CHAPTER 25
ALLOCATING OUR RESOURCES

In an effort to adjust our resources to our needs, we have to consider that their requirements are not only defined quantitatively. Our wishes also require a certain quality of means. Although there may be great variety of means, we assemble them from the five basic types of qualities that appear to us as perceptive, rational, and emotional mind, the physical world external to the first three categories, and time.

Nonmental physical resources represent the most intuitive definition of a resource because they encompass aspects of our body and other objects and their demeanor. They possess an obviously physical quality because we can perceive them with our senses. We can detect that these senses are being impressed by objects and events that exist outside our senses because these impressions change if we change our position relative to our environment or items in it change their positions relative to us. Our concept of a physical quality of these objects and events draws on our observations that external objects and events themselves or objects and events they emit or refract collide with receptors in our body that forward information about that impact. Our capability to receive and process these impressions makes us conclude that the corresponding facilities of our body must be physical as well. Additionally, the embeddedness of these facilities in our body and our ability to register impressions originating in or refracted by our body in the manner in which we register other objects or events convince us that our body is physical. The physical quality of sources independent from our senses is confirmed by their independent interaction and our ability to allocate them through our body or physical instruments with results that we can again detect. Finally, the separate existence of objects and events is confirmed by our ability to comprehensively classify them into components with certain properties that make them statically appear as objects and dynamically as events, and that we can detect these classifications, objects, and events in a variety of combinations that have occurred and continue to happen without our perception. Physical objects and events become resources if they by our willful shaping or coincidentally correspond with our requirements.

We may also freely acknowledge the resource character of time even if we have difficulties understanding what it exactly is. Similar to how our senses register impressions of nonmental physical resources, we can register time with the participation of our senses. But our registration of time seems to be indirect. We notice it by relating sensory impressions of change and of persistence to one another. Hence, there

appears to be a connection to nonmental physical objects and events. Even if we do not ruminate deeply about time, we may still appreciate that the interaction and allocation of objects and events occur in time and that the deprivation, pursuit, and fulfillment of our needs are part of that scheme. Many of our needs will only go without satisfaction for a limited time before declining to significant levels of deprivation. The fulfillment of our needs deteriorates and is deteriorated in time. The resources we require for the fulfillment of our needs may involve lead times to accrue or transmute into means. We also recognize that our time will become eventually depleted with the permanent exhaustion or a prior destruction of our body and that this only allows us limited opportunities to experience satisfaction. We begin our existence with an unknown, restricted allotment of time at our disposal to build and enjoy fulfillment. All our activities, inactivities, and occurrences of fulfillment deduct from that account. Some of our behavior and technology may add time. We might someday overcome death as a final certainty. However, until then, our understanding of the absolute limitation of time and the seeming attachment of our existence to it make it a particularly precious resource. Even if we could overcome death, the unidirectional current of time and the frequently irremediable change that arises in our exposure to it afford it a momentous uniqueness that make it a valuable resource for periods in which we can prevent undesired change. Then again, the changes that time entails can be favorable. In similarity to other nonmental resources, time is not necessarily our friend. It can encumber our pursuits by its duration or dissipation and only becomes a resource if its application can serve our needs.

Given the indispensable function of our perceptive facilities in our relation to nonmental physical objects and events, we may have no problems crediting related perceptive facilities as a resource category. They are responsible for providing us with information that permits us to pursue our needs in relation to the obviously physical world and time. Further, the quality of our rational mind as a resource seems to be beyond doubt. It correlates sensory impressions to reflect and reconstruct the obviously physical world. It can categorize that world into typical substances and deduce laws from their conduct. It can apply that knowledge to form representative constructs that we can impose to shape our world with foresight. All these qualities allow us to devise means and sequences that can advance the fulfillment of our needs. The full import of our emotional resources may not be as readily recognizable. We may value the vital function of emotional traits as instinctive mechanisms that convert and guide perceptions into motivations. But that seems to represent the governing mechanism of our

needs. Counting them as their own resource might appear foolish to us. In addition, emotions accompanying the mechanisms of our needs might not look like a resource to us. Particularly happiness appears to be more in the nature of a result attached to the fulfillment of needs that we may attain if we apply all other resources well. Happiness appears to be a measurement by which we can determine the effectiveness and efficiency of means and sequences in addressing our needs. The four types of resources we associate with physical phenomena are eventually transfigured through our pursuits into the physical fulfillment of one or more needs, surplus resources, refuse, and happiness. The fulfillment of needs may feed into the fulfillment of other needs. Surplus resources can provide useful means for future pursuits of the same or of other needs. Even refuse may be usable to some extent and re-enter pursuits as means. It may be more difficult to see how happiness should be a resource. As an emotionally rewarding byproduct of a scheme that pursues survival and thriving, it seems to be without substance. However, its enticement still makes it an essential resource.

Satisfaction during and at the end of a pursuit indicates that we are meeting our needs. But happiness seems to provide more than orientation. It seems to give us the inspiration and the energy to engage in pursuits if we incur happiness during such pursuits. Moreover, succeeding and completed pursuits seem to pass such inspiration and energy to other pursuits. Although happiness fades quickly intrinsically and seems to be lost by deprivation, an important aspect of it seems to survive. Happiness over the advancement and fulfillment of needs appears to produce emotional resources that we can reinvest into subsequent steps of the same or other pursuits. Conversely, we can observe that unhappiness caused by temporary frustration and ultimate inability to fulfill a need detracts from our emotional inspiration and energy. It seems to consume emotional resources. While we may draw encouragement and discouragement from awareness of past and present successes and failures, the production of emotional resources or their diminishment is not necessarily predicated solely upon such incidences. We also generate them from our anticipation of fulfillment or failure by extrapolating indicators without any precedent. They may even spring from unfounded assumptions about happiness that we hope to attain or unhappiness we fear to suffer. These may arise from a variety of perpetual or temporary internal and external circumstances. A high level of emotional resources exemplifies itself in sentiments of readiness, confidence, and resilience that we may equate or associate with happiness. A low level is represented in moods of being overwhelmed, discouraged, and feeble that we may identify with unhappiness.

These observations may cause us to group emotional resources and happiness as intimately related or identical on one side and the lack of emotional resources and unhappiness on the other. However, emotional resources appear to move in more complicated maneuvers than these characterizations indicate. The pain and fear of deprivation are significant forces that motivate us to seek fulfillment of our needs. Like their complements of pleasure and desire, they constitute more than indicators. Further, the pain and fear resulting from frustrations in our pursuits can serve as a powerful resource to invigorate pursuits. The emotional resources that accrue with an awareness of deprivation are of the same type as those that accrue from experiences or anticipation of happiness with advancement or fulfillment because they energize us take action on behalf of needs. Different appearances of positive and negative motivations arise because they derive from opposing sides in the spectrum of pain and pleasure. Although that distinction in sourcing makes them appear to be directed toward differing objectives, their distinctions in repudiation of deprivation and attraction to fulfillment complement each other. Being the defining constituents of our pain-pleasure mechanism, they are parts of the same movement.

