

CHAPTER 30

COOPERATIVE PRODUCTION

To determine what is necessary to establish a cooperative production of obviously physical, objectively perceptible, and rational resources as well as time, we may want to explore what makes individuals pursue a competitive strategy regarding them. The answer to that question appears simple. We seek to exclude others from nonemotional resources and seek to extract such resources from others because we do not possess adequate means of a particular kind to satisfy our needs. Scarcity of means appears to be the central motivation for engaging in any type of competition. To counteract the shortage of nonemotional resources among individuals, we must increase their supply and engender viable avenues for each individual to attain suitable means. Ideally, we would strive toward an environment where the obtainability and articulation of resources meet all our wishes. While such a comprehensive wealth may appear utopian, it is reasonable to presume that we could reduce competition by ameliorating the quantity and quality of nonemotional resources. To accomplish such an enhancement, we would have to intensify the effectiveness and efficiency of finding, creating, and using resources. If we attempt to undertake this autonomously, our capacity is relatively limited. We may considerably escalate our chances of success by drawing on the skills and capacities of other individuals.

Competitive conduct may superficially seem to enable this. The dedication of resources to offensive competitive purposes may appear as a productive undertaking because competitive conquests can confer a net advantage of means to their perpetrators. Similarly, we may obtain an impression of effectiveness or efficiency from the engagement of defensive means because it can secure access to resources and can protect means that are already attained. Offensive and defensive competitive strategies may further appear productive because they provide compensatory means to those who participate in the production of offensive and defensive means. Still, such means have usually a very limited functionality that is dedicated to effect exclusions and takings or the prevention, correction, and retribution of such violations, respectively. Their application may inhibit or destroy the production, use, or existence of constructive means. Even at their best, they do not offer any increase in overall means available for the constructive pursuit of needs. In addition, they impose a toll on constructive pursuits because they require a dedication of productive resources to the generation of means that are not constructive. Accordingly, offensive and defensive means and their production harm the pursuit of human happiness.

Cooperation would appear to be the logical alternative in drawing on the capacity of others if we wanted to raise the overall level of nonemotional wealth. If we relent with the compulsive or mendacious tactics of competition, we must motivate others to work with us voluntarily. We may move them to cooperate by offering them a benefit in return for their cooperation. We may offer them goods or services in an exchange. This presupposes that we and they possess goods or services for an exchange. An exchange presumes that the products exchanged can be generated and exist in a form that enables them to be transferred by crossing paths in different directions in a swap. Such a system would have substantial advantages over the autonomous production of means. It would allow us the choice of engaging in the creation of products for our direct consumption or for the purpose of exchanging them into goods and services that we cannot produce or that we cannot produce as effectively or efficiently. Specialization and favorable particularized resources may not only increase producers' efficiency but also their effectiveness, which may translate into products of higher effectiveness and efficiency. Even if we cannot achieve such advantages, we might still benefit from exchanging goods or services that we produce for a variety of other means that we can use.

However, engaging solely in exchanges of individual goods and services would fundamentally limit a system of cooperation. Even if it would allow for the exchange of sequenced and of combined individual accomplishments, we would not have made maximum headway if the production and exchange steps remained limited to individual activity. Although we would engage in cooperation, the benefits of that cooperation would be limited by the separated capacity of participants in the production and exchange of goods and services. We might significantly increase our capacities if we join them. This alternative form of cooperation avails individuals of momentous effectiveness and efficiency potential. It permits them to pool their goods and services with others and to allocate them in a common venture to create a product that they individually could not generate or could not generate as effectively or efficiently. Arguably, an arrangement of individual production and exchange steps might bring about the same result as long as a pooled enterprise can be segregated into individual contributions. But the rationalization of an integrated method that allocates and harmonizes these steps in a joint context may be superior. Beyond that, the pooling of contributions allows production facilities and subject matters of production that cannot be organized under the requirement of immediate individual exchanges. They may require a joint investment and the dependence of compensation on a joint result. It appears pos-

sible that an individual or a group of individuals might acquire sufficient resources to provide production facilities and subject matters of such a scale and hire and compensate individuals for their individual contributions. But the underlying venture may still entail a pooling of resources to generate a joint result. The ongoing compensation of individual contributions is only furnished based on past joint results or the anticipation that future joint results will carry such payments.

In many cases, a joint effort may be able to increase or maximize the effectiveness or the efficiency of production or products. Only, joint production enterprises cannot claim to always represent the best manner of producing and attributing means. Individual production or products may be most effective and efficient in many respects. Joint activities might unnecessarily complicate and unsettle the production or attribution of some means. The nature and individuality of our demands make it likely that a contingent of individual products for our direct use or for exchange will be necessary to competently pursue our happiness. Further, the joint exchange of such products or even identical products might not be most effective or efficient manner of distribution. While joint production enterprises might be able to address some individualized demands by adapting production and exchanges, the requirements of individualization might deprive joint production enterprises of their effectiveness or their efficiency advantages. Moreover, our production and attribution preferences may be molded not only by technical reasons pertaining to nonemotional resources. They may also be influenced by concerns regarding the production and attribution of emotional resources that may abide by different standards of effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, the pursuit of our needs may offer a varied picture regarding appropriate methods. Depending on our circumstances and needs, we may have to or may prefer to produce or trade means ourselves or jointly with others. We may be compelled or select to individually or jointly exchange implements that we individually or jointly produce and may have to come to terms with a similar variety of conditions in our production partners or trading partners.

To ascertain the most favorable method of acquiring means, we compare in all our activities the value of what we receive with what we invest and connected risks. We render a cost-benefit assessment. That applies to competitive as well as noncompetitive endeavors. If we employ resources to transform them into a means ourselves, we have to be able to accurately evaluate the requirements against the usefulness of the result to understand whether such an undertaking is warranted. We might be subjected to competitive activities from others or to other interferences that might alter our calculation. Yet, apart from such

disturbances, the effectiveness and efficiency of the process can be ascertained in advance unless it is experimental. That appears to be different in bilateral exchanges and joint production because each participant is likely to follow a motivation to maximize the ratio between return and investment. A component of competition then appears to be built into these manners of acquiring resources. In both, the circumstances of each party decide how much they can take advantage of one another. In a joint production enterprise, negotiations are additionally complicated because they involve multilateral undertakings to maximize return. This insertion of competitive strategies into mechanisms of cooperative production and exchange may constitute a preferred conveyance for competitive forces to take advantage of cooperative strategies. It allows them to practice competitive abuse under the cover of cooperative mechanisms. It also imperils cooperative economic activity by damaging the ability of counterparties to fulfill their needs. Participants who lose in this competitive challenge may not participate or may become unwilling, unreliable, or debilitated participants in future exchanges. Even if winners can secure an advantage for themselves, a competition for advantages among cooperation partners may damage the overall effectiveness or efficiency of cooperative economic activity. It may undermine it with all dangers and negative consequences that are intrinsic to competitive strategies. If cooperative economic activity is to maintain, increase, and maximize participants' means, they must avoid competitive manners of determining value. They have to find a method of ascertaining value that satisfies all necessary participants.

