

## CHAPTER 40

### CONSTRUCTION AND DESTRUCTION

The proposition that our continuing production of means constitutes an inherent requirement for the production of happiness may leave us with disbelief. Our experiences with the production of means may be characterized by an ongoing struggle against scarcity and other adversities. We may wish that we could remove ourselves from that struggle for means into an ideal state of happiness in which all our wishes have come true and are perpetually coming true. We may desire a state of harmony between what is or is developing and what we want, where our environment provides means in compliance with our wishes without our continuing involvement. We may believe that accomplishing such a state would liberate us. We would not have to rely on our pursuits and strategies of incremental advancement anymore. We would not have to bother with attaining pleasure in approximation of fulfillment because we would experience fulfillment itself. Such a condition of fulfillment would mean that our needs would never be subjected to a state of significant pain. We would solely experience them in a state of fulfillment that is mended at the slightest indication of a wish.

To resolve whether we should aspire to such a state, we would have to confirm that it would actually confer flawless happiness onto us. The first obstacle in our understanding would be to conceive how a state where all our needs are being satisfied could be achieved. We may also ask who or what would fulfill our wishes and needs if not we. We might envision a system in which privileged individuals have their wishes and needs permanently fulfilled by others who are not or less privileged. We might further imagine a system of deferred enjoyment where we first serve to fulfill the needs of others or work on accumulating means and subsequently are being attended in a state of retirement from that service or work. Such concepts have been created to various degrees of implementation. They have largely failed to provide superior happiness, let alone perfect happiness, even if they were conceptualized to cover a wide range of needs. They suffer from the built-in predicament that the happiness for some is purchased with the unhappiness of others or that the happiness of individuals is purchased with their deprivation at another time. They are the results of competitive imposition against others or against ourselves. We merely project the illusion that our needs are unconditionally met if we transfer the pain onto others or we reserve it to a different period in our existence. Even if we accomplish and manage to sustain such an inequity or deferment in the production of our means, the fulfillment of our wishes

is likely to be imperfect. To obtain means at the cost of others, we may have to engage in an ongoing effort to manipulate or coerce their production for us. This imposes on us the risk of exterior defensive repercussions and exposes us to fear, empathic pain, and the dissatisfaction of our need for collective survival and thriving from our involvement. The control and suppression of these adversities may cause us significant problems. If we obtain means at our own cost, we are left with the regret of having sacrificed parts of our existence and with wondering whether our later enjoyment can compensate us for that loss. Even if we view the means we receive on their own merits, the assistance we receive or create may only provide partial coverage of our needs.

At least with respect to our nonemotional requirements, there appears to be a clear way to improve fulfillment and to reduce or eliminate the pain and fear that may be attached to their pursuit without merely shifting our burden to other humans or to us at another time. We might create mechanisms that undertake our work for us. In time, we might manage to delegate the production of nonemotional means mostly to an automated system. In addition, we may apply technology to moderate or to abolish the interference of nonhuman coincidental forces and to place our environment into submission to human objectives. The only remaining problem would seem to be the interference among humans because their pursuits might stay incompatible. Here, we could only accomplish perfection if the activities of humans could be accustomed to not disturb one another's fulfillment. However, such perfection seems to be impossible to achieve if humans live in contact with one another. Arguably, to preclude or at least minimize interference, individuals who could interfere would have to be liberated from the burdens of pursuing nonemotional objectives. Yet it is hard to imagine how we should manage to live with other individuals if each of us had no restriction on the implementation of nonemotional wishes. Because of the wide range of capacities and their application, mutual disturbances would be set to grow. Technological development could provide much of the response to this problem by facilitating sufficient distancing among individuals. Given copious space, technological advancement, and other resources, the perfect accomplishment of nonemotional objectives at the direction of individuals might be possible to a large extent. Still, the development and deployment of the necessary technology might require intense cooperation among individuals. Further, the application of expanding technology by scores of individuals would generate a risk of interference that would have to be managed. Even if we would not have to depend on the cooperation by others anymore to reach or maintain nonemotional means, the risk that

these or their generation mechanisms might be applied in ways that interfere with others would require the setting of boundaries for individual pursuits. Individuals would still have to arrange the use of their capacity so as not to interfere with one another. Such boundaries may only become obsolete if the distance among individuals were so great that it could not be bridged. Such an unconditional separation seems impossible. Technology might always be able to bridge sooner or later the distances it creates. Thus, perfection in the fulfillment of nonemotional objectives may necessitate the voluntary and mutually enforced creation and maintenance of distance among individuals. Alternatively, an independent system might be created to restrain them.

With sufficient technological development, distancing, and arrangements that maintain and possibly increase distance to forestall interference, most, if not all nonemotional requirements of humanity might be fulfillable. But such a setting would work against the fulfillment of needs that require social interaction to activate emotional resources directly in us or to obtain emotional resources that others can generate in us. The generation of most emotional resources calls for or can benefit from human interaction in shape of personal contact. We might attempt to replace human counterparts with substitutes to give us the same satisfaction. Although specimens of other natural or adjusted life forms might serve in that capacity to some extent, their different character makes it doubtful that they could fulfill all needs that require interaction for the production of human emotional resources. Eventually, we may develop the technology to devise mechanisms that can fulfill such interactive emotional requirements. To capably substitute humans in the interactive procurement of emotional resources, they would have to emulate human needs and behavior in large measure. Hence, they would have to be fundamentally functionally equivalent to humans. While we might be able to program such machines to harmonize them with our wishes, awareness of the programmed character of their behavior would detract from the emotional effects they might be able to generate for us. On the other hand, if we grant such machines decisional freedom, they might not comply with our wishes and interfere with our pursuits. This might place us into a conundrum that could solely be resolved if we cooperatively interacted with such machines to reduce interference to a minimum. That would require us to compromise our pursuits to allow their pursuits. It would have the result that, despite the availability of all resources we want, we would be as constrained in how we apply them as we would be if we lived in a genuinely human society. The satisfaction of needs with interactive emotional requirements inexorably places us into a social context.

The requirement for social interaction to achieve emotional resources significantly complicates our aspiration to reach perfect satisfaction. Attaining attitudes and acts that generate emotional resources seems to require in important aspects intense and pervasive involvement. The requirement of contact raises the risk that participants' activities might interfere with one another. That risk is additionally elevated because emotional resources only partly arise from spontaneous autonomous generation or the exchange of emotions without the participation of nonemotional resources. A sizeable part of them emerges from the exchange of such resources. Unless we are a part of constructive interactions regarding nonemotional resources, we are not likely to achieve adequate levels of emotional resources. We can only maximize our supply of emotional resources if we partake in comprehensive mutuality. Our supply of emotional resources may therefore suffer as we approach and reach self-sufficiency in the supply of nonemotional resources. Availing ourselves of such a perfection appears to be similarly deleterious to our generation of emotional resources as purposely distancing ourselves from other humans. Constructive cooperation with others appears to be indispensable to maximize our happiness. To take complete advantage of the benefits of cooperation, interferences that might engender negative mutuality have to be reduced to a minimum. That may necessitate increased coordination and compromise. Yet a full development of the needs that give rise to comprehensive mutuality seems to naturally guide us to comport ourselves in ways that do not violate legitimate concerns of other individuals.

We might then decide not to look for distance and perfection in the supply of nonemotional resources and to instead seek a pursuit of needs in interaction with others. Notwithstanding, we may not be able to escape the problems that distance and perfection produce. The formation of such problems seems to be the inescapable consequence of cooperative commitments and efforts. Cooperation empowers technological and economic progress and coordination to a state of automation in which nonemotional resources are available without or at least without voluntary cooperation. Automation renders many interactive pursuits superfluous or constrains them, therewith threatening to isolate us, reduce mutuality, and adversely affect the production of emotional resources. We would not need one another or not need one another's consent anymore for many constructive pursuits. Potential interference might still have us engage in coordination and thus mutuality. But resulting contacts would be preventive or remedial and might not give us many of the emotional resources we crave. Moreover, even these activities might be automated. As a consequence, we may not be

very successful in generating emotional resources. Even if we can generate some pure emotional resources in the absence of nonemotional correlations, they may not be able to compensate for the lack of other sources and the emotional drain that the lack of mutuality with others causes. Cooperation may hence appear to ultimately lead to emotional starvation although it seems to be the sole remedy against emotional starvation in the near term. We may deem the risk remote that perfection in the supply of nonemotional resources might interfere with our supply for emotional resources. Our overt physical requirements, the manners in which we acquire theoretical and practical knowledge, and the ways in which we save time, extend our life, and secure our species render it advantageous or mandatory that we constructively interact with other humans and exchange resources. It is difficult to imagine how we could develop our happiness without cooperation and its benefits, nor would we wish to be without them. Requirements for mutual dependence regarding nonemotional resources among humans would appear to grow before they subside when humans hand over obviously physical and rational functions to machines and depend on these. Our craving for automation benefits appears to inescapably attract us and may move us to dismiss its threat for our future happiness.

