Editor
Dr. Shriprakash Pandey
Associate Editors
Dr. Om Prakash Singh    Dr. Sanjay Kumar Singh

Parshwanath Vidyapeeth, Varanasi
(Established: 1937)
(Recognized by B. H. U. as an External Research Centre)
Address:
I T I Road, P.O., B. H. U., Varanasi 221005
Email: pvpvaranasi@gmail.com
Website: www.pv-edu.org
Phone: 0542-2575890
Mob: 9936179817
ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. Shugan C. Jain  
New Delhi

Prof. Cromwell Crawford  
Univ. of Hawaii

Prof. Anne Vallely  
Univ. of Ottawa, Canada

Prof. Peter Flugel  
SOAS, London

Prof. Christopher Key Chapple  
Univ. of Loyola, USA

Prof. Ramjee Singh  
Bheckhampur, Bhagalpur

Prof. Sagarmal Jain  
Prachya Vidyapeeth, Shajapur

Prof. K.C. Sogani  
Chittaranjan Marg, Jaipur

Prof. D.N. Bhargava  
Bani Park, Jaipur

Prof. Prakash C. Jain  
JNU, Delhi

EDITORIAL BOARD

Prof. M.N.P. Tiwari  
B.H.U., Varanasi

Prof. K. K. Jain  
B.H.U., Varanasi

Dr. A.P. Singh, Ballia

Prof. Gary L. Francione  
New York, USA

Prof. Viney Jain, Gurgaon

Dr. Rahul K. Singh  
Pratapgarh

ISSN: 0972-1002

SUBSCRIPTION

Annual Membership  
For Institutions: Rs. 500.00, $ 50  
For Individuals: Rs. 300.00, $ 30

Life Membership  
For Institutions: Rs. 5000.00, $ 250  
For Individuals: Rs. 2000.00, $ 150

Per Issue Price: Rs. 150.00, $ 15

Membership fee & articles can be sent in favour of  
Parshwanath Vidyapeeth, I.T.I. Road, Kairaundi, Varanasi-5

PUBLISHED BY

Shri Indrabhooti Barar, for Parshwanath Vidyapeeth, I. T. I. Road,  
Kairaundi, Varanasi 221005, Ph. 0542-2575890

Email: pvpvaranasi@gmail.com

Theme of the Cover:

Bhaktāmara-stotra, verse-15 based picture, Yantra & Mantra

With courtesy: Sacitra Bhaktāmara-stotra by Shri Sushil Suri

NOTE: The facts and views expressed in the Journal are those of authors only. (पत्रिका में अक्षरश: तथ्य और विचार लेखक के अपने हैं।)

Printed by: Mahaveer Press, Bhelupur, Varanasi
 Contents

1. मोक्ष के कारणों का आच्छादक कर्म
   प्रो. कमलेश कुमार जैन
   1-6

2. जैन आचरणों पर विचारित संस्कृत व्याख्या-साहित्य
   डॉ. धर्मचन्द्र जैन
   7-30

3. कवितावतन पालि व्याकरण की पाणिनीय
   व्याकरण से तुलना
   डॉ. धेता जैन
   31-39

4. मध्यरा से प्राप्त जैन प्रतिमाओं पर उत्कीर्ण दान लेख
   डॉ. लोली पटवा
   40-51

5. आचारांग सूत्र में आध्यात्म की अवधारणा
   डॉ. अर्हिन्त कुमार जैन
   52-60

6. The Vindication of Tarka as a Pramāṇa
   in Jaina Philosophy
   Arvind Jaiswal
   61-68

7. Rituals and Healing: the Case of the
   Jaina Community in Medieval India
   Dr. Shalin Jain
   69-87

8. Jāpa (Recitation) and its Relevance
   Naveen Parekh
   88-101

विद्यापीठ के प्रांगण में
102-107
जैन जगत्
108-109
पुस्तक समीक्षा
110-114
Our Contributors

