

## CHAPTER 32

### REDISTRIBUTION AND CHARITY

Competitive impositions on cooperative pursuits might be thought to be primarily conducted by competitive interests that undertake to secure overproportional resources for themselves and their beneficiaries at the cost of others. But competitive impositions may also originate from individuals whose lack of resources threatens their pursuits more fundamentally. Such competitive efforts may be justified as emergency responses if humans' existence is imminently imperiled or their capacity to fulfill fundamental rights is imminently threatened to incur irreversible damage. Acts designed to stem such an emergency are legitimate as defensive competition where competitive abuse can be established as the source for the deficiencies causing the exigency. It seems more difficult to decide whether a competitive emergency response is legitimate if it is directed against individuals who have not produced the deprivation causing the exigency. Such actions appear to have defensive and offensive features. They are set forth in the defense of the most fundamental rights. But they also intrude on the rights of other individuals without provocation. We tend to accept that innocent parties must tolerate such intrusions if they are necessary to counter the emergency. We may only impose a boundary where the damage to be incurred through exigency avoidance activity threatens to be similarly severe as the damage that those afflicted by an exigency try to avoid.

A cooperative society may then acknowledge that selected categories of offensive and defensive competitive activities are legitimate. It may support them and seek to contain the risk of conflict and escalation that may arise from them by assisting such demands. However, beyond these reservations, competitive demands or activities by those who possess fewer resources than others may appear to be missing a legitimate basis even in a cooperative society. That may be so because competitive interests that become embedded in a cooperative society may challenge such demands even if the disproportionality of their resources compared to other parties has resulted from their previous offensive competitive activity. If competitors gain insight into the errors of their ways and are converted to assume a cooperative mindset, they may recognize that it is indefensible to hold on to ill-gotten resources. They may return these to their rightful owners or arrange for access to them and even pay compensation. But if they are swept up in a change to a cooperative system without their conversion, competitors may attempt to hold on to their competitively acquired resources. If pressed, they might return a part of these resources in a settlement that might

be preferred by both sides to evade combative troubles or might engage in charity to appease calls for farther-reaching measures. Yet they might also hold firm and only disgorge resources if they are forced by the new regime. Members in a cooperative society who have succeeded in earning resources through noncompetitive efforts may hold on to their assets with similar steadfastness. They may defend their possessions even more staunchly because they do not carry the internal and the external burden of having abused others to gain them. They might share resources to protect themselves against uncontrolled exigency takings by destitute individuals. They might even acknowledge a right of those individuals to cure exigencies and sense an obligation to respond to such right. Still, cooperatively minded individuals may feel strongly about their right to maintain possession of property they have earned and to use it at their discretion. They may rank the existential support of others as an objective that may not possess supreme priority among their needs. To the extent that need is present, its pursuit may be subject to a variety of conditions. They may render assistance dependent on their capability to maintain adequate levels of resources for themselves and insist that subsidies are only spent for necessities and used efficiently. They may require a close relatedness or connection with beneficiaries and that the destitute condition of beneficiaries arose through no fault of their own. They may demand a cooperative attitude of beneficiaries, that they exert best efforts to help themselves and show gratitude or return favors. However, even if beneficiaries fulfill all such conditions, cooperative members may continue to deem charity discretionary even if they sense some obligation.

Cooperatively motivated individuals may therefore oppose calls for systematic transfers of resources to individuals who suffer existential shortages of resources. They are likely to even more strongly oppose demands for transfers that would result in the equalization of resources. They may particularly have to contend with such equalization claims upon the defeat of competitive forces. To the extent such demands are not made to legitimately address exigencies, they appear to represent unjustifiable offensive competition. Because such equalizing demands are taking aim against the overproportional possession of resources, they may superficially appear to be identical or similar to cooperative aspirations against privileged competitive oppression. These movements may be united in their fight against systems that allow or enforce competitive reservation, acquisition, or maintenance of overproportional resources. But addressing the ills of competition may not end claims by forces proposing equalization. They may not distinguish between resources that were obtained through preclusion or exploita-

tion and resources earned through cooperative or individual production. That equalizing efforts are taken on behalf of deprived individuals or supported by a majority does not make them cooperative if voluntary participation by their producers is missing. Cooperative forces have legitimate competitive rights in exigencies and in defense against competitive impositions. But the distinction of equalization forces becomes visible when a competitive system directed toward the accumulation of overproportional resources has been overcome. Competitive victims have the right to be compensated by competitors for resources they lost to them, provided victims did not previously obtain possession of such resources by competition. Yet an equalization movement cannot allow them compensation if this would result in inequality. It would apply offensive competition to such and any other advantage.

A demand for equalization may emerge from the trouble in unraveling the benefits and damages in a society that was ruled or dominated by forces that accumulated overproportional resources through competitive strategies. It may be challenging to show that and to what extent resources were obtained by preclusion or takings from rightful claimants of access or ownership. Missing, poor, or unreliable records and the historical extent of competitive schemes through multiple orders may make the tracing of resources to individuals who had the last rightful claim of access or ownership a challenge. Resources may have been subject to various competitive events. Competitively obtained resources may have been commingled with or converted into other resources that were competitively or legitimately produced. Legitimately produced resources may be tainted if they were undertaken with resources that were competitively obtained or were used in competitive efforts. Tracing may also be problematic because resources ascend, are modified, decay, are lost, or may be transformed or compounded into different means. Beyond the ascertainment of competitively obtained resources or responsible parties, questions may emerge how compensation should be calculated and how the succession of responsibility is to be unraveled. Moreover, victims and successors in their claims may be difficult to determine and locate and claims may be difficult to apportion. The same individuals may have been victims and competitive offenders at the same or at different times. If compensation can be obtained, its extent may not cover the full amount of required compensation. Differences in the feasibility to ascertain or to achieve compensation may engender unwarranted imbalances among victims. In confrontation with such varied fundamental adversities, a cooperative regime might consider presuming that overproportional resources were obtained by competitive activities. This would burden those who con-

trol resources or those who postulate a right of access to resources to prove their ownership or access right. It has the advantage of causing the disappropriation of all ill-gotten resources. However, such a stance may be burdened with some of the same problems that afflict a proof of competitive acquisition, including the blending of resources. Even if parties could prove that they acquired access or possession with non-competitive methods, it might be difficult to prove in formalities and substance noncompetitive acquisition by predecessors from whom access or possession was acquired or by even more remote predecessors, or that the resources exchanged in acquisitions were acquired without competitive derivation. These problems could be diminished by limiting how far back noncompetitive acquisition must be shown.