Then again, we can already detect some damaging effects of cooperation at early stages. The growth of dependence on other humans seems to become inevitable with the increasing complexity of our pursuits. That complexity appears to call for knowledge and for skills that may exceed the ability of one person. In addition, rationalized production processes of complex products may call for the repetitive application of specialized tasks. That leads to an increasing particularization in human gainful pursuits. Such rationalization may not assist our acquisition of emotional resources. Its fragmentations and organizational constrictions may negatively affect human interaction. In a complex system that only functions if every participant adheres to a designated function, we tend to automate our functions even before we automate our nonemotional procedures through machines. As we perfect complex production processes, human contact appears to become increasingly unnecessary. To the extent human contact happens, it is likely to lack the voluntary character and range of interaction that are essential to allow the satisfying generation of emotional resources from interaction. Meaningful contact may eventually only be necessary to initially train and fit individuals into the production setting or to manage deficiencies in situations where participants do not or do not adequately fulfill their designated functions, and even these functions may wane. Otherwise, the management and arrangement of the production pro-

cess and setting may not offer occasions for the interactive generation of emotional resources. The functions of every participant are closely constrained to fit that participant's particularized contribution to the production process. Interactions with other participants are becoming constrained to the immediate necessities of acquiring a matter in production from those who contributed to it at the immediately previous production stage and to handing it off to participants whose contribution is obligatory immediately after a specific improvement has been made. The programmed character of the production arrangement may not permit any or much variance in these transitions. Even if individuals should be grouped together to attend to a production stage in a combined effort, their contribution may be strictly regulated into specific tasks they have to contribute. In both settings, participants concentrate on undertakings according to a program that envisions standardized results and therefore renders human participants into equivalents of machines. The concentration of human activity in this fashion is only possible if other nonemotional resource requirements for participants are being automatically delivered by the system. This poses another incentive beyond considerations of effectiveness and efficiency to expand human automation to the production of the entirety of nonemotional resources. Arguably, the mutual provision of contributions to furnish one another's resources should engender the production of emotional resources. However, the automated character of the contribution and distribution of nonemotional resources among individuals does not carry much emotional weight. Participants do not develop a sense of transfer of products because they are not significantly involved in their production, do not determine their destination, and are not directly dependent on one another's provisions. The fragmented production processes and the large, convoluted nature of the system obscure a notion of personal causality for nonemotional resources that participants obtain and provide. Even a gift of products becomes in most part a symbol of emotional intent without a capacity to produce emotional resources because such products are not needed.

Even if it might be difficult to develop a sense of mutuality between individuals in different production lines, the negative effects of human automation might be counteracted by the emotional resources that joint production confers. Participants in a joint production enterprise may derive some satisfaction from the knowledge that they and others are contributing to a combined purpose and a shared benefit. Tribal dispositions may move us in addition to considerations of effectiveness and efficiency advantages and coincide partly with them. But the restricted modes of human automation do not allow tribal motiva-

tions and their extension to mutuality, empathy, and our need for collective survival and thriving to ascend to their full beneficial emotional impact, even within a subsystem of integrated production. The tribal resemblance to a joint production enterprise demonstrates this incongruity more than independent exchanges. It may therefore constitute a setting where resistance against unnatural curtailments of emotional needs from human automation crystallizes. Its deficiencies may also point us to the fact that human automation inhibits tribal motivations and their extension to humans beyond a production line.

An argument might be made that the discomforts of human automation are limited because it constitutes merely an interlude until mechanical automation takes over. But our continuing reliance on interactive emotional resources and the failure of their generation make us suffer even more once production processes do not require human involvement anymore. Human contact is diminished past the already reduced connections of human automation as we engage machines to assist in our tasks or as we replace humans. Humans will initially have to interact to establish and maintain production mechanisms that engage machines. Yet, in time, human involvement will become redundant as machines assume these functions, coordinate production, and become capable of developing and maintaining machines. Human interaction may no longer be critical to address nonemotional concerns. Under human and mechanical automation, cooperation besides these economic systems may not offer sufficient meaningful interaction.

Our instinctive desires for interaction persist although we have progressed to productive techniques for nonemotional resources that seem to be more effective and efficient than comprehensive mutuality. Arguably, our demand for interactively created emotional resources is becoming an obstacle to securing and augmenting our individual and collective survival and thriving because it threatens to spoil the nonemotional benefits of human automation and its progression to mechanical automation. Because we derive ultimate satisfaction from securing our survival and thriving, it may seem appropriate that we subordinate emotional benefits from cooperation. We may therefore seek to suppress or eliminate traits that rely on the cooperative production of nonemotional resources to produce emotional resources to the extent the improvement of nonemotional supplies through automation leaves no room for such production. To the extent participation in human automation could be motivated by such traits, we may attempt to transform them to recognize fragmented production as a cooperative undertaking. We may deem the continuance of the remainder of such traits and the incurring of pain upon the nonfulfillment of the needs

that they issue to be without purpose and damaging to our happiness. Suppressing or eliminating such traits would represent a momentous sacrifice or modification of happiness as we know it. But the negative effects of human and of mechanical automation for the production of emotional resources reach beyond cooperative pursuits. The invasion by automation of activities we might have pursued individually, particularly in the absence of motivations to pursue them cooperatively, completes the replacement of our nonemotional production activities. To the extent outsourcing of our pursuits of nonemotional resources to other humans or to machines keeps us from being involved in the sequencing of pursuits, it deprives us of the happiness we derive during pursuits and even from ultimate achievement. We may still derive some satisfaction from the use of resulting means. Yet even such applications may be automated, thereby leaving us without a purposeful involvement with nonemotional resources and the related production of emotional resources. Here again, we may deem it useful to suppress or to eliminate our drive to pursue the fulfillment of needs, or we may advocate its alteration during human automation to focus and confine it to the pursuit of specialized utilities in the production mechanism. Even if we managed to suppress, modify, or eliminate traits that committed us to the individual or cooperative pursuit of nonemotional objectives, the consequences of the resulting lack of motivation and absence of emotional resources may be difficult to foresee because they are unparalleled in human development. But we have reason to greatly fear for our ability to maintain happiness because we would appear to abandon most of the sources from which we currently derive satisfaction. Even if automation could in part increase our satisfaction regarding our principal needs for individual and collective survival and thriving, there may also be disadvantages because these needs receive their reason of desirability in large part from subordinated needs.

Moreover, we may question how automation and interventions into our traits that are designed to make it palatable by disabling most or all of our motivations would serve our individual or collective survival and thriving. If the automated systems we devise should become unable to support and protect us, the consequences of our delegation of nonemotional pursuits and abatement of related motivations could be devastating. Such an inability to support and protect may arise by external causes that exceed the resistance of the system. An automated system may be particularly susceptible to such interference when it is new and its protective facilities have not been hardened by adjusting them in reactions to experiences of external interference. Another cause for concern may be the potential that automation might neglect

functionalities that monitor and supervise the system or would be able to intervene if automated processes would not proceed as planned or if they could not adjust themselves to changed circumstances. If that function were reserved, our concern might be that it might be abused. Even if an automated system should proceed as scheduled, should be corrected to maintain its functionality, or should become able to correct itself, it may present a threat to human survival and thriving. The more an automated system succeeds, the more we must become concerned that its power will be usurped for competitive purposes or that it will rise to be its own integrated phenomenon that will subordinate human interests. Both of these threats appear to be innately attached to human automation because it reduces individuals to functionalities in assisting the system. That this system is in turn conceived to serve human interests may give us a sense of security. Yet the estrangement of its production structures and processes from human discretion, its failure to accommodate production methods that human needs mandate, and its comprehensive coverage of a developed society that does not give many individuals an alternative to participating in it suggest that the system heavily compromises some human interests to attend humanity. The automated nature of both its requirements for human service and its production may remove individuals from meaningfully controlling or resisting inadequacies or harmful changes in either.

A system of human automation may therefore offer a desirable target for competitive abuse by those who manage to interject themselves in its governance. But it may also develop in a manner that focuses on its systemic functionalities as an integrated organism with its own life functions for which participating individuals become service providers. Such a conversion may remind us of the competitive developments that are ingrained in the separation of government from the governed. These tendencies may overlap and may combine to produce a setting where the same interests assume governance in both political and economic matters. Even if such an organism should recognize its service obligations, it might view these as payment or as recycling that is necessary to keep it alive. In human automation, such attitudes and their accommodation would have to be represented at least in part in the minds of participating individuals. While that may appear to offer some protection, tribal instincts or expectations of other benefits may cause individuals to place an entity they serve over other humans' or even their own interests. In mechanical automation, nonhuman guidance may complete the progression to independence and possible adversity, bolstered by the demands or mere existence of human beneficiaries that the system may regard as damaging to its self-interest.

