

Ācārya Samantabhadra's
Āptamīmāṃsā
(Devāgamastotra)

Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord

• Thoroughly Revised Second Edition •

आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित

आप्तमीमांसा
(देवागमस्तोत्र)

• आद्योपांत संशोधित द्वितीय संस्करण •



Divine Blessings:

Ācārya Vidyānanda Muni (1st Edition)

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara Muni (2nd Edition)

VIJAY K. JAIN

Ācārya Samantabhadra's

Āptamīmāṃsā

(Devāgamastotra)

Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord

आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित

आप्तमीमांसा

(देवागमस्तोत्र)

Ācārya Samantabhadra's
Āptamīmāṃsā
(*Devāgamastotra*)

Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord

• Thoroughly Revised Second Edition •

आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित

आप्तमीमांसा
(देवागमस्तोत्र)

• आद्योपांत संशोधित द्वितीय संस्करण •

Divine Blessings:

Ācārya Vidyānanda Muni (1st Edition)

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara Muni (2nd Edition)

Edited and Translated by:

Vijay K. Jain

Front cover:

॥ णमो जेमि जिणाणं ॥

This beautiful black idol of the twenty-second
Tīrthaṅkara, Lord Neminātha, is installed in
Old Jain Temple, Hastinapur, Uttar Pradesh.
Conch-shell (*śaṅkha*) is the symbol of the Lord.



Ācārya Samantabhadra's
Āptamīmāṃsā
(*Devāgamastotra*)

Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord

• Thoroughly Revised Second Edition •

English Translation and Edited by:
Vijay K. Jain



Copyright © 2025 by Vijay Kumar Jain

ISBN: 978-93-341-6598-2
Rs. 800/-

Thoroughly Revised Second Edition, Published 2025, by:
Vijay Kumar Jain
B-13, MDDA Colony, Dalanwala, Dehradun-248001 (Uttarakhand), India


First Edition, Published 2016, by:
Vikalp Printers, Anekant Palace, 29 Rajpur Road
Dehradun-248001 (Uttarakhand) India
ISBN: 81-903639-8-0

Printed at:
Vikalp Printers
Anekant Palace, 29 Rajpur Road, Dehradun-248001 (Uttarakhand), India
E-mail: vikalp_printers@rediffmail.com

DIVINE BLESSINGS

मंगल आशीर्वाद -

परम पूज्य दिगम्बराचार्य श्री विशुद्धसागर जी मुनिराज



भारत भूमि ही नहीं, अपितु विश्व-वसुन्धरा की प्राचीन संस्कृति श्रमण-संस्कृति है। प्राचीन धर्मों में अति-प्राचीन जैन धर्म है। भगवान् ऋषभदेव इस युग के प्रथम तीर्थंकर हैं, जो कि आदि-ब्रह्म, जगत्-ज्येष्ठ, सम्प्रति युग-सृष्टा हुए हैं। आप राज्य (सम्राट्) अवस्था में असि, मसि, कृषि, विद्या, वाणिज्य, शिल्प-कला इन षट्-कर्मों का प्रवर्तन कर प्रवृत्ति-मार्ग के कर्ता हुए और श्रमण-मार्ग में षटावश्यकानि मूल-गुणों के कर्ता निवृत्ति-मार्ग में अग्रसर हुए।

प्रथम तीर्थंकर ऋषभदेव (आदिनाथ स्वामी) के उपरान्त करोड़ों वर्ष व्यतीत होने पर अन्तिम तीर्थंकर भगवान् महावीर स्वामी हुए। इनके मध्य बाईस तीर्थंकर भगवान् हुए। ऐसे अनन्तानन्त तीर्थंकर भगवान् श्रमण-संस्कृति में हुए हैं। सम्पूर्ण तीर्थंकर भगवान् विश्व को वही-वही वस्तु के वस्तुत्व का सत्यार्थ-बोध प्रदान करते हैं। तीर्थंकर प्रभु अपनी दिव्यदेशना में अहिंसा, सत्य, अचौर्य, ब्रह्मचर्य, अपरिग्रह इन पाँच सिद्धान्तों के साथ, छह द्रव्य, पञ्चास्तिकाय, सात तत्त्व, नव पदार्थ, त्रय काल, षट् लेश्यादि की प्ररूपणा करते हैं।

प्रमाण, नय, निक्षेप के माध्यम से वस्तु तत्त्व का अधिगम कराते हैं। सर्वज्ञ-शासन में एकान्त एकान्त नहीं, अनेकान्त भी एकान्त नहीं। सम्पूर्ण तत्त्वों की प्ररूपणा अनेकान्त अर्थात् नय-सापेक्ष कथन होता है। सर्वथा एक-रूप ही नहीं। 'नययोगान्न सर्वथा'। जहाँ अनेकान्त दृष्टि है, वहाँ विसंवाद नहीं है। सत्यार्थवाद स्याद्वाद है, नहीं स्याद्वाद संशयवाद।

.....

स्याद्वाद के समझने के लिए शुद्ध हृदय एवं विशद, स्वच्छ बुद्धि चाहिए। एकान्तग्रह से दूषित चित्त वाले, स्व-पर के वैरी लोग स्याद्वाद-विद्या को समझ नहीं पायेंगे। एकान्त के विषधरो से डसे लोगों के लिए स्याद्वाद-विद्या नागदामनी के समान औषधि है।

सम्प्रति तीर्थंकर भगवान् वर्धमान महावीर स्वामी के पवित्र स्याद्वाद-शासन में महान् तार्किक, अनेकान्त स्याद्वाद विद्या-कुशल, कवियों में तीर्थंकर आचार्य प्रवर श्री समन्तभद्र स्वामी हुए, जिन्होंने दक्षिण से उत्तर, पूर्व से पश्चिम सम्पूर्ण देश को स्याद्वाद की सुगन्ध से सुवासित किया। उन्हीं आचार्यदेव ने विश्व भूमि को महान् परम-पयस्भूत, सर्व दर्शनों का सार, परमत के नाम के बिना उनके विपरीत मतों को खण्डित कर स्वमत को मण्डित करने वाले महान् ग्रन्थ 'आप्तमीमांसा' (देवागमस्तोत्र) का सृजन कर जगति को मिथ्यातम से दूर कर, सर्व तत्त्व प्रकाशक, उत्कृष्ट उपहार प्रदान किया है।

इस आलौकिक ग्रन्थराज पर आचार्य प्रवर भट्टाकलंक स्वामी ने 'अष्टशती' टीका अत्यन्त दुरूह क्लिष्ट भाषा में लिखी। दूसरी टीका आचार्य भगवन्त विद्यानन्द स्वामी ने अत्यन्त विशद प्रौढ़ भाषा में 'अष्टसहस्री' लिखी। इसे स्वयं ग्रन्थकार ने कष्ट-सहस्री संज्ञा दी। तीसरी टीका 'तात्पर्यवृत्ति' आचार्य प्रवर वसुनन्दी कृत है, जो कि बाल-प्रबोधाय है। चौथी टीका 'तत्त्वदीपिका' अत्यन्त प्राञ्जल है, जो पण्डित उदयचन्द्र जी द्वारा रचित है। पाँचवी (स्वकृत) 'देवागम देशना' है।

'आप्तमीमांसा' आन्वीचिकी विद्या का महान् ग्रन्थ है। आचार्य भगवन्त समन्तभद्र स्वामी ने इस ग्रन्थराज में विश्व-तत्त्व का सार भर दिया है। सम्प्रति काल में ऐसा अन्य कोई ग्रन्थ पृथ्वी पर उपलब्ध नहीं है, जो न्याय विद्या से पूर्ण हो।

ऐसे महा-श्रुतोपयोगी के रत्नों की महिमा को समझने वाले तत्त्व-मनीषी श्रुतामृत पयोधर के पिपासु, भव्यवर मुमुक्षु जिन्होंने आयु के प्रत्येक निषेक को माँ वागीश्वरी के आँचल-पान में लगाया है, ऐसे माँ भारती के सपूत विद्वान् विजय कुमार जी जैन (देहरादून) ने अहिन्दी-भाषी भव्यों के उपकार हेतु विश्व अध्येताओं के हितार्थ विशद व्याख्या के साथ 'आप्तमीमांसा' का अंग्रेजी भाषा में अनुवाद कर श्रेष्ठ कार्य किया है। इस पुरुषार्थ-साध्य कार्य के लिए मंगलाशीष है। आप इसी प्रकार से श्रुतोदधि में निमग्न रहें। आगम-कोश को वर्धमान करते रहें।

ॐ नमः सिद्धेभ्यः ।

इति शुभम् भूयात् ।

अकलंक मठ, सोँधा (कर्नाटक), भारत


14 दिसम्बर, 2024

श्रमणाचार्य विशुद्धसागर मुनि



(From the First Edition)

मंगल आशीर्वाद -
परमपूज्य आचार्यश्री विद्यानन्द जी मुनिराज



सर्वान्तवत्तद्गुणमुख्यकल्पं
सर्वान्तशून्यं च मिथोऽनपेक्षम् ।
सर्वापदामन्तकरं निरन्तं
सर्वोदयं तीर्थमिदं तवैव ॥

- आचार्य समन्तभद्र, युक्त्यनुशासनम्, गाथा 62

अर्थ - आपका तीर्थ, शासन सर्वान्तवान् है और गौण तथा मुख्य की कल्पना को साथ में लिए हुए है। जो शासन-वाक्य धर्मों में पारस्परिक अपेक्षा का प्रतिपादन नहीं करता, वह सर्वधर्मों से शून्य है। अतः आपका ही यह शासनतीर्थ सर्व दुःखों का अन्त करने वाला है, यही निरन्त है और यही सब प्राणियों के अभ्युदय का कारण तथा आत्मा के पूर्ण अभ्युदय का साधक ऐसा सर्वोदय-तीर्थ है।

.....

आचार्य समन्तभद्र प्रणीत आप्तमीमांसा का अंग्रेजी भाषा में अनुवाद एवं विवेचन करके धर्मानुरागी श्री विजय कुमार जी ने बहुत ही महत्त्वपूर्ण कार्य किया है। इससे सम्पूर्ण विश्व को आचार्य समन्तभद्र के अनुपम वचनों को समझने का सौभाग्य प्राप्त होगा। वे पहले भी इसी प्रकार के अनेक उत्कृष्ट ग्रन्थों को शुद्धता एवं सुन्दरता के साथ प्रकाशित कर चुके हैं। मेरा उनको बहुत-बहुत मंगल आशीर्वाद है।

शुभाशीर्वाद

नवम्बर 2015

कुन्दकुन्द भारती, नई दिल्ली

आचार्य विद्यानन्द मुनि

P R E F A C E

The Glory of *Ācārya* Samantabhadra

Ācārya Samantabhadra was a great *Digambara* ascetic endowed with exceptional knowledge of the Jaina doctrine. He preached and propagated, far and wide, core principles of the doctrine by visiting many places in India. His literary and philosophical talents are not open to dispute; many inscriptions and works by subsequent Jaina *Ācāryas* have extolled his virtues as well as his works in superlative terms. A case in point is the assertion by *Ācārya* Jinasena in *Ādipurāna*¹:

नमः समन्तभद्राय महते कविवेधसे ।

यद्ब्रुवन्नपातेन निर्भिन्नाः कुमताद्रयः ॥ ४३ ॥

I bow to *Ācārya* Samantrabhadra, the ultimate creator (Brahmā) among all poets, whose words are like a stroke of lightning which tears apart mountains of misconceptions.

कवीनां गमकानां च वादिनां वाग्मिनामपि ।

यशः सामन्तभद्रीयं मूर्ध्नि चूडामणीयते ॥ ४४ ॥

Ācārya Samantrabhadra's glory reigned supreme among all poets, scholars, disputants, and preachers; he was like a jewel on their heads.

Four exceptional qualities of *Ācārya* Samantabhadra have been mentioned: 1) poetic skill (*kavitva*) which made his compositions excellent in terms of profoundness of content and grandiosity of expression; 2) intellectual authority (*gamakatva*) because of which he was able to explore and expound deep meanings of profound religious texts; 3) debating skill (*vāditva*) which made him capable of reasoning out the most difficult philosophical disputes; and 4) charming eloquence (*vāgmitva*) that engendered admiration for his truthfulness

.....

and straightforwardness even in the minds of his adversaries.

Ācārya Narendrasena in *Siddhāntasārasaṅgraha*², a widely read Sanskrit text dealing with the seven substances (*tattvas*), avers that only the most fortunate human beings get access to the words of Ācārya Samantabhadra:

श्रीमत्समन्तभद्रस्य देवस्यापि वचोऽनघम् ।

प्राणिनां दुर्लभं यद्वन्मानुषत्वं तथा पुनः ॥ ११ ॥

Just as the attainment of human birth is difficult, it is extremely rare to get access to the incontrovertible words of the Most Learned Ācārya Samantrabhadra.

सुदुर्लभमपि प्राप्तं तत्कर्मप्रशमादिह ।

न ये धर्मरता मोहाद्धा हता हन्त ते नराः ॥ १२ ॥

Only when the inauspicious (*aśubha*) karmas of a man get to quiescence is he able to come face-to-face with the holy words of Ācārya Samantrabhadra. Those who fail to adopt the path of piety even after exposure to his words can only be said to have been overwhelmed by delusion.

Ācārya Samantabhadra has not only been termed a brilliant grammarian, logician and philosopher, he has been recognized as an unmatched disputant, and a great preacher of the Jaina doctrine. Ācārya Śubhacandra in *Jñānārṇava*³ has likened the poetic compositions of *Svāmi* Samantabhadra to the bright rays of the sun.

Ācārya Jinasena, author of *Harivaṅśapurāṇa*⁴, has likened the expositions of Ācārya Samantabhadra to the words of Lord Mahāvīra:

जीवसिद्धिविधायीह कृतयुक्त्यनुशासनम् ।

वचः समन्तभद्रस्य वीरस्येव विजृम्भते ॥ २९ ॥

The words of Ācārya Samantabhadra, the composer of *Jīvasiddhi* (discourse on the path to liberation) and *Yuktyanuśāsana* (discourse on the merits and demerits of different standpoints),

.....

carry the same glory as the words of Lord Mahāvīra.

It is mentioned in Jaina literature⁵ that Ācārya Samantabhadra once introduced himself to the king of Vārāṇasī as:

आचार्योऽहं कविरहमहं वादिराट् पण्डितोऽहम्,
दैवज्ञोऽहं भिषगहमहं मान्त्रिकस्तान्त्रिकोऽहम् ।
राजन्नस्यां जलधिवलयामेखलायामिलाया-
माज्ञासिद्धः किमिति बहुना सिद्धसारस्वतोऽहम् ॥

O king! I am a preceptor (*ācārya*), a poet (*kavi*), foremost among the interpreters of the sacred scriptures (*vādī*), a scholar (*paṇḍita*), an astrologer (*jyotiṣī*), a practitioner of medicine (*vaidya*), a reciter of spells (*māntrika*), and skilled in mystical incantations (*tāntrika*). Do I need say more? My utterances become inviolable commands (*ājñāsiddha*), and I have subjugated the goddess of learning Sarasvatī (*sārasvatasiddha*).

The personality of Ācārya Samantabhadra was a rare combination of the Three Jewels (*ratnatraya*) of Jainism – pristine faith, knowledge, and conduct – that are empirically considered essential to the attainment of liberation. He was one of the most impelling proponents of the Jaina doctrine of *anekāntavāda* – a philosophical system which maintains that the reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete apprehension of it must necessarily take into account all these aspects. Non-appreciation of this doctrine has caused the other philosophical systems fall into the trap of one-sided, incomplete, and unsustainable dogmas that fail to explain the Truth. The words of Ācārya Samantabhadra are incontrovertible as these are guarded by the Jaina doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) – a system of scientific safeguards that aims at maintaining proper consistency in metaphysical thought.

Several Jaina holy texts⁶ have mentioned that Ācārya Samantabhadra was destined to attain the highest and supreme status of a *Tīrthan̄kara* (a ford-maker for the others to cross the ocean

of worldly cycle of births and deaths – *saṃsāra*). As a *Tīrthaṅkara* he will propagate Truth for the welfare of all living beings and will be worshipped by the lords of the devas and the men during the five most auspicious events (*pañca kalyāṇaka*) that must take place in the life of a *Tīrthaṅkara*.

HIS TIME

The time when *Ācārya* Samantabhadra flourished cannot be ascertained with great precision. Jugalkishore Mukhtar, after due research and detailed analysis as presented in his Preface to *Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra*⁷, has arrived at the conclusion that *Ācārya* Samantabhadra must have lived after *Ācārya* Kundakunda and *Ācārya* Umāsvāmi but before *Ācārya* Pūjyapāda. Broadly, he has fixed *Ācārya* Samantabhadra's time as the second or the third century, Vikram *Samvata* (VS). As Gregorian Year 2000 CE corresponds to Year 2057 in the VS calendar, *Ācārya* Samantabhadra's time can be fixed around the second century CE.

HIS WORKS

Ācārya Samantabhadra is known to have authored the following profound treatises:

Āptamīmāṃsā or *Devāgamastotra*

Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra

Svayambhūstotra

Yuktyanuśāsana

Stutividyā or *Jinaśataka* or *Jinastutiśataka* or *Jinaśatakālaṅkāra*

Jīvasiddhi

Gandhahastimahābhāṣya

Uncertainty prevails about the existence of the last two treatises.

Āptamīmāṃsā, known also as *Devāgama* or *Devāgamastotra*, is a treatise of 114 verses which discusses in a philosophical-cum-logical manner the Jaina view of the reality, starting with the concept of

.....

omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. Devotion to a deity without proper assessment and understanding of its praiseworthiness leads to naught in terms of utility. Blind faith based on traditional values and without the use of own power of discrimination leads to superstitions. Superstitions arise from ignorance and keep the worshipper overwhelmed with expectations and fear, just the opposite of the very purpose of adoration. Adoration is laudable only if it renders tranquility and equanimity to the mind of the worshipper. In the opening verse of *Āptamīmāṃsā*, *Ācārya* Samantabhadra questions the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish, in Verse 6, the logic of accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy Supreme Being:

You only are such an Omniscient, free from all defects, because your words are not in contradiction with either the reason or the scripture. The proof of non-contradiction of your words lies in the fact that your tenets (about liberation, etc.) are unopposed to what has been established through the known sources of knowledge.

After having established that it was certainly possible to attain omniscience, and employing the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*), *Ācārya* Samantabhadra faults certain prevailing conceptions that were based on absolutism: existence (*bhāvaikānta*) and non-existence (*abhāvaikānta*), non-dualism (*advaita-ekānta*) and separateness (*pr̥thaktva-ekānta*), and permanence (*nityatva-ekānta*) and momentariness (*kṣaṇika-ekānta*). He asserts that the entity (*dharmī*) and its attribute (*dharma*) are neither absolutely dependent (*āpekṣika*) nor absolutely independent (*anāpekṣika*). Only an entity which has general (*sāmānya* – concerning the substance, *dravya*) and particular (*viśeṣa* – concerning the mode, *paryāya*) attributes can be the subject of knowledge. Substance without its modification and modification without its substance cannot be the subject of valid knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of knowledge. He goes on to clarify certain other burning issues and misconceptions.

.....

In Verse 91 he asserts that both fate and human-effort are jointly responsible for desirable and undesirable effects. The desirable and undesirable effects that one begets without premeditation should be understood due primarily to one's fate (*daiva*). The desirable and undesirable effects that one begets in consequence of premeditation should be understood due primarily to one's human-deed (*pauruṣa*). In Verse 95 the Ācārya asserts that our auspicious (*viśudhi*) or inauspicious (*saṅkleśa*) kinds of dispositions cause the influx of meritorious (*puṇya*) or demeritorious (*pāpa*) karmas. In Verse 98 we are told that bondage (*bandha*) is caused due to ignorance (*ajñāna*) accompanied by delusion (*moha*), and bondage is not caused due to ignorance (*ajñāna*) not accompanied by delusion (*moha*). Highlighting the indispensability of *syādvāda*, in Verse 105, it is asserted that *syādvāda*, the doctrine of conditional predication, and *kevalajñāna*, omniscience, are both illuminators of the substances of reality. The difference between the two is that while *kevalajñāna* illumines directly, *syādvāda* illumines indirectly.

Three profound commentaries in Sanskrit on Āptamīmāṃsā are available: *Aṣṭaśatī* (known also as *Āptamīmāṃsābhāṣya*) of Ācārya Akalaṅkadeva comprising 800 verses, *Aṣṭasahsrī* (known also as *Āptamīmāṃsālaṅkāra* or *Devāgamālaṅkāra*) of Ācārya Vidyānanda comprising 8000 verses, and a comparatively brief treatise *Āptamīmāṃsāvṛtti* (known also as *Devāgamāvṛtti*) of Ācārya Vasunandi.

Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra, comprising 150 verses, is a celebrated and perhaps the earliest *Digambara* work dealing with the excellent path of *dharma* that must be followed by the householder (*śrāvaka*). All efforts should be directed towards the acquisition and safekeeping of the Three Jewels (*ratnatraya*), comprising right faith (*samyagdarśana*), right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) and right conduct (*samyakcāritra*), that lead to releasing him from worldly sufferings and establishing him in the state of supreme happiness. The treatise expounds an easy-to-understand meaning of 'right faith': To have

.....

belief, as per the reality, in the sect-founder or deity (*āpta* or *deva*), the scripture (*āgama* or *sāstra*), and the preceptor (*tapobhṛt* or *guru*). It specifies criteria to distinguish between the real and the counterfeit enabling one to eliminate follies attributable to wrong faith. Only the householder who has right faith is established on the path to liberation. On the way, he obtains many ineffable boons; he is not reborn as an infernal being, as a plant or an animal, in neuter and feminine genders, in low caste, as a cripple, with a short lifetime, and in a state of poverty. He is reborn as a heavenly being (*deva*) endowed with extraordinary splendour and a lifespan of millions of millenniums, or as a human being endowed with vigour, lustre, learning, strength, glory and renown, growth and advancement, success, grandeur, high caste, and the ability to put in best of effort. In short, right faith is the treasure chest of whatever is propitious and worthy; wrong faith of whatever is inauspicious and contemptible. After laying the foundation called the right faith, *Ācārya* Samantabhadra goes on to complete the superstructure known as the Three Jewels (*ratnatraya*) with the remaining two elements, right knowledge and right conduct. The householder who has attained right faith on the destruction of darkness of delusion is fit to attain right knowledge and right conduct. He gets rid of the conduits of demerit (*pāpa*) comprising injury (*hiṃsā*), falsehood (*anṛta*), stealing (*steya*), unchastity (*abrahma*), and attachment to possessions (*parigraha*). Further, he observes three subsidiary vows (*guṇāvrata*), and four instructional vows (*śikṣāvrata*). Giving up of the body in a manner that upholds righteousness (*dharma*) on the occurrence of a calamity, famine, senescence, or a disease, from which there is no escape, is called the vow of *sallekhanā*. *Sallekhanā* has been termed as the final fruit or culmination of penance (religious austerity) and, therefore, all persons with right faith, the ascetic as well as the householder, look forward to attaining voluntary, passionless death at the appropriate time. The treatise finally describes the eleven stages (*pratimā*) of the householder's conduct.

Svayambhūstotra is a fine composition, in Sanskrit, dedicated to the adoration of the Twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkara*, the Most Worshipful Supreme Beings. Through its 143 verses *Svayambhūstotra* not only enriches reader's devotion, knowledge, and conduct but also frees his mind from blind faith and superstition. *Svayambhūstotra* takes the reader's mind to a higher plane. It proclaims that the adoration of the *Tīrthaṅkara* is neither for receiving boons nor for getting rid of unpropitious happenings. By making zealous obeisance, and by recapitulating and recounting the supreme qualities, including infinite knowledge and divine splendour, of the *Tīrthaṅkara*, the worshipper only wishes to clear up his soul of the karmic mire, developing thereby the power to someday tread the path shown by Him. Established firmly in the right faith and rid of ignorance, he experiences ineffable tranquility and equanimity.

Yuktyanuśāsana, comprising 64 verses, is a profound and deep adoration of the twenty-fourth *Tīrthaṅkara* Lord Mahāvīra. As per his unique style, evident in his compositions including *Svayambhūstotra* and *Stutividyā*, Ācārya Samantabhadra uses great sense of logic (*nyāya*) to establish the invincibility of the Divine Words of Lord Mahāvīra. The treatise evaluates in a logical manner the beliefs that lead to the attainment of the state of Supreme Bliss as against those that lead to the continuous wandering in the three worlds.

Stutividyā (*Jinaśataka*) – comprising 116 verses – is the adoration of the twenty-four Supreme Lords (*Tīrthaṅkara*). Ācārya Samantabhadra has skillfully used highly ornamental language in this work; for instance, the first half of the line of a verse becomes its second half by using the same letters in reverse order*. As proof of the

* Verse 10 reads as under:

भासते विभुताऽस्तोना ना स्तोता भुवि ते सभाः ।

याः श्रिताः स्तुत गीत्या नु नुत्या गीतस्तुताः श्रिया ॥

In both lines, the latter half is the reverse arrangement of letters used in the first half.

floridity of the language, verses in the treatise use attractive figures-of-speech (*alaṅkāra*) including *murajabandha*, *citrālaṅkāra* and *yamaka*. Without the help of a proper commentary, it is extremely difficult for the common man to comprehend the deep meaning contained in the verses of *Stutividyā* but when comprehended fully, he is bound to experience great deal of joy, and devotion to Lord Jina. The process of assimilating this great composition leads to the destruction of the inimical karmas – so hard to get rid of – of the worthy reader.

THE STORY OF HIS DISEASE

There is a story that finds mention in several Jaina texts about the hardship that *Ācārya* Samantabhadra had to endure while he was an ascetic. Although there are variations in some elements of the story, the essential gist is as follows:

Svāmi Samantabhadra, in his early stage of asceticism, was attacked with a disease known as *bhasmaka* which refers, in *Āyurveda*, to the condition of insatiable hunger or appetite. The stomach has digestive power or “fire” (*jaṭharāgni*) that drives all digestion and when it becomes very strong, food digests very quickly and produces hunger and desire for more food. As food gets digested very quickly, the throat remains dry and a burning sensation prevails. According to *Āyurveda*, air (*vāta*), bile (*pitta*) and phlegm (*kapha*) are essential elements in human body and a distortion in their balance gives rise to health problems. When *kapha* becomes weak and *vāta* and *pitta* become strong, any food eaten gets reduced to ashes (*bhasma*) in no time. The complications include jaundice, anemia, yellow skin, diarrhoea, urine anomalies, colic, unconsciousness, hemorrhage, hyperacidity and burning pain. The body progressively gets emaciated and weak. The only way to cure the disease is to eat rich and stodgy food in profuse quantity.

It is impossible for a Jaina (*Digambara*) saint to eat more than once a day or in excess of his customary intake which is less than the fill. Not deviating in the least from such restrictions, *Svāmi*

Samantabhadra tried to endure the affliction through strong resolve. Finding the disease intractable, he ultimately thought of embracing passionless death by resorting to the vow of *sallekhanā*, as allowed in Jainism. *Svāmi* Samantabhadra approached his Preceptor to get his approval for the proposed vow of *sallekhanā*. The Preceptor, an accomplished visionary, foresaw that *Svāmi* Samantabhadra had many more years still left in his life, and that he was destined to be a great exponent of Jainism. He, therefore, forbade *Svāmi* Samantabhadra from undertaking the vow of *sallekhanā* and asked him to free himself from the symbols and restrictions of Jaina sainthood till the time his disease got cured.

Svāmi Samantabhadra made obeisance to his Preceptor and, with a heavy heart, took leave of him. Discarding nakedness and smearing his body with ash, he adopted the exterior of a Hindu saint. He started taking food that would cure him of his disease. He reached the town of Kāncī, ruled by Śivakoṭi, a staunch follower of Lord Śiva. Śivakoṭi had built a Śiva temple in Kāncī where large amount of food was being offered daily to the deity (*Śivaliṅga*). Saint Samantabhadra told the king that he had the power to make the deity consume food being offered. The king accepted the offer. Closing the doors of the temple, Saint Samantabhadra ate the heap of food offering. When the doors were opened, everyone was highly impressed with the so-called divine feat of the saint. This continued for a few days.

As the disease of Saint Samantabhadra got mitigated with the passage of time, he was no longer able to eat all food being offered to Lord Śiva. The king became suspicious of the purported divine power of the saint and ordered his actions to be watched, keeping the doors of the temple open. Saint Samantabhadra grasped the gravity of the situation and took it as an external calamity (*upasagra*) befalling him. Vowing not to take any food until the end of the calamity and discarding all attachment to his body, he started the adoration of the Twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkara*.

As Saint Samantabhadra reached the adoration of the eighth

.....

Tīrthaṅkara, Lord Candraprabha, and as he gazed at the idol of the reigning deity (*Śivaliṅga*), due to some divine intervention, it burst, revealing a beautiful and magnificent image of Lord Candraprabha, to the wonder and astonishment of all present. Saint Samantabhadra finished the adoration of the remaining sixteen *Tīrthaṅkara*. This miracle led King Śivakoṭi and his younger brother Śivāyana fall at his feet. After completing the adoration of the Twenty-four *Tīrthaṅkara*, Saint Samantabhadra gave his blessings to the two brothers. This story portrays the environment in which the composition of the most sacred text *Svayambhūstotra* took place.

As Saint Samantabhadra got cured of his disease, he reinitiated himself into the order of holy Jaina asceticism. King Śivakoṭi and his brother Śivāyana, highly impressed with the Jaina doctrine and the power of true adoration, left their worldly pursuits and became *Ācārya* Samantabhadra's disciples.

I make obeisance humble at the worshipful feet of *Ācārya* Samantabhadra who had unmatched intellect to discern the right from the wrong and illumined, through profound compositions, the right path that leads to Supreme Bliss.



Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara

An ardent propagator of the Jaina Doctrine, *Ācārya* Viśuddhasāgara is ever-ready to whole-heartedly gift every potential (*bhavya*) right-believer (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*), the ascetic (*mahāvratī*, *muni*) as well as the householder with or without the minor-vows (*aṇuvratī* and *śrāvaka*), the 'nectar' out of all the four constituents (*anuyoga*) – *prathamānuyoga* (the study of the stories of epochal personages), *karuṇānuyoga* (the study of the universe and beyond, the time-cycle, and the stages of soul-existence), *caraṇānuyoga* (the foundation for origination, growth and protection of conduct for the householder and the ascetic), and *dravyānuyoga* (the study of the objects of the reality) – of the Holy

Scripture. It rests entirely on our own interest, intellect, effort, and subsidence-cum-destruction (*kṣayopaśama*) of the knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*) karmas to draw the ‘nectar’ out of this free-flowing knowledge-river.

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara maintains that the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) or the ‘dharma’ of the true ascetic (*muni*, *śramaṇa*) is the disposition (*bhāva*) of equanimity (*sāmya*). Since the words of the true ascetic are incontrovertible, it follows that, for him, enemy (*śatru*) and kinsfolk (*bandhu-varga*), happiness (*sukha*) and misery (*duḥkha*), praise (*praśaṃsā*) and censure (*nindā*), iron (*lohā*) and gold (*svarṇa*), and life (*prāṇa-dhāraṇa*) and death (*prāṇa-tyāga*) are alike.⁸

Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara has showered me with his divine blessings in this project. His divine blessings have had wondrous effect in making both, the process and the end-result, most gratifying.



I make worshipful obeisance not only to Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara but to each of the 8,99,99,997 supreme-ascetics (*bhāvaliṅgī-muni*), from the sixth (*pramatta-saṃyata*) to the fourteenth (*ayogakevalī*) stage-of-spiritual-development (*guṇasthāna*), present in the human-world (*manuṣya-loka*) comprising the two-and-a-half continents, starting from Jambūdvīpa and up to the mountain range of Mānuṣottara in the centre of Puṣkaradvīpa.⁹

December, 2024
Dehradun, India

– Vijay K. Jain



References:

1. डॉ. पन्नालाल जैन (2004), आचार्य जिनसेन विरचित आदिपुराण (प्रथम भाग), दसवाँ संस्करण, भारतीय ज्ञानपीठ, नई दिल्ली-110003, पर्व 1, गाथा 43-44, पृष्ठ 10.

.....

2. डॉ. ए. एन. उपाध्ये, डॉ. हीरालाल जैन (1972), **नरेन्द्रसेनाचार्यविरचितः सिद्धान्तसारसंग्रहः**, श्री लालचंद हिराचन्द्र दोशी, सोलापुर, द्वितीया आवृत्तिः, पृष्ठ 3.
3. पं. पन्नालाल वाकलीवाल (1913), **श्रीशुभचन्द्रविरचितः ज्ञानार्णवः**, श्रीपरमश्रुत प्रभावक मण्डल, बम्बई-2, द्वितीयावृत्तिः, पृष्ठ 8.
4. डॉ. पन्नालाल जैन (2003), **आचार्य जिनसेन विरचित हरिवंशपुराण**, आठवाँ संस्करण, भारतीय ज्ञानपीठ, नई दिल्ली-110003, प्रथमः सर्गः, गाथा 29, पृष्ठ 3-4.
5. प्रो. उदयचन्द्र जैन (1993), **आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित स्वयम्भूस्तोत्र की तत्त्वप्रदीपिका व्याख्या**, श्री गणेश वर्णी दि. जैन (शोध) संस्थान, वाराणसी-221005, प्रस्तावना, पृष्ठ 18.
6. पं. जुगलकिशोर मुख्तार (वि. सं. 1982), **श्रीसमन्तभद्रस्वामिविरचितो रत्नकरण्डक-श्रावकाचारः**, मणिकचन्द्र दि. जैनग्रन्थमालासमितिः, बम्बई, प्राक्कथन, पृष्ठ 62-72.
7. *ibid.*, p. 196.
8. Jain, Vijay K. (2018), “*Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra*”, Vikalp Printers, verse 3-41, p. 300-301.
9. डॉ. ए. एन. उपाध्ये एवं सिद्धान्ताचार्य पं. कैलाशचन्द्र शास्त्री (2014), **आचार्य नेमिचन्द्र सिद्धान्तचक्रवर्ति रचित गोम्मटसार जीवकाण्ड**, भारतीय ज्ञानपीठ, 18 इन्स्टीट्यूशनल एरिया, लोदी रोड, नई दिल्ली-110003, छठा संस्करण, पृष्ठ 869-870.

Supplementary Reading:

1. Jain, Vijay K. (2015), “*Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra – Adoration of The Twenty-four Tirthaṅkara*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
2. Jain, Vijay K. (2016), “*Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra – The Jewel-casket of Householder’s Conduct*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
3. जैन, विजय कुमार (2020), **आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित युक्त्यनुशासन - अन्वयार्थ एवं व्याख्या सहित**, प्रकाशकः विजय कुमार जैन, देहरादून.
4. जैन, विजय कुमार (2020), **आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित स्तुतिविद्या (जिनशतक, जिनस्तुतिशतं)**, प्रकाशकः विजय कुमार जैन, देहरादून.



VIJAY K. JAIN – BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Having had his schooling from Mhow and Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh, Vijay K. Jain (b. 1951) did his graduation in Electronics Engineering from Institute of Technology, Banaras Hindu University, and Post-Graduation in Management from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.

An independent researcher, Vijay K. Jain has authored several books, and edited and translated into English a number of profound Jaina texts.

1. *Marketing Management for Small Units* (1988).
2. **जैन धर्म : मंगल परिचय** (1994).
3. *From IIM-Ahmedabad to Happiness* (2006).
4. *Āchārya Umāsvāmi's Tattvārthsūtra – With Hindi and English Translation* (2011).
5. *Āchārya Kundkund's Samayasāra – With Hindi and English Translation* (2012).
6. *Shri Amritachandra Suri's Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya – With Hindi and English Translation* (2012).
7. *Ācārya Nemichandra's Dravyasaṃgraha – With Authentic Explanatory Notes* (2013).
8. *Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Iṣṭopadeśa – The Golden Discourse* (2014).
9. *Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra – Adoration of the Twenty-four Tīrthaṅkara* (2015).
10. *Ācārya Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā (Devāgamastotra) – Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord* (2016).
11. *Ācārya Samantabhadra's Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra – The Jewel-casket of Householder's Conduct* (2016).
12. *Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Samādhitantram – Supreme Meditation* (2017).
13. *Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine* (2018).
14. *Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi* (2018).
15. *Ācārya Kundakunda's Niyamasāra – The Essence of Soul-adoration (With Authentic Explanatory Notes)* (2019).
16. *Ācārya Guṇabhadra's Ātmānūsāsana – Precept on the Soul* (2019).
17. *Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha – With Authentic*

.....

Explanatory Notes in English (2020).

18. आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित युक्त्यनुशासन – अन्वयार्थ एवं व्याख्या सहित (2020).
19. आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित स्तुतिविद्या (जिनशतक, जिनस्तुतिशतं) (2020).
20. English translation of: दिगम्बराचार्य विशुद्धसागर विरचित सत्यार्थ-बोध; *Ācārya Viśuddhasāgara’s Satyārtha-bodha – Know The Truth* (2021).
21. *Ācārya Māṇikyanandi’s Parikṣāmukha Sūtra – Essence of the Jaina Nyāya* (2021).
22. *Ācārya Kundakunda’s Bārasa Aṇuvekkhā – The Twelve Contemplations (With Authentic Explanatory Notes)* (2021).
23. *Ācārya Pūjyapāda’s Bhakti Saṃgraha – Collection of Devotions* (2022).
24. *Ācārya Kundakunda’s Samayasāra – With Hindi and English Translation* (2022), Second Edition.
25. *Ācārya Nemichandra’s Dravyasaṃgraha – With Authentic Explanatory Notes* (2022), Second Edition.
26. *Ācārya Mānatuṅga’s Bhaktāmara Stotra – With Hindi and English Rendering* (2023).
27. *Ācārya Kundakunda’s Rayasāra – The Quintessential Jewel* (2023).
28. *Ācārya Kumudacandra’s Kalyāṇamandira Stotra – Adoration of Lord Pārśvanātha* (2024).
29. *Ācārya Devasena’s Ālāpa Paddhati – The Ways of Verbal Expression* (2024).
30. *Ācārya Vādirāja’s Ekībhāva Stotra (Anecdotal story – quelling leprosy)* (2024).
31. *Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā (Devāgamastotra) – Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord* (2025), Second Edition.

Vijay K. Jain is the proprietor of Vikalp Printers, a small, high-end printing and publishing firm, based in Dehradun, India.



॥ वागीश्वरि प्रतिदिनं मम रक्ष देवि ॥

.....

CONTENTS

मंगल आशीर्वाद - श्रमणाचार्य विशुद्धसागर मुनि	-----	(V)
मंगल आशीर्वाद (प्रथम संस्करण) - श्रमणाचार्य विद्यानन्द मुनि	-----	(VII)
PREFACE - VIJAY K. JAIN	-----	(IX)
VIJAY K. JAIN - BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	-----	(XXII)



<i>Verse No.</i>	<i>Head of the Verse</i>	<i>Page</i>
------------------	--------------------------	-------------

SECTION - 1

1.	देवागमनभोयानचामरादिविभूतयः	---	3
2.	अध्यात्मं बहिरप्येष विग्रहादिमहोदयः	---	4
3.	तीर्थकृतसमयानां च परस्परविरोधतः	---	7
4.	दोषावरणयोर्हानिर्निःशेषाऽस्त्यतिशायनात्	---	8
5.	सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्यचिद्यथा	---	10
6.	स त्वमेवासि निर्दोषो युक्तिशास्त्राऽविरोधिवाक्	---	13
7.	त्वन्मतामृतबाह्यानां सर्वथैकान्तवादिनाम्	---	17
8.	कुशलाऽकुशलं कर्म परलोकश्च न क्वचित्	---	18
9.	भावैकान्ते पदार्थानामभावानामपह्नुवात्	---	21
10.	कार्यद्रव्यमनादि स्यात् प्रागभावस्य निह्ववे	---	25
11.	सर्वात्मकं तदेकं स्यादन्यापोहव्यतिक्रमे	---	26
12.	अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भावापह्नुववादिनाम्	---	27
13.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	---	28
14.	कथञ्चित् ते सदेवेष्टं कथञ्चिदसदेव तत्	---	29

Verse No.	Head of the Verse	Page
15.	सदेव सर्वं को नेच्छेत् स्वरूपादिचतुष्टयात्	36
16.	क्रमार्पितद्वयाद् द्वैतं सहावाच्यमशक्तितः	38
17.	अस्तित्वं प्रतिषेधेनाविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि	40
18.	नास्तित्वं प्रतिषेधेनाऽविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि	42
19.	विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मा विशेष्यः शब्दगोचरः	43
20.	शेषभङ्गाश्च नेतव्या यथोक्तनययोगतः	44
21.	एवं विधिनिषेधाभ्यामनवस्थितमर्थकृत्	46
22.	धर्मे धर्मेऽन्य एवार्थो धर्मिणोऽनन्तधर्मणः	47
23.	एकानेकविकल्पादावुत्तरत्रापि योजयेत्	50

SECTION - 2

24.	अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि दृष्टो भेदो विरुध्यते	52
25.	कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं लोकद्वैतं च नो भवेत्	56
26.	हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेद् द्वैतं स्याद्धेतुसाध्ययोः	57
27.	अद्वैतं न विना द्वैतादहेतुरिव हेतुना	59
28.	पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि पृथक्त्वादपृथक् तु तौ	60
29.	संतानः समुदायश्च साधर्म्यं च निरंकुशः	61
30.	सदात्मना च भिन्नं चेज्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाद् द्विधाऽप्यसत्	62
31.	सामान्यार्था गिरोऽन्येषां विशेषो नाऽभिलष्यते	63
32.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	65
33.	अनपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये ह्यवस्तु द्वयहेतुतः	66

.....

