CHAPTER 35
COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE

The notion of cooperative governance seems to be simple. Because we cannot trust the delegation of cooperative administration to separate governmental institutions, our sole alternative is that we institute and manage a cooperative government ourselves. This proposition may remind us of the joint governance established to keep control of cooperative economic ventures. Such a cooperative model of governance may carry lingering ideas of being separate from the rest of our concerns. However, there is no reason we should not extend the rationale that moves us to be involved in the governance of joint production enterprises to the arrangement of human coexistence and other concerns of human collaboration. All these subject matters have in common that they necessitate the management of resources. Distinguishing modes of management according to whether we are focusing on the production or use phases of resources is meaningless because their use is part of the production process as well. Such a distinction is further dangerous because it threatens to separate economic pursuits from the pursuit of our other concerns. Even if we were to exclude such consideration as empathy and our need for collective survival and thriving, our more proximate concerns make a separation inadvisable. Including economic concerns into the organization of our communities is not only indicated because they provide the material basis for our subsistence but also because they are an indispensable part of mutuality. We cannot maintain separate structures and processes between our economic and our other activities without incurring the risk of subjecting us to unreconciled requirements in our relationship with other humans. To find harmony within ourselves and with the needs of others, we must place the pursuit of all our needs that we pursue interactively or with interactive effects into a harmonized cooperative system.

Control of possible competitive infractions continues to be relevant in a cooperative society. Individual pursuits have to be protected from other individual pursuits and cooperative overreaching. Similarly, cooperative endeavors have to be protected from other cooperative pursuits and against individual overreaching. Such violations may be unintended effects of pursuits. Moreover, intentionally competitive interests may continue to be part of a cooperative society or they may newly arise in it. They may not have been and might not subsequently be converted. Their competitive desires may be merely suppressed or lie dormant. Even if all members try to act cooperatively, they are likely to continue to possess competitive impulses. These may not be en-

tirely controllable even if underlying acquired aspects could be eliminated and even if members' needs would become generally reconciled. Genetic mechanisms sponsoring offensive competitive behavior might still be incited or bleed through. They and newly acquired traits continue to threaten the existence of a cooperative model, particularly as technological, economic, social, and cultural changes, the accrual and cessation of members, or extraneous circumstances affect cooperative structures and processes. These alterations produce a potential for the infusion of new or the invigoration of existing competitive tendencies in cooperatively committed societies. Therefore, even these advanced societies must maintain the capacity and the commitment to fight and eliminate offensive competitive tendencies and strategies in its ranks.

This task is not adequately addressed by the assumption of individual responsibility by governed. If it were left to individual members to interdict offensive competitive acts, a society may quickly disintegrate into direct conflict between individuals regarding the legitimacy of their pursuits. For that reason, the defense against offensive competition must be reserved as a cooperatively authorized task. But as we contemplate the organizational requirements for such a defense, we may quickly recognize that the structures and processes we might devise suffer from the same risk as any other endowment of defensive competitive power. Individuals or groups we deputize might abuse the instruments they are given to fight offensive competition to engage in competition for their own benefit. Not even a participation of all other members to curb the activities of one member can exclude this risk of competitive tyranny. Any power given to cooperative members to control other members produces room for error due to differences in objectives and invites intentional offensive competitive overreaching.

Even without such overreaching, the control of members' competitive activities by a society must resolve competitive complications. To restrain all competitive conduct effectively, governance might have to carefully supervise all member activities. It might have to prescribe, monitor, and enforce intricate and at times variable boundaries of behavior. The structures and processes to restrain competitive behavior may have the side effect of also placing a regulatory burden on rightful individual and cooperative pursuits and rendering them less effective or efficient. To protect members from competitive intrusions without causing undue intrusion by the mechanisms engaged to protect them, a system has to become finely focused in its constraint of competitive activities. On one hand, it may have to impose itself to preempt competitive effects and strategies. On the other hand, it cannot be overly stringent in imposing controls because they threaten to damage legit-

imate pursuits and hence carry competitive implications of their own. The resulting risks of ineffectiveness and oppression, of excessive permissiveness and excessive interference represent a source of error and abuse as well as a point of contention for negatively affected members. A cooperative government might avoid these problems by leaving pursuits undisturbed until their infraction is brought to its attention and limit its intrusions to remediation. It might further lower the risk of unjustified intrusion by regulating or addressing only excessive competitive behavior. Yet this might give sanction to significant competitive behavior that threatens to convert a cooperative system. To maintain a cooperative system, it seems obligatory to impose stringent defensive controls. But protecting a cooperative society against competitive interferences may seem only possible at the expense of interfering with some of its advantages. The cost of control arising from the disturbance of legitimate endeavors as well as the maintenance of necessary mechanisms of control might reduce the beneficial potential of a cooperative system. Moreover, such measures would only produce an enforced truce. With the release of enforcement pressure, competitive attitudes might succeed in drawing cooperative members into a spiral of competitive deterioration. Even if governmental control succeeded in securing members from one another's competitive infringements, it might have no or only limited success in engendering constructive cooperation to unfold its full potential. To the extent it might be possible to compel members into cooperating constructively, the risks and costs of constructive impositions may even outstrip those involved in averting competition because they involve stimulating affirmative acts equivalent to a dedicated pursuit. Sustaining such simulated pursuits requires the dedication of considerable resources that weighs on the efficiency of pursuits and may raise resistance by individuals subjected to such treatment. In consequence, a cooperative system may remain arrested at a low level of development if compliance is involuntary.