Recourse is further complicated because victims might not only demand compensation for competitive exclusions and takings, but also compensation, and where that should be ineffective, retribution for pain that competitive perpetrators inflicted. Compensation may therefore pose challenges that threaten its manageability for more reasons than mere logistical and inquisitive difficulties. Because a cooperative system may be charged with punishing competitive offenders as well, its proceedings may overlap. Administrating either, let alone both may overburden an emerging cooperative regime. On the other hand, not conducting them threatens to weaken a cooperative system. It would sanction past competitive abuse and a continued ownership of illegitimately obtained resources and leave legitimate claims for compensation and retribution unanswered. It would thus condone and commit injustice. A cooperative system may also be weakened because leaving competitive offenders, including their resources, unscathed may facilitate their agitations to impede and overthrow a cooperative system.

Many of these concerns might be adjudicated by disowning and punishing competitive rulers and redistributing their assets to victims. These distributions might originate with victims whose existential requirements have been most injuriously affected and attribute remaining funds in successive rounds of decreasing grades of severity proportionally among the claimants of a grade. But this may not fully satisfy victims because it does not hold subordinated competitors responsible who made competitive rule possible, implemented it in dealings with victims, and profited from these activities. Still, holding them fully responsible might raise an insurmountable obstacle. In a transformation from a regime that was controlled by overproportionally accumulating competitive powers to a cooperatively dominated system, many members are likely to be former competitors, agents, or supporters of competitors. A new regime may not be able to afford distressing them by

prosecuting them for their actions or taking all their competitive acquisitions. Cooperative forces may diminish their chances of assuming or maintaining power if they threaten or engage in such measures. It may therefore be easier to concentrate on prosecuting the most egregious competitive abusers and to redistribute large accumulations of wealth that principally profited from, supported, or directed the prior regime. Only, victims may not be willing to forgo all remedies against former competitive supporters. Even if they agree to curb retribution against subordinated former competitive forces in an effort to unite a society in going forward and to recruit such forces for cooperative efforts, they may not agree to let them begin their participation with the benefits of their abuse intact. Apart from concerns about compensation for illegitimate appropriations, they may fear that leaving subordinated competitive interests with overproportional means may assist these to engage in competition even without their former leaders.

The seemingly intractable problems of reconciling the attribution of resources in a transition to a cooperative system might prompt cooperative powers to advocate their resolution through equalization. The equalization of wealth may gain additional appeal where competitive production conditions have left large contingents of victims with so few distinctions in their resource levels that an equalization of resources constitutes a just allocation in relative terms. An equalization of wealth may then be most widely attractive if a change to a cooperative regime is preceded by an extremely competitive regime. It may be chosen as a counterpoint to the inequality of a system that was sponsored by competitors who sought overproportional possessions at the cost of most of the population. Beyond that, equal attribution is likely to be championed by forces that would gain in their level of resources from such a redistribution compared to other measures of compensation. Those forces may harbor motives to enrich themselves under the mantle of equalization as a defensive or a justifiable offensive measure even if they have no right due to previous competitive victimization or equalized attributions exceed their rights. Although they would obtain a windfall, equalization may appear to be the only way to inaugurate a cooperative system without continuing the battles of the past.

Yet such a new beginning appears unlikely because movements for redistribution may incur opposition not only from former competitors but also from individuals who have obtained overproportional resources solely or largely from individual or cooperative production under or prior to the former competitive rule. Such individuals may side with the resistance of former competitors for fear that they too might be included in claims for a redistribution upon the overthrow of com-

petitive rule. The result would be a division of a society between overprivileged and underprivileged members. A transition that only eliminates ultimate competitive control while leaving other privileged positions inviolate strengthens these by default. The conservation and reinforcement of their already entrenched position may cause privileged individuals to be viewed by underprivileged as beneficiaries, continuers, and defenders of the old order and to be held responsible for perpetuating conditions of deficiency. Claims to have earned overproportional wealth by noncompetitive strategies may find little sympathy in underprivileged individuals. Assertions of a historical entitlement to resources because they have supposedly been acquired from noncompetitive activities may sound hollow because most periods of human history and acquisitions of wealth in them have been competitive. The acquisition of overproportional resources in a competitive system suggests at the very least that their proprietors arranged themselves with competitive interests for mutual advantage and that their overproportional earnings were, if not derived from their involvement in competitive practices, benefited by them. In response to the abuse by the previous regime and apparent continuation of benefits by privileged forces, underprivileged individuals may be unwilling to draw a distinction between competitively, cooperatively, and individually established resources or between the former and new regime. This adversity may intensify if individuals with overproportional resources remain opposed to sharing these. Their conservative stance may give rise to or energize movements to disappropriate, disempower, and possibly punish them for resisting and for other wrongs that might be imputed to them.

Depending on which side has the upper hand after the overturn of a competitive regime, it may be able to exert bias in its favor. If individuals who previously held a privileged position lead the transition to a cooperative system, they might be able to more successfully defend against redistribution. If underprivileged interests lead that transition, they might induce more redistribution. However, the success of either side is likely to be incomplete. Privileged and underprivileged individuals may have to continue to rely on each other's productive contributions in a cooperative system, and they continue to be subject to each other's threats. Overprivileged members have to be concerned that insurrections against overproportional wealth can be contained without spreading to include them. They must also be concerned that the refusal by underprivileged individuals to continue in their contributions would dissolve the society in which they maintain their privilege into chaos, thereby jeopardizing that privilege and even their existence. On the other hand, the damaging potential of privileged individuals may

curtail underprivileged forces in imposing their intent. They may further consider that adverse treatment against privileged parties is likely to incapacitate or to discourage contributions by these. That may disturb the production of a society and lead to severe deficiencies. Moreover, substituting the contributions of privileged members would increase the productive pressure on underprivileged members. Such impositions might pervert a system that was to serve the underprivileged and place them into even more rigorous service than before. Although the removal of privileged parties from production might be undertaken to enhance underprivileged benefits, it might be the ultimate stage of their competitive oppression because it would subject them to unnecessary competitive effects. To avoid that absurdity, privileged individuals might have to be accommodated to an extent necessary to preserve the supply of resources. Hence, both groups may have to make concessions to positions they deem ideal if they wish to continue a society without unpredictable interruptions and upheaval. Because the state of affairs places overprivileged individuals in elevated possession of resources, they may have a stronger position in such a setting. But intransigence on their part may push underprivileged forces to change their cooperative stance and seek a more distinct transformation.