Verse No.	Head of the Verse		Page
34.	सत्सामान्यात्तु सर्वैक्यं पृथग्द्रव्यादिभेदतः	---	69
35.	विवक्षा चाविवक्षा च विशेष्येऽनन्तधर्मिणि	---	72
36.	प्रमाणगोचरौ सन्तौ भेदाऽभेदौ न संवृती	---	73

SECTION-3

37.	नित्यत्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि विक्रिया नोपपद्यते	---	74
38.	प्रमाणकारकैर्व्यक्तं व्यक्तं चेदिन्द्रियाऽर्थवत्	---	76
39.	यदि सत्सर्वथा कार्यं पुंवन्नोत्पत्तुमर्हति	---	80
40.	पुण्यपापक्रिया न स्यात् प्रेत्यभावः फलं कुतः	---	81
41.	क्षणिकैकान्तपक्षेऽपि प्रेत्यभावाद्यसंभवः	---	82
42.	यद्यसत्सर्वथा कार्यं तन्माजनि खपुष्यवत्	---	84
43.	न हेतुफलभावादिरन्यभावादनन्वयात्	---	87
44.	अन्येष्वनन्यशब्दोऽयं संवृतिर्न मृषा कथम्	---	88
45.	चतुष्कोटेर्विकल्पस्य सर्वान्तेषूक्त्ययोगतः	---	89
46.	अवक्तव्यचतुष्कोटिविकल्पोऽपि न कथ्यताम्	---	90
47.	द्रव्याद्यन्तरभावेन निषेधः संज्ञिनः सतः	---	91
48.	अवस्त्वनभिलाष्यं स्यात् सर्वान्तैः परिवर्जितम्	---	93
49.	सर्वान्ताश्चेदवक्तव्यास्तेषां किं वचनं पुनः	---	94
50.	अशक्यत्वादवाच्यं किमभावात्किमबोधतः	---	95
51.	हिनस्त्यनभिसंधात् न हिनस्त्यभिसंधिमत्	---	96
52.	अहेतुकत्वान्नाशस्य हिंसाहेतुर्न हिंसकः	---	97

Verse No.	Head of the Verse	Page
53.	विरूपकार्यारम्भाय यदि हेतुसमागमः	--- 99
54.	स्कन्धसंततयश्चैव संवृतित्वादसंस्कृताः	--- 100
55.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	--- 102
56.	नित्यं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नाकस्मात्तदविच्छिदा	--- 103
57.	न सामान्यात्मनोदेति न व्येति व्यक्तमन्वयात्	--- 105
58.	कार्योत्पादः क्षयो हेतोर्नियमाल्लक्षणात् पृथक्	--- 106
59.	घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम्	--- 108
60.	पयोव्रतो न दध्यत्ति न पयोत्ति दधिव्रतः	--- 109

SECTION - 4

61.	कार्यकारणनानात्वं गुणगुण्यन्यतापि च	--- 110
62.	एकस्याऽनेकवृत्तिर्न भागाऽभावादबहूनि वा	--- 112
63.	देशकालविशेषेऽपि स्याद्वृत्तिर्युतसिद्धवत्	--- 114
64.	आश्रयाऽऽश्रयिभावान्न स्वातन्त्र्यं समवायिनाम्	--- 115
65.	सामान्यं समवायश्चाऽप्येकैकत्र समाप्तितः	--- 116
66.	सर्वथाऽनभिसम्बन्धः सामान्यसमवाययोः	--- 118
67.	अनन्यतैकान्तेऽणूनां संघातेऽपि विभागवत्	--- 119
68.	कार्यभ्रान्तेरणुभ्रान्तिः कार्यलिङ्गं हि कारणम्	--- 120
69.	एकत्वेऽन्यतराभावः शेषाभावोऽविनाभुवः	--- 121
70.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	--- 122
71.	द्रव्यपर्याययोरैक्यं तयोरव्यतिरेकतः	--- 123

.....

Verse No.	Head of the Verse	Page
72.	संज्ञासंख्याविशेषाच्च स्वलक्षणविशेषतः	--- 123

SECTION - 5

73.	यद्यापेक्षिकसिद्धिः स्यान्न द्वयं व्यवतिष्ठते	--- 129
74.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	--- 131
75.	धर्मधर्म्यविनाभावः सिद्धयत्यन्योऽन्यवीक्षया	--- 132

SECTION - 6

76.	सिद्धं चेद्धेतुतः सर्वं न प्रत्यक्षादितो गतिः	--- 134
77.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	--- 136
78.	वक्तव्यनाप्ते यद्धेतोः साध्यं तद्धेतुसाधितम्	--- 137

SECTION - 7

79.	अन्तरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते बुद्धिवाक्यं मृषाऽखिलम्	--- 138
80.	साध्यसाधनविज्ञप्तेर्यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रता	--- 139
81.	बहिरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते प्रमाणाभासनिह्वात्	--- 140
82.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	--- 141
83.	भावप्रमेयाऽपेक्षायां प्रमाणाभासनिह्वः	--- 142
84.	जीवशब्दः सबाह्यार्थः संज्ञात्वाद्धेतुशब्दवत्	--- 143
85.	बुद्धिशब्दार्थसंज्ञास्तास्तिस्रो बुद्ध्यादिवाचिकाः	--- 144

Verse No.	Head of the Verse	Page
86.	वक्तृश्रोतृप्रमातृणां बोधवाक्यप्रमाः पृथक्	--- 145
87.	बुद्धिशब्दप्रमाणत्वं बाह्यार्थे सति नाऽसति	--- 146
<u>SECTION - 8</u>		
88.	दैवादेवार्थसिद्धिश्चेद्वैवं पौरुषतः कथम्	--- 148
89.	पौरुषादेव सिद्धिश्चेत् पौरुषं दैवतः कथम्	--- 149
90.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	--- 150
91.	अबुद्धिपूर्वाऽपेक्षायामिष्टाऽनिष्टं स्वदैवतः	--- 151
<u>SECTION - 9</u>		
92.	पापं ध्रुवं परे दुःखात् पुण्यं च सुखतो यदि	--- 152
93.	पुण्यं ध्रुवं स्वतो दुःखात् पापं च सुखतो यदि	--- 153
94.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	--- 154
95.	विशुद्धिसंक्लेशाङ्गं चेत् स्वपरस्थं सुखाऽसुखम्	--- 155
<u>SECTION - 10</u>		
96.	अज्ञानाच्चेदध्रुवो बन्धो ज्ञेयाऽनन्त्यान् केवली	--- 159
97.	विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्	--- 161
98.	अज्ञानान्मोहिनो बन्धो नाऽज्ञानाद्वीतमोहतः	--- 162
99.	कामादिप्रभवश्चित्रः कर्मबन्धाऽनुरूपतः	--- 164
100.	शुद्ध्यशुद्धी पुनः शक्ती ते पाक्याऽपाक्यशक्तिवत्	--- 165

Verse No.	Head of the Verse	Page
101.	तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं ते युगपत्सर्वभासनम्	--- 168
102.	उपेक्षाफलमाद्यस्य शेषस्याऽऽदानहानधीः	--- 171
103.	वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती गम्यं प्रति विशेषणम्	--- 174
104.	स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधिः	--- 175
105.	स्याद्वादकेवलज्ञाने सर्वतत्त्वप्रकाशने	--- 178
106.	सधर्मणैव साध्यस्य साधर्म्यादविरोधतः	--- 179
107.	नयोपनयैकान्तानां त्रिकालानां समुच्चयः	--- 181
108.	मिथ्यासमूहो मिथ्या चेन्न मिथ्यैकान्ततास्ति नः	--- 183
109.	नियम्यतेऽर्थो वाक्येन विधिना वारणेन वा	--- 184
110.	तदतद्वस्तु वागेषा तदेवेत्यनुशासती	--- 187
111.	वाक्स्वभावोऽन्यवागर्थप्रतिषेधनिरङ्कुशः	--- 189
112.	सामान्यवाग्विशेषे चेन्न शब्दार्थो मृषा हि सा	--- 190
113.	विधेयमीप्सितार्थाङ्गं प्रतिषेध्याऽविरोधि यत्	--- 191
114.	इतीयमाप्तमीमांसा विहिता हितमिच्छताम्	--- 192

APPENDICES

1.	REFERENCES AND GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGMENT	--- 193
2.	INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS	--- 197
3.	INDEX OF VERSES	--- 208
4.	GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION	--- 213



॥ श्री स्याद्वादविद्यायै नमः ॥

Ācārya Samantabhadra's

Āptamīmāṃsā

(Devāgamastotra)

Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord

आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित

आप्तमीमांसा

(देवागमस्तोत्र)

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra:

अनवद्यः स्याद्वादस्तव दृष्टेष्टाविरोधतः स्याद्वादः ।

इतरो न स्याद्वादो द्वितयविरोधान्मुनीश्वरास्याद्वादः ॥

(२४-३-१३८)

हे मुनिनाथ (श्री वीर जिन)! आपका जो स्याद्वाद (अनेकान्त-रूप कथन) है वह दोष-रहित है क्योंकि उसमें प्रत्यक्ष (दृष्ट) व परोक्ष (आगम, अनुमानादि, इष्ट) के द्वारा विरोध नहीं आता है। वह स्याद्वाद, 'स्यात्' या कथञ्चित् (किसी अपेक्षा से) वाचक शब्द से सहित, वस्तु के स्वभाव को यथार्थ कहने वाला है। इसके विपरीत जो एकान्त-रूप कथन है वह प्रत्यक्ष (दृष्ट) व परोक्ष (इष्ट) से विरोध-रूप है। इसलिए वह स्याद्वाद-रूप नहीं है अर्थात् वस्तु के भिन्न-भिन्न स्वभावों को सिद्ध करने वाला नहीं है।

O Supreme Sage (Lord Vira Jina)! Being qualified by the word 'syāt' (conditional, from a particular standpoint), your doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) is flawless as it is not opposed to the two kinds of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) – direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*). The wisdom propounded by others, not being qualified by the word 'syāt', is fallacious as it is opposed to both, the direct as well as the indirect knowledge.

Jain, Vijay K. (2015),

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra, p. 165-166.

Section 1

प्रथम परिच्छेद

Insignia like the attendance of heavenly beings do not make you great:

देवागमनभोयानचामरादिविभूतयः ।

मायाविष्वपि दृश्यन्ते नातस्त्वमसि नो महान् ॥१॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! देवों का आगमन, आकाश में गमन और चामर आदि विभूतियाँ जो आप में पायी जाती हैं, इन कारणों से आप हमारे स्तुति करने योग्य – गुरु, स्तुत्य, आप्त – नहीं हैं। ये विभूतियाँ तो मायावी पुरुषों में भी देखी जाती हैं।

Attendance of the heavenly beings, movement in the sky, waving of the flywhisks (*cāmara*) and other symbols of majesty are found even in jugglers; it is not owing to these that thou art great [supreme preacher (*guru*), worthy of adoration (*stutya*) and Omniscient (*sarvajña* or *āpta*)].

The aforesaid symbols of majesty do not establish greatness; these are found in jugglers too who do not possess real greatness and, therefore, not worthy of our adoration. If it be said that the symbols of majesty are artificial in case of jugglers but real in your case then on what basis can we distinguish between the real and the counterfeit? On the basis of the scripture? The others too have their own scripture which, according to them, is a valid source of knowledge.

Bodily and other distinctions do not make you great:

अध्यात्मं बहिरप्येष विग्रहादिमहोदयः ।

दिव्यः सत्यो दिवौकस्स्वप्यस्ति रागादिमत्सु सः ॥२॥

सामान्यार्थ – आप में शरीर आदि का जो अन्तरंग और बहिरंग अतिशय पाया जाता है वह यद्यपि दिव्य और सत्य है, किन्तु रागादियुक्त स्वर्ग के देवों में भी उक्त प्रकार का अतिशय पाया जाता है। अतः उक्त अतिशय के कारण भी आप मेरे स्तुत्य नहीं हो सकते हैं।

The superior excellence of your body, etc. – both internal and external – which though is real and divine can be found even in celestial beings who are swayed by impurities like attachment. Therefore, this too does not make thou great.

The *Arhat*, the World Teacher or 'Jina', is free from eighteen imperfections, and possessed of forty-six distinctive attributes. The divine attributes and splendours of the *Arhat* are described thus in the Scripture:

The *Arhat* is free from these eighteen imperfections:

1. *janma* – (re)birth;
2. *zarā* – old-age;
3. *tṛṣā* – thirst;
4. *kṣudhā* – hunger;
5. *vismaya* – astonishment;
6. *arati* – displeasure;
7. *kheda* – regret;
8. *roga* – sickness;
9. *śoka* – grief;

10. *mada* – pride*;
11. *moha* – delusion;
12. *bhaya* – fear**;
13. *nidrā* – sleep;
14. *cintā* – anxiety;
15. *sveda* – perspiration;
16. *rāga* – attachment;
17. *dveṣa* – aversion; and
18. *maraṇa* – death.

Forty-six divine attributes of the *Arhat* comprise four infinitudes (*ananta catuṣṭaya*), thirty-four miraculous happenings (*atiśaya*), and eight splendours (*prātihārya*).

The four infinitudes (*ananta catuṣṭaya*) comprise:

1. *ananta jñāna* – infinite knowledge;
2. *ananta darśana* – infinite perception;
3. *ananta sukha* – infinite bliss; and
4. *ananta vīrya* – infinite energy.

Of the thirty-four miraculous happenings (*atiśaya*), ten appear naturally at the time of birth, ten on attainment of infinite knowledge (*kevalajñāna*), and the remaining fourteen are fashioned by the celestial devas.

* Pride is of eight kinds: pride of knowledge (*jñāna mada*), veneration (*pūjā mada*), lineage (*kula mada*), caste (*jāti mada*), strength (*bala mada*), accomplishments (*ṛddhi mada*), austerities (*tapā mada*), and beauty (*śarīra mada*).

** Fear is of seven kinds: fear relating to this life (*ihaloka bhaya*), of the life beyond (*paraloka bhaya*), of death (*maraṇa bhaya*), of pain and suffering (*vedanā bhaya*), of being without protection (*atrāṇa bhaya*), of divulgence of one's deeds (*agupti bhaya*), and of the unexpected (*ākasmika bhaya*).

The eight splendours (*prātihārya*) are:

1. *aśoka vṛkṣa* – the Ashoka tree;
2. *siṃhāsana* – bejeweled throne;
3. *chatra* – three-tier canopy;
4. *bhāmaṇḍala* – halo of unmatched luminance;
5. *divya dhvani* – divine voice of the Lord without lip movement;
6. *puṣpa-varṣā* – shower of fragrant flowers;
7. *cāmara* – waving of sixty-four majestic flywhisks; and
8. *duṇḍubhi* – dulcet sound of kettle-drums and other musical instruments.

Jain, Vijay K. (2014), *Ācārya Puṣyapāda's Iṣṭopadeśa – The Golden Discourse*, p. 2-4.

The aforesaid symbols of superior excellence fail to establish real greatness; these symbols can be found in celestial beings too who are swayed by passions like anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed. It may be claimed that your symbols of superior excellence appear on the destruction of the four inimical (*ghātiyā*) karmas – deluding (*mohanīya*), knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*), perception-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇīya*), and obstructive (*antarāya*) – but it is not so in the case of the celestial beings. What is the basis of this assertion? Scripture? Let us wait till we are able to establish which scripture among many is a valid source of knowledge.

The fact that you are a sect-founder does not make you great:

तीर्थकृत्समयानां च परस्परविरोधतः ।

सर्वेषामाप्तता नास्ति कश्चिदेव भवेद्गुरुः ॥३॥

सामान्यार्थ – तीर्थकृत् (अर्थात् आगम-लक्षण तीर्थ को करने वालों) द्वारा प्रतिपादित समयों (अर्थात् आगमों) में परस्पर विरोध पाये जाने के कारण सभी तीर्थकृत् में आप्तता (सर्वज्ञता) का होना संभव नहीं है। उन तीर्थकृत् कहे जाने वालों में से कोई एक ही हमारा स्तुत्य (अर्थात् आप्त) हो सकता है।

There are mutual contradictions in the scriptures (*samaya, āgama*) of the sect-founders (*tīrthakṛt*); this should not have happened if all of them were endowed with omniscience (*āptatā, sarvajñatā*). It is clear, therefore, that only one of them, at most, could be worthy of our adoration.

It is possible for an individual to attain complete destruction of imperfections and their causes:

दोषावरणयोर्हानिर्निःशेषाऽस्त्यतिशायनात् ।

क्वचिद्यथा स्वहेतुभ्यो बहिरन्तर्मलक्षयः ॥४॥

सामान्यार्थ – किसी पुरुष-विशेष में दोषों (राग-द्वेषादिक) और आवरणों (दोषों के कारणों) की सातिशय हानि देखने में आती है। दोषों और आवरणों की पूर्ण हानि उसी प्रकार संभव है जिस प्रकार खान से निकले हुए सुवर्ण में मल-विरोधी कारणों के द्वारा कीट आदि बहिरंग मल और कालिमा आदि अन्तरंग मल दोनों प्रकार के मलों का अत्यन्त नाश किया जा सकता है।

In some individuals extensive destruction of imperfections and their causes is seen; there must be a case where a particular individual, owing to his supremacy, attains complete destruction of imperfections and their causes. It is akin to the complete removal of external and internal impurities (in a substance like the gold-ore) on the availability of appropriate means.

Imperfections (called *doṣa*), like attachment, aversion and passions, are dispositions of the soul (*bhāvakarma*) and these are due to the prior envelopment of the soul (called *āvaraṇa*) by the material karmas (*dravyakarma*), like the knowledge-obscuring karmas. There is the cause and effect relationship between the material karmas and the imperfections. With appropriate exertion, extensive destruction of imperfections and their causes is possible in some individuals.

Ācārya (Muni) Nemicandra's *Dravyasaṃgraha*:

जहकालेण तवेण य भुत्तरसं कम्मपुगलं जेण ।

भावेण सडिदि णेया तस्सडणं चेदि णिज्जरा दुविहा ॥३६॥

Dispositions of the soul to get rid of the karmic matter already bound with it, either when it falls off by itself on fruition, or when it is annihilated through austerities (*tapa*), constitute the subjective dissociation of the karmas (*bhāva nirjarā*). The actual shedding of the karmic matter from the soul is the objective dissociation of the karmas (*dravya nirjarā*). Thus, dissociation (*nirjarā*) should be known as of the above mentioned two kinds.

Jain, Vijay K. (2022),
Ācārya (Muni) Nemicandra's Dravyasaṃgraha, p. 181.

Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha:

संवरजोगेहिं जुदो तवेहिं जो चिदुदे बहुविहेहिं ।
 कम्माणं णिज्जरणं बहुगाणं कुणदि सो णियदं ॥१४४॥

The soul (*jīva*) which is equipped with stoppage (*saṃvara*) and 'yoga', i.e., pure-cognition (*śuddhopayoga*), and which engages in various kinds of austerities (*tapa*), as a rule, causes the dissociation or shedding (*nirjarā*) of numerous karmas.

Jain, Vijay K. (2020),
Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-Saṃgraha, p. 272.

On destruction of the inimical karmas, called the *ghātiyā* karmas, it is possible for a person to attain unhindered, infinite and pure knowledge, i.e., omniscience. A single substance is endowed with infinite modifications and there are infinite classes of substances. To know one substance fully is to know the whole range of the objects of knowledge and that is possible only in omniscience.

The attainment of omniscience is established:

सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्यचिद्यथा ।

अनुमेयत्वतोऽग्न्यादिरिति सर्वज्ञसंस्थितिः ॥५॥

सामान्यार्थ - सूक्ष्म-पदार्थ (स्वभाव-विप्रकृष्ट परमाणु आदिक), अन्तरित-पदार्थ (काल-विप्रकृष्ट राम आदिक) तथा दूरवर्ती (देश-विप्रकृष्ट मेरु आदिक) किसी को प्रत्यक्ष अवश्य होते हैं क्योंकि उनको हम अनुमान से जानते हैं। जो भी पदार्थ अनुमान से जाने जाते हैं कोई न कोई उनको प्रत्यक्ष से जानता है। पर्वत में अग्नि को दूरवर्ती पुरुष अनुमान से जानता है किन्तु पर्वत पर रहने वाला पुरुष उसी को प्रत्यक्ष से जानता है। इस प्रकार सूक्ष्म, अन्तरित तथा दूरवर्ती समस्त पदार्थों को जानने वाले सर्वज्ञ की सिद्धि होती है।

Objects that are minute (like atoms), past (like Lord Rama), and distant (like Mount Meru), being the objects-of-inference (*anumeya* – and, therefore, also the objects-of-knowledge – *prameya*), must be perceivable directly by someone; like the fire on the hill is an object-of-inference for a distant person but is perceived directly by the one who is in its proximity. The one who perceives directly the objects of knowledge that are minute, past, and distant is the Omniscient (*sarvajña*); this way the existence of the Omniscient is truly and firmly established.

Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*:

जदि पच्चक्खमजायं पज्जायं पलयिदं च णाणस्स ।

ण हवदि वा तं णाणं दिव्वं ति हि के परूवेति ॥१-३९॥

If those not-present modes (*paryāya*) – which are yet to originate, and which had originated in the past but destroyed – of the substance (*dravya*) were not reflected

directly in the knowledge of the Omniscient – *kevalajñāna* – who will call that knowledge superlative, worthy of adoration?

अत्थं अक्खणिवदिदं ईहापुव्वेहिं जे विजाणंति ।
तेसिं परोक्खभूदं णादुमसक्कं ति पण्णत्तं ॥१-४०॥

The Omniscient Lord has declared that those who know substances through the sensory-knowledge¹ (*matijñāna*), that operates in stages including speculation (*īhā*), are not able to know the not-present modes (*pariyāya*) of the substance.

Jain, Vijay K. (2018), *Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine*, p. 49-50.

Sensory knowledge ascertains, in stages, the nature of an object through the use of the senses. The past and the future modes of the object remain beyond the scope of such knowledge as these do not reach the senses. Besides, minute objects like the atoms, distant objects like the heaven and Mount Meru, and non-material objects like the soul, virtue and vice, also remain beyond the scope of sensory knowledge. Only the gross objects like the pot and the board are known by the senses and, therefore, sensory knowledge is indirect, inadequate, and fit to be discarded. Those possessing sensory knowledge, to whatever degree, cannot be called the Omniscient (*sarvajña*).

Things which are minute and remote in space or time are directly perceived by the *Arhat*, since these are cognizable, just

-
1. Sensory knowledge, being not direct, has four sequential stages: impression – *avagraha*; speculation or inquisitiveness – *īhā*; comprehension – *avāya*; and retention – *dhāraṇā*. (see, *Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra*, 1-15.) Such stages are not present when omniscience is functioning.

as the objects of our perception that are well ascertained. The reason assigned here is not fallacious because these are made the subject of the minor premise.

It has been said in the Scripture that all objects-of-inference (*anumeya*) are objects-of-knowledge (*prameya*).² It follows that the minute, past, and distant objects are perceived directly (*pratyakṣa*) by the *Arhat*, because these are *anumeya*.

Only omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) – the self-born, perfect, pure, non-sequential and super-sensuous (*atīndriya*) knowledge – embraces the knowledge of all objects and their infinite modes, making its possessor the Omniscient (*sarvajña*).

-
2. The particular knowledge of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*) obtained from the means (*sādhana, hetu*) is the inference (*anumāna*). Inference (*anumāna*) constitutes the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), albeit indirect (*parokṣa*). The object-of-inference (*anumeya*) invariably is an objects-of-knowledge (*prameya*). The example is to see the smoke (*sādhana, hetu*) and infer the presence of the fire (*anumeya*) on the hill. [see, Jain, Vijay K. (2021), *Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra – Essence of the Jaina Nyāya*, p. 46.]

You (Lord Jina) are such an Omniscient:

स त्वमेवासि निर्दोषो युक्तिशास्त्राऽविरोधिवाक् ।
अविरोधो यदिष्टं ते प्रसिद्धेन न बाध्यते ॥६॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! पूर्व में जिसे निर्दोष – वीतराग तथा सर्वज्ञ – सिद्ध किया गया है वह आप ही हैं। आपके निर्दोष होने का प्रमाण यह है कि आपके वचन युक्ति और आगम से अविरोधी हैं। आपका जो इष्ट (मोक्षादि तत्त्व-रूप अभिमत) है वह प्रसिद्ध से (प्रमाण अथवा पर-प्रसिद्ध एकान्त से) बाधित नहीं है। (इस कारण से आपके वचन युक्ति और आगम से अविरोधी हैं।)

You only are such an Omniscient, free from all defects, because your words are not in contradiction with either the reason or the Scripture. The proof of non-contradiction of your words lies in the fact that your tenets (about liberation, etc.) are unopposed to what has been established through the known sources of knowledge*.

In the first three verses *Ācārya* Samantabhadra spells out certain qualities belonging to the *Arhat*, which are also found in jugglers, celestial beings, and founders of various sects.

* The *dharmī*, the entity or abode of the *sādhyā* (that which is to be proved), is known through: 1) *pramāṇa prasiddha*, i.e., that which is known by *pramāṇa* – ‘This hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke’; 2) *vikalpa prasiddha*, i.e., that which is taken for granted being utterly distinct – ‘The horns of a hare are non-existent’; and 3) *pramāṇa-vikalpa prasiddha*, i.e., that which partakes of the nature of *pramāṇa* and *vikalpa* both – ‘Man is the master of his destiny because he has the power to control his actions’. [see, Jain, Vijay K. (2021), *Ācārya Māṇīkyaṇandi’s Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra – Essence of the Jaina Nyāya*, p. 57.]

These qualities cannot establish the omniscience of the *Arhat*.

In the next two verses the *Ācārya* establishes that it is possible for someone to attain complete destruction of imperfections which cause obstruction to infinite knowledge. And as the soul attains omniscience, it is able to perceive things which are minute, past and distant.

Omniscience is attained through the destruction of imperfections, i.e., the deluding (*mohanīya*), knowledge-covering (*jñānāvaraṇīya*), perception-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇīya*) and obstructive (*antarāya*) classes of karmas. Omniscience images, as it were in a mirror, all substances and their infinite modes, extending through the past, the present, and the future.

Ācārya (Muni) Nemicandra's Dravyasaṃgraha:

णट्टुचदुघाडकम्मो दंसणसुहणाणवीरियमईओ ।

सुहदेहत्यो अप्पा सुद्धो अरिहो विचिंतिज्जो ॥५०॥

That pure soul of the 'Arhat' or Lord Jina (the World Teacher) which has destroyed the four inimical (*ghāti*) karmas, is possessed of infinite perception (*darśana*), infinite bliss (*sukha*), infinite knowledge (*jñāna*) and infinite energy (*vīrya*), and which is housed in the supremely-auspicious (*paramaudārika*) body (*deha, śarīra*), should be meditated on.

Jain, Vijay K. (2022),

Ācārya (Muni) Nemicandra's Dravyasaṃgraha, p. 258.

Ācārya Kundakunda's Niyamasāra:

णिससेसदोसरहिओ केवलणाणाइपरमविभवजुदो ।

सो परमप्पा उच्चइ तच्चिवरीओ ण परमप्पा ॥७॥

The one who is rid of all (eighteen) imperfections in totality and is endowed with the supreme grandeur of omniscience

(*kevalajñāna*), etc., is called the Supreme Lord (*paramātmā*). The one who is not such qualified is not the Supreme Lord (*paramātmā*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2019),
Ācārya Kundakunda's Niyamasāra, p. 17.

Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra:

पक्खीणघादिकम्मो अणंतवरवीरिओ अहियतेजो ।

जादो अदिंदिओ सो णाणं सोक्खं च परिणमदि ॥१-११॥

On destruction of the four inimical (*ghāti*) karmas, the self-dependent soul – '*svayambhū*' – attains infinite knowledge (that illumines the self as well as all other objects) and indestructible happiness, both beyond the five senses (as such, termed *atīndriya*). On destruction of the obstructive (*antarāya*) karma, it is endowed with infinite strength. Thus, as the four inimical (*ghāti*) karmas are destroyed, the soul attains supreme lustre (*teja*) that is its own-nature (*svabhāva*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2018),
*Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra –
Essence of the Doctrine*, p. 27.

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra:

आप्तेनोच्छिन्नदोषेण सर्वज्ञेनागमेशिना ।

भवितव्यं नियोगेन नान्यथा ह्याप्तता भवेत् ॥५॥

As a rule, the sect-founder or deity (*āpta*) must be free from imperfections, all-knowing or Omniscient, and his teachings should become the basis of the Holy Scripture (*āgama*); without these attributes the trustworthiness of the sect-founder cannot be established.

Jain, Vijay K. (2016),
*Ācārya Samantabhadra's Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra –
The Jewel-casket of Householder's Conduct*, p. 20.

Being a possessor of omniscience – perfect knowledge and perception of unimaginable splendour and magnificence – the *Arhat* comprehends all objects of knowledge in their entirety, from all possible angles. His exposition of the reality is for the benefit of all living beings and non-controvertible by any known sources of knowledge. His words are the Holy Scripture.

Ācārya Samantabhadra's *Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra*:

आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लङ्घ्यमदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् ।

तत्त्वोपदेशकृत्सर्वं शास्त्रं कापथघट्टनम् ॥९॥

That alone is the true Scripture which is the word of the Omniscient, inviolable, not opposed to the two kinds of valid-knowledge – direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*) – reveals the true nature of reality, universally helpful to living beings, and potent enough to destroy all forms of falsehood.

Jain, Vijay K. (2016),

*Ācārya Samantabhadra's Ratnakaraṇḍaka-śrāvakācāra –
The Jewel-casket of Householder's Conduct*, p. 24.

The absolutist view is in contradiction with the direct sources of knowledge:

त्वन्मतामृतबाह्यानां सर्वथैकान्तवादिनाम् ।

आप्ताभिमानदग्धानां स्वेष्टं दृष्टेन बाध्यते ॥७॥

सामान्यार्थ - जिन्होंने आपके मत-रूपी अमृत - अनेकान्त शासन द्वारा प्रतिपादित वस्तु-तत्त्व - का स्वाद नहीं लिया है, जो सर्वथा एकान्तवादी हैं, और जो 'हम आप्त हैं' इस प्रकार के अभिमान से दग्ध हैं, उनका जो अपना इष्ट मत है उसमें प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण से बाधा आती है।

Those who are unfamiliar with your nectar-like doctrine and adopt absolutist (*ekānta*) views are the victims of conceit as they erroneously claim themselves to be Omniscient and trustworthy. What they seek to establish is contradicted by the direct (*pratyakṣa*) sources of knowledge.

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra:

एकान्तदृष्टिप्रतिषेधि तत्त्वं प्रमाणसिद्धं तदतत्स्वभावम् ।

त्वया प्रणीतं सुविधे स्वधाम्ना नैतत्समालीढपदं त्वदन्यैः ॥

(9-1-41)

O Lord Suvidhinātha! With the light of your omniscience you had promulgated the nature of reality in a manner which contradicts the absolutistic point-of-view, well-founded, and incorporates the principle of predication involving both the affirmation and the negation, depending on the point-of-view. Others have not been able to view the nature of reality in such light.

Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra, p. 58.

In the absolutist view, division of activities into virtuous and wicked is unsustainable:

कुशलाऽकुशलं कर्म परलोकश्च न क्वचित् ।
एकान्तग्रहरक्तेषु नाथ स्वपरवैरिषु ॥८॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! जो वस्तु के अनन्त धर्मों में से किसी एक ही धर्म को स्वीकारते हैं ऐसे एकान्त-रूप ग्रह के रंग में रंगे (वशीभूत) लोग अपने भी शत्रु हैं और दूसरे के भी शत्रु हैं। उनके यहाँ शुभ-कर्म एवं अशुभ-कर्म तथा परलोक आदि कुछ भी नहीं बनता है।

O Lord! Those saturated with prejudice to their own absolutist views (such as describing a substance absolutely permanent or absolutely transient) harm themselves as well as others. Such absolutist, stand-alone and non-equivocal views fail to establish the existence of virtuous (*śubha*) and wicked (*aśubha*) activities (*karma*) and consequently of things like rebirth (acquisition of another abode after death – *paraloka*).

Ācārya Samantabhadra's *Svayambhūstotra*:

य एव नित्यक्षणिकादयो नया मिथोऽनपेक्षाः स्वपरप्रणाशिनः ।
त एव तत्त्वं विमलस्य ते मुनेः परस्परैक्षाः स्वपरोपकारिणः ॥

(13-1-61)

O Unblemished Lord Vimalanātha! Those who hold the one-sided, stand-alone points-of-view such as describing a substance absolutely permanent (*nitya*) or transient (*kṣaṇika*), harm themselves and others, but, as you had proclaimed, when the assertions are understood to have been made only from certain standpoints, these reveal the

true nature of substances, and, therefore, benefit self as well as others.

Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra, p. 86.

Śrī Malliṣeṇa Surī's *Syādvāda-Maṅjarī* highlights the faults associated with the absolutist (*ekānta*) doctrine:

नैकान्तवादे सुखदुःखभोगौ न पुण्यपापे न च बन्धमोक्षौ ।
 दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनासिनैवं परैर्विलुप्तं जगदप्यशेषम् ॥२७॥

With the non-equivocal doctrine there are not experiences of pleasure and pain; not merit and sin, also not bondage and liberation. By the sword of the vice of contentions of bad reasoning the promulgators of such a doctrine abolish the world without residue.

With the non-equivocal (*ekānta*) doctrine, expressions of pleasure and pain, merit and sin, and bondage and liberation do not fit. A soul which is non-equivocally eternal the two experiences of pleasure and pain are not appropriate, for the mark of the eternal is 'having a single permanent form without loss and without origination'. If the eternal soul, having experienced pleasure, feels pain through the force of the apparatus of its karma, then, due to the difference in its own nature, non-eternalness follows; there is the consequence of loss of its having a single permanent form. The same is to be said of it when, having experienced pain, it enjoys pleasure.

Furthermore, experience of pleasure and pain are to be brought about by merit (to be obtained by good karma) and sin (to be obtained by evil karma), and the bringing about of them is the practical efficacy. That on the part of eternal isolated is not appropriate, either successively or not successively.

Bondage is the mutual interlacing of the self in its several infinitesimal parts (*pradeśa*) with atoms of karma, like a mass

of metal and fire. Liberation is waning of all karma. In the non-equivocally eternal these two also would not be. For bondage is a particular conjunction, and is defined as “the meeting of things which had not met”; non-meeting, belonging to a prior time is one state, and meeting, belonging to a later time, is another. Thus in the case of these two also the fault of difference of state is hard to get over. And how the self, having one-formness, has impromptu conjunction with bondage? And before conjunction with bondage, why was it not liberated? Moreover, by that bondage, does it experience alteration, or not? If it experiences, it is non-eternal. If it does not experience alteration, because of the fruitlessness of the bondage, it would be simply eternally liberated.

In case of non-appropriateness of bondage there is also non-appropriateness of liberation; because the word ‘liberation’ is a synonym for the cleaving apart of bonds.

Likewise also, in the doctrine of non-equivocal non-eternal there is no appropriateness of pleasure and pain, etc. What is non-eternal has the attribute of absolute annihilation; and if the soul is such, since the performer of the action of acquiring merit has perished without continuance, to whom does the experience of the pleasure which is the fruit thereof belong? Likewise, upon the total destruction also of the performer of action for acquiring sin, to whom does the consciousness of pain belong?

Excerpted, with minor modifications, from:
Thomas, F.W. (1968),
The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine –
Śrī Malliṣeṇa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maṅjarī, p. 149-151.

Fault in considering objects of knowledge as having 'absolute existence' (*bhāvaikānta*) character:

भावैकान्ते पदार्थानामभावानामपह्नुवात् ।

सर्वात्मकमनाद्यन्तमस्वरूपमतावकम् ॥९॥

सामान्यार्थ - पदार्थों के भाव (अस्तित्व) का एकान्त - पदार्थ सर्वथा सत्-रूप ही है - ऐसा भावैकान्त मानने पर अभाव पदार्थों (प्राक्-अभाव आदि) का लोप ठहरता है और इन चार प्रकार के वस्तु धर्मों का लोप करने से वस्तु-तत्त्व सर्वात्मक (सब-रूप), अनादि, अनन्त और अस्वरूप हो जाता है, जो आपका मत नहीं है।

If it be accepted that the objects of knowledge have 'absolute existence' (*bhāvaikānta*) character, their 'non-existence' (*abhāva*) character is denied. And then (by denying the four aspects of their non-existence) each object will pervade in every other object, will become without a beginning, without an end, and devoid of the form of its own.

Affirmation is the aspect of existence (*bhāva*); negation of non-existence (*abhāva*). The *abhāva* or non-existence of a substance – object of knowledge (*artha*) – is of four kinds:

1. Prior (antecedent) non-existence (*prāgabhāva*): The non-existence of the effect (the jar) in the cause (the lump-of-clay) previous to its production is the prior (antecedent) non-existence. It is expressed in the knowledge 'a thing will be'.

Due to prior (antecedent) non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) the effect comes into existence. The lump-of-clay signifies the prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) of the pitcher which is

formed on the lump-of-clay's cessation to exist.

Non-existence of the 'pitcher' before it is made is the *prāgabhāva* of the pitcher. The clay that was transformed into pitcher did not possess the attribute 'pitcher' before the pitcher was made.

All substances will become 'without beginning (defect – *anādi*)' if prior (antecedent) non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) is not accepted.

The absence of which, as a rule, accompanies the completion of an activity (e.g., making of a jar) is the prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*).

2. Posterior (emergent) non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*): The non-existence of the jar, consequent to its destruction by a pestle is the posterior (emergent) non-existence.

Due to posterior (emergent) non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) the effect comes to an end. The collection of pitcher-pieces signifies the posterior non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) of the pitcher which is necessarily destroyed on the rise of the pitcher pieces.

Non-existence of the 'pitcher' after it is broken is *pradhvaṃsābhāva* of the pitcher. The collection of pitcher-pieces no more possesses the attribute 'pitcher' after the pitcher has been broken.

All substances will become 'without end (defect – *ananta*)' if posterior (emergent) non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) is not accepted.

The absence of which, as a rule, accompanies the destruction of an activity (e.g., destruction of a jar) is the posterior (emergent) non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*).

3. Reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *itaretarābhāva*): Reciprocal non-existence is expressed in the consciousness 'this is not that'.

Reciprocal non-existence implies the non-pervasion of the nature of a thing in the nature of another thing; for instance the non-pervasion of the nature of a pitcher in the nature of a pillar. There is reciprocal non-existence of a pitcher in a pillar, as these exist.

Reciprocal non-existence focuses on the present, i.e., on the present form of substances. The jar and the board are mutually non-existent in each other but the possibility of conversion of one into the other cannot be ruled out. It is possible that after a jar gets destroyed and takes the form of clay, the clay then gets transformed into a board at some point of time.

All substances will become 'pervading in everything or all-pervading (defect – *sarvātmaka*)' if reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *itaretarābhāva*) is not accepted.

There is no rule which suggests that either the presence or absence of reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *itaretarābhāva*) will bring about the accomplishment or destruction of an activity. There is reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *itaretarābhāva*) in water and fire but there is no rule that in the absence of water there is fire and in the presence of water there is destruction of fire.

4. Absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*): Absolute non-existence is the non-existence of something in a substrate through the three times (past, present and future). Thus there is absolute non-existence of colour in air.

Absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) denies the existence, in all the three times, of an attribute of a substance in another substance – for instance the animate nature of the soul (*jīva*) cannot be found in the non-soul (*ajīva*); never ever can the soul become a non-soul and the non-soul a soul.

There is absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) between the soul (*jīva*) and the matter (*pudgala*); these two can never become one in the three times. Soul is existent with respect to its own characteristic of consciousness but exhibits absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) with respect to the inanimate nature of matter. All six substances (*dravya*) exhibit absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) with respect to each other; for example, there is absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) between the matter (*pudgala*) and the medium of motion (*dharma*), and between the space (*ākāśa*) and the substance of time (*kāla*). These substances may mingle like milk and water, give room to others, but still retain their individual identity.

While the time-frame of the reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *itaretarābhāva*) is the present, that of the absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) is the past, present and future.

All substances will become 'devoid of the form of their own (defect - *asvarūpa*)' if absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) is not accepted.

Fault in non-acceptance of prior (antecedent) non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) and posterior (emergent) non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*):

कार्यद्रव्यमनादि स्यात् प्रागभावस्य निह्वे ।

प्रध्वंसस्य च धर्मस्य प्रच्यवेऽनन्ततां व्रजेत् ॥१०॥

सामान्यार्थ – प्रागभाव का यदि लोप किया जाए तो घट आदि कार्य-रूप द्रव्य अनादि – उत्पत्ति-विहीन – हो जाता है और यदि प्रध्वंसाभाव का लोप किया जाए तो वह कार्य-रूप द्रव्य अनन्त – विनाश-विहीन – हो जाता है।

If prior (antecedent) non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) is not accepted, a produced entity (for example, a jar or a word) will become 'without beginning' (*anādi*). If posterior (emergent) non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) is not accepted, a produced entity will become 'without end' (*ananta*).

**Fault in non-acceptance of reciprocal non-existence
(*anyonyābhāva* or *itaretarābhāva*) and absolute non-existence
(*atyantābhāva*):**

सर्वात्मकं तदेकं स्यादन्यापोहव्यतिक्रमे ।

अन्यत्र समवाये न व्यपदिश्येत सर्वथा ॥११॥

सामान्यार्थ - यदि अन्यापोह - अन्योन्याभाव अथवा इतरेतराभाव - का व्यतिक्रम किया जाए अर्थात् अन्योन्याभाव के न मानने पर किसी का जो एक इष्ट तत्त्व है वह अभेदरूप सर्वात्मक हो जाएगा। तथा अत्यन्ताभाव के न मानने पर एक द्रव्य का दूसरे द्रव्य में समवाय-सम्बन्ध (तादात्म्य) स्वीकृत होता है। ऐसा होने पर किसी भी इष्ट तत्त्व का सर्वथा भेदरूप से कोई व्यपदेश (कथन) - जैसे यह चेतन है, और यह अचेतन है - नहीं हो सकेगा।

If reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *itaretarābhāva*) is not accepted, the substance under consideration will become 'pervading in everything or all-pervading' (*sarvātmaka*). If absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) is not accepted, the substance will become 'devoid of the form of its own' (*asvarūpa*) and distinction between different substances (e.g., the animate soul and the inanimate matter) will not be maintained.

