inference (*anumānābhāsa*) as both the smoke (*dhūma*) and the fire (*agni*) do not result in the knowledge of the subject. It has been mentioned in *sūtra* 2-3 that the knowledge that is unambiguous (*viśada*, *nirmala*, *spaṣṭa*) is direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The sudden sight of the smoke (*dhūma*), without adequate differentiation, is a case of ambiguous (*aviśada*) knowledge. This kind of knowledge is fallacy-of-the-direct (*pratyakṣābhāsa*).

परोक्षाभास का स्वरूप -

The mark of the fallacy-of-the-indirect (*parokṣābhāsa*) -

वैशद्येऽपि परोक्षं पदाभासं मीमांसकस्य करणज्ञानवत् ॥७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [वैशद्ये] विशदज्ञान होने पर [अपि] भी [परोक्षं] परोक्ष मानना [तदाभासं] परोक्षाभास है, [मीमांसकस्य] मीमांसक के [करणज्ञानवत्] करणज्ञान के समान।

To consider the knowledge that is unambiguous (*viśada*, *nirmala*, *spaṣṭa*) as indirect (*parokṣa*) constitutes fallacy-of-the-indirect (*parokṣābhāsa*); like the knowledge of the instrument (*kāraṇa*) (of knowledge) by the Mīmāṃsaka.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The knowledge that is ambiguous (*aviśada*) is indirect (*parokṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). (see, *sūtra* 3-1). As one knows the object-of-knowledge (*karma* – ‘the pitcher’) through the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), one also experiences the knower (*kartā* – ‘I’), the instrument (*kāraṇa* – ‘own-soul’) and the process-of-knowing (*kriyā* – ‘knowledge-acquisition’). (see, *sūtra* 1-9).

Although the knowledge through the senses (*indriya*) has partial (*ekadeśa*) unambiguity (*viśadatā*), the Mīmāṃsaka consider it as absolutely indirect (*parokṣa*). This is an example of the fallacy-of-the-indirect (*parokṣābhāsa*).

स्मरणाभास का लक्षण -

The mark of the fallacy-of-remembrance (*smarṇābhāsa*) –

अतस्मिंस्तदिति ज्ञानं स्मरणाभासं
जिनदत्ते स देवदत्तो यथा ॥८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अतस्मिन्] अतस्मिन् (अर्थात् पहले धारणारूप अनुभव नहीं किये गये पदार्थ में) [तत्] ‘वह है’ [इति] इस प्रकार के [ज्ञानं] ज्ञान को [स्मरणाभासं] स्मरणाभास कहते हैं, [यथा] जैसे

[जिनदत्ते] जिनदत्त में [सः] वह [देवदत्तः] देवदत्त है (ऐसा स्मरण करना)।

Application of the knowledge that has not been acquired earlier in form of retention (*dhāraṇā*) and thereby mistaking one for another is the fallacy-of-remembrance (*smarṇābhāsa*); like mistaking Jinadatta for Devadatta.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

A man had seen Devadatta earlier and could not acquire retention (*dhāraṇā*) about him. Retention (*dhāraṇā*) is the cause of not forgetting in the future what was ascertained in the past. (see, *sūtra* 3-3). After some time, he sees Jinadatta and due to his fallacious retention (*dhāraṇā*), recognizes him as Devadatta. This is a case of the fallacy-of-remembrance (*smarṇābhāsa*).

प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभास का स्वरूप -

The nature of the fallacy-of-recognition
(*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*) -

सदृशे तदेवेदं तस्मिन्नेव तेन सदृशं यमलकवदित्यादि
प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासम् ॥९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सदृशे] सदृश पदार्थ में [इदं तत् एव] 'यह वही है',
ऐसा कहना, [तस्मिन्] उसमें [एव] ही [तेन सदृशम्] 'यह उसके

सदृश है', ऐसा कहना। [यमलकवत्] युगपत् जन्मे (युगल उत्पन्न हुए) दो बालकों के समान (जैसे उनमें विपरीत ज्ञान हो जाता है), [इत्यादि] इत्यादि प्रकार के अन्यथा प्रत्यभिज्ञान को [प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासं] प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभास कहते हैं।

To recognize the 'similar' object as the one seen earlier, and to recognize the object seen earlier as the 'similar', are examples of the fallacy-of-recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*); like the failure to differentiate between the two offsprings born at the same time from the same pregnancy.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The first example pertains to the fallacy-of-recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*) due to oneness (*ekatva*) – to mistake the object that is similar (*sadṛśa*) as the 'one and the same' object – if 'A' and 'B' are similar; to mistake 'B' for 'A'.

The second example pertains to the fallacy-of-recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*) due to similarity (*sādṛśya*) – to mistake the same object as the 'similar' object – if 'A' and 'B' are similar; to mistake 'A' for 'B'.

To mistake the object seen earlier – *ekatva* – for another similar object – *sādṛśya* – is the fallacy-of-recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*) mentioned in the first example. To mistake a similar object – *sādṛśya* – for the one seen earlier – *ekatva* – is the fallacy-of-recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*) mentioned in the second example.

तर्काभास का स्वरूप -

The nature of the fallacy-of-induction (*tarkābhāsa*) -

असम्बद्धे तज्ज्ञानं तर्काभासम् ॥१०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [असम्बद्धे] अविनाभाव-सम्बन्ध से रहित पदार्थ में [तज्ज्ञानं] उस अविनाभाव-सम्बन्ध का ज्ञान करना [तर्काभासम्] तर्काभास है।

The knowledge that recognizes infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between objects that do not have such concomitance is the fallacy-of-induction (*tarkābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The knowledge that recognizes infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between objects which, in fact, do not have such relationship – infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) and infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) – constitutes the fallacy-of-induction (*tarkābhāsa*).

The skin-colour of the expectant son of a man has no infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*, *avinābhāva*) with his existing son; to say that the newborn shall be black since the existing son is black is an example of the fallacy-of-induction (*tarkābhāsa*).

अनुमानाभास का स्वरूप -

The nature of the fallacy-of-inference (*anumānābhāsa*) -

इदमनुमानाभासम् ॥११॥

अन्वयार्थ – [इदम्] यह [अनुमानाभासम्] अनुमानाभास है।
(जो आगे कहा जा रहा है।)

That (which is to be discussed now) is the fallacy-of-inference (*anumānābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The use of the inference (*anumāna*) involves constituents like the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*), the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*), and the illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*). The misuse of the constituents is the fallacy-of-inference (*anumānābhāsa*), which is discussed now.

पक्षाभास का स्वरूप –

The nature of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference
(*pakṣābhāsa*) –

तत्रानिष्टादिः पक्षाभासः ॥१२॥

अन्वयार्थ – [तत्र] उनमें [अनिष्टादिः] अनिष्ट आदि [पक्षाभासः] पक्षाभास है।

(उनमें अनिष्ट, बाधित और सिद्ध को पक्ष कहना पक्षाभास है।)

The fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) is making something that is of-no-interest (*aniṣṭa*), deniable (*bādhita*) and already-proven (*siddha*), as the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As mentioned in *sūtra* 3-16, the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is that which is of-interest (*iṣṭa*), undeniable (*abādhita*) and unproven (*asiddha*). That which is opposite to these three attributes is the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*). Here the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) and the proposition (*pratijñā*) are considered as synonyms.

अनिष्ट-पक्षाभास का उदाहरण -

An example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is of-no-interest (*aniṣṭa*) -

अनिष्टो मीमांसकस्यानित्यः शब्दः ॥१३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [मीमांसकस्य] मीमांसक का ऐसा कहना कि [शब्दः] शब्द [अनित्यः] अनित्य है, [अनिष्टः] अनिष्ट पक्षाभास है। (क्योंकि उसके मतानुसार शब्द नित्य है।)

If the Mīmāṃsaka says that the word (*śabda*) is transient (*anitya*), it is the case of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is of-no-interest (*aniṣṭa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Mīmāṃsaka asserts that the word (*śabda*) is permanent (*nitya*). This implies that the permanence (*nityata*) of the word is of-interest (*iṣṭa*) to them. If due to any reason, the Mīmāṃsaka says that the word is transient (*anitya*), it is a case of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is of-no-interest (*aniṣṭa*).

सिद्ध-पक्षाभास का उदाहरण -

**An example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference
(*pakṣābhāsa*) that is already-proven (*siddha*) -**

सिद्धः श्रावणः शब्दः इति ॥१४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [शब्दः] शब्द [श्रावणः] श्रवणेन्द्रिय से सुना जाता है, यह [इति] निस्संदेह [सिद्धः] सिद्ध-पक्षाभास है। (क्योंकि जब शब्द कान से सुना ही जाता है तब सिद्ध वस्तु को सिद्ध करना व्यर्थ ही है।)

‘The word (*śabda*) is heard (by the sense-of-hearing),’ is the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is already-proven (*siddha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The statement, ‘the word (*śabda*) is heard,’ is already-proven (*siddha*); it makes no sense to make this as the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*).

बाधित-पक्षाभास के भेद -

**The kinds of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference
(*pakṣābhāsa*) that is deniable (*bādhita*) -**

बाधितः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनैः ॥१५॥

अन्वयार्थ - (बाधित-पक्षाभास) [प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनैः]

प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, आगम, लोक और स्ववचनों के द्वारा [बाधितः] बाधित होता है।

The fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is deniable (*bādhita*) occurs when the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is in conflict with the direct (*pratyakṣa*), the inference (*anumāna*), the scriptural-knowledge (*āgama*), the convention (*loka*), or the own-words (*svavacana*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

That which is contrary to the direct (*pratyakṣa*) is the direct-deniable (*pratyakṣa-bādhita*) fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*).

That which is contrary to the inference (*anumāna*) is the inference-deniable (*anumāna-bādhita*) fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*).

That which is contrary to the Scripture (*āgama*) is the Scripture-deniable (*āgama-bādhita*) fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*).

That which is contrary to the accepted convention (*loka*) is the convention-deniable (*loka-bādhita*) fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*).

That which is contrary to one's own-words (*svavacana*) is the own-words-deniable (*svavacana-bādhita*) fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*).

प्रत्यक्ष-बाधित पक्षाभास का उदाहरण -

An example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the direct-deniable (*pratyakṣa-bādhita*) -

तत्र प्रत्यक्षबाधितो यथा अनुष्णोऽग्निर्द्रव्यत्वाज्जलवत् ॥१६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तत्र] उनमें से [प्रत्यक्षबाधितः] प्रत्यक्षबाधित पक्षाभास का उदाहरण- [यथा] जैसे [अग्निः] अग्नि [अनुष्णः] उष्णता रहित है (अर्थात् शीतल है) [द्रव्यत्वात्] (क्योंकि) वह द्रव्य है, [जलवत्] (जो द्रव्य होता, वह शीतल होता है) पानी के समान।

Of these, the example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) of the kind direct-deniable (*pratyakṣa-bādhita*) is: 'the fire is not-hot (cold) being a substance, as the water.'

EXPLANATORY NOTE

By actual perception, through the sense-of-touch, we know that the fire is hot; therefore, the example given above is direct-deniable (*pratyakṣa-bādhita*).

अनुमान-बाधित पक्षाभास का उदाहरण -

An example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the inference-deniable (*anumāna-bādhita*) -

अपरिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् घटवत् ॥१७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [शब्दः] शब्द [अपरिणामी] अपरिणामी है,
[कृतकत्वात्] कृतक (किया जाने वाला) होने से; [घटवत्] घट के
समान।

(जो कृतक होता है वह अपरिणामी होता है, जैसे घट।)

‘The word (*śabda*) is without-modification (*apariṇāmī*) since it is a creation (*kṛtaka*), as the pot (*ghaṭa*).’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The above is an example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the inference-deniable (*anumāna-bādhita*). The means (*hetu*) – ‘a creation’ (*kṛtaka*) – is in conflict with the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*), i.e., ‘without-modification’ (*apariṇāmī*). This means (*hetu*) – ‘a creation’ (*kṛtaka*) – in fact, establishes ‘with-modification’ (*pariṇāmī*).

आगम-बाधित पक्षाभास का उदाहरण -

An example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the Scripture-deniable (*āgama-bādhita*) –

प्रेत्यासुखप्रदो धर्मः पुरुषाश्रितत्वादधर्मवत् ॥१८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [धर्मः] धर्म [प्रेत्यासुखप्रदः] परलोक में दुःख देने वाला है, [पुरुषाश्रितत्वात्] पुरुषाश्रित होने से; [अधर्मवत्] अधर्म के समान।

(जो पुरुष के आश्रित होता है वह दुःखदायी होता है, जैसे अधर्म।)

‘The merit (*dharma*) leads to misery in the life-after (*paraloka*) since it is dependent on the man, as the demerit (*adharma*).’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

It is true that both merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are dependent on the man but, according to the Scripture, lead to the opposite results in the life-after (*paraloka*); merit (*dharma*) leads to happiness and demerit (*adharma*) to misery. The above example, therefore, is the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the Scripture-deniable (*āgama-bādhita*).

लोक-बाधित पक्षाभास का उदाहरण -

An example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the convention-deniable (*loka-bādhita*) -

शुचि नरशिरःकपालं प्राण्यङ्गत्वाच्छंखशुक्तिवत् ॥१९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [नरशिरःकपालं] मनुष्य के शिर (सिर) का कपाल (खोपड़ी) [शुचिः] पवित्र है, [प्राण्यङ्गत्वात्] जीव का अंग होने से; [शङ्खशुक्तिवत्] शंख, सीप के समान।
(जो प्राणी का अंग होता है वह पवित्र होता है, जैसे शंख और सीप।)

‘The human-skull is an auspicious object since it is a part of the body, as the conch-shell or the nacre.’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Worldly conventions do consider some body-parts, like the conch-shell, as auspicious objects, but not all body-parts are so. In fact, the human-skull is considered inauspicious. To draw an inference that the human-skull is auspicious because body-parts, like the conch-shell, are auspicious is the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the convention-deniable (*loka-bādhita*).

स्ववचन-बाधित पक्षाभास का उदाहरण -

An example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the own-words-deniable (*svavacana-bādhita*) -

माता मे बन्ध्या पुरुषसंयोगेऽप्यगर्भत्वात्प्रसिद्धबन्ध्यावत् ॥२०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [मे] मेरी [माता] माँ [बन्ध्या] बाँझ है क्योंकि [पुरुषसंयोगे] पुरुष का संयोग होने पर [अपि] भी [अगर्भत्वात्] उसके गर्भ नहीं रहता है, [प्रसिद्धबन्ध्यावत्] प्रसिद्ध बन्ध्या के समान। (जिसके पुरुष का संयोग होने पर भी गर्भ नहीं रहता वह बन्ध्या कहलाती है।)

‘My mother is a barren-woman since she does not conceive even after union with man.’


