

CHAPTER 31

COOPERATIVE TRANSFORMATION

Forces that intend to establish a cooperative system in a consummately competitive setting may have to construct it gradually through their own conversion and new accessions. Such cooperative modes would likely not include individuals who at the time derive better advantages from engaging in competitive endeavors. Cooperative enterprises may have to start out with individuals who are underprivileged as victims or who are newly engaged in economic activities and look for support. Beyond that, they might win over a few converts who are prepared to give up competitive practices even if they presently profit from them. Burgeoning cooperative endeavors may not be able to function completely cooperatively ways at first. To endure in an offensively competitive environment, they may have to limit cooperation mostly to their members. They may have to employ defensive and possibly offensive competitive tactics toward the outside. Eventually, they may be able to connect with other cooperative individuals and groups and extend a cooperative mode to these relationships. In time, they may succeed in establishing cooperative associations that can resist competitive attacks to a degree that allows their continuity in a system.

Yet not all cooperative associations may have to be newly built. Even the most extreme competitive systems seem to refer to some cooperative modes of production. They may prey on already established cooperative mechanisms, or they may permit, protect, support, or establish them to profit from their effectiveness and efficiency. Still, developing a competitive system that is dependent on cooperative production into a cooperative free market system seems to be an arduous undertaking. Those who profit from competitive systems with cooperative components are likely to assert their power to foil such a development. They are further unlikely to tolerate the rise of an alternative, independent cooperative system because this would curtail the sustenance and power base of their system. Independent cooperative ventures and systems of ventures would remove themselves from the control and use by competitive interests. Besides that loss, their existence and thriving might reveal the remaining competitive system as a less desirable alternative. The side-by-side comparison of the two systems would favor migration toward the cooperative system at least by those who are disadvantaged in a competitive setting. That would diminish the wealth of competitive interests and would threaten their power. A decrease in wealth would not solely reflect on a diminished capability to meet their needs. It would also reduce the means available for con-

trol and competitive extraction of resources. At the same time, those control efforts would have to intensify because participants could witness a system that could set them free and advance their interests better. Even if a cooperative system were not located in a proximity that facilitates defection, the mere existence and functioning of such a system anywhere can serve as proof for the superiority of cooperative systems and produce instability for competitive systems. Hence, competitive systems might strive to destroy independent cooperative systems wherever they might exist or, if that is not possible, to at least corrupt or damage them to a degree that extinguishes their superiority or renders it less glaring. Competitive systems may then either try to subject and instrumentalize cooperative ventures or, where that does not succeed, take resolute interdictive or restraining action against them.

In their fight against cooperative strategies, competitive powers are assisted by natural inertia built into human societies that resists a transition into a cooperative system and prefers hierarchy. The reason for such inertia is partly to be found in human aimlessness and confusion. They make us wish that someone had the answers to guide us to happiness. We may recoil from the difficulties of organizing disparate needs and wishes into a commonwealth. Even if we recognize that cooperative behavior adds effectiveness and efficiency to human behavior, we may not trust that humans can establish or maintain cooperation autonomously. We may believe that chaos will result unless a society is directed. Our instinctive preparedness to be hierarchically organized favors competition. A system of exclusionary or of predatory abuse can easily merge with and utilize social hierarchies because they naturally allow exclusion and exploitation. Competitive comportment and tolerance toward it may be natural consequences of our hierarchic inclination. They may at least in part be based on our standing in a society. Conversely, our social standing may result from competitive behavior or tolerance. These two factors may positively or negatively reinforce each other. Competitive attitudes and social standing may be aspects that are reflective of the same phenomenon. Both appear to be the combined result of external factors that provide opportunity and genetic and acquired emotional traits and other dispositions. Depending on where we find ourselves in the confluence of these factors, we may be willing to assert ourselves or allow others to dominate us.

Some of the factors determining our standing in a social structure seem to be considerations of individual and collective utility, similarity, and competitive power we recognize in one another. Such considerations may be based in part on possessions and resulting capabilities. Moreover, they may be sourced in acquired and genetic outward

physical dispositions and mental traits. The standing of an individual may then be substantially defined not only by that individual's qualities but also by how others evaluate these qualities. That evaluation is relative. An individual's council of traits judges traits and other dispositions of others similar to how it judges internally and compares the results. As a consequence, the determination of status among humans may be largely defined by their subjective comparison of dispositions. Our opinions of our standing may be partly based on our perceptions about us in comparison with others. In addition, they may be derived from assessments that are communicated by other individuals. To the extent their judgment is influenced by their mental traits, other dispositions, needs, and circumstances, our self-evaluation might be shaped by their nature and agenda. It might further be expansively shaped by our interpretations of their statements and their other demeanor. But such interpretations might again be influenced by our mental traits.