Fault in considering objects of knowledge as having ‘absolute non-existence’ (*abhāvaikānta*) character – *śūnyavāda*:

अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भावापह्ववादिनाम् ।

बोधवाक्यं प्रमाणं न केन साधनदूषणम् ॥१२॥

सामान्यार्थ – भाव को नहीं मानने वाले – सभी पदार्थों को सर्वथा असत्-रूप कहने वाले – अभावैकान्तवादियों के मत में भी इष्ट तत्त्व की सिद्धि नहीं हो सकती है क्योंकि वहाँ न बोध (ज्ञान) का अस्तित्व है और न वाक्य (आगम) का और इसलिए प्रमाण भी नहीं बनता है। प्रमाण के अभाव में स्वमत की सिद्धि तथा परमत का खण्डन किस प्रकार संभव है?

If it be accepted that the objects of knowledge have ‘absolute non-existence’ (*abhāvaikānta*) character and their ‘existence’ (*bhāva*) character is denied, cognition (*bodha*) and sentence (*vākya*) can no longer remain the sources of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). And in the absence of the sources of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), how can the proposed thesis (‘absolute non-existence’ character of an object of knowledge) be established, and that of the rivals repudiated?

Fault in accepting both, 'absolute existence' (*bhāvaikānta*) and 'absolute non-existence' (*abhāvaikānta*), without mutual dependence:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥१३॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ भाव और अभाव दोनों का निरपेक्ष अस्तित्व नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में 'यह अवाच्य है' ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 'absolute existence' (*bhāvaikānta*) and 'absolute non-existence' (*abhāvaikānta*) – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayaikānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational.

Flawless depiction of the reality through the 'seven-nuance system' (*saptabhaṅgī*):

कथञ्चित् ते सदेवेष्टं कथञ्चिदसदेव तत् ।

तथोभयमवाच्यं च नययोगान्न सर्वथा ॥१४॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे वीर जिन ! आपके शासन में वस्तु-तत्त्व कथञ्चित् सत्-रूप ही है, कथञ्चित् असत्-रूप ही है। इसी प्रकार अपेक्षाभेद से वह वस्तु-तत्त्व कथञ्चित् उभय-रूप और कथञ्चित् अवक्तव्य-रूप ही है। (कथञ्चित् सत् और अवक्तव्य-रूप, कथञ्चित् असत् और अवक्तव्य-रूप तथा कथञ्चित् सत्, असत् और अवक्तव्य-रूप ही है।) नय की अपेक्षा से वस्तु-तत्त्व सत् आदि रूप है, सर्वथा नहीं।

O Lord! In your reckoning, the object of knowledge is in a way existing (*sat*); in a way non-existing (*asat*); in a way both existing and non-existing (*sat* as well as *asat* – *ubhaya*); and in a way indescribable (*avaktavya*) [further, as a corollary, in a way existing (*sat*) and indescribable (*avaktavya*); in a way non-existing (*asat*) and indescribable (*avaktavya*); and in a way existing (*sat*), non-existing (*asat*), and indescribable (*avaktavya*)]. These assertions are made in accordance with the speaker's choice of the particular state or mode of the object – *naya*.

A thing or object of knowledge has infinite characters (i.e., it is *anekāntātmaka*); each character can be analyzed and grasped individually. Each individual character is called a *naya*. A *naya* thus reveals only a part of the totality, and should not be mistaken for the whole. A synthesis of different viewpoints is

achieved by the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) wherein every viewpoint is able to retain its relative importance. *Syādvāda* consists in seven vocal statements adorned by the qualifying clause ‘in a way’ – *syāt*, also spelled as ‘*syād*’.

When in regard to a single entity – soul, etc. – an enquiry is made relating to its attribute – existence, etc. – with all-round examination, there is a possibility of seven statements, adorned with the term ‘*quodammodo*’¹ or ‘in a way’ (*syāt*). This is called the ‘seven-nuance system’ (*saptabhaṅgī*). It embraces the seven limbs (*saptabhaṅga*) of assertion, the one-sided but relative method of comprehension (*naya*), and also the acceptance and rejection of the assertion.

Syādvāda, which literally signifies assertion of possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all possible standpoints. Its chief merit is the *anekānta*, or many-sided view of the object of knowledge. This, it would be seen at once, is most necessary in order to acquire full knowledge about any object.

Things are neither existent nor non-existent absolutely. Two seemingly contrary statements may be found to be both true if we take the trouble of finding out the two points-of-view from which the statements were made. For example, a man is a father with reference to his son, and a son with reference to his father. Now it is a fact that he can be a son and a father at one and the same time. A thing may be said to be existent in a way and to be non-existent in another way, and so forth. *Syādvāda* examines things from seven points-of-view, hence the doctrine is also called *saptabhaṅgī naya* (sevenfold method of relative comprehension). It is stated as follows:

1. The Latin word *quodammodo* has many meanings, mainly: ‘in a certain way’, and ‘in a certain measure’.

1. स्याद् अस्ति एव (*syād-asti-eva*)
In a way it simply is; this is the first 'nuance', with the notion of affirmation.
2. स्याद् नास्ति एव (*syād-nāsti-eva*)
In a way it simply is not; this is the second 'nuance', with the notion of negation.
3. स्याद् अवक्तव्य एव (*syād-avaktavya-eva*)
In a way it is simply indescribable; this is the third 'nuance', with the notion of *simultaneous* affirmation and negation.
4. स्याद् अस्ति नास्ति एव (*syād-asti-nāsti-eva*)
In a way it simply is, in a way it simply is not; this is the fourth 'nuance', with the notion of *successive* affirmation and negation.
5. स्याद् अस्ति अवक्तव्य एव (*syād-asti-avaktavya-eva*)
In a way it simply is, in a way it is simply indescribable; this is the fifth 'nuance', with the notion of affirmation and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation.
6. स्याद् नास्ति अवक्तव्य एव (*syād-nāsti-avaktavya-eva*)
In a way it simply is not, in a way it is simply indescribable; this is the sixth 'nuance', with the notion of negation and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation.
7. स्याद् अस्ति नास्ति अवक्तव्य एव (*syād-asti-nāsti-avaktavya-eva*)
In a way it simply is, in a way it simply is not, in a way it is simply indescribable; this is the seventh 'nuance', with the successive notions of affirmation and negation, and the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation.

The primary modes of predication are three – *syād-asti*, *syād-nāsti* and *syād-avaktavya*; the other four are obtained by combining these three.

The phrase ‘in a way’ (*syāt*) declares the standpoint of expression – affirmation with regard to own substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), and being (*bhāva*), and negation with regard to other substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), and being (*bhāva*). Thus, for a ‘jar’, in regard to substance (*dravya*) – earthen, it simply is; wooden, it simply is not. In regard to place (*kṣetra*) – room, it simply is; terrace, it simply is not. In regard to time (*kāla*) – summer, it simply is; winter, it simply is not. In regard to being (*bhāva*) – brown, it simply is; white, it simply is not. And the word ‘simply’ has been inserted for the purpose of excluding a sense not approved by the ‘nuance’; for avoidance of a meaning not intended. The phrase ‘in a way’ is used to declare that the ‘jar’ exists in regard to its own substance, etc. and not also in regard to other substance, etc. Even where the phrase is not employed, the meaning is conceived by knowers of it in all cases from the sense; just as the word ‘*eva*’ (एव) having the purpose of cutting off the non-application.

The seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case of pairs of opposite attributes like eternal and non-eternal, one and many, and universal and particular. These pairs of opposites can very well be predicated of every attribute of the reality. In the case of contradictory propositions, we have two opposite aspects of the reality, both valid, serving as the basis of the propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion; each assertion is definite and clear.

To the existence of an entity non-existence is indispensable; and to its non-existence the former. And the primariness and secondariness of the two depends on the standpoint or intent.

When a single entity is designated by the two attributes, existence and non-existence, applied simultaneously as primary, from the impossibility of such a word, the entity is indescribable. The pair of qualities, existence and non-existence, cannot be stated together, as one thing, by the term 'existent' because that is incompetent for the expression of non-existence. Similarly, the term 'non-existent' cannot be used because that is incompetent for the expression of existence. Nor can a single conventional term express that since it can cause presentation of things only in succession. From lack of all forms of expression the entity is indescribable, but it stands out – overpowered by simultaneous existence and non-existence, both applied as primary. It is not in every way indescribable because of the consequence that it would then be undenotable even by the word 'indescribable'. It only refers to the impossibility of finding an idea which could include both, the thesis and the antithesis, at the same time.

The remaining three are easily understood.

That the complex nature of a real object or *dravya* is amenable to description by the seven and only seven propositions is made clear by Ācārya Kundakunda in *Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha*:

सिय अत्थि णत्थि उहयं अव्वत्तव्वं पुणो य तत्तिदयं ।

दव्वं खु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ॥१४॥

The substance (*dravya*), essentially, is that which is expressed through the seven-limbs (*saptabhāṅga*) of assertion. These are: in a way (*syād*)¹ it simply is – *syād-asti*, in a way it simply is not – *syād-nāsti*, in a way it simply

-
1. The particle 'syād' in a sentence qualifies the acceptance or rejection of the proposition or predication expressed in the sentence. It refers to a 'point-of-view' or 'in a particular context' or 'in a particular sense'.

is and in a way it simply is not – *syād-asti-nāsti*, in a way it simply is indescribable – *syād-avaktavya*, and the combinations of ‘indescribable’ (*avaktavya*) with the first three: in a way it simply is and in a way it simply is indescribable – *syād-asti-avaktavya*, in a way it simply is not and in a way it simply is indescribable – *syād-nāsti-avaktavya*, and in a way it simply is, in a way it simply is not and in a way it simply is indescribable – *syād-asti-nāsti-avaktavya*.

Jain, Vijay K. (2020),
Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha, p. 29-30.

Ācārya Kundakunda’s *Pravacanasāra*:

अत्थि त्ति य णत्थि त्ति य हवदि अवत्तव्वमिदि पुणो दव्वं ।
पज्जाएण दु केणवि तदुभयमादिदुमण्णं वा ॥२-२३॥

According as the substance (*dravya*) is viewed with regard to its different modes (*paryāya*), it may be described by the following propositions: 1) in a way it is (*asti*); 2) in a way it is not (*nāsti*); 3) in a way it is indescribable (*avaktavya*); 4) in a way it is and is not (*asti-nāsti*); and by the remaining three propositions: 5) in a way it is and is indescribable (*asti-avaktavya*); 6) in a way it is not and is indescribable (*nāsti-avaktavya*); and 7) in a way it is, is not and is indescribable (*asti-nāsti-avaktavya*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2018),
*Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra –
Essence of the Doctrine*, p. 144-145.

Ācārya Samantabhadra’s *Svayambhūstotra*:

सर्वथानियमत्यागी यथादृष्टमपेक्षकः ।
स्याच्छब्दस्तावके न्याये नान्येषामात्मविद्विषाम् ॥

(18-17-102)

In your doctrine, the use of the word 'syād' (meaning, conditional, from a particular standpoint) rules out the absolutistic viewpoint and demonstrates only the relative aspect. Others do not use such stipulation and cause their own destruction.

Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra, p. 127.

PREVIEW ONLY

The first two standpoints of *saptabhaṅgī* – affirmation and negation:

सदेव सर्वं को नेच्छेत् स्वरूपादिचतुष्टयात् ।
असदेव विपर्यासान्न चेन्न व्यवतिष्ठते ॥१५॥

सामान्यार्थ – स्वरूपादि चतुष्टय – स्वद्रव्य, स्वक्षेत्र, स्वकाल तथा स्वभाव – की अपेक्षा से सब पदार्थों को सत्-रूप तथा पररूपादि चतुष्टय – परद्रव्य, परक्षेत्र, परकाल तथा परभाव – की अपेक्षा से असत्-रूप कौन नहीं अंगीकार करेगा? वस्तु-तत्त्व के विषय में यही व्यवस्था है; ऐसा न मानने पर किसी भी तत्त्व की व्यवस्था नहीं बन सकती है।

O Lord! Who will not agree that the objects of knowledge exhibit the quality of existence (*sat*) with regard to their own-quaternion (*svacatuṣṭaya*) [own-substance (*svadravya*), own-place (*svakṣetra*), own-time (*svakāla*), and own-being (*svabhāva*)], and the quality of non-existence (*asat*) with regard to other-quaternion (*paracatuṣṭaya*) [other-substance (*paradravya*), other-place (*parakṣetra*), other-time (*parakāla*), and other-being (*parabhāva*)]? Without such a method of analysis of the reality, no object of interest can be systematically established.

The positive predicate refers to the object's own-quaternion (*svacatuṣṭaya*) and the negative predicate refers to other-quaternion (*paracatuṣṭaya*). Consider this: 'as per the scripture, consciousness (*upayoga*) is the own-being (*svabhāva*) of the soul (*jīva*).' The positive predicate will be: 'the soul is existent (*sat*) with regard to consciousness (*upayoga*) which is its own-being (*svabhāva*).' The negative

predicate will be: 'the soul is non-existent (*asat*) with regard to non-consciousness (*anupayoga*) which is its other-being (*parabhāva*).'

As another illustration, the world is eternal with regard to its substance (*dravya*); it is non-eternal with regard to the forms (*paryāya*) of substances that are seen one day and gone the next.

If the object be considered existent (*sat*) with regard to its other-quaternion too, the difference between an animate object (*jīva* - soul) and an inanimate object (*ajīva* - non-soul, matter) will vanish. If the object be considered non-existent (*asat*) with regard to its own-quaternion too, everything will become null and void (*śūnya*).

Successive affirmation and negation (*ubhaya*), simultaneous affirmation and negation (*avaktavya*), and the remaining three limbs of *saptabhaṅgī*:

क्रमार्पितद्वयाद् द्वैतं सहावाच्यमशक्तितः ।

अवक्तव्योत्तराः शेषास्त्रयो भङ्गाः स्वेहतुतः ॥१६॥

सामान्यार्थ - वस्तु-तत्त्व स्व-पर-चतुष्टय की अपेक्षा से क्रम से विवक्षा होने से उभयात्मक (द्वैत) है तथा स्व-पर-चतुष्टय की अपेक्षा से युगपत् विवक्षा होने से कथन की असामर्थ्य के कारण अवक्तव्य है। इसी प्रकार सत्, असत् तथा उभय के साथ अवक्तव्य को लिए हुए जो शेष तीन भंग हैं वे भी अपने-अपने कारणों के अनुसार सुघटित हैं।

An object can exhibit, in a way, the dual character of existence as well as non-existence (*sat* and *asat* – *ubhaya*) when asserted successively in regard to the elements of the quaternion; the same character (existence as well as non-existence), when asserted simultaneously, leads to a proposition that is indescribable (*avaktavya*) due to the limitation of our expression. The remaining three forms of assertion [existing (*sat*) and indescribable (*avaktavya*); non-existing (*asat*) and indescribable (*avaktavya*); and existing (*sat*), non-existing (*asat*), and indescribable (*avaktavya*)] arise from their own causes depending on the particular state or mode of the object – *naya*.

When the object is seen successively from the two points-of-view – substance (*dravya*) and form (*paryāya*) – there is simple summing up only of the results. We can assert, without fear of contradiction, that soul is both eternal and non-eternal. It is

eternal from the substance (*dravya*) point-of-view and non-eternal from the form (*paryāya*) point-of-view.

When we think of the object from both the substance (*dravya*) and the form (*paryāya*) points-of-view simultaneously, it presents existence as well as non-existence at once, and as there is no word in our language except indescribability that can represent the idea that arises in the mind at that time, we express this by the word 'indescribable' (*avaktavya*).



PREVIEW ONLY

Existence has invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with non-existence:

अस्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येनाविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि ।

विशेषणत्वात् साधर्म्यं यथा भेदविवक्षया ॥१७॥

सामान्यार्थ – एक ही वस्तु (धर्मो) के विशेषण होने के कारण अस्तित्व धर्म (विधेय) का नास्तित्व धर्म (प्रतिषेध्य) के साथ अविनाभाव सम्बन्ध है, जैसे कि हेतु प्रयोग में साधर्म्य (अन्वय-हेतु) भेद विवक्षा से वैधर्म्य (व्यतिरेक-हेतु) के साथ अविनाभाव सम्बन्ध लिए रहता है।

Existence (*astitva*), being a qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an entity (*dharmī*), has invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with its opposite, non-existence (*nāstitva*). It is like presence-in-homologue (*sādharmya*), a qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the middle term (*hetu*), will have invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with its opposite, absence-in-heterologue (*vaidharmya*), used to highlight distinction (*vyatireka*).

The middle term (*hetu*) has both – the association (*anvaya*) and the distinction (*vyatireka*) – with the major term (*sādhyā*). Association (*anvaya*) establishes the homogeneousness (*sādharmya*), and distinction (*vyatireka*) the heterogeneousness (*vaidharmya*) with the major term (*sādhyā*).

Association (*anvaya*) establishes the logical connection (*vyāpti*) by positivity: “The hill is full of fire (major term) because it is full of smoke (middle term), as a kitchen,” – the presence of the major term (*sādhyā*) is attended by the presence of the middle term (*hetu* or *sādhana*) – presence-in-homologue (*sādharmya*).

Distinction (*vyatireka*) establishes the logical connection by contrariety: “The hill has no smoke (major term) because it has no fire (middle term), as a lake,” – the absence of the major term (*sādhya*) is attended by the absence of the middle term (*hetu* or *sādhana*) – absence-in-heterologue (*vaidharmya*).

Homogeneousness (*sādharmya*) and heterogeneousness (*vaidharmya*) are relative to each other and always go together. The middle term (*hetu*) is qualified by both – homogeneousness (*sādharmya*) and heterogeneousness (*vaidharmya*).

Smoke has invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with fire: smoke means existence of fire, and there is no smoke without fire. Fire, on the other hand, has no invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with smoke as there can be fire without smoke. It cannot be said that fire must have smoke, and that without smoke there is no fire.

But existence and non-existence have mutual (*ubhaya*) invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*); non-existence is always accompanied by existence and existence is always accompanied by non-existence. This is because existence and non-existence, both, are qualifying attributes (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the same substratum, i.e., the entity (*dharmī*).

Non-existence has invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with existence:

नास्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येनाऽविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि ।

विशेषणत्वाद्धैधर्म्यं यथाऽभेदविवक्षया ॥१८॥

सामान्यार्थ – एक ही वस्तु (धर्मी) में विशेषण होने से नास्तित्व धर्म अपने प्रतिषेध्य अस्तित्व धर्म के साथ अविनाभाव सम्बन्ध लिए रहता है, जैसे कि हेतु प्रयोग में वैधर्म्य (व्यतिरेक-हेतु) अभेद विवक्षा से साधर्म्य (अन्वय-हेतु) के साथ अविनाभाव सम्बन्ध लिए रहता है।

Non-existence (*nāstitva*), being a qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the entity (*dharmī*), has invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with its opposite, existence (*astitva*). It is like absence-in-heterologue (*vaidharmya*), a qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the middle term (*hetu*), will have invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with its opposite, presence-in-homologue (*sādharmya*), used to highlight association (*anvaya*).

An entity, expressible by word, possesses both the characters – existence and non-existence:

विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मा विशेष्यः शब्दगोचरः ।

साध्यधर्मो यथा हेतुरहेतुश्चाप्यपेक्षया ॥१९॥

सामान्यार्थ – विशेष्य (धर्मी या पक्ष) विधेय-रूप और प्रतिषेध-रूप होता है क्योंकि वह शब्द का विषय होता है। जैसे कि साध्य का धर्म अपेक्षा भेद से हेतु-रूप (साधन) भी होता है और अहेतु-रूप (असाधन) भी होता है।

The entity qualified (*viśeṣya*), being expressible by word, must possess the characters existence (*astitva* or *vidheya* – affirmative) as well as non-existence (*nāstitva* or *pratiśedhya* – negative). This is akin to the fact that depending on what is to be proved of the major term (*sādhya*), a reason can be a legitimate middle term (*hetu*) and also not a legitimate middle term (*ahetu*).

When the hill is full of fire, smoke is a *hetu*, able to establish the particular attribute of the *sādhya*. But when the hill is full of snow, smoke is an *ahetu*, unable to establish the particular attribute of the *sādhya*. Thus, smoke has both the attributes – *hetu* and *ahetu* – depending on the attribute of the major term (*sādhya*) under consideration.

In the same way, an entity, expressible by word, possesses both the characters – existence and non-existence – depending on the point-of-view. Existence is from one point-of-view (substance – *dravya*), and non-existence from another point-of-view (mode – *pariyāya*). Existence and non-existence are the qualifying attributes (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the entity qualified (*viśeṣya*).

The remaining nuances (limbs) of *saptabhaṅgī* also fit appropriately in the *naya* scheme:

शेषभङ्गाश्च नेतव्या यथोक्तनययोगतः ।

न च कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति मुनीन्द्र तव शासने ॥२०॥

सामान्यार्थ - यथोक्त नय के अनुसार शेष भंगों - कथञ्चित् अवक्तव्य, कथञ्चित् सत् और अवक्तव्य, कथञ्चित् असत् और अवक्तव्य, तथा कथञ्चित् सत्, असत् और अवक्तव्य - को भी लगा लेना चाहिए। हे मुनीन्द्र ! (वस्तु-तत्त्व अनेकान्तात्मक होने के कारण) आपके शासन में किसी प्रकार का विरोध नहीं है।

The remaining nuances of *saptabhaṅgī* - simultaneous affirmation and negation (indescribability); affirmation and indescribability; negation and indescribability; and affirmation, negation and indescribability - should also be understood in respect of appropriate state or mode of the object (*naya*). O Lord of the Sages! There are no contradictions in your doctrine [of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*)].

It has been established that existence is not contradictory to non-existence and existence as well as non-existence are possible in a single entity. In the same manner, indescribability also, consisting of simultaneous affirmation and negation, has no mutual contradiction. The whole seven-nuance view, a combination of the triad of nuances defined as existence, non-existence, and indescribability, has no contradictions whatsoever when viewed in light of the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*).

How is the association of these seemingly contradictory

attributes – existence and non-existence, one and many, eternal and non-eternal, universality and particularity, etc. – possible in a single entity? This is possible when the statement is conditioned by differences of conditions – delimitants or part-aspects. Non-existence in existent things is not contradictory when conditioned by differences of conditions. In the same way, existence and indescribability are not contradictory. Existence does not occur with avoidance of non-existence, nor does non-existence occur with avoidance of existence. Contradiction would be if existence and non-existence were to be with one (same) condition. Existence has one condition, and non-existence another. Existence is with respect to own form and non-existence with respect to the form of another.



PREVIEW

Relative existence of both, affirmation and negation, make it possible for an object to perform activity:

एवं विधिनिषेधाभ्यामनवस्थितमर्थकृत् ।

नेति चेन्न यथा कार्यं बहिरन्तरूपाधिभिः ॥२१॥

सामान्यार्थ – इस प्रकार विधि और निषेध के द्वारा जो वस्तु (अर्थ) अवस्थित नहीं है – अर्थात् उभय-रूप जो वस्तु है (सर्वथा अस्तित्व-रूप या सर्वथा नास्तित्व-रूप से निर्धारित नहीं है) – वही अर्थ-क्रिया को करने वाली होती है, अन्यथा नहीं। ऐसा न मानने पर बहिरंग और अन्तरंग कारणों से जो कार्य का निष्पन्न होना माना गया है वह नहीं बनता।

An object (*artha*) which is either absolutely existent (affirmation – *sat, vidhi*) or absolutely non-existent (negation – *asat, niṣedha*) is incapable of performing activity (*artha-kriyā*); only with the relative presence of both, existence and non-existence, it becomes capable of performing activity. It is not possible for an absolutely existent or absolutely non-existent object to perform activity even on the availability of appropriate extrinsic and intrinsic causes.

The activity of an object is called the *artha-kriyā*. The loss of its previous form and emergence of the new form, together, is called the *pariṇāma*. The *artha-kriyā* is possible only in objects which exhibit both, the general (*sāmānya – dravya*) as well as particular (*viśeṣa – paryāya*), attributes. It cannot exist only in *dravya* or only in *paryāya*. An object must have both, the general as well as the particular attributes; without *dravya* there is no *paryāya* and without *paryāya* there is no *dravya*. Without any of these two, the object becomes a non-object (*avastu*) and hence not a subject of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

Each attribute of the entity is different from the other; the point-of-view determines the primary or secondary nature of the attribute:

धर्मं धर्मेऽन्य एवार्थो धर्मिणोऽनन्तधर्मणः ।

अङ्गित्वेऽन्यतमान्तस्य शेषान्तानां तदङ्गता ॥२२॥

सामान्यार्थ – अनन्त-धर्म वाले धर्मों का प्रत्येक धर्म एक भिन्न ही प्रयोजन को लिए हुए होता है। और उन धर्मों में से एक धर्म के प्रधान होने पर शेष धर्मों की प्रतीति उस समय गौण-रूप से होती है।

Each individual attribute (*dharma*) of an entity (*dharmī*), having infinite attributes, carries with it a particular meaning. When one attribute is treated as the primary attribute, the other attributes stay in the background as the secondary attributes.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's Tattvārthasūtra:

अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः ॥५-३२॥

The seemingly contradictory attributes (*dharma*) are established from the points-of-view, whether primary (*arpita*) or secondary (*anarpita*).

The substance has infinite attributes (*dharma*). The particular attribute (*dharma*) under consideration and, therefore, primary (*mukhya*) as per the need of expression, is called 'arpita' or 'upanīta'. The other attributes (*dharma*), not under consideration and, therefore, secondary (*gauna*) as per the need of expression, are called 'anarpita'. This means that though other attributes are present in the substance but since, at that particular time, are not under consideration, these are secondary attributes. Thus, depending on the point-of-view,

contradictory attributes are established in a single substance. For instance, there is no contradiction in the same person Devadatta being a father, a son, a brother, a nephew, and so on. In each case, the point-of-view is different. From the point-of-view of his son he is a father, and from the point-of-view of his father he is a son. Similarly with regard to his other designations. In the same manner, from the point-of-view of its general (*sāmānya*) qualities, the substance (*dravya*) is permanent (*nitya*). From the point-of-view of its specific (*viśeṣa*) qualities – the modes – the substance (*dravya*) is impermanent (*anitya*). Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*), are the two points-of-view that reconcile apparent contradictions and make possible worldly intercourse.

Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2018),
Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra, p. 215-216.

Objects possess infinite attributes and may be conceived from as many points-of-view; i.e., objects truly are subject to all-sided knowledge (possible only in omniscience). What is not composed of infinite attributes, in the sphere of the three times, is also not existent, like a 'sky-flower'. To comprehend the object from one particular standpoint is the scope of *naya* (the one-sided method of comprehension). *Naya* comprehends one specific attribute of the object but *pramāṇa* comprehends the object in its fullness. *Pramāṇa* does not make a distinction between substance and its attributes but it grasps the object in its entirety. But *naya* looks at the object from a particular point-of-view and gives emphasis to a particular aspect of the object.

Both *pramāṇa* and *naya* are forms of knowledge; *pramāṇa* is *sakaladeśa* – comprehensive and absolute, and *naya* is *vikaladeśa* – partial and relative. A *naya* looks at the object from a particular point-of-view and presents the picture of it in

relation to that view; the awareness of other aspects is in the background and not ignored.

A *naya* is neither *pramāṇa* nor *apramāṇa* (not *pramāṇa*). It is a part of *pramāṇa*. A drop of water of the ocean cannot be considered the ocean nor the non-ocean; it is a part of the ocean. Similarly, a soldier is neither an army, nor a non-army; but a part of the army. The same argument goes with *naya*. A *naya* is a partial presentation of the nature of the object, while *pramāṇa* is comprehensive in its presentation. A *naya* does neither give false knowledge nor does it deny the existence of other aspects of knowledge. There are as many *naya* as there are points-of-view.

PREVIEW

The seven-nuance system (*saptabhaṅgī*) should also be applied in case of other duals like one and many:

एकानेकविकल्पादावुत्तरत्रापि योजयेत् ।

प्रक्रियां भङ्गिनीमेनां नयैर्नयविशारदः ॥२३॥

सामान्यार्थ - जो नय-निपुण (नय-विशारद) हैं उनको इस सात भंग वाली प्रक्रिया को आगे भी एक-अनेक आदि धर्म-युगलों में नय के अनुसार योजना करना चाहिए।

Those proficient in the scheme of the *naya* (viewing an object from a particular point-of-view) should apply the seven-nuance-system (*saptabhaṅgī*) to other dual attributes like one (*eka*) and many (*aneka*).

Objects of knowledge exhibit the quality of one (*eka*) as well as the quality of many (*aneka*). Oneness (*ekatva*), being a qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an entity (*dharmī*), has invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with manyness (*anekatva*). Manyness (*anekatva*), being a qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the entity (*dharmī*), has invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with oneness (*ekatva*). An object can exhibit, in a way, the dual character of oneness (*ekatva*) as well as manyness (*anekatva*) when asserted successively in regard to the elements of the quaternion; the same character (oneness as well as manyness), when asserted simultaneously, leads to a proposition that is indescribable (*avaktavya*) due to the limitation of our expression. The remaining three forms of assertion [oneness (*ekatva*) and indescribable; manyness (*anekatva*) and indescribable; and oneness (*ekatva*), manyness (*anekatva*), and indescribable] arise from their own causes

depending on the particular state or mode of the object – *naya*.

The *naya* scheme, applied to a pitcher: the pitcher is, in a way, one (as a substance), and also, in a way, many (as modes). The substance (*dravya*) of clay, exhibiting permanence (*dhrauvya*), runs through all modes; however, modes (*paryāya*) keep on changing due to origination (*utpāda*) and destruction (*vyaya*).



PREVIEW ONLY

Section 2

द्वितीय परिच्छेद

Fault in the doctrine of absolute non-dualism (*advaita-ekānta*):

अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि दृष्टो भेदो विरुध्यते ।

कारकाणां क्रियायाश्च नैकं स्वस्मात् प्रजायते ॥२४॥

सामान्यार्थ – अद्वैतैकान्त पक्ष में कारकों और क्रियाओं का भेद जो प्रत्यक्ष सिद्ध (स्पष्ट दिखाई देने वाला सत्य) है वह विरोध को प्राप्त होता है। क्योंकि जो भी कोई एक सर्वथा अकेला (असहाय) है वह स्वयं अपने से उत्पन्न नहीं हो सकता है।

The doctrine of absolute non-dualism (*advaita-ekānta*) suffers from contradiction as it denies the duality of factors-of-action (*kāraka*) and action (*kriyā*), as ascertained directly by cognition; it is not possible for an object to get produced out of itself.

In this verse we come to the Advaita-Vedānta doctrine which holds that Brahma, often described as ‘Existence-Thought-Bliss’ (*sat-cid-ānanda*) is the sole reality, the world being a product of illusion (*māyā*) or ignorance (*avidyā*). All different things are manifestations of Brahma; only the one eternally undivided Brahma exists. The doctrine justifies an ultimate non-reality of the world of things (*vastu-prapañca*) found in the triple universe as being appearance (*pratibhāsa*) through the power of illusion (*māyā*) or ignorance (*avidyā*).

Factors-of-action (*kāraka*) comprise the doer (*kartā*), the

activity (*karma*) and the instrument (*karāṇa*), etc. Action (*kriyā*) consists in changes that are termed as coming and going, motion and stillness, origination and destruction, eating and drinking, contraction and expansion, etc.

Duality between the factors-of-action (*kāraka*) and the action (*kriyā*) is seen in everyday experience. This universally observable cognition goes against the doctrine of absolute non-dualism (*advaita-ekānta*).

Without the instrumentality of the factors-of-action (*kāraka*) and the action (*kriyā*), it is also not possible to account for the production of an absolutely non-dualistic object; it can certainly not get produced by itself.

If illusion (*māyā*) is something 'existent', distinct from Self-Brahma, then reality is established as dual, setting an axe at the root of the Advaita doctrine. If illusion (*māyā*) is something 'non-existent' but capable of producing effects, there is contradiction within own statement, as in the phrase 'a barren mother'. A woman who gives birth to a child is a mother and barren is the opposite thereof; if mother, how barren?

Ācārya Amṛtacandra's commentary on Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*¹, explains the sixfold factors-of-action (*kāraka*) from the empirical as well as the transcendental points-of-view:

Factors-of-action (*kāraka*) are of six kinds: 1) the doer (*kartā*), 2) the activity (*karma*), 3) the instrument (*karāṇa*), 4) the bestowal (*saṃpradāna*), 5) the dislodgement (*apādāna*), and the substratum (*adhikarāṇa*). Each of these is of two kinds: empirical sixfold factors-of-action (*vyavahāra ṣaṭkāraka*) and transcendental sixfold factors-of-action

1. See, पं. मनोहरलाल (वि. सं. 1969), श्रीमत्कुन्दकुन्दाचार्यविरचितः

प्रवचनसारः, अध्याय 1, गाथा 16, पृष्ठ 21-22.

(*niścaya śatkāra*). When the accomplishment of work is through external instrumental causes (*nimitta kāraṇa*) it is the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (*vyavahāra śatkāra*) and when the accomplishment of work is for the self, in the self, through the self as the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*), it is the transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (*niścaya śatkāra*). The empirical sixfold factors-of-action (*vyavahāra śatkāra*) is based on what is called as *upacāra asadbhūta naya* and, therefore, untrue; the transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (*niścaya śatkāra*) is based on the self and, therefore, true. Since every substance (*dravya*) is independent and is not a cause of either the creation or the destruction of other substances, the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (*vyavahāra śatkāra*) is untrue. And since the transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (*niścaya śatkāra*) accomplishes the work of the self, in the self, through the self, it is true.

An illustration of the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (*vyavahāra śatkāra*) can be as under: the independent performer of the activity, the potter, is the doer (*kartā*); the work that is being performed, the making of the pot, is the activity (*karma*); the tool used for the performance of the action – the wheel – is the instrument (*kaṛaṇa*); the end-use of the work performed – the storage vessel – is the bestowal (*saṃpradāna*); the change of mode from one state to the other, from clay to pot, is the dislodgement (*apādāna*); and the bedrock of activity, the clay, is the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*). In this case, the doer (*kartā*), the activity (*karma*), the instrument (*kaṛaṇa*), the bestowal (*saṃpradāna*), the dislodgement (*apādāna*), and the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) are different entities and, therefore, the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (*vyavahāra śatkāra*) is established only from empirical point-of-view and not true.

The transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (*niścaya*

ṣaṭkāraka) takes place in the self and, therefore, true. The soul established in its Pure Self (through *śuddhopayoga*) attains omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) without the help of or reliance on any outside agency (such a soul is appropriately termed self-dependent or *svayambhū*). Intrinsically possessed of infinite knowledge and energy, the soul, depending on self, performs the activity of attaining its infinite knowledge-character and, therefore, the soul is the doer (*kartā*). The soul's concentration on its own knowledge-character is the activity; the soul, therefore, is the activity (*karma*). Through its own knowledge-character the soul attains omniscience and, therefore, the soul is the instrument (*karāṇa*). The soul engrossed in pure consciousness imparts pure consciousness to self; the soul, therefore, is the bestowal (*saṃpradāna*). As the soul gets established in its pure nature at the same time destruction of impure subsidential knowledge, etc., takes place and, therefore, the soul is the dislodgement (*apādāna*). The attributes of infinite knowledge and energy are manifested in the soul itself; the soul, therefore, is the substratum (*adhikarāṇa*). This way, from the transcendental point-of-view, the soul itself, without the help of others, is the sixfold factors-of-action (*niścaya ṣaṭkāraka*) in the attainment of omniscience through pure concentration (*śuddhopayoga*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2018), *Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine*, p. 21-23.

Absolute non-dualism cannot explain dualities like virtuous and wicked activities, and their fruits like merit and demerit:

कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं लोकद्वैतं च नो भवेत् ।

विद्याऽविद्याद्वयं न स्याद् बन्धमोक्षद्वयं तथा ॥२५॥

सामान्यार्थ – अद्वैत एकान्त में कर्म-द्वैत – शुभ और अशुभ कर्म, फल-द्वैत – पुण्य-रूप और पाप-रूप फल, लोक-द्वैत – इहलोक और परलोक नहीं बनते हैं। इसी तरह विद्या और अविद्या का द्वैत तथा बन्ध और मोक्ष का द्वैत भी सिद्ध नहीं होते हैं।

(If this doctrine of absolute non-dualism (*advaita-ekānta*) be accepted –) There will be no duality of activities (*karma*) – virtuous (*śubha*) and wicked (*aśubha*), of fruits (*phala*) of activities – merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*), of abodes of existence – this world (*īhaloka*) and the other (prior and next) world (*paraloka*), of knowledge (*vidyā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*), and of bondage (*bandha*) and liberation (*mokṣa*).

The duals that are mentioned in this verse negate the doctrine of absolute non-dualism.

The doctrine of non-dualism (*advaita*) itself expounds dualism as in the two statements, 'All this is the primeval Person', and 'All this surely in truth is Brahman'. So, even the scripture does not establish non-dualism.

Non-acceptance of one component of any of these duals entails the negation of the other component too since one cannot exist without the other. The entity defined as a non-dual Person in the doctrine is not within the range of demonstration.

There is obvious contradiction if non-dualism is established with the help of a middle term (*hetu*):

हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेद् द्वैतं स्याद्धेतुसाध्ययोः ।

हेतुना चेद्विना सिद्धिर्द्वैतं वाङ्मात्रतो न किम् ॥२६॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि कहा जाए कि अद्वैत की सिद्धि हेतु के द्वारा की जाती है तो हेतु (साधन) और साध्य के सद्भाव से द्वैत की सिद्धि का प्रसंग आता है। और यदि हेतु के बिना अद्वैत की सिद्धि की जाती है तो क्या वचनमात्र से द्वैत की भी सिद्धि नहीं हो सकेगी?

If we undertake to establish this doctrine of absolute non-dualism (*advaita-ekānta*) with the help of the middle term (*hetu*) [also called reason (*sādhana*) or mark (*liṅga*)], there is bound to be duality because the middle term (*hetu*) will have a predicate – the major term (*sādhya* or *liṅgī*). If it be established without the help of the middle term (*hetu*) by mere speech, in that case, can the contrary view (absolute dualism), too, not be established by mere speech?

The minor term, locus or abode (*pakṣa*) is that with which the reason or middle term (*hetu*) is connected, and whose connection with the major term (*sādhya*) is to be proved. The minor term (*pakṣa*) is related to the major term (*sādhya*) through their common relation to the middle term (*hetu*). In a proposition (*pratijñā*) the subject is the minor term (*pakṣa*), and the predicate the major term (*sādhya* or *liṅgī*).

In an inference (*anumāna*) for the sake of others, the minor term (*pakṣa*), etc., must be explicitly set forth. In non-scholarly discussion, the following is the sequence of assertion:

1. “This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term).” –

pratijñā : proposition; statement of that which is to be proved.

2. “Because it is full of smoke (middle term).” – *hetu* : statement of the reason.
3. “Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.” – *dr̥ṣṭānta* and *udāharaṇa* : the general rule or pattern expressed through an example.
4. “So is this hill full of smoke.” *upanaya* : recapitulation of the middle term (*hetu*).
5. “Therefore this hill is full of fire.” *nigamana* : recapitulation of the proposition (*pratijñā*).

The *hetu* or the reason consists in the statement of the mark or the sign (*liṅga*) which being present in the subject or the minor term (*pakṣa*) suggests that the latter possesses a certain property predicated of it. It is the assertion of the middle term (*hetu*) by which the relation or not of the minor term (*pakṣa*) to the major term (*sādhya*) is known. While the *pratijñā* is a proposition of two terms, the *hetu* is a one-term proposition.

There is inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) between the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*hetu*). In other words, there is inseparable presence of one thing in another, e.g., no smoke without fire. Absolute non-dualism loses its essential characteristic the instant a middle term is employed to establish it as there is inseparable connection between the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*hetu*). If from the middle term (*hetu*) there should be establishment of non-duality, there would be duality of the middle and major terms. If non-duality is established without the middle term why not establish it by mere speech? And, if established by mere speech, without the middle term, there is no problem in establishing its opposite too, i.e., dualism, likewise.

Non-dualism is inseparably connected (*avinābhāvi*) with dualism:

अद्वैतं न विना द्वैतादहेतुरिव हेतुना ।

संज्ञिनः प्रतिषेधो न प्रतिषेध्यादृते क्वचित् ॥२७॥

सामान्यार्थ – जिस प्रकार से हेतु के बिना अहेतु नहीं होता है उसी प्रकार से द्वैत के बिना अद्वैत नहीं हो सकता है। कहीं भी संज्ञी (नामवाले) का प्रतिषेध (निषेध) प्रतिषेध्य के बिना नहीं बनता है।

As there can be no non-reason (*ahetu*) without the presence of a middle term or reason (*hetu*), similarly there can be no non-dualism (*advaita*) without the presence of dualism (*dvaita*). The denial of a word-denoted-entity (*saṃjñī*) is nowhere seen without the real existence of the thing that is used for denial.

The existence of a reason (*hetu*) is necessarily accompanied by the existence of a non-reason (*ahetu*). Smoke is a reason (*hetu*) for establishing the existence of fire but a non-reason (*ahetu*) for establishing the existence of water. Also, for establishing the existence of fire, smoke is a reason (*hetu*) and water is a non-reason (*ahetu*).

The word dualism (*dvaita*), which is countered or denied by non-dualism (*advaita*), must have real connotation to be able to fit the task. Even when we express non-existence with the phrase 'sky-flower' it clearly connotes the existence of the entity 'flower'.