EXPLANATORY NOTE

It is well-understood that a barren-woman does not produce offspring

even after mating. Being the son of the woman, the above assertion contradicts own-words; this is an example of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) that is the own-words-deniable (*svavacana-bādhita*).

Fig.-5

Summary of the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*)



हेत्वाभास के भेद -

The kinds of the fallacies-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) -

हेत्वाभासा असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकाकिञ्चित्कराः ॥२१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकाकिञ्चित्कराः] असिद्ध, विरुद्ध, अनैकान्तिक, अकिञ्चित्कर (ये चार) [हेत्वाभासाः] हेत्वाभास के भेद हैं।

The unproven (*asiddha*), the contrary (*viruddha*), the unconstrained (*anaikāntika*), and the futile (*akiñcītaka*) are the four kinds of the fallacies-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The means (*hetu*) has been defined in *sūtra* 3-11 as that which has infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Four kinds of the fallacies-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) are mentioned in the present *sūtra*; these are explained now.

असिद्धहेत्वाभास के भेद और स्वरूप -

The nature of the unproven (*asiddha*) kind of the fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) -

असत्सत्तानिश्चयोऽसिद्धः ॥२२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [असत्सत्तानिश्चयः] जिस हेतु की सत्ता का अभाव हो

अथवा निश्चय न हो, उसे [असिद्धः] असिद्धहेत्वाभास कहते हैं।

The *menas (hetu)* which is non-existent (*asat*) or of uncertain (*aniścaya*) existence is the unproven (*asiddha*) kind of the fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

There are two kinds of the unproven (*asiddha*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*): 1) non-existent (*asatsattā* or *svarūpāsiddha*) and 2) of uncertain-existence (*saṅdigdhāsiddha*). The means (*hetu*) whose non-existence is a certainty is called non-existent (*asat* or *svarūpāsiddha*). The means (*hetu*) whose existence is uncertain or unproven is called of-uncertain-existence (*aniścaya* or *saṅdigdhāsiddha*).

स्वरूपासिद्ध हेत्वाभास का दृष्टान्त -

The non-existent (*asatsattā* or *svarūpāsiddha*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) -

अविद्यमानसत्ताकः परिणामी शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वात् ॥२३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [शब्दः] शब्द [परिणामी] परिणामी (अर्थात् अनित्य) है, [चाक्षुषत्वात्] चाक्षुष होने से; [अविद्यमानसत्ताकः] यह अविद्यमान सत्ता वाले स्वरूपासिद्ध-हेत्वाभास का उदाहरण है।

‘The word (*śabda*) is with-modification or transformational (*pariṇāmī, anitya*) since it is known-by-

the-eye (*cākṣuṣa*)'; this is an example of the non-existent (*asatsattā* or *svarūpāsiddha*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The following *sūtra* explains the non-existent (*asatsattā* or *svarūpāsiddha*) nature of the means (*hetu*).

पूर्व सूत्र में चाक्षुषत्व-हेतु के स्वरूपासिद्ध होने में कारण -

The non-existent (*asatsattā* or *svarūpāsiddha*) nature of the means (*hetu*) in the above example -

स्वरूपेणासत्त्वात् ॥२४॥

अन्वयार्थ - (शब्द का चाक्षुष होना) [स्वरूपेण] स्वरूप से ही [असत्त्वात्] असत् (असिद्ध) होने से।

(Because) By own-nature (*svarūpa*) it is non-existent (*asat*). [The word (*śabda*), by its nature, is not known-by-the-eye (*cākṣuṣa*).]

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The means (*hetu*) - 'known-by-the-eye (*cākṣuṣa*)' - mentioned in *sūtra* 6-23 is, by own-nature (*svarūpa*), non-existent (*asatsattā* or *svarūpāsiddha*) as the word (*śabda*) is known by the ear (*karṇa*) and not by the eye.

सन्दिग्धासिद्ध हेत्वाभास का उदाहरण -

**The second kind of the unproven (*asiddha*) –
saṇḍigdhāsiddha – fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) –**

अविद्यमाननिश्चयो मुग्धबुद्धिं प्रत्यग्निरत्र धूमात् ॥२५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [मुग्धबुद्धिं प्रति] अज्ञान व्यक्ति के प्रति यह कहना कि [अत्र] यहाँ [अग्निः] अग्नि है, [धूमात्] धूम होने से-
[अविद्यमाननिश्चयः] यह अविद्यमान निश्चय वाले सन्दिग्धासिद्ध हेत्वाभास का उदाहरण है।

To tell an ignorant man, ‘the fire (*agni*) is here because the smoke (*dhūma*) is present here,’ is an example of the means (*hetu*) of-uncertain-existence (*aniścaya* or *saṇḍigdhāsiddha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Why is this means (*hetu*) uncertain or unproven (*saṇḍigdhāsiddha*) to the ignorant man? This is explained now.

धूमत्वहेतु के सन्दिग्धासिद्ध हेत्वाभास होने में कारण -

Why the means (*hetu*) of the smoke (*dhūma*) in the previous *sūtra* is of-uncertain-existence (*saṇḍigdhāsiddha*) –

तस्य वाष्पादिभावेन भूतसङ्घाते सन्देहात् ॥२६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [भूतसङ्घाते] भूतसंघात में [वाष्पादिभावेन] वाष्प (भाप) आदि की अवस्था होने से [तस्य] उस अज्ञान व्यक्ति के [संदेहात्] संदेह होने से।
(इस कारण से धूमहेतु की असिद्धता सिद्ध है।)

In the '*bhūtasamghāta*' – collection of elements, like in a kettle or in a frying-pan – because of the presence of the steam/vapour, etc., the ignorant man may engender doubt (that the fire is present here); therefore, the means (*hetu*) is of-uncertain-existence (*aniścaya* or *saṇdigdhāsiddha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The ignorant man who has not understood the relationship between the smoke and the fire as it exists, may mistake the emission of the steam from a kettle as the presence of the fire. He is liable to get confused between the smoke and the vapour. Therefore, for him, the means (*hetu*) cited in the example is of-uncertain-existence (*aniścaya* or *saṇdigdhāsiddha*).

असिद्धहेत्वाभास का भेदान्तर -

Another illustration of the unproven (*asiddha*) kind of the fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) –

सांख्यम्प्रति परिणामी शब्दः कृतकत्वात् ॥२७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सांख्यम्प्रति] सांख्य के प्रति यह कहना कि [शब्दः]

शब्द [परिणामी] परिणामी है, [कृतकत्वात्] क्योंकि वह कृतक है।
(यह 'कृतकत्वात्' हेतु सांख्य के प्रति असिद्धहेत्वाभास है।)

To tell to the Sāṃkhya, 'the word (*śabda*) is with-modification (*pariṇāmī*) because it is a creation (*kṛtaka*).'

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The means (*hetu*) of 'creation' (*kṛtaka*) is of-uncertain-existence (*aniścaya* or *saṃdigdhāsiddha*) for the Sāṃkhya because of the reason given below.

पूर्व सूत्र के कथन की पुष्टि -

The explanation of the above sūtra -

तेनाज्ञातत्वात् ॥२८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तेन] उसके द्वारा (कृतकपना) [अज्ञातत्वात्] अज्ञात होने से।

(क्योंकि उसने कृतकपना जाना ही नहीं है।)

Because he (the Sāṃkhya) is unaware of the meaning of 'creation' (*kṛtaka*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In the Sāṃkhya doctrine only the appearance (*āvirbhāva*) and

disappearance (*tirobhāva*) are accepted and not origination (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vināśa*). The Sāṃkhya considers objects as absolutely-permanent (*nityaikānta*). He is totally unaware of the meaning of 'creation' (*kṛtaka*). Therefore, for him, to use the means (*hetu*) of 'creation' (*kṛtaka*) is of-uncertain-existence (*aniścaya* or *saṃdigdhāsiddha*).

विरुद्धहेत्वाभास का स्वरूप -

The nature of the contrary (*viruddha*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) (see, *sūtra* 6-21) -

**विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभावो विरुद्धोऽपरिणामी शब्दः
कृतकत्वात् ॥२९॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [विपरीतनिश्चिताविनाभावः] साध्य से विपरीत पदार्थ के साथ निश्चित अविनाभाव वाला [विरुद्धः] विरुद्धहेत्वाभास है, जैसे [शब्दः] शब्द [अपरिणामी] अपरिणामी है, [कृतकत्वात्] कृतक होने से।

The contrary (*viruddha*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) is when the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) exhibits infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with the opposite of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). For example, 'the word (*śabda*) is without-modification (*apariṇāmī*) since it is a creation (*kṛtaka*).'

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In the above mentioned inference (*anumāna*), the means (*hetu, sādhana*), i.e., ‘creation’ (*kṛtaka*), exhibits infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with the opposite of ‘without-modification’ (*apariṇāmī*); in fact, it exhibits infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) with ‘with-modification’ (*pariṇāmī*). Therefore, the above is an example of the contrary (*viruddha*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*).

अनैकान्तिकहेत्वाभास का स्वरूप -

The nature of the unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) (see, *sūtra* 6-21) -

विपक्षेऽप्यविरुद्धवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः ॥३०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [विपक्षे] विपक्ष में [अपि] भी [अविरुद्धवृत्तिः]
 अविरुद्ध प्रवृत्ति वाला [अनैकान्तिकः] अनैकान्तिक-हेत्वाभास है।
 (जिसका विपक्ष में भी रहना अविरुद्ध है, अर्थात् जो हेतु पक्ष, सपक्ष के समान
 विपक्ष में भी बिना किसी विरोध के रहता है, उसे अनैकान्तिक-हेत्वाभास
 कहते हैं।)

The unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) is when the means (*hetu, sādhana*) exists in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) too [besides in the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) and in the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa*)].

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) is the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) whose attribute (*dharma*) is yet to be determined. The subject that has similar attribute as the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is called the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa*). The means (*hetu, sādhana*) serves its purpose when it exists in the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) and in the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa*).

The unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) [or transgressive (*vyabhicārī*)] means (*hetu, sādhana*) exists not only in the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) and in the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa*), but also in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

Such unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) means (*hetu, sādhana*) is of two kinds: 1) that certainly exists in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) – *nīścita-vipakṣavṛtti*, and 2) whose existence in the opposite is doubtful – *śāṅkitavipakṣavṛtti*.

निश्चितविपक्षवृत्ति का उदाहरण -

An example of the unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) means (*hetu*) that certainly exists in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) – *nīścita-vipakṣavṛtti* –

निश्चितवृत्तिरनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वाद् घटवत् ॥३१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [शब्दः] शब्द [अनित्यः] अनित्य है, [प्रमेयत्वात्] क्योंकि वह प्रमेय (प्रमाण का विषय) है; [घटवत्] घट के समान। यह [निश्चितवृत्तिः] निश्चितविपक्षवृत्ति अनैकान्तिक-हेत्वाभास का उदाहरण है।

"The word (*śabda*) is transient (*anitya*) since it is an object-of-knowledge (*prameya*), like the pot (*ghaṭa*)"; this is an example of unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) means (*hetu*) that certainly exists in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) – *niścita vipakṣavṛtti*.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In the example given, the word (*śabda*) has been called transient (*anitya*) since it is an object-of-knowledge (*prameya*) or a subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). It says further that whatever is an object-of-knowledge (*prameya*) is transient (*anitya*), like a pot (*ghaṭa*). The means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) of being an object-of-knowledge (*prameya*) exists in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) too; therefore, this is an example of *niścita vipakṣavṛtti*.

निश्चितविपक्षवृत्तित्व की पुष्टि -

Clarification in respect of the above example of the unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) means (*hetu*) that certainly exists in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) – *niścita vipakṣavṛtti* –

आकाशे नित्येऽप्यस्य निश्चयात् ॥३२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [नित्ये आकाशे] नित्य आकाश में [अपि] भी [अस्य] इसका (अर्थात् प्रमेयत्वहेतु का) [निश्चयात्] निश्चय होने से।

Because the space (*ākāśa*) that is permanent (*nitya*), too, certainly satisfies this means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) [of being an object-of-knowledge (*prameya*)].

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The means (*hetu, sādhana*) of being an object-of-knowledge (*prameya*) exists in objects that are transient (*anitya*) – the word (*śabda*) and the pot (*ghaṭa*) – but it also exists definitely in the space (*ākāśa*), a subject of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), that is permanent (*nitya*), the opposite (*vipakṣa*) of being transient (*anitya*).

शङ्कितविपक्षवृत्ति का उदाहरण -

An example of the unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) means (*hetu, sādhana*) whose existence in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) is doubtful – *śaṅkitavipakṣavṛtti* –

शङ्कितवृत्तिस्तु नास्ति सर्वज्ञो वक्तृत्वात् ॥३३॥

अन्वयार्थ – [सर्वज्ञः] सर्वज्ञ [नास्ति] नहीं है [तु] क्योंकि [वक्तृत्वात्] वह वक्ता है अर्थात् बोलने वाला है। यह [शङ्कितवृत्तिः] शङ्कितविपक्षवृत्ति अनैकान्तिक-हेत्वाभास का उदाहरण है।

The omniscient (*sarvajña*) does not exist since he is a speaker (*vaktā*). This is an example of unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) means (*hetu*) whose existence in the opposite is doubtful – *śaṅkitavipakṣavṛtti*.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

There is no contradiction if the omniscient is a speaker too. Why the existence of the means (*hetu, sādhana*) – ‘he is a speaker’ – in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) is doubtful – *śaṅkitavipakṣavṛtti* – is explained in the next *sūtra*.

शङ्कितविपक्षवृत्तित्व की पुष्टि -

The justification of the ‘śaṅkitavipakṣavṛtti’ in the previous sūtra -

सर्वज्ञत्वेन वक्तृत्वाविरोधात् ॥३४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सर्वज्ञत्वेन] सर्वज्ञ के साथ [वक्तृत्वाविरोधात्]
वक्तापने का विरोध नहीं होने से।

Because there is no contradiction between the speaker-nature (*vaktāpanā*) and the omniscience (*sarvajñapanā*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

There is no contradiction if the particular individual has both, the omniscience (*sarvajñapanā*) and the speaker-nature (*vaktāpanā*). Here, the means (*hetu, sādhana*) of the ‘speaker-nature’ (*vaktāpanā*) has been called ‘śaṅkitavipakṣavṛtti’ since its existence in the opposite (*vipakṣa*), i.e., the presence of omniscience (*sarvajñapanā*), is doubtful. It is generally seen that with the rise of the knowledge the speech becomes more and more refined.

अकिञ्चित्कर-हेत्वाभास का स्वरूप -

The nature of the futile (*akiñcītaka*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) (see, sūtra 6-21) -

सिद्धे प्रत्यक्षादिबाधिते च साध्ये हेतुरकिञ्चित्करः ॥३५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [साध्ये सिद्धे] साध्य के सिद्ध होने पर [च] और [प्रत्यक्षादिबाधिते] प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाणों से बाधित होने पर [हेतुः] हेतु [अकिञ्चित्करः] अकिञ्चित्कर होता है।

When the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is already proven (*siddha*) or is contradicted (*bādhita*) by the direct (*pratyakṣa*), etc. [valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)], the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) becomes futile (*akiñcitkara*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In both cases – when the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is already proven (*siddha*) or is contradicted (*bādhita*) by any kind of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) – the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) becomes futile (*akiñcitkara*).