The resulting judgment we pass on ourselves may induce us to become victims of competitive behavior not only as the direct result of external domination and interference. We may contribute to our fate because we independently introduce attitudes or permit opinions and wishes of others regarding our standing. We may have an impression of our capacities and our value that may deeply affect how we relate to others. It may fundamentally shape our participation and expectation of results. We may hold ourselves and permit others to hold us under the impression that our capacities or our accomplishments are inferior. We may not insist on compensation commensurate with our contributions or advancement commensurate with our potential. We may believe that we are only capable of or only deserve a modest allotment of happiness and that others can achieve or deserve more. This sense of social standing may induce, reinforce, or invite external conditions of deprivation and of competitive abuse. It may condition us to suffer states of deprivation and competitive victimization without resistance. The reverse of this attitude may befall us as well. We may regard ourselves more deserving of social standing and rewards than others. This attitude may generate a sense of entitlement that may cause us to engage in competition if our surroundings do not attend to our needs as expected. While such overassertive attitudes may clash with the attitudes held by others, they may also be complemented and receive accommodation by the attitudes of underassertive individuals.

We may not consistently be subjected to internal and external signals of inferiority or superiority, nor may the intensity of such signals be consistent. They may differ depending on our particular internal and external positioning. This may create a complex set of valida-

tion directions for our behavior. We may experience periods in which we are insecure about our status. We may attempt to improve our status. However, the amalgamation of our dispositions and experiences tends to attribute to us a rank in social standing not only by external compulsion but also as a matter of our judgment. The combined effect of these external and internal determinants may constitute powerful forces of differentiation that can enable a competitive system to take hold and persist. The connection of social and economic order invites economically oriented competitive interests to use social organization for pursuing their economic objectives. It may also induce competitive interests to pursue means that might not be generally categorized as economic. But all of these pursuits have in common that they focus on the accumulation or domination of resources and their use at the cost of others. The dominance of and submission by other individuals may constitute a circumstance from which any type of resource can spring. Our willingness to fit into a hierarchic system helps competitive interests in overcoming our resistance to the proposition that we must suffer so they can benefit. For this reason, competitive interests are likely to promote existential philosophies that encourage societal hierarchy and to strive for positions of hierarchic domination of a society. They are therefore attracted to any kind of governance that entails a difference of power between government and the governed. Hierarchic governance allows them to exert control and to legitimize their agenda as a natural part of such a governance. As a result, governance and economic power are inherently linked in competitive strategies.

Historically, this link has been vital for competitive success. But the association between governance and economic power is attenuating as free market principles come to bear. The advance of free market principles may not only be due to their partial tolerance and approval by competitive forces. It is also attributable to technological development. Technology has made it progressively possible and necessary for parties to engage in economic ventures that are influenced by circumstances past the confines of traditional government. Better communications, production, transport, and storage capabilities as well as more advanced types of products have required economic interrelations and opened opportunities that rise above customary societal and economic boundaries. These trends amalgamate to result in a progressively interrelated and cooperative approach of economic activity that renders it increasingly problematic to keep enterprises and markets insulated. This development imposes a difficult choice on competitive rulers that dominate and utilize traditional systems. Although they can preclude transborder interaction, that may cause a downturn of their economy

or its failure to develop. This may deprive them of means they pursue in their competitive practices and even vitally of the means to continue these practices. It might destabilize and fatally affect their system. Their system may not be able to sustain itself without exchanges and cooperative association with other markets. Even if a competitive system could continue to subsist in isolation, its sourcing of means might be comparatively feeble. Deficiencies of sourcing by its subjects compared to participants in more cooperative systems may cause threats to such a system's stability and existence from within. Such problems may allow other systems to gain influence over or topple the competitive rulers of the weakened system. Their economic and technological superiority may further allow them to exert independent pressure by a threat of hostilities. A competitive system that does not open itself to cooperative economic conventions may then place its competitive rulers in peril. These may strive to preserve control by entering into alliances with similarly exclusive systems. But controlled exchanges and collaborations with these expose them to the risk of competitive usurpation without greatly improving their economic position. They may also seek alliances with more prosperous systems to obtain some advanced products for their use or the use of the population in exchange for more basic resources that their system can offer. While this might address some problems arising from seclusion that weakened the rulers of such systems, it may additionally weaken them because they become dependent. They may still lose their power to foreign forces.