To address these issues, we have to come to terms with human and mechanical automation. We may not want to reject either of them outright because we realize that they may be indispensable to improve our supply of nonemotional resources. To identify a solution to our dilemma, we must more closely review the problem. In human automation, the specialized and therefore repetitive and restricted character of our pursuits may leave us without much satisfaction because it confines the pursuits of our needs. It perverts cooperative production to command our participation and to entwine us into a dependence that leaves us without viable discretion or escape. Our function is defined by its requirements. Even if we might initially choose which slot in its production processes we wish to occupy, we may not be at liberty to change our position once we conform or may only change with significant risk and cost. Human automation curtails our derivation of emotional resources from individual and cooperative pursuits by a procedural interference. By coercing us into a specific function, it prevents us from fulfilling needs that would produce emotional resources from proceeding and achieving ultimate results. In addition to our need for cooperative interaction, human automation may violate our needs for control of our circumstances, self-determination, self-realization, self-respect, and expression. Even regarding the needs it addresses, human automation precludes us from experiencing procedural pleasure since it obliges us to accept their partial or ultimate fulfillment without our pursuit. Its provision of nonemotional resources is bound to depress our pleasure because our experiences of happiness regarding pertaining needs are reduced to receiving results. But even our enjoyment of these events is soured because human automation precludes us from experiencing pleasure from applying the range of our capacities to fulfill our needs. Not using these capacities may provoke as much of an adverse reaction in us as the ultimate nonfulfillment of related needs because their use is instinctively commanded and can therefore be regarded as forming a part of the related needs. These aspects may join with other substantive core objectives regarding the manner of pursuit that are set forth by the related or by other needs. As a consequence, ultimate needs might be nominally fulfilled but we might still not be able to derive appropriate satisfaction from that circumstance.

We may become frustrated as a result of these curtailments. In addition, we may suffer fatigue from the monotony of our automated tasks that progressively fail to occupy us as they become familiar. We may also have difficulties recognizing such activities as semblances of sequences that guide us to the fulfillment of needs. The repetitive advancement of a minute part in a larger sequence may not grant us the

immediate impression of being involved in a pursuit. It may not appear to us as a sequence but rather as a step we are doomed to repeat without ever advancing. Although we might know how our contribution adds to a final result, we may not be able to derive much satisfaction from the remainder of the production arrangement or its resulting achievement of an objective. Our lack of productive involvement in other production steps or with the individuals undertaking them may curb our satisfaction. We may improve our identification with a production venture if we can advance to other functional positions or if we rotate our involvement among them. Further, we may be able to increase our identification if we have regular, meaningful contact with other participants, including in the governance and implementation of the joint production enterprise. These changes may address some of our frustrations. However, the processes in which we participate may still not give us the necessary flexibility and breadth to use our capacities to our full satisfaction. In that case, we must be able to participate in several different enterprises or we may take a position of independence from any joint production enterprise. Our direct involvement in free market activities may avail us of multiple relationships that may allow us to use the extent of our talents and to interact more extensively. We may also reserve certain pursuits entirely for our individual sequencing and accomplishment. It therefore appears crucial to safeguard functional discretion as well as variable and comprehensive involvement to secure emotional resources from the pursuit of nonemotional resources. To facilitate a suitable stream of emotional resources, nonemotional production may have to be organized in ways that sacrifice its effectiveness and efficiency to some extent. Yet improved stability and motivation and increased security conferred by participants' control are likely to balance these sacrifices, rendering concessions to emotional concerns sound even under nonemotional criteria.

Such concessions would be a permanent requirement unless we can and we desire to adjust our traits to where sufficient emotional resources arise from occupations that lack functional discretion, variety, and comprehensive involvement. Hierarchic and tribal instincts seem capable of imposing such a regime at more primitive stages of our development. But they pose a great threat of competitive abuse. Further, such a reduction appears to be increasingly incompatible because we have made mental advancements reflected in needs and in our facilities of individual and collective reconciliation. These make it less likely that we would consent to have our personality adjusted to such narrow-minded conditions because they would fundamentally inhibit the manner in which we find and can increase emotional satisfaction.

We may come upon a greater problem and pressure for adjustment after an establishment of mechanical automation because we are no longer involved in the production process. To cope with that state, we might want to excise the needs and aspects of needs that insist on our involvement in processes that have been taken over by machines because they would have become impossible to fulfill. We might leave the accomplishments of machines on our behalf as well as our ability to generate happiness from ultimate occasions of fulfillment in place as sources of happiness. We might also modify our needs to make satisfaction coextensive with fulfillment. We might alter our needs as we achieve perfection for each of them at different times. Yet, even if we could alter our needs this way, excising aspects of them that compel our involvement might have negative repercussions on us if mechanically automated production should ever fail. Such changes would only seem to be conducive if we were to advance to a state where we could be certain that our involvement in the pursuit of our needs will never be necessary again or that we could reverse our modifications.

Such adjustments would fundamentally change and might drastically diminish our concept of happiness. Excluding the production of emotional resources by involvement in cooperative activities and procedural and substantive contribution would withhold large aspects of how we derive happiness. Because of the close traditional connection between the production of nonemotional and emotional resources, we may wonder how many needs could be fulfilled solely by the application of emotional resources. We cannot comprehend how mechanical automation could make us happy without sweeping alterations to our personality and, even assuming that such changes could be made, do not know how happy we could then be. But we do recognize that mechanical automation cannot fulfill all our needs and that its damaging effects may surpass the advantages it can yield. While we might secure nonemotional existential requirements, emotional requirements could suffer. To protect the fulfillment of these, we may confine mechanical automation and preserve or reintroduce human interaction with machines and other humans as well as discretion and variety of involvement similar to the remedies appropriate for human automation. We might further resolve the problems posed by automation by becoming so intertwined with machines and aligned with their production goals that their capacities and production become ours. This would also resolve the peril of the estrangement of production from humanity and its potential for a competitive conversion. Then again, personality adjustments may be possible that curb frustration or increase happiness in an automated setting. With or without such adjustments, new hori-

zons demanding or deserving attention may ascend. With most of our needs being met by mechanical automation, we might expand familiar aspects or find unfamiliar aspects of needs. We might form new needs or experience their formation as we have in the past of human development. We could use fulfilled needs as a basis for their pursuit.

We might also let automation liberate us to move into a virtual world where we can find fulfillment without adjustments to the reality of automation. Our immersion into a virtual world with believable interactions may move us to acknowledge it as a new and possibly only reality. Memory of our current reality may not allow us a fully satisfying relocation of our activities. We may not have a sufficient sense of accomplishment unless we replace our memory in ways that cause us to accept an alternate reality as original. Even if that were possible, the proposition to succumb to such a false sense of reality may fill us with dread. It might seem to us as the ultimate self-betrayal. Moreover, our abandonment of our physiological reality with or without an erasure of memory may appear to us as a form of death. And yet, our confrontation with the continued agony of being exposed to an overwhelming sense of uselessness, dependence, and incapacity might make us select that self-betrayal. We may agree to it if we could be certain that our transition to and existence in a virtual reality would be secure and appear rewarding and that the parts of us that would remain in our original reality would be well maintained. If it were possible to transition most or the entirety of us into a virtual domain, we might even relinquish our familiar physiological existence and accept an existence exclusively in a representational system. We might select a system populated by representations of actual humans or a mode in which the system provides semblances that are programmed to optimize our experiences of happiness. The similarity of such an existence to the way we wish our afterlife to be may cause us to also select such options if they arise before we can achieve permanent life in our original form.

However, short of such transmutation, we must solve the problems of perfection in our present reality. To handle the consequences of automation in our interest, we must make and implement decisions whether and how to adjust it or ourselves with respect to it before it hardens into a system that has grown immune to our governance. The problems caused by human and mechanical automation are bound to coalesce. Although there are some differences in the issues they pose to us as well as solutions, the confinement of individual and cooperative activities by both keeps us from realizing an extensive contingent of emotional resources. Moreover, the effectiveness and efficiency advantages of both tend to supply us with an abundance of nonemotion-

al resources that threaten to arrest us in the fulfillment of needs that use such resources. We thus face paralysis for most of our needs albeit at different stages. If we are not willing or able to adjust our needs to cope with such settings or are not able to competently decide whether our manipulation is beneficial, we might address the obstructions that automation presents for pursuits short of fulfillment. That undertaking appears to be relatively easy. We know what the objectives of obstructed needs are and can identify strategies to prevent obstacles and to reinstate blocked pursuits. This may call for controlling the modalities and the velocity of human and mechanical automation in correlation with human development. It may require slowing the progress of automation until we understand its implications and how we wish to react to them, and until humans have become proficient in entering a more harmonious relationship with production enhancements. Effectiveness and efficiency advantages of automation may make such a deliberate approach difficult to institute and maintain. It may therefore be unavoidable that we suffer from the negative effects of automation before we become sufficiently motivated to transform our production settings, and it may take additional development until we become capable of changing these settings appropriately. At that time, human or mechanical automation may be so entrenched that it may be difficult to adjust it to human requirements. Nevertheless, such problems seem to be solvable with sufficient consideration and motivation.