Upholding and potentially heightening the quantity and quality of production may require sustaining a delicate balance in which these divisions keep each other's excesses in check. However, even if such a balance can be achieved, it may be in the nature of a stalemate. Such a situation promises to be in disappointing disparity with the potential of mutuality. Both sides may possess sufficient insight to stop short of transgressing lines that would make cooperation impossible. Still, this leaves an extensive field of issues where they remain locked in an adverse impasse. They may continuously engage each other in a competitive battle for domination and relative advantages and waste their efforts in futile endeavors to win decisive victories over each other. This state of affairs is far removed from the ideal of both sides. But if they are cooperatively motivated, their differences are solely based on their divergences in resources. While they operate from different positions between deprivation and fulfillment, they are united in their concerns of not being able to meet their needs and dreams of fulfillment. Both sides also fear each other and may disdain having to endlessly contest each other. These commonalities produce powerful reasons to recast their adverse efforts and to enter into a cooperative mode that can unlock developments to resource levels that render fights about their attribution moot or that at least create more room for agreeable settlements. To enable such a mode, all remaining vestiges of exclusion and

exploitation from the former competitive system must be eliminated. In their stead, a free market has to be established and maintained. Its installation will resolve much of the division between underprivileged and privileged productive participants that continues from a competitively ruled system. It provides the necessary mechanisms and incentives by all participants to find their relative position according to the value of their contributions. The persistence of wealth that might have been gained from competitive practices might pose an obstacle to this emancipation because it continues to be remunerated as a productive contribution. However, this problem can be resolved by making credit an interest-free storage device for accumulated wealth that only bears compensation for transaction expenses and possibly a mutual default insurance by lenders. Individuals may continue to live off their wealth. But without contributing it to profitable enterprises, it would not earn them anything. The availability of interest-free credit would limit their investment opportunities to participation in ventures that cannot find credit approval. Financial contributions to such undertakings may be important to advance an economy, but they are solely rewarded if the funded venture succeeds. Over time, after all dead capital has been expended, only participants who generate value for themselves or others will be able to enjoy wealth. Contributions in a free market economy will still be valued below or above others and will engender relatively privileged or underprivileged lifestyles for contributors and their beneficiaries. Yet this does not describe the entire import of a cooperative system. Its principle of mutuality entails more than a setting in which legitimate economic interests can be maximized. Although part of this more extensive scope of mutuality is already visible in the requisite of balancing a free market structure with protections and support for its participants to sustain its potential, these and other measures of mutuality are also required by other cooperative principles.

The concept of equal resources resurfaces as one of these principles. It is founded on the idea that the coexistence of humans is only possible if individual rights are reduced to equal, harmonious spheres of pursuit that prevent overproportional infringement on the pursuit of others and keep mutual infringement to a minimum. The concept of equal spheres is based on the mutual acknowledgment of common existential needs and the common occurrence of idiosyncratic needs. If the principle of rights corresponding to needs would be strictly enforced, individuals would have rights to the full extent of their needs, including idiosyncratic needs. Even the limitation of rights to existential needs would threaten to allow serious mayhem. If the right to obtain resources is based on the presence of needs alone, one might ar-



gue that it does not halt where the interests of others are concerned. Resisting the attempts of other individuals to secure their fundamental rights at our detriment is a competitive act because it denies them resources to which they are entitled. But it represents a legitimate defensive competitive act if they would dispossess us of resources for the fulfillment of our fundamental rights because we are entitled to secure these as well. Thus, equal rights to resources might stand against one another. To prevent the otherwise unsolvable conflict, the members of a cooperative society may establish derivative rights of equal zones in which they guarantee to one another the undisturbed possession and application of resources. While the intermediation of equal spheres of liberty serves our needs to secure our individual and collective survival and thriving and their subsidiary fundamental rights, it does not appear to be a direct expression of any of these rights. Rather, it seems to represent their curtailment to equal stature in a practical compromise to resolve a challenge to human coexistence and cooperation posed by overlapping equal rights. We might consent to such a mutual restraint because it grants us protection from intrusion. But the proposition of human equality is only in part intuitive or based in fact. Despite many commonalities and calls from empathy, the need for collective survival and thriving, and mutuality in exchange relationships to handle others as we would want to be treated in their position, humans are regularly divided by a variety of attributes and circumstances. We may struggle to find sufficient justification for establishing and defending equality against rational recommendations and instinctive impulses that would have us react negatively to or take advantage of differences.

We may have to admit an exception to the guaranty of nondisturbance to accommodate claims by individuals to satisfy their needs from resources of others in case of existential exigencies and to the extent their acquisition does not create an existential exigency for such members or others. Moreover, by its underlying logic, the guaranty of a safety zone is limited by the definition of existential needs and a limited leeway for the practice of idiosyncrasies as a fundamental right. If we have resources in excess of what is required to meet these needs, our right to claim such resources based on fundamental rights ceases. Others who still lack existential resources have a right to this surplus. In both cases, our provision of excess resources to them is merely an acknowledgment of their right and a precaution to forestall disputes incident to their actualization of that right. To prevent such as well as other conflicts among individuals arising from inadequate resources, a society may agree on derivative principles of preservation and redistribution by which all members of a cooperative society are to abide.

These mechanisms introduce equalizing effects concerning the resources of individuals if they are positioned on different sides of upper and lower boundaries in their possession of resources. However, beyond both boundaries, the acknowledgment of fundamental rights and a resulting guaranty of equal, harmonious spheres of pursuit only appear to support the equality of rights to pursue and apply resources and not an obligation to provide such resources to others. It seems to permit individuals to fill their sphere of rights with the necessary resources in conformance with each individual's needs, capacity to pursue these needs, and available resources. The remaining inequality of resources appears to only violate this concept to the extent the possession or the use of such resources would have a competitive effect on the equal spheres of others and the implied right to extend their operations to the size of these spheres. An inequality of access and possession of resources might solely encroach upon the rights of others if it causes or aggravates a scarcity of resources that damages the ability of others to exercise their spheres to an equal degree. This concept might therefore seem to leave extensive room for legitimate discrepancies of resources. But as long as resources remain scarce, an overproportional reservation of access or an overproportional acquisition of resources frequently has an exclusionary and hence competitive effect on others. Preventing this consequence requires the limitation of access and possession of some resources originating outside individual spheres. Considerations of equal spheres of liberty and rights to develop the potential within these spheres therefore support the equal sharing of access and possession of scarce external resources among individuals.

The implications of this conclusion are significant. Properly responding to the obligations imposed on us by the equality of fundamental rights seems to entail that we redistribute our resources in excess of an existential minimum to those who suffer existential exigencies, if need be until we only can meet that existential minimum ourselves. It further may require that we redistribute our resources in excess of what is necessary to overcome existential emergencies to those who have not reached adequate levels of resources to fulfill their fundamental rights. Beyond these constraints, it appears to demand that we solely claim a proportionate share of scarce external resources and only increase our reservation and acquisition of them as they increase. These principles appear to not necessarily command equalization. But they do command us to improve the availability of resources to levels where existential emergencies, inadequate fulfillment of fundamental rights, and the scarcity of resources do not inflict competitive damage on humans anymore, where we are freed from battles for resources.