The doctrine of 'absolute separateness' is faulted:

पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि पृथक्त्वादपृथक् तु तौ ।

पृथक्त्वे न पृथक्त्वं स्यादनेकस्थो ह्यसौ गुणः ॥२८॥

सामान्यार्थ - पृथक्त्वैकान्त पक्ष में (वस्तु-तत्त्व को एक दूसरे से सर्वथा भिन्न मानना) प्रश्न उठता है कि क्या 'द्रव्य' और 'गुण' पृथक् हैं अथवा अपृथक्। यदि अपृथक् हैं तो पृथक्त्व का एकान्त ही नहीं रहा। और यदि पृथक् हैं तो भी पृथक्त्व नाम का गुण नहीं बनता है क्योंकि 'गुण' एक होते हुए भी अनेक पदार्थों में स्थित माना गया है और तब पृथक्भूत पदार्थ एक दूसरे से अपृथक् हो जायेंगे।

If one maintains that objects are possessed of the character 'absolute separateness' (*prthaktva-ekānta*) – declaring every object as absolutely different from all other – the question arises as to whether, in light of the character of absolute separateness, the substance and its qualities are considered non-separate or separate. If these be held as non-separate then the character of absolute separateness gets repudiated. If these be held as separate then too the character of absolute separateness cannot be maintained since such so-called 'separate' qualities are seen to reside in many objects making them 'non-separate'.

If oneness (*ekatva*) is denied absolutely, phenomena like series of successive events (*santāna*) become untenable:

संतानः समुदायश्च साधर्म्यं च निरंकुशः ।

प्रेत्यभावश्च तत्सर्वं न स्यादेकत्वनिह्वये ॥२९॥

सामान्यार्थ - एकत्व के अभाव में (यदि एकत्व का सर्वथा लोप किया जाए) जो सन्तान, समुदाय, साधर्म्य और प्रेत्यभाव निरंकुश हैं (निर्बाध-रूप से माने जाते हैं) उन सब का भी अभाव हो जायेगा।

If the reality of oneness (*ekatva*) – different units of a substance forming a composite – is absolutely denied (and thus subscribing to the doctrine of absolute separateness) then authentic phenomena like series of successive events (*santāna*), aggregate of qualities in a single object (*samudāya*), similarity between two objects (*sādharmya*), and birth following death or transmigration (*pretyabhāva*), would become untenable.

The Buddhists do not accept oneness (*ekatva*) – they subscribe to the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) – but believe in the four phenomena mentioned in the verse.

The term ‘series of successive events’ (*santāna*) is used by the Buddhist maintainers of momentariness to account for the continuity constituting the substance. However, just as the tree has no existence without the root, the above mentioned four phenomena cannot exist without accepting the reality of oneness (*ekatva*).

Fault in considering the knowledge (*jñāna*) as absolutely different from the object of knowledge (*jñeya*):

सदात्मना च भिन्नं चेज्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाद् द्विधाऽप्यसत् ।
ज्ञानाभावे कथं ज्ञेयं बहिरन्तश्च ते द्विषाम् ॥३०॥

सामान्यार्थ - (सर्वथा पृथक्त्वैकान्त को मानकर -) यदि ज्ञान को सत्-स्वरूप की अपेक्षा से भी ज्ञेय से पृथक् माना जाए तो ज्ञान और ज्ञेय दोनों असत् हो जायेंगे अर्थात् दोनों का ही अभाव ठहरता है। हे भगवन् ! आपसे द्वेष करने वालों के यहाँ ज्ञान के असत् होने पर (ज्ञान के अभाव में) बहिरंग और अन्तरंग किसी भी ज्ञेय का अस्तित्व कैसे बन सकता है?

If the knowledge or cognition (*jñāna*) be considered absolutely different, even in terms of its nature of 'being' (*sat*), from the object of knowledge (*jñeya*) then both, the knowledge (*jñāna*) and the object of knowledge (*jñeya*) turn out to be 'non-beings' (*asat*); the knowledge (*jñāna*) becomes a 'non-being' being different from the object of knowledge (*jñeya*) which is accepted to be a 'being' (*sat*), and without the instrument of knowledge (*jñāna*) the object of knowledge (*jñeya*) too becomes a 'non-being' (*asat*). O Lord ! In the absence of knowledge (*jñāna*) how can the existence of any external or internal objects of knowledge (*jñeya*) be proved by those opposed to your views?

Fault in considering words as capable of describing only the general (*sāmānya*) attributes of a substance:

सामान्यार्था गिरोऽन्येषां विशेषो नाऽभिलष्यते ।
सामान्याभावतस्तेषां मृषैव सकला गिरः ॥३१॥

सामान्यार्थ - कुछ लोगों के मत में शब्द सामान्य का कथन करते हैं क्योंकि (उनकी मान्यतानुसार) शब्दों के द्वारा विशेष का कथन नहीं बनता है। विशेष के अभाव में सामान्य का भी अस्तित्व नहीं बनता है और सामान्य के मिथ्या होने से सामान्य-प्रतिपादक समस्त वचन असत्य ही ठहरते हैं।

In the doctrine of others, words can describe only the general (*sāmānya*) attributes of a substance and not the specific (*viśeṣa*) attributes. [In the absence of the specific (*viśeṣa*) attributes, the general (*sāmānya*) attributes too become nonentity; therefore, words, which can describe only the nonentity, too become nonentity.] Upon accepting the general (*sāmānya*) attributes as nonentity, all words become false.

Just as the two mutually supportive causes, the substantial cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) and the instrumental cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*), result in the accomplishment of the desired objective, in the same way, two kinds of attributes in a substance – general (*sāmānya*) and specific (*viśeṣa*) – ascertain its particular characteristic (*naya*) depending on what is kept as the primary consideration for the moment while keeping the other attributes in the background, not negating their existence in any way.

All objects have two kinds of qualities – the general (*sāmānya*), and the specific (*viśeṣa*). The general qualities

express the genus (*jāti*) or the general attributes, and the specific qualities describe the constantly changing conditions or modes. In a hundred pitchers, the general quality is their jar-ness, and the specific quality is their individual size, shape or mark.

Dravya refers to a general rule or conformity. That which has the *dravya* as the object is the general standpoint (*dravyārthika naya*). *Paryāya* means particular, an exception or exclusion. That which has the *paryāya* as the object is the standpoint of modifications (*paryāyārthika naya*). Whatever condition or form a substance takes, that condition or form is called a mode. Modes partake of the nature of substance, and are not found without the substance.

Fault in accepting both, absolute ‘non-dualism’ (*advaita-ekānta*) and absolute ‘separateness’ (*pṛthaktva-ekānta*), without mutual dependence:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥३२॥

सामान्यार्थ – (अद्वैत-एकान्त और पृथक्त्व-एकान्त दोनों में अलग-अलग दोष देखकर) जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ अद्वैत और पृथक्त्व दोनों का उभयैकात्म्य (एकान्त) नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में ‘यह अवाच्य है’ ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

(Upon realization of the flaws of the two views individually –) The enemies of your doctrine of *syādvāda* can also not maintain that the two views – viz. ‘absolute non-dualism’ (*advaita-ekānta*) and ‘absolute separateness’ (*pṛthaktva-ekānta*) – describe one and the same phenomenon; it is impossible since the two views are self-contradictory (like ‘the child of a barren woman’). If (upon realization of the flaw of this position) they proclaim that the phenomenon is absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then, having described reality as ‘indescribable’, it becomes describable and their stand gets refuted (only a non-reality can be said to be indescribable). (*Syādvāda* characterizes a phenomenon as ‘indescribable’ only in the sense of inexpressibility of the state of simultaneous affirmation and denial of the proposition; the phenomenon is a reality but due to the limitation of the language it cannot be expressed.)

With mutual dependence, separateness (*pr̥thaktva*) and non-dualism or oneness (*ekatva*), become reality:

अनपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये ह्यवस्तु द्वयहेतुतः ।

तदेवैक्यं पृथक्त्वं च स्वभेदैः साधनं यथा ॥३३॥

सामान्यार्थ – परस्पर निरपेक्ष पृथक्त्व और एकत्व दोनों हेतुद्वय से अवस्तु हैं (पृथक्त्व अवस्तु है एकत्व-निरपेक्ष होने पर; एकत्व अवस्तु है पृथक्त्व-निरपेक्ष होने पर)। एकत्व और पृथक्त्व सापेक्ष-रूप में विरोध के न होने से उसी प्रकार वस्तु-तत्त्व को प्राप्त हैं जैसे कि साधन (हेतु) एक होने पर भी अपने भेदों के द्वारा अनेक भी है।

Considered independent of each other, the two views of separateness (*pr̥thaktva*) and non-dualism or oneness (*ekatva*) become fictitious or non-reality. [Separateness (*pr̥thaktva*) becomes a non-reality without it being considered in relation to non-dualism (*ekatva*), and non-dualism becomes a non-reality without it being considered in relation to separateness (*pr̥thaktva*)]. In fact, an object is characterized by oneness as well as separateness just as a single reason (*sādhana, hetu*) is characterized by one as well as many attributes.

The reason or middle term (*sādhana, hetu*) is defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with that which is to be proved, the major term (*sādhya*). Thus, it has invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) with the major term (*sādhya*). But it has other attributes too. Consider this: “This hill (minor term, locus or abode – *pakṣa*) is full of fire (major term – *sādhya*) because it is full of smoke (middle term or reason – *sādhana* or *hetu*), as in the kitchen (homogeneous example –

sapakṣa)”. Here smoke (*hetu*) exists in relation to the hill – *pakṣa-dharmatva* – and it also exists in relation to the kitchen – *sapakṣa-sattva*. Also, “Whatever is not full of fire (major term – *sādhya*) is also not full of smoke (middle term or reason – *sādhana* or *hetu*), as a pond (heterogeneous example – *vipakṣa*)” – *vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*. (see, *Note* below.)

According to Buddhist logicians, the true *hetu* should possess the following three characteristics:

- i) it should be present in the *pakṣa*,
- ii) it should also exist in the *sapakṣa*, and
- iii) it should not be found in the *vipakṣa*.

The *pakṣa* has already been explained to mean the *sādhya* and its abode, the *dharmī*; but *sapakṣa* is the place where the *sādhana* and *sādhya* are known to abide in some already familiar instance, while *vipakṣa* embraces all other places where the very possibility of the existence of the *sādhya* is counter-indicated.

Illustration:

This hill (*pakṣa*) is full of fire, because it is full of smoke;
 Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen
 (*sapakṣa*);
 Whatever is not full of fire is also not full of smoke, as a
 pond (*vipakṣa*).

Excerpted from:
 Jain, Champat Rai (1916),
Nyāya – The Science of Thought, p. 50.

Note:

The subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) is the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) whose attribute (*dharma*) is yet to be determined. The subject that has similar attribute as the possessor-of-the-attribute (*dharmī*) is called the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa*). The means (*hetu*, *sādhana*) serves its

purpose when it exists in the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) and in the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa*).

The unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) [or transgressive (*vyabhicārī*)] means (*hetu, sādhana*) exists not only in the subject-of-inference (*pakṣa*) and in the corroborative-subject (*sapakṣa*), but also in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) of the object-to-be-proved (*sādhya*).

Such unconstrained (*anaikāntika*) means (*hetu, sādhana*) is of two kinds: 1) that certainly exists in the opposite (*vipakṣa*) – *niścita-vipakṣavṛtti*, and 2) whose existence in the opposite is doubtful – *śaṅkita-vipakṣavṛtti*.

Jain, Vijay K. (2021),
Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's *Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra* –
Essence of the Jaina Nyāya, p. 177.

Flawless establishment of separateness (*pṛthaktva*) as well as non-dualism or oneness (*ekatva*) in an entity:

सत्सामान्यात्तु सर्वैक्यं पृथग्द्रव्यादिभेदतः ।
भेदाभेदविवक्षायामसाधारणहेतुवत् ॥३४॥

सामान्यार्थ – सत्-अस्तित्व में समानता होने की अपेक्षा से सब जीवादि पदार्थ एक हैं और द्रव्य आदि के भेद से अनेक (पृथक्) हैं। जैसे असाधारण हेतु भेद की विवक्षा से अनेक-रूप और अभेद की विवक्षा से एक-रूप होता है, उसी प्रकार सब पदार्थों में भेद की विवक्षा से पृथक्त्व और अभेद की विवक्षा से एकत्व सुघटित है।

With reference to the attribute of universal character of 'being or existence' (*sat, astitva*) all substances exhibit oneness or unity while with reference to their specific root-substance, etc. [substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and manifestation (*bhāva*)] these exhibit separateness or distinction; this is just as a specific reason (*sādhana, hetu*) is one when it is employed in entirety and many when its divisions are emphasized by the speaker.

Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha:

सत्ता सव्वपयत्था सविस्सरूवा अणंतपज्जाया ।
भंगुप्पादधुवत्ता सप्पडिवक्खा हवदि एक्का ॥८॥

The existence (*sattā, sat, sattva*) is the differentia of all objects (*vastu, padārtha*). Existence has universal attribute; it gets transformed into infinite modes (*paryāya*); it is with origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*); it is one [from the point-of-view of general-existence (*sattāsāmānya* or *mahāsattā*)]; and it is accompanied by its antithesis (*pratipakṣa*).

The object (*vastu*) is existing (*sat*) with regard to own-substance (*svadavya*), own-space (*svakṣetra*), own-time (*svakāla*), and own-nature (*svabhāva*) but is non-existing (*asat*) with regard to other-substance (*paradavya*), other-space (*parakṣetra*), other-time (*parakāla*), and other-nature (*parabhāva*). The general-existence (*mahāsattā*) that is found in all substances has its antithesis (*pratipakṣa*) in the particular-existence (*avāntarasattā*) that is found in one particular substance. The general-existence (*mahāsattā*) that is found at all times and in all modes has its antithesis as the particular-existence (*avāntarasattā*) that is found at one time and in one mode. The general-existence (*mahāsattā*) that has all three marks, origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*), has its antithesis in the particular-existence (*avāntarasattā*) that has only one mark of origination or destruction or permanence. The general-existence (*mahāsattā*) is from the pure generic-point-of-view (*śuddha saṃgraha naya*)¹. The particular-existence (*avāntarasattā*) is from the impure generic-point-of-view (*aśuddha saṃgraha naya*) and also from the empirical- or systematic-point-of-view (*vyavahāra naya*)².

Jain, Vijay K. (2020),
Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha, p. 18-20.

Reason (*sādhana, hetu*) is one but when employed in an inference (*anumāna*) it can be used in two ways: as an agent (*kāraka* – that from which a thing is made, like clay from which

1. The generic-point-of-view (*saṃgraha naya*) comprehends different substances, belonging to the same class, under one common head.
2. The division of the reality or the objects comprehended by the generic-point-of-view (*saṃgraha naya*), in accordance with the rule, is the systematic-point-of-view (*vyavahāra naya*).

a pitcher is made), or as a source of knowledge (*jñāpaka* – that which makes a thing known, like smoke leading to the knowledge of fire). Reason (*hetu*) is also classified as exhibiting *pakṣa-dharmatva*, *sapakṣa-sattva* or *vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti* depending on the intention of the speaker; without such classification, it is but one. (See also, explanatory note – verse 33, p. 66-68 *ante*.)

PREVIEW ONLY

Only the 'existent' (*sat*) forms the subject of expression or no-expression:

विवक्षा चाविवक्षा च विशेष्येऽनन्तधर्मिणि ।

सतो विशेषणस्यात्र नासतस्तैस्तदर्थिभिः ॥३५॥

सामान्यार्थ - विवक्षा और अविवक्षा करने वाले व्यक्ति अनन्त धर्म वाली वस्तु में विद्यमान (सत्) विशेषण की ही विवक्षा और अविवक्षा करते हैं, अविद्यमान (असत्) की नहीं। उस विशेषण का अर्थी विवक्षा करता है और अनर्थी अविवक्षा। सर्वथा असत् तो गधे के सींग (खरविषाण) या गगनकुसुम के समान अर्थ-क्रिया से शून्य, अवस्तु होता है।

The object of knowledge possesses infinite attributes and the speaker expresses a distinguishing attribute while choosing not to express other attributes; he does not speak of an attribute that is non-existent (like *kharaviṣāṇa* - the 'horns of a hare', or *gaganakusuma* - the 'sky-flower').

Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha*:

भावस्स णत्थि णासो णत्थि अभावस्स चेव उप्पादो ।

गुणपज्जयेसु भावा उप्पादवए पकुव्वंति ॥१५॥

There is no destruction (*vyaya*, *nāśa*) of the existing-object-of-knowledge (*bhāva*, *vastu*, *sat*, *padārtha*); similarly, there is no origination (*utpāda*) of the non-existing-object-of-knowledge (*abhāva*, *avastu*, *asat*). The existing-object-of-knowledge (*bhāva*, *vastu*, *sat*, *padārtha*) undergoes destruction (*vyaya*, *nāśa*) and origination (*utpāda*) in its qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2020),

Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha, p. 35.

Both unity (*abheda, ekatva*) and diversity (*bheda, pṛthaktva*) can coexist in a single substance:

प्रमाणगोचरौ सन्तौ भेदाऽभेदौ न संवृती ।

तावेकत्राऽविरुद्धौ ते गुणमुख्यविवक्षया ॥३६॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! आपके मत में भेद (पृथक्त्व) और अभेद (एकत्व, अद्वैत) दोनों प्रमाण के विषय होने से वास्तविक (परमार्थभूत) हैं, संवृति के विषय (काल्पनिक अथवा उपचारमात्र) नहीं। ये दोनों गौण और प्रधान की विवक्षा को लिए एक ही वस्तु में अविरोध रूप से रहते हैं।

Being objects of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) both, unity (*abheda, ekatva, advaita*) and diversity (*bheda, pṛthaktva, dvaita*), in a single substance are real, and not imaginary (*saṃvṛti*). Depending on the speaker's intention, these become primary or secondary, without there being any conflict in their coexistence in the same substance.

Section 3

तृतीय परिच्छेद

Fault in accepting the objects of knowledge as absolutely permanent (*nityatva-ekānta*):

नित्यत्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि विक्रिया नोपपद्यते ।

प्रागेव कारकाऽभावः क्व प्रमाणं क्व तत्फलम् ॥३७॥

सामान्यार्थ - (यदि यह माना जाए कि पदार्थ सर्वथा नित्य है तो -) नित्यत्वैकान्त पक्ष में विक्रिया की उत्पत्ति नहीं हो सकती है। जब पहले ही कारक का अभाव है (अवस्था न बदले तो कारकों का सद्भाव बनता ही नहीं है) तब प्रमाण और प्रमाण का फल (प्रमिति) ये दोनों कहाँ बन सकते हैं?

If the object of knowledge is supposed to be absolutely permanent (*nityatva-ekānta*) then there cannot be any modifications in it; when already there is the absence of the agent (*kāraka*) for a modification how can one have the possibility of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its fruit (*pramāṇa-phala* i.e., the activity resulting in correct knowledge – *pramiti* or *jñapti*)?

Only an object which has general (*sāmānya* – *dravya*) as well as particular (*viśeṣa* – *paryāya*) attributes can be the subject of knowledge. The general (*dravya*) without its modification (*paryāya*) and modification (*paryāya*) without its general (*dravya*) cannot be the subject of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*); only their combination can be the subject of valid-knowledge.

The conception of *pramāṇa* or valid-knowledge implies

three necessary factors, namely the possessor-of-knowledge (*pramātā*), the object-of-knowledge (*prameya*), and the activity resulting in correct knowledge (*pramiti*).

The possessor (*pramātā*) and the object (*prameya*) are strictly correlative factors involved in all knowledge. They are distinguishable, no doubt, as the knower and the known, but not separable in any act of knowledge.

All true knowledge must be connected with some method of knowledge. It is customary to analyze the knowledge-relation into the three factors comprising the possessor, the object and the process of knowledge. These correspond, respectively, to *pramātā*, *prameya* and *pramiti* in Indian philosophy.

What is the fruit of *pramāṇa – pramāṇa-phala*? The aim of *pramāṇa* is to make the object of knowledge clear. It is to illuminate the object. Most importantly, *pramāṇa* removes ignorance and enables one to make distinction between what is true and what is false and between what needs to be accepted and what needs to be discarded. The Omniscient, however, who enjoys infinite knowledge and bliss, has complete detachment and indifference for the worldly objects of knowledge although all possible objects of knowledge, of the three times, reflect in his Self (soul) as in a mirror.

No modification is possible if the source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the agent (*kāraṇa*) are considered absolutely permanent:

प्रमाणकारकैर्व्यक्तं व्यक्तं चेदिन्द्रियाऽर्थवत् ।

ते च नित्ये विकार्य किं साधोस्ते शासनाद्बहिः ॥३८॥

सामान्यार्थ - (सांख्यमत वादियों के मत में -) जैसे कि इन्द्रियों के द्वारा अर्थ अभिव्यक्त होता है उसी प्रकार प्रमाण और कारकों के द्वारा अव्यक्त को व्यक्त हुआ बतलाया जाता है। जब प्रमाण और कारक दोनों नित्य माने गए हैं तब उनके द्वारा विक्रिया कैसे बन सकती है? आपके अनेकान्त शासन से बाहर (नित्यत्व के एकान्त शासन में) कोई भी विक्रिया नहीं हो सकती है।

[It is held (by the Sāṃkhya system) that although unmanifest (*avyakta*) causes (*kāraṇa*) – the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and factor-of-action (*kāraṇa*) – are absolutely permanent but the manifest (*vyakta*) effects (*kārya*) – like the Great or Intellect (*Mahat* or *Buddhi*) and its consequence the I-ness or Ego (*Ahaṃkāra*) – are non-permanent and, therefore, transformation is possible.] It is held that just as the sense-organs reveal an object, manifest (*vyakta*) objects are revealed by the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the factor-of-action (*kāraṇa*). But when both, valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the factor-of-action (*kāraṇa*), considered absolutely permanent, are employed to make a non-manifest (*avyakta*) into a manifest (*vyakta*), what kind of modification could be predicated? O Lord! There is no possibility of any modification taking place outside your doctrine of manifold points-of-view – *anekānta*.

Note: In absolute permanence (*nityatva*), manifestation of any kind is not possible; there must be some change of mode to warrant manifestation.

The main tenets of the Sāṃkhya system are:

1. Dualism of (a) entirely inactive Spirit (*Puruṣa*) or Intelligence (*Cit*) and (b) a material, non-intelligent nature (*Prakṛti*) of triple constitution, from which emerges, and into which is dissolved, the entire universe of things experienced.
2. An evolution of *Prakṛti* in the presence of Spirit by stages of which the first is an instrument of determinate awareness (*Buddhi*, Reason), and the second a simultaneous origination of Egoity (*Ahaṃkāra*, principle of individuality) and of Sense-faculties. Thence come the essences of the Five Elements and through their composition the gross material elements and the general physical universe.
3. An unreal connection of Spirit and *Prakṛti* and its evolutes in consequence of a failure on the part of Spirit to realize his actual detachment and of a false semblance of intelligence in the mechanism of *Prakṛti* through reflection from the light of Spirit.
4. Liberation of Spirit from the unreal connection and bondage when, having seen the work of *Prakṛti* through and through, he realizes his own absolute aloofness.¹

The Reals (*tattvas*) are 25 as follows: the unmanifested (*avyakta*, *Prakṛti* in its unevolved quiescence); and the manifested (*vyakta*) – 24-fold by reason of the distinction of the ‘great principle’ (*Mahat*, *Buddhi*), ego (*Ahaṃkāra*), the 5 pure principles (*śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*), the 11 sense-organs including mind, the 5 gross elements (*ākāśa*, *vāyu*, *teja*, *jala*, *pṛthvī*), and the Spirit of the form of intelligence.

1. See, Thomas, F.W. (1968), “*The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine – Śrī Malliṣeṇa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maṅjarī*”, p. 93-94.

In the Sāṃkhya system, it is the function of the intellect (*buddhivṛtti*) that is regarded as *pramāṇa* or the specific cause of true knowledge. The self knows an object through a mental modification that corresponds to the impression produced in the sense-organ by the object in question. The object having impressed its form on the sense organ, the mind presents it to the self through a corresponding modification of itself. Hence the mental function is *pramāṇa* or the source of our knowledge of the object.

I or Ego (*Ahaṃkāra*), which is the ground of our personal identity, merely means further modification of the subtle *Buddhi* which itself is a modification of *acetana Prakṛti*.

Prakṛti is otherwise called *avyakta* or the unmanifest or *Pradhāna* or the primary basis of existence.

The intelligent *Puruṣa* is inactive by nature and hence is incapable of being the architect of his own destiny. *Acetana* – the unenlightened – *Prakṛti* has all activity and force in itself and is quite blind by nature. The *Puruṣa* is intelligent but inert and *Prakṛti* is all activity but blind. The union of the two – the blind and the cripple – leads to living.²

Human volition and consequent human conduct are said to be the effects of *acetana Prakṛti*; virtue and vice are alien to the *Puruṣa*. These are associated with the non-spiritual *Prakṛti* and hence these do not affect the soul and yet with a strange inconsistency it is the fate of *Puruṣa* to enjoy the fruits – pleasurable and painful – of the karmas directly and immediately due to the activity of *Prakṛti*. Why it is the fate of *Puruṣa* that he should vicariously suffer the consequences of an alien being in life is entirely unexplained.

As per the Sāṃkhya ontology, *Puruṣa* being ever free can

2. See, Prof. A. Chakravarti (2008), “Ācārya Kundakunda’s *Samayasāra*”, Introduction, p. 106.

never be bound; it is the *Prakṛti* that is bound and liberated. The question can be raised, if there is no bondage why talk of liberation; and if there is no real connection between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, how the false conception of such connection can rise? It is these points such as *Prakṛti* does everything and *Puruṣa* is neutral without doing anything, that are attacked. The Jaina position is that the soul or spirit is the agent of various *bhāva* or psychic states whereby there is the influx of karmas leading to further bondage; when the karmas are destroyed, with their causes rooted out and the existing stock evaporated, the soul attains its natural purity constituted of eternal bliss and omniscience.³

3. See, Upadhye A.N. (1935), “*Śrī Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra – A Pro-canonical Text of the Jainas*”, Introduction, p. XLVIII.

When the effect (*kārya*) has eternal existence (*sat*), the idea of a produced entity is untenable:

यदि सत्सर्वथा कार्यं पुंवनोत्पत्तुमर्हति ।

परिणामप्रक्लृप्तिश्च नित्यत्वैकान्तबाधिनी ॥३९॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि कार्य को सर्वथा सत् माना जाए तो चैतन्य पुरुष के समान उसकी उत्पत्ति नहीं हो सकती है। और उत्पत्ति न मानकर कार्य में परिणाम की कल्पना करना नित्यत्वैकान्त की बाधक है।

If the effect (*kārya*) be considered as having eternal existence (*sat*), like the intelligent *Puruṣa* (of the Sāṃkhya philosophy), it cannot be a produced entity. And to imagine the process of transformation in an entity which cannot be produced goes against the doctrine of ‘eternal existence’.

Phenomena involving merit (*punya*) and demerit (*pāpa*), etc. cannot be explained in the doctrine of absolute permanence (*nityatva-ekānta*):

पुण्यपापक्रिया न स्यात् प्रेत्यभावः फलं कुतः ।

बन्धमोक्षौ च तेषां न येषां त्वं नाऽसि नायकः ॥४०॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! जिनके आप नायक नहीं है, उन नित्यत्वैकान्त-वादियों के मत में पुण्य-पाप की क्रिया नहीं बनती है, और (क्रिया के अभाव में) प्रेत्यभाव (परलोक-गमन), सुख-दुःख-रूप क्रिया का फल, बन्ध तथा मोक्ष भी नहीं बनते हैं।

O Lord! Those who do not accept the superiority of your leadership and believe in absolute permanence (*nityatva-ekānta*) of objects are incapable of explaining the phenomena of actions involving merit (*punya*) and demerit (*pāpa*), of birth following death (*pretyabhāva*), of fruits of activities (*phala*, in terms of happiness and misery), of bondage (*bandha*), and of liberation (*mokṣa*).

Fault in the doctrine of 'absolute momentariness' (*kṣaṇika-ekānta*):

क्षणिकैकान्तपक्षेऽपि प्रेत्यभावाद्यसंभवः ।

प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यभावान्न कार्यारम्भः कुतः फलम् ॥४१॥

सामान्यार्थ - (नित्यत्वैकान्त में दोष को जानकर) यदि क्षणिकैकान्त (बौद्धों द्वारा प्रतिपादित अनित्यत्व-रूप एकान्त) का पक्ष लिया जाए तो उसमें भी प्रेत्यभावादिक संभव नहीं हैं। प्रत्यभिज्ञानादि जैसे ज्ञानों का अभाव होने से कार्य का आरम्भ संभव नहीं है और जब कार्य का आरम्भ ही नहीं तब उसका फल कैसे संभव हो सकता है?

(On the other hand -) When viewed from the point-of-view of 'absolute momentariness' (*kṣaṇika-ekānta*) then also it is impossible to explain phenomena like birth following death (*pretyabhāva*). [Since the soul, according to this view, is characterized by momentariness, therefore, memory (*smṛti*) and recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), etc., are not possible.] In the absence of the sources of knowledge, like recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), the origination of an effect (*kārya*) is not possible and consequently how can the fruit (*phala*) of that effect be imagined?

The Buddhists hold the self to be merely a succession of moments of awareness; and not like a single thread running through a collection of pearl drops, one permeating them all. On their view the moment of cognition whereby the carrying out of good or carrying out of evil has been effected, has not, because it perishes without residue, the enjoyment of the fruit thereof; and that which has the enjoyment of the fruit was not

the doer of that deed. Thus on the part of the former moment of cognition there is 'loss of deed', because it does not experience the fruit of the deed done by itself, and on the part of the latter moment of cognition there is 'enjoyment of a deed not done', because of enjoyment of fruit of deed not done by itself, but by another.¹

In regard to an object experienced by a prior awareness, a memory on the part of later awareness is not possible because they are other than it; like awareness on the part of another series. For a thing seen by one is not remembered by another; otherwise a thing seen by one person would be remembered by all. And, if there is no recollection, whence in the world comes the begetting of recognition? Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) arises from both recollection and (original) experience; it is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of *pratyakṣa* and *smaraṇa* (memory). For the maintainers of momentary destruction, memory does not fit in.

1. See, Thomas, F.W. (1968), "*The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine – Śrī Malliṣeṇa Surī's Syādvāda-Maṅjarī*", p. 119.

When the effect (*kārya*) is considered absolutely non-existent (*asat*), the idea of a produced entity is untenable:

यद्यसत्सर्वथा कार्यं तन्माजनि खपुष्पवत् ।

मोपादाननियामोऽभून्माऽऽश्वासः कार्यजन्मनि ॥४२॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि कार्य को सर्वथा असत् माना जाए तो आकाशपुष्प की तरह उसकी उत्पत्ति नहीं हो सकती। यदि असत् का भी उत्पाद माना जाए तो कार्य की उत्पत्ति में उपादान कारण का कोई नियम नहीं रहता और न ही उपादान कारण पर कोई विश्वास बना रह सकता है।

If the effect (*kārya*) be considered absolutely non-existent (*asat*) then it can never be produced just as it is impossible to produce the ‘sky-flower’ (*ākāśapuṣpa* or *gaganakusuma*). If production of the non-existent (*asat*) be accepted, the rule of the availability of a substantial cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) for the accomplishment of an effect (*kārya*) cannot be applied, and also there is the loss of all credibility (in terms of what produces what).

Kundakunda, following the tradition of Jaina metaphysics, speaks of two different causes, *upādāna kāraṇa* and *nimitta kāraṇa* – material cause and instrumental cause. For example, the clay is the material out of which the jar is made. In this case the material out of which the thing is made is the *upādāna kāraṇa*. For transforming the clay into the jar you require the operating agent, the potter, the potter’s wheel on which the clay is moulded, and the stick with which he turns the wheel, and so on. All these come under the *nimitta kāraṇa* or the instrumental causes. This distinction is considered very important in Jaina metaphysics. The *upādāna kāraṇa* or the

material cause must be identical with its effect. There can be no difference in nature and attributes between the material cause and its effect. From clay we can only obtain a mud-pot. Out of gold you can only obtain a gold ornament.¹

The relation between the material cause and its effect is that wherever the cause is present the effect would be present, and wherever the effect would be present the cause must have been present. Again, negatively, if the cause is absent the effect must also be absent and conversely if the effect is absent the cause must also be absent.

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra:

बाह्येतरोपाधिसमग्रतेयं कार्येषु ते द्रव्यगतः स्वभावः ।
नैवान्यथा मोक्षविधिश्च पुंसां तेनाभिवन्द्यस्त्वमृषिर्बुधानाम् ॥

(12-5-60)

The accomplishment of a task (*kārya* – the making of a pitcher, for example) depends on the simultaneous availability of the internal (*upādāna* – substantial) and the external (*nimitta* – auxiliary) causes; such is the nature of the substance (*dravya*)*. In no other way can liberation be achieved and, therefore, the learned men worship you, O Adept Sage!

Jain, Vijay K. (2015),

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra, p. 83-84.

*To give a familiar example, when a potter proceeds with the task (*kārya*) of making a pitcher out of clay, the potter is the external or instrumental cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) and the clay is the internal or substantial cause (*upādāna*

1. See, Prof. A. Chakravarti (2008), “*Ācārya Kundakunda's Samayasāra*”, Introduction, p. 171.

kāraṇa). The task necessarily means the destruction of clay in its original form but the inherent qualities of clay still remain in the pitcher. There is the origination (*utpāda*) of the new form of clay, the disappearance (*vyaya*) of its old form, and still the existence (being or *sat*) of the substance itself continues (*dhrauvya*). In other words, existence is accompanied by origination (*utpāda*), disappearance (*vyaya*), and permanence (*dhrauvya*). As there is no destruction of the inherent nature of clay, it is lasting. Permanence is the existence of the past nature in the present. From a particular point-of-view, the indestructibility of the essential nature of the substance is determined as its permanence. Qualities reside permanently in the substance but the modes change. Modes like the pitcher are not permanently associated with clay but the qualities reside permanently. So, *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* cannot be said to be non-existent like a 'sky-flower'.

Relationship of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) is not possible in the doctrine of 'absolute momentariness' (*kṣaṇika-ekānta*):

न हेतुफलभावादिरन्यभावादनन्वयात् ।

सन्तानान्तरवनैकः संतानस्तद्वतः पृथक् ॥४३॥

सामान्यार्थ – क्षणिकैकान्त में सर्वथा अन्वय के अभाव में पूर्वोत्तर-क्षणों के हेतुभाव व फलभाव आदि नहीं बन सकते हैं क्योंकि उन पूर्वोत्तर-क्षणों में सन्तानान्तर के समान सर्वथा पृथक् (अन्यभाव) होता है। सन्तानियों से पृथक् कोई एक सन्तान भी नहीं होता है।

In the doctrine of 'absolute momentariness' (*kṣaṇika-ekānta*) a logical connection (agreement in association – *anvaya*) between two entities cannot be established and, therefore, relationship of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) – *hetu-phala-bhāva*, etc. – is not possible. The cause remains utterly distinct from the effect as there is no commonality between entities belonging to different series of successive events (*santāna*). Moreover, (if each event is really momentary and perishes utterly, as the Buddhists assert) there is no existence of a 'series' apart from the individual elements that are believed to constitute the series.

The Buddhists assert that a never-ceasing series of momentary ideas (*santāna*), impressed each by the former, gives man the semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world and the soul.

If each idea is really momentary, and perishes utterly, how can it affect the subsequent idea, contemporaneity of ideas being negated by the Buddhist theory?

Using fiction without associated real meaning leads to deception:

अन्येष्वनन्यशब्दोऽयं संवृतिर्न मृषा कथम् ।

मुख्यार्थः संवृतिर्न स्याद् विना मुख्यान्न संवृतिः ॥४४॥

सामान्यार्थ – (बौद्धों द्वारा यदि कहा जाए –) पृथक्-पृथक् क्षणों में अनन्य शब्द (सन्तान) का जो व्यवहार है वह संवृति (काल्पनिक, औपचारिक) है तो सर्वथा संवृति होने से वह शब्द मिथ्या क्यों नहीं है? यदि शब्द (सन्तान) को मुख्य अर्थ के रूप में माना जाए तो मुख्य अर्थ सर्वथा संवृति-रूप नहीं होता है और मुख्य अर्थ के बिना संवृति नहीं होती है।

(If each successive event is really momentary, and perishes utterly, as the Buddhists assert –) To use the word *santāna* or ‘series’ – implying unity – for successive momentary events which have no unity among themselves can only be fictional (*saṃvṛti*) and, therefore, is the word not misleading? The real meaning of a word can never be called fictional and there cannot be an occasion for fiction unless the word has a real meaning.

According to the Buddhists concept of *santāna* (*lit.* offspring or child, meaning ‘series’ of successive events) no permanent parts exist in an entity which are carried forward as unchanged from one momentary mode to the next. *Santāna*, at any particular moment, is the material cause of the entity’s mode the next moment and not of any other object of same or different class.

The Buddhists argue that it is not possible to give verbal expression to the relation between a 'series' and its members:

चतुष्कोटैर्विकल्पस्य सर्वान्तेषूक्त्ययोगतः ।

तत्त्वाऽन्यत्वमवाच्यं चेत्तयोः सन्तानतद्गतोः ॥४५॥

सामान्यार्थ - (बौद्धों की ओर से यदि कहा जाए -) सत्त्व आदि सब धर्मों में चार प्रकार का विकल्प (चतुष्कोटिविकल्प) नहीं हो सकता है, अतः उन सन्तान और सन्तानी का भी तत्त्व-धर्म (एकत्व-अभेद और अन्यत्व-भेद) अवाच्य ठहरता है। (अगली कारिका देखें।)

(The Buddhists argue -) Since it is not possible to give verbal expression to the fourfold causal relations¹ (*catuṣkoṭivikalpa*) that can exist between the characteristic and the entity, similarly we can also not describe whether a series of successive events (*santāna*) is one with its members or different from them (or both, or neither); it is indescribable. (*See next verse.*)

The Buddhists say that there is one thing only, the cognition, but as the result of impressions left by previous cognition there appears the distinction of cognizer, cognized, and cognition, in place of the unity. Each idea is momentary, but it can and does impress its successor; there is no substantial reality like the soul but a never-ceasing series of momentary ideas, each impressed by the former, gives man the semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world and the soul.

-
1. (a) this characteristic belongs to this entity; (b) this characteristic does not belong to this entity; (c) this characteristic both belongs and does not belong to this entity; (d) this characteristic neither belongs nor does not belong to this entity.

Fault in the Buddhist argument:

अवक्तव्यचतुष्कोटिविकल्पोऽपि न कथ्यताम् ।
असर्वान्तमवस्तु स्यादविशेष्यविशेषणम् ॥४६॥

सामान्यार्थ – तब तो (बौद्धों को) चतुष्कोटिविकल्प (वस्तु में सत् आदि चार प्रकार के विकल्प) को अवक्तव्य भी नहीं कहना चाहिए (सर्वथा अवक्तव्य का पक्ष लेने पर ‘चतुष्कोटिविकल्प अवक्तव्य है’ यह कहना भी नहीं बनता है)। जो असर्वान्त (सर्व-धर्म रहित) है वह अवस्तु (आकाश-पुष्प के समान) है क्योंकि उसमें विशेष्य-विशेषण-भाव नहीं बनता है।

(The reply is –) It cannot be said that the fourfold causal relation (*catuṣkoṭivikalpa*) is indescribable. (Firstly, just by uttering these words it somehow becomes describable, and secondly, cognition by others of the fourfold causal relation has been made possible through description only.) Moreover, an entity devoid of all characteristics will be a nonentity (*avastu*) like the ‘sky-flower’ since it will neither have qualifying attributes (*viśeṣaṇa*) nor the substance to be qualified (*viśeṣya*).

Negation (*niṣedha*), in regard to some attribute, can only be of an existing entity (*sat*) and not of a nonentity (*asat*):

द्रव्याद्यन्तरभावेन निषेधः संज्ञिनः सतः ।

असद्भेदो न भावस्तु स्थानं विधिनिषेधयोः ॥४७॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो संज्ञी सत् (विद्यमान) होता है उसी का पर-द्रव्य आदि (पर-द्रव्य, पर-क्षेत्र, पर-काल, पर-भाव) की अपेक्षा से निषेध किया जाता है। जो सर्वथा असत् (अविद्यमान) है वह विधि और निषेध का विषय ही नहीं होता है।

Only a named (*sañjñī*), existing entity (*sat*) can be subjected to negation (*niṣedha*) with regard to attributes¹ like the root-substance. A nonentity (*asat* – a non existing substance) cannot be subjected to either affirmation (*vidhi*) or negation (*niṣedha*).

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra:

सतः कथञ्चित्तदसत्त्वशक्तिः खे नास्ति पुष्पं तरुषु प्रसिद्धम् ।
सर्वस्वभावच्युतमप्रमाणं स्ववाग्विरुद्धं तव दृष्टितोऽन्यत् ॥

(5-3-23)

The nature of reality (*sat*) involves two logical predications – one affirmative (*asti*) and the other negative (*nāsti*); like a flower exists in the tree and does not exist in the sky. If reality be accepted without any of these two predications (*asti* and *nāsti*), nothing can exist logically and will lose validity. O Lord Sumatinātha, the assertions of all others

1. The attributes are (a) root-substance (*dravya*); (b) space of its existence (*kṣetra*); (c) time of its existence (*kāla*); and (d) its nature (*bhāva*).

not following your doctrine are self-contradictory.

Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra, p. 31-33.