But even if we should resolve the paralysis caused by automation and succeed in fully integrating the production of emotional resources with our production of nonemotional resources, the question remains what effect the fulfillment of our needs will have on us. Automation challenges us by delivering fulfillment of our needs in the area of nonemotional resources without our meaningful involvement in its generation. If we modify or remove the needs that automation fails to address to conform to the range for which it generates fulfillment, we would experience complete fulfillment. If we do not carry out such adjustments and instead strive to harmonize our needs by adjusting our production techniques to derive sufficient individual and cooperative activities, we may perfect our supply not only of nonemotional but also of emotional resources. An encompassing organization of our needs together with the development and use of our capacity may eventually yield persistent fulfillment of our needs in a comprehensive scope. In both settings, we must address the consequences and causes of having our pursuits arrested because we organize them so well that our needs become perpetually fulfilled. Such conditions confront us with a problem for the generation of emotional resources that appears to be more

difficult to resolve than issues of obstruction in their generation or in the generation of nonemotional resources short of fulfillment because we now seem to have no constructive prospect of resolution.

We may find it difficult to acknowledge fulfillment of our needs as a problem because we may be intensely invested and even struggle in accomplishing fulfillment. We may wish we could leave these troubles behind for good and enjoy achievement. We may not have experienced what it is like to have all our wishes come true without significant pursuit. We might manage to imagine for most of our needs what it means to have them satisfied to some extent because we have experienced their fulfillment in some way. Still, we might not have experienced their perfect fulfillment without the preceding pain of deprivation and without procedural pain in their pursuit. Nor are we likely to have experienced the contemporaneous satisfaction of all our needs. Accordingly, our experiences might not prepare us well for evaluating a setting of perfection. However, it seems that human development is approaching such a setting as a consequence of its technological progress in interrelation with individual and collective reconciliation. We might keep advancing toward it under the compulsion of our needs to only become aware of the problem as we are already embroiled in it. If all our wishes were being fulfilled without a significant effort or delay, we might soon be at a loss to formulate meaningful wishes. Moreover, if the implementation of our wishes were to be taken from us, nothing meaningful would be left for us to do that would grant us satisfaction. Our obviously physical and mental capacities and activities would become superfluous. There would be no point for planning or executing any pursuit. As long as we have not reached or sufficiently approached such a state, we might think that it should make us happy because all our needs seem to be attended and we would be liberated from worrying about and laboring on their fulfillment. There might appear to be no cause to need anything else. We could dedicate ourselves to a playful life in which existential pains would be replaced by the pleasures of entertainment. But the absence of meaningful activity might give rise to boredom or restlessness that all diversions we devise might be unable to mend because we recognize them as spurious substitutes.

That we should feel dissatisfied when all our needs are purportedly being satisfied means that we would be missing fulfillment of an essential ingredient. This missing ingredient appears to be the lack of movement. The fulfillment of our needs without previous deprivation may be ineffective or at least less effective in bringing us satisfaction. We would obtain fulfillment of our objectives without having felt the need for their fulfillment or at least not a need to an extent that makes

us appreciate fulfillment appropriately. The movement from deficiency to fulfillment is part of the essence of our needs beyond their objective of fulfillment. We may designate that requirement for movement our need for pursuit. We may distinguish all other needs that derive happiness from fulfillment as ulterior needs. Due to the regular coextension of our need for pursuit with the desire to fulfill ulterior needs, we may hesitate to claim the existence of a separate need for pursuit. The happiness we experience during pursuits is at least in part a derivative of ulterior needs that are attended by these. Our enjoyment of movement seems to some extent be a product of our mind in anticipation of ulterior fulfillment. Only, that sourcing cannot explain why we should continue to possess a drive for pursuit if the pertaining ulterior needs have been completely satisfied to every imaginable extent. Our anticipation of fulfillment has then merged with satisfaction about it and our motivation to advance should therefore have been provisionally extinguished. We can no longer generate happiness from approximating fulfillment of an ulterior need until its deficiencies arise again. But when we encounter such situations, we still sense a need to move on. Hence, it appears that the happiness we derive from movement is born from more than an anticipation of ultimate happiness. The existence of a separate need for pursuit may be difficult to detect because complete satisfaction covering our present, future, and contingent ulterior needs is rare. It may ordinarily coincide with ulterior causes.

To comprehend this need, it might be helpful to consider incidents where we have presently fulfilled a need. There seem to be valid reasons for a drive to produce means for the satisfaction of our ulterior needs that is separate from or is at least unaffected by their fulfillment. If we reacted only to indications of fulfillment status, we would remain idle in situations of fulfillment until our circumstances would deteriorate to cause us sufficient pain of nonfulfillment to motivate us into remedial action. We would then spring into action to mend that deprivation. We would react in the moment to the indications of our needs according to our priorities. Such a reactivity can produce potentially dangerous delays and inconsistencies in our actions. The pleasure over an accomplishment may be of short duration. But it may take more time for the state of fulfillment to abate and to give way to sufficient deprivation that impresses us with a level of dissatisfaction that stirs us into action. Holding our pursuit of a need in abeyance until we sense dissatisfaction would produce a seesaw of inactivity and activity, of complacency and pursuit. It may take us some time to produce the means that are necessary to satisfy needs. We may not already possess the means to avoid that time lag because we have not planned for that

event. If we are at leisure until we are sufficiently impressed by dissatisfaction, we may not be able to produce means in time to apply them. That may expose us to levels of deprivation from which we might not be able to recover or might only be able to recover at great cost. Even where that is not usually the case, missing attention to the buildup of our means during periods of fulfillment or low levels of pain deprives us of a safety zone that might prove to be useful or even existentially important. Interceding events may take us out of our comfort zone in which the oscillation between inertia and pursuit does not materially affect our ability to fulfill our needs. We may face irregularities or enduringly altered circumstances in which the resources we can produce during periods of fulfillment become critical for our ability to counter and overcome deprivation. Standing down in the absence of deprivation may turn periods of activity into a race against time that we may lose. Even if the heightened levels or risks of deprivation do not rise to existential levels and we foreclose them, the stress of pursuit under exigent conditions may burden our happiness. Thus, inaction during periods of fulfillment may expose us to unnecessary hardships. To adequately supply our needs with means, we must maintain a certain and possibly a maximum level of production during such periods.

Arguably, we should not have to rely on a need for pursuit to fill gaps in our activities due to fulfillment. Our capacity to anticipate pain and pleasure can motivate us to maintain production during periods when our ulterior needs stay fulfilled. Our rational abilities can greatly support our motivation to work on future events of threat or opportunity during phases of contentment. They can detail our emotional awareness that a temporarily fulfilled need may revert or be exposed to deprivation and that opportunity of more pleasure lies ahead. They might also be better able than our emotional mind on its own to prognosticate and evaluate developments and the prospects for future irregular events that might negatively or positively impact our fulfillment status. Even if there is no current indication of events that might deprive us or require the investment of resources, our rational mind might anticipate their possibility and calculate the chances. This imagination permits us to better connect emotionally with these circumstances and to take appropriate anticipatory action. Our rational mind may generate supplemental advice about what actions to take with its calculations of requirements and with its projections of consequences depending on which actions we take. These requirements and consequences can give rise to additional incentives for pursuits. Fears that we might lose the fulfillment of or not be able to fulfill ulterior needs in the future and desires to be prepared for opportunities may there-

fore combine with our need for pursuit even if ulterior needs are currently fulfilled. They may not only collaborate to engage us in pursuits of resources during times of repose. Both may also require us to practice thrift. They may both act as constant irritants in the enjoyment of the happiness that flows from accomplishments and seem to contribute momentarily to the decline of pleasure. Both sources impress us with the idea that satisfaction will not last. Both urge us to worry how to maintain or to regain a state of satisfaction even as we are satisfied. The resulting coextension of our need for pursuit with ulterior needs obscures its existence, nature, and utility. Because its functions appear to be duplicative, we may not detect it or deem it to be relevant.

Our need for pursuit may solely gain a distinctive profile when we review it in a setting where ulterior pursuits have been satisfied to levels that render additional pursuits to fulfill them unnecessary, even as a matter of future provision or precaution. In such a setting, continuing activities of pursuit would seem to be exclusively driven by our need for pursuit. To fulfill its function of focusing us on pursuit at a time of contentment, our need for pursuit must behave partly in ways that are countercyclical to the movements of ulterior needs. Our satisfaction about the fulfillment of an ulterior need coincides with the act of fulfillment. Even pursuits that are motivated by fear of future deprivation and desire of future satisfaction would come to a similar close when these concerns have all been fulfilled. The mission of an ulterior need is then over. Its motivating push by pain and pull by pleasure are released. The related need does not incentivize us anymore because it has been met. For the time being, it does not exist anymore. Once we experience the relief of an ulterior need in its closing act, the rush of reaching accomplishment fades quickly and the intense purpose during pursuit gives way to quiet emptiness. All that remains is our wistful memory of pursuit and satisfaction. Our ulterior need has lost its satisfaction and cannot provide us with happiness during the period of continuing fulfillment before its state of satisfaction reaches a deficit. Our need for pursuit will not be able to produce happiness until the ulterior need or our related fear of deprivation and our desire of satisfaction arise again. The investment by our need for pursuit in the pursuit of the ulterior need is presently frustrated. This frustration creates pain. The same act that produces pleasure in the fulfillment of an ulterior need leads to pain in the aftermath of fulfillment. We feel happy regarding our achievement at the moment we arrive. But we also feel a loss because, with fulfillment, we can no longer develop pleasure from pursuit. By meeting an ulterior need, we banish the pain arising from not having it satisfied. Only, in its place steps another pain that arises

from its fulfillment. That pain may be fractional depending on whether we have any room left for pursuit of a need's current, future, or contingent requirements. In a state of scarcity or imperfection, we may be so preoccupied to meet some or all of these requirements that we may not sense much pain attributable to our need for pursuit. Yet, as our ulterior needs approach or remain in a state of fulfillment, the pain resulting from the deprivation of their pursuit is bound to grow.