The restrictive aspect of fundamental rights and equal spheres born from insight into necessities is supplemented by a more immediately desired aspect. A movement to share resources seems to emerge from our cooperative needs. It can be particularly based on the need to pursue collective survival and thriving and the related obligation to support others in their pursuits. The use and transfer of resources under this requirement would be customized according to what can best assure collective survival and thriving. That standard by itself does not imply the equalization of resources. The need to protect and support humanity, even if we grant it precedence over our need for individual survival and thriving, does not warrant the implication that we would consider ourselves or other individuals equally valuable for the survival and thriving of humankind. But our protection and support of ourselves and others might only be influenced by considerations of relative value if we have to select who might rather maximize humanity's chances for survival and thriving. In all other cases, we are motivated to advance the fulfillment of fundamental needs of all humans to maximize humanity's potential. Our motivation to share resources further gains definition from needs that inherently require cooperation, from other utilitarian considerations of its benefits in the pursuit of other needs, and from empathic instincts that are possibly fueled by a guilty conscience about our prior competitive acts or failure to intervene.

The full development of such cooperative needs and considerations endows the equal sharing of resources with additional legitimization and it comprehensively broadens the scope of sharing. It draws boundaries for our pursuits in relation to other individuals. The totality of our needs delineates autonomous obligations that are independent of external covenants or claims of right. It limits our pursuit of our needs by our concerns for others. It commands us not to endanger the survival and thriving of other humans and to maximize their support and protection for our benefit. Practiced by all participants, rights and obligations enter into a harmonious correspondence by being equally founded in needs. These needs produce a system of mutuality among humans committed in service to one another. This system is founded on needs to benefit others and on the benefits of exchange. At a fully developed stage of all our needs, emergencies and inadequate supplies for the fulfillment of existential needs would become rare. That is not only because we would enjoy the security of a comprehensive network of mutuality but also because our needs would drive us to develop our practical capacities through the advantages that cooperation can yield. The benefits of mutuality suggest that we carry on with the sharing of resources after existential requirements of all humans are covered.

The prospect of security and other rewards generated by mutuality should present a powerful incentive for the sharing of resources. The only reason individuals would not acknowledge the requirement of mutual support and protection is that they have not entirely understood their needs and the capacities of cooperation. In a competitively oriented society where individuals take part as offensive perpetrators or fend off competitive overreaching, voluntary mutual support might seem an illusory ideal. Even if a society transitions to a predominantly cooperative stance, comprehensive mutuality may be slow to develop and it may continue to be endangered because competitive insolences linger and take advantage of acts undertaken in the spirit of mutuality. Destitute members may be entitled to compensation for prior competitive impositions and their defensive competitive posture might be justified to a certain extent. Yet, upon such compensation, they must engage in mutuality to make use of that compensation and to deserve the sharing of further resources. Demanding and taking without trying to develop or use one's own productive capabilities constitutes offensive competitive behavior. It exploits others for their resources and withholds necessary assistance from others. It disqualifies individuals as subjects to promote the survival and thriving of humanity, restricts our empathy, and decreases expectations of mutuality. Its violation of the needs of others justifies them to resist additional attributions.

Individuals who confer benefits onto others have a right to impose and to enforce a corresponding obligation of assistance by beneficiaries. Beneficiaries' rights to be free of exigencies and to have their existential needs fulfilled and to be free from competitive exclusions and exploitations meet with parallel rights of benefactors and of other individuals. Beyond that, a lack of mutuality by beneficiaries also violates their autonomous obligation to follow their needs that urge the protection and support of others as a direct fulfillment of such needs or as a means to obtain fulfillment through mutuality. To banish continuing damage from competitive behavior and the related menace of competitive disintegration, a cooperative society may have to impose obligations on its members to protect and support one another. It may have to impose government that intercedes to punish a lack of mutual protection and support and step in to replace fulfillment of these obligations if they are being violated until its members develop their insights to carry these obligations voluntarily. But external imposition of mutuality is a type of defensive competition. It can only form a coarse, imperfect substitute for the intricate workings of autonomous mechanisms of mutuality. To obtain the full advantages of a cooperative system, external compulsion must be replaced by voluntary mutuality.

We may wonder how transfers of resources to those who have difficulties meeting their existential needs fit into a system of mutuality. It might seem that those who are receiving have by definition little to give in return. But that is not so necessarily so. Beneficiaries might possess nonemotional resources that they have not been able to adequately develop. More developed benefactors might cultivate these resources or they might enable beneficiaries to develop their own ability to engage these resources for mutual benefit. Such resources include external resources and the potential of humans to become more productive participants in economic activity. Beyond serving the purpose of providing compensation to benefactors, the development of such resources may be required to help other destitute individuals. This can assist the fulfillment of original benefactors' need to support and protect collective survival and thriving and soothe their empathy for the destitute conditions suffered by such third parties. In addition to emotional benefits flowing to benefactors from immediate improvements of recipients' situation, recipients can enable the generation of emotional resources in benefactors through their constructive use of subsidies. They can further engender momentous emotional resources by a transfer of their emotions of appreciation to their benefactors. Such productions of emotional resources benefiting the original benefactors may be perpetuated by the circumstances and behavior of subsequent levels of beneficiaries. The requisite of mutuality then figures prominently in motivating attributions of emotional and nonemotional resources to destitute individuals. The direct and indirect emotional resources for benefactors may be of existential importance to them, likely much beyond a return of nonemotional resources because they are able to spare nonemotional resources. Benefactors may hence only be moved to assist if they receive sufficient direct and indirect emotional rewards. Fear that destitute individuals might forcibly take resources may alone not be a strong enough motivator. It may provoke potential victims to invest resources in defensive measures instead of assistance, or it might induce them to relent in their productivity. Moreover, the threat or actuality of having resources taken may invite adverse emotions that deter caring attitudes, discourage subsidies, and provoke individuals subjected to such competitive approaches to active defensive measures that may weaken destitute individuals even more.

Gaining and sustaining assistance may burden the performance of beneficiaries with substantial demands. Benefactors may not be satisfied with mere pronouncements and superficial gestures of love, respect, or gratitude, although these may provide them with some emotional gratification. Such expressions may appear hollow without ac-

tions by beneficiaries that match such expressions. Further, benefactors are likely to be dissatisfied with merely guaranteeing their beneficiaries' existence, at least if their support exceeds what is necessary to mend acute and temporary existential exigencies. The satisfaction of benefactors' need to support and protect collective survival and thriving requires that beneficiaries use their assistance to become able to help themselves and others so that they turn from a liability into an asset for the ability of humanity to survive and thrive. Benefactors are therefore likely to link requirements to their assistance. These may include a demonstration that recipients use assistance effectively and efficiently to address existential deficiencies, to reduce and obviate the necessity of support, and to become capable of assisting others. More generally, benefactors may require that beneficiaries engage in cooperative practices and abstain from competitive demeanor. Such conditioning of assistance and of the right of assistance seems legitimate. It holds beneficiaries to the same standards of cooperation that apply to benefactors in an inseparable bond of mutual obligations.