A determination of appropriate compensation might ultimately have to defer to the determination by individual participants whether the value they receive represents a fair compensation for the resources they invested. To arrive at a reasonable determination regarding this matter, we would have to develop an understanding of what we would consider fair compensation. That seems relatively easy in an exchange of unrelated goods or services. To engage in an exchange, participants must be motivated to obtain something they do not have. What they seek to acquire must be more important to them than what they are to give up to obtain it. They seek to obtain a product with more value to them than what they invest. An even bargain in which the ratio between return and investment is the same for both parties seems to be a result that should be satisfying to all parties who engage in exchanges without competitive intent. In that event, the only remaining question seems to be how we can establish a fair medium without detailed investigations in each instance. It appears to be more difficult to determine a fair compensation in joint production enterprises where the

return available for contributors is produced in part by their contribution. We might think that if the contribution of each participant is indispensable to produce a cooperative result, each participant ought to benefit equally. Such thinking is based on the notion that each contribution is a necessary ingredient without which the cooperative result would not take place or not occur in the form or degree of benefit derived. That concept may not appear problematic to the extent the cooperative result accrues through contributions of the same quality and quantity. Yet a joint production enterprise frequently calls for a combination of contributions that are different in quantity or quality. Either differentiation may have consequences on the result that may be difficult to evaluate and bring in relation. However, such assessments appear to be necessary because an economic venture can only attract resources with differentiations it requires if it returns rewards that reflect them. Differences in compensation may strike us as justifiable if different contributions convey different value to the common venture. If returns were not attributed in relation to the value of participants' investment of resources, a venture would transfer means from participants that contribute higher value to participants with a contribution of lower value. Such competitive effects would serve as a disincentive to some contributions. To motivate individuals to participate with the quantity and quality of contributions that are necessary to achieve an enterprise's objectives, and to optimize the fulfillment of these, a joint production enterprise must reward contributions proportionally.

This comprehension alone does not advance us much in determining differences in value. We may not have a problem if we can attribute returns proportionally to different quantities of the same type of investment. Unless different quantities give rise to disproportional effectiveness or efficiency, there is no reason to treat them disproportional. It is more problematic to distribute revenue in proportion to invested resources when these resources differ in quality. There might appear to be several ways to determine the value that a resource contributes to a joint production enterprise. Contributors might expect to be entirely compensated for or in relation to costs and risks involved in producing or acquiring a contribution. Such an approach may be subjectively plausible. Nevertheless, the risks and costs may have been abnormally high. Further, the risks or costs of generating or obtaining a contribution may fail to translate into its effectiveness or efficiency. They may therefore not be reliable indicators regarding the value of a contribution. Deference to the combined judgment of all participants in a joint production enterprise may not help because each contributor remains tempted to view the relative value of contributions based

on that contributor's costs and risks and impressions of other parties' costs and risks. A contributor may also assess the relative value of contributions incorrectly because of missing awareness of the importance of other contributions for the joint result compared to the contributor's own involvement. Valuations may additionally be influenced by participants' intention to optimize the return on their investment that may not be tied to a consideration of its relative merit. Irrelevant considerations might enter bilateral negotiations as well. Only, there, the clarity of a determination what a party is willing to pay to obtain the products of another appears to cut more readily through nonpertinent considerations. Such a clarity may be missing in a joint production enterprise. Still, ultimately, the valuation principles involved in bilateral exchanges can be compounded in application to such enterprises.

Generally, the value for a contribution to a joint production enterprise that produces for exchange would have to be founded on the market value of the product that it helps to achieve. That value is determined by its customers in form of the price they are willing to pay in an exchange. It determines the collective upper boundary of distributions by the enterprise to contributors after expenses and reserves. In further application of market principles to contributions, their attribution of value would depend on a contribution's relative desirability. This desirability is contingent upon its competence to contribute to the profitability of the enterprise. The relative valuation for contributions would depend on their comparative effectiveness and efficiency. This measure appears to be the dominant consideration in bilateral negotiations. Their conclusion depends on two factors. One is what an enterprise is able and willing to expend for a contribution of a certain quality and quantity. The other is what a contributor is able and willing to accept in exchange. The desire to obtain each other's goods or services by the individual contributor and by the remaining enterprise gives rise to mutual assessments of the value of cooperation that must correspond to make a joint enterprise possible. These valuations may determine the relative attribution of the profits obtained by the enterprise. However, beyond considerations of the value a joint product can reach in the market, both sides may also base their judgment on their opportunities to obtain a better result in alternative settings. For the rest of the enterprise, that setting might be a combination with a different contributor or its dissolution into independent parties. For the participant whose contribution is valued, an alternative setting might be independent production or a combination with another enterprise. If the sides to a negotiation are not willing or able to match or exceed alternative market opportunities for each other, they might not moti-

vate each other to join or to remain. These criteria appear to generally apply to all joint production enterprises with a few exceptions for enterprises that are not joint ventures. Here, owners may function as an internal joint venture that represents the enterprise, and attributions among them may be determined based on what is left after all other expenses and reserves. On the other hand, the dictate of market prices for nonowner contributions to such an enterprise might be more predominant because such contributors might not adjust their compensation demands to results. An adjustment appears to distinguish joint ventures from other enterprises or aspects of enterprises in which the principles of exchange valuation that apply to bilateral exchanges also apply to valuing contributions. But even expectations of compensation for contributions to joint ventures are likely to arise according to markets, and contributors may fail to join or cease membership in a joint venture if these expectations are disappointed. In the end, all investments of any form are measured by what is received in exchange.