To prevent such threats and to build and maintain an economy that secures their position, competitive rulers might condition the exposure of their domains to economic interchange on precautions calculated to assert control. However, that interchange is by its intrinsic nature uncontrollable by any system that opens to it. Any decision to allow an interchange with other economic systems may therefore have extensive repercussions for the stability of competitive rulers and their system. The longing of their population for products available in other markets and their economic endeavors to become able to afford such products may be an irresistible driving force for increased intermarket cooperation. That cooperation leads to a commingling of markets into one large, connected market that supersedes the constituent markets. This reduces the ability of ruling competitors to control their domain and employ traditional competitive practices under the shield of traditional government. This traditional model of securing and using competitive domination becomes at least in part outdated and relegated in a transboundary economic setting that is moving beyond governmental checks and impositions by its requirements and consequences.

It may thus appear that, with the growing correlation and merger of economic systems, a very important tool for competitive strategies loses some of its utility. Then again, the same circumstances leading to that downturn in utility generate other competitive advantages that might exceed those that are lost. Technological progress provides individuals with access to multiple avenues for interaction with different sets of individuals. It enables the switching of interrelations with other individuals as the various contexts of our pursuits appear to necessitate or render advantageous. Additionally, technological progress provides us with the necessity and possibility to rely on others in the fulfillment of our needs without any social relationship. This has made our ties with particular individuals less close and less cogent. We may choose connections specific to our interests and in a much looser and more provisional manner. We may replace recurrent personal contacts with cursory, interchangeable, remote, and frequently anonymous settings. Although such eclectic access might increase nonemotional resources, its superficiality, fragmentation, and detachment may reduce emotional aspects in these relations and damage our ability to acquire emotional resources from them. This weakening of our emotional capabilities may motivate us to look elsewhere for satisfaction.

In addition, the resulting reduction of mutuality can cause significant competitive risks. It may deteriorate our motivation to behave responsibly toward others. The extension of competitive activity may go unbridled by mechanisms of internal restraint. To find comfort in competitive activities, competitors must overcome scruples against invading the means of other individuals or of their pursuits of means. To that effect, competitors have to curb their care for other individuals. A technologically advanced setting may induce and facilitate such a reduction. A personal setting with individuals might convince us of sufficient commonalities to persuade us against engaging in competitive strategies or to exercise them with restraint. Witnessing the commonality with victims, the impact competitive activities have on them, and the awareness of the similarity of their suffering to how we would be affected may render it harder to overcome reservations. But our scruples and notions of responsibility may be reduced where information inducing such identification is missing. Our ignorance regarding others and about the effects of our actions affords us a dispensation from empathy and including them into our need for collective survival and thriving, and it allows us to reduce them to a resource to be exploited or a source of interference to be excluded. To become more successful in competitive strategies, we may even seek to avoid awareness of our victims' human nature. Further, the attenuation of contact diminishes

the accessibility of external corrective influences on our actions by victims or their associates and offers opportunities to take advantage of others with less concern of direct or social repercussions. The lack of external restraint endows competitive practices with more maneuvering room and an ability to flourish in areas that traditionally would be policed by obligations of mutuality even in the absence of governmental restraint. Such areas may be found in behavior that is regulated by informal systems of social response. Manners and ethics would appear to be the most susceptible to fall prey to a lack of social enforcement. Beyond that, mutuality may be partly regulated by agreements or general legal obligations imposed by a system. Yet the difficulties to track and control competitors in settings that evade the reach of traditional enforcement mechanisms may allow competitors to circumvent repercussions from these. The technological and social dissolution of traditional economies may make cooperative concerns vulnerable to competition that is unchecked by manners, ethics, and even law.

A technologically advanced economy may then allow the emergence of particularly ruthless competitors. Moreover, the flexibility of competitors compared to the often specialized function and restricted position of their victims may avail them of decisive advantages. Arguably, such circumstances favor nimble competitors in the shape of individuals or small competitive enterprises. But the full competitive use of an economy with less boundaries and regulations may require enterprises with considerable scale and organizational competence. Such enterprises may have existed to some extent at more primitive stages of economic development. These might be situated to take advantage of increased transsystem opportunities before other interests and may continue to dominate. However, the growth of transsystem technological and economic structures and processes creates an unprecedented diversity and breadth of opportunities that may encourage the establishment of new competitive enterprises that may obtain influential or dominating positions. In either case, competitive interests that constituted or supported the competitive governance of societies are bound to attempt to become part of such developments and to continue their reign through them. While traditional governments retain important service functions for competitors, these may embrace competitive opportunities of transsystem operations, possibly with the assistance of traditional governments. The ability to evade governmental and other regulation beyond traditional territories and the use of this ability to bypass protections of victims in their country of origin may open vast more profitable and less risk laden or burdensome realms of competitive activity. Competitors may prefer to operate free of the limitations