Jaina logicians describe every fact of the reality according to four different aspects: its substance (*dravya*), space of its existence (*kṣetra*), time of its existence (*kāla*), and its nature (*bhāva*). Every object admits of a fourfold affirmative predication (*svacatuṣṭaya*) with reference to its own substance (*svadravya*), own space (*svakṣetra*), own time (*svakāla*), and own nature (*svabhāva*). Simultaneously a fourfold negative predication is implied with reference to other substance (*paradravya*), other space (*parakṣetra*), other time (*parakāla*), and other nature (*parabhāva*). The substance of an object not only implies its *svadravya* but differentiates it from *paradravya*. It becomes logically necessary to locate a negation for every affirmation and vice-versa. We must not only perceive a thing but also perceive it as distinct from other things. Without this distinction there cannot be true and clear perception of an object. When the soul, on the availability of suitable means, admits of the fourfold affirmation with respect to *svadravya*, *svakṣetra*, *svakāla*, and *svabhāva*, it also admits of the fourfold negation with respect to *paradravya*, *parakṣetra*, *parakāla*, and *parabhāva*.

Excerpted from:

Jain, Vijay K. (2014), *Ācārya Puṣyapāda's Iṣṭopadeśa – The Golden Discourse*, p. 6.

A nonentity (*avastu*) is indescribable; only an entity (*vastu*) becomes a nonentity, in some respect, depending on the process of its transformation:

अवस्त्वनभिलाष्यं स्यात् सर्वान्तैः परिवर्जितम् ।

वस्त्वेवाऽवस्तुतां याति प्रक्रियाया विपर्ययात् ॥४८॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो सर्व-धर्मों से रहित है वह अवस्तु है (किसी भी प्रमाण का विषय नहीं होने के कारण), और जो अवस्तु है वह ही (सर्वथा) अनभिलाष्य (अवाच्य) होती है। वस्तु प्रक्रिया के विपर्यय से (विपरीत हो जाने पर – पर-द्रव्य आदि की अपेक्षा से) अवस्तुता को प्राप्त हो जाती है।

Something that is devoid of all characteristics is a nonentity (*avastu*) [being not discernible through any form of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)] and being a nonentity that something is indescribable (*anabhilāpya, avācya*). (In worldly affairs –) Only a real entity (*vastu*) is called a nonentity (*avastu*) – somehow, in some respect – when the process of attributing characteristics to it – *prakriyā* – is changed.

There is no real nonentity (*avastu*); a nonentity must be devoid of all characteristics and, therefore, not a subject of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Such a nonentity is indescribable (*anabhilāpya, avācya*). In worldly affairs, only a real entity (*vastu*) becomes a nonentity (*avastu*), in some respect, when the process of attributing characteristics to it – *prakriyā* – is changed. For example, water – a real entity (*vastu*) – becomes a nonentity (*avastu*) when it is boiled and gets transformed into steam, or when it is cooled and gets transformed into ice.

If all characteristics of an entity are indescribable then do not make these a subject of articulation:

सर्वान्ताश्चेदवक्तव्यास्तेषां किं वचनं पुनः ।
संवृतिश्चेन्मृषैवैषा परमार्थविपर्ययात् ॥४९॥

सामान्यार्थ – (क्षणिकैकान्त-वादी बौद्धों के अनुसार) यदि यह कहा जाए कि सर्व धर्म अवक्तव्य हैं तो उनका कथन (धर्म-देशना आदि के लिए) क्यों किया जाता है? यदि उनका कथन संवृति-रूप (केवल व्यवहार के लिए) है तो परमार्थ से विपरीत होने के कारण वह मिथ्या ही है।

If all characteristics of an entity are indescribable (as proclaimed by the Buddhists) then why make these a subject of articulation (in discourses, to corroborate and contradict viewpoints)? If it be accepted that this kind of articulation is fictional (*saṃvṛti*) – merely conventional – then it is opposed to the reality.

The use of the term 'indescribable' by our rivals amounts to 'non-existence' of the reality:

अशक्यत्वादवाच्यं किमभावात्किमबोधतः ।

आद्यन्तोक्तिद्वयं न स्यात् किं व्याजेनोच्यतां स्फुटम् ॥५०॥

सामान्यार्थ - (यदि क्षणिकैकान्त-वादी बौद्धों से पूछा जाए -) तत्त्व अवाच्य क्यों है? क्या अशक्य (कथन करने की असमर्थता) होने से अवाच्य है, या अभाव (अस्तित्व-विहीन) होने से अवाच्य है, या आप में ज्ञान न होने से अवाच्य है? पहला और अन्त के विकल्प तो बनते नहीं हैं (आप को स्वीकार नहीं हो सकते हैं)। यदि अभाव होने से वस्तु-तत्त्व अवाच्य है तो बहाने बनाने से क्या लाभ? स्पष्ट कहिए कि वस्तु-तत्त्व का सर्वथा अभाव है।

To the question as to why the reality is pronounced as 'indescribable' (*avācya*) the possible answers are (a) due to lack of strength to express it, (b) due to its non-existence (*abhāva*), and (c) due to lack of knowledge. The first and the third options cannot be accepted by the proponents of 'indescribability' (as this would mean inadequacy on their part). Then why pretend and concede that, as per your assertion, the reality is 'indescribable' because it does not exist? And that amounts to nihilism – *sūnyavāda*. Speak clearly.

**Incongruence in the doctrine of 'absolute momentariness'
(kṣaṇika-ekānta):**

हिनस्त्यनभिसंधात् न हिनस्त्यभिसंधिमत् ।

बध्यते तदद्वयापेतं चित्तं बद्धं न मुच्यते ॥५१॥

सामान्यार्थ – (यदि क्षणिकैकान्त-वादी बौद्धों के क्षण-क्षण में प्रत्येक पदार्थ के निरन्वय विनाश का सिद्धान्त माना जाए -) हिंसा करने का जिस चित्त का अभिप्राय नहीं है वह हिंसा करता है, जिस चित्त का हिंसा करने का अभिप्राय है वह हिंसा नहीं करता है। जिस चित्त ने हिंसा करने का कोई अभिप्राय नहीं किया और न हिंसा ही की वह चित्त बन्ध को प्राप्त होता है। और जिस चित्त का बन्ध हुआ उसकी मुक्ति नहीं होती है, फिर मुक्ति किसकी होती है?

(The Buddhists' assertion that the never-ceasing series of momentary ideas, each impressed by the former, gives man the semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world and the soul, amounts to -) The mind that had not intended to injure, injures; the mind that had intended to injure, does not injure; and the mind that had neither intended to injure nor injured, suffers bondage (*bandha*). Moreover (since the existence of the last mentioned mind is also momentary), the mind that had suffered bondage does not get rid of bondage. To whom, then, does liberation belong? (The term liberation is a synonym for 'severance of bonds' and liberation can take place only of the person who was earlier bound, while on the contention of momentary extinction, the moment a person is bound it acquires an altogether new state without ever getting the opportunity to get rid of bondage. The contention, therefore, results in the negation of liberation.)

Fault in asserting that destruction takes place on its own, without any cause:

अहेतुकत्वान्नाशस्य हिंसाहेतुर्न हिंसकः ।

चित्तसन्ततिनाशश्च मोक्षो नाष्टाङ्गहेतुकः ॥५२॥

सामान्यार्थ – (क्षणिकैकान्त-वादी बौद्धों के अनुसार विनाश बिना कारण के स्वयं होता है –) विनाश के अहेतुक होने से हिंसा करने वाला हिंसक नहीं ठहरता है। इसी प्रकार चित्त-सन्तति के विनाश-रूप जो मोक्ष माना गया है वह भी अष्टाङ्गहेतुक नहीं हो सकता है। (बौद्ध-मत में मोक्ष को चित्त-सन्तति का नाश-रूप माना गया है। मोक्ष के आठ अंग भी वर्णित हैं – सम्यग्दृष्टि, सम्यक् संकल्प, सम्यक् वाच्, सम्यक् कर्मन्, सम्यक् आजीवन, सम्यक् व्यायाम, सम्यक् स्मृति तथा सम्यक् समाधि।)

(In view of your assertion that destruction takes place on its own, without any cause –) When there is no cause for destruction then the person alleged to have injured someone cannot be the cause of injury. In the same light, the eightfold path (*aṣṭāṅgahetuka*)¹ to liberation (*mokṣa*), in the form of destruction of the series of mental states, cannot be the cause of liberation (*mokṣa*).

-
1. Buddha's Noble Eightfold Path consists in a set of eight interconnected factors or conditions, that when developed together, lead to the cessation of suffering (*duḥkha*): Right View (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*), Right Intention (*samyak saṃkalpa*), Right Speech (*samyak vāc*), Right Action (*samyak karman*), Right Livelihood (*samyak ājīvana*), Right Effort (*samyak vyāyāma*), Right Mindfulness (*samyak smṛti*), and Right Concentration (*samyak samādhi*).

The Buddhists say that all, except consciousness, is unreal. Consciousness alone is the established truth. All the three worlds are the result of discrimination or thought-relations. No external object exists in reality. All that is, is consciousness. Liberation (*mokṣa*) is origination of a cognition purified from the inundation of the forms of objects which have passed away upon the annihilation of all suffusions (*vāsanā*)¹. And that does not fit since simply from the absence of the cause, the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*) is unaccountable.²

-
1. 'vāsanā', which in common language signifies imparting of a scent, is much discussed in Buddhist writings; it denotes a factor in a thought due to prior experience or activity, a bias.
 2. See, Thomas, F.W. (1968), "*The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine – Śrī Malliṣeṇa Surī's Syādvāda-Maṅjarī*", p. 120.

For entities that are internally connected, the cause of destruction and origination is one and the same:

विरूपकार्यारम्भाय यदि हेतुसमागमः ।

आश्रयिभ्यामनन्योऽसावविशेषादयुक्तवत् ॥५३॥

सामान्यार्थ - (बौद्ध-मत के अनुसार जिसको विनाश का कारण कहा जाता है वह विनाश का कारण नहीं है अपितु उससे केवल विसदृश-कार्य की उत्पत्ति होती है -) यदि विसदृश पदार्थ की उत्पत्ति के लिए हेतु का समागम इष्ट किया जाता है तो वह नाश और उत्पाद दोनों का कारण होने से उनका आश्रयभूत है और इसलिए अपने आश्रयी नाश और उत्पाद दोनों कार्यो से अभिन्न (अनन्यरूप) होगा।

If a cause is required to bring into existence a dissimilar effect (that is, an effect that is different from the preceding moment) then that cause should be responsible for both – bringing into existence of a new effect and destruction of the effect that existed at the preceding moment. Therefore, for entities that are internally connected, the cause of both effects, destruction and origination, is one and the same.

The stroke of a hammer which is the cause of destruction of a jar is also the cause of origination of potsherd; the cause of two effects is the same. Wherever there is concomitance between effects, the cause must be the same; like mango-ness and tree-ness are concomitant and coexist.

For an entity devoid of self-existence, there cannot be origination, destruction and continuance:

स्कन्धसंततयश्चैव संवृतित्वादसंस्कृताः ।

स्थित्युत्पत्तिव्ययास्तेषां न स्युः खरविषाणवत् ॥५४॥

सामान्यार्थ – (यदि क्षणिकैकान्त-वादी बौद्धों के मत में विसदृश-कार्य की उत्पत्ति को स्कन्ध-सन्ततियों की उत्पत्ति माना जाए -) स्कन्धों की संततियाँ भी आपके मत में संवृति-रूप होने से अपरमार्थभूत (अकार्य-रूप) हैं, तब उनके लिए हेतु का समागम कैसा? अतः जो पाँच स्कन्ध (रूप-स्कन्ध, वेदना-स्कन्ध, संज्ञा-स्कन्ध, संस्कार-स्कन्ध, विज्ञान-स्कन्ध) बताए गए हैं वे परमार्थ-सत् नहीं हैं, उनमें गधे के सींग (खरविषाण) के समान स्थिति, उत्पत्ति और व्यय नहीं बन सकते हैं।

The series (*santāna*) and lumps or aggregates (*skandha*) are considered fictional (*saṃvṛti*) – mere usage – and devoid of self-existence. There can certainly be no origination, destruction and continuance of a fictional entity like the ‘horns of a hare’ (*kharaviṣāṇa*).

In Buddhist phenomenology the aggregates (*skandha*) are the five functions or aspects that constitute the sentient being:

- a) form or matter (*rūpa*),
- b) sensation or feeling (*vedanā*),
- c) perception or cognition (*saṃjñā*),
- d) mental formations or volitions (*saṃskāra*), and
- e) consciousness or discernment (*viññāna*).

The five aggregates are considered to be the substrata for

clinging and thus ‘contribute to the causal origination of future suffering’. Clinging to the five aggregates must be removed in order to achieve release from *saṃsāra*. Nothing among them is really “I” or “mine”.

In the technical language of Buddhism, the human knowledge is confined to the *saṃvṛti-satya*, i.e., to the phenomenal reality. It is unable to grasp the *paramāṛthika-satya*, i.e., the noumenal reality. The empirical world is the phenomenal reality while the ultimate truth is the noumenal reality. The phenomenal reality is *svabhāva-sūnya*, i.e., devoid of self-existence.

Fault in accepting both, absolute 'being' (*nityatva*) and absolute 'non-being' (*anityatva*), without mutual dependence:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥५५॥

सामान्यार्थ – स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वालों के यहाँ विरोध आने के कारण उभयैकात्म्य (नित्यत्व और अनित्यत्व दोनों एकान्त पक्षों को एक-रूप मानना) नहीं बन सकता है। यदि (दोनों एकान्त पक्षों की मान्यता में विरोध आने के भय से) अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) का एकान्त माना जाए तो वह भी नहीं बनता है, अवाच्य शब्द का प्रयोग करने से स्ववचन विरोध उपस्थित होता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. absolute 'being' (*nityatva*) and absolute 'non-being' (*anityatva*) – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayaikānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational.

From different points-of-view both permanence (*nityatva*) and momentariness (*anityatva*) are universally experienced:

नित्यं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नाकस्मात्तदविच्छिदा ।
क्षणिकं कालभेदात्ते बुद्ध्यसंचरदोषतः ॥५६॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! आपके अनेकान्त मत में प्रत्यभिज्ञान का विषय होने के कारण तत्त्व कथञ्चित् नित्य है। प्रत्यभिज्ञान का सद्भाव बिना किसी कारण के नहीं होता है क्योंकि अविच्छेदरूप से वह अनुभव में आता है। काल के भेद से परिणाम-भेद होने से तत्त्व कथञ्चित् क्षणिक भी है। सर्वथा नित्य और सर्वथा क्षणिक तत्त्व में बुद्धि का संचार नहीं हो सकता है।

Being subject to recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*)¹, the real has permanence from a particular point-of-view. Recognition of the real is not accidental since it is universally experienced without any hindrance. O Lord! In your view the real also has momentariness since it exhibits change of state at different times. If the real be considered either absolutely permanent or

1. Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), in general, means knowing the thing as that which was known before. It consists in knowing not only that a thing is such and such but that it is the same thing that was seen before. Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) is the conscious reference of the past and a present cognition of the same object. I see a jar, recognize it as something that was perceived before, and say 'this is the same jar that I saw'.

Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of the present cognition and remembrance (*smṛti*). Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) is not regarded as depending solely on a previous mental impression and, therefore, is exempt from the fatal defect of remembrance (*smṛti*).

absolutely momentary, its cognition, remaining static always, will be meaningless.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi asserts in *Tattvārthasūtra*¹:

तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यं ॥५-३१॥

Permanence is indestructibility of the essential nature (quality) of the substance.

The assertion based on remembrance (*smṛti*), “This is only that,” is recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*). (This is the same thing I saw yesterday.) That does not occur accidentally. That which is the cause of such a statement is its intrinsic nature (*tadbhāva*). *Tadbhāva* is its existence, condition or mode. A thing is seen having the same nature with which it was seen formerly. So it is recognized in the form, “This is the same as that”. If it be considered that the old thing has completely disappeared and that an entirely new thing has come into existence then there can be no remembrance. And worldly relations based on it would be disturbed. Therefore, the indestructibility of the essential nature of a substance is determined as permanence. But it should be taken from one point-of-view. If it be permanent from all points-of-view, then there can be no change at all. And, in that case, transmigration as well as the way to salvation would become meaningless.

1. See, Jain, S.A. (1960), “*Reality : English Translation of Shri Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi*”, p. 156-157.

Existence is characterized by origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*):

न सामान्यात्मनोदेति न व्येति व्यक्तमन्वयात् ।
व्येत्युदेति विशेषात्ते सहैकत्रोदयादि सत् ॥५७॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! आपके शासन में वस्तु सामान्य की अपेक्षा से न उत्पन्न होती है और न नष्ट होती है। यह बात स्पष्ट है क्योंकि सब पर्यायों में उसका अन्वय पाया जाता है (वस्तु का सामान्य-स्वरूप उसकी सब अवस्थाओं में स्थिर रहता है)। तथा विशेष की अपेक्षा से वस्तु नष्ट और उत्पन्न होती है। युगपत् (एक साथ) एक वस्तु में तीनों (उत्पाद, व्यय, ध्रौव्य) का होना ही सत् है।

O Lord! In your doctrine, so far as the general characteristic (*sāmānya svabhāva*) of a substance is concerned it neither originates nor gets destroyed since existence (being or *sat*) is its differentia. However, so far as the particular characteristics (*viśeṣa svabhāva*) are concerned, the substance originates and gets destroyed. Thus, the existence (of a substance) is characterized by origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*).

A substance is permanent from the point-of-view of general properties. From the point-of-view of its specific modes it is not permanent. Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general and the particular, somehow, are different as well as identical. Thus these form the cause of worldly intercourse.

If origination, destruction and permanence are not viewed as mutually dependent, the 'being' (*sat*) will get reduced to a non-entity like the 'sky-flower':

कार्योत्पादः क्षयो हेतोर्नियमाल्लक्षणात् पृथक् ।

न तौ जात्याद्यवस्थानादनपेक्षाः खपुष्पवत् ॥५८॥

सामान्यार्थ – एक हेतु का नियम होने से (उपादान कारण का) जो क्षय है वही (उत्तराकार-रूप) कार्य का उत्पाद है। उत्पाद और विनाश लक्षण की अपेक्षा से कथञ्चित् पृथक्-पृथक् हैं। जाति आदि के अवस्थान के कारण उत्पाद और विनाश में कथञ्चित् भेद नहीं भी है। परस्पर निरपेक्ष उत्पाद, व्यय और ध्रौव्य आकाश-पुष्प के समान अवस्तु हैं।

The destruction of the cause (a jar, for example) is the cause of the origination of the effect (the potsherd); both, destruction of the cause and origination of the effect, invariably go together. In some respect (the mode), the two – origination and destruction – are mutually different. However, due to the presence of the universal characters of 'being' (class – *jāti*, enumeration – *saṃkhyā*, etc.) the two – origination and destruction – can also be said to be not different from each other. If origination, destruction and permanence are not viewed as mutually dependent, the 'being' (*sat*) will get reduced to a nonentity like the 'sky-flower'.

Here we come to the main metaphysical tenet of Jainism to the effect that every real is a complex of origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*), and permanence (*dhrauvya*) besides of substance (*dravya*), mode (*paryāya*) and quality (*guṇa*).

From the point-of-view of modes, the three characteristics (origination, destruction and permanence) are mutually different from one another and are also different from the substance. From the point-of-view of substance, these three (origination, destruction and permanence) are not perceived separately from the substance. Hence these are not different.

Origination, destruction and permanence, mutually irrespective, become non-existent like the 'sky-flower'. Mere origination does not exist because that is without stability and departure; mere destruction does not exist because that is without stability and origination; mere permanence does not exist because that is without destruction and origination – all three, mutually irrespective, are like the 'hair of a tortoise'¹.

1. See, Thomas, F.W. (1968), "*The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine – Śrī Malliṣeṇa Surī's Syādvāda-Maṅjarī*", p. 130.

Three characters of existence – origination, destruction and permanence – explained through an example:

घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम् ।

शोकप्रमोदमाध्यस्थ्यं जनो याति सहेतुकम् ॥५९॥

सामान्यार्थ – (सुवर्ण-घट को सुवर्ण-मुकुट में परिवर्तित करने की स्थिति में-) सुवर्ण के घट का, सुवर्ण के मुकुट का और केवल सुवर्ण का इच्छुक मनुष्य क्रमशः सुवर्ण-घट का नाश होने पर शोक को, सुवर्ण-मुकुट के उत्पन्न होने पर हर्ष को, और दोनों ही अवस्थाओं में सुवर्ण की स्थिति होने से शोक और हर्ष से रहित माध्यस्थ्य-भाव को प्राप्त होता है। और यह सब सहेतुक होता है। (बिना हेतु के उन घटार्थी, मुकुटार्थी तथा सुवर्णार्थी के शोकादि की स्थिति नहीं बनती है।)

(When a diadem is produced out of a gold jar –) The one desirous of the gold jar gets to grief on its destruction; the one desirous of the gold diadem gets to happiness on its origination; and the one desirous of gold remains indifferent, as gold remains integral to both – the jar as well as the diadem. This also establishes the fact that different characters of existence (origination, destruction and permanence) are the causes of different responses.

Another example of the threefold character of existence:

पयोव्रतो न दध्यत्ति न पयोत्ति दधिव्रतः ।

अगोरसव्रतो नोभे तस्मात्तत्त्वं त्रयात्मकम् ॥६०॥

सामान्यार्थ – जिसका दूध ही लेने का व्रत है वह दही नहीं खाता है, जिसका दही ही लेने का व्रत है वह दूध नहीं पीता है, और जिसका गोरस नहीं लेने का व्रत है वह दोनों (दूध तथा दही) नहीं लेता है। इस प्रकार से वस्तु-तत्त्व त्रयात्मक (उत्पाद, व्यय तथा ध्रौव्य रूप) है।

The one who has vowed to take only milk, does not take curd; the one who has vowed to take only curd, does not take milk, and the one who has vowed not to take any cow-produce¹ (*gorasa*) does not take either. Thus existence ('being' or *sat*) has threefold character – origination (of the mode that is curd), destruction (of the mode that is milk), and permanence (of the substance that is cow-produce, present in curd as well as milk).

1. The genus cow-produce (*gorasa*) is consumed in many forms like milk, curd, cheese, and buttermilk.

Section 4

चतुर्थ परिच्छेद

The view that the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*), etc., are absolutely different:

कार्यकारणनानात्वं गुणगुण्यन्यतापि च ।

सामान्यतद्वदन्यत्वं चैकान्तेन यदीष्यते ॥६१॥

सामान्यार्थ - (नैयायिक-वैशेषिक मत में -) यदि कार्य-कारण में, गुण-गुणी में और सामान्य-सामान्यवान् में सर्वथा (एकान्त रूप से) भेद माना जाए तो ऐसा मानना ठीक नहीं है -

(As per the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology -) If one maintains that the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*), the quality (*guṇa*) and the possessor of that quality (*guṇī*), and the generality (*sāmānya*) and its possessor (*sāmānyavān*), are absolutely different, then difficulties arise -

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, seven categories of reality are substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), uniqueness (*viśeṣa*), inherence (*samavāya*) and non-existence (*abhāva*). Substance (*dravya*) is that in which a quality or an action can exist but which in itself is different from both quality and action. Quality (*guṇa*) differs from substance and action (*karma*) in the sense that it is an unmoving property. The action (*karma*), like quality, has no separate existence, it belongs to the substance. But while quality is a permanent feature of a substance, action is a

transient one. Generality (*sāmānya*) relates to abstract characteristic that is singular and eternal and yet pervades many. Like leadership is a single characteristic, but it resides in many individuals. Leadership is also eternal because it was already in existence before the first leader emerged and will continue to exist even if there were no more leaders. Uniqueness (*viśeṣa*) is that characteristic by virtue of which a thing is distinguished from all other things. Like space, time and soul, it is eternal. Everything in the world, existent or non-existent, is accompanied by uniqueness. Generality and uniqueness are opposite concepts. Inherence (*samavāya*) is a permanent relation between two entities, one of whom inheres in the other. One of the entities depends for its existence on the other. Objects in an inherent relationship cannot be reversed as those that are related by nearness. Non-existence (*abhāva*) is that which is not found in any of the six positive categories, and yet according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view non-existence exists, just as space and direction. To illustrate, to the question ‘how does one know that there is no chair in the room?’, the answer is ‘by looking at the room’. Thus non-existence also exists.

The universalities and particularities are held to be eternal and have a distinct own-nature, but these are not credited with existence (*sattā*), which is confined to substances, qualities and actions.

The gist of the Jaina argument is that universality and particularity are involved in the nature of everything and not imposed from outside by virtue of a relation of ‘inherence’ (*samavāya*).

Fault in accepting that there is inherence (*samavāya*) of a single effect in many causes:

एकस्याऽनेकवृत्तिर्न भागाऽभावाद्बहूनि वा ।

भागित्वाद्वाऽस्य नैकत्वं दोषो वृत्तेरनार्हते ॥६२॥

सामान्यार्थ – (यदि वैशेषिक मत के अनुसार कार्य-कारण, गुण-गुणी और सामान्य-सामान्यवान् में सर्वथा भेद माना जाए तो -) एक की अनेकों में वृत्ति नहीं हो सकती है, क्योंकि उसके भाग (अंश) नहीं होते हैं। और यदि एक के अनेक भाग हैं, तो वह एकत्व स्थिर नहीं रहता है। इस प्रकार एक की अनेक में सर्वात्मक अथवा सर्वदेश वृत्ति मानने से अनार्हत मत में अनेक दोष आते हैं।

A single effect (in the aggregate – *avayavi*) cannot inhere in many causes (the constituent parts – *avayava*) since, as has been assumed, it is possessed of no parts. Or if it be assumed that the effect is possessed of parts then it no longer remains a single entity. Thus, there are difficulties in accepting the non-Jaina position regarding the way the effect inheres in its cause.

The Vaiśeṣika hold¹ that ‘attributes’, like the intelligence (*caitanya*) and the colour (*rūpa*), and ‘bearers of attributes’, like the self (*ātmā*) and the pot (*ghaṭa*), are completely different, yet being connected by ‘inherence’ (*samavāya*) these attain the designations ‘attributes’ and ‘bearers of attributes’. Inherence weaves together; it is also styled ‘occurrence’ (*vṛtti*). Through that occurrence, the inherence connection, the

1. See, जगदीशचन्द्र जैन (डॉ.) (1992), श्रीमल्लिषेणसूरिप्रणीता
स्याद्वादमञ्जरी, पृष्ठ 43.

designation 'attributes' and 'bearer of attributes' is approved.

However, there can be no relation of 'attributes' and 'bearer of attributes' if the two are utterly different. If it be said that the relation between the two is through 'inherence' then we must be able to cognize the thing called 'inherence' and that is not possible. The connection between the 'attributes' and the 'bearer of the attributes' is to be adopted only as defined by 'non-separate existence' and not something other, such as inherence, etc.



PREVIEW ONLY

Fault in accepting absolute separateness between the aggregate (*avayavī*) and the constituent parts (*avayava*):

देशकालविशेषेऽपि स्याद्वृत्तिर्युतसिद्धवत् ।

समानदेशता न स्यात् मूर्तकारणकार्ययोः ॥६३॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि अवयव-अवयवी, कार्य-कारण आदि एक दूसरे से सर्वथा पृथक् हैं, तो युतसिद्ध पदार्थों की तरह (घट-वृक्ष की तरह) भिन्न देश और भिन्न काल में उनकी वृत्ति (स्थिति) माननी पड़ेगी। इस कारण से मूर्तिक कारण और कार्य में जो समानदेशता (एक-काल-देशता) देखी जाती है वह नहीं बन सकेगी।

If cause and effect are considered absolutely separate from one another, there should be separateness between these with respect to space and time, just as is seen between two external material substances (e.g., the pot and the tree – residing in separate substrata – *yutasiddha*). Then it will not be possible to explain the occurrence (*vṛtti*) of cause and effect in a material entity in the same space (and the time).

Fault in accepting inherence (*samavāya*) as independent of the constituent parts (*avayava*) and the aggregate (*avayavī*):

आश्रयाऽऽश्रयिभावान्न स्वातन्त्र्यं समवायिनाम् ।

इत्ययुक्तः स सम्बन्धो न युक्तः समवायिभिः ॥६४॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि यह कहा जाए कि समवायियों में आश्रय-आश्रयी-भाव (अवयव आश्रय है और अवयवी आश्रयी है) होने के कारण स्वतंत्रता नहीं है जिससे देश-काल की अपेक्षा से भेद होने पर भी वृत्ति बनती है, तो ऐसा कहना ठीक नहीं है। क्योंकि जो स्वयं असम्बद्ध है (समवाय अनाश्रित होने से असम्बद्ध ही रहता है) वह एक अवयवी का दूसरे अवयवी के साथ सम्बन्ध कैसे करा सकता है?

It might be said that there exists a relationship of substratum and superstratum between two entities (viz. the constituent parts and the aggregate – *avayava* and *avayavī*) through inherence (*samavāya*), and due to inherence the two cannot remain independent of each other even at different space and time. We respond that if inherence (*samavāya*) itself is independent of the two entities, how can it possibly create a relationship between these?

Relationship between generality (*sāmānya*) and inherence (*samavāya*):

सामान्यं समवायश्चाऽप्येकैकत्र समाप्तितः ।

अन्तरेणाऽऽश्रयं न स्यान्नाशोत्पादिषु को विधिः ॥६५॥

सामान्यार्थ – सामान्य और समवाय अपने-अपने आश्रयों में पूर्ण रूप से रहते हैं। और आश्रय के बिना उनका सद्भाव नहीं हो सकता है। तब नष्ट और उत्पन्न होने वाले अनित्य कार्यों में उनके सद्भाव की विधि-व्यवस्था कैसे बन सकती है?

(As per the Vaiśeṣikas –) Generality or universality (*sāmānya*) and inherence (*samavāya*) both exist in their entirety (and inseparably) in their substratum (that is, the entity). Also, these two cannot exist independent of their substratum. If so, how can these persist in entities which are subject to destruction and origination?

Ācārya Māṇikyanandī's *Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra*:

समवायेऽतिप्रसङ्गः ॥६-७२॥

If inherence (*samavāya*) be accepted, it gives rise to the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*atiprasaṅga* or *atīvyāpti*).

The Naiyāyika believe that the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the fruit (*phala*) are associated with the soul (*ātmā*) through the inherence (*samavāya*). And this way the relation of the fruit (*phala*) with the particular soul (*ātmā*) is established. This contention is contradicted here.

As the inherence (*samavāya*) has been considered eternal (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and all-pervasive (*vyāpaka*), it should remain in all souls (*ātmā*) in one single form only. And then, the differentiation that this fruit (*phala*) pertains to the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) of this particular soul (*ātmā*) and not of any other soul will not be possible. The fruit (*phala*) pertaining to one soul (*ātmā*) will become the fruit (*phala*) pertaining to any other soul (*ātmā*); this is the fault (*doṣa*) of over-pervasiveness (*atiprasaṅga* or *ativyāpti*). Therefore, it is not correct to consider the fruit (*phala*) absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) from the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

It has been established that the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is neither absolutely (*sarvathā*) inseparable (*abhinna*) nor absolutely (*sarvathā*) separable (*bhinna*) from the fruit (*phala*).

It is right to consider the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as in-some-respect (*kathañcit*) inseparable (*abhinna*) and in-some-respect (*kathañcit*) separable (*bhinna*) from the fruit (*phala*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2021),
*Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra –
 Essence of the Jaina Nyāya*, p. 222-223.

If no relation whatsoever is accepted between generality (*sāmānya*) and inherence (*samavāya*):

सर्वथाऽनभिसम्बन्धः सामान्यसमवाययोः ।

ताभ्यामर्थो न सम्बद्धस्तानि त्रीणि खपुष्पवत् ॥६६॥

सामान्यार्थ – (वैशेषिक मत के अनुसार –) जब सामान्य और समवाय का परस्पर में किसी प्रकार का (संयोगादि-रूप का) सम्बन्ध नहीं है तब उन दोनों के साथ द्रव्य, गुण तथा कर्म-रूप जो अर्थ है उसका भी सम्बन्ध नहीं बनता है। अतः सामान्य, समवाय और अर्थ ये तीनों ही ‘आकाशपुष्प’ के समान अवस्तु ठहरते हैं।

(As per the Vaiśeṣikas –) The generality (*sāmānya*) and the inherence (*samavāya*) are considered absolutely independent of each other. Also, these two have no relation whatsoever with their substratum, the entity (*artha*) – the object of knowledge. If so, all three – the generality (*sāmānya*), the inherence (*samavāya*), and the entity (*artha*) – become nonentities like the ‘sky-flower’.

The universalities and particularities are held by the Vaiśeṣikas to be eternal and having their own distinct nature, but they are not credited with existence (*sattā*), which is confined to the entity (*artha*) – substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*).

Fault in accepting atoms as absolutely non-distinct:

अनन्यतैकान्तेऽणूनां संघातेऽपि विभागवत् ।

असंहतत्वं स्याद्भूतचतुष्कं भ्रान्तिरेव सा ॥६७॥

सामान्यार्थ – (बौद्ध-मत के अनुसार –) यदि अनन्यतैकान्त में परमाणुओं की अनन्यता का एकान्त माना जाए तो स्कन्ध-रूप में उनके मिलने पर भी विभाग के समान परस्पर असम्बद्धता ही रहेगी। और ऐसा होने पर बौद्धों के द्वारा मान्य जो भूतचतुष्क (परमाणुओं का पृथिवी, जल, अग्नि और वायु ऐसे चार स्कन्धों के रूप में कार्य) है वह वास्तविक न होकर भ्रान्त ही होगा।

If it be maintained that the atoms (*aṇu*) are absolutely non-distinct (oneness – *ananyatva*) then these should remain as such (non-distinct) even after their union to form molecules (*skandha*), creating thereby a substance. Under such a regime the four basic substances (*bhūtacatuṣka* of the Buddhists) – earth (*pṛthvī*), water (*jala*), fire (*agni*), and air (*vāyu*) – which are but the effects of the union of atoms, will turn out to be illusory.

If the effect is illusory, the cause must also be illusory; the atoms (*aṇu*) then become illusory:

कार्यभ्रान्तेरणुभ्रान्तिः कार्यलिङ्गं हि कारणम् ।
उभयाऽभावतस्तत्स्थं गुणजातीतरच्च न ॥६८॥

सामान्यार्थ - भूतचतुष्क-रूप कार्य के भ्रान्त होने पर तत्कारण अणु भी भ्रान्त ही ठहरेंगे क्योंकि कार्य के द्वारा कारण का ज्ञान किया जाता है (अर्थात् कारण कार्यलिङ्गक होता है)। कार्य और कारण दोनों के अभाव से उनमें रहने वाले गुण, जाति, क्रिया-आदि का भी अभाव हो जाएगा।

As the cause (*kāraṇa*) is established by the effect (*kārya*), therefore, when the effect (*bhūtacatuṣka* of the Buddhists) is illusory, the cause [the atoms (*aṇu*) responsible for the formation of molecules (*skandha*)] must also be illusory. And with non-existent character of both, the cause and the effect, the attributes of the effect like quality (*guṇa*) and genus (*jāti*) will also become illusory (non-existent).

Note: The relation between the material cause (*kāraṇa*) and its effect (*kārya*) is that wherever the cause is present the effect would be present, and wherever the effect is present the cause must have been present. As a corollary, if the cause is absent the effect must be absent and if the effect is absent the cause must also be absent.

Fault in considering the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) as absolutely one:

एकत्वेऽन्यतराभावः शेषाभावोऽविनाभवः ।

द्वित्वसंख्याविरोधश्च संवृतिश्चेन्मृषैव सा ॥६९॥

सामान्यार्थ – (सांख्यमतानुसार –) यदि कार्य और कारण को सर्वथा एक माना जाए तो उनमें से किसी एक का अभाव हो जाएगा। और एक के अभाव में दूसरे का भी अभाव ठहरेगा क्योंकि उनका परस्पर में अविनाभाव सम्बन्ध है। यदि द्वित्व-संख्या को संवृति-रूप – कल्पित अथवा औपचारिक – माना जाए तो संवृति के मिथ्या होने से द्वित्व-संख्या भी मिथ्या ही ठहरती है।

(As per the Sāṃkhya view –) If the effect (*kārya*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) are considered absolutely one, then, as the two are declared to be inseparably connected (*avinābhāvī*), one of these is bound to be non-existent. (And, as a corollary, the other too becomes non-existent.) If it be said that the effect and the cause are actually one but are referred to as two by mere usage then also, being a product of imagination (*saṃvṛti*), both these remain misconceptions.

Fault in accepting both, absolute separateness (*anyatva*) and absolute oneness (*ananyatva*) of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*), without mutual dependence:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥७०॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ कार्य और कारण की अन्यता और अनन्यता दोनों का निरपेक्ष अस्तित्व नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में ‘यह अवाच्य है’ ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. absolute separateness (*anyatva*) and absolute oneness (*ananyatva*) of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayaikānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.

The doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) declares that the substance and its modes show oneness as well as separateness in some respects only:

द्रव्यपर्याययोरैक्यं तयोरव्यतिरेकतः ।

परिणामविशेषाच्च शक्तिमच्छक्तिभावतः ॥७१॥

संज्ञासंख्याविशेषाच्च स्वलक्षणविशेषतः ।

प्रयोजनादिभेदाच्च तन्नानात्वं न सर्वथा ॥७२॥

सामान्यार्थ - द्रव्य और पर्याय में कथञ्चित् ऐक्य (अभेद) है, क्योंकि उन दोनों में अव्यतिरेक पाया जाता है। द्रव्य और पर्याय कथञ्चित् एक दूसरे से नाना-रूप (व्यतिरेक) भी हैं, क्योंकि द्रव्य और पर्याय में परिणाम-परिणामी का भेद है, शक्तिमान् और शक्तिभाव का भेद है, संज्ञा (नाम) का भेद है, संख्या का भेद है, स्वलक्षण का भेद है, और प्रयोजन आदि का भेद है। (आदि शब्द से काल एवं प्रतिभास का भेद ग्रहण किया गया है।)

The substance (*dravya*) and its mode (*pariyāya*), somehow, exhibit oneness (with each other) as both these have logical continuance (*avyatireka*). The two also, somehow, exhibit separateness from each other – *vyatireka* – as there is difference of effect (*pariṇāma* and *pariṇāmī*), of capacity (*śaktimāna* and *śaktibhāva*), of designation (*saṃjñā*), of number (*saṃkhyā*), of self-attribute (*svalakṣaṇa*), of utility (*prayojana*), and so on¹. The substance and its modes, thus, are neither absolutely one nor absolutely different; as established by the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*), these two, the substance and its modes, show oneness as well as separateness in some respects only.

1. Time (*kāla*) and appearance (*pratibhāsa*) are also included.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

गुणपर्ययवद् द्रव्यम् ॥५-३८॥

That which has qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*) is a substance (*dravya*).

The one which has qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*) is said to be one with qualities and modes. That in which qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*) exist is a substance (*dravya*). It has already been explained (*sūtra* 5-30) that from the point-of-view of modes – *paryāyārthika naya* – there is a difference between the attributes and the substance (*dravya*). From the point-of-view of the substance – *dravyārthika naya* – there is no difference. Hence it is appropriate to consider these – qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*) – as marks (*lakṣaṇa*) of the substance (*dravya*) under consideration (*lakṣya*). What are qualities (*guṇa*) and what are modes (*paryāya*)? Those characteristics which exhibit association (*anvaya*) with the substance are qualities (*guṇa*). Those characteristics which exhibit distinction or exclusion (*vyatireka*) – logical discontinuity, ‘when the pot is not, the clay is,’ – are modes (*paryāya*). The substance (*dravya*) possesses both. In essence, that which makes distinction between one substance and another is called the quality (*guṇa*), and the modification of the substance is called its mode (*paryāya*). The substance (*dravya*) is inseparable (residing in the same substratum – *ayuta-siddha*) from its qualities (*guṇa*), and permanent (*nitya*). That which distinguishes one substance from other substances is its distinctive (*bhedaka*) quality (*guṇa*). The presence of this quality proves its existence. The absence of distinctive qualities would lead to intermixture or confusion between substances. For instance, the substance of soul (*jīva*) is distinguished from the matter (*pudgala*) and other substances by the presence of its distinctive qualities, such as knowledge.

The matter (*pudgala*) is distinguished from the souls (*jīva*) by the presence of its distinctive qualities, such as form (colour), etc. Without such distinguishing characteristics, there can be no distinction between the souls and the matter. Therefore, from the general (*sāmānya*) point-of-view, knowledge, etc., are qualities always associated with the soul, and qualities like form, etc., are always associated with the matter. Their modifications, which are known from particular (*viśeṣa*) point-of-view, are modes (*pariyāya*). For instance, in the souls (*jīva*), the modes (*pariyāya*) are knowledge of the pitcher, knowledge of the cloth, anger, pride, etc., and in the matter (*pudgala*) these are intense or mild odour, colour, etc. The collection or aggregate of qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*pariyāya*), which somehow is considered different from these, is called the substance (*dravya*). If the aggregate were completely (from all points-of-view) the same, it would lead to negation of all – the substance (*dravya*), the qualities (*guṇa*) and the modes (*pariyāya*). This is explained thus: if the aggregate of mutually different qualities be considered one and the same as qualities, the aggregate itself would become non-existent, as these are mutually different. The form (colour) is different from the taste, etc. If the aggregate is same as the colour, and the colour being different from the taste, etc., the aggregate is bound to be different from the taste, etc. Therefore, the conclusion would be that colour alone is the aggregate. But one colour is not fit to become an aggregate or a collection. Hence it leads to the negation of the aggregate. And, with negation of the aggregate, its constituents too are negated. It would lead to negation of the substance (*dravya*) and the qualities (*guṇa*). Similarly, it must be considered in case of taste, etc. Therefore, the aggregate of qualities must be admitted to be somehow – from particular point-of-view – same as the qualities.

Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2018),
Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra, p. 222-224.

Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha*:

पञ्जयविजुदं दव्वं दव्वविजुत्ता य पञ्जया णत्थि ।
दोण्हं अणण्णभूदं भावं समणा परूविति ॥१२॥

The substance (*dravya*) does not exist without the modes (*pariyāya*) and the modes (*pariyāya*) do not exist without the substance (*dravya*). The ascetics (*śramaṇa*) proclaim that the object (*bhāva* or *vastu*) is one (*abheda*) with the two – the substance (*dravya*) and the mode (*pariyāya*).