The involvement of markets may summon competitive tendencies if alternatives are obtainable. Competitors might pit potential cooperative counterparts against one another and compel them to settle on a lower exchange value. Only, the availability of alternative sources whose competitive tendencies are more restrained for those they seek to oppress may cause such competitive tendencies to fail. The availability of alternatives to both parties to an exchange exerts pressure to leave competitive propensities behind. The apparent contradiction of using alternatives in exchanges to exert pressure on the other side dissolves in the difference of purpose integral to defensive strategies. To eliminate competition in exchanges, cooperative forces must strive to bring prices into conformance with a setting that leaves each side with even profit. We cannot count on such an ideal cooperative spirit, and determining equal profit margins might be difficult. Nevertheless, cooperatively oriented participants may curtail the ability of competitors to exact clearly inequitable transactions. Through offers of more equitable pricing by cooperatively oriented parties, targets of competitive pressure may attain choices that permit them to decline dealing with competitors at inequitable prices. Cooperatively oriented participants may thus change the balance of power, and competitors would have to comply with cooperative principles to continue their market participation. The desire in market participants to acquire resources at equitable prices appears to let markets naturally gravitate toward a cooperative ideal. Competitors might only prevent that outcome by creating, enhancing, or using manipulations or coercions that give market participants no other choice than to accept inequitable conditions.

Arguably, our concept of valuation should be grounded on considerations of how effectively a particular resource can serve to reach a particular result. In an environment of scarcity, we ascribe value to the efficiency of a means as well. But technical competence alone does not lead us in judging the value of a product. Our standard is also subjective. The value of a product is in part delineated by the urgency of our needs. The actualized effectiveness and efficiency and hence the value of means rise and sink in our estimation depending on the satisfaction status of the needs to which they relate. Once we determine the value of a means that we wish to acquire, we place it into relation to the resources we would be willing to give in exchange, the price we are willing to pay. What we are willing to pay is not only determined by our opinion of what we are to acquire. It is further determined by our valuation of what we might exchange. That valuation will be determined by similar criteria as the valuation of what we seek to acquire. We inquire regarding the value of what we are to deliver in an exchange as a means for our pursuits. The relative intensities of our needs regarding both what we will have to give up and what we are to obtain in the exchange may include rational considerations and emotional evaluations not only of our current but also our future requirements. Our current and our anticipated needs will be factors in determining the ratios to which we agree in an exchange. Our motivations meet with a similar, complementary evaluation process by a prospective exchange partner. The value of a product is therefore at least in part determined by the relative effectiveness and efficiency in the exchange parties' particular circumstances. These depend on their relative neediness regarding the owned and the to be purchased items. Both parties undertake a cost-benefit assessment of what is to be given up and to be obtained. These considerations that underlie an exchange are principally the same as the cost-benefit considerations of autonomous individual pursuits.

In addition to considerations of effectiveness and efficiency, the value of means in an exchange depends critically on the availability of resources. If there is solely one avenue to fulfill a need and that need becomes overwhelming, the value we accord to pertinent means may become limitless. Yet, even if we have an absolute need for a resource, our valuation of it will decline if alternatives are available. In that case, the parties will engage a cost-benefit assessment to determine the relative value they ascribe to each possibility. The availability of alternatives may mean that not all requirements by participants have ripened to selections. This may be normal in an ongoing development or a recurrence of desires and the development or subsidence of products that might assist in their fulfillment. The presence of alternatives may

also imply that more resources are available than are required to meet corresponding needs. Prospective exchange partners may try to guide our selection by offering better value or accepting less value to lower or avoid the risk that they might lose the selection to an alternative offeror. If there is an oversupply for a product, its valuation may diminish because there is more supply than demand for it. If there is an undersupply, more needs the product might address continue unfulfilled or suffer deficiencies in fulfillment. This causes a rise in the valuation of such products. Hence, the availability of means is in a functional relationship with effectiveness and efficiency to determine value.

The common effectiveness and efficiency of resources and with them our valuation of means can be objectively ascertained by pairing means with specific applications. Variations in the valuation of products based on availability and participants' deprivation regarding what is to be received and exchanged appear to be less legitimate. It seems that by sanctioning such considerations to enter valuations we permit competitive strategies to govern a cooperative mechanism. One might argue that a valuation based on undersupply or oversupply relative to needs can only be successful because of extortion. Oversupply implies that one would reject means unless their offeror agrees to accept less than their intrinsic value. Undersupply implies that one would refuse to transfer products unless the recipient is prepared to pay more than their intrinsic value. The competitive aspects would appear to be additionally expanded where multiple potential exchange partners react to oversupply or undersupply. In the event of an oversupply, offerors of a product may attempt to exclude other offerors from exchanges by underbidding them. In the case of an undersupply, customers may try to exclude other potential customers from access to the product by outbidding them. Every time incongruities of supply and demand enter a valuation of means in an exchange and such incongruities do not pertain to both objects in the exchange equally, one party appears to take advantage of the relative misfortune of the other. The party whose satisfaction of needs and availability of resources permit a stronger position appears to engage in predatory behavior by threatening the other with exclusion from needed resources. Differences in neediness due to particular individual circumstances might be reduced or eliminated if there is a market for products. Still, it might seem that considerations of need and availability should be banned from influencing valuations in a cooperative system and that valuations should be solely based on objective effectiveness and efficiency. Variations in the availability of a product or discrepancies in the deprivation of parties might not seem to objectively affect the effectiveness or efficiency of a product.

However, these do not represent independent parameters that can be valued separate from the need that is served by a means. Effectiveness and efficiency only arise because there is a need that defines the benefit in both of their formulas. If there is no need or if the need is negligible, a means that can satisfy such a need is of no or little use. Therefore, the subjective factor of a need constitutes a legitimate element of valuation beyond the question whether and how much or efficiently a means can assist in accomplishing a certain objective result. In addition, the availability of a product may regularly be a function of needs and its effectiveness or efficiency to fulfill such needs. The use of a product in the pursuit of a need claims that product and makes it at least for some period unavailable to others. It may further render a product more permanently unavailable by modifying or consuming it. Unless a product is in abounding supply, our needs and the effectiveness and efficiency of a product in satisfying them cause a reduction in its availability. Moreover, to the extent a product is created, procured, or enhanced by human engagement, it is made available because of its effectiveness and efficiency in satisfying needs. Due to these relationships, availability constitutes a legitimate factor in establishing value.