In a setting of regular fluctuations in the fulfillment level of our traits and where our pursuits are unobstructed, the emotional energy from pain and fear appears to readily combine with the energy we derive from happiness and desire. But that appears to change when these parameters become violated. While we generate the same type of energy, its positive direction then seems to be disturbed because it is directed toward fighting detrimental settings that drain our energy. We may thus find ourselves in a potentially confusing situation where setbacks and the frustration of a pursuit may drain and cause the generation of emotional resources. These contradictory forces may overlap in part. The loss of emotional resources in an unsuccessful pursuit might for some time exceed the emotional resources we gain from our frustration until the rising pressures of a prolonged or otherwise intensifying deprivation catch up. Yet these tendencies may generally accrue in separate phases. When we initially incur obstructions in our pursuits and suffer losses of emotional resources, we might try again or change strategies. If these repeated or revised attempts also fail, or if we find no alternatives worth trying, our emotional energy may be further reduced. We may for some time be perplexed and resign. We may even invest energy to maintain that resignation because we fear remaining unsuccessful in subsequent trials and that we would waste more emotional and other resources. However, as our deprivation and the related pain as well as fears in dependent traits rise, our increasing desper-

ation gives us motivational strength again. It may motivate us to keep trying or even to rally in an extraordinary effort. But if our pursuit still remains obstructed, we may increasingly become disposed to grasp at more remote possibilities for progress. Thus, while this newfound motivation is directed toward satisfaction, it might be differently articulated. If constructive sequences do not work, we may seek to free ourselves from this impasse. If we fail to resolve it constructively, we may seek to weaken or destroy its causes. If we misidentify its causes or are prevented from addressing them, we may attack other aspects to vent our energy. Any of these choices may endanger our pursuits not only as the result of our immediate actions but also as a result of reactions and reverberating consequences that such aggression entails.

Our apprehension of the unpredictable and possibly destructive ways that may be associated with the generation of emotional energy from frustration may additionally prompt us to avoid frustrating situations. The threat of impulsive reactions that are not in the interest of other traits and that might not even be in the interest of the trait that draws energy from frustration may approach, match, or even exceed the endangerment from a continuing nonfulfillment of that trait. We must therefore keep as much control as we can within our council of traits over traits that develop such energy. Where we cannot avoid the frustration of traits, we must attempt to direct this energy in ways that optimize our overall happiness. These may include carefully managed activities that, although they are initially destructive can be vindicated as necessary or helpful parts in a strategy that is ultimately constructive. Where that is not possible, we may see no other remedy than the suppression of a trait that would generate emotional energy from frustration, its distraction into less harmless avenues, or possibly the adjustment of the trait if its frustration is chronic. Yet none of these avenues might be feasible, or they may pose at least as much of a threat to our happiness as the problem they are aimed to solve. In addition, if they do not succeed, the pent-up energy we sought to address may only break free more aggressively and be subject to less control by our council of traits. Preventing frustration might therefore represent our only option to avoid excessive harm. Beyond considerations that make the support and protection of traits advisable because their fulfillment benefits other traits, we must attempt to keep traits from falling into frustration to prevent them from accruing ill-advised destructive tendencies and the motivational strength to implement them. This is the reason we have to keep detrimental traits that we cannot permanently address reasonably satisfied. But similar reasoning applies to constructive traits because of their potential to become detrimental.

Frustrations of our traits may not have to be total to misguide us. We may accumulate ample frustrations from partial denials of our pursuits. These may generate enough emotional energy to imprudently attack these denials even if the overall balance of a pursuit is positive. A mere reduction in the flow of emotional energy by unrewarded pursuits may trigger such mechanisms. Even in the course of an overall successful pursuit, we may suffer setbacks or necessary losses that are not contemporarily balanced by positive experiences of advancement. We may also consider the mere weakening of our emotional energy due to fear of negative occurrences as unhappy events. A further drain may occur if the results do not meet our expectations regardless of how unrealistic these might be. This makes the threat of misguided emotional energy ubiquitous. But we may still find a pursuit meaningful if we derive more constructively usable emotional resources from it overall than the associated frustrations destroy. There does not seem to be a formula to tell us whether this is the case. Even nominally successful pursuits might dispossess us of more emotional resources than they yield. Moreover, pursuits that are successful might entail implications for the initially achieved objective or for other pursuits that may turn our overall balance of emotional resources negative. The grounds for a reduction of emotional resources may include the negative reactions of other individuals to infringements of their pursuits by us or our failure to protect or support them against other infringements. An additional urgency may arise from consequential deprivation of other traits during or resulting from our attempts to reach or maintain objectives. Traits that might claim to achieve better success with the investment of resources may develop their own frustrations. These may escalate because traits whose pursuit offers currently more resistance might induce us to concentrate resources on them and to discount our obligation to attribute resources in an equitable way that enables the pursuit of all participating traits or of as many of them as possible in their relative priority. Under the influence of all these factors, even if we should be successful in a pursuit, the gains of emotional resources from attainment and the generation of emotional resources from failure that we may be able to direct toward constructive purposes might not suffice. They might not compensate us for losses of emotional resources from frustrations in our pursuit of that trait or of other traits and the damage that misdirected emotional resources may cause.

Emotional energy balances of traits may be affected by the positive or negative transfer of emotional energy among traits. The different types of pain and pleasure that are attached to our needs may not permit a direct transfer of these resources among needs. This may ap-

pear to make each trait essentially responsible for maintaining its own balance of emotional resources. But the emotional resources and deficits generated in the pursuit of one need still seem to indirectly affect the existence and the availability of emotional resources in the pursuit of other needs. The energy state of traits may sway the anticipation by other traits that are affected by the fulfillment state of these traits regarding their own chances for fulfillment. Beyond these conditions of dependence, incidents or anticipations of fulfillment or failure regarding traits can afford us encouragement or discouragement that we can also succeed or might fail in the pursuit of other traits as a matter of judging our capacity or our ability to apply that capacity. We may also take comfort in the notion that other needs are or might be fulfilled and that the fulfillment of these other needs allows us to concentrate on needs whose satisfaction remains lacking, or we may be concerned that such containment is lacking and that our efforts will be scattered. The energy state of traits may then damage or lift our views regarding the viability of other pursuits or our outlook with regard to individual or collective survival and thriving generally. Achieving and maintaining the highest possible level of emotional energy may be regarded as a composite need constituted by the desire of each need for optimized emotional resources. We generate happiness from collecting emotional energy because it optimizes our motivation to move forward.

Emotional energy can only be generated because of the generation of pain and pleasure and their anticipations of fear and desire by parts of our emotional mind and the perception by other parts of our emotional mind that translate these emotions into instructions. The related perceptive traits are inseparably part of our emotional mind. Further, perceptive facilities that register, translate, and transport signals of our body, including of our mind, to facilities in our emotional mind that generate pain, pleasure, fear, and desire from them are intimately related to these emotions. They are so different from the representative function of perceptive traits pertaining to obviously physical phenomena that we must classify them as emotional resources.