The instruments a cooperative system would have to employ to enforce cooperative societal behavior would be antithetical to the ideal of comprehensive satisfaction of human needs through a mutuality that is incentivized by reconciled individual needs. Instead of guiding members into directions they might learn to appreciate, intense domination of their affairs by the system may raise resistance against their disenfranchisement and stunt the development of voluntary cooperation. The enforcement of cooperative principles may create a cooperative system by direction and compulsion. Such a system may be clearly defensive in its opposition of offensive competitive conduct. It might also be characterized as defensive in its insistence on constructive co-

operation because a failure to cooperate might be in violation of contracted principles. Nevertheless, while there would be a difference between such a system and an offensive competitive system in purpose and effect, many of its methods might be indistinguishable and might grow to be offensive in their intent and effect. Control structures and processes might make it difficult for members to leave or change the system. They may also give rise to enforcement hierarchies that select or form themselves offensive competitive forces or can be easily converted by such forces. Hence, in an effort to prevent conversion into a competitive system, inculcate cooperation among members, and reach effectiveness and efficiency levels approaching voluntary cooperation, a cooperative system might convert itself into a competitive system.

The only way to forestall struggle between defensive and offensive competitive forces and to control the risk of competitive conversion, and to fulfill the promise of cooperation, seems to be that we become self-governing individuals who behave cooperatively without external pressure. We will have to become capable of pursuing comprehensive happiness without external governance that exerts any kind of domination over us. To maximize our happiness, we must develop the capacity to voluntarily curb our negligent and intentional competitive tendencies. We have to learn to hold ourselves accountable for our deportment under cooperative principles. We must practice cooperative principles that aim at optimizing overall happiness. To undertake this, we must develop and carry within us a universal concept of happiness that contains our happiness and the happiness of our surroundings as an indistinguishable motivation. The principles of this concept are already inherent in us, waiting to be activated to their full extent and to overcome our competitive mindsets. The development of our rational conviction that the happiness of other humans reflects on our happiness through principles of mutuality might be supported by emotional insight in form of utilitarian attraction regarding our need for individual survival and thriving. A further part of utilitarian attraction is represented by our need for collective survival and thriving. Beyond that, empathy imposes a need to advance the fulfillment of other individuals' needs on us because it forces us to emotionally identify with them. These factors combine to produce a fundamental shift not only in the manner in which we pursue happiness but also in the concept of our happiness. They compel us to include the happiness of others into the pursuit of our happiness. They require us to act with consideration for the pain of others that is similar to the consideration we apply to ourselves. This places a significant burden on us because it renders us responsible for the happiness of other humans in addition to our own.

To the extent we possess a competitive mindset, we are likely to revolt against our responsibility toward other humans because it contradicts our competitive intent or lack of care. We may allow the pain of others to go unanswered despite its depressing effect on our happiness. We may suppress the guilt we sense for our infliction of pain on others. As a consequence, our life may be less happy even if we secure competitive objectives. We may consider this a worthwhile trade. We may try to increase the benefit of that trade by attempting to become immune to rational and emotional considerations that would impose on us responsibility for others. To achieve that immunity, we may attempt to curb our perception of conditions that trigger impressions of responsibility. We may try to distance ourselves externally as well as internally or use already existing distances. Depending on the severity of our competitive practices and breach of responsibility, we may have to cultivate constructs and impressions of negative differentiations in other humans to drastic compensatory heights so we can pursue competitive practices with fewer scruples against them. A lacking sense of responsibility appears to form an indispensable condition for engaging in competitive behavior. Conversely, the infusion of a sense of responsibility may be necessary to overcome the intensity of our competitive impulses and may form an indispensable condition of comprehensive cooperation beyond a mere proximate opportunistic utilization.

All aspects that constitute this wider aspect of responsibility are based on an inclusion of other humans in our tribe. We must recognize them to be sufficiently similar to make mutuality possible, to regard them to be worthy of our need for collective survival and thriving, and to identify emotionally with them. Tribal instincts then seem to be helpful and potentially critical for the complete development of our happiness. To use them properly and not have them damage our inclination toward cooperation by limiting tribal definitions, we must widen our notion of tribality to include all humans. Even without the infusion of empathy, our need for collective survival and thriving demands such an expansion. In a narrower delineation of that need, we might focus only on caring for direct descendants, relatives, or an otherwise restricted group of humans. We might exclude from our attention, and employ competitive practices against, individuals who might prove vital for securing the survival and thriving of humanity. The potential that this would matter might seem remote considering the profusion of humans. But increased technological capabilities and resulting interdependences may escalate the risk that tribal insolences present a direct existential threat for humanity or cause a weakening that may become critical under added conditions. Further, the exclusion of

other humans from our care and a competitive attitude toward them may negatively reflect on all our needs in an increasingly interdependent setting. Even if we discount the value of broader cooperation, future challenges might prove us wrong. Even if we cannot productively benefit, banning others from our tribe may afflict us with the risks and costs of competitive conflicts. Our exclusion of or indifference toward them may incite competitive responses. Limiting our tribe may hence be shortsighted even for purposes of our more proximate needs. It is in our interest to help other humans to accomplish their objectives in a balanced manner that optimizes happiness. As a consequence, emotional and rational insights may combine to have us care for others.