Because our need for pursuit is tied to a subject to pursue, it afflicts us with a strange contradiction. As much as we may wish to fulfill our ulterior needs, we loathe their fulfillment as well. We preoccupy ourselves with finding fulfillment of our wishes only to become unhappy soon after we reach it. Even our ulterior needs affirm this contradiction within themselves because they mourn the rush of satisfaction after it has faded. The resulting motivation of pursuit contributes an added momentum to the chronic restlessness of our need for pursuit. But this need is distinctive because we cannot ever satisfy it even momentarily by creating a quantity or quality of fulfillment or means. There is no state we can reach that would signal the completion of its mission because it constitutes the antithesis of completion. Our need for pursuit does not have a state of fulfillment relative to the status of means we acquire or apply. The only time it appears to be satisfied is during our pursuit of ulterior needs. Its fulfillment originates from the pursuit of accomplishment, not from accomplishment itself.

The partial incongruities of objectives within and among ulterior needs and between them and our need for pursuit make a state of perfect happiness unreachable even under ideal conditions. The purported ideal of a state where all our wishes are and are being fulfilled without requiring pursuit reveals itself as an erroneous objective that would cause significant pain. Every wish that is being fulfilled without our participation is taken out of the process that generates happiness. Hence, although we might dedicate our existence to achieving perfect fulfillment, we should hope that we will never reach that state. To enable us to produce happiness, our fulfillment has to remain imperfect. We must feel dissatisfaction over deficiencies so that we can engage in purposeful pursuits. This dissatisfaction exposes us to pain. But the alternative of perfection engenders unhappiness with a much greater intensity. Even if we approach or reach perfection regarding an ulterior need, our resulting pain may stay within manageable boundaries if the fulfillment deteriorates or is disturbed with sufficient alacrity. For the time being, we may find some distraction in other experiences of happiness from the pursuit of needs that are not yet contented regarding their present, future, or contingent requirements. Notwithstanding, if

we succeed in fulfilling other ulterior needs, the more noticeable lack of meaningful pursuits raises the threat of dissatisfaction further. Our unhappiness may rise to critical proportions if ulterior needs are kept at levels that remain at or close to perfection because we then derive little or no relief from their pursuit. Pleasure over the fulfillment of ulterior needs will give way to increasing pain over their completion and effortless maintenance. Even if fulfillment is not wholly complete, further gains may be impossible or involve overproportional sacrifice that causes additional pain. As we come closer to such a state, anticipation of more pain of the kind we begin to experience or our recall of frustration over previous perfection may evoke fear. Pain from perfection and its approach may be supplemented by pain from pursuits that are more removed from fulfillment and are obstructed or can only be advanced under disproportional sacrifice. We may use resources we derive from successful pursuits to advance pursuits that aggravate us because of lacking or excessive approximation to completion. But there are limits to what we can spend on them without increasing our frustration over missing progress, the waste of resources, and deficiencies that might arise for needs that could better use these resources.

To answer the challenge to our needs for movement and for the fulfillment of ulterior needs, we must look further. We may direct our production of resources to meet more remote future requirements or more far-fetched contingencies, or we may endeavor to develop innovative and more elaborate wishes that modulate and refine our needs. We may invest rising amounts of resources into pursuits that provide us with decreasing increments of fulfillment. We may load our strategies with luxurious excesses and inefficiencies. We may resort to frivolous pursuits without a productive semblance to mask and divert our pain. To evade encountering a satisfaction limit from providing means for the present, future, and contingent fulfillment of particular needs, we may generate and hoard generic wealth. This equivocation may allow us to derive pleasure from the pursuit of resources even after their purpose as means for ulterior pursuits becomes doubtful or exhausted. The development of an artificial need for wealth by the generalization of our pursuit of means gives us endless opportunities for pursuit and achievement by the fungible power that wealth provides. As our other needs meet boundaries of fulfillment, we may pour ever increasing resources into the generation of wealth. We may have the generation of wealth from wealth consume us to forget the pain from other pursuits. But these distractions are bound to eventually reveal their futility, and we will reach an end of our capability to generate adequately, let alone fully satisfying events of happiness from their pursuit or fulfillment.

As we approximate perfection, we may face the absurd situation that, although all our ulterior needs have been fulfilled and are being fulfilled without great effort and although we possess all the resources necessary to fulfill our future and contingent needs, we cannot sense pleasure over that secure state. Instead, it fills us with pain. We might experience some incidents of pleasure from the fulfillment of some of our ulterior needs because there might be minor fluctuations in their fulfillment status due to a short delay between the rise of a need and its fulfillment. We might also continue to obtain some happiness from pursuing maintenance tasks and from new wishes that raise the level for perfection. We might find some joy in diversions that temporarily immerse our mind into unawareness of our situation. There might be some disturbances that impress us despite the abundance and competence of our resources. But these involvements with the production of happiness may not weigh sufficiently to cause much of a difference in our mood. The resulting unhappiness about our inability to generate happiness can be overwhelming because nothing we pursue can bring us much happiness. Even as we approach such a state, our rising pain and fear may overwhelm any happiness we may feel over the remaining pursuits and events of fulfillment of ulterior needs. That pain and fear would grow because of our reduced or extinct ability to obtain relief. This induces an atmosphere of increasingly unbearable constriction. We may feel that we have been deprived of our freedom, that we are being kept in suffocating dependence or helplessness, that we are doomed to have an existence dominated by pain. In such a desperate situation, our sole way to liberate ourselves from our constrictions and to regain the ability to generate happiness would be to destroy this paralysis. We would have to engage in or tolerate the destruction of our state of perfection to a level that allows us to build up to it again and experience the happiness of pursuit and fulfillment at the culmination of pursuit. We appear then prone to destroy that which should give us the most happiness because it represents our highest achievement.

To humans situated at a distance from perfection, it might appear inexplicable and absurd that an individual who has reached perfection should want to destroy a situation that they highly desire and might pursue with their best efforts. Even if they should acknowledge that destructive tendencies can arise from a state of frustration upon approximating or achieving perfection, they might not have apprehensions that they or their beneficiaries might descend into such destructive behavior. They might believe that such tendencies can be obviated if individuals stay occupied struggling with deficiencies in the fulfillment of their needs. However, the very inability to approximate and

reach perfection of ulterior needs because we cannot advance or cannot satisfactorily advance due to obstacles can form a separate ground of frustration that can stimulate destructive tendencies as well. These might be even stronger because we face not only the frustration in the forward movement of our need for pursuit but also of ulterior needs. The substance of destructive impulses and their consequences may be similar between obstinate nonfulfillment and persistent fulfillment. In both cases, we may strive to destroy circumstances that we perceive to hold us back and are only safe from destructive tendencies if we make adequate progress. Frustrations and destructive inclinations from perfection and obstruction during pursuit among different needs may reinforce one another and may combine in our attitude against a lack of movement. Our frustration and destructive tendencies may proliferate because frustrated needs may depress our ability to fulfill other needs by draining emotional resources. In the event of blockage during pursuit, other needs might be infected because resources are being withheld from them as a result. That may easily arise because of the mutual dependence among existential needs. But the narrowing of existential needs through idiosyncrasies proliferates such a hazard because it increases the risk of blockage. Although we might retreat to existential basics when idiosyncratic modifications become unfulfillable, idiosyncrasies may disable that option and paralyze the entirety of a trait.

To the extent needs are able to produce happiness, its different types might not be able to adequately compensate the pain that arises from our inability to pursue other needs. We might not only encounter difficulties to compensate among ulterior needs. The derivative relationship of our need for pursuit with our ulterior needs might invest us with a distinct need for pursuit regarding each ulterior need. These divisions may not allow us to effectively compensate among needs for the loss of our ability to generate happiness. We may merely obtain an indirect consolation of frustrations from complete or incomplete pursuits. Even to the extent needs can inspire the production of emotional resources that can balance frustrations in other needs, our capacity to produce such resources in reference to different types of pursuits is limited. Positive influences may be balanced or overpowered by negative influences from frustrated needs. If emotional resources of another kind can be installed in dissatisfied needs, they may produce energy whose application in arrested pursuits may prompt additional frustration. Such pursuits already produce a rising amount of energy because of the denial of their objectives. An impasse may not be effectively addressed unless its causes are removed. But accumulating internal and transferred emotional resources may turn against these causes.