Having thus verified the full extent of emotions as a resource, we may turn to explore the relationship of the five types of resources. Although these categories may appear to stand for different qualities, we may place some of them in groups according to more fundamental criteria. We may refer to rational, emotional, and perceptive resources combined and singularly as mental resources. Mental resources might not only reside within us but also in naturally occurring or manufactured sources external to us. We might regard our mental resources as nonphysical and the more obviously physical world, including time, as

physical. But we may soon associate the objectively verifiable parts of our perceptive mind and of our rational mind with physical resources because their functions can be relatively easily confirmed as physical, move in reflection of physical concepts, and can be most readily emulated by artificial mechanisms. We may designate the enlarged group as nonemotional resources and segregate it from emotional resources because these may appear to be very different from resources we can rationalize as physical or reflective of physical phenomena. Even time may take on a mystic quality that may cause us to regard it as a nonphysical force that can affect physical aspects or even to consider it a dimension through which three-dimensional substance moves. However, when we look to the foundations of these resources, they reveal themselves as physical phenomena. We detect that our distinctions of mental from physical resources result from our limited perception and understanding of physical objects and events that represent our mind. We further acknowledge time as a function of physical resources, as a measurement of their movement relative to one another.

Despite the fundamental commonality of all five varieties of resources, we may deem their distinctions useful for managing our pursuits because they designate different aspects of physical phenomena that are challenging or impossible to transform into one another. Still, their common sourcing should make it at least possible to have them interact or to find a common basis for comparing them. The means on which we draw to fulfill our needs are often a product of several or all categories of resources. At every step of a sequence, the presence and the participation of each type of resource may change. That is not only due to interaction and transformation but also because resources may be shed or added or steps may be combined. This may cause us to lose track of how our resources move. If we want to competently plan and implement their attribution, we must find a way of assessing and tracing them. To illustrate the resource requirements of a trait, it appears expedient to expand our list of priorities by five columns representing each type and to enter resource demands for every step adjacent to it for each trait. We may designate the result as our resource worksheet. We must juxtapose this listing of requirements with a column listing available resources of each type for each step to show whether the selected pursuit is feasible. Analyzing means into required and available types of resources permits us to correlate the demands and means of traits to arrive at a tally of their separate and their combined requirements and resources. This allows us to explore improved economy and harmonization and to find indications for the type and quantity of resources that must be developed or acquired to fulfill our needs.

The resource demands of traits may not be immediately obvious. We may have to derive them by examining the sequences of our pursuits in detail. In these sequences, steps for which we use our resources will form resources for subsequent steps in a production process by which our traits try to achieve their objectives. Production includes the identification, acquisition, allocation, transportation, storage, maintenance, and other processing of resources. If resources are invested productively, they result in higher levels of means with each step in the sequence of the same or another pursuit, although we must count them as a loss for a production stage. But not all our resources become part of higher states. Some of them will be lost along the way. We may experience losses as a consequence of several possible causes. Our resources may fall prey to interfering incidents, or we may squander them. It may be in the nature of means to decay. It may be in the nature of production processes we employ that parts of the resources invested are lost. Lost resources may become deleterious byproducts. Such byproducts may cause active interference with our pursuits, giving rise to additional losses, and their neutralization may involve the investment of additional resources. Even if byproducts are not actively noxious, they may pose an obstacle for pursuits by their presence.

Moreover, refuse may leave resources in a form or distribution that makes them impossible to use. This might not be much of a concern as long as such resources are readily available otherwise. Yet, as our production processes place more resources in such conditions, access to the resources contained in refuse may become indispensable to sustain and build our pursuits. Finding alternative access to resources of the kind bound in refuse by expanding our search or through technology may be or become impossible. In this event, the availability of the resources for our use would end. Even if resources were available from other sources or we could access the resources bound in refuse, their acquisition may be more difficult and require the investment of additional resources that might not be adequately compensated by the resulting benefits. As our pain of deprivation rises, we may view this subjectively differently. However, unless the resources that are necessary to render pertinent resources available are attainable in sufficient surplus of benefit over our investment in them and this investment is not missing in other pursuits, having to increase our investment to access resources damages us. Alternatively, we might be able to change our demand for resources by changing our production to involve different varieties or new types of resources. But if our use of these propels us into a similar bind, we can only escape the reduction and ultimate denial of involved pursuits by using resources more efficiently.

To determine the efficiency of pursuits and to develop our understanding at which junctures efficiency could be improved, we will have to adjust our accounting as it follows sequences to reflect added, changed, or diminished resources. Neither the amount nor the relative quality of resources required or available is likely to remain constant or move according to a formula as we engage in different steps. To facilitate calculations of necessary and available resources, we must address the fundamental question how we can describe resources in quantifications. We might use the measure in which a type of resource naturally impresses us. That may be relatively uncomplicated when we deal with obviously physical resources and time. Measuring our mental resources is more difficult because they do not lend themselves in the same degree to objective measurement. We may obtain a quantitative grasp of them by measuring the time our mental resources are preoccupied with a task or the amount of resources it takes to generate, maintain, or regenerate them. Yet we may have considerable difficulties accounting for all the subjects to which we dedicate perceptive, rational, and particularly our emotional facilities or the periods of our focus. Our attention may be intermittent, divided, and in part unconscious. We may pursue several needs together or our mental activities may be interwoven with external mental activities. The processes that build, uphold, and recuperate our mind seem even less traceable. This may only allow us to estimate mental resources in rough summarizations of the intensity and time which we invested or by their results.

We further meet the problem of representing resources within the same category by unifying quantitative measures. Time appears to be the only uncomplicated category in this respect. Even if we had to calculate changes in it, we could undertake this under a unifying formula. Obviously physical resources pose more of a challenge because they consist of different substances. Although these comply with general laws of logic, they are separated by their different properties and the specific laws of nature emanating from them. Hence, they are not necessarily quantitatively comparable through a common denominator. Dissolving them to a fundamental level at which they share common building blocks and organizational principles to find manageable commonalities may not be helpful for many of our pursuits. Even if we were to deal with resources at elemental levels, we may not have fully mastered their conversion to make this commonality relevant. Moreover, the obviously physical resources we use are frequently amalgamations of elements. It is therefore difficult to see how we could identify a workable common denominator for our obviously physical resources and list them as a single, unified factor. With the possible exception of

physically traceable perceptive resources, our three mental categories of resources pose an even more problematic challenge to unification in each of their categories because we have difficulties reducing them to physical occurrences. Even revealing these may not assist us much in our attempt of measurement because our perceptive, rational, and emotional resources are significantly defined by differentiated higher levels of organization. Perceptive resources are distributed into senses, emotional resources are separated into states of emotion pertaining to different traits, and rational resources are divided into extensive varieties of thoughts. The differences in the quality of the resources with which we operate within the same resource categories seem to make their categorizations as an instrument to keep track of them illusory.