But the development of a mature comprehension of our objectives and how the objectives of others assist them might not come easily. Even if we have sufficient insight to understand the value of cooperation in support of our needs, that insight may give way to temptations when we encounter opportunities where competition could currently benefit us more. Positive tribal motivations that find reflection in empathy and in our need to safeguard collective survival and thriving may help us overcome such moments of weakness where we might otherwise succumb to our competitive impulses. They can further provide an intuitive motivation that can guide and anticipate the result of a more detailed and more comprehensive rational and emotional consideration of our needs by instinctively enlarging our responsibility to all humans. This function as a visceral guardian of our virtue and protagonist of our mental development seems to be impossible to subdue. The expansion of our tribal motivations appears to be our natural inclination included in their underlying instinct because our commonalities leave us with overwhelming evidence counseling us to include all humans into our tribe. That inclusion does not allow us to violate the fundamental needs of another human or to allow the violation of such needs without incurring detriment in our happiness. Even if there appear to be justifications for undertaking emergency offensive or defensive competitive activities against other humans, our awareness of our violations and their effects for our emotional mind will continue. We will be plagued by guilt if we intrude on our instinctive imperative, regardless of rational and emotional justifications we might have or attempt to create. We cannot remain happy knowing that someone else is unhappy. Experiences of happiness when we have defeated someone in a competitive challenge or we have successfully defended ourselves may have us believe differently for some time. Only, our general tribal instinct cannot be permanently subdued. Offensive or defensive competitive victory might satisfy a variety of our needs or affirm our abil-

ity to satisfy them. Such experiences of happiness may counteract our instinctive pain, but they cannot erase it. As the euphoria of winning passes, that pain gains clarity and remains in our conscience.

Our tribal instinct appears to be most apparently important to complete our need for collective survival to its full magnitude. But an instinctive tribal manner of harmonizing a society also seems to produce capable guidance in an environment where individuals have not proceeded to a clear vision of their needs or of optimized manners of pursuing them in correlation with other humans. It might abbreviate procedures by which individuals find specific reasons in their needs to motivate cooperation. Moreover, an instinctive concern for other participants' interests creates an unconditional, more immediate motivation for cooperative behavior that can simulate a perfected consideration. Because impulses to benefit others may meet and exceed in generosity conditions for mutuality that participants would stipulate, they can remove participants' reservations about whether mutuality is appropriate. They can create autonomously as a gift what otherwise may require a mutual claim of rights, a statement of incongruent positions, negotiations, and an agreement. Individuals might have to state their needs and wishes so others become aware of these and might require similar information from others to arrive at mutuality. However, they would be less worried about mutual consideration of needs and wishes if they could trust that tribal instinct enveloped everybody's mind. With each of their acts and omissions, individuals would forecast the consequences for their needs as well as the needs of other humans. If individuals focused on everybody else's happiness as much as they focus on their own, everybody's needs would have a chance of being appropriately considered. Minding the happiness of one another without external pressure would ensure a commonwealth among humans that is not tainted by imposition. Short of reaching complete awareness of our needs and the best harmonized manner of fulfillment in a system of mutuality, tribal instinct seems to be humanity's best chance to approach the reconciliation of individual pursuits. That is because it expands the concept of cooperation to a range where our happiness and the happiness of others become indistinguishable. Such instinct without the comprehension that its impulses find confirmation by our reconciled needs may not suffice to keep us committed. It alone may not allow us to develop complete individual and collective reconciliations and resulting mutuality. But it represents a guiding ideal that gives us hope, encourages us to explore and build the conditions for such harmonized states, and stands in for needs while we develop them. That makes cultivating tribal compassion in us and others essential.

Given that humans share the necessary emotional facilities, this may appear to us as a universally and proximately feasible undertaking. Even if our need for collective survival and thriving should be underdeveloped and we reserve it for limited groups of humans, the empathic aspect of tribal instinct may be more difficult to ignore or suppress. With adequate information about the intensity of pain or pleasure of others, we should be able to feel empathy. That seems easiest if we can relate to causes that make others feel pain or pleasure. Even if we have not experienced and cannot imagine similar pain or pleasure, and even if we do not understand why others feel the way they do, we still can generally recognize the intensity of their pain or pleasure by comparing their reactions to how we would react. Although empathic mechanisms may only imperfectly reflect the emotions experienced by others, we feel for them in an approximation. Our discomfort regarding the pain of others may be sufficient for us to help remedy or avoid their pain so that we can be free of the empathic pain they cause us.