The direction and intensity of the resulting destructive impulses may vary in accordance with the perceived circumstances and causes of our frustrations. If we believe that certain individuals or conditions have caused or sustain conditions that obstruct our path toward fulfillment, we may turn our efforts toward them. We may act against ourselves if we perceive that we are at fault for the arrest of our development short of fulfillment. We may react similarly if our paralysis is the result of perfection. If fulfillment is being presented to us without our participation, we may direct destructive activities against external sources we deem responsible. If perfection results from our efforts, we may turn against ourselves. Destructive activities may concentrate on segments, entireties, properties, possessions, or more loosely attached conditions that we identify as causes. It may also attack subjects that incorporate causes if we are incapable or unwilling to differentiate or to practically separate causes that we want to destroy from others that appear less adverse, neutral, or beneficial. Beyond generalizations, our destructive acts may be more profoundly misguided. The complexities of interaction among causes and our inability to trace such causes may prompt us to render erroneous or superficial attributions of causality. We may act out our frustrations against innocent targets because they might have succeeded where we failed and remind us of our failure as long as their advantage continues. We may try to avoid hurting causes to which we are attached. We may undertake to resolve the contradiction between motivations of destruction and protection by misdirecting our destructive impulses, preferably against targets that will incur lower damage or cause no or a lower level of responsive damage.

We may believe our behavior to be defensive because we regard it indispensable to counter oppressive conditions. But our frustrations may only be partly attributable to offensive competitive infractions by our human or nonhuman surroundings. If we entertain destructive activities toward our surroundings past reasonable defensive measures, we lack justification and become offensive competitors. Beyond these considerations of justification, limits for our destructive activities may be dictated by the interests of needs that suffer from a lack of movement or of other needs. As traits that advocate destructive endeavors recognize this, they may attempt to overcome our internal resistance to applying destruction toward other humans or other environmental aspects by inventing circumstances that justify our actions as defensive. If they cannot persuade us, such traits may try to circumvent our unwillingness to act destructively upon full consideration by preempting proceedings of our council of traits with unreflected instincts that may predate human ability to weigh their merits. Such instincts might

independently activate when needs become frustrated. But frustrated needs might purposely reinforce them to overwhelm our reservations. These needs might provoke threats by our human or nonhuman environment that will compel the remainder of traits to defensively align themselves. We might also persuade surrogates to engage in destruction on our behalf. Self-destructively oriented traits may apply similar manipulations. They might provoke adverse behavior against us with the expectation that outside forces will carry out destructive acts that we cannot bring ourselves to inflict on us. If provocative behavior can be vindicated, we may be able to plausibly refute responsibility for the damage we cause to ourselves. Such strategies may combine if we perceive internal and external causes for destruction. While such contrivances may seem unlikely, the pressure on one or more paralyzed traits may grow and extend to other traits so profoundly that it may move the decision by our council of traits in its favor past other concerns or may lead to the formation of a faction that can force or deceive other traits. Hence, the frustration of our pursuits poses a significant threat that we might engage in destructive behavior against our interest.

Even if we might dismiss many destructive propositions as unwarranted, there may be incidents where destruction appears to have merit under the reconciled considerations of our council of traits. Under these considerations, we would try to spare resources and production capacities that might be required or helpful in the subsequent advancement. We would therefore closely manage destructive undertakings. If we were forced to destroy, we might attempt to gradually abate or weaken conditions that impede advancement. We would also make an effort not to provoke defensive reactions that might interfere with our plans. But if we are subjected to sufficient frustration to engage in destructive activities, we might not be guided by such optimizing considerations. We might not even realize the reasons for our destructive conduct or how it can be channeled to our benefit. Even with our best efforts, such a channeling may be difficult to accomplish. Once we engage in destructive strategies regarding one of our needs, the connectedness of our needs and pursuits makes it likely that other needs will be harmed. Proximity and particularly a cooperative environment may expose other humans to destruction and prompt them to defend, possibly fostered by destructive penchants of their own. The resulting dynamics may escalate destructive activity that is at first limited in scope and intensity into a more extensive conflagration of deleterious mutuality with indeterminate consequences. Destructive and defensive acts by multiple parties contribute to escalation. Unless destruction is collectively reconciled, it may unleash unmitigated competition.

Destructive susceptibilities resulting from the frustration of advancement may prevent individuals, groups, whole societies, and possibly humankind from progressing very far. Their development may be destroyed or decisively damaged at relatively early stages. This may be due to the lack of movement during pursuits most humans experience in underdeveloped conditions if their natural harmony with their situation is lastingly disturbed or after their wishes outgrow that balance. A further source is the hierarchic and tribal conditioning at primitive stages that elevates competitors to ruling positions. Their frustrations from perfection or its lack may engender destructive activities against themselves, their support structures, or ultimate victims. Participants in support structures might target destructive tendencies against their rulers and themselves if their position promotes them to near perfection or against rulers, other participants in their support structures, or ultimate victims if these encumber their ascent. Ultimate victims may become destructive against competitive rulers and their support structures because of competitive abuse that keeps them from approaching perfection and against themselves or other victims for permitting such abuse. But in a system that affords them increasing resources based on controlled cooperation, they may also vent their frustrations over their rising uncomfortable proximity to perfection in a mounting number of pursuits against themselves, one another, support structures, or rulers as responsible parties. Then again, tribal and hierarchic instincts, concerns that such destructive impulses might destroy a society, as well as other factors relative to their setting that instill fear or desire in them, may prompt some or all of these participants to direct destructive ambitions partly or entirely to the outside. They might further seek diversion by directing destructive activities, possibly under the engagement of tribal and hierarchic instincts, against targets in their society whose devastation is acceptable and whose reactions are controllable.

Competitive aspirations might be comprehensible simply as demands of competitors that arise from their unrealized needs. Destructive aspects that regularly accompany them can be partly explained by the curtailment and the success of these demands and the reactions of other affected individuals. Much of the destruction that threatens the advancement and the existence of individuals, groups, larger societies, and humankind might therefore be cured by eliminating competition. But even if competition can be excluded as a cause for or consequence of destruction and destructive acts are consensually undertaken, these must be carefully controlled to meet their purpose of creating an overall benefit of advancement. Frustrations arising from a lack of progress short of fulfillment appear to offer more hope for constructive resolu-

tion than the frustration arising from perfection. Stalled advancement might be broken by repeated, alternative, or novel manners of pursuit. Progress may provide us with an increasing variety of capable choices. The possibility of constructive alternatives may keep us from selecting destructive strategies until we have exhausted these possibilities. Still, as we succeed in surmounting impediments to the fulfillment of our needs, perfection eventually poses an absolute barrier to advancement because it seems to leave no alternatives. It therefore promises to pose a more formidable menace to us than lacking progress short of fulfillment. Humans might see no other choice than the destruction of their accomplishments when they approach or reach perfection so that they can continue experiencing happiness. Perfection may become part of an irresistible cycle involving constructive and destructive forces.

These forces may subject individuals to repeating cycles of creation, perfection, destruction, and renewal. A similar movement can be observed in the existence of groups and larger societies and may apply to all of humanity. The cyclicity of human existence may be difficult to detect because individuals and even their associations may only exist long enough to represent and experience partial distances in a cycle of creation, perfection, destruction, and renewal. The developments may be so large that they may take part in generational dimensions without awareness of them or of individuals' position or function in them. The cyclicity between construction and destruction might not be easily observable from the viewpoint of involved individuals because they may be subjected or contribute to a multitude of nontypical and confusing manifestations or because their more immediate cycles may be countercyclical or out of phase. Moreover, their awareness may suffer because their part may have been inculcated into them as a matter of genetic or acquired traits or by an environment that influences their behavior more immediately by its adversities and opportunities. Their reality may make them unaware of or not heed the lessons of the past. We may only be able to obtain sufficient insight when we deliberately stand apart. Our habitual lack of perspective may render it difficult to counteract or moderate cycles of construction and destruction. Even if we develop insight regarding their existence, it may be hard to stop or reverse their momentum. This may be particularly difficult as long as we are not approaching perfection because all our resources may appear to be positively aligned and we would seem to damage ourselves and one another if we altered our behavior. It may be difficult to escape cycles of construction and destruction because everything might go right and all our activities might seem to be necessary and helpful until their results and continuation leave us in absolute despair.

The apparent inevitability that we should resort to destruction when we reach perfection, the threat that it might be unregulated and become unmanageable, and the danger it presents for our survival and thriving even if it is consensual turn this phenomenon into a difficult challenge. We might consider recurrently halting or tainting our progress and level of fulfillment to render them imperfect. However, such activities may critically weaken us in existential aspects of our needs. We might not be able to scale fulfillment successfully or unanticipated challenges might interfere with the intended outcome. Even where affected aspects can be classified as not rising to existential levels, spoiling our pursuits might not be advisable. We would curtail our pleasure from pursuit and fulfillment. We might incur additional pain from our appreciation that we are inflicting this reduction of happiness on ourselves. We would further subject ourselves to the combined power of frustrations regarding our need for pursuit and ulterior needs. Their continuing demands would generate a constant undercurrent of pain that we would have to suppress. Maintaining these reductions may be particularly difficult if we have not experienced the detrimental effects of damaging saturation and might not know whether or when such a level might be attained. The prevalence of deprivation in our experiences may leave us without reference. We would not likely be willing to decrease pursuits until after we have experienced the paralyzing effects of perfection and find these to exceed our pain of insufficient fulfillment. That pain might not be any weaker than suffering perfection and may burden us with similarly intense destructive tendencies.