Our calculations regarding required and available resources are finally encumbered by our difficulties of tracing them in the steps we take as we progress through sequences of our endeavors. Resources of the same or different type of resources convert into one another or interact to produce means with diverse qualities in different categories. Even if we could segregate every such occurrence as a parallel or a sequential step, such a dissolution of a sequence into components might overwhelm us with accounting requirements and contextual complexity. To competently plan and pursue sequences that require our direction, we have to understand the permutations of resources we have to effect. If we do not have that knowledge, we must acquire it from other sources or through testing. Still, for purposes of resource planning, it may be sufficient to combine smaller steps to sections of sequences that we can define as coherent means and to state their combined resource requirements and available resources more generally.

When we examine the sequences we derived from inquiries regarding our traits, we may recognize that resources have different origins. None of our pursuits are purely autonomous. We may obtain resources by unilateral appropriation under expenditure of resources we previously acquired or generated, by exchange in which we grant and receive resources, or by the contribution of resources and collection of rewards from a common venture with our human or nonhuman environment. The sequences we have fashioned from our impressions may already reflect such ways of origination. But where that is not the case, we have to incorporate them, possibly as alternative selections, in our sequences. Each of these three modes permits us to convert resources into others through dealings with our environment. This may solve issues of permutation among resources that we might not be able to accomplish on our own. It may also assist us in comparing different resources by the relative value ascribed to them through conversion.

Considering the conversion capabilities we find within our own resources as well as those available from our environment, we have to determine how we can attribute resources in the most efficient manner to meet our requirement of a minimal acceptable advancement for as many needs as possible. When we compare the requirements for resources among needs, we will detect that the smallest meaningful increments of pursuit for different needs will in all likelihood represent different demands regarding the quality and quantity of resources. Besides these two general criteria that define the demand for the attribution of our resources, we can detect a third criterion that references a time aspect. This aspect differs from the resource of time. It is measured by the timing of events that are necessary to secure fulfillment rather than by the amount of time that is dedicated to a pursuit.

The dissimilarities pertaining to quality, quantity, and timing of pursuit among needs are in part due to technical functions. They may be based on the objects and events with which we are working and the allocations among them that we find, create, and select. Following selected standards for the pursuit of our needs, we would schedule the formation and sequencing of certain steps with certain means to fulfill the requirements of a certain objective at a certain point in time. We would define what quality and quantity of resources are necessary and when they must be invested to meet our targets, allowing for contingencies of variables and bracing against the unknown. The reduction to the smallest meaningful steps would then be partly dictated by the technical requirements within the qualitative, quantitative, and temporal parameters we set for the result and our core concerns along the way. But our demands for progress may also have a subjective dimension that is independent from objectively definable requirements of a pursuit. Each need may necessitate a different minimum quantity and quality of resources and a provision of these at a particular minimum rate of progress to keep us producing happiness in our pursuits and to prevent us from drifting into frustration. To maintain pursuits as acceptable, the implementation of our wishes has to proceed at a particular rate of accomplishment. In addition, although we may be generally preoccupied with meeting the minimum demands of our needs, we must be mindful of the potential that a maximum conducive measure of advancement might prevail as well. There may be speeds and allocations of volumes and qualities of resources that exceed our ability to properly administer an attribution of means. The oversupply of means may engender more than a waste of resources. It may overwhelm and thus encumber, block, damage, or destroy the processes in which we produce happiness for the directly involved or for other needs.

Our pursuits must remain within certain parameters of attribution and timing to be constructive in and to maximize the generation of happiness. These parameters may be composed of objective criteria intrinsic to the nature of the objects and processes we employ as well as subjective components. These criteria determine whether the use of certain qualities and quantities of resources at a certain pace causes us happiness or unhappiness and possibly different degrees of happiness or unhappiness. Initially, our demands for progress may be positioned outside the range of what is objectively or subjectively conducive. Encounters with the pain of transgressing the subjective or objective upper and lower boundaries of our range of happiness will permit us to calibrate what range of conditions makes us happy. It appears that to reach superior happiness, we have to attain a better understanding of the qualitative, quantitative, and timing mechanisms that objectively and subjectively underpin each of our pursuits. There will be constellations of these factors that represent optimum fulfillment conditions. But there may also be constellations under which we can still fulfill a need at less than the greatest imaginable satisfaction. To fulfill a need at a minimum acceptable level, we must explore the correct relationship among the quality of a resource, its measure, and its timing under objective and subjective criteria. Our initial presumption might be that the lowermost acceptable level of fulfillment translates into conditions that require the least amount, quality, and application speed of resources. Yet that presumption might be improper. Further, we may deem that we increase the overall availability of resources by investing less quantity and quality of means and maximizing the period until we have to invest resources. Here again, our supposition may not be correct. The efficiency of minimum progress may lag behind the efficiency obtainable with a higher or faster investment of resources because such an investment may produce proportionally better means. In that case, we must determine whether the gains from increased investment of resources in a pursuit outweigh the losses we might incur from not having these resources available for the current pursuit of other needs or the future conduct of any need. Detailed investigations and considerations may be necessary to select the most efficient pursuit.

Once we have determined these factors for each need, we prepare a current version of our list of priorities and evaluate the current progress requirements of each need. We determine the smallest meaningful step to advance the fulfillment of each need, and we attribute the amount and quality of each of the five resource types required to take such step. After we proceed in this way for all our needs, we tally their demands on our resources and we compare the result with the

amount of resources that we have available at this time. We then repeat this process for subsequent steps for each need. As we engage in the planning of these attributions, the future resource demands of our needs become less certain. To the extent changes in our circumstances or requirements are recurrent, we may be able to take prospective account of them. But our projections may have to be adjusted because of internal and external interferences with our devices or because these may be flawed. We may not know whether our predictions of resource requirements and availability are accurate. Their totality might not be foreseeable before and even during the course of our pursuit. Unforeseen conditions may call for or enable more, less, or different means in strategies, different strategies, or different objectives. For that reason, we will have to supervise our resource requirements. Upon any change in our needs or in aspects of their implementation, we have to reassess whether our pursuits and attributions remain in our best interest.

Nevertheless, we have to try to assess our requirements and the availability of resources in the present and future, including the possibility of changes as much as possible to place our pursuits on the most stable footing. Providing this stability involves more than an accounting and reasonable thrift in the expenditure of existing resources. To improve the fulfillment of our needs, we also have to manage the accrual, maintenance, and accessibility of our resources. Many of our resources are located, extracted, manufactured, grown, accumulated, or renewed over time. They may accrue by the engagement of the capacities of us, other humans, or other entities, substances, structures, and processes. Their accrual and existence may be positively or negatively affected by an extensive number of factors. To secure means, we may have to carry out provisions for the generation and preservation of resources so that they will be available at the time when we need them. We may not know whether we will be able to secure the necessary resources. We may be incorrect about what will be required to make resources available and the effectiveness or efficiency of conditions that create them or that they create. Unforeseen circumstances may interfere with our plans. Beyond that, transformations in the availability of resources may change our needs, their requirements, and their priority. Our consideration of these factors and our wish to secure ourselves against them add to and merge with our initial planning of sequences in which the availability of resources is presumed and in which we are principally concerned with the abstract technical ability of a sequence to yield a desired benefit. Even if we are only concentrating on a minimum acceptable level of benefits because of resource concerns, budget considerations are necessary to confirm and build on that concept.