But all rational and emotional concerns that should stem competitive activity and encourage cooperation may fail to sufficiently organize the behavior of individuals. In that event, a cooperative society has to curb the damaging effects of such deficiencies by devising prohibitions and mandates that emulate the interactive effects of mutuality, the need for collective survival and thriving, and empathy and by reinforcing such standards with defensive remedies for their violation. While these guidelines cannot replace the motivations they simulate, they might be able to prevent or remedy most of the damage induced by their lack of genuine presence. As a part of its defensive strategy, a society may inflict pain on offenders in retribution. It may also fashion the type of pain it inflicts to promote an understanding in the offender of the pain the violation inflicted on victims. That seems to be particularly appropriate if empathy is weak. Yet, although such measures may be effective as retribution to appease victims, they might not alter the competitive attitude and hence the danger to a society or to humanity that an offender represents. Instead, such punishment may meet with added frustration and offensive motivation if perpetrators do not understand the wrongful nature of their activities. They might recognize with perfect clarity that they do not wish to be subjected to infractions of the kind they imposed on others and that their environment rejects their actions. Still, their competitive attitude may liberate them from acknowledging the depravity of imposing such infractions on others. They may therefore dismiss their punishment as an offensive, unjustified undertaking. Although it may deter them from future similar behavior, such deterrence may wear off, be altered, or be superseded by

internal and external conditions or developments. To discourage competitive conduct more categorically and lastingly, competitors must be enlightened that their violations of others are not in their interest regardless of punishment. That may require making perpetrators aware of the more proximate utilitarian advantages of mutuality, their need for collective survival and thriving, and their empathy. It may require assistance to develop neglected or suppressed aspects of their council of traits. It may require adjusting or eliminating deformed acquired or genetic traits that make them engage in competitive practices and do not permit their council of traits to make decisions that place them in harmony with themselves and others. A cooperative society may offer such mechanisms as part of its defensive strategy or even as part of a preventive strategy. But there may be limits to the feasibility and success of such processes. Where these and the deterrence of traditional defense measures fail, a society may have to resign to the fact that it is unable to inculcate cooperative behavior. All it can do in these cases is to separate such persons to prevent them from inflicting further competitive harm. That might not be accomplishable by dissociation. The risk to humans in other societies or that delinquents would find ways to surreptitiously rejoin and damage a society may necessitate keeping such persons in confinement. While reformation processes for offenders might also be accompanied by confinement, the failure of such an adjustment would have to result in permanent confinement.

The presence and employment of auxiliary mechanisms of law, ethics, and etiquette in a society indicate that our lack of empathic development and the insufficient development of our insights regarding our other needs pose obstacles to an overall happiness. Advancing the happiness of others as an instrument for advancing our happiness appears to be firmly supported by rational and emotional considerations, and we might not have difficulties being convinced of its desirability. However, even if that might be our ideal, we and our social environment might still be far removed from a manner of existence where we can unreservedly entrust our interests to one another. The flaws and potential instabilities of a cooperative system caused by the lack of insight and by the intrinsic competitive undercurrent in humans may fill us with apprehension whether the cooperative ideal will be systematically followed if we attempt a cooperative setting. We may be particularly concerned because we give up our autonomy in a cooperative society in favor of reliance on the cooperation by others. We give others power over our happiness and become more vulnerable to their possible abusive behavior. We may be apprehensive about the risk and the damage we could sustain and may not trust in the incorruptibility of

others and their sound understanding of cooperative matters without recourse. For the foreseeable future, we may have to support the ideal of self-responsibility by mutual accountability and enforcement.

Hence, we create mutual conventions in the establishment and amelioration of a cooperative arrangement. By these devices, we seek not only to constrain instability by minimizing interpretive differences and to enhance the binding effects of mutual assistance by establishing operational cooperative guidance, but we also seek to protect our interests by impressing other participants with negative repercussions if they should fail to comport. These agreements may take a multiplicity of forms and apply to a variety of subjects. We can observe them in societal or interpersonal devices as different as constitutions, treaties, laws and regulations, or private contracts. They further include informal constructs such as the conventions of friendship, family bonds, or other social arrangements of corresponding demeanor. Many implied and express agreements may be entered among a restricted number of individuals or groups and may therefore miss the necessary power to threaten effective enforcement. Still, their participants may be able to call upon other individuals, associations, or the whole society to reinforce their binding character by formal or informal mechanisms. This assistance may be given because the threat of competitive derailment of social relationships could affect wider circles in a society. Through mechanisms of limited mutual and overarching societal enforcement, participants may build containment structures that endeavor to make the cost of competitive lapses higher than their benefits. These are essential instruments in securing and stabilizing cooperation. However, in them resides also a significant source of conflict because they compel members' compliance with cooperative models. No action regarding subject matters that affect the claims or possessions of other individuals could be undertaken unless these individuals have theretofore expressly or impliedly agreed to subject themselves to such treatment. Exceptions exist only for circumstances where fundamental rights are affected that individuals reserve regardless of whether anybody agreed to them. Yet, to forestall their competitive subjection by a cooperative arrangement beyond such fundamental reservations, individuals must possess the right to negotiate agreements and to decide independently whether and how to bind themselves, and whether to dissociate. As in an economic exchange, parties could not be permitted to manipulate the demand of potential counterparts to enter into an agreement. Nor could they exclude others or withhold their agreement for competitive purposes. But they could seek satisfaction of their needs independently or with participants and upon terms they find most suitable.

Despite all efforts to enter into agreements and secure the performance of agreements, it seems impossible to negotiate, define, and enforce all the nuances of behavior that empathy, our need for collective survival and thriving, and considerations of mutuality imply. Even if that were possible, it is unlikely to succeed without disturbing their fulfillment. Being told how to behave toward others may frustrate individuals even if they are fully committed to cooperation and the system's impositions reflect all of the overt behavior they desire because it preempts their council of traits. Under that preemption, their needs for control of their circumstances, self-determination, self-realization, expression, self-respect, and privacy, needs that inherently depend on the production of emotional resources that can solely accrue through mutuality, and other needs that may benefit from developing mutuality would lose important and even vital elements to fulfill them whose presence depends on voluntary action by cooperative participants.