As a result, we may face challenges that seem impossible to resolve. Keeping us from reaching perfection may infuse frustrations of inadequate fulfillment and restraint of pursuits. But overcoming these frustrations would require activity that advances us toward perfection. Our attempts to prevent or remedy frustrations of one kind necessarily appear to expose us to incurring frustrations of the other. This implies an existence of unending contradiction as a result of our actions. Pacing our advancement might slow this cycle. Yet stretching our pursuits over longer periods may increase the pain of deprivation we feel about being separated from the fulfillment of ulterior needs and about the diminished rate of advancement for our need for pursuit and may render events of happiness less frequent. Nor may it prevent our pursuits from eventually arriving at a state of fulfillment. This may lead us to conclude that strategies that curb our approach toward fulfillment are ineffective to secure our happiness or to keep us from sliding into a mode of destruction. They might even precipitate our frustration to destructive levels. We will have to look elsewhere for a solution.

The hazard of damaging our happiness by holding back and by succeeding may cause us to focus on alternative strategies that help to distract us from the frustrations of perfection and of detention during pursuit and that keep our destructive tendencies in check. If we approach perfection, we may entertain pretenses of conditions in which the fulfillment status of ulterior needs or our pursuit of such needs appears to be imperiled. We may also imagine settings where perfection is destroyed and where our capacity to engage in meaningful advancement is empowered or renewed. If we restrain ourselves from advancing toward perfection, we may be given to pretenses in which we overcome these boundaries and achieve fulfillment. We may apply similar pretenses if we are involuntarily arrested during our pursuits. Depending on the configuration of circumstances that keep us from achieving happiness, we may engage in or welcome diversions that permit us to engage in one or the other fantasy regarding different needs, and possibly even in both alternately or contemporaneously. Assuming that the state in which we are not finding ourselves presents a worthwhile remedy for our current frustrations may help us avoid the desperation that might set in if we recognized that we would be unhappy in either situation. If we are prevented from achieving perfection, we may pretend that we could rest upon fulfillment and exist happily ever after. If we are troubled by perfection, we may pretend that a life of adversity in our endeavors is the solution to our problems. Arguably, such ideas might arouse us to take destructive action. However, internal and external barriers of fear might restrict that effect in correlation with pretense. In this realm, we may achieve sufficient de-escalation of our destructive tendencies by acting them out through fantasies. We may also find comfort in the notion that they do not rise to the same extent as in our fantasies. We may further console ourselves with the impression that the type of frustration we do not suffer is more painful than the frustration of the type we suffer. We may persuade ourselves that, regardless of our state of accomplishment, losing it would place us into a less agreeable condition. We may generate sufficient appreciation for our state from these pretenses, but they might coexist or alternate with fantasies in which our problems do not exist or are removed.

Our self-deceptions prepare fertile ground for manipulations by external powers. Because we might readily consume reinforcements of our pretenses in any of the directions between which we vacillate, external manipulations might confine themselves to nuanced influences that might be difficult to discern. Deception and self-deception might consolidate to restrain or encourage constructive or destructive activities that prevent us from transcending our continuing dissatisfaction.

In support of fantasies concerning advancement that prevent us from taking destructive action, we may seek simulated activities of our own or identify with the actual or simulated endeavors of others. But such fantasies only permit us a temporary semblance of advancement. In addition, there are only a limited number of archetypes for settings and processes to address our frustrations through imagination. Thus, the initial novelty of imaginary sanctuaries and our impressionability by them are bound to wear off. In time, our preoccupation with fantasies alone is therefore unlikely to provide us with sufficient pleasure to keep the pain over continuing failures of advancement contained. We may take this as an incentive to increase the intensity of our fantasies by accepting them as real to some degree and acting upon them in a way that distracts us from our actual reality. We may try to see threats or opportunities where none exist or exaggerate existing problems and opportunities. By battling and overcoming invented menaces and progressing to realize imaginary opportunities under conditions we manage, we can compensate to a limited extent for obstructions to our advancement in areas in which we are powerless or fearful. But we must be careful not to have our acting out of fantasies in our reality lead to destructive consequences in it. Resulting safeguards confine the scope of such activities. Further, their imaginary nature may emerge and set us back at some point. Finally, their underlying, unresolved problems continue to fester and will direct our attention back to them.

To still restrain our pain of frustration through a sense of pursuit, we may expose ourselves to more credible risks by calculated deviations from our reality and engaging in controllable thrills. We may have to increase our exposure to threats to a level where such threats might materialize unless we act in ways that avoid or prevent that materialization. We may pursue purported opportunities connected with risk in our reality for the thrill of advancement, although such enjoyment might turn out to be neutralized when they fail to become substantiated. More than that, we may be hopeful that our apprehension of pain from the risks, costs, and possibly inadequate results of opportunities may impress us sufficiently to extend or reinstate our appreciation of the current state. We might also incur more direct threats for such purposes. Fear and the subsequent nonrealization of deprivation may let us sense satisfaction similar to an original pursuit in which we attain that state. Yet, to perceive a sufficiently meaningful fear to engender happiness about the nonmaterialization of risk and to give us a sufficient advancement in eluding loss, we may have to leave pretenses behind. To maximize our relief, we may have to relinquish control or our ability to control risks may have to be at least questionable.

As our frustration grows, we may not only have to increase risk but also the stakes for loss to achieve the necessary level of relief. We might venture into settings that could result in damage as long as we perceive a sufficient likelihood that we can circumvent the realization of that threat and are willing to incur the damage if it should actualize. However, the threat of losing control of risk and loss might reach levels where our damage might meet or exceed the damage we might incur from destruction upon frustration. This would make our machinations that seek to place us in apprehension of damage to avoid the actuality of damage ineffective and inefficient. Approaching that level might still seem advisable to us to quell our frustration. But our strategy of threatened damage is ultimately as unproductive as less harmful pretenses. Endangerment can solely contain our frustration temporarily, and it does not address the underlying problem. The increased threats of risk and cost are deceptions. As all our self-initiated deceptions, we undertake them because we have indication of our true state of affairs. We know of the pain and fear we are trying to cover up even if we do not dare to plainly acknowledge them. Notwithstanding, their existence and the foundations for their existence continue unabated.

If coping mechanisms short of destructive activities do not provide the appropriate reprieve from our pain, our activities would eventually have to become destructive. But the risk and cost of destructive mechanisms may discourage us from engaging in or inviting the active destruction of a state of perfection or insufficient success. Instead, we may transcend our inability to advance by letting go. An impasse due to perfection or obstruction during pursuit may resolve merely by abstaining from support for it, by permitting it to deteriorate by natural decay, or by abstaining from defending it against interference. Inherent or surrounding circumstances may independently deconstruct an arrested state of affairs for us. This strategy may seem to be most advantageous if we are looking for the destruction of perfection. In a situation where we struggle to reach fulfillment, we may not possess the resources to weather deterioration by inactivity. Then again, allowing the deterioration of an impasse due to perfection may not be the best resolution either because we could lose control of its processes. As an alternative to active and passive destruction, we might avoid or minimize damaging effects of impasses by leaving them behind and pursuing our needs in an alternative setting that allows us to grow. We may choose dissociation from other individuals and our more extended environment. Only, this alternative is limited in the space it provides as well. It might also engender disqualifying destruction, particularly absent an acknowledged right to dissociate and equitable procedures.

To forestall the disintegration of groups and of societies by destructive conflict or as a consequence of dissociations, and to promote the improvement of happiness for their members, permitting a certain amount of controlled destruction may be indispensable. Because frustrations of pursuits have been encountered throughout human development, societies have developed many informal and formal rules that offer maneuvering space for destructive behavior, often in correlation with the accommodation of competitive conduct. They regularly provide settings in which unhelpful destructive propensities can be vented relatively harmlessly to avoid damage in more essential areas. They may further sanction the changing or dismantling of certain structures and processes that block or moderate the advance of certain interests. Even if such activities inflict damage, the ensuing alignment of means with constructive pursuits may be deemed to be of greater value. The elimination or overhaul of settings and strategies may be condoned or encouraged to promote the overall effectiveness and efficiency of pursuits. The only condition may be that such activities abide by substantive and procedural rules to control their scope and consequences. Beyond such reserved regions, a great number of destructive strategies to overcome the frustration of pursuits may remain barred because they are regarded as harmful to the happiness of ruling concerns.