and contortions that fitting into accepted societal norms creates when it serves their interests. They may therefore use their influence or control of government to allow internationalization so their interests can operate even less disturbed by government. They might further regard governments and social organization they represent as pawns they can utilize to advance their purposes after they have obtained an existence independent of them. Transsystem competitors may pit governments and societies against one another to degrade their resistance to their competitive practices and to profit from their conflicts without being tied to which side wins. They might sell or lend resources to all sides, speculate on developments they influence, and possibly pick winners.

But transsystem competitors may also have more stable uses for traditional societies and their governments. Their stature may render them formidable forces domestically that are difficult to oppose. They may continue to dominate their home systems where they regard this necessary or convenient and use them for transsystem undertakings. To secure that basis, competitive interests may behave mostly cooperatively within their homeland and restrict competitive activities largely to areas beyond its boundaries. Such cooperation may render societies receptive to aligning themselves and allowing transsystem enterprises to more expansively use them for transsystem competition. The lure of shared profits from operations outside the boundaries of a system together with the prospect of being spared from the depredations of competitive power may turn cooperative governments and societies that competitive interests did not previously control or sufficiently influence in their favor. The segregation from foreign suffering may be a welcome shield for an enterprise's home population to maintain ignorance with a subdued conscience. Transsystem competitors may support that mindset with manipulation and information control. If domestic cooperative forces stand in their way, they may invoke and advance negative tribal motivations toward them or use other domestic competitive tools, including government to disable such opposition.

Through transsystem enterprises, competitive interests can extend their domestic footing and reach beyond their boundaries under the pretense of free markets and the guise of constructive market participants. To perform true to their competitive potential, transsystem enterprises have to escape foreign governmental regulation. That may require pushing for formal deregulation in foreign territories. Competitive forces may strive to influence foreign governments by traditional competitive strategies of manipulation or coercion. They may further use their influence on or domination of their domestic government to manipulate or coerce foreign governments into acceptance. If foreign

governments resist internationalization, competitive interests may use their power to destabilize or overturn them to establish friendly rule. To camouflage their corruption or compulsion of foreign governments and to deceive foreign populations into backing their cause, competitive interests may conduct a manipulatory campaign to persuade foreign societies that opening their markets and deregulating them are in the best interest of their members. They might stress individual freedoms that purportedly flow from or frame the opening and deregulation. They may imply that upon opening their markets, such societies will also enjoy an improved material standard of living. They and the governments they already control may offer mutuality in the deregulation and opening of their established markets in return for the deregulation and opening of foreign markets if they are confident that they will gain an overall advantage. The mutuality of such arrangements is of no import if they can overwhelm foreign enterprises that could reciprocate foreign market involvement or can induce them to join in an association, acquisition, or merger. They may seek as many parties to such governmental and private agreements as possible to extend their reach and obfuscate their agenda. Intergovernmental agreements and associations may become useful tools to favor transsystem competitive pursuits by achieving uniformity of conditions, by controlling member systems through such structures, and by influencing nonmember systems to open their markets and to deregulate adverse restrictions.

By forming transsystem enterprises, competitive interests create a new, comprehensive competitive system that avails their abuses of better efficiency and effectiveness because they can now choose the locale, type, intensity, and period of their activities. They can assail or retreat, shift operations and profits, circumvent detection, and escape liability. Their requisite heft to invade other territories allows them to make governments and populations dependent on them and to favor or to penalize localities depending on whether these accommodate or oppose their endeavors. Their often widely distributed ownership and the seclusion, remoteness, anonymity, and large, often subdivided organization of their management obscure competitive accountabilities even if such enterprises are clearly identified as competitive offenders. The combination of power and elusiveness makes transsystem enterprises more formidable opponents for cooperative interests than traditional competitive forms of organization. Dislodging transsystem enterprises may be particularly difficult if they act cooperatively in some markets and concentrate their competitive practices on other markets. Because their influence and power are likely to afford them with domination of domestic and foreign governments, fighting such enterpris-

es may be left to few foreign governments that might be able to resist and victims in territories whose governments fail to defend or prevail against competitive abuse. This resistance may still be of great concern to transsystem enterprises because it has the potential to spread, even to their homeland. When their means of manipulation and coercion do not sufficiently succeed to defeat it, they may call on the governments and societies with which they are cooperating to actively assist them in foreign territories. This positions the conflict with foreign victims on an escalated, truly international level. These may have been aware of the homeland of transsystem competitors and adverse to its tolerance of foreign competition. They may also have been adverse to their government for allowing competitors to enter and damage them. But their identification of competitors and the enabling local government with foreign societies and their governments through the intervention of these in domestic affairs may add determination to defensive efforts because such activities evoke negative tribal sentiments.