सिद्धसाध्य अकिञ्चित्कर-हेत्वाभास का उदाहरण -

An example of the futile (*akiñcitkara*) means (*hetu*) when the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is already proven (*siddha*) –

सिद्धः श्रावणः शब्दः शब्दत्वात् ॥३६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [शब्दः] शब्द [श्रावणः] श्रावण (अर्थात् श्रवण-इन्द्रिय का विषय) है, [शब्दत्वात्] शब्द होने से।

‘The word (*śabda*) is the subject-of-the-sense-of-hearing (*śrāvaṇa*) because it is a word (*śabda*).’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

That the means (*hetu, sādhana*) – ‘it is a word (*śabda*)’ – in the example given is futile (*akiñcitkara*) is explained now.

पूर्व सूत्र में शब्दत्वहेतु के अकिञ्चित्कर-हेत्वाभास होने का कारण -

Explanation as to why the means (*hetu*) – the ‘word’ (*śabda*) – in the above example is a futile (*akiñcitkara*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) –

किञ्चिदकरणात् ॥३७॥

अन्वयार्थ – [किञ्चित्] कुछ भी [अकरणात्] नहीं करने से।
(शब्दत्वहेतु के कुछ भी नहीं करने से यह अकिञ्चित्कर-हेत्वाभास है।)

Because the means (*hetu, sādhana*) – ‘it is a word (*śabda*)’ – has done nothing.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is already known; it is known that the word (*śabda*) is heard by the sense-of-hearing, the ear. The means (*hetu, sādhana*) – ‘it is a word (*śabda*)’ – is futile (*akiñcitkara*); it has done nothing to establish the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Therefore, it is a futile (*akiñcitkara*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*).

प्रत्यक्षादिबाधित अकिञ्चित्करत्व की उदाहरणरूप से पुष्टि -

An example of the futile (*akiñcitkara*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) when the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is contradicted (*bādhita*) by the direct (*pratyakṣa*), etc. -

यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निर्द्रव्यत्वादित्यादौ किञ्चित्कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् ॥३८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [यथा] जैसे [अग्निः] अग्नि [अनुष्णः] अनुष्ण (ठंडी) है, [द्रव्यत्वात्] द्रव्य होने से [इत्यादौ] इत्यादि अनुमान में [किञ्चित्] कुछ भी [कर्तुम्] करने के लिए [अशक्यत्वात्] शक्य न होने से यह द्रव्यत्व हेतु अकिञ्चित्कर-हेत्वाभास है।

As in statements like ‘the fire (*agni*) is cold (*anuṣṇa*) because it is a substance (*dravya*),’ the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) does nothing to establish the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The statement that the fire is cold is already contradicted (*bādhita*) by the direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) – ‘it is a substance (*dravya*)’ – does nothing to establish that the fire is cold. The means (*hetu*, *sādhana*), therefore, is futile (*akiñcitkara*).

All means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) that try to establish through inference (*anumāna*) the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) that is already contradicted (*bādhita*) by the direct (*pratyakṣa*) or any other kind of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are the futile (*akiñcitkara*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*).

अकिञ्चित्कर हेत्वाभास का विचार केवल शास्त्रकाल में, वादकाल में नहीं -

The futile (*akiñcītkara*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) is useful only in descriptive texts, not in scholarly discussions -

**लक्षण एवासौ दोषो व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्य पक्षदोषेणैव
दुष्टत्वात् ॥३९॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [असौ] यह अकिञ्चित्कर हेत्वाभासरूप [दोषः] दोष [लक्षण] (हेतु के) लक्षण काल में (शास्त्र के पठन-पाठन काल में) [एव] ही है; [व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्य] व्युत्पन्नप्रयोग के काल में (वादकाल में) [पक्षदोषेण] पक्ष/साध्य में दोष होने से [एव] ही [दुष्टत्वात्] दूषित हो जाने से यह अनुपयोगी है।


The description of the fault (*doṣa*) of the futile (*akiñcītkara*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) is useful only in texts, as a mark of the means (*hetu*); in scholarly discussions, as the use [of the futile (*akiñcītkara*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*)] results in the fault (*doṣa*) in the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) itself, it fails to serve any purpose.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In scholarly discussions the futile (*akiñcītkara*) fallacy-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*) vitiates the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) itself; it is not used. It is used for the study purpose only by the learners.

This ends the discussion on the fallacies-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*).

Fig.-6
Summary of the fallacies-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*)



अन्वय और व्यतिरेक के भेद से दृष्टान्त दो प्रकार का है। (सूत्र ३-४३)
अन्वय-दृष्टान्ताभास के भेद -

The example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) is of two kinds: 1) infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*), and 2) infallible-negation (*vyatireka*). (see, *sūtra* 3-43)

The fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*) involving infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) – *anvayadr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa* –

दृष्टान्ताभासा अन्वयेऽसिद्धसाध्यसाधनोभयाः ॥४०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अन्वये] अन्वय में [असिद्धसाध्यसाधनोभयाः]
असिद्ध-साध्य, असिद्ध-साधन और असिद्धोभय (असिद्ध-साध्य-साधन)
[दृष्टान्ताभासाः] दृष्टान्ताभास कहलाते हैं।
(अन्वयदृष्टान्ताभास के तीन भेद हैं- साध्यविकल, साधनविकल और उभयविकल।)

The fallacy of the example or illustration (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) of the kind infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) – *anvayadr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa* – is of three kinds: 1) the unproven-object-to-be-proved (*asiddhasādhya* or *sādhyaavikala*), 2) the unproven-means (*asiddhasādhana* or *sādhanavikala*), and 3) the unproven-object-to-be-proved-and-means (*asiddhasādhyaśādhana* or *ubhayaavikala*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These three kinds of fallacies in the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) vitiate the inference; this will be shown now.

अन्वय-दृष्टान्ताभास के उदाहरण -

Examples of the three kinds of fallacies – *anvaya-dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa* – in a single statement –

अपौरुषेयः शब्दोऽमूर्तत्वादिन्द्रियसुखपरमाणुघटवत् ॥४१॥

अन्वयार्थ – [शब्दः] शब्द [अपौरुषेयः] अपौरुषेय होता है
[अमूर्तत्वात्] अमूर्त होने से, [इन्द्रियसुखपरमाणुघटवत्] इन्द्रियसुख,
परमाणु और घट के समान।

‘The word (*śabda*) is not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) because it is incorporeal (*amūrta*); as the sensual-pleasure (*indriya-sukha*), the atom (*paramāṇu*), and the pot (*ghaṭa*).’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In the inference (*anumāna*) given above, the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) of the sensual-pleasure (*indriya-sukha*) is the unproven-object-to-be-proved (*asiddhasādhya* or *sādhya*) because it [the sensual-pleasure (*indriya-sukha*)] is man-made (*pauruṣeya*). It means that this example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) fails to establish the ‘not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*)’ nature of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

The example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) of the atom (*paramāṇu*) is the unproven-means (*asiddhasādhana* or *sādhanavikala*) because it [the atom (*paramāṇu*)] is corporeal (*mūrta*). It means that this example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) fails to establish the ‘incorporeal (*amūrta*)’ nature of the means (*sādhana*).

The example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) of the pot (*ghaṭa*) is the unproven-object-to-be-proved-and-means (*asiddhasādhya-sādhana* or *ubhayavikala*)

because it [the pot (*ghaṭa*)] is man-made (*pauruṣeya*) and corporeal (*mūrta*). It means that this example (*dṛṣṭānta*) fails to establish both, the ‘not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*)’ nature of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the ‘incorporeal (*amūrta*)’ nature of the means (*sādhana*).

अन्वय-दृष्टान्ताभास का उदाहरणान्तर -

Another example of the fallacy of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) involving infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) – *anvaya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* –

विपरीतान्वयश्च यदपौरुषेयं तदमूर्तम् ॥४२॥

अन्वयार्थ - (पूर्वोक्त अनुमान में) [यत्] ‘जो [अपौरुषेयं] अपौरुषेय होता है [तत्] वह [अमूर्तम्] अमूर्त होता है’, इस प्रकार की [विपरीतान्वयः] विपरीत-अन्वय व्याप्ति का दिखाना ‘विपरीत-अन्वय’ नाम का दृष्टान्ताभास है।

‘That which is not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) is incorporeal (*amūrta*)’; this is the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) incorporating reverse-infallible-affirmation (*viparīta-anvaya*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) indicates infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) with the means (*sādhana*). (see, *sūtra* 2-7) Illustration: ‘There is the fire (*–sādhya*) on the hill because there is the smoke (*–sādhana*).’ The fire (*–sādhya*) is

established through the employment of the smoke (*-sādhana*). It is wrong to say, 'Where there is the fire, there is the smoke, as on the hill.' This will be infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) that has reverse-infallible-affirmation (*viparīta-anvaya*).

In the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) given in the *sūtra*, infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) has been shown of 'not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*)' [the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*)] with 'incorporeal (*amūrta*)' [the means (*sādhana*)]. The right infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) that has infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) would be 'That which is incorporeal (*amūrta*) [the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*)] is not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) [the means (*sādhana*)], as the soul (*ātmā*), the medium of-motion (*dharma-dravya*), etc.' Therefore, the example given in the *sūtra* is a case of the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*).

उपरोक्त सूत्र नं. ६-४२ के वर्णन की पुष्टि -

Further explanation as to why the example in *sūtra* 6-42 is a case of the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*) -

विद्युदादिनाऽतिप्रसङ्गात् ॥४३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [विद्युदादिना] विद्युत (बिजली) आदि से

[अतिप्रसङ्गात्] अतिप्रसंग दोष होने से (दृष्टान्ताभास आता है)।

('जो अपौरुषेय हो, वह अमूर्त है,' ऐसी विपरीत अन्वयव्याप्ति के मानने पर विद्युत के भी अमूर्तता की प्राप्ति होती है, अर्थात् बिजली को भी अमूर्त मानना चाहिए। पर वह अपौरुषेय होती हुई भी अमूर्त नहीं, किन्तु मूर्त है। इसलिए विद्युत आदि के अपौरुषेयपना होने पर भी अमूर्तपने का अभाव होने से यह अन्वय-दृष्टान्ताभास है।)

Because it suffers from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness¹ (*atiprasaṅga* or *ativyāpti*) with the lightning (*vidyuta*), etc.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If we accept the reverse-infallible-affirmation (*viparīta-anvaya*) that whatever is not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) is incorporeal (*amūrta*), the lightning (*vidyuta*), etc., that are not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*), would become incorporeal (*amūrta*). The example suffers from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*atiprasaṅga* or *ativyāpti*).

व्यतिरेक-दृष्टान्ताभास के भेद और उदाहरण -

Examples of the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*) involving infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) –
***vyatirekadṛṣṭāntābhāsa* –**

व्यतिरेकेऽसिद्धतद्व्यतिरेकाः
 परमाण्विन्द्रियसुखाऽऽकाशवत् ॥४४॥

अन्वयार्थ – [असिद्धतद्व्यतिरेकाः] असिद्धसाध्य, असिद्धसाधन, असिद्धोभय (असिद्धसाध्यसाधन) [व्यतिरेके] व्यतिरेक में दृष्टान्ताभास हैं। (उनके उदाहरण क्रम से) [परमाण्विन्द्रियसुखाऽऽकाशवत्] परमाणु, इन्द्रियसुख और आकाश के समान।

1 – Over-pervasiveness (*atiprasaṅga*, *ativyāpti*) – the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) is also found outside the object (*lakṣya*). (see, footnote, *sūtra* 2-12, p. 35)

The fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) involving infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) – *vyatirekadṛṣṭāntābhāsa* – also is of three kinds: 1) of the unproven-object-to-be-proved (*asiddhasādhya*), 2) of the unproven-means (*asiddhasādhana*), and 3) of the unproven-object-to-be-proved-and-means (*asiddhobhaya*). The examples are (consecutively) the atom (*paramāṇu*), the sensual-pleasure (*indriya-sukha*), and the space (*ākāśa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) which shows infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) – in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), the means (*sādhana*) must be absent – is of the infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) kind. (see, *sūtra* 3-45). Both, the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*), must be absent.

Use infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) for the three examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) given in this *sūtra* to the inference (*anumāna*) in *sūtra* 6-41: ‘The word (*śabda*) is not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) because it is incorporeal (*amūrta*).’

First, ‘That which is not not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) is not incorporeal (*amūrta*), as the atom (*paramāṇu*).’ Here, the atom (*paramāṇu*) represents the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) involving infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) of the unproven-object-to-be-proved (*asiddhasādhya*) because it is not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*); there is no infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

Second, ‘That which is not not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) is not incorporeal (*amūrta*), as the sensual-pleasure (*indriya-sukha*).’ The sensual-pleasure (*indriya-sukha*) represents the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) involving infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) of the unproven-means (*asiddhasādhana*) because it is incorporeal (*amūrta*); there is no infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) of the means

(sādhana).

Third, 'That which is not not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) is not incorporeal (*amūrta*), as the space (*ākāśa*).' The space (*ākāśa*) represents the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*drṣṭāntābhāsa*) involving infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) of the unproven-object-to-be-proved-and-means (*asiddhobhaya*) because it is both, not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*) and incorporeal (*amūrta*); there is no infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) either of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) or the means (*sādhana*).

व्यतिरेक दृष्टान्ताभास का उदाहरणान्तर -

Another example of the fallacy of the example (*drṣṭānta*) involving infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) – *vyatireka-drṣṭāntābhāsa* –

विपरीतव्यतिरेकश्च यन्नामूर्त्तं तन्नापौरुषेयम् ॥४५॥

अन्वयार्थ – (पूर्वोक्त अनुमान में) [च] और [यत्] जो [अमूर्त्त] अमूर्त्त [न] नहीं है [तत्] वह [अपौरुषेयम्] अपौरुषेय [न] नहीं है, यह [विपरीतव्यतिरेकः] विपरीत-व्यतिरेक दृष्टान्ताभास है।

In the earlier example, to show infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) in the manner: 'That which is not incorporeal (not *amūrta*) is not not-man-made (not *apauruṣeya*)', is the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*drṣṭāntābhāsa*) incorporating reverse-infallible-negation (*viparīta-vyatireka*).


EXPLANATORY NOTE

In infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) involving infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*), the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) must accompany the absence of the means (*sādhana*). Not the other way round; i.e., the absence of the means (*sādhana*) accompanying the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*); e.g., to say, ‘where there is the absence of the smoke, there is the absence of the fire.’