Just as the cow-produce (*gorasa*) does not exist without modes like the milk and the curd, similarly, the substance (*dravya*) does not exist without the modes (*pariyāya*). Or, just as the modes like the milk and the curd do not exist without the cow-produce (*gorasa*), similarly, the modes (*pariyāya*) do not exist without the substance (*dravya*). Thus, existence has threefold character – origination (of the mode that is the curd), destruction (of the mode that is the milk), and permanence (of the substance that is the cow-produce, present in the curd as well as the milk). In both, the substance (*dravya*) and the mode (*pariyāya*), oneness exists in regard to the object (*bhāva* or *vastu*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2020),

Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha, p. 27-28.

Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha*:

भावा जीवादीया जीवगुणा चेदणा य उवओगो ।
सुरणरणारयतिरिया जीवस्स य पञ्जया बहुगा ॥१६॥

The existing-objects-of-knowledge (*bhāva*, *vastu*, *sat*, *padārtha*) include the soul (*jīva*). The qualities (*guṇa*) of the soul (*jīva*) are consciousness (*cetanā*) and cognition (*upayoga*). The modes (*pariyāya*) of the soul (*jīva*) are in form of numerous celestial-beings (*deva*), human-beings (*manuṣya*), infernal-beings (*nāraka*), and plants-and-

animals (*tiryāṅca*).

Consciousness (*cetanā*) is of two kinds: pure-consciousness (*śuddha cetanā*) and impure-consciousness (*aśuddha cetanā*). Cognition (*upayoga*), too, is of two kinds: knowledge-cognition (*jñānopayoga*) and perception-cognition (*darśanopayoga*). Pure-consciousness (*śuddha cetanā*) comprises knowledge-consciousness (*jñānacetanā*). Impure-consciousness (*aśuddha cetanā*) comprises karma-consciousness (*karmacetanā* or *bhāvakarma*) and fruit-of-karma-consciousness (*karmaphalacetanā*).

Knowledge-cognition (*jñānopayoga*) is with details and makes distinction (*vikalpa*) between objects (*artha*), like the soul (*jīva*) and the non-soul (*ajīva*). Perception-cognition (*darśanopayoga*) is without details and does not make such distinction. Knowledge-cognition (*jñānopayoga*) comprises knowledge of eight kinds: sensory-knowledge (*matijñāna*), scriptural-knowledge (*śrutajñāna*), clairvoyance (*avadhijñāna*), telepathy (*manahparyayajñāna*), omniscience (*kevalajñāna*), wrong-sensory-knowledge (*kumati*), wrong-scriptural-knowledge (*kuśruta*), and wrong-clairvoyance (*kuavadhi, vibhaṅga*). Omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) is pure (*śuddha*) and without-envelopment (*nirāvaraṇa*). The other seven kinds of knowledge are impure (*aśuddha*) and with-envelopment (*āvaraṇa*).

Perception-cognition (*darśanopayoga*) is of four kinds: ocular-perception-cognition (*caḥṣudarśana*), non-ocular-perception-cognition (*acaḥṣudarśana*), clairvoyant-perception-cognition (*avadhidarśana*), and perfect, infinite-perception-cognition (*kevaladarśana*). Perfect, infinite-perception-cognition (*kevaladarśana*) is permanent as it is the result of destructional (*kṣāyika*) dispositions, pure (*śuddha*), and without-envelopment (*nirāvaraṇa*). The other three are the results of destruction-cum-subsidential (*kṣāyopaśamika*) dispositions, impure (*aśuddha*), and with-envelopment

(*āvaraṇa*).

Modes (*pariyāya*) are of two kinds: mode-of-substance (*dravyapariyāya*) and mode-of-qualities (*guṇapariyāya*).

The mode-of-substance (*dravyapariyāya*) is of two kinds: 1) *samānajātīya dravyapariyāya* – results from the union of atoms of the same class of substance, like different kinds of physical matter, and 2) *asamānajātīya dravyapariyāya* – results from the union of different classes of substances, like the humans, and the celestial-beings.

The mode-of-qualities (*guṇapariyāya*), too, is of two kinds: 1) *svabhāva guṇapariyāya* – as the substance of soul (*jīva*) transforms with its intrinsic *agurulaghguṇa*, which manifests in *ṣaṭguṇahāniviṛddhi*, and 2) *vibhāva guṇapariyāya* – as the quality of knowledge in the substance of the soul (*jīva*) becomes less or more due to association with the matter (*pudgala*).

There is another way by which modes (*pariyāya*) are classified: 1) *artha pariyāya* – the subtle-modes, and 2) *vyañjana pariyāya* – the gross-modes.

The subtle-modes (*artha pariyāya*) are extremely subtle, change every instant, and beyond description. For the soul (*jīva*), the impure (*aśuddha*) subtle-modes (*artha pariyāya*) include transformations due to the constantly changing passions (*kaṣāya*) and thought-complexion (*leśyā*).

The gross-modes (*vyañjana pariyāya*) are gross, relatively enduring, and capable of description. For the soul (*jīva*), the unnatural gross-modes (*vibhāva vyañjana pariyāya*) are the states of existence like the human-being (*manuṣya*) and the infernal-being (*nāraka*). Its natural gross-mode (*svabhāva vyañjana pariyāya*) is the state of liberation.

Jain, Vijay K. (2020),
Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha, p. 37-39.

Section 5

पञ्चम परिच्छेद

The entity (*dharmī*) and its attribute (*dharma*) are neither absolutely dependent (*āpekṣika*) nor absolutely independent (*anāpekṣika*):

यद्यापेक्षिकसिद्धिः स्यान्न द्वयं व्यवतिष्ठते ।

अनापेक्षिकसिद्धौ च न सामान्यविशेषता ॥७३॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि पदार्थों (धर्म व धर्मी आदि) की सिद्धि आपेक्षिक (सर्वथा एक-दूसरे की अपेक्षा रखने वाली) होती है, तो आपेक्ष्य और आपेक्षिक दोनों में से किसी की सिद्धि नहीं हो सकती है। और सिद्धि को सर्वथा अनापेक्षिक (एक-दूसरे की अपेक्षा न रखने वाली) मानने पर उनमें सामान्य-विशेष भाव नहीं बन सकता है।

The existence of the entity (*dharmī*) and its attribute (*dharma*) cannot be established if these are considered absolutely dependent (*āpekṣika*) on each other as neither can then hold its identity. (In case two objects are absolutely dependent on each other, both are bound to lose their individual identity.) If these, the entity and its attribute, be considered absolutely independent (*anāpekṣika*) of each other, then the general (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) attributes cannot be established. [Only an entity which has general (*sāmānya* – *dravya*) and particular (*viśeṣa* – *paryāya*) attributes can be the subject of knowledge. *Dravya* without its modification and modification without its *dravya* cannot be the subject of valid

knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of knowledge.]

Ācārya Samantabhadra's *Svayambhūstotra*:

यथैकशः कारकमर्थसिद्धये समीक्ष्य शेषं स्वसहायकारकम् ।

तथैव सामान्यविशेषमातृका नयास्तवेष्टा गुणमुख्यकल्पतः ॥

(13-2-62)

Just as the two mutually supportive causes, the substantial cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) and the instrumental cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*), result in the accomplishment of the desired objective, in the same way, your doctrine that postulates two kinds of attributes in a substance, general (*sāmānya*) and specific (*viśeṣa*), and ascertains its particular characteristic (*naya*) depending on what is kept as the primary consideration for the moment while keeping the other attributes in the background, not negating their existence in any way, accomplishes the desired objective.

Jain, Vijay K. (2015),

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra, p. 87.

Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's *Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra*:

सामान्यविशेषात्मा तदर्थो विषयः ॥४-१॥

The object (*artha, vastu, padārtha*) of the nature of the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) is the subject of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2021),

*Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra –
Essence of the Jaina Nyāya*, p. 135.

Fault in accepting both absolute dependence (*āpekṣika*) and absolute independence (*anāpekṣika*) of the entity and its attribute, without any mutual relation:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥७४॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ आपेक्षिक सिद्धि और अनापेक्षिक सिद्धि दोनों का निरपेक्ष अस्तित्व नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में ‘यह अवाच्य है’ ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two – viz. absolute dependence (*āpekṣika*) and absolute independence (*anāpekṣika*) of the entity and its attribute – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayaikānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.

There is invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) between an entity (*dharmī*) and its attribute (*dharma*) but still each has its own-nature:

धर्मधर्म्यविनाभावः सिद्धयत्यन्योऽन्यवीक्षया ।

न स्वरूपं स्वतो ह्येतत् कारकज्ञापकाङ्गवत् ॥७५॥

सामान्यार्थ – धर्म और धर्मी का अविनाभाव सम्बन्ध ही परस्पर की अपेक्षा से सिद्ध होता है, उनका स्वरूप नहीं। स्वरूप तो कारक और ज्ञापक के अंगों की तरह स्वतः सिद्ध है। (कारक के दो अंग कर्ता और कर्म तथा ज्ञापक के दो अंग प्रमाण और प्रमेय ये अपने-अपने स्वरूप के विषय में दूसरे अंग की अपेक्षा नहीं रखते हैं। व्यवहार के लिए पारस्परिक अपेक्षा आवश्यक है, स्वरूप के लिए नहीं।)

The fact that there is invariable togetherness (*avinābhāva*) between an entity (*dharmī*) and its attribute (*dharma*) is established on the basis of their relative existence. This fact, however, has no implication on their respective own-nature. Their respective own-nature is self-proven like the constituent parts of the agent-of-production (*kāraka*) [the doer (*kartā*), the activity (*karma*), etc.], and the agent-of-knowledge (*jñāpaka*) [the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and the object-of-knowledge (*prameya*)].

Note: The doer (*kartā*) does not rely on the activity (*karma*) for its own nature and the activity (*karma*) does not rely on the doer (*kartā*) for its own nature. Similarly, the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) does not rely on the object-of-knowledge (*prameya*) for its own nature and the object-of-knowledge (*prameya*) does not rely on the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for its own nature. But empirically these are considered related to each other.

.....

The existence of the entity (*dharmī*) and its attribute (*dharmā*), thus, can be described in seven ways: 1) somehow dependent (*āpekṣika*), 2) somehow independent (*anāpekṣika*), 3) somehow both (*ubhaya*) – dependent and independent, 4) somehow indescribable (*avaktavya*), 5) somehow dependent and indescribable (*āpekṣika-avaktavya*), 6) somehow independent and indescribable (*anāpekṣika-avaktavya*), and 7) somehow both dependent and independent and indescribable (*ubhaya-avaktavya*).



PREVIEW ONLY

Section 6

षष्ठ परिच्छेद

Fault in the two views that Reality can only be established through the use of the middle term (*hetu*), or through the authority of the scripture (*āgama*):

सिद्धं चेद्धेतुतः सर्वं न प्रत्यक्षादितो गतिः ।

सिद्धं चेदागमात् सर्वं विरुद्धार्थमतान्यपि ॥७६॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि हेतु से ही (एकान्ततः) सब तत्त्वों की सिद्धि होती है, तो प्रत्यक्ष आदि से पदार्थों का ज्ञान नहीं बन सकेगा। (ऐसा मानने पर हेतुमूलक अनुमान-ज्ञान भी नहीं बन सकेगा क्योंकि अनुमान के लिए धर्मी, साधन और उदाहरण का प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान होना आवश्यक है।) और यदि आगम से सब तत्त्वों की सिद्धि होती है, तो परस्पर-विरुद्ध अर्थ के प्रतिपादक मतों की भी सिद्धि हो जाएगी।

If it be maintained that Reality can only be established through the use of the middle term (*hetu*) then it will not be possible to establish anything with the help of the proven sources of knowledge – direct (*pratyakṣa*) sources of knowledge, etc. [For, under such a regime, the use of the middle term (*hetu*), which necessarily requires, among other things, prior knowledge of the entity (*dharmī*), the reason (*sādhana* or *liṅga*), the general rule or pattern (*dṛṣṭānta*) and illustration (*udāharaṇa*), will not be possible.] If it be maintained that Reality can only be established through the authority of the scripture (*āgama*) then even contradictory doctrines (promulgated by different scriptures)

.....

will stand established. (The knowledge thus obtained, without any scrutiny, will be unreliable and not necessarily true.)

In the process of inference (*anumāna*) for the sake of others, the proposition (*pratijñā*) is the statement about the aspect to be proved of the major term (*sādhya*). The middle term (*hetu*) is the statement of reason (*sādhana*). For the learners, the statement of the general rule or pattern (*dṛṣṭānta*) is supported by an example (*udāharaṇa*). The middle term (*hetu*) is then recapitulated and the proposition (*pratijñā*) is reconfirmed. (See also, p. 57-58 *ante*.)

Fault in accepting both, the use, without mutual relation, of the middle term (*hetu*) and the scriptural authority (*āgama*) to establish Reality:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥७७॥

सामान्यार्थ - जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ हेतु-सिद्धि और आगम-सिद्धि दोनों का निरपेक्ष अस्तित्व नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में 'यह अवाच्य है' ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. the use of the middle term (*hetu*) and the scriptural authority (*āgama*), to establish Reality – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayaikānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational.

Reality can be established by both, the authentic middle term (*hetu*) and the scripture (*āgama*) promulgated by a true authority (*āpta*):

वक्तॄर्नाप्ते यद्धेतोः साध्यं तद्धेतुसाधितम् ।

आप्ते वक्तॄरि तद्वाक्यात् साध्यमागमसाधितम् ॥७८॥

सामान्यार्थ – वक्ता के अनाप्त होने पर जो हेतु से सिद्ध किया जाता है वह हेतु-साधित (युक्तिसिद्ध) कहा जाता है और वक्ता के आप्त होने पर उसके वचनों से जो सिद्ध किया जाता है वह आगम-साधित (आगमसिद्ध) कहा जाता है। (आप्त यथार्थ वस्तु-तत्त्व का प्रतिपादक एवं अविस्वादादक है।)

When the promulgator of Reality is ‘not a true authority’ (*anāpta*), whatever is established through the use of the authentic middle term (*hetu*) is called *hetu*-established (*hetusiddha*); when the promulgator of Reality is ‘a true authority’ (*āpta*), whatever is established through his incontrovertible statement is called *āpta*-established (*āgama-siddha*).

Section 7

सप्तम परिच्छेद

Fault in the *viññānādvaita*'s assertion that cognition arrived at through the subjective act of perception is the only source of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*):

अन्तरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते बुद्धिवाक्यं मृषाऽखिलम् ।

प्रमाणाभासमेवातस्तत् प्रमाणादृते कथम् ॥७९॥

सामान्यार्थ – (विज्ञानाद्वैत मतावलम्बियों के अनुसार –) केवल अन्तरंग अर्थ (वेद्य-वेदक रूप) का ही सद्भाव है, ऐसा एकान्त मानने पर सब बुद्धि-रूप अनुमान और वाक्य-रूप आगम मिथ्या हो जायेंगे और मिथ्या होने से वे प्रमाणाभास ठहरते हैं। किन्तु प्रमाण का अस्तित्व स्वीकार किये बिना प्रमाणाभास का व्यवहार भी कैसे हो सकता है?

If it be maintained (as the proponents of *viññānādvaita* do) that there is existence only of internal 'objects of knowledge' (*artha*), i.e., of cognition arrived at through the subjective act of perception, then all inferences (*anumāna*) drawn by the intellect (*buddhi*), and verbal testimony of the scripture (*āgama*) would become sources of invalid-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*). But how can there be invalid-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*) without first accepting the existence of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*)?

In the *viññānādvaita* scheme, inference, through the use of the *sādhya* and the *sādhana*, cannot establish that cognition alone is real:

साध्यसाधनविज्ञप्तेर्यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रता ।

न साध्यं न च हेतुश्च प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदोषतः ॥८०॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि साध्य और साधन (हेतु) की विज्ञप्ति (ज्ञान) को विज्ञान-मात्र ही माना जाए तो ऐसा कहने से प्रतिज्ञादोष (स्ववचन-विरोध) और हेतुदोष (असिद्धादि दोष) उपस्थित होते हैं – और इस कारण न कोई साध्य बन सकता है और न हेतु।

(In the scheme of *viññānādvaita* –) If through the use of the *sādhya* (statement of that which is to be proved, the major term) and the *sādhana* (statement of the reason – the middle term, *hetu*) one tries to prove that cognition alone is real, the process will not be a legitimate one. The statement of the *sādhya*, without considering any distinction whatsoever between the *sādhya* and *sādhana*, will suffer from what is known as the fallacy of the thesis (*pratijñādoṣa*); and the statement of the *hetu*, without accepting its inseparable connection with the major term, *sādhya*, will suffer from the fallacy of the reason (*hetudoṣa*).

Fault in the *bahirāṅgārthaikānta* that maintains the absolutist view that all cognitions have real substrata in the external world alone:

बहिरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते प्रमाणाभासनिह्वात् ।

सर्वेषां कार्यसिद्धिः स्याद्विरुद्धार्थाऽभिधायिनाम् ॥८१॥

सामान्यार्थ – केवल बहिरंग अर्थ का ही सद्भाव है (अन्तरंग-ज्ञान को न मानकर केवल बहिरंगार्थता को ही मानना), ऐसा एकान्त मानने पर प्रमाणाभास (संशयादि-रूप मिथ्याज्ञान) का निह्व (लोप) हो जाने से विरुद्ध अर्थ का प्रतिपादन करने वाले सब लोगों के कार्य की सिद्धि ठहरेगी।

If the absolutist view (of the *bahirāṅgārthaikānta*) that all cognitions have real substrata in the external world alone (totally objective, with no subjective input) be maintained then each cognition becomes *prima facie* valid, with a total absence of a cause for fallacy in the source of valid-knowledge (i.e. non-existence of *pramāṇābhāsa*). And, as a result, all propositions, even those holding contradictory positions, will remain validated.

Fault in accepting both, the all-subjective cognition of the internal reality and the all-objective cognition of the external reality, without mutual dependence:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥८२॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ अन्तरंग अर्थ एकान्त और बहिरंग अर्थ एकान्त दोनों का निरपेक्ष अस्तित्व नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में ‘यह अवाच्य है’ ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. the all-subjective cognition of the internal reality and the all-objective cognition of the external reality – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayaikānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.

Both, internal- and external-cognition, can be the sources of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*):

भावप्रमेयाऽपेक्षायां प्रमाणाभासनिह्वः ।

बहिःप्रमेयापेक्षायां प्रमाणं तन्निभं च ते ॥८३॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! आपके मत में भाव-प्रमेय (स्वसंवेदन द्वारा ज्ञान के प्रत्यक्ष होने पर) की अपेक्षा से कोई भी ज्ञान प्रमाणाभास नहीं है। और बाह्य-प्रमेय (इन्द्रिय-ज्ञान के द्वारा अर्थ को मानना) की अपेक्षा से ज्ञान प्रमाण और प्रमाणाभास दोनों होता है।

O Lord! You have asserted that when reality is ascertained through internal-cognition (*bhāva-prameya*) that illumines the knowledge-object (*prameya*) through the Self, there is no scope for invalid-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*), and when it is ascertained through external-cognition (*bāhya-prameya*) that illumines the knowledge-object through the senses, there is the possibility of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as well as invalid-knowledge (*pramāṇābhāsa*).

The word 'soul' must have a corresponding external object (bāhyārtha):

जीवशब्दः सबाह्यार्थः संज्ञात्वाद्धेतुशब्दवत् ।

मायादिभ्रान्तिसंज्ञाश्च मायाद्यैः स्वैः प्रमोक्तिवत् ॥८४॥

सामान्यार्थ – 'जीव' शब्द संज्ञा होने से बाह्य अर्थ सहित है; जो शब्द संज्ञा या नामरूप होता है वह बाह्य अर्थ के बिना नहीं होता है जैसे 'हेतु' शब्द। (धूम शब्द जब 'हेतु' की तरह प्रयुक्त होता है तब वह 'धुआँ' बाह्य पदार्थ के अस्तित्व के बिना नहीं होता है।) जिस प्रकार 'प्रमा' शब्द का बाह्य अर्थ पाया जाता है, उसी प्रकार 'माया' आदि भ्रान्ति की संज्ञाएँ भी अपने भ्रान्ति रूप अर्थ से सहित होती हैं।

The word '*jīva*' (soul), being a designation (*sañjñā*), must have a corresponding external-object (*bāhyārtha*) that it signifies; a word, being a designation (*sañjñā*), is always associated with a corresponding external-object, just as the word '*hetu*' – the middle term. (The word '*hetu*' may have the 'smoke' as the corresponding external-object.) As the word '*pramā*' (valid apprehension) has a corresponding object that signifies valid apprehension, similarly words like '*māyā*' (illusion), signifying an illusory cognition, have corresponding objects that signify illusory cognition.

These three, a piece of cognition (*buddhi*), a word (*śabda*), and an object (*artha*), signify three corresponding comprehensions:

बुद्धिशब्दार्थसंज्ञास्तास्त्रिस्तो बुद्ध्यादिवाचिकाः ।

तुल्या बुद्ध्यादिबोधाश्च त्रयस्तत्प्रतिबिम्बकाः ॥८५॥

सामान्यार्थ - बुद्धि-संज्ञा, शब्द-संज्ञा और अर्थ-संज्ञा ये तीन संज्ञाएँ क्रमशः बुद्धि, शब्द और अर्थ की समान रूप से वाचक हैं। और उन संज्ञाओं के प्रतिबिम्ब-स्वरूप बुद्धि आदि का बोध भी समान रूप से होता है।

The three kinds of designations (*sañjñā*) – a piece of cognition (*buddhi*), a word (*śabda*), and an object (*artha*) – concurrently signify three corresponding comprehensions – a piece of cognition (*buddhi*), a word (*śabda*), and an object (*artha*), respectively. And the three kinds of comprehensions reflect equally the corresponding designations. (For example, the word 'jīva' – when the designation is *jīva-buddhi*, it reflects the cognition of 'jīva'; when the designation is *jīva-śabda*, it reflects the word 'jīva'; and when the designation is *jīva-artha*, it reflects the object that is 'jīva'.)

The speaker (*vaktā*) having the piece of cognition (*bodha*), the hearer (*śrotā*) hearing the sentence (*vākya*), and the subject (*prāmatā*) having the apprehension (*pramā*), are distinct:

वक्तृश्रोतृप्रमातृणां बोधवाक्यप्रमाः पृथक् ।
भ्रान्तावेव प्रमाभ्रान्तौ बाह्याऽर्थो तादृशेतरौ ॥८६॥

सामान्यार्थ – वक्ता का जो (अभिधेय-विषयक) बोध (वाक्य की प्रवृत्ति में कारण) होता है, श्रोता (अभिधेय-परिज्ञान के लिए) जिस वाक्य को सुनता है, और प्रमाता को जो प्रमा (अभिधेय-विषय में योग्य-अयोग्य अथवा सत्य-असत्य का निर्णय) होता है – ये तीनों पृथक्-पृथक् व्यवस्थित हैं। (इस प्रकार विज्ञानाद्वैतता बाधित ठहरती है।) प्रमाण के भ्रान्त होने पर अन्तर्ज्ञेय और बहिर्ज्ञेय रूप बाह्यार्थों का विवेचन भी भ्रान्त ही ठहरेगा।

The speaker (*vaktā*) with a particular piece of cognition (*bodha*), the hearer (*śrotā*) receiving the auditory perception in the form of the sentence (*vākya*), and the subject (*pramātā*) in whom the apprehension (*pramā*) inheres as an attribute, are distinctly established. In case the so called valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is fallacious, the corresponding external objects (*bāhyārtha*) – in the form of internal and external cognition – too will be fallacious.

The validity of the knowledge depends on whether there is agreement or disagreement with the corresponding external object (*bahyārtha*):

बुद्धिशब्दप्रमाणत्वं बाह्यार्थे सति नाऽसति ।

सत्यानृतव्यवस्थैवं युज्यतेऽर्थाप्त्यनाप्तिषु ॥८७॥

सामान्यार्थ – बुद्धि और शब्द में प्रमाणता बाह्य अर्थ के होने पर होती है, बाह्य अर्थ के अभाव में नहीं। बाह्य अर्थ की प्राप्ति होने पर सत्य की व्यवस्था और बाह्य अर्थ की प्राप्ति न होने पर असत्य की व्यवस्था की जाती है।

The piece of cognition (*buddhi*) and the word (*śabda*) can be sources of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) only when the external objects (*bāhyārtha*) corresponding to these exist; not when there is absence of the corresponding external objects. Truth is established on the existence of the corresponding external objects (of the piece of cognition and the word), and untruth when the external objects are absent.

Two kinds of sources of valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) can be thought of: one, used for self through the piece of cognition (*buddhi*), and two, used for others through the word (*śabda*). These two can be considered authentic only when there is existence of the corresponding external objects (*bahyārtha*).

The existence of the corresponding external objects (*bāhyārtha*) establishes the authenticity of the speaker (*vaktā*), the hearer (*śrotā*), and the subject (*pramātā*) and also of the piece of cognition (*bodha*), the uttered sentence (*vākya*), and the valid apprehension (*pramā*). The corresponding external object (*bāhyārtha*) of the word 'jīva' (soul) is thus established.

The validity of the knowledge depends on whether there is agreement or disagreement with the corresponding external object (*bāhyārtha*); when there is agreement, the knowledge is valid; in case of disagreement, the knowledge is invalid.

PREVIEW ONLY

Section 8

अष्टम परिच्छेद

Fault in accepting that the accomplishment of objects (*artha*) is due only to fate (*daiva*):

दैवादेवार्थसिद्धिश्चेद्दैवं पौरुषतः कथम् ।

दैवतश्चेदनिर्मोक्षः पौरुषं निष्फलं भवेत् ॥८८॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि दैव से ही सब अर्थ (प्रयोजन-रूप कार्य) की सिद्धि होती है तो पौरुष से दैव की सिद्धि कैसे कही जा सकेगी? और दैव से ही दैव की सिद्धि मानने पर कभी भी मोक्ष नहीं होगा। मोक्ष के अभाव में मोक्ष प्राप्ति के लिए पुरुषार्थ करना निष्फल ही होगा।

If the accomplishment of the objects (*artha*) is due only to fate (*daiva*), then how could human-deed (*pauruṣa*) be responsible for the creation of fate? If it be assumed that fate is responsible for the creation of fate, then there is no possibility of attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*), and all human-effort (*puruṣārtha*) to attain liberation (*mokṣa*) will be futile.

Fault in accepting that the accomplishment of objects (*artha*) is due only to human-deed (*pauruṣā*):

पौरुषादेव सिद्धिश्चेत् पौरुषं दैवतः कथम् ।

पौरुषाच्चेदमोघं स्यात् सर्वप्राणिषु पौरुषम् ॥८९॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि पौरुष से ही सब अर्थ (प्रयोजन-रूप कार्य) की सिद्धि का एकान्त माना जाए तो पौरुष-रूप कार्य की सिद्धि कैसे होती है? यदि उसकी दैव से सिद्धि होती है तो ऐसा मानने पर उक्त एकान्त का विरोध होता है। और यदि पौरुष से ही पौरुष की सिद्धि मानी जाए तो सब प्राणियों का पौरुष अमोघ (निष्फल न होना) ठहरेगा (जो प्रत्यक्ष के विरुद्ध है)।

If the accomplishment of the objects (*artha*) is due only to human-deed (*pauruṣa*) then who is responsible for the accomplishment of human-deed (*pauruṣa*)? If it be said that fate (*daiva*) is responsible for the creation of human-deed (*pauruṣa*) then the above statement gets contradicted. If it be said that human-deed (*pauruṣa*) itself is responsible for the creation of human-deed, then human-deed for the accomplishment of objects (*artha*) by all living-beings should always be successful. (This is against what is seen.)

Fault in accepting both, the accomplishment of objects is due only to fate (*daiva*) and that it is due only to human-deed (*pauruṣā*), without mutual relation:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥१०॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ दैव और पौरुष दोनों एकान्तों का निरपेक्ष अस्तित्व नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में ‘यह अवाच्य है’ ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. the accomplishment of objects (*artha*) is due only to fate (*daiva*) and the accomplishment of objects is due only to human-deed (*pauruṣa*) – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayai-kānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.

Both fate (*daiva*) and human-deed (*pauruṣā*) are jointly responsible for the desirable and undesirable effects:

अबुद्धिपूर्वाऽपेक्षायामिष्टाऽनिष्टं स्वदैवतः ।

बुद्धिपूर्वव्यपेक्षायामिष्टाऽनिष्टं स्वपौरुषात् ॥९१॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो इष्ट (अनुकूल) और अनिष्ट (प्रतिकूल) अर्थ की प्राप्ति किसी को अबुद्धिपूर्वक (बुद्धि-व्यापार की अपेक्षा के बिना) होती है उसे स्व-दैव-कृत समझना चाहिये। जो इष्ट और अनिष्ट अर्थ की प्राप्ति बुद्धिपूर्वक (बुद्धि-व्यापार की अपेक्षा रखकर) होती है उसे स्व-पौरुष-कृत समझना चाहिये।

The desirable and undesirable effects (*kārya*) that one begets without premeditation should be understood due primarily to one's fate (*daiva*). (In incidences of such effects human-deed (*pauruṣa*) occupies the secondary role and fate (*daiva*) the primary role.) The desirable and undesirable effects (*kārya*) that one begets in consequence of premeditation should be understood due primarily to one's human-deed (*pauruṣa*). (In incidences of such effects fate (*daiva*) occupies the secondary role and human-deed (*pauruṣa*) the primary role.)

Fate (*daiva*) – It is invisible (*adr̥ṣṭa*). The word implies the man's inherent capability (*yogyatā*) and the fruition of his past karmas (*pūrva-karma*).

Human-deed (*pauruṣa*) – It is visible (*dṛṣṭa*). The word implies the man's effort for the accomplishment of the particular object (*artha*).

Both, fate (*daiva*) and human-deed (*pauruṣa*), are responsible for the accomplishment of the object (*artha*).

Section 9

नवम परिच्छेद

Fault in accepting that causing pain and pleasure to others must necessarily result into demerit and merit:

पापं ध्रुवं परे दुःखात् पुण्यं च सुखतो यदि ।
अचेतनाऽकषायौ च बध्येयातां निमित्ततः ॥९२॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि पर को दुःख देने से निश्चित रूप से पाप का बन्ध होना और पर को सुख देने से निश्चित रूप से पुण्य का बन्ध होना माना जाए तो पर के दुःख और सुख में निमित्त होने के कारण अचेतन पदार्थ (कण्टकादिक और दुग्धादिक) और कषाय रहित जीव (वीतरागी) को भी पाप और पुण्य का बन्ध होते रहना चाहिये।

If it be maintained that causing pain to others must necessarily result into bondage of demerit (*pāpa*) and that causing pleasure to others must necessarily result into bondage of merit (*puṇya*) then, being the instrumental cause of pain and pleasure to others, inanimate objects (like thorn and poison, milk and sweet-food) and persons free from passions¹ (like passionless saints of high order) must also suffer bondage (of karmas involving merit and demerit).

1. Major passions (*kaṣāya*) are four – anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceitfulness (*māyā*), and greed (*lobha*).

Fault in accepting that causing pain and pleasure to oneself must necessarily result into merit and demerit:

पुण्यं ध्रुवं स्वतो दुःखात् पापं च सुखतो यदि ।
वीतरागो मुनिर्विद्वांस्ताभ्यां युञ्ज्यान्निमित्ततः ॥९३॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि अपने को दुःख देने से पुण्य का बन्ध निश्चित रूप से होता है और अपने को सुख देने से पाप का बन्ध निश्चित रूप से होता है तो वीतराग (कषाय-रहित) और विद्वान् मुनिजनों को भी (पुण्य और पाप-रूप) कर्म-बन्ध होना चाहिये क्योंकि वे भी अपने सुख और दुःख की उत्पत्ति के निमित्त-कारण होते हैं।

If it be maintained that causing pain to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of merit (*puṇya*) and that causing pleasure to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of demerit (*pāpa*) then, being the instrumental cause of pain and pleasure to oneself, those free from all attachment (*vītarāga*), and learned ascetics must also suffer bondage (of karmas involving merit and demerit).

Fault in accepting both, causing pain and pleasure to others and to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of karmas, without mutual dependence:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥१४॥

सामान्यार्थ - जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ पर-दुःख-सुख और स्व-दुःख-सुख जनित पाप और पुण्य सम्बन्धी दोनों एकान्तों का निरपेक्ष अस्तित्व नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में 'यह अवाच्य है' ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. causing pain and pleasure to others and causing pain and pleasure to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of karmas – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayaikānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words 'the phenomenon is indescribable' is not tenable as it is irrational.

Auspicious or inauspicious kinds of dispositions cause the influx of meritorious or demeritorious karmas:

विशुद्धिसंक्लेशाङ्गं चेत् स्वपरस्थं सुखाऽसुखम् ।

पुण्यपापास्रवौ युक्तौ न चेद्व्यर्थस्तवाऽर्हतः ॥९५॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि स्व-पर में होने वाला सुख-दुःख विशुद्धि का अंग है तो पुण्य का आस्रव होता है और यदि संक्लेश का अंग है तो पाप का आस्रव होता है। हे भगवन् ! आपके मत में यदि स्व-परस्थ सुख और दुःख विशुद्धि और संक्लेश के कारण नहीं हैं तो पुण्य और पाप का आस्रव व्यर्थ है, अर्थात् उनका कोई फल नहीं होता है।

When pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are due to the limbs (*aṅga*) of the auspicious kind of disposition (*viśuddhi*)¹, these are causes of the influx of meritorious karmas (*puṇya*). When pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are due to the limbs of the inauspicious kind of disposition (*saṅkleśa*)², these are causes of the influx of demeritorious karmas (*pāpa*). O Lord! In your view, if pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are not due to the auspicious or inauspicious kinds of dispositions then there cannot be influx of meritorious or demeritorious karmas; these do not yield any fruit.

-
1. auspicious kind of disposition (*viśuddhi*) – due to virtuous (*dharmya*) and pure (*śukla*) kinds of concentration. There are three limbs (*aṅga*) of the auspicious kind of disposition – its cause (*kāraṇa*), its effect (*kārya*), and its own-nature (*svabhāva*).
 2. inauspicious kind of disposition (*saṅkleśa*) – due to sorrowful (*ārta*) and cruel (*raudra*) kinds of concentration. This also has three limbs – its cause (*kāraṇa*), its effect (*kārya*), and its own-nature (*svabhāva*).

.....

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

शुभः पुण्यस्याशुभः पापस्य ॥६-३॥

Virtuous activity is the cause of merit (*puṇya*) and wicked activity is the cause of demerit (*pāpa*).

Ācārya Puṅjapada's *Sarvārthasiddhi*

What is good and what is evil? Killing, stealing, copulation, etc. are wicked activities of the body. Falsehood, harsh and uncivil language are wicked speech-activities. Thoughts of violence, envy, calumny, etc. are wicked thought-activities. The opposites of these are good. How can activity be good or wicked? That activity which is performed with good intentions is good. And that which is performed with evil intentions is wicked. But the distinction is not based on the activities being the causes of auspicious and inauspicious karmas¹. In that case, there would be no good activities at all, as good activities also are admitted to be the cause of bondage of knowledge-obscuring karmas, etc. (by the Jainas)². That, which purifies the soul or by which the soul is purified, is merit (*puṇya*), namely that which produces happy feeling, etc. That which protects or keeps the soul away from good is demerit (*pāpa*), namely that which produces unhappy feeling, etc.

Jain, S.A. (1960), *Reality : English Translation of Shri Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi*, p. 168-169.

1. From the Jaina standpoint, intentions are all-important and not activities in themselves. And the consequences are largely determined by the intentions underlying any activity.
2. From the real point-of-view, it is no doubt true that all activities are undesirable as every kind of activity is the cause of influx and bondage. But from the empirical point-of-view there is difference. Merit leads to pleasure and demerit to pain.

Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha*:

रागो जस्स पसत्थो अणुकंपासंसिदो य परिणामो ।
चित्ते णत्थि कलुस्सं पुण्णं जीवस्स आसवदि ॥ (१३५)

The influx-of-merit (*puṇyāsrava*) takes place in the soul (*jīva*) that has commendable (*praśasta*) attachment (*rāga*), compassion (*anukampā*), and absence-of-evil-inclinations (*citta-akaluṣatā*).

अरहंतं सिद्धसाहुसु भक्ती धम्मम्मि जा य खलु चेद्वा ।
अणुगमणं पि गुरूणं पसत्थरागो त्ति वुच्चंति ॥ (१३६)

Commendable-attachment (*praśasta-rāga*) entails:
1) devotion (*bhakti*) towards the 'Arhat' (Supreme Lords Jina), the 'Siddha' (the liberated souls), and the 'Sādhu' (the ascetics), 2) involvement, with dedication, in pious activities, and 3) following the 'Masters' (*guru*).

तिसिदं बुभुक्खिदं वा दुहिदं दट्ठूण जो दु दुहिदमणो ।
पडिवज्जदि तं किवया तस्सेसा होदि अणुकंपा ॥ (१३७)

The soul (*jīva*) that is grieved at the sight of the thirsty, the hungry and the miserable, and provides succour for them, is with compassion (*anukampā*).

कोधो व जदा माणो माया लोभो व चित्तमासेज्ज ।
जीवस्स कुणदि खोहं कलुसो त्ति य तं बुधा वेंति ॥ (१३८)

When these – anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceitfulness (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*) – overwhelm the heart and cause agitation (*kṣobha*), the knowledgeable call it evil-inclinations (*kaluṣatā*) in the soul (*jīva*).

चरिया पमादबहुला कालुस्सं लोलदा य विसयेसु ।
परपरितावपवादो पावस्स य आसवं कुणदि ॥ (१३९)

Excessive negligent-activity (*pramāda-caryā*)¹, evil-inclination (*kaluṣatā*), hankering after sensual-pleasures (*viṣaya-lolupatā*), causing anguish to others (*para-paritāpa*), and slandering others (*para-apavāda*), are causes of influx-of-demerit (*pāpāsrava*).

सण्णाओ य तिलेस्सा इंदियवसदा य अत्तरुद्दाणि * ।

णाणं च दुप्पउत्तं मोहो पावप्पदा होति ॥ (१४०)

The four instincts (*saṃjñā*), the three (inauspicious) thought-complexions (*leśyā*), sense-domination, sorrowful (*ārta*) and cruel (*raudra*) meditation (*dhyāna*), knowledge-application in deplorable activities, and delusion (*moha*), are dispositions (*bhāva*) that cause demerit (*pāpa*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2020),

Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha, p. 251-258.

1- The fifteen activities due to negligence (*pramāda*) are indulgence in four passions (*kaṣāya*), five senses (*indriya*), four kinds of narratives (*vikathā*) – pertaining to monarch (*rājakathā*), woman (*strīkathā*), thief (*corakathā*) and food (*bhojanakathā*) – sleep (*nidrā*) and fondness (*sneh*).

1- पाठान्तर - अट्टरुद्दाणि

Section 10

दशम परिच्छेद

Fault in views that ignorance is the cause of bondage and that liberation is possible with slight-knowledge:

अज्ञानाच्चेद्ध्रुवो बन्धो ज्ञेयाऽनन्त्यान् केवली ।

ज्ञानस्तोकाद्विमोक्षश्चेदज्ञानाद्बहुतोऽन्यथा ॥९६॥

सामान्यार्थ – यदि अज्ञान से बन्ध नियम से होता है तो ज्ञेयों के अनन्त होने से कोई भी केवली नहीं हो सकता है। और यदि अल्पज्ञान से मोक्ष की प्राप्ति मानी जाए तो अज्ञान के बहुत होने के कारण बन्ध का प्रसंग सदा बना रहेगा और इसलिए मोक्ष का होना नहीं बन सकेगा।

If ignorance (*ajñāna*) be considered an assured cause of bondage (*bandha*) then since there are infinite knowables (*jñeya*), no one can become an Omniscient (*kevalin*) [i.e., the one who has attained omniscience (*kevalajñāna*)]. If it be maintained that liberation (*mokṣa*) results from even slight-knowledge (*alpa-jñāna*) then, because of the persistent presence of acute ignorance, the cause of bondage will persist and, as such, attainment of liberation cannot be imagined.

The Sāṃkhya view that only through the realization of his independence from the environment including his own psycho-physical mechanism, *Puruṣa* attains perfect knowledge, is the point of contention in this verse. According to the Sāṃkhya view, with his discriminative knowledge *Puruṣa* is able to

perceive that the activities are all due to *Prakṛti* while he himself remains in unruffled peace. *Prakṛti*, which continues to spin round on account of its own impulse, can no more influence the liberated *Puruṣa* because he has attained freedom on account of his discriminative knowledge.

PREVIEW ONLY

Fault in accepting that ignorance is an assured cause of bondage and even slight-knowledge is the cause of liberation, without mutual relation:

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥९७॥

सामान्यार्थ – जो स्याद्वाद-न्याय से द्वेष रखने वाले हैं उनके यहाँ अज्ञान से बन्ध और अल्पज्ञान से मोक्ष दोनों एकान्तों का निरपेक्ष अस्तित्व नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि दोनों के सर्वथा एकात्म्य मानने में विरोध-दोष आता है। अवाच्यता (अवक्तव्यता) एकान्त भी नहीं बन सकता है क्योंकि अवाच्यतैकान्त में ‘यह अवाच्य है’ ऐसे वाक्य का प्रयोग करने से वह वाच्य हो जाता है।

Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. ignorance (*ajñāna*) is an assured cause of bondage (*bandha*) and even slight-knowledge (*alpajñāna*) is the cause of liberation (*mokṣa*) – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – *ubhayaikānta*), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable (*avācyataikānta*) then for them even to utter the words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.