Apprehensive of such escalation, transsystem competitors may reserve direct intervention from their homeland to circumstances that they cannot handle otherwise. They may be more inclined to use this intervention if it assists them to defend or to consolidate their power domestically by rallying the populace under their rule pursuant to hierarchic and tribal instincts. They may also profit from the production of instruments for foreign exploits. Moreover, they may involve their homeland if they can be certain that the resulting risks and costs will be primarily borne by their homeland. Where conflicts promise to advance transsystem enterprises or the interests behind them, that populace may be habitually called upon to support and to protect foreign competitive positions. Such a belligerent stance engenders hostility by foreign victims against the government and population of a complicit society and defensive activities by them that elevate its risk and cost. The benefits from foreign domination efforts may not compensate for the injuries these efforts engender for the homeland. A society would therefore be well advised to curb competitive practices of transsystem enterprises even if it carries no principal competitive scruples. Another practical reason is that transsystem enterprises may continue pursuing competitive objectives domestically albeit more with manipulative than with coercive means. They are bound to be the most powerful domestic competitive forces besides traditional forces in the background that control them. Even if these enterprises are largely focused on foreign territories, the domestic competitive ambitions of competitive rulers continue. While these may share benefits from foreign adventures, they only do this to secure their continued domination.

The advanced manipulation and coercion techniques employed by competitive interests may not only hinder cooperative forces from forming but also from gaining traction in their opposition. To understand how one might successfully contend with competitive forces, it seems necessary to investigate the basic functions of an economic enterprise led by competitive forces because it constitutes the core asset of competitive activities. An enterprise may have one or more owners. Its principal functions are not initially differentiated from the pursuits of its ownership. As a representation or composite of individuals, it is subject to the same principles and parameters that apply to its participants in their pursuit of happiness. Mostly as an enterprise grows, but in some cases from its beginning, it may conduct its activities through individuals other than its ownership or only through selected owners in representation of the entire ownership. It may thus become separately organized and managed. That separation may detach the mindset and behavior of an enterprise from its owners and their needs. The distancing of enterprises from their owners favors the competitive use of enterprises. The reason for the existence of an economic enterprise is the production of particular means for the use by owners or for the exchange of means on behalf of its owners. Under the active involvement of its owners, that production must justify itself as a part of the owners' systems of mutuality. However, without such involvement, an enterprise becomes reduced to its limited economic purpose.

In such a detached form, an economic enterprise constitutes a poor tool for the pursuit of happiness. Its reduced mission will cause it to ignore and sacrifice any other concerns. An enterprise that is concentrated on the production of particular means or money is liberated from the council of traits that might constrain the actions of individuals. It is a machine without a conscience. It tends to engage in its pursuits with a single-minded determination to fulfill its mission. It may utilize cooperation extensively in its undertakings if that strategy appears to be the most promising and employ exclusionary or predatory strategies where they offer better results. Liberated from the cooperative concerns of mutuality that attach to the entirety of human needs, it carries no scruples to apply competitive strategies if these benefit its limited objectives more than cooperative practices. Its single-minded pursuit of means without guidance by a council of needs can make an enterprise that is separated from its owners an effective and efficient instrument in the generation of resources. Then again, this feature also makes it extraordinarily dangerous to human happiness. Its exclusive focus on producing certain means or money can damage not only others but also its owners in excess of the benefits it can convey.

Owners of an enterprise may not have a dedicated intent to use the enterprise to engage in competition. Still, their continuing constitutional involvement in such an enterprise renders them accountable to themselves, to one another, and jointly to other individuals for the behavior of the enterprise. This exposure may have a restraining effect on the activities of the enterprise. Yet, as owners pass governance to managers and separate themselves from the activities of an enterprise, external forces may be the exclusive sources for restraint beyond cost-benefit calculations within an enterprise. The management of an enterprise by employed or representative individuals may not be able to replace management by the totality of its owners. This may be partly attributable to the fact that management might enjoy indemnity by the enterprise or might not have resources invested in the enterprise. More important, the qualification requirements for management may focus on qualities that do not reflect the full scope of human interests. The ability to maximize the economic success of an enterprise may be a highly sought and rewarded quality that attracts individuals who can dedicate themselves to that objective without reservation. The single-minded pursuit of resources by an enterprise is likely to find reflection in its managers' ambitions to maximize their employability, compensation, and prestige by advancing that mission. Owners may be involved in selecting such managers. They may intend to remove themselves from responsibility for competitive activities taken by their enterprise. However, even if they hand over management for other reasons, the same consequences may ensue. The retreat of owners leaves an enterprise as a competitive entity that is separate from its owners.