In the example given in the *sūtra*, ‘not incorporeal (absence of *amūrta*)’ is the absence of the means (*sādhana*) and ‘not not-man-made (absence of *apauruṣeya*)’ is the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Such kind of reverse-infallible-negation (*viparīta-vyatireka*) suffers from the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*atiprasaṅga* or *ativyāpti*) with the lightning (*vidyuta*), etc. Lightning is ‘not incorporeal (not *amūrta*)’, i.e., it is corporeal (*mūrta*), but it does not have ‘the absence of not-man-made (absence of *apauruṣeya*)’, i.e. it is not-man-made (*apauruṣeya*). Therefore, the example given in the *sūtra* involves the fallacy of the example (*drṣṭānta*) involving infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) – *vyatireka-drṣṭāntābhāsa*.

See Fig.-7 on the next page for a summary of the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*drṣṭāntābhāsa*).

Fig.-7

Summary of the fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*)

[Earlier (see, *sūtra* 3-42), these three – the example (*udāharana*, *dṛṣṭānta*), the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*), and the conclusion (*nigamana*) – have been mentioned as useful for the uninitiated. Not to use these for the uninitiated constitutes the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*).]

बाल-प्रयोगाभास का लक्षण -

The mark of the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*) -

बालप्रयोगाभासः पञ्चावयवेषु कियद्धीनता ॥४६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [पञ्चावयवेषु] (अनुमान के) पाँच अवयवों (अंगों) में से [कियद्धीनता] कितने ही कम अवयवों का प्रयोग करना

[बालप्रयोगाभासः] बाल-प्रयोगाभास है।

(अनुमान के - प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु, उदाहरण, उपनय और निगमन - इन पाँच अवयवों में से कितने ही कम अवयवों का प्रयोग करना बाल-प्रयोगाभास है।)

Of the five limbs of inference (*anumāna*) [the proposition (*pratijñā*), the reason or means (*hetu*), the example (*udāharana*), the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*)] if any is (are) missing, that is the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The uninitiated learners fail to fully appreciate the import of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) if all the five limbs of the inference (*anumāna*)

are not employed. Using only three or four limbs constitutes the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*).

बाल-प्रयोगाभास का उदाहरण -

Example of the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*) -

अग्निमानयं देशो धूमवत्त्वाद्यदित्थं तदित्थं यथा महानसः
इति ॥४७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अयं] यह [देशः] प्रदेश [अग्निमान्] अग्निवाला है [धूमवत्त्वात्] धूम वाला होने से; [यत्] जो [इत्थं] इस प्रकार (धूम वाला) होता है [तत्] वह [इत्थं] इस प्रकार (अग्नि वाला) होता है, [यथा] जैसे [महानसः] रसोईघर।

(इस प्रयोग में प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु और उदाहरण ये तीन ही अवयव कहे गये हैं, इसलिये बाल-प्रयोगाभास है।)

‘This region is full of the fire because it is full of the smoke. Wherever is the smoke, there is the fire, as the kitchen.’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In this statement only three limbs of the inference (*anumāna*) are employed: 1) ‘This region is full of the fire,’ – proposition (*pratijñā*); 2) ‘Because it is full of the smoke,’ – reason or means (*hetu*); and 3) ‘As the kitchen,’ – example (*udāharaṇa* or *dṛṣṭānta*).

Since only three limbs of the inference (*anumāna*) are used here, it constitutes the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*).

चार अवयवों के प्रयोग करने पर तदाभासता -

**Fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*)
when four limbs of the inference (*anumāna*) are used -**

धूमवांश्चायमिति वा ॥४८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [वा] अथवा [अयम्] यह (प्रदेश) [च] भी [इति]
इसलिए [धूमवान्] धूम वाला है।

(‘यह (प्रदेश) भी धूमवाला है’ -उपनय। ऊपर कहे गये तीन अवयवों
के साथ उपनय का प्रयोग करना और निगमन का प्रयोग नहीं करना भी
बाल-प्रयोगाभास है।)

Further, ‘This (region) too, therefore, is full of the
smoke.’

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In the illustration of *sūtra* 6-47, is added the fourth limb of the inference (*anumāna*) – ‘This region too, therefore, is full of the smoke,’ – application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*). As the fifth limb ‘conclusion (*nigamana*)’ is still missing, it too constitutes the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*).

विपरीत प्रयोग करने पर भी प्रयोगाभासपना -

Use of the limbs of the inference (*anumāna*) in reverse (*viparīta*) sequence constitutes the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*) -

तस्मादग्निमान् धूमवांश्चायम् ॥४९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तस्मात्] इसलिए [अयम्] यह [अग्निमान्] अग्नि वाला है [च] और (यह भी) [धूमवान्] धूम वाला है।

(दृष्टान्त के बाद उपनय बोलना चाहिए कि 'उसी तरह यह भी धूम वाला है'। तत्पश्चात् निगमन बोलना चाहिए कि 'इसलिए यह अग्नि वाला है'। परन्तु इस सूत्र में उपनय और निगमन का क्रम-भंग कर विपरीतता से कहे गये हैं, इसलिए यह बाल-प्रयोगाभास है।)

'Therefore it (this region) is full of the fire and full of the smoke too.'

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The correct sequence for the use of the limbs of the inference (*anumāna*) is to use the example (*udāharaṇa* or *dr̥ṣṭānta*), and then the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*). The statement 'This region, like the kitchen, is full of the smoke,' is correct. After this, the conclusion (*nigamana*) is used - 'Therefore, this region is full of the fire.' In the statement made in the *sūtra*, the conclusion (*nigamana*) has been used before the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) - 'This region is full of the fire and full of the smoke too.'

The use of reverse (*viparīta*) sequence of the limbs constitutes the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*).

विपरीत प्रयोग करने पर प्रयोगाभास कहने में कारण -

Explanation as to why the use of the reverse (*viparīta*) sequence constitutes the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*) -

स्पष्टतया प्रकृतप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् ॥५०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [स्पष्टतया] स्पष्ट रूप से [प्रकृतप्रतिपत्तेः] प्रकृत पदार्थ का ठीक-ठीक ज्ञान कराने में [अयोगात्] अयोग्य होने से (यह प्रयोगाभास ही है)।

Because the use of the limbs (*avayava*) in reverse (*viparīta*) sequence does not result in clear understanding of the relevant subject.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The use of the less than five limbs of the inference (*anumāna*) or their use in reverse (*viparīta*) sequence constitutes the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*) as the learner may not be able to understand the full import of the statements.

आगमाभास का स्वरूप -

The nature of the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*) -

रागद्वेषमोहाक्रान्तपुरुषवचनाज्जातमागमाभासम् ॥५१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [रागद्वेषमोहाक्रान्तपुरुषवचनात्] राग-द्वेष और मोह से आक्रान्त (व्याप्त) पुरुष के वचनों से [जातम्] उत्पन्न हुए (पदार्थ के ज्ञान को) [आगमाभासम्] आगमाभास कहते हैं।

The knowledge-of-the-objects obtained from the words of the person with attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*) is the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Only the man free-from-attachment (*vītarāga*) is the Omniscient Lord; he is all-knowing (*sarvajña* or *āpta*), and his words benefit all living beings (*hitopadeśī*). The knowledge-of-the-objects (*arthajñāna*) obtained from the person with attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*) is the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*).

Several sacred Jaina texts define the true Scripture (*āgama*); two definitions are excerpted below:

तस्स मुहुग्गदवयणं पुव्वावरदोसविरहियं सुद्धं ।

आगममिदि परिकहियं तेण दु कहिया हवन्ति तच्चत्था ॥१-८॥

- आ. कुन्दकुन्द 'नियमसार'

उन परमात्मा (आप्त) के मुख से निकला हुआ वचन, जो कि पूर्वापर - आगे और पीछे - दोष से रहित है और शुद्ध है, उसे 'आगम' कहा गया है और उस (आगम) के द्वारा कहे हुए ही तत्त्वार्थ (द्रव्य) होते हैं।

Words emanating from the mouth of the Supreme Lord (*āpta*, *paramātmā*), free from the fault of inconsistency – contradiction between an earlier and a subsequent statement – and pure, constitute the Scripture (*āgama*). The Scripture expounds the nature of the substances – *tattvārtha*.

आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लङ्घ्यमदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् ।

तत्त्वोपदेशकृत्सार्व शास्त्रं कापथघट्टनम् ॥९॥

- आ. समन्तभद्र 'रत्नकरण्डकश्रावकाचार'

वह शास्त्र सर्वप्रथम भगवान् के द्वारा उपज्ञात है, अन्य वादियों के द्वारा अखण्डनीय है, प्रत्यक्ष और अनुमानादि के विरोध से रहित है, तत्त्व का उपदेश करने वाला है, सबका हितकारी है और मिथ्यामार्ग का खण्डन अथवा निराकरण करने वाला है।

That alone is true scripture which is the word of the Omniscient (*āpta*), inviolable, not opposed to the two kinds – direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*) – of valid knowledge, reveals the true nature of the Reality, universally helpful to living beings, and potent enough to destroy all forms of falsehood.

आगमाभास का उदाहरण -

An example of the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*) -

यथा नद्यास्तीरे मोदकराशयः सन्ति, धावध्वं माणवकाः ॥५२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [यथा] जैसे [माणवकाः] 'हे बालकों! [धावध्वं] दौड़ो-दौड़ो, [नद्याः] नदी के [तीरे] किनारे [मोदकराशयः] मोदक (लड्डुओं) की राशियाँ (ढेर) [सन्ति] हैं।'

As: 'O children, run; there are heaps of *laḍḍū* (sweetmeat) on the riverbank.'

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The person, on being disturbed by the children, tells a lie to get rid of them; there were no heaps of *laḍḍū* (sweetmeat) on the riverbank. His words do not constitute the Scripture and illustrate the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*).

आगमाभास का उदाहरणान्तर -

Another example of the fallacy-of-the-Scripture
(*āgamābhāsa*) -

अङ्गुल्यग्रे हस्तियूथशतमास्ते इति च ॥५३॥

अन्वयार्थ - [च] और (दूसरा उदाहरण) [इति] इस प्रकार है-
[अङ्गुल्यग्रे] 'अंगुली के अग्रभाग पर [हस्तियूथशतम्] हाथियों के
सैकड़ों समुदाय [आस्ते] विद्यमान हैं।'

As another example: 'Herd of hundreds of elephants exist on the tip of the finger.'

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Sāṃkhya, swayed by his false doctrine that advocates the presence of all objects at all places, makes such a statement; this is against the direct (*pratyakṣa*) as well as the indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge. Not emanating from the all-knowing (*āpta*), this too is an example of the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*).

पूर्वोक्त दोनों उदाहरणों के आगमाभास होने का कारण -

The reason why the two examples are the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*) -

विसंवादात् ॥५४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [विसंवादात्] विसंवाद होने के कारण (उनके आगमाभासपना है)।

[These constitute the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*)–] Because these cause a rift (*visaṃvāda*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The mark of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is that it should have definiteness, and opposed to fallacies (*samāropa*). (see, *sūtra* 1-3) The words that lead to a rift in the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) cannot be called the Scripture (*āgama*).

The persons whose words cause a rift (*visaṃvāda*), a controversy (*vivāda*), an inconsistency (*pūrvāpara-virodha* – contradiction between an earlier and a subsequent statement), or a violation-of-truth (*viparīta-artha*) cannot be called the Scripture (*āgama*); such words are the fallacy-of-the-Scripture (*āgamābhāsa*).

The description of the fallacy-of-the-nature (*sva rūpābhāsa*) (see, *sūtra* 6-1) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is complete.

प्रमाण-संख्याभास का वर्णन -

Description of the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*) in the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमित्यादि संख्याभासम् ॥५५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [प्रत्यक्षम्] प्रत्यक्ष [एव] ही [एकं] एक [प्रमाणम्] प्रमाण है, [इत्यादि] इस प्रकार कहना [संख्याभासम्] संख्याभास है।

To make statements like ‘only the direct (*pratyakṣa*) is the one kind of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)’ is the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

It has already been said (see, *sūtra* 2-2) that the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is of two kinds: the direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the indirect (*parokṣa*). To make a rule or to determine that the direct (*pratyakṣa*) only is the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) or that the direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the inference (*anumāna*) only constitute the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), nothing else, is the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*).

प्रत्यक्षमात्र-प्रमाण के संख्याभासत्व का स्पष्टीकरण -

Explanation as to why considering the direct (*pratyakṣa*) only as the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is a fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*) -

**लौकायतिकस्य प्रत्यक्षतः परलोकादिनिषेधस्य
परबुद्ध्यादेशचासिद्धेरतद्विषयत्वात् ॥५६॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [लौकायतिकस्य] लौकायतिक अर्थात् नास्तिकमती चार्वाक की [प्रत्यक्षतः] प्रत्यक्ष से [परलोकादिनिषेधस्य] परलोक आदि के निषेध की [च] और [परबुद्ध्यादेः] पर की बुद्धि आदि की [असिद्धेः] सिद्धि न होने से [अतद्विषयत्वात्] उस (प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण) के विषय न होने के कारण एक प्रत्यक्ष को ही प्रमाण मानना संख्याभास है।

The belief by the Laukāyatika (Cārvāka, *nāstikamatī*) that the direct (*pratyakṣa*) only is the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*) because the direct (*pratyakṣa*) cannot refute the life-after (*paraloka*) and establish the intellect (*buddhi*) of others, etc., not being its subjects.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Not being the subjects of the direct (*pratyakṣa*), one can neither refute nor establish the two cases mentioned in the *sūtra* through it. Although these are not the subjects of the direct (*pratyakṣa*), nevertheless these are determined through other kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), like inference (*anumāna*). Therefore, considering the direct (*pratyakṣa*) only as the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is a fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*).