Notwithstanding, the possibly overwhelming nature of the pain that arises from the frustration of pursuits makes it likely that rules to contain destructive behavior stay at risk to be broken. Containing that threat may require significant defensive efforts in a state where means are scarce. As societies and humanity evolve and are better capable to secure means, destructive tendencies born from scarcity and the need for their management may wane. However, that progress advances us toward a condition of completion. As we approach that state, destructive mechanisms are likely to again take hold, now on the basis of perfection instead of the preceding reason of deprivation. The widespread attainment of stages that approach perfection with progressing development may make it essential for our individual and collective survival and thriving that we develop the ability to address and manage our resulting destructive tendencies. Yet, in contrast to a regulation of destructive tendencies from scarcity, there are only few rules or customs that specifically address destructive behavior upon approaching or encountering perfection. This is not surprising because states approaching perfection in human endeavors have been historically uncommon. They may have long been influential in the behavior of privileged classes or rulers. Their attempts to deconstruct barriers to their advancement upon blockage during pursuit and upon approaching perfection

have had momentous consequences. But their behavior has been historically rarely regulated because they were often above the law. Even as they have increasingly been bound by laws, their power to weaken, circumvent, or break such laws may continue to pose a grave danger. Their power may also add impact to their destructive endeavors. Particularly upon perfection, effects may far surpass the damage generated by their competitive strategies to obtain resources. They may further surpass the effects of destructive behavior upon blockage during their pursuits because destruction due to perfection seeks to demolish resources, not to obtain them. If the desperation of competitive rulers is shared by a populace that approaches saturation of some needs as well, potent combined destructive intent and expression may result.

Then again, not even a cooperative commonwealth may be able to escape the risk of destruction. Destructive leanings may already induce challenges to cooperation under conditions of scarcity as a reaction to obstructions in the course of pursuits. They may combine with competitive impulses and degenerate a cooperative society into a system that is dominated by competitive interests. In such a system, destructive tendencies by victims may frequently be controlled by their fear of competitive domination. Beyond that, the demands on victims to safeguard their subsistence may keep their destructive propensities in check. Although apprehension of punishment and pressures to provide means might beleaguer a progressing cooperative society with diminishing intensity, they may keep destructive tendencies under control. Moreover, cooperative arrangements carry a promise to keep destructive tendencies that are related to competitive activity from arising. Yet such cooperative arrangements lift the likelihood for success by a systemic elevation in the standard of resources. They may thereby raise the threat of destruction upon approaching perfection to a more intense and pervasive phenomenon. The damage to be inflicted in or by cooperative societies upon approaching perfection promises to be great. This is not only due to the broad scope of destructively motivated individuals and their perfected needs but also the growing technological development and the connectedness of cooperative structures and processes. Further, the rising interdependence and shared development levels of cooperative societies align them in their fate. Similar effects might occur in and among developed competitive systems. But the diametric contrast of destructive behavior to the constructive mutuality of cooperative societies may cause higher destruction in them. Their systemic, intentional dependence on harmony renders them inadequately prepared for destructive conduct and the competitive pressures in a subsequent phase of rebuilding in a setting of scarcity.

Where destruction is the only remaining choice to solve the paralysis of advancement, we must select a closely customized approach to achieve its purpose with a minimization of destruction and related fallout. Such a minimization would comport with the general intent of destructive tendencies to remove blockages in our pursuits. The ultimate motivation for destruction in consequence of the frustration of advancement is not devastation. The destructive aspect of this mechanism represents our recourse of last resort to reinstate our ability to produce happiness again and to overcome the mounting pain of frustration. We are trying to cure this pain that can only be abated by destroying some of our circumstances and thus incurring some pain of destruction. In the event of a blockage short of fulfillment, our actions may be justified as defensive maneuvers. This right of defense and the fact that the pain that we impose may not be necessarily ours may relieve some of our concerns about whether we can obtain adequate satisfaction. Similar considerations may come to mind when we destroy situations of perfection. Nevertheless, we have to be worried about the possibility that destructive endeavors in both situations might get out of hand on their own or through the reactions they precipitate and inflict more pain on us than they can relieve. In the event of a blockage during pursuit, surmounting obstacles may implicate the expenditure of resources for technical removal. But it may also destroy implements that serve us or someone else in pursuits and cause more pain due to possible consequences of their disruption. While that threat is similar when we try to destroy perfection, we incur pain in part more predictably because its creation through deprivation constitutes an intended requirement to resurrect the production of happiness. That appears to make this strategy different from our usual strategies by which we try to distance ourselves from states of deprivation. Yet the destruction of frustration from perfection is not fundamentally different from other pursuits in which we must incur painful stages on the way to fulfilling ulterior needs. Our objective in both incidents is the overall advancement of satisfaction for the sake of which we are ready to incur pain.

However, we encounter a more fundamental problem if we destroy perfection because such destruction appears to be inherently antithetical to our mission of individual and collective survival and thriving. The purpose of our needs is to secure and advance our individual and collective survival and thriving in an adverse or neutral environment. As long as we have not generated a maximum of suitable means for the advancement of our pursuits to overcome the challenges of our environment and have not secured our and humankind's survival and thriving, our dissatisfaction makes sense. But our motivational consti-

tution contains a severe flaw. It presumes based on the history of human development that we will forever struggle with the fulfillment of our ulterior needs and it does not take in consideration that it might reach its purpose. It leaves us without guidance what to do when we reach the success to which it commits us. The mechanism of our happiness is not built to deal with prosperity and seems to leave us without capacity to make use of it. Its functions become out of place and dangerous to our existence as we approach and reach its purpose. To preserve the integrity of its programmed functionality, the mechanism must ultimately press for the destruction of the success it generates so that it can endure. To escape the absurdity of this mechanism, we may deem it necessary to change the responsible conditions in our traits.

Arguably, current and anticipated aspects of our ulterior needs impart sufficient urgency for their pursuit. Because we do not depend on our need for pursuit in that respect, we might consider deleting it to counteract the threat of destruction upon perfection. We might include in that elimination motivations of regret over the passing of satisfaction and our progressive inability to achieve momentous events of fulfillment that would haunt our ulterior needs and combine with our need for pursuit in motivations for pursuit. We may define these motivations separately from the incentives supplied by ulterior needs that relate to actual and prospective deprivation and fulfillment. We might purge all such motivations. That would deprive us of our backup motivations for a production during periods when ulterior needs are fulfilled in their present, future, and contingent concerns. These backup motivations maximize our engagement and avert complacency even if we are certain that we have met all possible resource requirements of an ulterior need. Removing them appears to be inconsequential if we possess full knowledge of all eventualities we could possibly encounter and could exclude any additional surprises because we could cover all our requirements by our ulterior needs. We may consider delaying the elimination of motivations for pursuit until we possess sufficient wisdom to not trust prematurely that fulfillment has been exhausted. But destructive tendencies of such motivations might become too dangerous to maintain these solely for such reason. It appears that to secure happiness, we must transform them and our ulterior needs so that we can appreciate fulfillment without a process that takes us from pain to pleasure and without appreciable jeopardy to our fulfillment. Until we can accomplish these modifications of our emotional disposition, our development would expose us to increasing danger because the emotional mechanism of frustration and destruction that perfection naturally triggers confronts us with rapidly mounting intensity.

The rising urgency of this problem requires that we find an interim solution. However, we must consider that developing the ability to manipulate our traits so we can derive enduring pleasure from the perfection of our ulterior needs might not be an apt solution to lastingly secure our survival and thriving. Even if we could condition ourselves not to become frustrated with such a setting, we would become stagnant and irrelevant consumers of resources without any purpose other than to have our existence continued and to sense happiness in an act of self-indulgence. We may not be willing to tie our fate to such a shallow, passive existence unless we could be certain that it is the ultimate we can achieve or that our adjustment is reversible when other options arise. Nor may the necessary changes to traits to achieve such a state be available when we require them. To detect a more appealing and more attainable solution to our destructive reaction to fulfillment, we have to focus on the causes of our frustration instead of attempting to manipulate its symptoms. We have to examine whether we can address the limited array of needs and their limited objectives. To escape saturation, we must expand our needs. To accomplish this expansion, we might endeavor to adjust our genetic or acquired traits. We might eliminate or modify traits that frustrate the unfolding of constructive traits and of an overall harmony among our traits. We might also improve or add traits that increase our happiness by assisting our principal needs for individual and collective survival and thriving. But it appears unrealistic to think that we could significantly enhance the array of needs that currently serve our individual and collective survival and thriving. We do not appear to possess much potential for growing our needs because of a functional finality of means that could benefit our individual and collective survival and thriving. We may hence encounter boundaries that relegate us to minor repairs and optimizations.

Then again, we might not have to venture into new traits or aspects of traits to meaningfully expand our pursuits. We may find unrealized capacity in our current needs without having to change them. We may have relatively quickly a complete grasp on the fulfillment of needs that pertain to our individual existence or may encounter firm limitations of impossibility. Compared to them, considerations related to the longer-term perspectives of our need for collective survival and thriving might appear to offer greater possibilities for elaboration. Although we may already designate this need as our ultimate need, our commitment might be enriched in its scope and its intensity. The next chapter begins to explore how a more expansive approach might curb or avert our self-destructive tendencies, increase our satisfaction, and secure a constructive future for us individually and collectively.