The budgeting process consists in harmonizing the availability and use of resources through a comprehensive plan that adjusts to the movement of our endeavors in relation to other relevant internal and external circumstances. Such planning may be quite complex. We attempt to insert certainty into a system that is inherently unstable because of a variety of factors that are hard to predict or even calculate in their probability. To succeed, our planning must take that variability into account with sufficient security margins and we will have to continually inspect and revise our plan to reflect new or more precise information and better abilities to project. Besides this obligation, our budgeting of requirements and resources seems to be burdened by the fact that our resource requirements and the accrual of resources may move in different timelines. Even if resources are created or transmuted by the process of pursuit itself, the time in which we require these processes to occur to satisfy our needs may differ from the time these processes may take to happen. Accordingly, the production timing of means may have to be considered and the scheduling of our pursuits may have to be adjusted to allow the investment of resources in them when it is needed. We may further be able to modify the timing of our requirements. However, when we operate at the lower end of acceptable advancement, we may not possess much flexibility in this respect. The budgeting process suffers from the fact that needs have different demands regarding the quantity and quality of resources. The particularities of the resources they require may involve different processes and ingredients that distinguish these resources. We might render resources accountable for budgeting purposes by classifying them pursuant to their type. We might make them comparable by referring to their conversion value that we ascribe to them within the same category or across types. Yet this would still leave the problem of different speeds in the accrual of their particularized resources. We would additionally have to account for the circumstance that needs may demand fulfillment according to their individual time frame, pace, and rhythm. While we must unite these aspects for each need, we must include the differences in their timelines of resource requirements and accrual.

To better comprehend and manage resource requirements and resource availability, it seems useful to keep a regular accounting that traces and schedules the accrual of resources and our requirements for them in equal time measures. By comparing equal intervals in which these aspects occur, we might also develop a better comprehension of how deviations might influence our ability to meet our needs. Because there is no unifying time frame for the accrual of needs or their satisfaction nor for the accrual or the use of resources in their pursuits, we

have to select arbitrary but for purposes of comparison equal periods so that we can measure differences as we proceed. Building a specific plan of pursuit and a finely tuned budget to fund that plan in an exacting manner is necessary to maximize the yield of happiness from our pursuits. This is particularly so if we operate in an environment of relative scarcity. However, the specificity of our budget also demands from us to be highly attentive and reactive to its content. If we are to pursue the fulfillment of our needs effectively and efficiently, we need to detect discrepancies between our planning and the reality of its implementation timely so we can make effective and efficient modifications. The unpredictability of intervening causes as well as false or incomplete information regarding requirements and the availability of resources may keep us from competently predicting sequences. These odds may improve with our experience or by learning from others. We may be able to forecast certain causalities on the basis of that understanding. Yet few matters in our pursuits are exact replays of events. If fulfillment does not depend completely on us, we may have difficulties forecasting assistance, obstruction, or neutrality by other forces or the consequences on our efforts. Our uncertainty concerning our budgeting will only resolve as we progress and approach or pass the markers of our requirements and resources. The best approach might be to set forth our best-considered calculations and to consider and undertake adjustments as we come across diverging information during the implementation of our plan. If the reality of our pursuits does not meet the expected marks, we have to explore the possible causes and reconcile these causes to our plan or reconcile our plan to these causes.

If we do not possess sufficient information or if it is not steady enough to allow dependable planning and execution, that insight can serve us as an important planning tool. We may try to obtain more information, promote the stability of our pursuits, or allocate resources in amounts and qualities that improve our chances of reaching desired benefits in spite of insecurity. This allocation of resources to cover risk must be reconciled with our construction of the broadest possible allocation of resources to our traits. It takes part in defining the smallest increments that are acceptable to us and in the differentiation of our pursuits according to whether they represent basic survival functions, the capacities of our traits to produce fulfillment in the future, or less important traits. We may define the first two categories of traits as essential and distinguish them from our nonessential needs. Nonessential needs may be of an existential nature and may be ultimately necessary or helpful to sustain and develop individual or collective human existence. Notwithstanding, such needs may be nonessential for keep-

ing individuals alive and their existential capacities intact, at least for a limited period. The minimum increments for maintaining essential needs in an emergency mode may only be acceptable for the duration of the emergency. To survive, we may be forced to take measures that are not sustainable or less sustainable than other approaches because other approaches would involve higher cost, related risk, or risk related to benefits presently or in the future for the need whose fulfillment we are trying to secure or for other needs. We may similarly conduct measures that preserve our facilities of pursuit. As soon as an emergency is lifted, changes in manners may be demanded by traits we secure in an emergency or by other traits inside or outside their group. Even our initial coverage of nonessential pursuits may have to permit compromises concerning costs, risks pertaining to costs, and risks pertaining to benefits to reach extended or complete coverage of minimal increments. Reducing these exposures to achieve acceptable levels for any traits may involve the allocation of additional resources. We may seek to mend these exposures first for basic survival needs and subsequently to preserve capacities. Depending on the severity of threats to our capacities, we may leave some exposure for basic survival needs if we can instead preserve some capacities. But it appears much less likely that we would tolerate the exposure of essential traits to enable the pursuit of nonessential traits. Hence, a larger coverage of traits seems to be unlikely until essential needs are being satisfied in an acceptable manner. We may further employ such considerations as we attain resources to cover nonessential needs in the sequence of their priority.

Our views about what constitutes an acceptable level of pursuit would not be limited to the attribution of resources to one acceptable increment of pursuit. We only engage in such attributions to traits because we have, based on our planning, the reasonable expectation that we will be able to see the pursuits we have selected through to their fulfillment and that these pursuits will not unacceptably infringe on other pursuits. Thus, the acceptability of increments is part of a comprehensive acceptability assessment. This positions the evaluation of a benefit increment not only in the context of its cost, the risk related to that cost, and the risk of not reaching that increment. We undertake similar evaluations in relation to all other increments according to our planned pursuits. We are reducing the complexity of such an evaluation by selecting minimum acceptable pursuits. We are doing this to maintain as many pursuits as we can. However, minimum attributions must have us worried whether they will be able to sustain such pursuits. Our confinement to minimum acceptable pursuits may have us hovering at the edge of conditions where the return from a pursuit be-

comes unacceptable. This may be a risk we may be prepared to suffer regarding nonessential pursuits in exchange of their pursuit. Yet this may not be a level of security we deem acceptable regarding essential traits. We may therefore build safety margins into attributions to such traits before we allocate resources to nonessential traits. We may be confident enough not to require the present attribution of resources for all of their future resource requirements. But we may set sufficient resources aside to enable our survival and the preservation of our existential capacities for periods of exigency that we deem possible. Only after we have secured ourselves against such contingencies to our satisfaction may we proceed to address less critical needs. In making allocations for emergency contingencies, we may have to weigh the likelihood and severity of infringements on essential needs and the benefit of knowing us secure against the lack of fulfillment for needs that suffer denial because of our allocations to emergency contingencies.