The disparity of values offered for an exchange does not have to be a result of competitive activity. It appears legitimate that we try to lower our demand for resources that we gain from others, to produce goods or services for which exchange partners maintain great demand, and that we lower production for products in low demand. It further seems legitimate that we withhold our resources from exchange if we do not receive adequate countervalue or we wish to increase our supply so that our requirements for that resource do not force us into exigencies. Our counterparts in an exchange only become affected by our actions and circumstances because their needs motivate them to seek means from us. Although the discrepancy of relative neediness might have a marked impact on their ability to fulfill their needs, we are not responsible for the status of their needs unless we caused their deprivation. Nor do we carry the responsibility to make particular products available to them, let alone to make them available at a price or quantity that they demand. As a consequence, our conduct cannot be characterized as competitive. This classification would seem to be reserved for instances where parties distort demand by other parties or manipulate the supply that would meet the demand of such parties to obtain inequitable terms in an exchange. In the absence of such competitive abuse, a comparison of relative need and availability to establish value appears to be not only legitimate but also necessary. The dependence of valuation on need and availability, and the pain that is induced by

heightened need and lack of availability, are requirements to bring the production of means into balance with correlated needs. If pain drives us to commit to an exchange at a dramatic cost, it indicates to us that we must adjust the way we attempt to satisfy the pertinent needs. We must plan and implement a better supply. That might be undertaken by producing means ourselves, finding or producing alternative means or strategies of employing them, or lowering requirements. We might also increase the volume or quality of our production for exchange or engage in the production of more valuable items for exchange to better meet the cost of items we seek to acquire. On the other hand, parties that produce goods or services that are in high demand and in low supply may recognize that they can increase their returns by producing and offering more of them. If they prefer to obtain higher returns without increasing production, the high price of a product may attract other parties to become offerors. The resulting enhancement in supply is likely to lower prices. The countermovements that heightened need and a lack of availability incite have a tendency of rendering the availability and value of goods and services in line with their effectiveness and efficiency and to stabilize the fulfillment of related needs. Similarly, on the occasion of oversupply, a drop in valuation is necessary to reduce the production of means to a level that is necessary for the fulfillment of needs. It restricts waste and frees resources and production capacities to address demands for products that better meet the same need or that can meet other needs. Except to forestall existential exigencies and except in situations where it is impossible to develop alternative resources, valuation fluctuations must therefore be allowed. They form conditions of a necessary mechanism that can optimize the fulfillment of participants' needs and that seems to be responsible for critical motivation and resources in the development of humanity.

Although valuations may fluctuate, a system in which producers and customers are free and able to react to market conditions has the tendency to pull extreme discrepancies into regions where availability and needs are more in congruence. Allowing issues of need and availability to be reflected in value seems to ultimately assist the overall satisfaction of participants' needs. It creates a self-adjusting mechanism that decreases the distortions of supply and demand for goods and services and that aligns production with what is needed. It helps to create an environment where the quality and quantity of productive contributions and products offered are optimized for the fulfillment of participants' needs. A market system liberated of competitive contortions appears to be necessary to provide the appropriate direction to individuals and joint enterprises to generate means that promote and

maximize happiness. Buyers and sellers have to therefore be free to establish the price for exchange items according to considerations of the relative supply and demand pertaining to their products. We may call such a system a free market system. Notwithstanding the general self-adjusting properties natural to a free market, salutary or necessary adjustments might not be possible or forthcoming in all circumstances. Response mechanisms undertaken by members on their own initiative may not be instituted or may not function, or they may not be instituted or may not function with adequate speed, breadth, or proficiency. Participants may not be able to adjust to changes without coordination or assistance. In these cases, a cooperative society may have to step in and manage the production and attribution of means to cure or prevent drastic deprivations for parties that suffer from undersupply or the consequences of oversupply. That support function is inherent in the mutual assistance purpose of a cooperative society. It may also be necessary to shield a cooperative society from the hazard that members who cannot adequately satisfy their needs in a free market might resort to competitive action. This threat of competitive destabilization alone produces a strong incentive for cooperative societies to engage in precautionary activities that decrease or avert excessive disharmony of supply and demand. Additional vigilance and action may be required to defend a free market system against ingrained competitive forces. Still, such interventions must be limited to closely defined inevitabilities. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances that prevent a free market system from properly reacting to challenges, the allocation capacities of such a system appear to be superior to the planning and implementation capacities of governmental action.

It may seem self-evident that a free market system ensures that the wishes of customers are reflected in the production of means. But it may seem less apparent that participants involved in the production process can obtain from a free market system what they need. It might seem that the risk involved in providing products and pricing that find acceptance by exchange partners places producers at a disadvantage. This risk becomes additionally elevated if multiple offerors try to exchange the same or similar products in the same market. If a product does not fulfill the effectiveness and efficiency criteria set by customers or meets them less than another product, customers may pass on it. Unless a venture that is producing for the exchange of its products can commit a customer to purchase, it may find the entirety of its efforts uncompensated. This results in a situation that is similar to what might derive from collaterally constructive competition. The pressure on producers may be somewhat eased because the variety in custom-

ers' demands may allow several products with similar function to find customers. Generally, customers tend to select products that provide the effectiveness they desire at the best efficiency. Yet customers may be willing to pay more for luxuries. They may also concede certain deficiencies in effectiveness if a product requires fewer resources to acquire. However, if a product does not provide a minimum of required effectiveness, it will be useless regardless of how little it costs. On the other hand, the price of a product may reach heights that may motivate customers to abstain from acquiring a product regardless of its effectiveness to the extent they have alternative, less costly manners of satisfying a need available or can delay or curb their pursuits. Between these extremes, customers determine by their purchase decisions how the price of a product must relate to its effectiveness to be acceptable. Because customers may differ in their acceptances, it may be difficult to describe and to meet these expectations for an adequate number of customers to make a product successful. A complication is added because customers' determinations can fluctuate. Demands may develop because their wishes or resources may change. They may further develop with the favorability of conditions set for them by the market. Customers may demand improvements in price or effectiveness. These demands may arise from genuine requirements, but they may also be founded on the availability of better pricing and effectiveness provided by offerors. Offerors set objectives in these categories that other offerors must beat, meet, or at least approximate to succeed. A producer may create additional pressure for itself and other offerors by determining that meeting current demands by customers is not sufficient. It may wish to attract more business by exceeding such demands and by meeting expectations of new segments of customers. These causes change considerations whether a producer can better meet and exceed acceptance requirements to a continuing battle that depends on how well offerors can improve the effectiveness or efficiency of their products by raising the effectiveness and efficiency of their production.