Cooperative societies that comprehend this threat may restrict their cooperative prescriptions and solely address excesses in a firmly regulated manner. They may allow leeway for individual decisions and additional agreements by their members. To have some guiding influence, they may institute informal conventions in ethics or manners. In such an environment of formal and informal directives, behavioral impositions and repercussions are typically well developed for active infractions because they and their causative influence are relatively obvious. Depending on the prevalence of competitive interests in a system, it may exempt conduct that, in spite of damaging some or all participants, is permitted, protected, encouraged, or even supported. But a cooperative system with committed members may find it comparatively easy to interdict damaging acts without triggering adverse consequences by its members since these acts play no part in constructive pursuits and are obviously detrimental to such pursuits. Problems for its purpose of advancing its members' happiness are likely to arise if it were to encompass rules according to which cooperative assistance to others is indicated. The coverage of this area by rules and enforcement usually lags behind the prohibition of active interferences. That may be attributable to an unawareness of the problems this poses for a cooperative society. Prohibitions concerning omissions to act are historically underdeveloped because humanity has only slowly extended its acknowledgment of fundamental rights from noninterference to assistance. It has also been slow to grasp that individual interests in avoiding competition and in mutuality, as well as empathy and the need for collective survival and thriving, demand assistance to others. Most concepts that mandate affirmative assistance may be based on a duty

that arises from special relations, prior acts, or the ability to abate an emergency with a significantly lower exposure. Not acting to assist in these situations may be deemed so deviant from what is required to maintain a society that it must be prohibited and compliant demeanor must be ordained and enforced. Still, these exceptions leave a substantial area of social nonresponsibility of members for their failures to assist others. To fulfill its purpose of advancing overall happiness, even a fully cooperative system will have to continue to maintain this void in its impositions and may not be able to constrict it by many additional exceptions. But even the proscription of negative acts will have to stop short of narrowing choices of conduct for individuals so much that the result approximates or equates a mandate to act affirmatively.

The limitations of affirmative regulation if a cooperative society is to succeed render it vulnerable to competitive conversion unless the cooperative behavior that is left to voluntary implementation is motivated by autonomous cooperative mindsets of its members. This motivation will be strongest in communities in which individuals achieve mutuality and motivation from empathy and their need for collective survival because of personal relations and direct awareness. The key to finding a level of cooperation beyond what can be effectively negotiated, defined, and enforced then seems to be that compatible individuals congregate in groups. Establishing a functional group appears to be a question of size. When we build small cooperative groups, it is easier to find individuals with harmony in their attitudes and pursuits. As we assemble larger associations, we may have to diminish the areas to be addressed by them to obtain agreement. Even the pursuits of common existential objectives may be encumbered by idiosyncratic particularizations. To derive benefits from a larger group, we may have to organize to secure selected objectives on which we can agree with others or limit the organization to basic generalities. Yet, as helpful as these approaches might be, they do not fully live up to our desire for mutuality that spans many or even most of our needs. This desire makes us favor the formation of small communities with a more comprehensive integration. Limits of our numerical capacity to engage in satisfying comprehensive mutuality favor a limited membership for such communities as well. Even individuals in smaller groups are likely to possess incompatible personality aspects. To escape the suppression of needs or contrivances of compromise and to enable the flourishing of a cooperative undertaking, even smaller groups may have to condone a range of individual and of associative particularities within and beyond the group. But they have a greater chance to achieve meaningful mutuality despite these differences and separations because they can contain

individuals with heightened compatibility and because of the favorable dynamics in a small group. A small group allows and induces us to have a personal relationship with all other members and to be aware of their needs, wishes, and pursuits. This, together with our recognition of their similarity, may strengthen our empathy for them and foster their inclusion into our need for collective survival and thriving beyond considerations of mutuality. But it fortifies our commitment and our ability to cooperate mutually with them as well. Mutuality is further advanced because many of our pursuits are connected with their pursuits. Consideration for them might hence be partly motivated by our fear of repercussions if we fail. Still, our main motivation derives from the expectation that advancing their pursuits will result in their advancement of our pursuits. All these considerations induce us to assist the welfare of others in the best possible manner and for this reason are bound to benefit us by reciprocity to the greatest extent. They also comply with the constructive aspects of our tribal instinct.

This understanding recommends to us how a cooperative society should be organized. Because small communities bring out the best in cooperative motivations and appear to offer the highest potential of satisfaction for the related needs, they must form the foundation of a cooperative society. To avail individuals in such communities of maximum cooperative benefits, all cooperative measures that are manageable by individuals on a parochial level would have to be reserved for pursuit and regulation on this level. Only cooperative aspects of pursuits that demand or can benefit from cooperation with other groups would be delegated to associations with these. This approach imparts the added benefit of reducing the burden of matters to be reconciled at higher levels and minimizes the competitive effects of higher societal organization. It facilitates harmonious differentiation among communities and decreases requirements for compromises. While such an approach places great importance on small communities, these would remain limited to addressing matters that members commit to their jurisdiction. Moreover, they would have to retain their character as instruments that individuals must be free to select and deselect. Because the coherence of compatible individuals prevents excessive alienation from members' ideals, reduces dissent and conflict, and nurtures constructive collaboration with minimal guidance and enforcement, individuals may want to join or they may not want to leave. But they must not be forced to join and have to remain free to dissociate. Conversely, individuals organized in communities have to be free to decline an accession of individuals or to dissociate them. Similar rights must apply to the relationship among communities and between them and a larg-