The real causes of bondage and liberation:

अज्ञानान्मोहिनो बन्धो नाऽज्ञानाद्वीतमोहतः ।

ज्ञानस्तोकाच्च मोक्षः स्यादमोहान्मोहिनोऽन्यथा ॥१८॥

सामान्यार्थ – मोह-सहित अज्ञान से बन्ध होता है और मोह-रहित अज्ञान से बन्ध नहीं होता है। इसी प्रकार मोह-रहित अल्प-ज्ञान से मोक्ष होता है, किन्तु मोह-सहित अल्प-ज्ञान से मोक्ष नहीं होता है।

Bondage (*bandha*) is caused due to ignorance (*ajñāna*) accompanied by delusion (*moha*), and bondage is not caused due to ignorance (*ajñāna*) not accompanied by delusion (*moha*). In the same way, liberation (*mokṣa*) is caused due to slight-knowledge (*alpajñāna*) not accompanied by delusion (*moha*), and liberation (*mokṣa*) is not caused due to slight-knowledge (*alpajñāna*) accompanied by delusion (*moha*).

Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*:

मोहेण व रागेण व दोसेण व परिणदस्स जीवस्स ।
जायदि विविहो बंधो तम्हा ते संखवइदव्वा ॥१-८४॥

The dispositions of delusion (*moha*) or attachment (*rāga*) or aversion (*dveṣa*) in the soul give rise to bondage of various kinds of karmas; therefore, the soul must root out all such dispositions.

Due to its dispositions of attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and delusion (*moha*), the soul undergoes the bondage of various kinds of karmas, like knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇīya*), and, therefore, these three dispositions need

annihilation. Not knowing the trap of the hunter, the male elephant, deceived by delusion (*moha*) and overwhelmed by attachment (*rāga*), moves near the female elephant while chasing away, out of aversion (*dveṣa*), other male elephants; it ultimately falls into the camouflaged ditch. In the same way, the karmas form bonds with the soul when it is under the spell of delusion (*moha*), attachment (*rāga*), and aversion (*dveṣa*). The soul aiming for liberation must root out these three causes of its downfall – delusion (*moha*), attachment (*rāga*), and aversion (*dveṣa*).

Jain, Vijay K. (2018), *Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine*, p. 99.

Dispositions, like attachment or desire, originate according to the type of karmic bondage:

कामादिप्रभवश्चित्रः कर्मबन्धाऽनुरूपतः ।

तच्च कर्म स्वहेतुभ्यो जीवास्ते शुद्ध्यशुद्धितः ॥१९॥

सामान्यार्थ – इच्छा आदि भावसंसार-रूप कार्यों की उत्पत्ति विचित्र है और वह कर्मबन्ध के अनुसार होती है तथा कर्मबन्ध अपने कारणों के अनुरूप होता है। जिन्हें कर्मबन्ध होता है वे जीव शुद्धि और अशुद्धि के भेद से दो प्रकार के (भव्य और अभव्य) होते हैं।

The origination of dispositions, like attachment or desire, is variegated (*vicitra*) according to the type of karmic bondage (*karmabandha*), and this karmic bondage originates from its own appropriate causes. The souls subject to karmic bondage are of two types – those possessing spiritual purity (*śuddhi*) [and destined to attain liberation (*mokṣa*) – *bhavya jīva*], and those possessing spiritual impurity (*aśuddhi*) [and destined not to attain liberation (*mokṣa*) – *abhavya jīva*].

The manifestation of purity in a soul has a beginning while the manifestation of impurity is beginningless:

शुद्ध्यशुद्धी पुनः शक्ती ते पाक्याऽपाक्यशक्तिवत् ।
साद्यनादी तयोर्व्यक्ती स्वभावोऽतर्कगोचरः ॥१००॥

सामान्यार्थ – पाक्य-शक्ति (पकने की योग्यता) और अपाक्य-शक्ति (पकने की अयोग्यता – किसी-किसी मूँग या उड़द को कितना भी पकाया जाए वह पकता नहीं है) की तरह शुद्धि और अशुद्धि ये दो शक्तियाँ हैं। शुद्धि की व्यक्ति सादि और अशुद्धि की व्यक्ति अनादि है। यह वस्तु-स्वभाव है जो तर्क का विषय नहीं होता है।

These, purity (*śuddhi*) and impurity (*aśuddhi*), are two kinds of power akin to the cookability (*pākya*) or the non-cookability (*apākya*) of a cereal (viz. beans like *uṛada* and *mūṅga*). The manifestation of purity (in a soul) has a beginning while the manifestation of impurity is beginningless. And, being (the soul's) own-nature (*svabhāva*), it is not open to logical argument (*tarka*).

The capacities (purity and impurity) of two kinds of souls are compared with those of beans; some of these become soft and edible on being stewed and others remain hard even after being stewed for a long time. It is not possible to know beforehand whether a particular bean is edible or non-edible. On being boiled some beans, as per their nature, will become soft; the others, as per their nature, will remain hard as before. In the same manner, it is not possible to know beforehand whether a person has the capacity to attain liberation (*mokṣa*) or not.

Austerities (*tapas*) and observance of vows (*vrata*) are like heating our souls up. On performance of such laudable efforts, some will acquire true knowledge and attain liberation, but others will not be able to get rid of worldly sufferings and are destined to stay forever in the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsāra*). The attainment of purity in a soul has a beginning but impurity is beginningless.

In this verse Ācārya Samantabhadra makes an important point: purity or impurity of souls is their inherent nature (*svabhāva*) and, therefore, not open to logical argument (*tarka*). We cannot know through indirect knowledge of the senses if a person has the capacity to attain liberation (*mokṣa*); only the Omniscient can know this.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

जीवभव्याभव्यत्वानि च ॥२-७॥

The soul-principle – *jīvatva*, the capacity for liberation – *bhavyatva*, and the incapacity for liberation – *abhavyatva* are the three dispositions (*bhāva*) due to the inherent nature of the soul – *pāriṇāmika*.

The three characteristics mentioned in the *sūtra* are inherent in and unique to the soul (*jīva*), not found in other substances. Why are these considered inherent in the soul? These do not depend on rise (*udaya*), subsidence (*upaśama*), destruction (*kṣaya*) or destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) of karmas. The soul-principle (*jīvatva*) is soul-consciousness (*caitanya*). The soul that will attain right faith (*samyagdarśana*), etc., is called 'bhavya' – endowed with the capacity for liberation. Or, it is endowed with *bhavyatva*. And the soul that will not attain right faith, and so on, is called 'abhavya' – not endowed with the capacity for liberation. Or, it is endowed with *abhavyatva*. These three – *jīvatva*, *bhavyatva* and *abhavyatva* – are the inherent qualities of the soul.

Should not the other qualities like existence – *astitva*, permanence – *nityatva*, and having space-points – *pradeśavatva*, be mentioned along with these three qualities? No. These have been included by the particle ‘*ca*’ in the *sūtra*. If so, the number three is contradicted. No. The distinctive (*asādhāraṇa*) characteristics which are inherent in the soul are three only. Qualities like existence (*astitva*) are common (*sādhāraṇa*) characteristics as these apply to the souls (*jīva*) as well as the non-souls (*ajīva*). So these are included separately by the particle ‘*ca*’.

Since the soul is incorporeal or non-material (*amūrta*), how do the dispositions of subsidence – *aupaśamika* – etc., apply to it? These dispositions have reference to the bondage of karmas. How can there be bondage of karmic matter with the incorporeal soul? It is possible because the soul is incorporeal or non-material (*amūrta*) only from a certain point-of-view; it is not true that the soul is non-material (*amūrta*) from all points-of-view. From the point-of-view of its modes (*paryāya*) in bondage, owing to the influence of karmas, it is corporeal (*mūrta*) in the embodied state. From the point-of-view of its pure nature, the soul is incorporeal (*amūrta*). It is further contended that if the soul becomes one with the body because of the influence of karmas then it cannot be considered separate from the body. It is not so. Though the soul is one with the body in the embodied state, it is different from the body because of its distinctive mark (*lakṣaṇa*). The Scripture says, “From the point-of-view of bondage, the soul is one with the body, still it is different from the body because of its distinctive mark (*lakṣaṇa*). Hence the incorporeal nature of the soul is predicated in a non-absolutistic (*anekāntātma*) sense only.”

Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2018),
Ācārya Umāsvāmī’s Tattvārthasūtra, p. 68-70.

That by which substances (souls and non-souls) are rightly known, or knowledge alone, is *pramāṇa*:

तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं ते युगपत्सर्वभासनम् ।

क्रमभावि च यज्ज्ञानं स्याद्वादनयसंस्कृतम् ॥१०१॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! आपके मत में तत्त्वज्ञान को प्रमाण कहा गया है। तत्त्वज्ञान दो प्रकार का है – अक्रमभावी और क्रमभावी। जो ज्ञान एक साथ (युगपत्) सम्पूर्ण पदार्थों को जानता है, ऐसा प्रत्यक्ष केवलज्ञान अक्रमभावी है। जो ज्ञान (मतिज्ञान आदि) क्रम से पदार्थों को जानता है वह क्रमभावी है। क्रमभावी ज्ञान स्याद्वाद और नय दोनों से संस्कृत होता है।

O Lord! As per your teaching, that by which substances (souls and non-souls) are rightly known, or knowledge alone, is *pramāṇa* (*lit.* the valid-knowledge). *Pramāṇa* is of two kinds: first, direct (*pratyakṣa*) – omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) – which knows the whole range of objects of knowledge simultaneously, without gradation (*akramabhāvī*), and second, indirect (*parokṣa*), which knows the objects of knowledge partially and in succession (*kramabhāvī*). Knowledge in succession features the doctrine of conditional predication – *syādvāda* – and ascertainment, without contradiction, of one particular state or mode of the object, called *naya*.

The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; his apprehension of reality is partial and it is valid only from a particular viewpoint. This leads to the *nayavāda* of the Jainas. When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be devised, and that is *syādvāda*, the doctrine of conditional

predication. Thus the doctrine is the direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and the limitations of human apprehension and expression.

Pramāṇa is the comprehensive view; *naya* is the partial view.

Ācārya Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*:

जादं सयं समत्तं णाणमणंतत्थवित्थडं विमलं ।
रहियं तु ओग्गहादिहिं सुहं ति एगंतियं भणियं ॥१-५९॥

That self-born, perfect and pure knowledge which spreads over infinite things and which is free from the stages of perception such as apprehension and speculation is called the real happiness¹.

Upadhye, A.N. (1935),
Śrī Kundakundācārya's Pravacanasāra, p. 76.

While the self-born, direct knowledge (or omniscience) is utterly pure and free from stages, the sensory knowledge (*matijñāna*) has four stages as mentioned in the following *sūtra*.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's *Tattvārthasūtra*:

अवग्रहेहाऽवायधारणाः ॥१-१५॥

Impression – *avagraha*, inquisitiveness – *ihā*, comprehension – *avāya*, and retention – *dhāraṇā*, are the four stages [of sensory knowledge (*matijñāna*)].

The first awareness or adoption of an object as it comes in the range of the senses is impression (*avagraha*), the first stage of sensory knowledge (*matijñāna*). When there is the meeting of

1. Ignorance, the result of knowledge-obscuring karmas, is misery in this world. Real happiness consists in destroying the karmas and attaining omniscience, the very nature of the self.

the sense-organ and the object, it is first perceived; that is *darśana*. The awareness of the object immediately following it is *avagraha*. For instance, on seeing an object, the impression that it is white in colour is *avagraha*. The desire to know particulars regarding the object apprehended through *avagraha* is inquisitiveness (*īhā*). Thus, the desire to know more – ‘Is that white object a crane or a flag?’ – is inquisitiveness (*īhā*). Knowing the object, as it is, after ascertaining its particulars is the next stage – comprehension (*avāya*). By its movement up and down and by the flapping of the wings, it is ascertained that it is a crane only and not a flag. Retention (*dhāraṇā*) is the cause of not forgetting in the future what was ascertained in the past. For instance, ‘This is the same crane which I saw this morning,’ is retention. These are mentioned in the *sūtra* in the order in which they arise.

Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2018),
Ācārya Umāsvāmī’s Tattvārthasūtra, p. 28-29.

Fruits of the two kinds of *pramāṇa*:

उपेक्षाफलमाद्यस्य शेषस्याऽऽदानहानधीः ।

पूर्वा वाऽज्ञाननाशो वा सर्वस्यास्य स्वगोचरे ॥१०२॥

सामान्यार्थ – प्रथम जो युगपत्सर्वभासनरूप प्रमाण (केवलज्ञान) है, उसका फल उपेक्षा है। शेष जो क्रमभावी-भासनरूप प्रमाण (मत्यादि ज्ञान-समूह) है उसका परम्परा फल आदान (ग्रहण) और हान (त्याग) की बुद्धि है। अथवा पूर्व में कही गई उपेक्षा भी उसका फल है। वास्तव में अपने विषय में अज्ञान का नाश होना ही सब प्रमाण-रूप ज्ञानों का फल है।

The fruit of the first kind of *pramāṇa* – direct (*pratyakṣa*) or omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) – is equanimity (*upekṣā*). The fruit of the other kinds of *pramāṇa* – indirect (*parokṣa*) – is discernment, i.e., acceptance (*ādāna*, *grahaṇa*) or rejection (*tyāga*); besides, of course, equanimity, as stated above. Destruction of ignorance (*ajñāna*) about the self, however, is the actual fruit of all methods of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

Ācārya Umāsvāmi's Tattvārthasūtra asserts that the five kinds of knowledge constitute the two types of *pramāṇa*:

तत्प्रमाणे ॥१-१०॥

These (five kinds of knowledge) are the two types of *pramāṇa* (valid-knowledge).

As regard the fruit of *pramāṇa*, there is satisfaction in the attainment of knowledge. The soul, whose knowledge-nature is clouded by the foreign matter of karmas, finds satisfaction in determining the nature of substances with the help of the

senses. That is spoken of as the fruit of knowledge (or of *pramāṇa*). Or the attainment of equanimity (*upekṣā*) and the destruction of ignorance (*ajñāna*) may be considered the fruit. Equanimity is freedom from attachment and aversion. Also, on the destruction of darkness, that is ignorance, the self attains the power of discrimination between what needs to be accepted and rejected.

Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's *Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra*:

अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् ॥५-१॥

Destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*), rejection (*hāna*, *tyāga*), acceptance (*grahaṇa*, *ādāna*, *upādāna*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*) are the kinds of the fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The fruit is of two kinds: the direct (*sākṣāta*) fruit and the conventional (*paramparā*) fruit. Destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) pertaining to the objects (*vastu*, *padārtha*) is the direct (*sākṣāta*) fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The other kinds of fruit, like rejection (*hāna*, *tyāga*), are the conventional (*paramparā*) fruit as these take place only after destruction-of-ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) pertaining to the objects (*vastu*, *padārtha*).

The conventional (*paramparā*) fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is of three kinds: rejection (*hāna*, *tyāga*), acceptance (*grahaṇa*, *ādāna*, *upādāna*), and equanimity (*upekṣā*). To discard the undesirable or disagreeable object (*vastu*) is called the rejection (*hāna*, *tyāga*). To acquire the desirable or agreeable object (*vastu*) is called the acceptance (*grahaṇa*, *ādāna*, *upādāna*). So long as the man is afflicted with attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*), he imagines objects (*vastu*) to be worth discarding or accepting. But when he acquires the state of freedom from attachment (*rāga*) and

aversion (*dveṣa*) – *vītarāga* – he no more has the sense of either acceptance or rejection for the objects (*vastu*); he develops the sense of equanimity (*upekṣā*) toward all objects. This sense of equanimity (*upekṣā*), too, is the fruit of the valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

Even before acquiring freedom from attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*), the knowledgeable man can have the sense of equanimity (*upekṣā*) toward objects-of-knowledge (*jñeya*) which are neither of interest nor of disinterest to him.

Jain, Vijay K. (2021),
Ācārya Māṇikyanandi's Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra –
Essence of the Jaina Nyāya, p. 143-144.

The word 'syāt' is used to assert a particular attribute of the object of knowledge and explicatory of the manifold points-of-view (*anekānta*):

वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती गम्यं प्रति विशेषणम् ।

स्यान्निपातोऽर्थयोगित्वात्तत्र केवलिनामपि ॥१०३॥

सामान्यार्थ – हे भगवन् ! 'स्यात्' शब्द अर्थ (ज्ञेय पदार्थ) के साथ सम्बद्ध (जैसे 'स्यादस्ति घटः' में) होने के कारण अनेकान्त का द्योतक होता है। केवलियों और श्रुतकेवलियों के भी वाक्यों में प्रयुक्त 'स्यात्' शब्द निपात (अव्यय) है और गम्य-बोध्य (विवक्षित अर्थ) का विशेषण (बोधक-सूचक) होता है।

O Lord! The word 'syāt', used in conjunction with the object of knowledge (*artha*), imparts to your sentences a definitive meaning explicatory of the manifold points-of-view (*anekānta*) and corroborates a particular attribute of the object. The word 'syāt' is a *nipāta*¹ – a particle, an indeclinable – acknowledged by the Omniscients (*kevalins*) as well as the 'All-knowing Masters of the Scripture' (*śrutakevalins*); it qualifies the meaning of the sentence concerned.

-
1. An *avyaya* is a preposition, an indeclinable word or particle; a kind of compound. *Nipāta* words are parts of *avyaya* used to communicate the meaning. The word 'syāt' is used in relation to a particular meaning, not in terms of doubt, possibility or vacillation (i.e., it does not imply 'maybe' or 'perhaps').

Syādvāda is the doctrine of conditional predication, renouncing the absolutist view:

स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधिः ।
सप्तभंगनयापेक्षो हेयाऽऽदेयविशेषकः ॥१०४॥

सामान्यार्थ – सर्वथा एकान्त का त्याग करके कथञ्चित् विधान करने का नाम स्याद्वाद है। (इसलिए कथञ्चित् आदि शब्द स्याद्वाद के पर्यायवाची हैं।) स्याद्वाद सप्तभंगों और नयों की अपेक्षा को लिए रहता है तथा हेय और उपादेय का विशेषक (भेदक) होता है। (गाथा 14, पृ. 29 भी देखें।)

Discarding the absolutist (*ekānta*) point-of-view and observing the practice of using the word '*kathañcit*' – 'from a certain viewpoint', or 'in a respect', or 'under a certain condition' – is what is known as *syādvāda* – the doctrine of conditional predication. It embraces the seven-limbs (*saptabhaṅga*) of assertion, the one-sided but relative method of comprehension (*naya*), and also the acceptance and rejection of the assertion. (See also, verse 14, p. 29 *ante*.)

The particle '*syāt*' in a sentence qualifies the acceptance or rejection of the proposition or predication expressed by the sentence. It refers to a 'point-of-view' or 'in a particular context' or 'in a particular sense'. The '*vāda*' presents a theory of logic and metaphysics. *Syādvāda* means a theory of predication of reality from different points-of-view, in different contexts or from different universes of discourse. *Syādvāda* is the expression of the pictures of reality obtained from different points-of-view in definite and determinate logical predications. *Syādvāda* promotes catholic outlook of many-sided approach to the problem of knowledge of reality. It is anti-dogmatic and it

presents a synoptic picture of reality from different points-of-view. *Syādvāda* expresses a protest against the one-sided, narrow, dogmatic and fanatical approach to the problems of reality. It affirms that there are different facets of reality and these have to be understood from various points-of-view by the predications of affirmation, negation and indescribability.

Anekānta is the basic understanding of the complexity of reality and the necessity of looking at it from different points-of-view. *Syādvāda* is the expression of the *anekāntavāda* in logical and predicational form. In this sense, *anekāntavāda* is the foundational principle and *syādvāda* is the logical expression of the foundational principle.¹

In the presentation of the nature of an object in its infinite aspects we have to adopt the sevenfold predicational form – *saptabhaṅgī* – which includes the positive and the negative predications without contradicting each other. The nature of the object can be considered from seven points-of-view and their predications would be sevenfold. Everything can be presented through sevenfold predications.

Ācārya Samantabhadra's *Yuktyānuśāsana*:

विधिर्निषेधोऽनभिलाष्यता च

त्रिरेकशस्त्रिद्विंश एक एव ।

त्रयो विकल्पास्तव सप्तधाऽमी

स्याच्छब्दनेयाः सकलेऽर्थभेदे ॥४५॥

The three fundamental options (*vikalpa*) of predication comprise affirmation (*vidhi*), negation (*niṣedha*) and indescribability (*anabhilāpyatā*, *avācyatā*). Taken one at a

1. See, Shastri, Devendra Muni (1983), "A Source-book in Jaina Philosophy", p. 240.

time, there are three combinations; taken two at a time, there are three combinations; and taken three at a time, there is one combination. Thus, there are a total of seven combinations. O Lord Jina! These combinations, each carrying different meaning, are possible only in your doctrine. Each predication is restricted by the particle 'syāt' (meaning 'point-of-view' or 'in a particular context' or 'in a particular sense').

Translated into English from:

Jain, Vijay K. (2020),

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Yuktyānuśāsana, p. 103.

Thus, each predication has been worked out on the basis of a combination of the fundamental threefold predications of affirmation, negation and indescribability. A limb (*bhaṅga*) refers to the partial presentation or a particular form of expression. *Saptabhaṅgī* is the sum total of the seven limbs of logical expression. It is the expression of the psychological basis in *nayavāda*.

The doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) and omniscience (*kevalajñāna*) are both illuminators of reality:

स्याद्वादकेवलज्ञाने सर्वतत्त्वप्रकाशने ।

भेदः साक्षादसाक्षाच्च ह्यवस्त्वन्यतमं भवेत् ॥१०५॥

सामान्यार्थ – स्याद्वाद और केवलज्ञान दोनों सम्पूर्ण तत्त्वों (जीवादि) के प्रकाशक हैं। दोनों के प्रकाशन में साक्षात् (प्रत्यक्ष) और असाक्षात् (परोक्ष) का भेद है। जो वस्तु इन दोनों ज्ञानों में किसी भी ज्ञान का विषय नहीं होती है वह अवस्तु है।

Syādvāda, the doctrine of conditional predication, and *kevalajñāna*, omniscience, are both illuminators of the substances of reality (*tattva*). The difference between the two is that while *kevalajñāna* illumines directly (*pratyakṣa*), *syādvāda* illumines indirectly (*parokṣa*). Anything which is not illumined or expressed by the two is not a substance of reality and hence a non-substance (*avastu*).

Syādvāda and *kevalajñāna* are the foundational facts of knowledge. The difference between the two is that *kevalajñāna* is the complete and all-embracing knowledge of reality while *syādvāda* is the conditional predication of the individual propositions of the knowledge obtained in *kevalajñāna*. *Kevalajñāna* is the direct experience and *syādvāda* is its indirect expression.

A *naya* gives expression to a particular aspect of an object, comprehended fully by *syādvāda*:

सधर्मणैव साध्यस्य साधर्म्यादविरोधतः ।

स्याद्वादप्रविभक्ताऽर्थविशेषव्यञ्जको नयः ॥१०६॥

सामान्यार्थ – साध्य का साधर्म्य दृष्टान्त के साथ साधर्म्य द्वारा और वैधर्म्य दृष्टान्त के साथ वैधर्म्य द्वारा बिना किसी विरोध के जो स्याद्वाद-रूप परमागम के विषयभूत अर्थ-विशेष (‘नित्यत्व’ आदि) का व्यञ्जक होता है, वह नय कहलाता है।

A naya gives expression to a particular aspect (like ‘*nityatva*’) of an object, comprehended fully by *syādvāda*, through the use of homogeneous (*sādharmya*) or heterogenous (*vaidharmya*) general rule or pattern (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) to establish, without contradiction, inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) between the major term (*sādhyā*) and the middle term (*hetu*). (Thus, *naya* is designated here as a virtual synonym of *hetu*, beside its usual designation as a relative, one-sided comprehension.)

Ācārya Devasena’s Ālāpa Paddhati:

प्रमाणेन वस्तु संगृहीतार्थैकांशो नयः, श्रुतविकल्पो वा,
ज्ञातुरभिप्रायो वा नयः, नानास्वभावेभ्यो व्यावृत्य एकस्मिन् स्वभावे
वस्तु नयति प्राप्नोतीति वा नयः ॥१८१॥

The standpoint (*naya*) accepts one particular characteristic (*aṃśa*, *dharma*) of the substance (*vastu*) whose manifold nature has rightly been determined through valid-knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Or, the chosen option (*vikalpa*) of the scriptural-knowledge (*śrutajñāna*) is the standpoint

(*naya*). Or, the particular intention of the knower is the standpoint (*naya*). Or, that which establishes the substance, having manifold nature, into its one particular nature is the standpoint (*naya*).

स द्वेधा सविकल्पनिर्विकल्पभेदात् ॥१८२॥

The standpoints (*naya*) are of two kinds – relative (*savikalpa*) and non-relative (*nirvikalpa*).

[The relative (*savikalpa*) standpoint (*naya*) is the right-standpoint (*sunaya*) and the non-relative (*nirvikalpa*, *nirpekṣa*) standpoint is the faulty-standpoint (*durnaya* or *nayābhāsa*).]

Jain, Vijay K. (2024),
Ācārya Devasena's Ālāpa Paddhati –
The Ways of Verbal Expression, p. 177-178.

A substance (*dravya*) is an inseparable consolidation of attributes:

नयोपनयैकान्तानां त्रिकालानां समुच्चयः ।

अविभ्राड्भावसम्बन्धो द्रव्यमेकमनेकधा ॥१०७॥

सामान्यार्थ - तीनों कालों को विषय करने वाले नयों और उपनयों के विषयभूत (एकान्त विषयों का) अनेक धर्मों के तादात्म्य सम्बन्ध को प्राप्त समुदाय का नाम द्रव्य है। वह द्रव्य एक भी है और अनेक भी है।

A substance (*dravya*) is an inseparable consolidation of attributes expressed through all one-sided, but relative, comprehensions (*naya*) and their subdivisions (*upanaya*), pertaining to the three times (the past, the present, and the future). It is one (with respect to the *dravyārthika naya*) and many (with respect to the *pariyāyārthika naya*).

Ācārya Devasena's Ālāpa Paddhati:

नयानां समीपा उपनयाः ॥४३॥

Those that remain in proximity of the standpoints (*naya*) – as branches of the standpoints (*naya*) – are the secondary-standpoints (*upanaya*).

सद्भूतव्यवहारः असद्भूतव्यवहारः उपचरितासद्भूतव्यवहार-
श्चेत्युपनयास्त्रेधा ॥४४॥

Intrinsic empirical standpoint (*sadbhūta vyavahāra naya*), non-intrinsic (alien) empirical standpoint (*asadbhūta vyavahāra naya*), and figurative, non-intrinsic (alien) empirical standpoint (*upacarita asadbhūta vyavahāra naya*) are the three kinds of the secondary-standpoints (*upanaya*).

Intrinsic empirical standpoint (*sadbhūta vyavahāra naya*) – The term *sadbhūta* implies the intrinsic nature of the thing. Though essentially inseparable, this *naya* makes distinction between the substance (*dravya*) and its subdivisions like qualities (*guṇa*), modes (*paryāya*), nature (*svabhāva*) and agent (*kāraka*). This *naya* envisages distinction in an indivisible whole: e.g., making a distinction between the ‘fire’ and its intrinsic nature of ‘burning’.

Non-intrinsic (alien) empirical standpoint (*asadbhūta vyavahāra naya*) – The term *asadbhūta* implies importation of alien substance or its qualities into the substance under consideration or its qualities. In essence, *asadbhūta vyavahāra naya* envisages oneness in essentially distinct substances. The expression under this *naya* is figurative; e.g., an ‘earthen-pot’ is conventionally termed as a ‘ghee-pot’ due to its usage.

Figurative, non-intrinsic (alien) empirical standpoint (*upacarita asadbhūta vyavahāra naya*) – *Upacārita* is usage sanctified by convention but with no intrinsic justification. Here the alien thing with which the self is identified lacks intimate relation that exists between the soul and the body; e.g., “My ornament.” Only in a figurative sense can one call the ornament as one’s own; similarly, calling certain individuals, the son or the wife, as one’s own. Identification of the self with other things is a figurative and transferred predication and that is *upacārita asadbhūta vyavahāra naya*. [See, Jain, Vijay K. (2020), Preface to Ācārya Kundakunda’s *Pañcāstikāya-Saṅgraha*, p. XXIX-XXXI.]

Jain, Vijay K. (2024),
*Ācārya Devasena’s Ālāpa Paddhati –
The Ways of Verbal Expression*, p. 62-63.

The conglomeration of inter-dependent and relative assertions reveals the true nature of an object:

मिथ्यासमूहो मिथ्या चेन्न मिथ्यैकान्ततास्ति नः ।

निरपेक्षा नया मिथ्या सापेक्षा वस्तु तेऽर्थकृत् ॥१०८॥

सामान्यार्थ – कोई कह सकता है कि नित्यत्व आदि एकान्त धर्मों को मिथ्या मानने पर उनका समुदाय-रूप द्रव्य भी मिथ्या ही मानना चाहिये। यह ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि स्याद्वादियों के यहाँ मिथ्यैकान्तता नहीं है, केवल निरपेक्ष नय ही मिथ्या होते हैं। हे भगवन् ! आपके मत में नय परस्पर सापेक्ष हैं और इसलिए उनके विषय अर्थक्रियाकारी होते हैं (और इसलिए उनके समूह के वस्तुपना सुघटित है)।

If it be said that the conglomeration of unseemly propositions [purported to be made by independent, one-sided points-of-view (*naya*) in isolation (of reality)] is bound to be false, our reply is that this is not correct. In your scheme, O Lord, only those one-sided points-of-view (*naya*) which make absolute and non-relative assertions are false; assertions which are inter-dependent and relative, in fact, each reveal an aspect of truth, and their conglomeration, therefore, reveals the true nature of an object.

A sentence asserts, either positively or negatively, a particular characteristic of the multifarious nature of an entity:

नियम्यतेऽर्थो वाक्येन विधिना वारणेन वा ।

तथाऽन्यथा च सोऽवश्यमविशेष्यत्वमन्यथा ॥१०९॥

सामान्यार्थ - (वस्तु-तत्त्व के अनेकान्तात्मक होते हुए भी उसे वाक्य द्वारा कैसे नियमित किया जाता है उसका समाधान -) अनेकान्तात्मक वस्तु-तत्त्व का विधि-वाक्य अथवा निषेध-वाक्य के द्वारा नियमन होता है। अनेकान्तात्मक होने से वस्तु-तत्त्व विधि-रूप भी है और निषेध-रूप भी है। यदि ऐसा न माना जाए तो केवल विधि-वाक्य अथवा केवल निषेध-वाक्य से जो एकान्त-रूप विशेष्य (वस्तु-तत्त्व) है वह अवस्तु ही है।

In the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*), a sentence asserts, either positively (*vidhi*) or negatively (*niṣedha*), a particular characteristic of the multifarious nature of an entity. Irrespective of whether the sentence asserts the characteristic positively or negatively, both such (seemingly contradictory) characteristics are present in it. Without the acceptance of this feature (i.e., if only the positive or the negative characteristic is assumed to be present in the entity), the entity is bound to become a nonentity (*avastu*).

The basic thesis in Jainism is the non-one-sided (*anekānta*) nature of the reality. A thing is supposed to have infinite-fold characteristics or properties. It becomes imperative, therefore, to apply all kinds of predicates, including seemingly contradictory ones, to describe its singular aspect depending on one's point-of-view. To illustrate, an entity has an aspect

that is unchanging – this is its ‘*sat*’ aspect or ‘*svabhāva*’ aspect or its ‘substance’ aspect. The reality seems to be unchanging when we consider its ‘substantial’ aspect but it seems to be ever-changing when we consider its qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*). *Anekāntavāda* synthesizes the two aspects and builds them into a coherent whole.

All standpoints (*naya*) are right in their own respective spheres but if they are taken to be refutations, each of the other, they are wrong. A man who knows the ‘non-one-sided’ nature of the reality never says that a particular view is absolutely wrong. A *naya* deals only with the particular point-of-view of the speaker and does not deny the remaining points-of-view, not under consideration at the moment.

Ācārya Samantabhadra’s *Svayambhūstotra*:

विवक्षितो मुख्य इतीष्यतेऽन्यो गुणोऽविवक्षो न निरात्मकस्ते ।
तथारिमित्रानुभयादिशक्तिर्द्वयावधेः कार्यकरं हि वस्तु ॥

(11-3-53)

O Lord Śreyāṅsanātha! You had pronounced that the *naya* deals with a particular attribute that is under consideration – called the primary attribute – of a substance and it does not deny the existence of the remaining attributes – called the secondary attributes. A substance, thus, exhibits attributes like a friend, a foe, and neither a friend nor a foe; it incorporates duality of attributes (and their combinations)¹ which truly explain its existence.

The sevenfold mode of predications (*saptabhaṅgī*) with its partly meant and partly non-meant affirmation (*vidhi*) and negation (*niṣedha*), qualified with the word ‘*syāt*’ (literally, in

1. See, Jain, Vijay K. (2015), “*Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra*”, p. 72-75.

some respect; indicative of conditionality of predication) dispels any contradictions that can occur in thought. The student of metaphysics in Jainism is advised to mentally insert the word ‘*syāt*’ before every statement of fact that he comes across, to warn him that it has been made from one particular point-of-view, which he must ascertain.

Ācārya Amṛtacandra’s *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*:

परमागमस्य बीजं निषिद्धजात्यन्धसिन्धुरविधानम् ।

सकलनयविलसितानां विरोधमथनं नमाम्यनेकान्तम् ॥ २ ॥

I bow to ‘*anekānta*’ (the doctrine of manifold points-of-view – relative pluralism), the root of unmatched Jaina Scripture, that reconciles the partial viewpoints of men, born blind, about the elephant, and which removes all contradictions about the nature of substances by apprehending reality through multiplicity of viewpoints.

Ācārya Amṛtacandra has termed the doctrine of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) as the root of the Jaina Scripture. Without a clear understanding of this gem of Jainism, men of this world are like the blind men of the parable¹; they insist on their partial knowledge being accepted for the whole truth.

1. See, Jain, Vijay K. (2012), “*Shri Amritachandra Suri’s Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya – with Hindi and English Translation*”, p. 3-4.

The nature of reality can be predicated only through a sentence that incorporates both the affirmation and negation, depending on the point-of-view:

तदतद्वस्तु वागेषा तदेवेत्यनुशासती ।

न सत्या स्यान्मृषावाक्यैः कथं तत्त्वार्थदेशना ॥११०॥

सामान्यार्थ – वस्तु तत् और अतत् (सत् और असत् आदि) रूप है। जो वाक्य वस्तु को सर्वथा तत्-रूप (सत्-नित्यादि-रूप) अथवा सर्वथा अतत्-रूप (असत्-अनित्यादि-रूप) ही प्रतिपादित करता है वह सत्य नहीं है। ऐसे मिथ्या वचनों के द्वारा तत्त्वार्थ (तत्त्व-स्वरूप) का प्रतिपादन कैसे हो सकता है?

The nature of reality is such that it can be predicated only through a sentence that incorporates both the affirmation ('that is' – *tat*) and negation ('that is not' – *atat*), depending on the point-of-view. (In case a sentence predicates affirmation, affirmation is the primary theme and negation is present but as a secondary theme; in case a sentence predicates negation, negation is the primary theme and affirmation is present but as a secondary theme.) A predication that takes the absolutist view of either affirmation or negation is not true. And how can one describe the nature of reality through such a false sentence?

Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra:

तदेव च स्यान्न तदेव च स्यात् तथाप्रतीतेस्तव तत्कथञ्चित् ।

नात्यन्तमन्यत्वमनन्यता च विधेर्निषेधस्य च शून्यदोषात् ॥

(9-2-42)

O Lord Suvidhinātha! Your description of the reality postulates that, as established by experience, there is the

conditional affirmation from a particular point-of-view, and also the conditional negation from another point-of-view. The two views, existence and non-existence, are not without any limitation; these views are neither totally inclusive nor totally exclusive to each other. Leaving out the limitation will lead to nihilistic delusion.

नित्यं तदेवेदमिति प्रतीतेर्न नित्यमन्यत्प्रतिपत्तिसिद्धेः ।
न तद्विरुद्धं बहिरन्तरङ्गनिमित्तनैमित्तिकयोगतस्ते ॥

(9-3-43)

When we reckon the existence of a substance we maintain that it is eternal and when we reckon the non-existence of that substance we maintain that it is perishable. O Lord Suvidhinātha! You had declared that the two views that proclaim the same substance to be eternal as well as perishable are reconciled by the doctrine that postulates the material or internal cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) and the auxiliary or external cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) for any activity to take place.

Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra, p. 59-60.

A sentence while calling attention to its own general meaning simultaneously negates the other meanings:

वाक्स्वभावोऽन्यवागर्थप्रतिषेधनिरङ्कुशः ।

आह च स्वार्थसामान्यं तादृग्वाक्यं खपुष्पवत् ॥१११॥

सामान्यार्थ – वाक्य का यह स्वभाव है कि वह अपने अर्थ सामान्य का प्रतिपादन करता हुआ अन्य वाक्यों के अर्थ का प्रतिषेध करने में निरङ्कुश (स्वतंत्र) होता है। इस वाक्य-स्वभाव से भिन्न जो सर्वथा अन्याऽपोहात्मक¹ (निषेध-रूप) वाक्य है वह ‘आकाशपुष्प’ के सामान्य अवस्तु है।

It is the nature of a sentence that while calling attention to its own general meaning expressly conveyed by it, it also negates the meanings that may be conveyed by other (unspoken) sentences. (For example, the sentence, “Bring the jar,” not only conveys to the listener to bring the jar but also that a piece of cloth, a table, or a lamp, are not to be brought. Thus, while a sentence affirms its own meaning, it also simultaneously negates the other meanings.) If a sentence be thought of as capable only of negating what has been specifically expressed in it by the speaker and not as capable of affirming what has been specifically spoken – this scheme is called ‘*anyāpoha*’ – the speech becomes a nonentity like the ‘sky-flower’ (*ākāśa-puṣpa*).

1. अन्याऽपोहवाद बौद्धों का एक विशिष्ट सिद्धान्त है। शब्द या वाक्य मात्र अन्य अर्थ की व्यावृत्ति करते हैं, वस्तु को नहीं बताते। जैसे किसी ने ‘घट’ कहा सो घट शब्द घट को न बतलाकर ‘अघट’ की व्यावृत्ति (अभाव) मात्र करता है, इसी को अन्याऽपोह कहते हैं। (देखें, जैन, विजय कुमार (2020), **आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित युक्त्यनुशासन**, फुटनोट, पृ. 122.)

The use of the word ‘syāt’ acts like a stamp of truth that enables the listener to grasp the intended particular meaning of a sentence:

सामान्यवाग्विशेषे चेन्न शब्दार्थो मृषा हि सा ।

अभिप्रेतविशेषाप्तेः स्यात्कारः सत्यलाञ्छनः ॥११२॥

सामान्यार्थ - यदि कहा जाए कि (‘अस्ति’ आदि) सामान्य वाक्य अन्यापोह-रूप (पर के अभाव-रूप) विशेष का प्रतिपादन करते हैं, तो ऐसा मानना ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि अन्यापोह शब्द का अर्थ सिद्ध नहीं होता है। अतः अन्यापोह का प्रतिपादन करने वाले वचन मिथ्या हैं। और अभिप्रेत अर्थ विशेष की प्राप्ति होने से स्यात्कार (स्याद्वाद) सत्य का चिह्न है।

If it be said that a sentence expressing the universality (*sāmānya*) aspect, in fact, denotes only the particularity (*viśeṣa*) aspect as posulated in the scheme of *anyāpoha*, this is not correct since the speech then becomes a nonentity.¹ The use of the word ‘*syāt*’ acts like a stamp of truth that enables the listener to grasp the speaker’s intended meaning. (An entity has both the universality (*sāmānya*) as well as the particularity (*viśeṣa*) aspects. When the expression makes the universality aspect as its subject, the particularity aspect becomes secondary and when the expression makes the particularity aspect as its subject, the universality aspect becomes secondary; this is doubtlessly achieved by using the word ‘*syāt*’ in the expression.)

1. In the Buddhist concept of ‘*anyāpoha-vāda*’, the word is capable only of negating what is not meant, without affirming anything. (see, footnote on the previous page.)

Affirmation, when not in conflict with negation, yields the desired result of describing truly an object of knowledge:

विधेयमीप्सितार्थाङ्गं प्रतिषेध्याऽविरोधि यत् ।

तथैवाऽऽदेयहेयत्वमिति स्याद्वादसंस्थितिः ॥११३॥

सामान्यार्थ – प्रतिषेध्य का अविरोधी जो विधेय है वह ईप्सित (अभीष्ट) अर्थ की सिद्धि का कारण है। विधेय को प्रतिषेध्य का अविरोधी होने के कारण ही वस्तु आदेय और हेय है। इस प्रकार से स्याद्वाद की (युक्तिशास्त्राऽविरोध के कारण) सम्यक् स्थिति की सिद्धि होती है।

Affirmation, when not in conflict with negation, yields the desired result of describing truly an object of knowledge. Only when affirmation and negation are juxtaposed in mutually non-conflicting situation, one is able to decide whether to accept or reject the assertion. This is how the doctrine of conditional predication (*syādvāda*) establishes the truth.

The 'Āptamīmāṃsā' has been composed for the seekers of own well-being:

इतीयमाप्तमीमांसा विहिता हितमिच्छताम् ।

सम्यग्मिथ्योपदेशार्थविशेषप्रतिपत्तये ॥११४॥

सामान्यार्थ – इस प्रकार यह 'आप्तमीमांसा' अपने हित की चाह रखने वालों को सम्यक्-उपदेश और मिथ्या-उपदेश के अर्थ-विशेष की प्रतिपत्ति (भेद-विज्ञान) के लिए बनाई गयी है।

This treatise 'Āptamīmāṃsā' – Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord – has been composed for those who seek their well-being (i.e., realization of the Self) by enabling them to discern between the true and the false preaching.