इसी प्रकार बौद्धादि के मतों में भी संख्याभासपना है -

There is the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*) in the doctrines of the Buddhists, etc. -

**सौगतसांख्ययौगप्राभाकरजैमिनीयानां
प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानार्थापत्त्यभावैरेकैकाधिकैः
व्याप्तिवत् ॥५७॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [सौगतसांख्ययौगप्राभाकरजैमिनीयानां] सौगत (बौद्ध), सांख्य, यौग, प्राभाकर, जैमिनीयों के [प्रत्यक्षानुमानागम-उपमानार्थापत्त्यभावैः एकैकाधिकैः] प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, आगम, उपमान, अर्थापत्ति और अभाव, इन एक-एक अधिक प्रमाणों के द्वारा [व्याप्तिवत्] व्याप्ति के समान।
(जैसे इन एक-एक अधिक प्रमाणों के द्वारा व्याप्ति विषय नहीं की जाती है।)

Like the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) does not take place by the apprehensions of the Saugata (the Buddhists), the Sāṃkhya, the Yauga, the Prābhākara and the Jaiminī who successively increase the number [that constitute the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)] by one each in terms of the direct (*pratyakṣa*), the inference (*anumāna*), the Scripture (*āgama*), the analogy (*upamāna*), the postulation or the presumption (*arthāpatti*), and the absence (*abhāva*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As the Cārvāka fail to establish the intellect (*buddhi*) of others, etc., through their apprehension of only one form – the direct (*pratyakṣa*) – of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the others too fail to establish the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) through their respective apprehension of the increasing forms of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The Saugata (the Buddhists) consider the direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the inference (*anumāna*) as the two forms of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The Sāṃkhya consider the direct (*pratyakṣa*), the inference (*anumāna*) and the Scripture (*āgama*) as the three forms of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The Yauga consider the direct (*pratyakṣa*), the inference (*anumāna*), the Scripture (*āgama*) and the analogy (*upamāna*) as the four forms of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The Prābhākara consider the direct (*pratyakṣa*), the inference (*anumāna*), the Scripture (*āgama*), the analogy (*upamāna*) and the postulation or the presumption (*arthāpatti*) as the five forms of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The Jaiminī consider the direct (*pratyakṣa*), the inference (*anumāna*), the Scripture (*āgama*), the analogy (*upamāna*), the postulation or the presumption (*arthāpatti*) and the absence (*abhāva*) as the six forms of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

All these apprehensions fail to establish the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*, *avinābhāva*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*). It is essential to accept the induction (argument or reasoning, *tarka*) as a form of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*); on accepting this, the numbers [that constitute the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)] accepted by the above mentioned doctrines get haywire. It is thus proved that the numbers [of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)] postulated in these doctrines constitute the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*).

चार्वाकों द्वारा अनुमान आदि से परबुद्ध्यादिक की सिद्धि मानने में आपत्ति -

Negation of the Cārvāka view that if the intellect (*buddhi*) of others, etc., are not known through the direct (*pratyakṣa*), these can be known through other means, like the inference (*anumāna*) -

अनुमानादेस्तद्विषयत्वे प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ॥५८॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अनुमानादेः] अनुमान आदि के [तद्विषयत्वे] उस (परबुद्धि आदि) का विषयपना मानने पर [प्रमाणान्तरत्वम्] अन्य प्रमाणों के मानने का प्रसंग प्राप्त होता है।

The contention (of the Cārvāka) that it [the intellect (*buddhi*) of others, etc.] can be known through other means like the inference (*anumāna*) gives rise to the affirmation of the other kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If the Cārvāka say that the intellect (*buddhi*) of others, etc., can be known through other means like the inference (*anumāna*) then this leads to the affirmation of the other kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and this contradicts their own view that the direct (*pratyakṣa*) is the only kind of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

तर्क को अप्रमाण मानकर संख्याभासत्व के निराकरण से हानि -

The harm done by not accepting the induction (argument or reasoning, *tarka*) as a form of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

तर्कस्येव व्याप्तिगोचरत्वे

प्रमाणान्तरत्वमप्रमाणस्याव्यवस्थापकत्वात् ॥५९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तर्कस्य] तर्क को [एव] ही [व्याप्तिगोचरत्वे] व्याप्ति का विषय करने वाला मानने पर [प्रमाणान्तरत्वम्] (सौगतादिक को) उसे एक भिन्न प्रमाण मानना पड़ता है; (क्योंकि) [अप्रमाणस्य] अप्रमाण-ज्ञान पदार्थ की [अव्यवस्थापकत्वात्] व्यवस्था नहीं कर सकने के कारण व्याप्ति की सिद्धि नहीं कर सकता है।

If (by the Saugata, etc.) it is conceded that the induction (argument or reasoning, *tarka*) establishes the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*, *avinābhāva*), it [the induction (argument or reasoning, *tarka*)] must be accepted as a separate kind of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) because the fallacious-knowledge (*apramāṇa*) fails to establish the substance (*padārtha*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The contentions of the Saugata, etc., fail to establish the infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*, *avinābhāva*) between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) and, therefore, must accept the induction (argument or reasoning, *tarka*) as a form of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Once they accept this, the numbers that they mention as the forms of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are amiss.

पूर्वोक्त कथन की पुष्टि -

The above is explained further -

प्रतिभासभेदस्य च भेदकत्वात् ॥६०॥

अन्वयार्थ – [च] और [प्रतिभासभेदस्य] प्रतिभास में भेद होने से (पृथक्-पृथक् प्रतीति आने से) ही तो प्रमाणों में [भेदकत्वात्] भेद स्थापित किया जाता है।

(पदार्थ के स्वरूप का प्रतिभास अर्थात् विभिन्न प्रतीतिरूप ज्ञान जितने प्रकार का होगा, उतने ही प्रकार के प्रमाण मानने पड़ते हैं। यही कारण है कि अनुमान की भिन्न प्रतीति से चार्वाक की और तर्कज्ञान की भिन्न प्रतीति से सौगतादिक की प्रमाण संख्या विघटित हो जाती है।)

The kinds of discernment (*pratibhāsa*) determine the kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

All kinds of discernment (*pratibhāsa*) – the knowledge of the true nature of the substance (*padārtha*) – must constitute the kinds of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). That is how the discernment (*pratibhāsa*) of inference (*anumāna*) shatters the contention of the Cārvāka who consider the direct (*pratyakṣa*) as the only kind of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Similarly, the discernment (*pratibhāsa*) of the induction (argument or reasoning, *tarka*) shatters the contention of the others (the Saugata, etc.).

This concludes the description of the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyā-bhāsa*).

प्रमाण के विषयाभास का स्वरूप-

The fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*) in the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) –

विषयाभासः सामान्यं विशेषो द्वयं वा स्वतन्त्रम् ॥६१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [सामान्यं] केवल सामान्य को, [विशेषः] केवल विशेष को [वा] अथवा [द्वयं] दोनों को [स्वतन्त्रम्] स्वतन्त्र (दोनों को) प्रमाण का विषय मानना [विषयाभासः] विषयाभास है।

To make only the general (*sāmānya*), only the specific (*viśeṣa*), or both the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) but independent of each other, as the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Sāṃkhya consider only the general (*sāmānya*) as the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The Buddhists consider only the specific (*viśeṣa*) – the mode (*paryāya*) – as the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika consider both the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*), independent of each other, as the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). But, as has been proved earlier (see, *sūtra* 4-1), the object (*artha, vastu, padārtha*) which is of the nature of inter-dependence of the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) is the true subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). All other conceptions, therefore, are the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*).

केवल सामान्यादिक के विषयाभासत्व में हेतु -

Explanation as to how the other conceptions are the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*) -

तथाऽप्रतिभासनात् कार्याकरणाच्च ॥६२॥

अन्वयार्थ – [तथा] उस प्रकार (अर्थात् केवल सामान्यरूप से अथवा केवल विशेषरूप से) [अप्रतिभासनात्] (वस्तु का) प्रतिभास नहीं होने से [च] और [कार्याकरणाच्च] (केवल सामान्यरूप या केवल विशेषरूप पदार्थ अपना) कार्य नहीं कर सकता, इसलिए वे विषयाभास हैं।

Since such [only the general (*sāmānya*) or only the specific (*viśeṣa*)] kind of discernment (*pratibhāsa*) does not manifest and the object with such attribute cannot perform activity (*arthakriyā*), this conception is the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viṣayābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If someone says that such [only the general (*sāmānya*) or only the specific (*viśeṣa*)] object (*vastu*) can perform the activity (*arthakriyā*), two question are raised: 1) will the activity be performed with own capability? and 2) will the activity be performed without own capability? These questions are resolved now.

स्वयं समर्थ पदार्थ के निरपेक्ष कार्यकारित्व मानने से हानि –

The fault in the first consideration of activity with own-capability –

समर्थस्य करणे सर्वदोत्यत्तिरनपेक्षत्वात् ॥६३॥

अन्वयार्थ – [समर्थस्य] समर्थ (एकान्तात्मक तत्त्व) के [करणे] कार्य करने पर [अनपेक्षत्वात्] किसी की अपेक्षा न होने से [सर्वदा]

हमेशा [उत्पत्तिः] (कार्य की) उत्पत्ति है, अर्थात् उत्पत्ति का सर्वदा प्रसंग प्राप्त होता है।

If the activity be performed by the object entirely with own capability, without any dependence on others, the activity will take place incessantly.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If the object does not require any external assistance for the performance of activity (*arthakriyā*) then it should be ever-active and origination (*utpatti*) should take place incessantly.

The contention that the object performs activity only when the instrumental-causes (*sahakāri kāraṇa*) are available and that is why origination (*utpatti*) does not take place incessantly is discussed in the following *sūtra*.

स्वयं समर्थ पदार्थ के सहकारी कारणों के सान्निध्य से कार्यकारित्व मानने से हानि -

The fault in considering that the activity is performed by the object itself with assistance of the external causes -

परापेक्षणे परिणामित्वमन्यथा तदभावात् ॥६४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [परापेक्षणे] दूसरे (सहकारी कारणों) की अपेक्षा रखने पर [परिणामित्वम्] (पदार्थ के) परिणामीपना प्राप्त होता है; [तदभावात्] उसके (सहकारी कारणों के) अभाव होने से [अन्यथा] अन्यथा (इसके विपरीत) अर्थात् कार्य नहीं हो सकता है।

If the activity be performed by the object itself with assistance from other instrumental-causes (*sahakāri kāraṇa*) then it becomes transformational (*pariṇāmī*); otherwise, the activity cannot take place.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If it be considered that the activity is performed by the object itself with assistance from other instrumental-causes (*sahakāri kāraṇa*) then it becomes transformational (*pariṇāmī*). It undergoes destruction (*vyaya*) of the present mode, origination (*utpāda*) of the new mode, and permanence (*nitya*, *dhrauvya*) of the own-nature; this proves the simultaneity of the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*). Without the availability of assistance from other instrumental-causes (*sahakāri kāraṇa*) the object will become non-transformational (*apariṇāmī*), like in the stage of prior (antecedent) non-existence – *prāgabdhāva*.

Prior (antecedent) non-existence (*prāgabdhāva*): The non-existence of the effect (the jar) in the cause (the lump-of-clay) previous to its production is the prior (antecedent) non-existence. It is expressed in the knowledge ‘a thing will be’. Due to prior (antecedent) non-existence (*prāgabdhāva*) the effect comes into existence. The lump-of-clay signifies the prior non-existence (*prāgabdhāva*) of the pitcher (*ghaṭa*) which is formed on the lump-of-clay’s cessation to exist. Non-existence of the ‘pitcher’ before it is made is the *prāgabdhāva* of the pitcher. The clay that was transformed into the pitcher did not possess the attribute ‘pitcher’ before the pitcher was made. All substances will become ‘without-beginning (defect – *anādi*)’ if prior (antecedent) non-existence (*prāgabdhāva*) is not accepted.¹

1. See, Jain, Vijay K. (2016), ‘Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā (*Devāgamastotra*) – Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord’, verse-9, p. 19-20.

The pitcher (*ghaṭa*) is transformational (*pariṇāmī*) since it has maintained the 'clayness' of the lump-of-clay in it. This is the meaning of being transformational (*pariṇāmī*). If this is not accepted, as the lump-of-clay was unable to store water, the pitcher should also have the same attribute. This proves that with assistance from the instrumental-causes (*sahakārī kāraṇa*) the object becomes transformational (*pariṇāmī*).

स्वयं असमर्थ पदार्थ के कार्यकारित्व मानने से हानि (दूसरे पक्ष में दोष) -

The fault in the second consideration, of activity without own-capability -

स्वयमसमर्थस्याकारकत्वात् पूर्ववत् ॥६५॥

अन्वयार्थ - [स्वयमसमर्थस्य] स्वयं असमर्थ होने वाले (पदार्थ) के [अकारकत्वात्] अकार्यपना प्राप्त होता है, [पूर्ववत्] पूर्व के समान (प्रथम पक्ष के समान)।

No activity can be performed by the object without own capability; like the one with own-capability but without assistance from other instrumental-causes.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As the object with own-capability was unable to perform activity without the instrumental-causes (*sahakārī kāraṇa*), the object without own capability will not be able to perform activity even with assistance of the instrumental-causes.

This establishes that only the object that is of the nature of both, the

general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*), can perform activity (*arthakriyā*).

The conceptions of the object being only the general (*sāmānya*), only the specific (*viśeṣa*), or only the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) independent of each other, will constitute the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*).

This concludes the discussion on the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*).

प्रमाण-फलाभास का वर्णन -

The description of the fallacy-of-the-fruit (*phalābhāsa*) in the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

फलाभासः¹ प्रमाणादभिन्नं भिन्नमेव वा ॥६६॥

अन्वयार्थ - [प्रमाणात्] प्रमाण से प्रमाण के फल को सर्वथा [अभिन्नं] अभिन्न [एव] ही [वा] अथवा [भिन्नं] भिन्न ही मानना [फलाभासः] फलाभास कहलाता है।

To consider the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its fruit (*phala*) either as absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) or absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) is the fallacy-of-the-fruit (*phalābhāsa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In both cases, the comprehension of the fruit (*phala*) of the valid-

1. पाठान्तर - फलाभासं

knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is contrary to the true fruit (*phala*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

फल को प्रमाण से सर्वथा अभिन्न मानने से हानि -

The fault in considering the fruit (*phala*) absolutely inseparable (*abhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

अभेदे तद्व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः ॥६७॥

अन्वयार्थ - [अभेदे] अभेद होने पर [तद्व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः] उनके भिन्नपने के व्यवहार की उपलब्धि न होने का प्रसंग प्राप्त होता है।
(उन प्रमाण और प्रमाण के फल में भिन्नपने का व्यवहार भी नहीं हो सकता है।)

If the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is considered absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) from the fruit (*phala*) the depiction of each of these will not be possible.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

If the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) be considered absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) from the fruit (*phala*) their individual depiction will not be possible; individuality of both will vanish. It will not be possible to say that this is the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and this is its fruit (*phala*).

The Buddhists consider the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) from the fruit (*phala*) but say that their concepts of fictional-unity (*saṃvṛti*) in successive momentary

events and consequent negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the non-fruit (*aphala*) is able to establish their separate identity.