er society. As a subcategory of the general right to be free from competitive impositions, the right to freely associate would have to be acknowledged and implemented by all participants to a commonwealth as a condition for their cooperation. Cooperative communities and the society that contains them carry the additional distinction that hierarchic aspects are absent from them and that they are managed by the entirety of their members. Mutual consideration is ensured by requiring decisions to be approved by all members. Public deliberations and negotiations to obtain such a result give each member an opportunity to be heard, to persuade others and be persuaded through arguments, and to be held and hold other members accountable to the community. The coincidence of a unanimity requirement and deliberation facilitate determinations that fairly reflect and balance member concerns. Communities may not necessarily comply with the traditional concept of families or other associations living in the same location. Personal contact constitutes an important aspect of communities that strive to achieve comprehensive mutuality. Members might therefore continue to maintain a principal location in geographic vicinity of one another. Yet innovative communication, transportation, and cooperation techniques may expand our range to where localized forms of community become less important and may even hinder pursuits if they are exclusive. Comprehensive mutuality might be ideal because it is most satisfying for members and can lead to developments at higher levels that are expansively reconciled. However, individuals and their communities may also organize in communities with limited purviews to develop partial mutuality where comprehensive mutuality is not possible or to bring their concerns into consideration at higher levels.

Despite human development, many matters could be left to be handled by communities separately. But a sizeable number of pursuits or their effects may involve issues that require to be or profit from being managed by multiple communities. To embody similar benefits as smaller communities and to preserve the benefits of these, cooperative enterprises of multiple communities have to be organized in close analogy to relations among individuals. Communities would possess the same rights and obligations as individuals in cooperative communities because they are direct representations of the collective of their members. The only variable would arise because communities may vary in the number of persons they contain. To ensure equity, the attribution of quantifiable obligations and rights would have to be proportional to that number, provided that individuals would only be counted once if several communities represent the same members in a matter. Some matters may be resolved by occasional arrangements as requirements

or opportunities arise. These arrangements might involve representatives appointed for such tasks who report to and are bound by the direction of participating communities and who might retain assistance as an entirety based on that direction. Other matters require continued cooperation because they are of a recurring or continuing nature. Once it is determined by the members that communities will cooperate on these matters, governmental structures and processes have to be established to competently administrate these. Professional administrators may have to be retained because of the continuing intensity and detail of tasks. With the increasing development of humanity, the administration of such matters may also require particularized expertise that most individuals might not have. Hence, the participation by members in matters that are delegated to higher levels of government may encounter functional boundaries. Even if they can, possibly with some instruction, formulate fundamental conventions on subject matters, it will often be impossible for substantive and procedural reasons that they remain involved in elaborating these conventions and in the details of their application. But organizations that provide advice and implement conventions tend to take on an existence of their own and remove government from the governed. Forestalling a competitive deterioration of administrative institutions requires that their activities are conditioned upon prior authorization and that they remain bound to the direction of the population they serve. It also requires transparency and accountability. In addition, professional governmental functions will have to be limited to indispensable tasks that cannot otherwise be suitably secured. Professional functionaries will have to be appointed by unanimous consent based on demonstrated skill and reliability in similar or subordinated positions. Further, although it might not be feasible to regularly change appointments to professional positions, retention must stay subject to ongoing unanimous consent.

Individuals in communities may find the exercise of such direction and oversight in government at elevated levels too taxing to conduct it directly. Rather than having all members of a community engage in parallel control of such government, they may select representatives among themselves to address particular aspects of administrative government on behalf of the community. Only, such delegations may still leave constituent communities exposed to competitive deterioration. The concentration of power in delegates and their separation may lead them to constitute a separate government together with other delegates and in coordination with administrative functionaries. To prevent competitive abuse by representatives, they would have to remain subject to strict direction and control by the communities that

send them. They would have to be subject to unanimous appointment by such communities and these would have to have the right to recall them if unanimous support is lost. Their mandate would have to be closely defined and their work would have to be reviewed. The preparation of conventions at delegated levels might necessitate that representatives have measured discretion to undertake research, drafts, and negotiations on behalf of communities. Notwithstanding, to preserve direction and control of such processes, they would have to be subject to prior authorization by their community, its continuing information and oversight, and the reservation of resulting agreements to its sanction. Finally, representatives would have to be appointed by criteria of merit without competitive selection, and appointments would have to be regularly changed, preserving the regular positioning of individuals in their community. Hence, members' governmental burdens could be significantly eased, but they would have to stay intricately involved.