Managers may perceive their function to be in the service of the enterprise rather than its owners. That impression may lead managers to make the wellbeing of the enterprise their purpose before the wellbeing of its owners. They may attempt to strengthen the enterprise by withholding distributions and by holding or investing them for the advantage of the enterprise. Through the dedication of its management, the intent and existence of the enterprise may become self-contained and self-perpetuating. Through management, the enterprise may develop a need to survive and thrive that is separate from all other considerations, even individual considerations of participants in its management. By accomplishing this state, it finalizes its detachment from human needs. This development together with further aspects of detachment in economic dealings and the lack of external constraint affords enterprises with a devastating potential. Their existence as separate entities devoid of ethics and of accountability attracts owners and managers who intend to use these entities for competitive purposes.

It appears that the most effective way to fight this development would be to focus on the original cause that gave rise to it. That cause is the failure by owners to involve themselves in the enterprises they own. The competitive tendencies of enterprises can only be overcome if owners assert and maintain a control that incorporates enterprises they own into the system of their individual needs. Maintaining such a control seems to be in the owners' interest. To make an economic enterprise an effective tool in the pursuit of its owners' strategies, such an enterprise must reflect the full range of its owners' needs. It must become a composite of its owners that represents not only their economic but also all of their other needs. Such an enterprise would engage in mutuality with its suppliers, customers, owners, other enterprises, individuals, or groups of individuals as an individual would engage with another. In spite of the overall benefits of such conduct for owners and others, it may be difficult to motivate owners to assert and maintain their control and take personal responsibility for the behavior of enterprises in which they are invested. Owners may have competitive motivations that keep them dedicated to the maximization of economic results. The separation and anonymity of acting through enterprises may shield them from being held responsible by their victims or by their environment and from holding themselves responsible.

Instituting individual responsibility may necessitate that owners are held responsible for the activities of their enterprise in proportion to their holdings. To warrant that liability, decisional power regarding operations would have to rest not only nominally but actually with the owners. Although administrative tasks could still be delegated to a separate management, these delegated tasks would have to be monitored by the owners. Moreover, all fundamental decisions would have to be reserved to them. To preclude competitive activities among owners, all their decisions would have to be unanimous. Without such a requirement, a majority of owners or stakes might bind other owners to policies that are contrary to their needs. To allow representative homogeneity of an enterprise, justify liability, and prevent competitive extortion, owners would have to be able to associate and exclude dissenting owners. Similarly, dissenting owners would have to have the right to leave if they could not find arrangements with the other owners. Both separations would have to take place under guaranties of fair compensation for separating stakes. Similarly discriminating attitudes by members and prospective purchasers would create a market setting where the worth of enterprise shares would not only be influenced by whether the enterprise's practices avoid competitive consequences but also by whether they reflect the totality of investors' needs.

There are limits to this type of control if there is sufficient demand from competitive interests for the stakes sold by the enterprise and dissenting owners. In a competitive environment, the market for ownership stakes may favor enterprises that concentrate on competitive economic results as their foremost objective. The better-rounded approach of more conscientious enterprises may reduce their competitive economic success and consequently their competitiveness compared to other enterprises. That causes diminished valuation of enterprises that exercise their responsibility for overall happiness. A significant issue in comparing the profitability of cooperative and competitive enterprises is that profitability is defined by competitive interests in narrow terms of economic benefits they can extract. Their valuation does not take into account societal benefits. Beyond that, their valuation is often permitted to ignore the negative impact of an enterprise on its human and its nonhuman environment. That impact might be difficult to detect or measure and may affect resources that are not yet claimed or appropriated. Even where the competitive fallout is traceable to particular events and victims, it may not or not fully reflect on the enterprise. Contributors to or customers of its production process may not be able to diverge from the production context without sustaining more damage than they would by experiencing competitive infringements of an enterprise. Victims outside the production sequence of a good or service may be comparatively powerless as well. Extraneous circumstances including unawareness, cost, risk, lack of expertise, and the dispersion of victims might render recourse difficult to obtain. The prevailing rules and attitudes may sanction competitive infringements. A competitive regime may hold back or fail to protect or support defensive activities to a degree that thwarts serious repercussions even if an enterprise violates laws. For these reasons, victims may not obtain sufficient recourse to influence its profitability materially. Even if some defensive strategies are permitted and succeed, the effects on an enterprise may be of an order that allow it to regard them as tolerable costs of business and to amply profit from its infringements.