There are limits to such improvement. An enterprise that produces for exchange is subject to exchange and valuation pressure regarding not only its products but also its independent or joint contributions. The ability to compensate will ultimately be dictated by the market for its products. Nevertheless, its contributors are liable to demand compensation in line with expectations that are dictated by the market for their type of contribution. To thrive and attract willing and able contributors, an enterprise must produce results that allow it to meet or exceed market compensation for contributions. Contributions that allow an enterprise to exceed customers' expectations in the mar-

ket for its products may require that enterprise to exceed the average compensation for contributions. A joint venture may have some flexibility in compensation practices. Because it shares profits, it may be able to share the costs as well. Many of its risks may accrue at its inception. Joint venturers have to first invest before they can obtain the rewards of their joint efforts. Unless they can obtain loans, their contributions must carry expenses until the venture can cover and return their advancement from its revenues. These expenses pertain to establishment and initial operational costs, including the compensation of independent parties that is not linked to the success of the venture. A joint venture may therefore be given time to develop its profitability. But its members will have cost-benefit criteria that determine their initial and their continued participation. If, apart from accommodations for irregularities of a startup phase, its revenues after expenses cannot meet the compensatory expectations of its members and do not show adequate signs of improvement, members are not likely to sustain that venture. They will continue to impose similar criteria after the startup phase of an enterprise and may reduce or abandon its operations if its profitability descends below levels they deem adequate.

For an enterprise that produces for exchange, the combined requirements of market acceptance and of compensation may not leave much room to succeed. These pressures seem to be at least partly absent for joint production enterprises that produce for the use of their members. Such enterprises would still face pressures implicated in the production of a joint production enterprise. Some of these pressures might be higher than in an enterprise that produces for exchange. Obtaining loans might be more problematic because the enterprise will not have revenues from exchange. Owners might not have the ability to obtain loans either unless they can sell distributions or possess other property. Further, such an enterprise may be relatively cumbersome because it is limited to the distribution of the products it generates. If contributors cannot employ the products directly, they must exchange their distributions, which subjects them to the pressures of the market. Only if contributors have use for the goods or services that an enterprise produces may this type of joint venture have superior efficiency because it can forgo at least some of the pressure generated by exchanges. Contributors may compare their results with a market-driven result for their investment and may expect attributions commensurate with the market value of contributions. But their independence from marketing, sales, and distribution and from concerns of competition and product rejection may give them more flexibility to obtain a profitable result than an enterprise producing for exchange. While enter-

prises that produce for direct consumption by their contributors then may possess significant advantages, relying solely on such models appears to be impossible in an advanced economy. Even extended enterprises that produce a diversity of goods and services will not be able to meet all wishes or fulfill them with acceptable flexibility. Unless contributors participate in the generation of products they desire, internal exchange patterns threaten to approach the complexities of a market. Beyond that, individuals are not capable of participating in a sufficient number of joint ventures to fulfill all their needs directly. Hence, such joint ventures or their contributors will have to engage in exchanges.

To survive and thrive in a free market, producers for exchange may be tempted to improve their odds by engaging in competitive tactics. Applying such tactics appears to be difficult. Under free market principles, the value of contributions is established by negotiations regarding a particular exchange, by custom established through the results of previous negotiations, and by contemporaneous offers of other market participants. If there is no market established for a contribution yet, its value will likely be established by the increase in market value that it confers upon a product that incorporates it compared to products of similar functionality or at least purpose that are produced without it. This ultimately depends on the comparative efficacy for an end customer. Free market dynamics should then foreclose success for competitive maneuvers. Only, they may be disrupted by the pervasive pressures of what it takes to be successful in such a market, independent proclivities to seek and exploit competitive advantages, or a combination of such causes. Participants may prosecute competitive strategies in either direction of a line of production involving independent parties. They may apply them against their independent contributors or customers. But competitive strategies may not only be undertaken by separate participants that exchange a product or its parts in different forms of completion. They might also be undertaken by joint production enterprises against their participants or by these against their enterprises. Although all of these varieties of competition are possible, joint production enterprises seem favored to win because of their concentrated economic power relative to other market participants.

The most vulnerable parties appear to be contributors that deal with such entities. Pressures from within and from the environment of enterprises may cause these to generate market conditions or take advantage of circumstances that may prompt joint or independent contributors to provide contributions with decreased compensation while not allowing a commensurate lowering of quality or quantity in their contribution. However, a reduction of compensation may not be pos-

sible beyond certain levels because contributors might stop participating. Even in the absence of other opportunities for profitably contributing, contributors might be able to reduce their expenses, park their resources and exist on their substance, or dissolve and leave constituents with similar resilience. Still, direct or indirect contributors who do not possess sufficient reserves and who must apply their resources or lose them, including individuals who contribute their physical substance or services, may not have this flexibility. They might have to accept reduced market values for their contributions to salvage any value from their resources. Proprietors of other perishable contributions might cease generation of those resources and save the costs involved in that generation to cut their losses. They might join the group of individuals who might have to offer their physical substance or services to survive. But human resources are rather unique in that they cannot be reduced below a definite boundary because certain types and quantities of resources are necessary to secure the existence of their contributors. The endangerment of their existence by a failure to find sufficient means motivates human contributors to preserve themselves at almost any cost. Even in a free market, the value of their contributions may be below what they need to exist. Yet the endangerment of existential needs makes individuals particularly vulnerable to competitive pressure. Then again, the compelling need to secure their existence also may push them to reverse their reaction from submission to determined resistance because they have little to lose. Competitive reactivity may already pose a problem requiring remediation in a free market. But the exercise of competitive pressure to create or take advantage of existential difficulties constitutes an explosive focal point for defensive and offensive competition in return. This potential of desperate individuals to become radicalized imparts them with great power. Where the boundary of a reversal reaction lies may be difficult to tell and may vary depending on the awareness and priorities of contributors. That insecurity and the speed, vigor, breadth, and possibly ferocious escalation with which a reversal may occur may persuade competitors to refrain from approaching such limits and maintain a security margin.

This may still leave relatively safe areas within which producers with sufficient market power can unilaterally impose terms or through similar behavior or explicitly collude to decrease the compensation of contributions by weaker participants. They may also create other circumstances that foreclose or reduce the freedom of such contributors to choose their participation. Victimized contributors may mount defensive or offensive competitive efforts of their own. But these might not be as effective because of their more dispersed nature, their rela-

tive lack of organization, or their overproportional vulnerability. They might further lack in solidarity because their interests might be differently targeted or affected by competition or because competitive pressure against them places them in competition with one another.