But cooperative forces have to include into their considerations that humans who lack existential resources might operate in an emergency mode that might justify what may appear to be competitive action. They may also act defensively on account of previous violations of their rights or the neglect by others to include them in the exercise of cooperative needs. It has to be expected that their desperation and frustration of deprivation may incite victims to take incongruous and possibly hostile measures. Accordingly, competitive behavior by beneficiaries might have to be condoned to some extent until the availability of resources has normalized to cover all their existential necessities and past abuse and neglect have been addressed. Some leniency may further be indicated with regard to holding recipients to constructive requirements of assistance. It may take them some time to build their constructive capacities and motivations. Then again, existential jeopardy for individuals may require intervention to solve management issues and discourage competitive attitudes due to recipients' relatively low level of development or the deterioration of their circumstances. They may require assistance to build and entrench cooperative structures and procedures. Destitute individuals may be unable to build by themselves a setting that enables adequate effectiveness and efficiency or prevents competitive use of assistance. Societal conditions may not even permit adequate distribution to mend acute shortcomings. Such circumstances may require that benefactors intervene to help control, suppress, and abolish practices that disturb beneficiaries' and benefactors' rights and obligations and to build constructive practices.

These assistance requirements raise the question whether benefactors have a right or an obligation to assist destitute individuals who reject such assistance. That does not seem to be the case since assistance springs in response to the right of destitute individuals to claim resources based on their needs, an express or implied covenant of mutuality, and from the benefactors' cooperative needs. Arguably, benefactors' cooperative needs give them a right to fulfill these. However, beyond questions whether they can be fulfilled if assistance is rejected, the exercise of such needs stands against the acknowledgment of a sphere of noninterference around every individual. Hence, individuals commonly cannot be forced to accept assistance. The only exceptions might consist of situations where a refusal of assistance threatens to violate a superior fundamental right of the benefactor, the beneficiary, or another person. Although occasions might be conceivable in which the consequences of nonassistance would activate a defensive right of benefactors, their cooperative needs might be adequately fulfillable in correlation with other individuals. Further, it seems difficult to argue that benefactors have an obligation to assert a right for assistance on the refusing individuals' behalf. Such an obligation could solely arise if the refusal were due to a temporary or permanent nonapplication or misapplication of an individual's council of traits. We might also have problems thinking of situations of third parties that could give rise to a right or obligation to inflict assistance because refusal would threaten their more important fundamental interests. Yet benefactors may not be bound to a failure to request or a refusal to accept assistance if these attitudes are influenced by others. Such influence might constitute an infringement on the fundamental rights of self-determination, self-realization, expression, and self-respect of other humans. Benefactors might have a right and an obligation to protect and support these based on their cooperative needs and a general covenant of mutuality. They might further have a right and an obligation to assist if individuals would presumably ask for assistance if they were not prevented.

That a person does not ask for assistance under conditions apparently requiring it could then be seen as an event that demands inquiry whether assistance is required. If it is required but not accepted, an inquiry may be warranted whether the refusal is attributable to undue influence, and, if it is not, whether it is defensible under the mandate of a fully functioning council of traits or the concerns of other individuals. The trouble of constructing situations that pose the issue of a right or obligation to assist individuals against their will shows that the actualization of this issue is rare, its considerations are complicated, and its applications are limited to severe and unusual conditions.

The extension of assistance to others connotes that benefactors have more resources than beneficiaries. If benefactors are to continue to undertake assistance, they must continue to possess and thus must be able to generate more resources. For that reason, benefactors must own overproportional productive resources, as long as the means left after deductions for resources necessary to maintain their production are shared pursuant to their obligations, until beneficiaries can develop productive resources or take over productive control of transferred resources. To effect a true equalization of resources according to such obligations and to fully legitimize demands for mutuality, benefactors cannot restrict themselves to sharing the results of their production. They must share productive resources as well and assist beneficiaries in their use. Without such empowerment, cooperation would remain one-sided and the requirement to share would drain benefactors of resources without an appreciable limit. This might not only be dissatisfactory to benefactors. The perpetuation of recipients' dependence on assistance may also generate significant frustrations for them because they might not be able to fulfill many of their needs by their own pursuits or might not be able to fulfill them at all. Unilateral support and protection may work well to cover exigencies. They may also provide some emotional resources to recipients based on the emotional transfer implicit in a showing that other humans care for them and based on the awareness that their survival and thriving and other needs are being addressed. Still, unilateral granting of resources may leave many collateral needs unfulfilled and even damage their fulfillment. It may violate or fail to address a number of recipients' needs including needs for control and reliability of their circumstances, privacy, self-determination, expression, self-realization, and self-respect, the various needs that depend on the production of emotional resources that can solely accrue through cooperation, and all other needs of recipients that can benefit from the institution of mutual cooperation. We may then conclude that constructive developmental conditions that recipients must achieve to receive assistance are mirrored by an obligation of benefactors to assist in ways that favor such constructive developments.

As individuals become cognizant of their needs and how to best satisfy them, they are certain to realize that the maximization of their happiness is conditioned upon their extension of assistance to others. Mutuality and the intrinsically or functionally complementary character of our fundamental needs on which it is based may manage to replace competition. They impart the desire to harmonize our concerns with concerns of others and to reach a maximum of overall fulfillment through mutual harmonic enhancement. The connectedness of differ-



ent types of resources we need and the built-in requirement of mutuality to satisfy some of our needs seem to draw us into a process that is aiming at that result independent from of a complete understanding and purposeful internal or external reconciliation of all our needs. But witnessing the workings of this mechanism may support such an understanding and reconciliation. Without giving in to this mechanism, humans remain locked in irreconcilable adversity of their rights to resources where propositions of systematic sharing are rejected as illegitimate and harmful. Such attitudes are rampant in competitive societies, but they might also persist in nominally cooperative societies. In such a society, mutuality can only come to bear in aspects and largely only under formal legal fortification and cannot fully develop its productive superiority. Competitive powers that adapt to or emerge from such societies may exercise cooperation only selectively. Even individuals who obtained overproportional resources without competitive efforts may resist sharing. They may strive to retain or build competitive governance structures that safeguard their properties against distribution demands, and they may enter alliances with competitive forces to subdue the for them disconcerting demands for shared resources.