To attach a more adequate valuation to an enterprise's products and the value of ownership in such enterprise according to its overall impact, a broader cooperative determination may be necessary. Such a determination may be facilitated in competitive societies to the extent they rely on markets to maximize their profits. By operating in a market, competitive interests must rely in important aspects on the voluntary cooperation by customers for their products. Even if direct customers in a production sequence might not have sufficient power or motivation to hold an enterprise that supplies them responsible, indi-

vidual customers for the ultimate product that they purchase to fulfill their needs might possess such a power. They might also possess relevant motivation because they, as parts of the general population, are most likely to bear the brunt of uncompensated negative consequences. Except for owners, such customers may hold the most power to affect enterprises' practices. Beyond influencing enterprises with which they trade directly, they might indirectly influence contributors to a product. Given a choice, they may make their dealings with an enterprise contingent on cooperative demeanor. By the market's resistance to products of an enterprise that engages in or supports competitive practices, such an enterprise will lose revenue and profit. Existing and potential owners would have to devalue it because it stands in comparative contest regarding its profitability with other enterprises. The outcome of that contest may depend on small margins of profitability and small differences in these margins. Relatively small groups of exchange partners may therefore have significant influence.

A competitive enterprise could then be obliged by market forces to change into a cooperative enterprise. Yet applying such pressure selectively may not have the desired effect. It may only strengthen certain competitors at the cost of other competitors and provoke a concentration among them. On the other hand, applying market pressure against all competitive enterprises may damage customers as much as their competitive counterparts. For these reasons, an embargo of competitive enterprises would have to be supplemented by the concurrent support of enterprises that act cooperatively. Similarly, if competitive enterprises cannot be motivated to become appropriately cooperative because they have market power that renders end customers dependent on them, it is essential that cooperative interests establish and advance enterprises offering cooperative alternatives. Even if such alternative ventures are initially small or limited and cannot satisfy all demands, their profitability derived from the purchase of their products by cooperatively minded customers empowers them to expand. While enlightened individuals will turn toward alternate sources where possible, the reconciliation of their needs will also have them focus on the pursuit of existential requirements. It will not allow competitive interests to entice them with spurious means that bind them into a competitively dominated production machinery. The resulting restructuring of an economic system in favor of reconciled production objectives critically dispossesses competitive interests of profits and of power. As competitive enterprises acquire less profit from competitive methods than they can derive in a cooperative mode, they have to modify their policies and become cooperative to survive or at least to thrive.

Cooperative influence targeted at transforming competitive enterprises by economic behavior may be exerted spontaneously or in a more organized fashion. However, the basis for any such a process is that cooperative interests come to understand their power to change competitive practices and how to leverage that power. To activate cooperative reaction, it is further vital that cooperative interests be made aware of the practices that warrant their intervention. Some relevant information may not be readily available. Obtaining it may require investigation or effective publication. To stop enterprises from concealing and withholding information, it is necessary to record and open all of their relevant activities to public view. If an enterprise denies transparency, it may be presumed to hide competitive practices and may be pressured by market reactions to disclose itself. Cooperative pressure might also be applied directly to owners. By expanding accountability to them, they might be obliged to take control of their enterprises. To attribute and enforce responsibility, it might be necessary to withdraw their shield of anonymity and to make ownership of enterprise stakes public knowledge. Cooperative interests might then withhold dealings with such owners similar to how they place pressure on enterprises to change their ways. It might additionally be necessary to rescind stakeholders' shields of legal separation and to enable parties that are damaged by competitive practices of an enterprise to pursue legal recourse against its owners. Such final measures may be hard to enact until the grip by competitive enterprises on governmental organization is sufficiently attenuated to modify the law pertaining to enterprises. Therefore, cooperative economic measures might be a more feasible manner of defense. Unless competitive systems manifestly reveal their nature, they may be unable to counteract cooperative defensive measures because these proceed by the competitive procedures of such systems.