Alternatively, or in addition to pressuring contributors, a competitive enterprise may cause customers to pay prices above free market standards. It might try to manipulate the value of its offerings by exaggerating the effectiveness or efficiency of its products in falsified tests and advertisements. It also might decrease these standards to increase original sales, replacements, or repair. However, such manipulations may not be very successful because producers in a product category may establish market standards of effectiveness and efficiency that serve to measure the value of a product. A competitive enterprise might therefore resort to manipulating the other aspects that impact value, customers' need for and the availability of the product. It might endeavor to elevate the related needs of customers by foreclosing their access to resources or by arranging that resources they already possess are taken or lost. It might attempt to manipulate potential customers' minds to implant the concept of a need where none exists, to promote impressions of a need, or to particularize a need toward its products. It might try to make the products it can provide scarce or appear to be scarce. It might strive to engineer situations where customers have no choice. If its products are not unique, these manipulations would benefit from collusion with other sources of the same or similar products. Competitive enterprises might organize with or influence other potential or actual offerors of the same or of similar products. Where that is not possible or only partly succeeds, they might acquire these offerors, damage their ability to meet market demands, force them out of business, or intimidate them into compliance. These strategies may largely or entirely succeed under the use of collaterally constructive competition with apparent benefits for customers. If customers mount defensive competitive efforts, their activities would fall into the category of pressure on contributors. They might have a good chance of succeeding if their position in the production sequence allows them to wield concentrated market power or to organize with other customers.

Particularities of production sequences and particular strengths and weaknesses may privilege or handicap participants in competitive contests independent from their position in the sequence. It may appear impossible to conclude categorically that participants at any step during a production sequence are more powerful than others. Still, we can determine that individual contributors are likely to be in a weaker competitive position. We may further regard the competitive position

of individual end customers to be weak. Individual consumers may be dispersed and not possess the awareness, motivation, or skill to resist professionally focused competitive pressure from their suppliers effectively or to mount their own pressure in an organized fashion. Their market power is founded on the cumulative impact of their individual determinations. By influencing and directing such individual determinations, competitive interests may be able to render them agents and victims. Although individual end customers can be viewed as the ultimate arbiters of value for goods and services, they do not appear to have more power than individual contributors in the supply chain. In fact, they are likely to be the same person. Individual end customers are likely to incorporate the products they acquire in exchanges into purposes that sustain or build their productive capacity. To afford the means to obtain a product in an exchange, they may have to participate as contributors in a supply chain. This dual function as customers and contributors is not exclusive to individual contributors and to end customers. Each participant to an exchange in a supply chain is likely both a customer and a contributor. The positioning of individuals may only seem distinguishable because it is characterized by requirements that relate more directly to human needs. But that makes individuals centrally important in the overall production context because human needs form the ultimate causes for all production sequences. Humans and their needs are the central link in which all production sequences eventually meet and hence become circular. It appears odd that, notwithstanding this significance, the position of so many humans should be the weakest in the production circle and in the consequential societal setting. As long as humans direct production, the sole reason why this would be so is that a minority of individuals directing these circles competitively pervert production according to their needs.

If individuals would realize their combined market power, it is unlikely that they would use it as an offensive competitive instrument. For one, they would damage the production process of which they are an integral part and which they desire to serve their needs. Moreover, their insight into their combined importance and their resolve to work together for mutual benefit are unlikely to occur without the contemporaneous insight that common needs should be the focus and measure of all production and that competitive practices imperil these values. Beyond fighting competitive conduct, such individuals may therefore promote constructive strategies to improve participants' contemporary standing in exchanges and develop their position by conveying value to others. Accomplishing the necessary quantitative or qualitative progressions may demand that participants improve their abilities

or efforts. It may require that they reallocate their efforts to more effective and efficient techniques or endeavors. They may also have to coordinate their contributions with those of other contributors in the supply chain who might have to engage in similar or complementary improvements to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of resulting combined products. The broad adoption of such attitudes and the resulting advancements and value of products will permit exchanges of mutually beneficial means at higher quantities and quality. The higher value of contributions will improve the ability of participants to afford one another's products, and the enhancement of means will serve the overall improvement of happiness. While organization and technology may be important for such a progress, all constructive enhancements are initially, and many may remain, rooted in human capabilities. Accordingly, maximizing the ability of a society to build happiness for its members depends on the actualization of its members' potentials.

This development of capabilities would seem to be the cooperative answer to competitive pressures among market participants. Nevertheless, a residual competitive effect seems to persevere in the manner by which striving for excellence in products and contributions affects markets. Offerings still contend with offerings by other individuals or enterprises for the same customers. Customers still select products that provide better effectiveness or efficiency. This may transfer a market position a producer has held or might have held to others. The migration of customers would deprive producers of the resources they invested, of their earnings, of resources to keep up production and to support themselves and their contributors. It excludes them from participating in exchanges or may force them to offer their products at a price that they cannot maintain. An improvement of the effectiveness or efficiency of their products may be impossible for them or may not entice customers to their products. This may leave such producers and their contributors in a spectrum of calamities, including ruin. For such parties, it may be hard to conceive of the practices that engender such results as noncompetitive. Striving to obtain other producers' customers or access to uncommitted customers appears to contain exclusionary and predatory features even if it is undertaken through enhanced effectiveness and efficiency. One may further contend that customers leave producers no other choice than to engage in competition. Arguably, customers act competitively by excluding products from their selection based on considerations of effectiveness and efficiency.

Only, a customer who chooses from a variety of offerings those that appear to be best suited for the customer's pursuits according to the criteria of effectiveness and efficiency does nothing to manipulate

or coerce the needs of offerors or the effectiveness, efficiency, or availability of their products. Similarly, an offeror providing products that constitute superior means under the customers' criteria does nothing to manipulate or coerce these aspects. As long as these parties do not manipulate or coerce the assessments of value in others, their pursuits do not constitute competitive behavior. Customers' selections among different offerings to optimize the fulfillment of their needs, and offerors' endeavors to anticipate or comport with these choices, are corrective measures that adjust the production of means to better meet customers' needs. As customers, all individuals can benefit from these adjustments and the market's overall tendency of securing and improving the effectiveness, efficiency, and availability of means. That parties might be caught in a market adjustment as producers signifies, in the absence of competitive interferences, that these producers or contributors associated with them have not sufficiently contributed and have failed or underperformed in the societal efforts to advance production. It may appear unjust that contributors to a product who have no responsibility in the failure or underperformance of a product should be negatively affected. Yet, if producers were permitted to insist that others deal with them under inferior conditions they provide or to which they contribute, they would take competitive advantage of customers and other offerors. To accommodate these inferior producers, better-suited contributions would have to be barred from finding customers. Customers would have to be precluded from accessing resources that serve their needs better and forced to transfer means to parties that leave them with inferior means. By forestalling access to better goods and services, a cooperative system would engage in the unproductive, exclusionary, and predatory competition that it strives to overcome. It would hold customers and more capable producers back for the sake of advancing the needs of substandard producers. By its essential logic, a cooperative system cannot permit such competitive offenses.