As we establish minimum requirements and build up to fulfill them for all our needs, we proceed to cover our needs pursuant to our list of priorities. We initially operate under our fundamental, static list in as far as we have to operate in an emergency mode to secure our essential needs. While essential priorities may display circulation among survival aspects and among aspects that preserve our capacities separately, survival aspects may not open their circulation to aspects that preserve our capacity unless there are surplus resources available. To the extent there are resources left to preserve capacities, traits whose capacity is endangered may engage in a circulation among themselves. To the extent nonessential needs could be satisfied, they might initially engage in a detached circulation configuration that might even be limited to relatively high-level traits. Although all nonessential traits might push to rise in circulation, it may be easier to suppress statically lower-ranked nonessential traits than traits with higher ranking under conditions that are insufficient to cover all of these traits. For a united circulation to occur, it might be necessary that we can leave the threat of an emergency safely behind. Only then might needs with nonessential priority become able to move to a level that trumps essential concerns. Such circulation may at first begin with the partial participation of some highly ranked nonessential needs before it grows and eventually covers the entirety of participating traits. Even if we reach a broad coverage of participating needs, we would anticipate and reflect circulatory priority variations in our budgeting because this may apprise us of changes in minimum acceptable requirements. But keeping abreast of our priorities in our projections is also important if at any juncture our resources should become insufficient to sustain the minimum ac-

ceptable requirements of all needs. In that event, the coverage of our traits would regress in the reverse order of how it was built, only adjusted for possible changes of priority at the time. Beyond that, our list of priorities serves an essential function in the attribution of surplus resources to maximize the utilization of surplus once we have secured minimum acceptable installments for all needs and are confident that such attributions can be maintained throughout the chosen sequences. We might use that surplus to build reserves regarding nonessential traits in descending order of their priority. We might attribute surplus possibly in multiple rounds of minimal meaningful enhancements until all effective and efficient opportunities under our current strategies have been exhausted or all resources have been exhausted, with only one reasonable exception. We may deviate from a sequential inclusion of traits in coverage if we can discern that extraordinary investment in certain traits may yield overproportional benefits that can ultimately improve the coverage of needs that were initially left out. We must be careful not to let such exceptions unravel the systematic improvement of happiness. We must make firm plans for compensatory coverage of neglected needs to set in before their dissatisfaction develops to a level where negative impressions substantially diminish or extinguish the positive impact of extraordinary investments. We may also change our tactics if surplus permits us to substitute new strategies that can yield higher benefits or can yield benefits at better effectiveness or efficiency. Here again, we would trace our priorities downward with the goal of improving the pursuit of the greatest number of needs.

Competent decisions whether to attribute additional rounds of resources or escalate to more effective pursuits and how to shape such changes require that we reassess and optimize such elevated pursuits within each participating trait and among them as we did with regard to our basic strategy. When we devised that basic strategy, we had to consider whether an extension of resources beyond survival needs and subsequently beyond concerns of preserving our capacities would endanger the fulfillment of these essential aspects of our existence. The pain from nonessential needs upon their nonfulfillment may have inspired us to regard our essential concerns with a perspective that concentrated on the shorter-term and on more likely threats to their fulfillment. These concerns become now attenuated. With the improved availability of means, we may enlarge and complete our provisions for essential needs if we did compromise them previously. However, our wealth may also prompt new potential problems for the stable fulfillment of all our needs, including our essential needs. Our investments in machinations to have pursuits undertaken by complex interactions

of humans and machines might change our environment and change us so much that we might have difficulties surviving without these or to preserve our capacity for pursuing our existential needs. That may devastate us when these mechanisms falter or fail. Beyond depriving us, these machinations and their transformations may infringe on our flexibility to retreat and concentrate on essential concerns if that were necessary. We might further have to worry that with enhanced wealth and sufficient coverage for all our needs, we might become willing to relax not only cost and related risk concerns but also risk concerns related to our benefits for the sake of gaining higher benefits. As possible gains of happiness become smaller, our investments may become increasingly disproportional and more adventurous. The availability of resources for unprecedented quantities and qualities of activities may expose us to higher risks of which we might not be aware. It may simultaneously lull us into the impression that these resources will permit us to remedy any problem that might materialize in or from their production and application. In possibly unfounded confidence in future developments, we may negligently, recklessly, or even willfully accrue encumbrances whose resolution we commit to prospective capacities. We might even sense as the success of pursuits and the abundance of resources we desire increase that we will have to address a related set of problems and possibly additional issues. But we might dismiss such considerations as long as we are concerned about the lack of resources in trying to build our pursuits. We might be more worried that noninherent forces may interfere with our ascent or cause it to slide.

If, upon a quantitative or qualitative expansion of our pursuits, we meet circumstances that do not permit us to address all our needs with the requirements of our strategies at the time, we would have to reduce the attribution of resources again according to the directives of priority. In an approach where we only attribute the minimum necessary installments of resources, we might have to temporarily abandon the pursuit of lowest-ranking needs on our list of priorities in ascending order until we can implement the smallest increments for all higher-ranking priorities. If we had expanded our pursuits to rounds of attribution, we would, beginning with the latest round of attributions, peel back individual attributions to needs in ascending order until we could sustain all higher-ranked needs in addition to previous rounds of attributions for all needs. To the extent we would have escalated into more demanding alternatives of pursuit, we would try to revert to less demanding pursuits in ascending order with the reversion of our pursuits. But such a retreat might be difficult. We might not be able to abandon or to scale back more resource-intensive pursuits without in-

curring substantial detriment. The particular structures and processes for more demanding forms of pursuit may not be or not easily be convertible to simpler endeavors. Beyond the loss and resistance of these structures and processes, it may take time and substantial resources to transition to less demanding modes. This may make it difficult to respond to changing conditions. Therefore, we have to be careful when we replace our more parsimonious approaches with more resource-intensive manners of pursuit. Unless we are prepared to incur lessened or missing compatibility with diminished levels of resources, we must be certain that we can sustain elevated types of sequences in spite of all possible adversities. Alternatively, we may select only higher-level sequences that are flexible and permit without material difficulty the adjustment of our expenditures as our circumstances require.