कल्पना से प्रमाण और फल का व्यवहार करने में आपत्ति -

Contradiction of the concept of the consequent negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the non-fruit (*aphala*) to establish the inseparableness -

**व्यावृत्त्यापि न तत्कल्पना फलान्तराद्
व्यावृत्त्याऽफलत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥६८॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [व्यावृत्त्या] व्यावृत्ति से अर्थात् अफल की व्यावृत्ति से [अपि] भी [तत्कल्पना] उस फल की कल्पना [न] नहीं की जा सकती, अन्यथा [फलान्तरात् व्यावृत्त्या] अन्य-फल की व्यावृत्ति से [अफलत्व-प्रसङ्गात्] अफलपने की कल्पना का प्रसंग प्राप्त होता है।

By the negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the non-fruit (*aphala*) the fruit (*phala*) [of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)] cannot be imagined; otherwise, by the negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the other-fruit (*phalāntara*) the imagination of the presence of the non-fruit (*aphala*) too shall arise.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Buddhists derive the knowledge of something by its absence or negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) in the other; the word 'go' (the cow) is

established by its absence or negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) in the other – ‘ago’ (not-cow) – like the horse and the elephant. Similarly, they consider the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) from the fruit (*phala*) but imagine the presence of the fruit (*phala*) through the negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the non-fruit (*aphala*). The *sūtra* contradicts this contention by raising a question that in such a situation, why the negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the other-fruit (*phalāntara*) would not lead to the imagination of the presence of the non-fruit (*aphala*) too. The idea is that by the absence or negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) in the other, the fruit (*phala*) cannot be imagined.

कल्पनामात्र से फलव्यवहार न हो सकने में दृष्टान्त -

An example that that the fictional (*kālpanika*) fruit (*phala*) (of the Buddhists) is not sustainable -

प्रमाणान्तराद् व्यावृत्त्येवाऽप्रमाणत्वस्य ॥६९॥

अन्वयार्थ - [प्रमाणान्तरात्] जैसे प्रमाणान्तर (अन्य प्रमाण) की [व्यावृत्त्या] व्यावृत्ति से [एव] ही [अप्रमाणत्वस्य] अप्रमाणपने का प्रसंग आता है।

Like (as per their contention), the negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the other-valid-knowledge (*pramāṇāntara*) would give rise to the invalid-knowledge (*apramāṇa*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Buddhists accept that the negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the

invalid-knowledge (*apramāṇa*) gives rise to the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), in the same way, the negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the other-valid-knowledge (*pramāṇantara*) should give rise to the invalid-knowledge (*apramāṇa*).

So, the negation (*vyāvṛtti*, *nivṛtti*) of the other-fruit (*phalāntara*) should lead to the imagination of the presence of the non-fruit (*aphala*).

Therefore, it is not correct to consider the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) from its fruit (*phala*).

प्रमाण और उसके फल में भेद का निर्णय -

The conclusion about the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its fruit (*phala*) -

तस्माद्वास्तवो भेदः ॥७०॥

अन्वयार्थ - [तस्मात्] इसलिए (प्रमाण और प्रमाण के फल में)
[वास्तवः] वास्तव में (काल्पनिक नहीं) [भेदः] भेद है।

Therefore, there is real (not imaginary) difference (*bheda*) in the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its fruit (*phala*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

It is wrong to deduce that there is absolutely no difference between the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its fruit (*phala*). Also, the difference between the two is not imaginary but real; if the difference be considered imaginary, all further discussion is futile.

प्रमाण वा उसके फल में सर्वथा भेद मानने से हानि -

The fault in considering the fruit (*phala*) absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

भेदे त्वात्मान्तरवत्तदनुपपत्तेः ॥७१॥

अन्वयार्थ - [भेदे] (सर्वथा) भेद मानने पर [तु] तो [आत्मान्तरवत्] अन्य आत्मा के समान [तदनुपपत्तेः] उस प्रमाण के फल की उपपत्ति सिद्ध न होने से यह भेद मानना दूषित है।
(सर्वथा भेद मानने पर अन्य आत्मा के समान यह इस प्रमाण का फल है, ऐसा व्यवहार नहीं हो सकेगा।)

If the fruit (*phala*) be considered absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*), its association with the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) of the particular soul (*ātmā*) will not be possible; there will be no difference from the fruit (*phala*) enjoyed by any other soul (*ātmā*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Naiyāyika consider that the fruit (*phala*) is absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The *sūtra* explains that this is a fallacy. The fruit (*phala*) enjoyed by the other soul (*ātmā*) cannot be called the fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) of our soul. If the fruit (*phala*) be considered absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the fruit (*phala*) enjoyed by our own soul (*ātmā*) will not be called ours. To this contradiction, the Naiyāyika reply that the soul (*ātmā*) has

association with the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) through the inherence (*samavāya*). And, the fruit (*phala*) too has association with the soul (*ātmā*) through the inherence (*samavāya*). This way, the relation of the fruit (*phala*) with only the particular soul (*ātmā*) will get established.

समवाय-सम्बन्ध से प्रमाण और प्रमाण-फल का निर्णय मानने का निषेध -

The inherence (*samavāya*) cannot establish that the fruit (*phala*) is absolutely separable (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) -

समवायेऽतिप्रसङ्गः ॥७२॥

अन्वयार्थ - [समवाये] समवाय के मानने में [अतिप्रसङ्गः] अतिप्रसंग दोष आता है।

If inherence (*samavāya*) be accepted, it gives rise to the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*atiprasaṅga* or *ativyāpti*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Naiyāyika believe that the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the fruit (*phala*) are associated with the soul (*ātmā*) through the inherence (*samavāya*). And this way the relation of the fruit (*phala*) with the particular soul (*ātmā*) is established. This contention is contradicted here.

As the inherence (*samavāya*) has been considered eternal (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and all-pervasive (*vyāpaka*), it should remain in all souls (*ātmā*)

in one single form only. And then, the differentiation that this fruit (*phala*) pertains to the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) of this particular soul (*ātmā*) and not of any other soul will not be possible. The fruit (*phala*) pertaining to one soul (*ātmā*) will become the fruit (*phala*) pertaining to any other soul (*ātmā*); this is the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*atiprasaṅga* or *ativyāpti*). Therefore, it is not correct to consider the fruit (*phala*) absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

It has been established that the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is neither absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) nor absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) from the fruit (*phala*).

It is right to consider the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as in-some-respect (*kathañcit*) inseparable (*abhinna*) and in-some-respect (*kathañcit*) separable (*bhinna*) from the fruit (*phala*).

This concludes the discussion on the fallacy-of-the-fruit (*phalābhāsa*).

स्व-पर पक्ष के साधन और दूषण की व्यवस्था -

The aptness (*sādhana*) and the inaptness (*dūṣaṇa*) during the course of a debate -

**प्रमाणतदाभासौ दृष्टतयोद्भावितौ परिहृतापरिहृतदोषौ वादिनः
साधनतदाभासौ प्रतिवादिनो दूषणभूषणे च ॥७३॥**

अन्वयार्थ - [प्रमाणतदाभासौ] प्रमाण और प्रमाणाभास [प्रतिवादिनः] प्रतिवादी से [दृष्टतयोद्भावितौ] दूषित होने पर वे दोनों अर्थात् प्रमाण और प्रमाणाभास प्रकट होने वाले होते हैं तथा [वादिनः] वादी से [परिहृतापरिहृतदोषौ] परिहृत और अपरिहृत दोष वाले होते हैं तब वे वादी के लिए [साधनतदाभासौ] साधन और साधनाभास होते हैं [च]

तथा प्रतिवादी के लिए [दूषणभूषणे] दूषण और भूषण।

(वादी के द्वारा प्रयुक्त प्रमाण और प्रमाणाभास प्रतिवादी के द्वारा दोषरूप से उद्भावित किये जाने पर वादी से परिहृत और अपरिहृत दोष वाले रहते हैं तो वे वादी के लिए साधन और साधनाभास हैं और प्रतिवादी के लिए दूषण और भूषण हैं।)

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) employed by the propounder (*vādī*) are subject to be flawed by the disputant (*prativādī*); if the propounder (*vādī*) is able to or not able to defend himself then these are corroborative (*sādhana*) and disruptive (*sādhanābhāsa*), respectively, for the propounder (*vādī*), and ungainly (*dūṣaṇa*) and gainly (*bhūṣaṇa*), respectively, for the disputant (*prativādī*).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

During the debate, the propounder (*vādī*) presents his case based on the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the disputant (*prativādī*) presents a flaw in it. If the propounder (*vādī*) is able to defend himself, it is corroborative (*sādhana*) for him and ungainly (*dūṣaṇa*) for the disputant (*prativādī*).

Consider the situation when the propounder (*vādī*) presents his case based on the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) and the disputant (*prativādī*) presents a flaw in it. If the propounder (*vādī*) is not able to defend himself, it is disruptive (*sādhanābhāsa*) for him and gainly (*bhūṣaṇa*) for the disputant (*prativādī*).

The idea is that the ability to prove the own point-of-view and disprove the other's point-of-view is the fruit of the understanding of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*).

नयादि तत्त्वों के स्वरूप के निर्णय का उपाय -

The standpoint (*naya*), etc., are the means to ascertain the nature of the objects -

संभवदन्यद्विचारणीयम् ॥७४॥

अन्वयार्थ - [संभवत्] संभव (पूर्व में कहे हुए प्रमाण और प्रमाणाभासों के लक्षण) [अन्यत्] उनसे अन्य जो नय, निक्षेपादि हैं [विचारणीयम्] वे भी विचारणीय हैं।
(वस्तुतत्त्व की सिद्धि के लिए संभव अन्य नय-निक्षेपादि भी विचारणीय हैं।)

To ascertain the nature of the objects, other possible (existent) subjects [like the particular standpoint (*naya*), the installation (*niksepa*), etc.] too need to be considered.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Besides the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the subject matter of this treatise, other subjects like the '*naya*' and the '*nikṣepa*' should be understood from other sacred texts in order to ascertain the nature of the objects - *vastutattva*.

It has been said in the Scripture that after knowing the substance with the help of *pramāṇa*, ascertaining its one particular state or mode is *naya*. Secondly, the scope of *pramāṇa* comprises all attributes of the substance. The *pramāṇa* is *sakalādeśa* - comprehensive and absolute - and *naya* is *vikalādeśa* - partial and relative.

In brief, *naya* is of two kinds, the *dravyārthika naya* and the *paryāyārthika naya*. The *paryāyārthika naya* is concerned with *bhāva nikṣepa* - the present mode (*paryāya*) or actual state (*bhāva*) of the substance. Since *bhāva nikṣepa* refers to the mode (*paryāya*) of the

substance, it is specific and falls under *paryāyārthika naya*. The *dravyārthika naya* is concerned with the other three *nikṣepa* – *nāma*, *sthāpanā* and *dravya* – which are general in nature. The *dravyārthika naya* refers to the general attributes of the substance, and the *paryāyārthika naya* to the constantly changing states or modes (*paryāya*) of the substance. That which has the substance (*dravya*) as its object is the standpoint-of-substance – *dravyārthika naya*. That which has the mode (*paryāya*) as its object is the standpoint-of-modes – *paryāyārthika naya*. Both the substance and the modes are ascertained by the *pramāṇa* (comprehensive knowledge).¹

* अन्तिम भावना *

* The Composer's Endnote *

परीक्षामुखमादर्श, हेयोपादेयतत्त्वयोः ।
संविदे मादृशो बालः, परीक्षादक्षवद्व्यधाम् ॥

सूत्रकार आचार्यदेव अपने कथन का उपसंहार करते हुए अपनी लघुता प्रदर्शित करते हैं-

श्लोकार्थ- [परीक्षामुख] इस 'परीक्षामुख' ग्रन्थ को [आदर्श] आदर्श (दर्पण) के सदृश [हेयोपादेय] हेय और उपादेय [तत्त्वयोः] दोनों तत्त्वों के [संविदे] ज्ञान के लिए [मादृशः बालः] मेरे जैसे बालक (अज्ञानी) ने [परीक्षादक्षवत्] परीक्षा में दक्ष (कुशल) के समान [व्यधाम्] रचा।

1. See, Jain, Vijay K. (2018), 'Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi', p. 12.

(जैसे तत्त्व-परीक्षा में निपुण विद्वान् अपने प्रारब्ध कार्य को पूर्ण करता है, उसी प्रकार मैंने भी इस ग्रन्थ को पूर्ण करके अपने कर्तव्य का निर्वाह किया है।)

Like a mirror to reflect the knowledge of the objects-of-the-reality (*tattva*) that are worth rejecting (*heya*) and accepting (*upādeya*), this treatise (*grantha*) **‘Parīkṣāmukha’** has been composed by deficient-and-ignorant (*bāla*) me, as if adept in reasoning.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

As is the tradition followed by many learned authors, the composer (*Ācārya Māṇikyanandi*) of this profound treatise **‘Parīkṣāmukha’** expresses his modesty through this endnote.

He notes that as the man adept in reasoning concludes the task undertaken, he too has fulfilled his obligation by concluding this treatise (*grantha*).

इति षष्ठः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः

This concludes Chapter-6.

* * *

*At the conclusion of this worthy endeavour I (Vijay)
adore and worship the Lotus Feet of Lord Mahāvīra,
the twenty-fourth Tīrthaṅkara, for continued propitiousness:*

दयादमत्यागसमाधिनिष्ठं नयप्रमाणप्रकृताऽऽञ्जसार्थम् ।

अधृष्यमन्यैरखिलैः प्रवादैर्जिन! त्वदीयं मतमद्वितीयम् ॥६॥

– आ. समन्तभद्र ‘युक्त्यनुशासन’

हे वीर जिन! आपका मत (अनेकान्तात्मक शासन) दया (अहिंसा), दम (इन्द्रियदमन, संयम), त्याग (परिग्रह-त्यजन), समाधि (प्रशस्तध्यान) से निष्ठ (पूर्ण) है। नय और प्रमाण से सम्यक् वस्तुतत्त्व (पदार्थों) को बिल्कुल स्पष्ट (सुनिश्चित) करने वाला है और (अनेकान्तवाद से भिन्न) अन्य सभी प्रवादों से अबाध्य (जीता नहीं जा सकने वाला) है। इसीलिये वह अद्वितीय है।

O Lord Vīra! Your Doctrine advocating compassion (*dayā* or *ahiṃsā*), self-restraint (*indriyadamana* or *saṃyama*), renunciation (*dāna* or *parigrahyāga*), and meditation (*samādhi* or *dhyāna*) is unparalleled. Through the concepts of the partial-standpoint (*naya*) and the comprehensive-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), it determines, absolutely clearly, the nature of the substances; it cannot be contradicted by any other doctrine.

समाप्तोऽयं ग्रन्थः

This concludes the treatise ‘*Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra*’.



संदर्भ एवं अन्य उपयोगी ग्रन्थ

REFERENCES AND OTHER HELPFUL TEXTS

All that is contained in this book has been excerpted, adapted or translated into English from a number of authentic Jaina texts. Due care has been taken to conserve the essence of the holy Scripture composed by the ancient-preceptors (*pūrvācārya*).

Contribution of the following publications in preparation of the present volume is gratefully acknowledged:

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न्याय पारिभाषिक शब्द एवं सिद्धान्त
NYĀYA TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS

The term and its description

page

valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

| प्रमाण

The valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the definitive --- 6
 (*vyavasāyātmaka*) knowledge of the self (*sva*) and of the
 things not ascertained earlier (*apūrvārtha*).