Reviewers of these proposals for cooperative government might find several objections to them. They might doubt the ability of cooperative communities to cooperate beyond their confines because their strong internal coherence might translate into competitive differentiation from humans outside their community. But such concerns fail to consider that the development of insight that imparts individuals with cooperative attitudes within their communities moves indivisible from an evolution of the same insight regarding all of humanity. In a setting in which technological and economic progress connects and otherwise impacts individuals beyond traditional associations, the requirements of mutuality grow past traditional concepts. Moreover, our increasing awareness of individuals outside the boundaries of our groups, about how we are connected with them, and how they are coping instills us with rising empathy and an extension of our needs for collective survival and thriving to them. These emotional impressions encourage us to extend our instinctive tribal concepts to all humans. They combine with rational insights concerning the detrimental consequences of not following these motivations that cause us to fear for the fulfillment of needs that have not previously motivated us to act cooperatively. A resulting rise in awareness that maximizing our happiness requires the reconciliation of our needs with the needs of all other humans and the maximization of their happiness motivates us to engage in a type of cooperation that does not halt at the boundaries of our groupings. The combined intensity of these motivations affords us the power to overcome negative connotations of tribal instincts and other competitive motivations. It gives us hope that attaining an extensive range of harmony among humans is possible if their minds are opened to reality.

Another concern might be how a society can do justice to all of its members if it positions communities at the center of its organizational concept. Far-reaching requirements for compatibility may make it difficult to obtain association in communities that offer comprehensive mutuality. But individuals who cannot attain accession to existing groups are free to organize a comprehensive community according to their needs if they can find similarly disposed individuals. If individuals are so disagreeable in their personality that they do not constitute an acceptable member of any community with comprehensive mutuality, they might find continuing mutuality in communities that focus on a limited number of needs or particular interests. They also could still engage in a broad range of mutualities in singular or repeated exchanges or rely on themselves. A cooperative society has to assure an environment where that is possible to maintain the fundamental right of free association. Members who lack compatibility have a fundamental right to abstain from associating in communities. Although a society is not obligated to replace for them the benefits of comprehensive mutuality, it must not discriminate against them beyond the inherent consequences of their nonaffiliation with common ventures. The generally cooperative attitude of individuals in a cooperative society and the interchange requirements and opportunities of developed humanity would seem to still provide a generally cooperative setting. In addition, all members of a cooperative society would have to agree on fundamental rights and on their support and protection as the necessary foundation for their society. These arrangements maximize the ability of individuals to find fulfillment in accordance with their varied dispositions. The superior fulfillment that might be achieved through comprehensive mutuality may instigate and reinforce motivations by individuals to develop their cooperative capacity and possibly adjust their personality to more thoroughly harmonize with others. Under the direction of their cooperative needs, humans may even be able to penetrate their parochial limitations in mutuality and render it universal.

Beyond these principled concerns, reviewers might have doubts about the feasibility of cooperative government. They might question how constituents should find the time and other resources to conduct government and whether they would be willing to make the necessary efforts. But there does not seem to be a viable alternative if members desire to assure that government represents their interests. Only procedural management can be delegated, but not its substantive underpinnings. Members must select cooperative undertakings, dictate how they should be conducted, and ensure that they are conducted as directed. A questioning of individual involvement in government would

have to be attributed to the prominence of traditional hierarchic and competitive prejudices or the otherwise incomplete development and reconciliation of needs. Once participants' needs have become reconciled, their partaking in cooperative matters will not appear to them as extraordinary but as a natural manner of pursuit that is indispensable to attain and maintain fulfillment for their cooperative needs.

The competent exercise of governance functions requires in addition to administrative efforts that members become adequately educated about matters they determine. Acquiring and maintaining that education and undertaking their governmental duties demand sizable reallocations of resources from members' economic pursuits. But their liberation from exploitation and exclusion if they act on their reconciled insights will make vastly more resources available to them. Additional resources accrue with the effectiveness and efficiency improvements of cooperative technological, economic, and organizational development. The evolution of the internal and external conditions that fully ensconce cooperative government may take time even after a society has become committed to it. To facilitate the transition from deficient circumstances, cooperative governance may have to be initially limited to matters within individuals' current management ability and raised as their practical insights and means grow. Existing representational systems could be adjusted to progressively embrace the requirements for cooperative government. Critics may also consider the unanimity requirements of cooperative governance overwrought and unrealistic even if members are cooperatively oriented. But the threat of competitive abuse by a majority is so grave that the imposition of the will of some members or communities over others has to be absolutely avoided. Moreover, a concordance among cooperative members is easier to achieve than it might seem. The formation of communities with advanced mutuality is vital for advancing a cooperative society. Nevertheless, workable communities can begin to form and develop if members have not found ultimate mutuality in them and even if they never find it. Since mutuality in large parts consists of compromises that are formed because they contribute to an overall best result under the circumstances, members of a community may achieve a negotiated consensus long before they arrive at a state where each member is willing to advance the other because of an autonomous desire. The participation and unanimity requirements of a cooperative society regulate the pace of government to members' capabilities. Then again, any encumbrances on practical concerns that arise from cooperative governance appear to be minor compared to the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies that competitive abuses of and clearances by government exert.

A final question might be how a cooperative system can ascend from situations of cooperative deficit. Cooperative communities might develop from traditional cooperative communities that have survived organizational changes of human development, from cooperative production enterprises, or even through the conversion of competitively oriented organizations. But new associations might be necessary. They may also be easier to form with less traditional baggage. In a competitively dominated environment, these communities and elevated levels of cooperation among them might have to be organized parallel to existing governance. They might gradually exert influence to change societal structures and processes or build the potential to replace them when competitive domination collapses. Other forms of organization may be helpful as well to defend against competitive forces and effect their demise. Still, the core of defensive competition happens by individual refusal to cooperate with competitive forces. That power of individual involvement continues in the constructive aspects of cooperative change. Much of the preparatory work for a cooperative society can and must be laid by individual efforts. These include acts of kindness, including assistance, tolerance, consideration, compromise, and forgiveness that build cooperative attitudes without formal organization, and the sharing of information about competitive abuse and cooperative philosophy. Competitive interests will find it even harder to curtail such constructive autonomous conduct than individual passive resistance. It is so obviously correct that manipulative contrivances or coercion disqualify themselves by their contrast and are likely to fail.