In a society where privileged interests can meet their objectives while underprivileged members can meet and safely exceed their minimum existential necessities, a rift between privileged and underprivileged individuals or groups might be controllable through a variety of effective manipulation strategies. Further, as underprivileged individuals ascend or hope to ascend to ranges of resources approaching the upper boundary of existential requirements, they might naturally side with those whose resources by far outstrip theirs against more underprivileged individuals. Yet societies that fail to effectively address the exposure of members to existential emergencies might continue to be subjected to powerful demands for redistribution. Such a society may be at risk of sustaining substantial risks and costs in trying to control these demands without meeting them. Even a small group of desperate individuals with little or nothing left to lose may be dangerous to a societal order. Not even a competitive society might be able to afford to forsake individuals who cannot meet their minimum existential requirements without assistance. Failing to accommodate their necessities would propel competitive attitudes into glaring focus and risk an upheaval that might spread beyond the most underprivileged victims. This pressure is elevated in societies that purport to have transitioned to cooperative organization because the failure to help others in need poses an irreconcilable contradiction of cooperative principles. All societies may then possess some mechanism of sharing resources.

The internal and external motivations for redistribution are not necessarily tied to the membership of beneficiaries and benefactors in a particular society. The common sourcing of fundamental rights and the resulting obligation to respect and harmonize with one another's pursuits, as well as complementary types of needs, appear to attach to all humans in relation to one another regardless of their organizational membership. This makes all individuals responsible to all other individuals. Still, many individuals may at best only be motivated to apply these principles toward individuals within their societies. Sharing resources with individuals in other societies may not or merely faintly reach the dedication to sharing within a society. Such limitations may be caused by an insufficiency of resources, utilitarian self-sufficiency, tribal orientation, or negative tribal sentiments toward the outside of a society. Further, a lack of connection may ease immediate practical pressure to acknowledge one another's fundamental rights and to respond to them with a redistribution scheme. Separation and the unawareness and misinformation that it breeds may also affect the motivations to share issued by our cooperative needs. Some or even all aspects that motivate us to share resources within a society may then be deemed missing or attenuated in relationships among societies.

This may cause a setting for humanity where more affluent societies do not assist other societies in which individuals suffer existential deprivations as much as they might assist within their own society. Together with active exploitation and preclusion of foreign societies, this disengagement may preserve and deepen the differentiation between prosperous and destitute societies. Competitive attitudes between them may therefore persevere even if they have internally progressed to more cooperative approaches. Technological and economic advancement may augment relations among societies, promote sharing, and thereby counteract abuse and indifference by prosperous societies and hostility from destitute societies. However, the advantages economically and technologically more successful societies realize and the outward competitive strategies they are prone to engage frequently outweigh this positive movement by far and aggravate the deprivation of destitute societies. The separateness of societies might alleviate many of the direct pressures that counsel toward cooperation. Yet the separately organized nature of societies may also effect that inwardly successful competitive strategies, particularly manipulative strategies that directly influence individuals, might not work as well on the outside. Such strategies might have to be modified and supplemented by indirect manipulatory or coercive strategies through the leadership of foreign societies. Where these strategies fail, tribally charged antago-

nism among societies threatens to ignite conflict and escalation. The relative lack of means and the separation of underprivileged societies may allow privileged societies to mostly ignore their deficiencies. They may only address deprivations when they reach large-scale exigencies by temporary assistance to calm sensations of empathy and guilt that compromise privileged individuals' emotional wellbeing. The resulting weakness of destitute societies may not permit them to mount a claim with appropriate influence to have privileged societies share resources with them. Where societies are subjected to foreign competitive domination, they may even be prevented from issuing such claims. Nevertheless, as competitive burdens and existential deprivations increase, differences between privileged and underprivileged societies grow, or individuals become mindful of their rights, deprived societies or their members may become more determined to take defensive competitive actions. These tendencies may be difficult to contain because of their fundamental causes. This makes the failure to share resources among societies a dangerous behavior that privileged societies must address even if their awareness has not graduated sufficiently to understand the full extent of human obligations and benefits related to sharing.

In spite of commanding reasons to share resources, the willingness to do so may be woefully underdeveloped both within and among societies. Still, there are several reasons to hope that technological and economic development will generate conditions in which humans become more motivated to share. One underlying reason is that the specialization and constraint of human automation and its technological facilitation obstruct emotionally satisfying contact. Although its production and exchange processes are constructive, they are fragmented and are lacking the intensity of involvement that is necessary to generate emotional resources through mutuality. This may make us look for meaningful interchanges with humans that can fill in the emotional void that is left by our nonemotional pursuits. But we may also try to derive the missing satisfaction from an enhanced focus on pursuing and maintaining nonemotional resources. Further, our desire for them may be independently so important for us that it detracts us from producing emotional resources in a comprehensive condition of mutuality. Even in a purportedly cooperative economy, we may still be focusing to a fault on gaining and sustaining nonemotional resources. That ill may cause delay in developing a positive aspect of sharing because we may for some time be too ensconced in it to understand what we are missing. Mistaken beliefs that we can replace emotional resources we can only obtain from mutuality may be relatively accessible in their causes. Yet comprehending an independent fixation on nonemotional

resources appears to call for a more fundamental look at how we advance economically. Although individual engagement and cooperation can produce significant effectiveness and efficiency benefits, much of our wealth depends on the advancement and implementation of technology. Technology can provide goods and services that are aimed to better satisfy our needs. Only, these more advanced means come at a price. They require that we dedicate an increasing portion of our pursuits to their generation and administration. Further, mounting complexities in the design, construction, use, maintenance, and control of technological products favor progressive specialization. Hence, a large part of the products we apply in our pursuits may not be the result of our own efforts. To obtain them, we must offer value in exchange. Initially, that value would be determined in comparison with traditional means of pursuit. If a technologically advanced means purveys better effectiveness or efficiency, its value is likely to be set according to the comparative advantage it creates. If we want to acquire this advantage in an exchange, we have to be able to exchange goods or services that meet the advantage in value. If we do not possess sufficient wealth, we have to generate wealth to accomplish these means. That increase in wealth may be accomplished through dedication of more of our basic personal resources or through better organization. It may also result from technological advancement of our production means, including the acquisition of higher personal skills. As our effectiveness and efficiency advance and find reflection in the quality, quantity, and price of goods and services we offer, we place others under pressure to raise their effectiveness and efficiency to be able to afford these means. This creates a spiral of pressure to produce ever more value for purposes of exchange. The resulting movement to increase effectiveness and efficiency in exchanges increases general wealth. This should reflect positively on participants' happiness because it raises their resources.