Since *pramāṇa* (valid-knowledge) enables one to acquire --- 8
 things favorable and relinquish things unfavorable,
 therefore, it can be nothing but knowledge (*jñāna*).

The divisions of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are the --- 21
 direct (*pratyakṣa*) and the other [called, the indirect
 (*parokṣa*)].

direct (*pratyakṣa*) valid-knowledge

| प्रत्यक्ष-प्रमाण

The knowledge that is 'viśada' – unambiguous (*nirmala*, --- 22
spṣṭa) – is the direct (*pratyakṣa*) [valid-knowledge
 (*pramāṇa*)].

**connection of the sense (*indriya*)
 and the object (*padārtha*)**

| सन्निकर्ष

The connection of the sense (*indriya*) with the external --- 8,
 objects (– the Naiyāyika). 152-154

**mundane-direct (*sāṃvryavahārika-
 pratyakṣa*) knowledge**

| सांख्यवहारिक-प्रत्यक्ष

The knowledge obtained with the help of the senses --- 25
 (*indriya*) and the mind (*mana*) is partially (*ekadeśa*)
 unambiguous (*viśada*) – with respect to some part only –
 and is called the mundane-direct (*sāṃvryavahārika-
 pratyakṣa*) knowledge.

infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*)

| अन्वय

Infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) is when in the presence of the cause (*kāraṇa*) the effect (*kārya*) must exist. Or, infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) indicates infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) with the means (*sādhana*). Illustration: ‘There is the fire (*sādhya*) on the hill because there is the smoke (*sādhana*).’ --- 28, 44

infallible-negation (*vyatireka*)

| व्यतिरेक

Infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) is when in the absence of the cause (*kāraṇa*) the effect (*kārya*) must not exist. Or, infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) indicates infallible-non-existence of the means (*sādhana*) in the absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Illustration: ‘Wherever there is no fire (absence of *sādhya*), there is no smoke (absence of *sādhana*).’ --- 28

supreme-direct (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*) knowledge – *kevalajñāna*

| मुख्य-प्रत्यक्ष – केवलज्ञान

When all envelopments (*āvaraṇa*) are eliminated on the availability of special concomitances, the sense-independent (*atīndriya*) and completely unambiguous (*nirmala, spaṣṭa*), supreme-direct (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*) knowledge – *kevalajñāna* – manifests. --- 33

under-pervasiveness (*avyāpti*)

| अव्याप्ति

The mark (*lakṣaṇa*) is not universally found in the object (*lakṣya*). --- 35

over-pervasiveness (*ativyāpti*)

| अतिव्याप्ति

The mark (*lakṣaṇa*) is also found outside the object (*lakṣya*). --- 35

indirect (*parokṣa*) valid-knowledge | **परोक्ष-प्रमाण**

That which is different from the direct (*pratyakṣa*) is the --- 37
indirect (*parokṣa*) [valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)].

The indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge is that which is caused --- 38
by direct (*pratyakṣa*), etc., and has these divisions:
remembrance (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*),
inductive-reasoning (*tarka*), inference (*anumāna*), and
the Scripture (*āgama*).

remembrance (*smṛti*) | **स्मृति**

Remembrance (*smṛti*) is caused by bringing to the fore --- 40
the earlier retention (*dhāraṇā*) and gaining the
knowledge that ‘that’ – particular object – has the same
form.

recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) | **प्रत्यभिज्ञान**

The knowledge based on the confluence of the present --- 41
vision and remembrance (*smṛti*) of the earlier vision is
recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*).

inductive-reasoning (*ūhaḥ, tarka*) | **तर्क (ऊहः)**

The knowledge of infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or --- 43
avinābhāva) caused through infallible-affirmation
(*upalambha, anvaya*) or infallible-negation
(*anupalambha, vyatireka*) is called inductive-reasoning
(*ūhaḥ* or *tarka*).

**infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti*
or *avinābhāva*)** | **व्याप्ति, अविनाभाव**

Infallible-concomitance (*vyāpti* or *avinābhāva*) is said to --- 44
exist when, invariably, in the presence of the
instrumental-object (*sādhana, hetu*) the object-to-be-
proved (*sādhya*) is present and in the absence of the

object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) the instrumental-object (*sādhana*) is absent.

inference (*anumāna*)

| अनुमान

The particular knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) obtained from the means (*sādhana*, *hetu*) is the inference (*anumāna*). --- 46

The acquisition of the knowledge of the object-to-be-proved [the major-term, the probandum (Latin), *sādhya*, *liṅgī*] through the means (the middle-term, *sādhana*, *hetu*, *liṅga*) is the inference (*anumāna*). The example is to see the smoke and infer the presence of the fire on the hill. --- 46

The inference (*anumāna*) is of two kinds: 1) for-self (*svārtha*) and 2) for-other (*parārtha*). --- 80

the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*)

| साध्य

The object-to-be-proved [the major-term, the probandum (Latin), *sādhya*, *liṅgī*] is that which is 'of-interest' (*iṣṭa*), 'undeniable' (*abādhita*) and 'unproven' (*asiddha*). --- 51

the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*)

| पक्ष, धर्मी

The substratum of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) is the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) or the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa* – the minor-term, the locus or the abode). --- 63-65

the proposition (*pratijñā*)

| प्रतिज्ञा

Statement of that which is to be proved. --- 65

the reason or the means (*hetu*)

| हेतु

Statement of the reason. --- 65, 73, 74

The means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) whose mark is infallible-concomitance (*avinābhāva*) [between the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*)] is of two kinds: 1) infallible-presence (*upalabdhirūpa*) and 2) infallible-absence (*anupalabdhirūpa*).

--- 84

the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*, *udāharaṇa*) | दृष्टान्त, उदाहरण

Statement of the general rule supported by the example.

--- 65, 76, 77

the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*)

उपनय

Application-of-the-rule to the case.

--- 65, 78

the conclusion (*nigamana*)

निगमन

The conclusion.

--- 65, 79

infallible-coexistence (*tathopapatti*)

तथोपपत्ति

Infallible-coexistence (*tathopapatti*) is defined as: ‘In presence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), the means (*sādhana*) must exist.’

--- 126

infallible--non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*)

अन्यथानुपपत्ति

Infallible-non-coexistence (*anyathānupapatti*) is defined as: ‘In absence of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*), the means (*sādhana*) must not exist.’

--- 126

the Scripture (*āgama*)

आगम

The knowledge-of-the-objects (*arthajñāna*) whose instrumental-cause (*nimitta*) is the speech, etc., of the Omniscient Lord (*āpta*) is the Scripture (*āgama*).

--- 130

**the general (*sāmānya*) quality
(*guṇa*) of objects**

सामान्य गुण

All objects (<i>artha, vastu</i>) have two kinds of qualities (<i>guṇa</i>) – the general (<i>sāmānya</i>) and the specific (<i>viśeṣa</i>). The object of the nature of the general (<i>sāmānya</i>) and the specific (<i>viśeṣa</i>) is the subject of the valid-knowledge (<i>pramāṇa</i>).	---	135
The general (<i>sāmānya</i>) is of two kinds: 1) oblique-general (<i>tīryak-sāmānya</i>) and 2) upwardness-general (<i>ūrdhvatā-sāmānya</i>).	---	138
The oblique-general (<i>tīryak-sāmānya</i>) is expression of similarity (<i>sadṛśa</i>); as ‘cowness’ – the general attribute of being a cow – is present in all cows, black, white, etc.	---	138
The upwardness-general (<i>ūrdhvatā-sāmānya</i>) is characterized by the presence of the substance (<i>dravya</i>) in its previous (<i>pūrva</i>) and subsequent (<i>uttara</i>) modes (<i>paryāya</i>); as the clay is present in all consecutive modes in making of the pot (<i>ghaṭa</i>).	---	139

**the specific (*viśeṣa*) quality (*guṇa*)
of objects**

विशेष गुण

The specific (<i>viśeṣa</i>), too, is of two kinds: 1) mode-specific (<i>paryāya-viśeṣa</i>) and 2) distinction-specific (<i>vyatireka-viśeṣa</i>).	---	140, 141
The modifications (<i>pariṇāma</i>) that take place consecutively in a substance (<i>dravya</i>) are its modes (<i>paryāya</i>); like the experience of happiness (<i>harṣa</i>) and misery (<i>viṣāda</i>) in the soul (<i>ātmā</i>).	---	141
The modification-with-distinction (<i>visadṛśa-pariṇāma</i>) that resides in another-object (<i>arthāntara</i>) is called distinction (<i>vyatireka</i>); like in the cow and the buffalo. The two have modification-with-distinction (<i>visadṛśa-pariṇāma</i>) and that is the nature of the distinction-specific (<i>vyatireka-viśeṣa</i>).	---	142

the fruit of the valid-knowledge
(*pramāṇa*)

प्रमाण का फल

Destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*), rejection (*hāna*, *tyāga*), acceptance (*grahaṇa*, *ādāna*, *upādāna*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*) are the kinds of the fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). --- 143

The fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is, from a particular standpoint (*kathāñcit*), indistinctive (*abhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and, from a certain other standpoint, distinctive (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). --- 146

the fallacious-knowledge
(*pramāṇābhāsa*)

प्रमाणाभास

Other than those mentioned under the valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) constitute the fallacious-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*). --- 148

Opposite to the own-nature (*svarūpa*), number (*saṃkhyā*), subject (*viśaya*), and fruit (*phala*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) constitute its fallacy (*ābhāsa*). --- 148, 149

Comprehension of the own-nature (*svarūpa*) that is contrary to the nature (*svarūpa*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-nature (*svarūpābhāsa*).

Comprehension of the number (*saṃkhyā*) that is contrary to the true number (*saṃkhyā*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*).

Comprehension of the subject (*viśaya*) that is contrary to the true subject (*viśaya*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*).

Comprehension of the fruit (*phala*) that is contrary to the true fruit (*phala*) of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-fruit (*phalābhāsa*).

the fallacy-of-remembrance
(*smarṇābhāsa*)

स्मरणाभास

Application of the knowledge that has not been acquired --- 157
earlier in form of retention (*dhāraṇā*) and thereby
mistaking one for another is the fallacy-of-remembrance
(*smarṇābhāsa*); like mistaking Jinadatta for Devadatta.

the fallacy-of-recognition
(*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*)

प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभास

To recognize the 'similar' object as the one seen earlier, --- 158
and to recognize the object seen earlier as the 'similar',
are examples of the fallacy-of-recognition (*pratyabhi-*
jñānābhāsa); like the failure to differentiate between the
two offsprings born at the same time from the same
pregnancy.

the fallacy-of-induction
(*tarkābhāsa*)

तर्काभास

The knowledge that recognizes infallible-concomitance --- 159
(*avinābhāva*) between objects that do not have such
concomitance is the fallacy-of-induction (*tarkābhāsa*).

the fallacy-of-inference
(*anumānābhāsa*)

अनुमानाभास

The misuse of the constituents of inference (*anumāna*) --- 160
like the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*), the means
(*sādhana*, *hetu*), and the illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) is the
fallacy-of-inference (*anumānābhāsa*).

the fallacy-of-the-subject-of-
inference (*pakṣābhāsa*)

पक्षाभास

The fallacy-of-the-subject-of-inference (*pakṣābhāsa*) is --- 160
making something that is of-no-interest (*aniṣṭa*),
deniable (*bādhita*) and already-proven (*siddha*), as the
subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*).

the fallacies-of-the-means
(hetvābhāsa)

हेत्वाभास

The unproven (*asiddha*), the contrary (*viruddha*), the unconstrained (*anaikāntika*), and the futile (*akīncitkara*) are the four kinds of the fallacies-of-the-means (*hetvābhāsa*). --- 169

the fallacy-of-the-illustration
involving infallible-affirmation –
anvaya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa

अन्वय-दृष्टान्ताभास

The fallacy of the example or illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) of the kind infallible-affirmation (*anvaya*) – *anvaya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* – is of three kinds: 1) the unproven-object-to-be-proved (*asiddhasādhya*), 2) the unproven-means (*asiddhasādhana*), and 3) the unproven-object-to-be-proved-and-means (*asiddhasādhya-sādhana*). --- 186

the fallacy-of-the-illustration
involving infallible-negation –
vyatireka-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa

व्यतिरेक-दृष्टान्ताभास

The fallacy-of-the-illustration (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) involving infallible-negation (*vyatireka*) – *vyatireka-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* – is of three kinds: 1) of the unproven-object-to-be-proved (*asiddhasādhya*), 2) of the unproven-means (*asiddhasādhana*), and 3) of the unproven-object-to-be-proved-and-means (*asiddhasādhya-sādhana*). --- 190, 191

the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-
uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*)

बाल-प्रयोगाभास

Of the five limbs of inference (*anumāna*) [the proposition (*pratijñā*), the reason or means (*hetu*), the example (*udāharaṇa*), the application-of-the-rule (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*)] if any is (are) missing, that is the fallacy-of-usage-for-the-uninitiated (*bāla-prayogābhāsa*). --- 195

the fallacy-of-the-number
(*saṃkhyābhāsa*)

प्रमाण-संख्याभास

To make statements like ‘only the direct (*pratyakṣa*) is the one kind of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)’ is the fallacy-of-the-number (*saṃkhyābhāsa*). --- 204

the fallacy-of-the-subject
(*viśayābhāsa*)

प्रमाण-विषयाभास

To make only the general (*sāmānya*), only the specific (*viśeṣa*), or both the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) but independent of each other, as the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the fallacy-of-the-subject (*viśayābhāsa*). --- 211

the fallacy-of-the-fruit
(*phalābhāsa*)

प्रमाण-फलाभास

To consider the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its fruit (*phala*) either as absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) or absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) is the fallacy-of-the-fruit (*phalābhāsa*). --- 216

the particular standpoint (*naya*)

नय

It has been said in the Scripture that after knowing the substance with the help of *pramāṇa*, ascertaining its one particular state or mode is *naya*. The scope of *pramāṇa* comprises all attributes of the substance. The *pramāṇa* is *sakalādeśa* – comprehensive and absolute – and *naya* is *vikalādeśa* – partial and relative. --- 225, 226

Briefly, *naya* is of two kinds, the *dravyārthika naya* and the *paryāyārthika naya*. That which has the substance (*dravya*) as its object is the standpoint-of-substance – *dravyārthika naya*. That which has the mode (*paryāya*) as its object is the standpoint-of-modes – *paryāyārthika naya*.