This concludes the 'Āptamīmāṃsā' (also known as the 'Devāgamastotra') composed by the supremely holy and stainless Ācārya Samantabhadra, a glittering jewel among the authors of the sacred scripture, who reigned supreme as a poet, a disputant, a preacher and an orator, and whose expositions, based on the incontrovertible doctrine of 'syādvāda', have torn apart mountains of misconceptions.

With great devotion, I make obeisance humble at the worshipful feet of Ācārya Samantabhadra.



REFERENCES AND GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

All that is contained in this book has been excerpted, adapted, or translated into English from a number of authentic Jaina texts. Due care has been taken to conserve the essence of the holy Scripture composed by the ancient preceptors (*pūrvācārya*).

Contribution of the following publications in preparation of the present volume is gratefully acknowledged:

1. प्रो. उदयचन्द्र जैन (2012), **आचार्य समन्तभद्र द्वारा विरचित आप्तमीमांसा की तत्त्वदीपिका नामक व्याख्या**, श्री गणेश वर्णी दि. जैन संस्थान, वाराणसी-221005.
2. पं. जुगलकिशोर मुख्तार (1978), **श्रीमत्स्वामि-समन्तभद्राचार्यवर्य-विरचित देवागम अपरनाम आप्तमीमांसा**, वीर सेवा मन्दिर ट्रस्ट प्रकाशन, वाराणसी-221005.
3. गणिनी आर्थिकारत्न श्री ज्ञानमती माताजी (1989), **श्रीमद्भगवद्विद्वानंदाचार्य विरचित अष्टसहस्री**, भाग 1, 2 एवं 3, दिगम्बर जैन त्रिलोक शोध संस्थान, हस्तिनापुर (मेरठ), उ.प्र.
4. गणिनीप्रमुख आर्थिकाशिरोमणि श्री ज्ञानमती माताजी (2012), **स्वामी समन्तभद्राचार्य विरचित देवागम स्तोत्र (आप्तमीमांसा)**, दिगम्बर जैन त्रिलोक शोध संस्थान, हस्तिनापुर (मेरठ), उ.प्र.
5. जगदीशचन्द्र जैन (डॉ.) (1992), **श्रीमल्लिषेणसूरिप्रणीता स्याद्वादमञ्जरी**, श्री परमश्रुत प्रभावक मण्डल, श्रीमद् राजचन्द्र आश्रम, अगास-388130, पंचमावृत्ति.
6. पं. कैलाशचन्द्र शास्त्री (2010), **जैन न्याय**, भारतीय ज्ञानपीठ, 18 इन्स्टीट्यूशनल एरिया, लोदी रोड, नई दिल्ली-110003.
7. पं. मनोहरलाल (वि. सं. 1969), **श्रीमत्कुन्दकुन्दाचार्यविरचितः प्रवचनसारः**, श्री परमश्रुत प्रभावक मण्डल, बम्बई-2.

.....

8. पं. मोहनलाल शास्त्री (2005), श्रीमाणिक्यनन्दिस्वामि विरचित परीक्षामुख, भारतवर्षीय अनेकान्त विद्वत्परिषद्.
9. श्री मनोहर जी वर्णी 'सहजानन्द जी' महाराज (1970), आप्तमीमांसा प्रवचन, सहजानन्द शास्त्रमाला, रणजीतपुरी, सदर, मेरठ.
10. सिद्धान्ताचार्य पं. फूलचन्द्र शास्त्री (2010), आचार्य पूज्यपाद विरचित **सर्वार्थसिद्धि**, भारतीय ज्ञानपीठ, 18 इन्स्टीट्यूशनल एरिया, लोदी रोड, नई दिल्ली-110003, सोलहवाँ संस्करण.
11. जैन, विजय कुमार (2020), आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित युक्त्यनुशासन - **अन्वयार्थ एवं व्याख्या सहित**, प्रकाशक: विजय कुमार जैन, देहरादून.
12. जैन, विजय कुमार (2020), आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित **स्तुतिविद्या (जिनशतक, जिनस्तुतिशतं)**, प्रकाशक: विजय कुमार जैन, देहरादून.
13. Chakravarti Nayanar, A. (Prof.) (2009), "*Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya-Sāra*", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi, Third Edition.
14. Chakravarti, A. (Prof.) (2008), "*Ācārya Kundakunda's Samayasāra*", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi, Fifth Edition.
15. Ghoshal, Saratchandra (2010), "*Āpta-mīmāṃsā of Āchārya Samantabhadra*", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi.
16. Jain, Champat Rai (1916), "*Nyāya – The Science of Thought*", The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah (India).
17. Jain, Champat Rai (1975), "*The Key of Knowledge*", Today & Tomorrow's Printers & Publishers, New Delhi, Fourth Edition.
18. Jain, S.A. (1960), "*Reality : English Translation of Shri Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi*", Vira Sasana Sangha, Calcutta-37.
19. Jain, S.C. (Dr.) (2003), "*Vimaladāsa's Saptabhaṅgī Taraṅgiṇī*", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi.
20. Jain, S.C. (Dr.) (2003), "*Yogasāra Prābhṛta*", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi.
21. Jain, Vijay K. (2014), "*Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Iṣṭopadeśa – The Golden Discourse*", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.

.....

22. Jain, Vijay K. (2015), “*Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra – Adoration of The Twenty-four Tīrthaṅkara*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
23. Jain, Vijay K. (2018), “*Ācārya Umāsvamī’s Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārtha-siddhi*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
24. Jain, Vijay K. (2020), “*Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha – With Authentic Explanatory Notes in English*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
25. Jain, Vijay K. (2018), “*Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
26. Jain, Vijay K. (2022), “*Ācārya (Muni) Nemicandra’s Dravyasaṃgraha*”, Second Edition, Vijay Kumar Jain, Dehradun.
27. Jain, Vijay K. (2019), “*Ācārya Kundakunda’s Niyamasāra – The Essence of Soul-adoration*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
28. Jain, Vijay K. (2021), “*Ācārya Māṇikyanandi’s Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra – Essence of the Jaina Nyāya*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
29. Jain, Vijay K. (2022), “*Ācārya Kundakunda’s Saṃayasāra – With Hindi and English Translation*”, Second Edition, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
20. Jain, Vijay K. (2024), “*Ācārya Devasena’s Ālāpa Paddhati – The Ways of Verbal Expression*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
31. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2012), “*Shri Amritchandra Suri’s Puruṣārtha-siddhyupāya – with Hindi and English Translation*”, Vikalp Printers, Dehradun.
32. Jaini, Jagmanderlal (1916), “*Outlines of Jainism*”, Jain Literature Society, Cambridge University Press, London.
33. Shah, Nagin J. (1999), “*Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā – Critique of an Authority*”, Dr. Jagruti Dilip Sheth, Nehru Nagar Char Rasta, Ambawadi, Ahmedabad-380015.
34. Shastri, Devendra Muni (1983), “*A Source-book in Jaina Philosophy*”, Sri Tarak Guru Jain Granthalaya, Shastri Circle, Udaipur (Rajasthan).
35. Thomas, F.W. (1968), “*The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine – Śrī Malliṣeṇa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maṅjarī*”, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi-Varanasi-Patna.

36. Upadhye, A.N. (1935), “Śrī Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra – A Pro-canonical Text of the Jainas”, Shetha Manilal Revashankar Jhaveri – for the Parama-Śruta-Prabhavaka-Maṇḍala, Bombay.
37. Vidyabhusana, Satis Chandra (1909), “Nyāyāvatāra : The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic by Siddha Sena Divākara”, The Indian Research Society, Calcutta.



INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS

abhāva – non-existence 21-26, 72, 95, 110, 111
abhāvaikānta – absolute non-existence 27, 28
abhavya jīva – the soul destined not to attain liberation 164
abhavyatva – the incapacity for liberation 166
abheda – unity, one 73, 126
abhinna – inseparable 117
acakṣudarśana – non-ocular perception-cognition 127
adṛṣṭa – invisible 151
ādāna – acceptance 171-172
adhikaraṇa – substratum 53-55
advaita – absolute non-dualism 52, 53, 56, 57, 59, 65, 73
āgama – scripture 7, 15, 134, 136-138
agupti bhaya – fear of divulgence of one's deeds 5
agurulaghuguna – intrinsic transformation in a substance 128
Ahaṃkāra – the I-ness or Ego 76-78
ahetu – not a legitimate middle term 44, 59
ajñāna – ignorance 159, 161, 162, 171, 172
ajīva – non-soul 23, 37, 127, 167
ākāśa-puṣpa – the 'sky-flower' 84, 189

ākasmika bhaya – fear of the unexpected 5
akramabhāvī – without gradation 168
alpajñāna – slight-knowledge 159, 161, 162
amūrta – non-material 167
anabhilāpya – indescribable 93, 176
anādi – without beginning 22, 25
anaikāntika – unconstrained 68
ananta – without end, infinite 5, 22, 25
ananta darśana – infinite perception 5
ananta jñāna – infinite knowledge 5
ananta sukha – infinite bliss 5
ananta vīrya – infinite energy 5
ananyatva – absolutely distinct, absolute oneness 119, 122
anāpekṣika – absolutely independent 129, 131, 133
anāpta – not a true authority 137
anarpita – secondary 47
aneka – many 50
anekānta – the manyfold points-of-view 30, 76, 174, 176, 184, 186
anekāntātāmaka – non-absolutistic, infinite characters in an object 29, 167
anekāntavāda – the doctrine of non-absolutism 44, 123, 176,

185, 186
anekatva – manyness 50
antarāya – obstructive 2, 6, 14, 15
anukampā – compassion 157
anumāna – inference 12, 57, 70, 135
anumeya – object of inference 10, 12
anvaya – association 40, 42, 87, 124
anyāpoha – the doctrine of the Buddhists that the word is capable only of negating what is not meant, without affirming anything 189, 190
anyonyābhāva – reciprocal non-existence 22-24, 26
aṅga – limbs 155
apādāna – dislodgement 53-55
apākya – non-cookability 165
āpekṣika – absolutely dependent 129, 131, 133
āpta – Omniscient, deity 3, 15, 137
arati – displeasure 4
Arhat – Supreme Lord Jina 4, 11-14, 16, 157
arpita – primary 47
ārta – sorrowful 155, 157
artha – entity, object of knowledge 21, 46, 118, 127, 128, 130, 138, 144, 148-151, 174
artha paryāya – the subtle-modes 128
artha-kriyā – activity of an object 46
asadbhūta – importation of alien substance or its qualities into the substance under

consideration or its qualities 182
asadbhūta vyavahāra naya – non-intrinsic (alien) empirical standpoint 181, 182
asādhāraṇa – distinctive 167
asat – non-existing 29, 36-38, 46, 62, 70, 72, 84, 91
asti – is, assertion 31, 32, 34, 91
astitva – being or existence 40, 42, 69, 167
aśubha – wicked 18, 56
aśuddha – impure 70, 127, 128
aśuddha saṃgraha naya – impure generic-point-of-view 70
aśuddhi – spiritual impurity 164
asvarūpa – devoid of the form of its own-being 24, 26
aṣṭāṅgahetuka – the Noble Eightfold Path 97
atat – ‘that is not’ 187
atīndriya – super-sensuous 12, 15
atiprasaṅga – over-pervasiveness 116, 117
atiśaya – miraculous happenings 5
ativyāpti – over-pervasiveness 116, 117
ātmā – the self, the soul 112, 116, 117
atrāṇa bhaya – fear of being without protection 5
atyantābhāva – absolute non-existence 23, 24, 26
aupaśamika – dispositions of subsidence 167
avācyā – indescribable 93, 95
avācyataikānta – absolutely

indescribable 28, 102, 122, 131, 136, 141, 150, 154, 161
avadhidarśana – clairvoyant-perception-cognition 127
avadhijñāna – clairvoyance 127
avagraha – impression 11, 169, 170
avaktavya – indescribable 29, 31, 32, 34, 38, 39, 50, 133
avāntarasattā – particular existence 70
āvaraṇa – envelopment 8, 128
avastu – non-object, nonentity 46, 72, 93, 178, 184
avāya – comprehension 11, 169, 170
avayava – the constituent parts 112, 114, 115
avayavī – the aggregate 112, 114, 115
avidyā – ignorance 52, 56
avinābhāva, avinābhāvī – invariable togetherness 40-42, 50, 59, 66, 121, 132
avyakta – non-manifest 76-78
avyatireka – logical continuance 123
avyaya – see, *nipāta*
ayutasiddha – residing in the same substratum 124

bahiraṅgārthaikānta – the absolutist view that all cognitions have real substrata in the external world alone 140
bāhya-prameya – external-cognition that illumines the

knowledge-object through the senses 142
bāhyārtha – corresponding external-objects 143, 145-147
bala mada – pride of strength 5
bandha – bondage 56, 81, 96, 159, 161
bhāva – being, existence, nature, object, disposition 21, 27, 32, 69, 72, 79, 91, 92, 126, 158, 166
bhāva nirjarā – subjective dissociation of karmas 9
bhāvaikānta – absolute existence 21, 28
bhāvakarman – soul's disposition, karma-consciousness 8, 127
bhāva-prameya – internal-cognition that illumines the knowledge-object through the Self 142
bhavya jīva – the soul destined to attain liberation 164
bhavyatva – the capacity for liberation 166
bhaya – fear 5
bheda – diversity 73
bhinna – separable 117
bhūtacatuṣka – four basic substances [earth (*prthvī*), water (*jala*), fire (*agni*), and air (*vāyu*)] mentioned by the Buddhists 119, 120
bodha – cognition 27, 145, 146
buddhi (1) – a piece of cognition 138, 144, 146
Buddhi (2) – Great or Intellect 76, 77

caḥśudarśana – ocular-perception-cognition 127
cāmara – flywhisks 3, 6
catuśkoṭivikalpa – fourfold causal relations 89, 90
cetanā – consciousness 126, 127,
cintā – anxiety 5
citta-akaluṣatā – absence-of-evil-inclinations 157

daiva – fate 148-151
darśana – perception 5, 14, 127, 170
darśanāvarenaṇīya – perception-obscuring 6, 14
darśanopayoga – perception-cognition 127
deva – celestial-beings 126
dhāraṇā – retention 11, 169, 170
dharmī – the entity, possessor of the attribute 13, 41, 42, 47, 50, 67, 129, 132-134
dhrauvya – permanence 51, 69, 70, 86, 105, 106
dhyāna – meditation 158
doṣa – imperfection, fault 8, 116, 117
dravya – substance 10, 14, 24, 32-34, 36-39, 43, 46, 48, 51, 54, 64, 69, 70, 74, 85, 91, 92, 106, 110, 118, 123-126, 128, 129, 181, 182
dravya nirjarā – objective dissociation of the karmas 9
dravyakarma – material karmas 8
dravyaparyāya – mode-of-substance 128

dravyārthika – pertaining to the substance 64, 124, 181
dr̥ṣṭa – visible 151
dr̥ṣṭānta – the general rule or pattern 58, 134, 135
duḥkha – suffering 97
durnaya – faulty-standpoint 180
dvaita – dualism, diversity 59
dveṣa – aversion 5, 162, 163, 172, 173

eka – one 50, 117
ekānta – absolutist 17, 19, 52, 53, 57, 60, 65, 74, 81, 87, 96, 175
ekatva – oneness, non-dualism, 50, 61, 66, 69, 73

gaganakusuma – the ‘sky-flower’ 72, 84
gauṇa – secondary 47
ghāti, ghātiya – inimical (karmas) 14, 15
ghātiyā karma – inimical karmas 6, 9
gorasa – the genus cow-produce 109, 126
grahaṇa – acceptance 171-172
guṇa – quality 106, 110, 118, 120, 124, 125, 128, 182, 185
guṇa-paryāya – mode-of-qualities 128
guṇī – the possessor of quality 110
guru – the Preacher, the Master 3, 157

hetu – means, middle term 12, 40-43, 57-59, 66-71, 134-137, 139, 143, 179
hetudoṣa – fallacy of the reason 139

ihā – inquisitiveness, speculation 11, 169, 170
ihaloka bhaya – fear relating to this life 5
indriya – senses 158
itaretarābhāva – see, *anyonyābhāva*

janma – (re)birth 4
jāti – genus, class, caste 5, 64, 106, 120
jāti mada – pride of caste 5
jñāna mada – pride of knowledge 5
jñānāvaraṇīya – knowledge-obscuring 6, 14, 162
jñānopayoga – knowledge-cognition 127
jñāpaka – agent-of-knowledge 71, 132
jñapti – activity resulting in correct knowledge 74
jñeya – object of knowledge 62, 159
jīva – soul 9, 24, 36, 124-128, 143, 144, 146, 157, 164, 166, 167
jīvatva – the soul-principle 166

kāla – time 24, 32, 61, 91, 92, 123
kaluṣatā – evil-inclination 158
kāraka – factors-of-action 52-55, 74, 76, 132, 182

kāraṇa – cause 63, 76, 84-87, 110, 120-122, 130, 155, 188,
karaṇa – instrument 53-55
karma – activity, action 18, 19, 53-56, 110, 132
kartā – the doer 52-55, 132
kārya – effect 76, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87, 110, 120-122, 151, 155
kaṣāya – passions 128, 152, 158
kathāncit – in some respect 117, 175
kevaladarśana – perfect, infinite-perception-cognition 127
kevalajñāna – infinite knowledge, omniscience 5, 11, 15, 55, 127, 159, 168, 171, 178
kharaviṣāṇa - the ‘horns of a hare’ 72, 100
kheda – regret 4
kramabhāvī – in succession 168
kriyā – action 52, 53
krodha – anger 152, 157
kṣaṇika, kṣaṇikatva – momentariness 18, 61, 82, 87, 96
kṣaya – destruction 166
kṣayopaśama – destruction-cum-subsidence 166
kṣāyopaśamika – destruction-cum-subsidential dipositions 127
kṣetra – place 32, 36, 69, 70, 91, 92
kṣobha – agitation 157
kṣudhā – hunger
kuavadhi – wrong-clairvoyance 127
kula mada – pride of lineage 5
kumati – wrong sensory-knowledge

127

kuśruta – wrong scriptural-
knowledge 127

lakṣaṇa – distinctive mark 124, 167

leśyā – thought-complexion 128,
158

liṅga – mark, sign 57, 58, 134

liṅgī – see, *sādhya*

lobha – greed 152, 157

mada – pride 5

mahāsattā – general-existence 69,
70

Mahat – the Intellect 76, 77

māna – pride 152, 157

manahparyayañāna – telepathy
127

manuṣya – human-beings 126, 128

marāṇa – death 5

marāṇa bhaya – fear of death 5

matijñāna – sensory-knowledge 11,
127, 169

māyā (1) – illusion 52, 53, 143

māyā (2) – deceitfulness 152, 157

moha – delusion 2, 5, 158, 162, 163

mohanīya – deluding 6, 14

mokṣa – liberation 56, 81, 97, 98,
148, 161, 162, 164-166

mukhya – primary 47

nāraka – infernal-beings 126, 128

nāśa – destruction 72

nāsti – ‘is not’, negation 31-34, 91

nāstitva – non-existence 40, 42, 43

naya – standpoint, relative method
of comprehension 29, 30, 38, 44,
48-51, 54, 63, 64, 70, 124, 130,
168, 169, 175, 179-183, 185

nayābhāsa – faulty-standpoint 180

nayavāda – the apprehension that
the viewpoint is valid only in
some respect 168, 177

nidrā – sleep 5, 158

nigamana – recapitulation of the
proposition 58

nimitta – instrumental 54, 63, 84,
85, 130, 188

nimitta kāraṇa – instrumental
cause 54, 63, 84, 85, 130, 188

nipāta – a preposition, an
indeclinable word or particle
174

nirāvaraṇa – without-envelopment
127

nirjarā – shedding, dissociation 9

nirpekṣa – non-relative 180

nirvikalpa – non-relative 180

niścaya – transcendental 54-55

niścita-vipakṣavṛtti – certainly
exists in the opposite 68

niṣedha – negation 46, 91, 176, 184

nitya – permanent 18, 48, 117, 124

nityatva – permanence 74, 76, 81,
102, 103, 167, 179

padārtha – object 69, 72, 126, 130,
172

pakṣa – minor term, abode, locus
57, 58, 66, 67, 68, 71

pakṣa-dharmatva – exists in relation to the subject-of-inference 67, 71
pākya – cookability 165
pāpa – demerit 56, 81, 81, 152, 153, 155, 156, 158
pāpāsrava – influx-of-demerit 158
para-apavāda – slandering others 158
parabhāva – other-being 36, 37, 70, 92
paracatuṣṭaya – other quaternion 36
paraloka – abode after death 5, 18, 56
paraloka bhaya – fear relating to life beyond 5
paramātmā – the Supreme Lord 15
paramaudārika deha – supremely-auspicious body 14
para-paritāpa – causing anguish to others 158
pariṇāma – effect 46, 123
parokṣa – indirect (knowledge) 2, 12, 16, 168, 171, 178,
paryāya – form, mode 10, 11, 14, 37-39, 43, 46, 51, 64, 69, 72, 74, 106, 123-126, 128, 129, 167, 182, 185
paryāyārthika – pertaining to the mode 64, 124, 181
pauruṣa – human-deed 148-151
phala – fruit 56, 75, 81, 82, 87, 116, 117
pradeśa – infinitesimal (indivisible) space-point 19, 167

pradeśavattva – having space-points 167
pradhvaṅṣisābhāva – posterior (emergent) non-existence 22, 25
prāgabhāva – prior (antecedent) non-existence 21, 22, 25
Prakṛti – nature 77-79, 160
pramāda-caryā – negligent-activity 158
pramāṇa – valid-knowledge 2, 12, 13, 27, 46, 48, 49, 73-76, 93, 116, 117, 130, 132, 138, 142, 145, 146, 168, 169, 171-173, 179
pramāṇa prasiddha – that which is known by valid-knowledge 13
pramāṇa vikalpa prasiddha – that which partakes of the nature of valid-knowledge and distinctness both 13
pramāṇābhāsa – invalid-knowledge 138
pramāṇa-phala – fruit of valid-knowledge 74, 75
pramātā – the possessor (of knowledge), the subject 75, 145
prameya – the object-of-knowledge 10, 12, 75, 132, 142
pramiti – activity resulting in correct knowledge 74, 75
praśasta – commendable 157
pratibhāsa – appearance 52, 123
pratiśedhya – negative 43
prātihārya – splendour 6
pratiñā – the proposition 57, 58, 135, 139
pratiñādoṣa – fallacy of the thesis

139

pratyabhijñāna – memory and recognition 82, 83, 103, 104
pratyakṣa – direct (knowledge) 2, 11, 16, 17, 83, 134, 168, 171, 178
pretyabhāva – transmigration 61, 81, 82
pr̥thaktva – separateness 60, 65, 66, 69, 73
pudgala – the matter 24, 124, 125, 128
pūjā mada – pride of veneration 5
puṇya – merit 56, 81, 152, 153, 155-157
puṇyāsrava – influx-of-merit 157
Puruṣa – Spirit 77-80, 159, 160

rāga – attachment 5, 157, 162, 163, 172, 173
raudra – cruel 155, 157
ṛddhi mada – pride of accomplishments 5
roga – sickness 4
rūpa – form of matter 77, 100, 112

śabda – word 144
sadbhūta – the intrinsic nature of the thing 182
sadbhūta vyavahāra naya – intrinsic empirical standpoint 181, 182
sādhana – means, reason 12, 40, 41, 57, 66-70, 135, 139
sādharmya – presence-in-homologue 40-42, 61, 179

sādhu – the ascetic 157
sādhya – that which is to be proved 12, 13, 40, 41, 43, 57, 58, 66-68, 135, 139, 179
sakaladeśa – comprehensive and absolute 48
sāmānya – general 46, 48, 63, 105, 110, 116, 118, 125, 129, 130, 190
samavāya – inherence 110-112, 115-118
samaya – scripture 7
saṃjñā (1) – instincts 158
saṃjñā (2) – perception or cognition 100
saṃjñā (3) – designation 123, 143, 144
saṃjñī – word-denoted-entity 59, 91
saṃkhyā – enumeration, number 106, 123
saṃkleśa – inauspicious kind of disposition 155
saṃpradāna – bestowal 53-55
saṃsāra – worldly existence, cycle of rebirths 101, 166
saṃskāra – volitions 100,
samudāya – aggregate of qualities in an object 61
saṃvara – stoppage 9
saṃvṛti – fictional, imaginary 73, 88, 94, 100, 101, 121
śaṅkita-vipakṣavṛtti – existence in the opposite is doubtful 68
santāna – offspring, series of successive events 61, 87-89, 100
sapakṣa-sattva – exists in relation

to the corroborative-subject 67, 71
saptabhaṅga – seven limbs of assertion 30, 33, 175
saptabhaṅgī – the seven-nuance system 29, 30, 36, 38, 44, 50, 176, 177, 185
śarīra mada – pride of beauty 5
sarvajña – Omniscient 3, 10-12
sarvajñatā – omniscience 8
sarvathā – absolutely 117
sat – existing, being 29, 36-38, 46, 62, 69, 70, 72, 80, 86, 91, 105, 106, 109, 126, 185
sat-cid-ānanda – ‘Existence-Thought-Bliss’ 52
ṣaṭguṇahānivrddhi – manifestation of *agurulaghuguṇa* in form of rhythmic rise and fall 128
ṣaṭkāraka – sixfold factors-of-action 53-55
sattā – existence 69, 111, 118
savikalpa – relative 180
skandha –aggregates, molecules 100, 110, 120
smṛti, smaraṇa – memory, remembrance 82, 97, 103
sneh – fondness 158
śoka – grief 4
śrotā – hearer 145, 146
śrutajñāna – scriptural-knowledge 127, 179
śrutakevalin – the All-knowing Master of the Scripture 174
stutya – worthy of adoration 3
śubha – virtuous 18, 56

śuddhi – spiritual purity 164
śuddhopayoga – pure-cognition, pure concentration 9, 55
sukha – bliss 5, 14
sunaya – right-standpoint 180
śūnya – null and void 37, 101
sūnyavāda – nihilism 27, 95
svabhāva – own-nature, own-being 15, 36, 70, 92, 101, 105, 128, 155, 165, 182, 185
svabhāva vyañjana paryāya – natural gross-mode 128
svacatuṣṭaya – own quaternion [own-substance (*svadravya*), own-place (*svakṣetra*), own-time (*svakāla*), and own-being (*svabhāva*)] 36, 92
svayambhū – self-dependent soul 15
sveda – perspiration 5
syād or *syāt* – in a certain way 2, 30, 31-35, 174, 175, 177, 185, 186, 190
syādvāda – the doctrine of conditional predication 2, 28, 30, 65, 102, 122, 131, 136, 141, 150, 154, 161, 168, 175, 176, 178, 179, 191, 192
tapa, tapas – austerities 9, 166
tapa mada – pride of austerities 5
tat – ‘that is’ 187
tīrthakṛt – sect-founder 7
tiryāṅca – plants-and-animals 127
tr̥ṣā – thirst 4
tyāga – rejection 171-172

ubhayaikānta – endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints 28, 102, 122, 131, 136, 141, 150, 154, 161
udāharaṇa – example, illustration 58, 134, 135
udaya – rise 166
upacārita – usage sanctified by convention 182
upacarita asadbhūta vyavahāra naya – figurative, non-intrinsic (alien) empirical standpoint 181, 182
upādāna (1) – acceptance 172
upādāna (2) – substantial, material, internal 54, 63, 84, 85, 130, 172, 188
upādāna kāraṇa – substantial cause 54, 63, 84, 130, 188
upanaya (1) – recapitulation of the middle term 58
upanaya (2) – secondary standpoint, subdivision of *naya* 181
upaśama – subsidence 166
upayoga – cognition, consciousness 36, 126, 127
upekṣā – equanimity 171-173
utpāda – origination 51, 69, 70, 72, 86, 105, 106

vaidharmya – absence-in-heterologue 40-42, 179
vaktā – speaker 145, 146
vākya – sentence 27, 145, 146
vāsanā – suffusion, bias 98

vastu – entity, object 69, 70, 72, 93, 126, 130, 172, 173, 179
vastu-prapañca – non-reality of the world of things 52
vedanā – sensation or feeling 100
vedanā bhaya – fear of pain and suffering 5
vibhaṅga – wrong-clairvoyance 127
vibhāva vyañjana paryāya – unnatural gross-modes 128
vicitra – variegated 164
vidheya – affirmative 43
vidhi – affirmation 46, 91, 176, 184, 185
vijñāna – consciousness or discernment 100
vijñānādvaita – there is existence only of cognition arrived at through the subjective act of perception 138
vikaladeśa – partial and relative
vikalpa – distinction, the chosen option 13, 176, 179
vikalpa prasiddha – that which is utterly distinct 13
vikathā – four kinds of narratives pertaining to monarch, woman, thief and food 158
vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti – absence in the opposite subject 67, 71
vīrya – energy 5, 14
viśaya-lolupatā – hankering after sensual-pleasures 158
viśeṣa – particular, specific 45, 48, 63, 110, 125, 129, 130, 190
viśeṣaṇa – qualifying attribute 40-

43, 50, 90
viśeṣya – entity qualified 43, 90
vismaya – astonishment 4
viśuddhi – auspicious kind of
disposition 155
vītarāga – free from all attachment
153, 173
vṛtti – occurrence 112, 114
vyakta – manifest 76, 77
vyāñjana paryāya – the gross-
modes 128
vyāpaka – all-pervasive 117
vyāpti – logical, inseparable
connection 40, 58, 179

vyatireka – distinction, exclusion
40, 41, 123, 124
vyavahāra – empirical 53, 54, 70,
181, 182
vyavahāra naya – empirical- or
systematic-point-of-view 70
vyaya – destruction 51, 70, 72, 86,
105, 106
yogyatā – capability 151
yutasiddha – residing in separate
substrata 114
žarā – old-age 4



INDEX OF VERSES

कारिका अनुक्रमणिका

कारिका का प्रथम चरण	--- Verse No.	Page
अज्ञानाच्चेद्ध्रुवो बन्धो	--- 96	159
अज्ञानान्मोहिनो बन्धो	--- 98	162
अद्वैतं न विना द्वैताद्	--- 27	59
अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि	--- 24	52
अध्यात्मं बहिरप्येष	--- 2	4
अनन्यतैकान्तेऽणूनां	--- 67	119
अनपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये	--- 33	66
अन्तरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते	--- 79	138
अन्येष्वनन्यशब्दोऽयं	--- 44	88
अबुद्धिपूर्वापेक्षाया-	--- 91	151
अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि	--- 12	27
अवक्तव्यचतुष्कोटि-	--- 46	90
अवस्त्वनभिलाष्यं स्यात्	--- 48	93
अशक्यत्वादवाच्यं किम्	--- 50	95
अस्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येना-	--- 17	40
अहेतुकत्वान्नाशस्य	--- 52	97
आश्रयाऽऽश्रयिभावान्न	--- 64	115
इतीयमाप्तमीमांसा	--- 114	192
उपेक्षाफलमाद्यस्य	--- 102	171
एकत्वेऽन्यतराभावः	--- 69	121
एकस्यानेकवृत्तिर्न	--- 62	112
एकानेकविकल्पादा-	--- 23	50
एवं विधिनिषेधाभ्याम्	--- 21	46

कारिका का प्रथम चरण	--- Verse No.	Page
कथञ्चित् ते सदेवेष्टं	--- 14	29
कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं	--- 25	56
कामादिप्रभवश्चित्रः	--- 99	164
कार्यकारणनानात्वं	--- 61	110
कार्यभ्रान्तेरणुभ्रान्तिः	--- 68	120
कार्यद्रव्यमनादि स्यात्	--- 10	25
कार्योत्पादः क्षयो हेतो-	--- 58	106
कुशलाकुशलं कर्म	--- 8	18
क्रमार्पितद्वयाद् द्वैतं	--- 16	38
क्षणिकैकान्तपक्षेऽपि	--- 41	82
घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी	--- 59	108
चतुष्कोटेर्विकल्पस्य	--- 45	89
जीवशब्दः सबाह्यार्थः	--- 84	143
तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं ते	--- 101	168
तदतद्वस्तु वागेषा	--- 110	187
तीर्थकृतसमयानां च	--- 3	7
त्वन्मतामृतबाह्यानां	--- 7	17
देवागमनभोयान-	--- 1	3
देशकालविशेषेऽपि	--- 63	114
दैवादेवार्थसिद्धिश्चेद्	--- 88	148
दोषावरणयोर्हानिः	--- 4	8
द्रव्यपर्याययोरैक्यं	--- 71	123
द्रव्याद्यन्तरभावेन	--- 47	91
धर्मधर्म्यविनाभावः	--- 75	132
धर्मे धर्मेऽन्य एवार्थो	--- 22	47
नयोपनयैकान्तानां	--- 107	181

कारिका का प्रथम चरण	--- Verse No.	Page
न सामान्यात्मनोदेति	--- 57	105
न हेतुफलभावादि-	--- 43	87
नास्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येना-	--- 18	42
नित्यत्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि	--- 37	74
नित्यं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्	--- 56	103
नियम्यतेऽर्थो वाक्येन	--- 109	184
पयोव्रतो न दध्यन्ति	--- 60	109
पापं ध्रुवं परे दुःखात्	--- 92	152
पुण्यं ध्रुवं स्वतो दुःखात्	--- 93	153
पुण्यपापक्रिया न स्यात्	--- 40	81
पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि	--- 28	60
पौरुषादेव सिद्धिश्चेत्	--- 89	149
प्रमाणकारकैर्व्यक्तं	--- 38	76
प्रमाणगोचरौ सन्तौ	--- 36	73
बहिरङ्गार्थैकान्ते	--- 81	140
बुद्धिशब्दप्रमाणत्वं	--- 87	146
बुद्धिशब्दार्थसंज्ञास्ता-	--- 85	144
भावप्रमेयाऽपेक्षायां	--- 83	142
भावैकान्ते पदार्थानाम्	--- 9	21
मिथ्यासमूहो मिथ्या चेत्	--- 108	183
यदि सत्सर्वथा कार्यं	--- 39	80
यद्यसत्सर्वथा कार्यं	--- 42	84
यद्यापेक्षिकसिद्धिः स्यात्	--- 73	129
वक्तव्यनाप्ते यद्धेतोः	--- 78	137
वक्तृश्रोतृप्रमातृणां	--- 86	145
वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती	--- 103	174

कारिका का प्रथम चरण	--- Verse No.	Page
वाक्स्वभावोऽन्यवागर्थ-	--- 111	189
विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मा	--- 19	43
विधेयमीप्सितार्थाङ्गं	--- 113	191
विरूपकार्यारम्भाय	--- 53	99
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं	--- 13	28
”	--- 32	65
”	--- 55	102
”	--- 70	122
”	--- 74	131
”	--- 77	136
”	--- 82	141
”	--- 90	150
”	--- 94	154
”	--- 97	161
विवक्षा चाविवक्षा च	--- 35	72
विशुद्धिसंक्लेशाङ्गं चेत्	--- 95	155
शुद्ध्यशुद्धी पुनः शक्ती	--- 100	165
शेषभङ्गाश्च नेतव्या	--- 20	44
संज्ञासंख्याविशेषाच्च	--- 72	123
स त्वमेवासि निर्दोषो	--- 6	13
सत्सामान्यात्तु सर्वैक्यं	--- 34	69
सदात्मना च भिन्नं चेत्	--- 30	62
सदेव सर्वं को नेच्छेत्	--- 15	36
सधर्मणैव साध्यस्य	--- 106	179
संतानः समुदायश्च	--- 29	61
सर्वथाऽनभिसम्बन्धः	--- 66	118

कारिका का प्रथम चरण	--- Verse No.	Page
सर्वात्मकं तदेकं स्यात्	--- 11	26
सर्वान्ताश्चेदवक्तव्या-	--- 49	94
साध्यसाधनविज्ञप्तेः	--- 80	139
सामान्यवाग्विशेषे चेत्	--- 112	190
सामान्यं समवायश्च	--- 65	116
सामान्यार्था गिरोऽन्येषां	--- 31	63
सिद्धं चेद्धेतुतः सर्वं	--- 76	134
सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः	--- 5	10
स्कन्धसंततयश्चैव	--- 54	100
स्याद्वादकेवलज्ञाने	--- 105	178
स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्त-	--- 104	175
हिनस्त्यनभिसंधात्	--- 51	96
हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेद्	--- 26	57



GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION


<i>Devanāgarī</i>	<i>IAST*</i>	<i>Devanāgarī</i>	<i>IAST</i>	<i>Devanāgarī</i>	<i>IAST</i>
अ	<i>a</i>	घ	<i>gha</i>	प	<i>pa</i>
आ	<i>ā</i>	ङ	<i>ṅa</i>	फ	<i>pha</i>
इ	<i>i</i>	च	<i>ca</i>	ब	<i>ba</i>
ई	<i>ī</i>	छ	<i>cha</i>	भ	<i>bha</i>
उ	<i>u</i>	ज	<i>ja</i>	म	<i>ma</i>
ऊ	<i>ū</i>	झ	<i>jha</i>	य	<i>ya</i>
ए	<i>e</i>	ञ	<i>ña</i>	र	<i>ra</i>
ऐ	<i>ai</i>	ट	<i>ṭa</i>	ल	<i>la</i>
ओ	<i>o</i>	ठ	<i>ṭha</i>	व	<i>va</i>
औ	<i>au</i>	ड	<i>ḍa</i>	श	<i>śa</i>
ऋ	<i>ṛ</i>	ढ	<i>ḍha</i>	ष	<i>ṣa</i>
ॠ	<i>ṝ</i>	ण	<i>ṇa</i>	स	<i>sa</i>
अं	<i>ṁ</i>	त	<i>ta</i>	ह	<i>ha</i>
अः	<i>ḥ</i>	थ	<i>tha</i>	क्ष	<i>kṣa</i>
क	<i>ka</i>	द	<i>da</i>	त्र	<i>tra</i>
ख	<i>kha</i>	ध	<i>dha</i>	ज्ञ	<i>jña</i>
ग	<i>ga</i>	न	<i>na</i>	श्र	<i>śra</i>

*IAST: *International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration*




Sacred Jaina Texts Edited and Translated by Vijay K. Jain

Shri Amritachandra Suri's
Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya




Rs. 350/-

Ācārya Pūjyapāda's
Iṣṭopadeśa




Rs. 450/-

Ācārya Samantabhadra's
Svayambhūstotra




Rs. 500/-

Ācārya Samantabhadra's
**Ratnakaraṇḍaka-
śrāvakaścāra**




Rs. 500/-

Ācārya Pūjyapāda's
Samādhitāntram




Rs. 600/-

Ācārya Kundakunda's
Pravacanasāra




Rs. 600/-

Ācārya Umāsvāmī's
**Tattvārthasūtra –
With Sarvārthasiddhi**




Rs. 750/-

Ācārya Kundakunda's
Niyamasāra




Rs. 600/-

Ācārya Guṇabhadra's
Ātmānūsāsana




Rs. 600/-

Ācārya Kundakunda's
Pañcāstikāya-saṅgraha




Rs. 750/-

आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित
युक्त्यनुशासन




Rs. 500/-

आचार्य समन्तभद्र विरचित
स्तुतिविद्या




Rs. 500/-

दिगम्बराचार्य विशुद्धसागर
विरचित सत्यार्थ-बोध




Rs. 600/-

Ācārya Māṅikyanandi's
Parīkṣāṃukha Sūtra




Rs. 800/-

Ācārya Kundakunda's
Bārasa Aṇuvekkhā




Rs. 800/-

Ācārya Pūjyapāda's
Bhakti Saṃgraha




Rs. 600/-

Ācārya Kundakunda's
Samayasāra
(Second Edition)




Rs. 800/-

Ācārya (Muni) Nemichandra's
Dravyasaṃgraha
(Second Edition)




Rs. 800/-

Ācārya Mānatuṅga's
Bhaktāmara Stotra




Rs. 250/-

Ācārya Kundakunda's
Rayaṇasāra




Rs. 750/-

Ācārya Kumudacandra's
Kalyāṇamandira Stotra




Rs. 250/-

Ācārya Devasena's
Ālāpa Paddhati




Rs. 750/-

Ācārya Vādirāja's
Ekibhāva Stotra



Rs. 250/-

Ācārya Samantabhadra's
Āptamimāṃsā
(Second Edition)




Rs. 800/-

ORDERING INSTRUCTIONS

WhatsApp:

9412057845 (Mrs. Sonal Jain Chhabra); 8923114988 (Ms. Malika Jain)

...‘आप्तमीमांसा’ आन्वीचिकी विद्या का महान् ग्रन्थ है। आचार्य भगवन्त समन्तभद्र स्वामी ने इस ग्रन्थराज में विश्व-तत्त्व का सार भर दिया है। सम्प्रति काल में ऐसा अन्य कोई ग्रन्थ पृथ्वी पर उपलब्ध नहीं है, जो न्याय विद्या से पूर्ण हो।



ऐसे महा-श्रुतोपयोगी के रत्नों की महिमा को समझने वाले तत्त्व-मनीषी श्रुतामृत पयोधर के पिपासु, भव्यवर मुमुक्षु जिन्होंने आयु के प्रत्येक निषेक को माँ वागीश्वरी के आँचल-पान में लगाया है, ऐसे माँ भारती के सपूत विद्वान् विजय कुमार जी जैन (देहरादून) ने अहिन्दी-भाषी भव्यों के उपकार हेतु विश्व अध्येताओं के हितार्थ विशद व्याख्या के साथ ‘आप्तमीमांसा’ का अंग्रेजी भाषा में अनुवाद कर श्रेष्ठ कार्य किया है। इस पुरुषार्थ-साध्य कार्य के लिए मंगलाशीष है। आप इसी प्रकार से श्रुतोदधि में निमग्न रहें। आगम-कोश को वर्धमान करते रहें।

- दिगम्बराचार्य विशुद्धसागर मुनि

Rs. 800/-



विकल्प

Vikalp Printers

ISBN 978-93-341-6598-2



9 789334 165982 >