Yet it appears that a mounting segment of means is not directly available for the satisfaction of needs because wealth and the ability to generate wealth are closely conditioned upon each other. The pressure to consecrate our efforts and to innovate and employ technology may leave us wondering how much of the resources we gain is available to pursue our needs. It seems that we invest a growing part of our wealth into instruments that help us to produce and maintain wealth, a great part of which is invested to produce and maintain wealth, and so on. The progressive reinvestment of resources into the production of resources may be difficult to see because that reinvestment may seem to leave many growing resources that are available for the satisfaction of our needs. However, a considerable amount of these resources is also

reinvested in means to produce more wealth. To the extent technology cannot replace human involvement, it is not sufficient to generate wealth by reinvesting wealth that we picked up in prior economic cycles of production and exchange. Generating wealth may require us to invest personal resources so we can offer a marketable product. These personal resources have to be built and renewed. Therefore, some and possibly a momentous amount of the wealth we produce or receive in exchanges may be used to maintain our ability to provide personal resources. That appears to be the customary course of pursuit for many. The purpose of all our individual existential needs is to gain resources that enable us to maintain our production of resources for the fulfillment of our existential needs. At more advanced degrees of effectiveness and efficiency, we are merely reinvesting elevated amounts of resources to meet higher standards of what we consider an adequate fulfillment of our wishes. We invest more resources to fulfill our needs to a higher degree, because our standards may have grown more elevated with our aptitudes to actualize them, and because we can afford to accommodate more nonexistential idiosyncrasies. Catering to such idiosyncrasies may be a worthwhile undertaking in the service of our happiness. But not all our wishes that aim at high levels of fulfillment are focusing on utility. Some of the highly developed products and intricacies seem spurious because they do not materially contribute to our fulfillment over less demanding alternatives. We may waste increasing amounts of resources on ever smaller steps of improvement. The cost of many sophisticated means may thus not be commensurate with the value they contribute. Considering the amounts of wealth we reinvest into the maintenance and increase of wealth and the waste of wealth on luxuries for which we have little need, we may ask whether we improve our happiness with rising levels of our demands and production. After having advanced to secure a certain level of means, the production of additional quantities or qualities of means appears to become increasingly trivial and incapable to confer happiness upon us.

The machinery of which we have become components to raise our standard of living may be difficult to restrain or to redirect toward more productive objectives. It originated in our enduring or recurrent scarcity of resources from which humans have endeavored to escape for eons. The security of means has been such an important objective of human development and this objective appears to be so deeply ingrained in us that we may have difficulties reorienting ourselves after we have reached this objective. We may not have the necessary insight because we may not realize the decreasing or lacking utility of continuing activity. We may not have the resolve to change the machinery of

development because we indelibly connect the improvement of technical effectiveness and efficiency in our pursuits with gains in happiness. We may misinterpret our inability to derive much pleasure from our advancements as a lack of sufficiently impressive advancements and therefore further accelerate and intensify our efforts. We may also have become accustomed and been indoctrinated to focus on luxuries as important or even determining objectives for our happiness. But we do not merely pursue wealth because we desire ever more and better means for the fulfillment of our needs. We may desire an excess of resources to secure the future fulfillment of our needs. Considering the threats we face and can imagine, such a practice seems to be reasonable to a point. However, we may surpass that measure because we may have difficulties gauging what quantities or qualities of resources will be necessary to fulfill our needs in the future. Although the accumulation of wealth may grant us some comfort, our insecurity about future contingencies and our fear of not being able to cover them might not allow us to derive much happiness. They may cause us to accumulate wealth without limit to cover ever less probable threats. Even if we are not giving in to that affliction, we might marshal wealth to overcome conditions that resist control. Our failure in spite of such efforts may drastically confront us with our powerlessness in important concerns. More generally, the accumulation of wealth may instill intense worry in us concerning its building, preservation, and administration. These burdens weigh against the happiness we can derive from wealth. They join the resource losses we suffer coincidentally or necessarily in any pursuit of resources. In meaningful pursuits, such losses may be compensated by results. But the lack of utility in the excessive pursuit of wealth threatens to cause an overall drain on our happiness. While we may derive some satisfaction from the growth and presence of wealth, much of it may never be used for purposes that greatly matter.

Even if we understand that the accumulation of wealth, implementations of progress, and luxury can only bring us limited happiness, we may lack the vision for more rewarding alternative pursuits. We may cling to the distractions that their pursuit and possession can offer. An entire cooperative society may subscribe to such a mentality. Further, competitive interests may strongly encourage these attitudes because they enable high levels of competitive utilization at high levels of stability. Then again, competitive interests may themselves fall victim to the same erroneous existential philosophy. Even if participants harbor doubts concerning the ultimate benefits of this philosophy, it may appear difficult or even impossible to escape the highly organized, finely tuned, and comprehensive production machinery of which they have

become part and on which they depend. They may fear that attempting and succeeding to change this machinery may have painful effects. Even if they might be willing to forgo certain luxuries, they may wish to safeguard existential functions that an integrated productive system at high levels provides. As a result, they may remain part of a system characterized by intense effort and lacking ultimate return where productive means and wealth substantially revolve into each other.

This system seems to subjugate us to feed its apparent purpose of an ever increasing production. Even if it produces an abundance of nonemotional resources, it seems to stifle our ability to produce emotional resources. It engenders complications on a nonemotional level as well not only because of the usage of limited resources but also because of overproduction. The practical measure for our wealth should be the coverage of our wishes by means. If we possess more resources than can find reasonable employment in our pursuits, the surplus becomes irrelevant. To prevent such a system from stalling for a lack of meaningful objectives beyond a saturation and to preserve wealth, we may elevate spurious objectives and expenditures to a meritorious status. Alternatively, we must posit wealth as an objective separate from its applications. Money offers such a separation. We battle the irrelevance of our endeavors and their results by elevating monetary wealth and its enhancement into a purpose in itself. Still, to build and maintain such wealth, there must be a market where money carries equivalents in products that others consider valuable. If those who could engage in exchanges with us possess ample resources of the kind we offer, these resources would not retain value and money as intermediary would be worthless. Others must be relatively poor concerning our offerings of goods and services to make us rich through exchanges. Further, to maintain the value of money we accumulate, others who seek to acquire our goods or services have to lack a sufficient supply of it.