1. Prof. Kamlesh Kumar Jain
   Former Head, Dept. of Jaina & Baudhh Darshan, SVDV, BHU

2. Dr. Dharm Chand Jain
   Retd. Professor, Dept. of Sanskrit, JNVU, Jodhpur, Rajasthan

3. Dr. Shweta Jain
   PDF Fellow, Dept. of Sanskrit, JNVU, Jodhpur, Rajasthan

4. Dolly Patwa
   Research Scholar, Dept. of A.I.H.C. & Archaeology, BHU,

5. Dr. Arihant Kumar Jain
   Senior Fellow, Dept. of Philosophy, Mumbai University

6. Arvind Jaiswal
   Research Scholar, Dept. of Philosophy & Religion, BHU

7. Dr. Shalin Jain
   Professor, Dept. of History, Guru Tegh Bahadur Khalsa Col-
   lege, University of Delhi, Delhi

8. Sh. Naveen Parekh
   502, Ajaramar Enclave, Plot N. 207, Road N. 14, Jawahar
   Nagar, Goregaon (W), Mumbai-400062
The Vindication of Tarka as a Pramāṇa in Jaina Philosophy

-Arvind Jaiswal

Introduction:

Tarka in Indian Philosophy is denigrated, following Nyāya School and other orthodox schools as well, as either not being a distinct valid instrument of knowledge, or not being an instrument of valid knowledge at all. It is either pushed in the domain of some other valid instrument of knowledge or regarded as an invalid or invalid instrument of knowledge. To be clear, it is not that everywhere, in Indian Philosophy, the sources of knowledge and the knowledge obtained through those sources are distinct. Buddhist Logicians, namely Dharmakīrti etc., are reluctant to separate the means of knowledge from the knowledge itself, whereas Naïyāyikas preferably proclaim this separation in talking about anumāna (inference) as the means to attain anumiti (that is the name for inferential cognition, it is privileged to be a type of knowledge), also when distinguish upamāna from upamiti. Likewise, it cannot be said as a rule that when tarka is regarded invalid, it is done so always as invalid knowledge, or always as invalid instrument of knowledge. Dharmakīrti in his Nibandhāvalī and Pramāṇavārttika (1.35 & 1.40) asks 'Jainas what is the need to accept another separate means to obtain knowledge of that what can be obtained by inference'.

We see that Buddhists are ruling out tarka to be a separate valid instrument of knowledge and they are not doing the same with what we come to know through that instrument. Together with that, Buddhists do not separate the instrument of knowledge from that what we know through that instrument. The discrepancy is worth noting here, as we shall see later on in this paper more explicitly, at this point in Buddhist logician's view when they profess that 1) that what is believed by others to be known through tarka is something valid as knowledge, but not tarka as valid instrument of knowledge, and 2) knowledge
and the instrument of knowledge are not different from each other. Buddhists resolution, we can dare to say, to such an observation might go like this: although the valid knowledge is not distinct from the valid means of knowledge but *tarka* is an invalid means of knowledge for it has no object of its own to know, given that all the objects, only two in Buddhist logicians view: *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e. unique particulars, and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, i.e. conceptual universals, are already exhausted by perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) respectively. Buddhists would be ready to accept *tarka* as a separate instrument of knowledge only if it has an object of its own. This commitment of Buddhists is widely known as their *pramāṇa-vyavasthāvāda*, that each *pramāṇa* has to have their own distinct *prameya*, i.e. the object of knowledge. Besides, Buddhists condemnation of *tarka* as an invalid instrument of knowledge, *Naiyāyikās* take it to be invalid cognition (*apramāṇa*). Howsoever one discards the validity of *Tarka*, as a valid instrument of valid cognition, i.e. knowledge, or as valid cognition itself, Jaina thinkers have endeavoured to re-establish its validity, as we shall see in this paper how their arguments advance. In order to do that, Jaina thinkers have come up, first, with what they think to be the nature of *tarka*, thereafter they call on the conceptions of *tarka* put forward by the thinkers of other main schools of classical Indian philosophy and criticise those conceptions of *tarka*, and thereby showed that *tarka* is vindicated in being a *pramāṇa*. This paper takes the same course as well.

**Nature of Tarka according to Jaina Thinkers**

Primarily, Jainas define that *Tarka* is *vyāpti-jñāna*. *Vyāpti* is such a special kind of relation between *sādhya* and *sādhana* which does not tolerate any promiscuity, in Sanskrit, *vyabhicāra*, in the relation and which instates a sense of *gamya*, i.e., where one can reach to, and *gamaka*, i.e., what can lead one to somewhere, in and between them. Simply put, the fact that two things, say, @ and #, are related to each other in a fashion which enables one thing, let it be @, to be reached through the other, #, and that their relativity in the aforesaid
fashion nowhere, as well as at no point of time, fails is *vyāpti*. For instance, a relation of smoke and fire: here, smoke is *gamaka* and fire is *gamyā* -in the sense that wherever smoke is present, fire is present as well, and wherever fire is not present, smoke also is absent there- but not *vice versa*. There is no irregularity in the relation when fire, i.e., the *gamyā* in this case, is regarded as something that can be reached through smoke, i.e., the *gamaka*, whereas if smoke is taken to be *gamyā* through fire taken as *gamaka* will also do, but not always. Here comes the role of *tarka*, it seizes the universal *gamyā* and *gamaka* relation.