Our system of maintenance and ordered advance and retreat in the attribution of resources may be severely hampered if our ability to marshal resources is not corresponding with our requirements. Imbalances of resources belonging to the same type may be relatively easily remedied. However, the transmutation among types may be relatively ineffective or inefficient, or may be impossible. If we run out of some types of resources before we exhaust others, our potential to advance to more satisfying levels of fulfillment is uneven. Our pursuits would be limited although we would have unused potential left. That problem might be solved through external conversions. Yet, even if we can convert resources, pursuits that allow us to generate products we can externally convert may expose us to relative shortages. In addition, resources may be differently affected by expansion or by events that induce us to cut back on the levels of pursuit or to restrict pursuits entirely. Imbalances in our resources may cause us to advance or to curtail pursuits without adhering to their position in the sequence of our priorities but rather depending on whether or not we possess required resources. The fact that we are not missing all the resources to meet a demand by our sequences may have us focus on supplementing missing resources. Even if a resource is not unavailable but only scarce, we may concentrate on obtaining that scarce resource. This behavior may propel endeavors that require missing or relatively scarce types or resources to higher priority. We may intensify our efforts to procure the resources they require, and we may attempt to redirect other types of resources from the pursuit of other needs to our remediation efforts. That may lower our fulfillment levels for other needs as well. When an imbalance among our types of resources determines which needs gain priority in fulfillment, needs with lower fundamental importance may gain exaggerated prominence in our mind and skew the expression of

our personality and our chances of survival or thriving. Resource imbalances may cause us to worry about the fulfillment or better fulfillment of needs with relatively lesser importance. The determination of our concerns and activities by the availability of certain resources may result in our losing track of what matters most for our happiness. To avoid such consequences, we must strive for a balanced approach toward our production of resources and the accumulation of reserves for incidents when this production should fail that correspond to specific resource necessities or can be converted into required resources. We may trade the safety of reserves only for a budgeting mode that is adjusted to sequential requirements to the extent we can be certain that spare resources will not be needed. While we may consider this to unreasonably hamper nonessential pursuits because it oversecures us, we may still take reserve measures to secure our individual and collective existence and thriving at least in the form of a potential to recover.

The complexity of assessments and the intervention of unforeseen circumstances may make us doubt whether we can derive much benefit from budgeting our pursuits. We may mourn the loss of an existence where we could, like other animals, simply follow our instincts without being bothered by the prospect of pain or pleasure beyond immediate concerns. We may deem their relative inability to adjust pursuits as a fair exchange for avoiding to have our instincts amended by complicating impressions and the anxiety resulting from foreseeing problems and being tasked to find solutions for them. But we cannot go back. More than that, we would not be happy regressing ourselves because we would knowingly limit our chances for individual and collective survival and thriving. Still, we might prefer the relative ease of proceeding under the guidance of our instincts, surrounding decisional patterns lodged in our emotional mind, and the involvement of our rational mind to solve problems when we consider our instinctive and emotional capacities to be overburdened. Such direction may prove to be effective in many situations. It was instrumental to place us collectively and individually into our current circumstances. Only, its dearth of comprehensive understanding also allows error and imposes limits on our ability to increase our happiness. Budgeting constitutes the only way to improve our chances of reaching desired benefits by becoming more aware of the involved costs and risks and addressing them as a consequence that awareness. The necessity of budgeting is not novel to us. Experiences have been pointing us toward the insight that, despite many shortcomings in our knowledge and interceding vagaries, happiness is built in a deliberate, systematic, and continuous manner that adjusts to internal and external circumstances and their interrela-

tion. The clarity of these experiences is often obscured and overlooked because the manner of pursuit they imply is unspectacular and arduous. We much sooner notice and are impressed by spectacular ascents and bursts of good fortune or talent. These incidents give us hope that happiness can be easier accomplished. We seem to find confirmation for such a hope in fortuitous events that contribute to our happiness. We may also possess coincidental attributes and assets that favor us in our interaction with our surroundings. These advantages might result in partly overproportional achievements. But we also experience firsthand, through observations, and by accounts, that such advantages do not assure a stable happiness overall. Rather, they can form dangerous detractions of the requirement to employ deliberate planning and implementation due to a false sense that such work is unnecessary. Thus, while we may sustain hope in fortuitous advancement of our pursuits, we know that we have to undertake conscientious work to progress.

While systematic techniques for selecting our pursuits may only raise a reconciliation process that we already tend to apply to more complete levels, proceeding from a fragmented or casual approach to a comprehensively reconciled budget might be an intimidating undertaking. Ideally, we would have extracted and defined all our traits in their ideal and actual state, be able to sequence them in their relative importance, and be mindful of the principal constellations among our traits without consideration of resources. We would know what minimum advancements in their pursuit still maintain their functions or are acceptable to us. We would have reconciled the positive and negative effects of this reduction for each trait and among traits. We could quantify and qualify the types of resources to be expended and available for advancing each need on a schedule that correlates each pursuit to our other pursuits. For the event that surplus resources are available, we would have identified the scale of effectiveness and efficiency of alternative strategies for every pursuit by itself and in interrelation with other needs. We would have reconciled our needs and our technical capacity and could name pursuits that are set to maximize our overall happiness at any level of resources. We would know how we can most effectively and efficiently obtain, maintain, and apply the resources that satisfy the requirements of our needs. We would understand what measures are effective and efficient to defend our pursuits against interferences and how to react if these penetrate our defenses. We could gauge the probability of interferences at least generally.

Yet it is unrealistic to assume that we should be able to master all these categories of insight even as the product of a systematic program of exploration. We may struggle in all of them, and we may con-

tinue to struggle as we go forward. We may never be able to derive a fully reconciled, completely perfected plan for our pursuits. Even with the suggested methods, the challenges in improving our happiness remain formidable. Still, if we desire to ameliorate our control of the aspects in our life that allow us control, there is no substitute for gaining as much clarity in all pertinent categories of insight as we can because they together establish the mechanism by which we take control. Even if we cannot devise a complete, detailed, and accurate budget, we can derive advantages from devising and maintaining it to the best of our ability. Rather than being overwhelmed by all the insights we have to develop to reach perfection, we must focus on making a sensible start and systematically building on initial insights to improve our lot.

Even if we are self-assured that we can afford more than a basic coverage for our pursuits, we have to go through the theoretical exercise of establishing minimum acceptable intensities for our endeavors and building these in our mind to levels we confirm to be sustainable. We then must focus on transitioning our affairs to that target. At the beginning, we may require some time to build the pertaining insights. We may further need some time to develop our abilities to implement our insights. Abrupt transitions may sometimes be necessary, but they may also cause avoidable damage. Unless we are certain that a sudden transition can benefit us or we encounter an emergency that requires bolder action, it appears advisable to engage in measured deconstruction of current pursuits to the manners and the levels indicated by the systematic exposition of our pursuits. To the extent a deconstruction of our current circumstances might present us with hardships, we may try to find pathways that diminish these hardships or at least pace the process to keep losses in check and allow for the building of sufficient resources that secure the transition. Such an approach allows us to adjust our circumstances without losing our footing. We must therefore consider the consequences of transition and make a plan for rendering it most effective and efficient for maximizing our happiness. In such a plan, we must weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of different possibilities of transition. Such assessments may be hard because of the novelty of the transition and desired practices according to our plans. Much of what we need to know about optimized ways of pursuing happiness and our transition to them may have to be acquired and addressed as we engage in these activities. In spite of all plans and care in their execution, we are bound to make mistakes, meet unforeseen adversities, and grow in our insights and abilities to implement them. Our ideas of a harmonized and ultimately an optimized manner of pursuit and our transition to it will in all likelihood have to be adjusted and refined.