We might then approve a mechanism of selecting the most effective or efficient offers by comparison because it advances the overall fulfillment of our needs in a society. But we still face challenges to maintain this mechanism of comparative selection in its purity against competitive tendencies by market participants. Participants may have to be committed by regulation, supervision, and measures of defensive competition to abstain from manipulating needs of other participants or the effectiveness, efficiency, or availability of products. Participants may endeavor competitive strategies to obtain illegitimate advantages although they could contribute constructively and could secure sufficient compensation. Without interdiction, they might deem competi-

tive strategies to be more efficient for them. They might presume that competitive strategies would provide them with more or better means than they could secure through constructive contributions. However, a cooperative system that institutes free markets must address deeper causes for competitive activity as well. The existential threat of losing in one's efforts to provide accepted economic contributions to a society and the aftermath of having lost may create a degree of desperation in participants that might motivate them to undermine, overturn, or violate rules adverse to competition. The systemic creation of losers in a free market where customers select better or best products, and the resulting competitive challenges, threaten to drown the advantages of a cooperative system. The risks and costs of suppressing and fighting the competitive challenges would be substantial. Although such measures seem justified as defensive, a cooperative system must counteract the competitive threat that would arise from a division of the system into a cooperative upper class of winners and beneficiaries and an underclass of losers. This may require that losing participants in the economic process elevate their efforts to match their potential. They may suffer because they have not been willing or able to develop or live up to that potential. A cooperative system must encourage effort and discourage sloth. But it also has to solve a problem of competitive effects that it creates for some participants. It has to remedy the problem that comparative selection invites redundant and thus wasteful duplication of efforts and uses losing offerors as uncompensated agents to generate products of superior effectiveness and affordability. It must further address its hazard of leaving the productive capacity of losing offerors idle. These competitive effects can only be reduced but not prevented. Left unattended, they may approach those of collaterally constructive competition and endanger the appeal of a cooperative system because they make a distinction of comparative selection problematic.

A cooperative system faces the challenge of having to remediate this potentially lethal flaw without disturbing the mechanism of comparative selection. It must avoid wasteful multiplication of efforts that negatively affects overall effectiveness and efficiency while preserving the availability of alternatives. For that purpose, it has to sanction and encourage joint ventures of producers in redundant ranges of technological development and production. Still, this can only moderate but not eliminate duplication of efforts in the production of similar products among which customers can choose. A cooperative system might have to assist in overcoming economic misfortunes in these remaining areas where producers proceed separately. To advance, a cooperative society has to encourage the development and offer of products with

better effectiveness, efficiency, and availability. Producers must be enabled to pursue trials that might identify and produce such goods and services. To motivate participants to shoulder productive risks and to prevent the waste of participants' productive capacity upon their failure, a cooperative society has to maximize the competence of producers and minimize the damaging effects of failure in such trials. It must encourage diligence and address failure despite its application. Failing endeavors might be reorganized to become productive or, where that is not possible, would have to be disbanded with a minimum of overall damage and with the recycling of workable aspects. Individual participants who are or are left without productive involvement must be protected from existential threats and have to be assisted in rejoining the cooperative productive process. A cooperative system has to find employment for every capable member and assure fair compensation for adequate efforts that at least covers the minimum existential requirements for such individuals and legitimate dependents. It must protect minors and afford them an opportunity to fully develop their productive potential. Finally, members must be assisted to sustain their productive capabilities after they are developed or to overcome their temporary hindrance. They must also be protected when these capabilities permanently diminish or end. These measures secure highest levels of effectiveness, efficiency, and availability of means and inhibit competitive orientations by displaced members. They further defend the fundamental rights of members and fulfill societal obligations of cooperative mutuality. Thus, the response to the competitive deficiencies of a free market system is to remediate them with cooperation.

Many individuals who practice competition in a mostly cooperatively oriented society may try to resist such measures. They may reject participating in the funding of such measures if they are economically successful and having to sacrifice taking advantage of victims to some extent. They may not be interested in the overall beneficial aspects of cooperative economic behavior or even the positive long-term results for their practices. They have a different understanding of free markets that idealizes a setting in which competitive interests are substantially free to take advantage of victims. They may not consider the inherent competitive results of a free market system as shortcomings because these are compatible with their competitive perspective. Nor may they be interested in enhancing the productive potential of all the members of a society because this might render these more difficult to control. The preeminence of them individually or of a group of which they are part is their sole concern, and they may fight any cooperative impositions on them. Uncompromising attitudes of higher-level com-

petitors may be shared by victims who adopted competitive mindsets as a result of circumstances, indoctrination, or a lack of consideration. If they do not rely on societal support of losers, they may regard it as a competitive infringement on them even if they do not participate in funding it. They may contend that it confers an unfair advantage onto individuals who have proven themselves to be undeserving. They may resent that others are given economic standing similar to theirs without a similar level of exertion. The focused assistance by a cooperative system to improve and to sustain the productive capacity of members and its conditioning on a showing of effort seem capable of dispelling such attitudes. Moreover, lower-level competitors might be converted because they are likely to experience the benefits of such assistance at some point and because they may have become offensive competitors only for lack of an alternative. This may threaten the competitive support on which higher-level competitors rely in their rule. They benefit from assistance for losers that keeps them from rising against competitive abuse or the system that condones it. Yet, to maintain a competitive attitude in lower-level members, higher-level competitors may fail to give and impede cooperative assistance or render it ineffectual.