Yet, even if cooperative interests are mindful of the techniques that can defeat competitive strategies, they might worry whether sufficient numbers of individuals can be converted and motivated to take remedial action. They may be encouraged to know that it has become more difficult in the course of human development for competitive interests to justify competitive domination. To succeed, it must increasingly be applied surreptitiously or under the use of ever more complex manipulation. On the other hand, as their domination has become increasingly threatened by the spread of mindfulness and the regression of traditional justifications for domination, competitive interests have exerted extensive efforts to counteract challenges with enhanced techniques of mind control. That may render fighting them more difficult. The rising intensity of their manipulatory efforts may diminish awareness of competitive impositions. These may be so numerous, deep, refined, and complementary that they may establish a plausible fictional interpretation of subjects' existence. Competitive forces may successfully distract victims and prevent their mental growth through nonin-

formation and misinformation and through directed positive and negative emotions. They may instill or reinforce victims with opinions of the world, its threats, and its opportunities, as well as their and their victims' position and function in it, that may make victims their intentional or unintentional supporters, apathetic targets, or bystanders. If they cannot influence victims to think, feel, and act according to their commands and philosophies and hence turn them into systemic functionaries, they may at least create or reinforce insecurity, doubt, guilt, self-devaluation, dependence, and apprehension about autonomously formulating and pursuing paths of happiness. Either way, they may be largely able to keep their subjects from becoming self-aware and self-determining. They may indoctrinate these to fear, to resent, or to fight enlightened philosophies, protagonists, followers, and activities, or to sanction persecutions against these. Competitive forces may thus succeed in securely obstructing and eliminating those who seek to expose and overcome their practices. But aggressive measures may be unnecessary. Competitive forces may permit knowledge of their domination and manipulation to be accessible because they have conditioned subjects to overlook, not seek, or not react to such information or to emotionally reject disclosures in circumvention of rational processes.

Even if we should concede the potential of such conditions, we might reject the possibility that we have fallen for such manipulations. We might argue that such manipulations would have to be too pervasive to be centrally planned. We might contend that such a plan could not be kept secret. We might discount that independent, corresponding behavior might be even more efficient and effective. We might be unable to see that our mind is manipulated because large parts of our environment might have been shaped to comport with our conditioning. Moreover, the cooperative support system that competitive rulers permit or encourage so they can utilize it or hide their presence in it might cause us to reject that we live in a competitively dominated and manipulated society. Further, the diversity of available theoretical philosophies and choices might leave us with the impression that we are free to think and act for ourselves. We might trust that our decisions are free because we have been manipulated not to step outside insinuated choices. Because we do not test the system's boundaries, we may not know of them. Our internalization of instructions may render the enforcement and even the positing of external limitations largely unnecessary and permit them to be held in abeyance. This appearance of freedom and harmony discredits claims of competitive oppression. Because internalized instructions exist as apparent attributes of our self, we must win a battle in us before we can address competitive rule.

Even if we are mindful of the advantages of cooperative governance and that we are being manipulated by competitive interests, we might be apprehensive about making the necessary changes. We may fear to lose remaining benefits or status under a competitively dominated system. As deficient as such a system might be, we may wonder whether a new order can be successfully established, how much better it will serve our interests, and how much damage we might suffer during a change. We may not only be concerned about the repercussions of standing up against competitive interests. The diversity of activity if individuals are free to organize according to their wishes in multiple types and various levels of associations, to not organize, and to dissociate may appear troublesome to us. The variances from our familiar settings in which members of a society are involuntarily or voluntarily governed by an external order may instill doubt in us about constituents' ability to govern astutely. Such concerns may be well founded in lower states of human development in which humans have not gained full insight into their needs, not reconciled them within themselves or with one another, and have not established a foundation for their interaction with their acknowledgment of fundamental rights. Without these prerequisites, an attempted cooperative governance and organization may deteriorate into a disorderly competitive struggle. Keeping us unprepared for a cooperative setting and making us aware of such an unpreparedness may be essential competitive strategies. To prevent chaos and overcome our disability, it will be necessary to incrementally reorganize a society not only as its members acquire knowledge and means that permit them to govern. Its cooperative reorganization will also have to be paced according to the populace's strides toward individual and collective reconciliation and toward respect for fundamental rights. In systems where competitive interests prevent incremental reform and precipitate a more rapid change, cooperative interests will be well advised to develop and practice cooperative performance until they are confident that they can assume and maintain governance before they effect change, making only an exception if circumstances are so dire that the risk of subsequent disorder must be entered.

While it is essential to identify and pursue our needs and overcome competitive hindrances in us and others through individual and collective reconciliation, this does not exhaust our challenges in living up to our potential to gain happiness. We still must comprehend how all this comports with the extended environment that sustains human existence. We might also ask how happy we can become if we succeed with our enhancement efforts and what our individual and collective destination might be. The next section addresses these questions.