A gradual approach can then accommodate insecurities and errors in our plans. It may further allow us to experiment with alternative manners of pursuit. By building such pursuits from minimal attributions and testing them without relying on them while we continue to rely on possibly less suitable but still constructive, familiar pursuits, we might be able to try new, unproven concepts in relative safety and low exposure to loss. We could allow for mistakes and let our experiences direct us toward improvements. In addition to these precautions, short budgeting intervals can help us to monitor and control the advancement of our deconstruction and construction processes as well as the accuracy of our predictions for targeted manners and levels of pursuit in meeting our needs. Although it is essential that we plan for sequences of transition and advancement, short periods of review allow us to respond early to positive and negative nonconforming developments. The planning of deconstruction and construction in steps makes a review between their application an apt vantage point to determine whether we remain in conformance and to adjust subsequent increments if necessary. But we may additionally improve our reactivity by reviewing effectiveness and efficiency assessments while we apply an increment. To react timely, the comparison between our expectations and the reality of our pursuits may have to be continuing.

Such a combination of deliberate pacing and systematic scrutiny may contribute to an improved and potentially optimized manner of pursuit. However, it cannot ascertain happiness. Our struggles may have to continue because our capacities are limited and because even the most circumspect preparation and execution and the best circumstances we can secure may leave us with a less than perfect fulfillment. Even if we achieve a reconciliation of our needs and we maximize our production of resources, our individual efforts may not be sufficient to overcome the inadequacy of our resources. Even if we can reach fulfillment of needs according to our reconciled set of ideals, that victory might be soured by intrinsic or by extraneous difficulties in its fulfillment. We may find that the fulfillment of our reconciled needs or the conditions under which we have to fulfill them cannot satisfy us to the expected extent. Hence, although happiness may serve as a beacon in our efforts, we must maintain a realistic comprehension of our ability to reach it to avoid disappointment. We must understand that we may never attain perfection in our plans or their implementation. Even if we should manage to approach or to reach what we had deemed to be the ultimate level of happiness and we would not be exposed to reconciliation requirements or hardships that damage the yield of these pursuits, we may gain better insight regarding the ability of these pur-

suits to satisfy us or affect our plans. Our awareness and understanding of means or our needs may change. The possibility of such challenges may have us focus parts of our efforts on generic pursuits for the purpose of building reserves that allow us to learn about and try potential variances or alternatives. But this can only address the problems of reaching or preserving happiness to a limited extent. A differential between what we wish ideally and can achieve may linger, even beyond the sacrifices of compromising our needs with one another.

We may therefore expect that we should be happier if we could lower our demands to attainable levels in securing our individual and collective survival and thriving. We might be more contented if we would aspire to a reduced but still functional level for the fulfillment of our needs that can be achieved without incurring the risk and overproportional cost that are likely to be attached to more ambitious levels of fulfillment. The key to our happiness appears to be our ability to harmonize our demands with the availability of resources. Depending on our sustained or our repeated inability to overcome limitations, we may wish we could regulate our demands to lower fulfillment levels or even eliminate entire needs or idiosyncratic particularizations.

The proposition that we should not desire more than we can afford might strike us as plausible as long as this is sufficient to enable our individual and collective survival and thriving. Rational arguments may be most critical of our idiosyncratic traits in this regard. That other humans can exist and even excel without our idiosyncrasies gives us a reasonable presumption that we can get by with an abridged level of them or without them. This presumption may be incorrect because we may be comparing ourselves to individuals who exist in circumstances that vary from ours. To be certain, we would have to prove that idiosyncrasies encumber our pursuits without at least equivalent rewards. This might be accomplished by observing us and individuals in similar circumstances who exist without such idiosyncrasies. The elimination or reduction of existential needs might be most problematic. Although some of them might not seem indispensable, we might not know how their absence or weakening could affect our potential for survival or thriving. The fact that humans commonly share such needs might indicate that they carry vital functions. To delete or decrease such needs without the risk of serious consequences, we would have to prove that such traits are detrimental considering all contingencies in which they might apply to us or other humans. If needs fulfill a valid purpose, we will have to prove that giving up higher yet less secure or more costly levels of achievement for more secure or more economical levels does not impair our individual or collective survival and thriving. Concerns

that we might not advance our skills and other resources under these restraints should be properly addressable. We might remain involved in development, only under deliberate provisions that do not expose us to unreasonable risks or cost. As prudent as such an approach may appear, it may be difficult to restrain ourselves because we may be incapable of adjusting our ideals as a matter of rationally induced willpower to reduced levels of satisfaction. Even if we fit our pursuits to circumstances that we cannot change, our ideals may remain irrepressible and subject us to pain if we tried to suppress any aspect of them. Then again, we may compare our endeavor to control them to our undertaking to reconcile our traits. There as well, we subject our traits to partial suppression. We may regard this as a burden on their separate ideals although we could never accomplish all or even any of these if we pursued our traits without reconciliation. Their reconciled accomplishment appears to be the best we can achieve while serving all constructive participating traits. All this appears to very similarly apply to the lessening of our undertakings to more reasonable levels. For that reason, our council of traits should be able to administrate it. The only difference might be that, while we might permanently adjust our traits to reconciled attitudes, we must not permanently reduce them to particular levels of fulfillment because this would foreclose our development. Maintaining and building our ideals beyond what we can safely navigate is necessary to transcend limitations and secure our needs to the best of our potential. Hence, some dissatisfaction must remain.

As we review potential methods to decrease our costs and risks and to increase benefits, we are directed to consider cooperation with other individuals as a substantial source for attaining such advantages. We are inherently dependent on collaboration with humans to satisfy some of our most important needs. Additionally, cooperation may allow us to ameliorate the contentment of needs that do not inherently require a participation of other individuals. The pursuits we wish may be too large, too complicated for us individually. We alone may not be able to develop or to command the necessary quantity or quality of resources. We might therefore significantly improve our chances of approaching and possibly meeting our individually reconciled ideals by drawing on the capabilities of other individuals. Beyond that, our relationship with other humans must be coordinated to prevent or at least reduce mutual infringements and resulting conflicts. The positive and negative aspects of correlations with other humans are bound to add complexities to the planning and conduct of our pursuits because they must be reconciled with the pursuits of other individuals as well. The next section examines the modalities of this collective reconciliation.