Still, there may be more sophisticated competitors in a cooperatively oriented economy. They may understand that assistance measures for losing participants are essential to maintain and increase the vitality of the economy on which they prey. Joining in the provision of funds for that support may not bother them if their benefits from such a mechanism exceed their costs. Beyond a direct increase in the profitability of their competitive endeavors, such participants may consider that systemic support for economic losers relieves fallout from their competitive abuses as well. In addition to having the system provide effective remediation for their misdeeds, competitors may encounter considerably less attention and resistance if they can label the fallout a product of a free market system. Such competitors may therefore not only tolerate but even embrace the protection and support of economic losers by a cooperative system. They may further support some regulation for competitive activities to maintain a stable competitive setting that diminishes the possibility of competitive threats to their position directly and renders itself supportable by cooperative interests. They may still oppose regulations that affect their standing and operations. But they may agree to and even actively engage in the containment of less sophisticated competitors that advocate or practice more strident competitive approaches so that their own positions and activities appear more reasonable by contrast. By controlling extreme competitive attitudes in others, they may succeed profiling themselves as

reasonably competitive or even as neutral elements in a society that is divided or undecided between competitive and cooperative approaches. Their moderating demeanor may appear as a satisfactory compromise to cooperative forces and preserve sufficient competitive maneuvering room. The representation of middle ground positions sophisticated competitors as societal arbiters and ordains them to be selected to govern in such a society. The situating of sophisticated competitors in government positions and the trust they receive from cooperatively oriented individuals to defend these against extreme competition provides them with extensive accepted prospects to manage resources for their purposes. This may tempt competitive rulers or those with ambitions to rule to assume control of existing or created less sophisticated competitive segments of a society. Such control permits them to tune positions and actions of such segments more or less fervent, evidencing them as menaces and possibly rendering them conciliatory as policies require. Besides these radical segments, a great number of subordinated competitors may advocate moderate competitive government. They may understand that extreme positions are unlikely to command stable majorities and could antagonize cooperative interests to a point where the correlation with them becomes less profitable. Sophisticated competitive leaders in a cooperatively oriented society may then be quite successful in unifying their side and pacifying the other.

However, to succeed, they must preclude cooperative elements from gaining insight into their tactics of governance and the underlying competitive nature of the competitively oriented system they lead. Their position might become jeopardized if subjects were to more fully comprehend their practices and had a clearer understanding of cooperation and its advantages. Consequently, sophisticated competitive powers strive to move and maintain societal agreements in their favor by manipulating the opinions of other members of them, competition, and cooperation. In such a strategy, they may shape competitive activities that do not seem to be competitive on their face but imperil a cooperative society. To defend itself, a cooperative system must become competitive against at least the most virulent competitive interests. It must interdict and eradicate competitive activities in economic, social, and governmental processes by regulation and intervention and must reverse and punish competitive overreaching. This requires it to stoop to tactics that are similar to those employed in open offensive competition. Competitive interests may denounce these activities to confuse the identity of offensive and defensive forces. They may defame measures that are offered or taken to protect against offensive competition or to raise the stability, effectiveness, or efficiency of a cooperative so-

ciety as offensive competitive strategies. They may portray them as ineffective or as illegitimate restrictions that curb the effectiveness and efficiency of a free pursuit of legitimate needs. They may also mischaracterize or downplay the occurrence, character, or seriousness of more flagrant offensive competitive infractions to discredit the response by cooperatively oriented powers. They might even use their influence to manufacture cooperative attitudes and responses that exhibit an over-reaction or a more fundamental impropriety by cooperative forces.

Competitive interests may venture to complete their campaign to reverse attitudes concerning cooperation and competition by focusing on inverting the negative connotation of the term competition and terms connected to it. They may try to have them become coextensive with constructive effectiveness and efficiency and a system of comparative selection based on them. They may try to use the partial congruence of comparative selection in a free market with collaterally beneficial competition to confuse distinctions. They may deny or play down the distinction between exclusionary and predatory practices that separate collaterally beneficial competition from merit processes of comparative selection. They may spread and use confusion with comparative selection to represent competition as the cause of positive results that comparative selection can yield. Competitors may apply such efforts to disorient victims and bystanders, to motivate supporters, and possibly to soothe their own conscience. In their undertaking to influence others, they might gain plausibility and uncritical acceptance by referring to the competitive intent that parties may harbor even if they contribute to constructive pursuits and uncoerced and unmanipulated exchanges that are representative of a cooperative arrangement. They may tout this gratuitous aspect as the leading reason for the functioning of comparative selection. Competitive interests may then succeed in making competition appear to be the motor of a cooperative system and in giving credence to their adjustment of the meaning of competition as a constructive, productive undertaking. They may also succeed in perverting the designation of free markets to include and exalt exclusionary and predatory activities, hence replacing the mechanism of comparative selection relating to the merits of producers and products with competitive usurpation. They may further declare the availability of choice as a competitive mark. They may apply the label of competitiveness to products within the effectiveness and efficiency scope that is accepted by customers, to products that find better acceptance than others, and to offerors of such products. This permits them to obscure the distinction between free market and competitive principles and to make these appear synonymous. Once this confusion takes hold, com-

petitive forces can mislabel competitive strategies as cooperative. This reversal of terminology may not only be applied in economic but also in other circumstances. Together with the designation of cooperative forces as exclusionary and predatory and of competitive forces as defenders of the ability to fulfill one's needs, it may confuse cooperatively minded individuals sufficiently to turn them in favor of competition or may raise enough doubt so that such individuals may find it difficult to categorically oppose competition as a deleterious force.

We may trust that, as humanity advances and insight is raised, increasing numbers of individuals will see through competitive machinations. We may believe that humans are bound to realize that competitive manners of pursuit do not advance their objectives as much as cooperative practices. But competitive powers may not give in without a fight. They may harden their stance and resort to coercion. However, this may threaten their rule because it provokes awareness of their nature, stirs violent resistance, and decreases the production on which they rely. Competitive interests may therefore strive to avoid coercion and continue with manipulations as long as they can. Similarly, cooperative forces may regard forcible resistance as a remedy of last resort because a battle with competitive forces may heavily damage cooperative interests. Further, a defensive competitive fight may actuate a cooperative organization to assume a command structure that resembles offensive competitive domination. This may have a cooperative movement slide into the abandonment of its essence and transform into an offensively competitive mechanism. Asserting command over cooperative structures and processes on which competitors already rely and the incremental establishment of additional cooperative mechanisms may pose a more promising alternative. Still, questions remain not only how a peaceful reorganization can be accomplished but also how it can be preserved once it is achieved. Even if we could suppress competitive impulses, they may remain. The potential that cooperative individuals and societies might surrender to temptation and relapse to competitive practices may never be remote. Although we may call individuals, societies, or structures and processes cooperative, they may only be so in part. Individuals may continue to maintain competitive attitudes and practices and to display varying degrees of commitment to cooperative modes. They may retain competitive practices in abeyance in case they are required or become more advantageous. It may take continuous, comprehensive individual and societal attention and defenses to keep offensively competitive impulses restrained. The next chapter addresses how cooperative interests can meet such challenges and advance toward a more complete and stable cooperative system.