परीक्षामुख-सूत्रपाठ

PARĪKṢĀMUKHA SŪTRA – RECITATION

प्रथमः परिच्छेदः

प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासाद्विपर्ययः ।

इति वक्ष्ये तयोर्लक्ष्म सिद्धमल्पं लघीयसः ॥

स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ॥१॥

हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् ॥२॥

तन्निश्चयात्मकं समारोपविरुद्धत्वादनुमानवत् ॥३॥

अनिश्चितोऽपूर्वार्थः ॥४॥

दृष्टोऽपि समारोपात्तादृक् ॥५॥

स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसायः ॥६॥

अर्थस्येव तदुन्मुखतया ॥७॥

घटमहमात्मना वेद्मि ॥८॥

कर्मवत् कर्तृकरणक्रियाप्रतीतेः ॥९॥

शब्दानुच्चारणेऽपि स्वस्यानुभवनमर्थवत् ॥१०॥

को वा तत्प्रतिभासिनमर्थमध्यक्षमिच्छंस्तदेव तथा नेच्छेत् ॥११॥

प्रदीपवत् ॥१२॥

तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वतः परतश्च ॥१३॥

द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

तदद्वेधा ॥१॥

प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदात् ॥२॥

विशदं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥३॥

प्रतीत्यन्तराव्यवधानेन विशेषवत्तया वा प्रतिभासनं वैशद्यम् ॥४॥

इन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तं देशतः सांव्यवहारिकम् ॥५॥

नार्थालोकौ कारणं परिच्छेद्यत्वात्तमोवत् ॥६॥

तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानाभावाच्च केशोण्डुकज्ञानवन्नक्तञ्चरज्ञानवच्च ॥७॥

अतज्जन्यमपि तत्प्रकाशकं प्रदीपवत् ॥८॥

स्वावरणक्षयोपशमलक्षणयोग्यतया हि प्रतिनियतमर्थं व्यवस्थापयति ॥९॥

कारणस्य च परिच्छेद्यत्वे करणादिना व्यभिचारः ॥१०॥

सामग्रीविशेषविश्लेषिताखिलावरणमतीन्द्रियमशेषतो मुख्यम् ॥११॥

सावरणत्वे कारणजन्यत्वे च प्रतिबन्धसम्भवात् ॥१२॥

तृतीयः परिच्छेदः

परोक्षमितरत् ॥१॥

प्रत्यक्षादिनिमित्तं स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागम भेदम् ॥२॥

संस्कारोद्बोधनिबन्धना तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः ॥३॥

स देवदत्तो यथा ॥४॥

दर्शनस्मरणकारकं सङ्कलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं, तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं
तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादि ॥५॥

यथा स एवायं देवदत्तः, गोसदृशो गवयः, गोविलक्षणो
महिषः, इदमस्माद् दूरम्, वृक्षोऽयमित्यादि ॥६॥

उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः ॥७॥

इदमस्मिन्सत्येव भवत्यसति तु न भवत्येव ॥८॥

यथाऽग्नावेव धूमस्तदभावे न भवत्येवेति च ॥१॥

साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥१०॥

साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुः ॥११॥

सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः ॥१२॥

सहचारिणोर्व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च सहभावः ॥१३॥

पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कार्यकारणयोश्च क्रमभावः ॥१४॥

तर्कात्तन्निर्णयः ॥१५॥

इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं साध्यम् ॥१६॥

संदिग्धविपर्यस्ताव्युत्पन्नानां साध्यत्वं यथा स्यादित्यसिद्धपदम् ॥१७॥

अनिष्टाध्यक्षादिबाधितयोः साध्यत्वं मा भूदितिष्टाबाधितवचनम् ॥१८॥

न चासिद्धवदिष्टं प्रतिवादिनः ॥१९॥

प्रत्यायनाय हीच्छा वक्तुरेव ॥२०॥

साध्यं धर्मः क्वचित्तद्विशिष्टो वा धर्मी ॥२१॥

पक्ष इति यावत् ॥२२॥

प्रसिद्धो धर्मी ॥२३॥

विकल्पसिद्धे तस्मिन् सत्तेतरे साध्ये ॥२४॥

अस्ति सर्वज्ञो नास्ति खरविषाणम् ॥२५॥

प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे तु साध्यधर्मविशिष्टता ॥२६॥

अग्निमानयं देशः परिणामी शब्द इति यथा ॥२७॥

व्याप्तौ तु साध्यं धर्म एव ॥२८॥

अन्यथा तदघटनात् ॥२९॥

साध्यधर्माधारसन्देहापनोदाय गम्यमानस्यापि पक्षस्य वचनम् ॥३०॥

साध्यधर्मिणि साधनधर्मावबोधनाय पक्षधर्मोपसंहारवत् ॥३१॥

को वा त्रिधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानो न पक्षयति ॥३२॥

एतद्व्ययमेवानुमानाङ्गं नोदाहरणम् ॥३३॥

न हि तत्साध्यप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गं तत्र यथोक्त हेतोरेव व्यापारात् ॥३४॥

तदविनाभावनिश्चयार्थं वा विपक्षे बाधकप्रमाणबलादेव तत्सिद्धेः ॥३५॥

व्यक्तिरूपं च निदर्शनं सामान्येन तु व्याप्तिस्तत्रापि तद्विप्रतिपत्तावनवस्थानं स्याद्
दृष्टान्तान्तरापेक्षणात् ॥३६॥

नापि व्याप्तिस्मरणार्थं तथाविधहेतुप्रयोगादेव तत्स्मृतेः ॥३७॥

तत्परमभिधीयमानं साध्यधर्मिणि साध्यसाधने सन्देहयति ॥३८॥

कुतोऽन्यथोपनयनिगमने ॥३९॥

न च ते तदङ्गे, साध्यधर्मिणि हेतुसाध्ययोर्वचनादेवासंशयात् ॥४०॥

समर्थनं वा वरं हेतुरुपमनुमानावयवो वाऽस्तु साध्ये तदुपयोगात् ॥४१॥

बालव्युत्पत्त्यर्थं तत्रयोपगमे शास्त्र एवासौ न वादेऽनुपयोगात् ॥४२॥

दृष्टान्तो द्वेधा अन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् ॥४३॥

साध्यव्याप्तं साधनं यत्र प्रदर्श्यते सोऽन्वयदृष्टान्तः ॥४४॥

साध्याभावे साधनाभावो यत्र कथ्यते स व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः ॥४५॥

हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयः ॥४६॥

प्रतिज्ञायास्तु निगमनम् ॥४७॥

तदनुमानं द्वेधा ॥४८॥

स्वार्थपरार्थभेदात् ॥४९॥

स्वार्थमुक्तलक्षणम् ॥५०॥

परार्थं तु तदर्थपरामर्शिवचनाज्जातम् ॥५१॥

तद्वचनमपि तद्धेतुत्वात् ॥५२॥

स हेतुर्द्वेधोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥५३॥

उपलब्धिर्विधिप्रतिषेधयोरनुपलब्धिश्च ॥५४॥

अविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधौ षोढा-व्याप्यकार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तरसहचरभेदात् ॥५५॥

रसादेकसामग्र्यनुमानेन रूपानुमानमिच्छद्भिरिष्टमेव किञ्चित्
कारणं हेतुर्यत्र सामर्थ्याप्रतिबन्धकारणान्तरावैकल्ये ॥५६॥

न च पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोस्तादात्म्यं तदुत्पत्तिर्वा कालव्यवधाने तदनुपलब्धेः ॥५७॥

भाव्यतीतयोर्मरणजाग्रद्बोधयोरपि नारिष्टोद्बोधौ प्रतिहेतुत्वम् ॥५८॥

तद्व्यापाराश्रितं हि तद्भावभावित्वम् ॥५९॥

सहचारिणोरपि परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात्सहोत्पादाच्च ॥६०॥

परिणामी शब्दः, कृतकत्वात्। य एवं स एवं दृष्टो यथा घटः।
कृतकश्चायं, तस्मात्परिणामीति। यस्तु न परिणामी, स न कृतको दृष्टो यथा
वन्ध्यास्तनन्धयः। कृतकश्चायम्, तस्मात्परिणामीति ॥६१॥

अस्त्यत्र देहिनि बुद्धिर्व्याहारादेः ॥६२॥

अस्त्यत्रच्छाया छात्रात् ॥६३॥

उद्देष्ट्यति शकटं कृत्तिकोदयात् ॥६४॥

उद्गाद् भरणिः प्राक्तत एव ॥६५॥

अस्त्यत्र मातुलिङ्गे रूपं रसात् ॥६६॥

विरुद्धतदुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे तथा ॥६७॥

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श औष्ण्यात् ॥६८॥

नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्शो धूमात् ॥६९॥

नास्मिन् शरीरिणि सुखमस्ति हृदयशल्यात् ॥७०॥

नोद्देष्ट्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं रेवत्युदयात् ॥७१॥

नोद्गाद्भरणिर्मुहूर्तात्पूर्वं पुष्योदयात् ॥७२॥

नास्त्यत्र भित्तौ परभागाभावोऽर्वागभागदर्शनात् ॥७३॥

अविरुद्धानुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे सप्तधा-
 स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तरसहचरानुपलम्भभेदात् ॥७४॥
 नास्त्यत्र भूतले घटोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥७५॥
 नास्त्यत्र शिंशपा वृक्षानुपलब्धेः ॥७६॥
 नास्त्यत्राप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्योऽग्निर्धूमानुपलब्धेः ॥७७॥
 नास्त्यत्र धूमोऽनग्नेः ॥७८॥
 न भविष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेः ॥७९॥
 नोद्गाद्भरणिर्मुहूर्तात्प्राक् तत एव ॥८०॥
 नास्त्यत्र समतुलायामुन्नामो नामानुपलब्धेः ॥८१॥
 विरुद्धानुपलब्धिर्विधौ त्रेधा-विरुद्धकार्यकारणस्वभावानुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥८२॥
 यथास्मिन्प्राणिनि व्याधिविशेषोऽस्ति निरामयचेष्टानुपलब्धेः ॥८३॥
 अस्त्यत्र देहिनि दुःखमिष्टसंयोगाभावात् ॥८४॥
 अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्वेकान्तस्वरूपानुपलब्धेः ॥८५॥
 परम्परया सम्भवत्साधनमत्रैवान्तर्भावनीयम् ॥८६॥
 अभूदत्र चक्रे शिवकः स्थासात् ॥८७॥
 कार्यकार्यमविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ ॥८८॥
 नास्त्यत्र गुहायां मृगक्रीडनं मृगारिसंशब्दनात् कारणविरुद्धकार्यं
 विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ यथा ॥८९॥
 व्युत्पन्नप्रयोगस्तु तथोपपत्त्याऽन्यथानुपपत्त्यैव वा ॥९०॥
 अग्निमानयं देशस्तथैव धूमवत्त्वोपपत्तेर्धूमवत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेर्वा ॥९१॥
 हेतुप्रयोगो हि यथा व्याप्तिग्रहणं विधीयते सा च तावन्मात्रेण
 व्युत्पन्नैरवधार्यते ॥९२॥
 तावता च साध्यसिद्धिः ॥९३॥

तेन पक्षस्तदाधार सूचनायोक्तः ॥९४॥

आप्तवचनादिनिबन्धनमर्थज्ञानमागमः ॥९५॥

सहजयोग्यतासङ्केतवशाद्धि शब्दादयो वस्तुप्रतिपत्तिहेतवः ॥९६॥

यथा मेर्वादयः सन्ति ॥९७॥

चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः

सामान्यविशेषात्मा तदर्थो विषयः ॥१॥

अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तप्रत्ययगोचरत्वात् पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारावाप्ति-
स्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेनार्थक्रियोपपत्तेश्च ॥२॥

सामान्यं द्वेधा तिर्यगूर्ध्वताभेदात् ॥३॥

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वैशद्येऽपि परोक्षं पदाभासं मीमांसकस्य करणज्ञानवत् ॥७॥

अतस्मिंस्तदिति ज्ञानं स्मरणाभासं जिनदत्ते स देवदत्तो यथा ॥८॥

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संविदे मादृशो बालः, परीक्षादक्षवद्व्यधाम् ॥



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अ	<i>a</i>	घ	<i>gha</i>	प	<i>pa</i>
आ	<i>ā</i>	ङ	<i>ṅa</i>	फ	<i>pha</i>
इ	<i>i</i>	च	<i>ca</i>	ब	<i>ba</i>
ई	<i>ī</i>	छ	<i>cha</i>	भ	<i>bha</i>
उ	<i>u</i>	ज	<i>ja</i>	म	<i>ma</i>
ऊ	<i>ū</i>	झ	<i>jha</i>	य	<i>ya</i>
ए	<i>e</i>	ञ	<i>ña</i>	र	<i>ra</i>
ऐ	<i>ai</i>	ट	<i>ṭa</i>	ल	<i>la</i>
ओ	<i>o</i>	ठ	<i>ṭha</i>	व	<i>va</i>
औ	<i>au</i>	ड	<i>ḍa</i>	श	<i>śa</i>
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ॠ	<i>ṝ</i>	ण	<i>ṇa</i>	स	<i>sa</i>
अं	<i>ṁ</i>	त	<i>ta</i>	ह	<i>ha</i>
अः	<i>ḥ</i>	थ	<i>tha</i>	क्ष	<i>kṣa</i>
क	<i>ka</i>	द	<i>da</i>	त्र	<i>tra</i>
ख	<i>kha</i>	ध	<i>dha</i>	ज्ञ	<i>jña</i>
ग	<i>ga</i>	न	<i>na</i>	श्र	<i>śra</i>

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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NOTES

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
जैन दर्शन में 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' न्याय-शास्त्र श्रेष्ठ एवं प्रधान सूत्र-शास्त्र है जिसमें प्रमाण एवं प्रमाणाभास की विशद विवेचना की गई है। स्वापूर्वार्थग्राही सम्यक्-ज्ञान प्रमाण है। जिससे हित की प्राप्ति एवं अहित का परिहार होता है ऐसा सत्यार्थ-बोधक सम्यक्-ज्ञान ही प्रमाण है। जो प्रमाण से भिन्न मिथ्या-ज्ञान है वह प्रमाणाभास है। आचार्यप्रवर माणिक्यनन्दि स्वामी ने प्रमाण एवं प्रमाणाभास की विशद व्याख्या 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' जी ग्रंथ में की है। सम्प्रति न्याय-विद्या विशारदकों के लिए 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' ग्रंथ प्रधान-ग्रंथ है।



सम्प्रति जैन न्याय विषयक जिज्ञासा की पूर्ति हेतु विश्व में अहिन्दी-भाषी आंग्ल-प्रिय जनों के प्रतिबोध हेतु सरल-हृदयी, जिनागम-भक्त, निर्ग्रन्थ गुरु-श्रीचरण आराधक, जिनदेव वचन प्रमाण मानने वाले विद्वान श्री विजय जैन (देहरादून) ने 'परीक्षामुख सूत्र' पर जो आंग्ल-भाषा में विवेचना की है वह प्रशंसनीय है। आपका यह पुरुषार्थ भव्यों के अज्ञान-अविद्या जन्य तम-हरण के लिए दिव्य-आदित्य प्रकाशवत कार्य करेगा। आपके श्रुत-संवेग भाव के लिए मंगल आशीष।

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