By the employment of *tarka*, *vyāpti*'s virtue of failing nowhere and at no point of time is captured; by no other means, it is emphasised by Jainas, one can capture this feature of the relation between two things whatsoever. For instance, understanding of (a) Smoke, at any time and at any place, is produced by fire, or, (b) Smoke, at any time and at any place, is not produced by non-fire, can arise only through reasoning. The reason to disregard perception here is that through perception only few instances of some phenomenon are known, not all. It is practically impossible for one person, and theoretically implausible for all persons as well, to perceive all smoke-fire instances of even the present, let alone instances of past and of future. Thus, there is no question of universality of *gamyā-gamaka* relationship being known through perception. If memory and recollections are added to perception, even then it is not possible for memory and recollection are restricted to some or other time and space, as is the case with perception. All memories, all recollections and all perceptions of all the persons living or dead on the earth taken together will not suffice to make universality claim that is being made through *tarka*, for it is plain and simple that it cannot include the instances that will come into being in the future. Likewise, if *anumāna* is said to be the means through which we capture the universality of this relation then it will be but commission of *anyonyāśraya doṣa*, for
anumāna itself depends on vyāpti. Hence, it is to be said that tarka is a separate pramāṇa for the knowledge of vyāpti.\(^6\)

Obviously, if realism granted to be fine, a relation and the knowledge of that relation are distinct. Thereby, vyāpti and vyāpti-jñāna are required to be taken as different from each other in the sense that the first is ontological and the latter is epistemological. Noteworthy is that vyāpti-jñāna, not vyāpti, is being called tarka, in the definition above. Tarka, in this manner, is knowledge concerning universal relations. It is altogether a different issue, and so this is left undiscussed here, whether those universal relations hold between ideas or things. For our purpose, it will do if we grant both that it holds between things and that between the distinct knowledge tokens of those things as well. If that sort of universal relation holds and its characteristic universalis is to be captured qua universalis, then one has to rely on tarka as a pramāṇa, as Jainas contend.

To make the concept of tarka more comprehensive, it is expanded by defining it as uhastarkaḥ. To be more precise, sakaladesakālādyavacchedena sādhyasādhanabhāvādivicaya uhastarkaḥ.\(^7\) It translates, an assertion delimited by all spaces and times of some things being in a state of “provable-by” and “proof-of” etc is tarka. Thus, apart from the above example of smoke-fire relation, the assertions such as “the word ‘pot’ signifies a pot”, “A pot is signified by the word ‘pot’, and so on and so forth exemplify tarka.\(^8\) This signifier-of and signified-by relation is included, with the introduction of “etc” in the definition of tarka, in the set of those objects which are known through tarka. Akin to vyāpti’s case, such thinking also that a specific word is a signifier-of all the instances of a specific thing at all places and times is impossible to be ascertained unless reasoning is done to reach at that thinking. Same is to be said of some specific thing being signified-by some specific word at all places and times.

For Jainas, it is not that vyāpti, which comprises of co-located-ness of one thing with another that pervades the first, is by its own nature graspable from the repeated observations in agreement and no
different observation than that of agreement. Also, it is not possible, according to Jaina's view, that सामान्य-लक्षणा-प्रत्येकति can seize all the instances of that which is in the state of provable-by and proof-of etc with something. Because, "I am reasoning out," it is proved in our experience, to seize all the instances of that which is in the state of provable-by and proof-of with something. Thus, it implies that तर्क, i.e., suppositional reasoning, only and nothing else helps us grasp व्याप्ति. Further, envisaging सामान्य-लक्षणा-प्रत्येकति lacks प्रमाण as well, for without assertion, even by known universals all particulars are not seized. Along with that, signified-by and signifier-of state as well is conceived by तर्क, for it is the state that pertains to all instances, not merely universality in relation, of a word and its meaning. Here, in rejecting that सामान्य-लक्षणा-प्रत्येकति can provide us with the knowledge required to establish universality acclaimed in the व्याप्ति etc relations, it is evident that Jainas are reluctant to take this knowledge to be a knowledge of universal relations of ideas only, in that case सामान्य-लक्षणा-प्रत्येकति could have done the job and तर्क was not needed.