Once competitive enterprises have been compelled to conform to cooperative principles, they lose value in competitive undertakings. Without being able to call upon enterprises as competitive tools, competitive interests will fade as well because they will have lost the principal sourcing for their domination. Reflections of competitive power in government will necessarily subside because of waning funding and because victorious cooperative powers will impose a new, cooperative order. Because they understand the existential threat from cooperative developments, competitive interests may battle strenuously to prevent cooperative countermeasures from succeeding. But they will ultimately be left without options that could help them to fend off determined cooperative conversion pressure. If they do not adjust to that pressure, they lose market share and weaken their profitability. If they continue

applying cooperative mechanisms, they continue to empower victims to wield effective weapons that can compel enterprises to become entirely cooperative or perish. Their only choice to retain power may be to dispense with reliance on cooperation by victims and instead count on a threat or application of force to secure resources. Yet such a drastic change might be difficult to accomplish once competitors have settled into a system of limited cooperation with productive forces. They may not possess the necessary enforcement mechanisms. Such mechanisms are likely to be required because the changes toward an openly oppressive system, and even limited coercion against movements that leverage cooperative power in a competitive system, risk summoning resistance and escalation into open conflict. The great risks and costs of such a conflict may leave competitive interests no other choice than to resign their competitive power and to seek a peaceful transition to a cooperative system that leaves at least some of their privileges or possessions intact and permits them to fight another time. Their forceful resistance against a cooperative transformation can only result in their forced overthrow and more severe defensive ramifications because the basis for successfully conducting such resistance has collapsed.

This specter, if cooperative forces recognize that they are being competitively abused and that they can effectively convert a competitive system that depends on cooperative production into a cooperative system, induces competitive forces to engage in determined measures to prevent that recognition. It makes them focus with all their might on the manipulation of their victims to prevent them from becoming attentive to their needs, their fundamental rights, systematic infringements of these rights, and remedies against these infringements. Even as manipulations fail, competitive forces may try to inhibit the spread of that failure. They might succeed in preserving sufficient support for their rule by applying their usual methods and in particular by frightening subjects or by taking advantage of subjects' preexisting fears of change. They may employ their manipulation machinery to make defensive competitive measures by cooperative forces that damage their interests appear to be offensive, counterproductive, and destructive to the system's economy. They may blame any failure on cooperative opposition, characterize it as antisocial and treasonous, and invoke negative tribal sentiments. They may attempt to cut off avenues for cooperative powers to operate by pronouncing them or their activities illegal. Competitive rulers may apply selective force or its threat with less risk of escalation under the guise of protecting order. Unwise methods employed or rash or desperate reactions by inexperienced or misguided cooperative powers may play into the hands of competitive powers.

They may provoke or by infiltration induce cooperative forces into activities that exceed a mere refusal to purchase or lease their products. Burgeoning cooperative movements may seem to be no match for an entrenched machinery of manipulation and coercive power that had time to build and lie waiting to eradicate opposition as it forms.

Competitive interests might be able to stop cooperative organizational mechanisms directed against them from arising, or they may obstruct them to uselessness. They might also be able to keep existing cooperative production mechanisms restricted to their intended purpose of supplying means for their purposes and keeping the populace pacified. But they will have great difficulty to control informal cooperation by individuals who act similarly because they have similarly become mindful of their competitive oppression and of effective avenues of remedial action. Where that does not occur independently, all that may be necessary to give rise to such an awareness is that information that can initiate and guide a path to such awareness is shared. While competitive interests might retain the loyalty of many subjects, a sufficient number of individuals might escape the manipulative apathy or unquestioning devotion to the system. Even without coordination, the sum of their independent, often small changes in economic demeanor may give rise to the profitability advantages of cooperative enterprises and connected developments that may cause competitive enterprises and systems to convert or perish. The dispersed, autonomous character of emancipated victims' behavior does not leave competitive rulers with much potential to counteract it. If they attempted to curtail the supply of existential necessities, they would directly damage their only continuing source of income. They would also imperil the existential foundations of their victims and galvanize these to take decisive counteraction. They may not dare transgressing or approaching such limits to incur the opposition of individuals with little to lose who can identify intentional competitive acts and their authors as sources for their endangerment. Further, campaigns to align noncompliant individuals on a large scale may require and paralyze extensive resources and give rise to widespread conflict that may unite and increase opposition.

All this may give us confidence that competitive rule can be defeated. But our considerations to this point have only discussed problems that privileged competitive forces pose for cooperation. Competitive pressure on cooperative demeanor can originate from underprivileged individuals as well. Moreover, privileged individuals in a cooperative society may exhibit competitive behavior against underprivileged individuals. The next chapter addresses the character of such conflicts of interest and how a cooperative system might resolve them.