Buddhists understanding of Tarka criticised

Buddhists opine that because व्याप्ति is of the nature of concepts and it takes place after the completion of perception, तर्क is not प्रमाण in that. Jainas defy this saying that although it takes place that way and is of that nature, it is not grasping, in the manner of seizing all the instances of it, in the percepts accumulated in perception. Hence, as they consider a concept universal an object of knowledge known through अनुमान प्रमाण, this type of conceptual knowledge also must have a प्रमाण to be known through. Buddhists traditionally accept प्रामाणय, for the practical purposes, of that प्रमाण which, as in the case of अनुमान, presents to us even अवस्थ, so they should not have any difficulty in positing a conceptual व्याप्ति relation as the object of तर्क प्रमाण.

Furthermore, talking about the grasp of व्याप्ति through प्रत्याक्ष-अनुपालभा-पञ्चक is spurious. The mechanism of प्रत्याक्ष-
anupalambha-paṅcaka goes like this: firstly, one perception of absence of smoke where smoke and fire both are absent; thereafter, two positive perception of smoke where fire is being posited; and later on, two perceptions of the absence of smoke where fire is not posited. These fivefold perceptions are supposed to be the process through which vyāpti is grasped. Jainas discard it for perception does, as perception functions sannihitamātravicayatayā (by making object only to that which is connected immediately to it at the moment) and avicārakatayā (without consideration in thought), not include the characteristic of conceiving place etc mediated all instances of a thing.¹⁴

Naiyāyika’s underestimation of tarka criticised

Apart from the aforementioned sāmanya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti criticism, Nyāya thinking about tarka is more directly in what follows. Naiyāyikas define tarka as vyāpyasyāhāryāropeṇa vyāpakasyāhārya-prasāñjanam tarkah. It means, by opted imposition of that which is to be pervaded, opted introduction of that which pervades the previously said thing is called tarka. It is believed to be auxiliary to some other pramāṇa, it plays its role when arises any doubt antithetic to the content that is known through other pramāṇa, and by virtue of eliminating of that doubt, tarka thus is in conformity with that pramāṇa only. In Naiyāyikas view, “Paradigmatically, tarka is called for in order to establish a presumption of truth in favour of one thesis that has putative source support against a rival thesis that also has putative source support, a thesis and a counter-thesis both backed up by, for example, apparently genuine inferences (the most common situation) or by competing perceptual or testimonial evidence.”¹⁵ For them, it is not a pramāṇa in its own right. Jainas reject this saying that tarka which grasps vyāpti is a pramāṇa in its own right for it has sva-para-vyayasāyitva, tarka-s accepted by others are employed somehow in one’s own discourse as well, it is useful in dissolving opted doubt which culminates into viparyaya, or it can independently be used to dissolve doubt itself.¹⁶ Thus, serving these purposes and that too independently sometimes, it is not only auxiliary to some pramāṇa, rather it is a pramāṇa in its own right.
Discussion

Scholars have tried to show circularity in the *tarka* articulated by Jaina thinkers. But any such accusation can be dismissed pointing out that it is either confined to some specific notion of *tarka* of a particular Jaina thinker or it is generated out of misapprehension of the notion of *tarka*. Another discussion can be started over the issue: whether or not *tarka* is a sentence driven reasoning; or, if it is, how far can we go in formulating a theory of *tarka* sentences, not only as per the Nyāya understanding of it but also of others as well, including Jainas. Jaina notion of *tarka* can also be utilized to show that it is not just a cognitive validator, as Naiyāyikas think it to be, but it is verily a valid, or at least a valid instrument of cognition.

Notes and References:


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. p. 75

5. Ibid. p. 76

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.


♠ ♦ ♦
Sri dha-hy hrih aham bhunyo dasapurop.

Mantra - Hail to the Bhagavati, the Gauda, the Pure, the Brahmukala, the Most Powerful, and the Most Desirable.

Pravachan - Practice and cultivate, and the abundance of fruiting will be gained.

Strengthening chastity and increasing prestige and prosperity.

Parshwanath Vidyapeeth, I.T.I. Road, Karaundi, Varanasi-5