This seems to imply that individuals with the ambition to build and retain wealth would have to ultimately engage in competitive behavior. Yet such measures might not be necessary because there might be sufficient numbers of individuals who cannot or for other reasons do not build or maintain a saturation of their wealth. In a cooperative context, personal production and management capacities seem to significantly determine the acquisition and maintenance of wealth. Some individuals who invest their personal resources into offerings may not be very successful in generating wealth even if they are given every cooperative opportunity because they lack capacity, knowledge, or discipline or offer products that are not in sufficient demand. Because lower-valued positions in a highly developed cooperative economy attract

less compensation, such individuals may have to reinvest most if not all of their receipts from exchanges to sustain themselves and continue their generation of means. As the utility of goods and services advances, those who do not adjust to enhanced demands suffer comparatively in the production of wealth. They may have diminished capacity to create wealth in absolute terms as well because technological capabilities render their participation less necessary and hence less in demand. Other individuals who made bad decisions despite their assets or suffered bad fortune might be similarly situated. Their expenditures of money with an emphasis on existential necessities are joined in supporting the value of money by individuals of higher production capacities. These must also secure the basic requirements of existence, but they may additionally succumb to encouragements or temptations to spuriously disburse their wealth. Without consumption in both the existential and luxury areas, an economic mechanism based on the revolving increase of wealth and its representation in money would collapse. While the supply of basic requirements may form a stable foundation, a flourishing and growing market for luxurious means may be indispensable to establish sufficient equivalents of goods and services in the representation and growth of wealth. It is therefore critical for wealth interests that a society or sufficient parts of it advance in their productivity sufficiently to enable and sustain such a luxury market.

Superior talent, skill, dedication, products in demand, good decision making, and good fortune carry the potential to build a surplus of exchange receipts that can be invested into the production of goods or services for exchange to increase wealth beyond receipts that might be based on personal resources. The production of existential necessities and nontechnological refinements can provide reward opportunities for such investments. The production of luxuries enabled by technological innovation crucially adds to these opportunities. The revolving mechanism of wealth permits better disposed and more fortunate individuals to increase their wealth. This capacity may become a function of astute investment decisions without a significant requirement to dedicate personal resources apart from what is involved in making such decisions. The compounding growth potential of such wealth is only limited by technological evolution and demand from individuals who have not reached saturation for products of such investments.

This incongruence in the accumulation of wealth unavoidably creates a precarious polarization of wealth in a free market economy. That polarization is becoming even more pronounced as human contributions to production are replaced by machines. That replacement would likely start out with relatively low-skilled human labor to even-



tually comprise all categories of human contributions. At such a point, nonpersonal resources would fully dominate production and economic attributions from exchanges, possibly except for investment or allocation decisions. Because other personal contributions will cease, economic activity at advanced levels may consist of exchanges among individuals or groupings who own and operate nonpersonal wealth that would be dictated by the requirements of their automated production facilities. This would make other individuals who do not economically contribute expendable and deprive them of an exchange basis for their subsistence. To gain means, such individuals might fall back on competitive strategies. In a more sustainable effort, they might also try to institute a parallel, secondary economy in which they bring forth and exchange goods and services commensurate with their capacities. But their low capacities would likely cause them to struggle in their bid for survival and thriving. That might not change even if their activities remained protected from the superior capacities of an advanced economy and individuals who fail or refuse to cooperatively secure their existence in this secondary economy. Humanity would be separated into privileged and underprivileged groups according to the ability of individuals to produce wealth beyond personal wealth. These groups may coexist and there might be limited ascent and decline between them depending on individual dispositions and fortunes. But they may grow apart because of their dissimilarities in production capacity and techniques. They might also become opponents because they might claim access and appropriation to some of the same resources. Yet their fulfillment profiles present extremes that demonstrate different scarcities disturbing fulfillment. Members of a secondary economy may struggle for nonemotional resources. But their cooperative production at lower sophistication levels could provide them with comprehensive mutuality that may include the adequate production of emotional resources. Members of the principal, technologically advanced economy may suffer reverse deprivations. The two parallel cultures might hence possess elements that might complement and complete each other.

To the extent individuals who have aggregated or are aggregating wealth continue to depend on demand for goods and services from underprivileged individuals or to the extent the development of a secondary economy would challenge the primary economy for resources, privileged classes may subsidize underprivileged individuals to inhibit them from establishing an autonomous, nonsubservient economy. Beyond that, the privileged may subsidize underprivileged individuals to prevent competitive disturbances that might be caused by a comparative lack of resources. Ultimately, privileged and underprivileged indi-

viduals in such a scheme would resemble each other because of their dependence on mechanical automation. Arguably, a difference would remain in their ability to direct that automated capacity. But pacifying the underprivileged would necessitate degrees and articulations of resource dedication to them that would limit the direction of economic processes by privileged owners and force them to avoid great discrepancies of attributions between the two divisions. With the automation of production, the differences between privileged and underprivileged individuals may eventually vanish. Ownership is bound to lose its substantively organizing functionality as the economic affairs of humanity become more thoroughly automated, as automation becomes capable of providing sufficient resources for all, and as the acquisition of such resources does not necessitate exchanges of individual economic contributions anymore. In this state, the sharing and equalization of non-emotional resources would be complete. Hence, the technological and economic development of humanity appears to eventually make offensive and defensive competition unnecessary and irrelevant. Since emotional resources cannot then be obtained through competitive activity, there would be no remaining subject for competitive aspirations to attach. Any lasting competitive instincts might be repressed by the continuing requirement to achieve emotional resources through cooperation. But it is difficult to imagine how emotional resources could arise without the cooperation among individuals concerning their nonemotional pursuits. We may therefore find such a state undesirable.

Then again, such considerations may not determine our actions as long as we seem to be far removed from such a state. As long as we suffer deficiencies in the fulfillment of our needs, obtaining resources may endure in the foreground of our efforts. As a consequence of cooperative economic activity, the ownership of money and other readily convertible assets has become progressively important to secure resources. Generic wealth has become synonymous in our mind with the capacity to create happiness regarding many if not most of our needs. This elevates wealth to take on independent importance in our mind. Our preoccupation with acquiring, securing, and growing wealth may detract us from applying it toward the fulfillment of needs or from applying it with sufficient consideration. We may also fear that its reduction deprives us of our capacity to fulfill our needs, even if that reduction would be expended on the fulfillment of our needs. Moreover, the happiness we experience during the generation of wealth as a generic means in the sequences of many of our needs and the emotional anticipation of how we might employ our wealth in these various sequences may propose an unrealistic and exaggerated worth of wealth com-

pared to the happiness that can arise from its investment. As a result, we may underfulfill or fail to fulfill needs whose pursuit could benefit from the application of wealth even though we might be greatly effective and efficient in its production. We may rationalize our dedication to wealth with the argument that it is necessary to obtain appropriate levels of reserves for future contingencies. We may also argue that we have to accumulate a sufficient amount of it or wait until a propitious time to employ it in a way that fulfills our needs. While these may be valid contentions, there may be circumstances in which we could lose valuable time and opportunities to advance, fulfill, or preserve the fulfillment of needs and might not be able to recoup this loss by a later conversion into particular means. Further, only a limited number of our needs, even nonemotional requirements, can be fulfilled suddenly by exchanging means. Even if such a conversion should be possible, it may involve relatively high levels of cost or risk. To pursue our needs effectively and efficiently, we must balance prudent strategies of growing and maintaining wealth for future enjoyment and contingencies with its timely conversion and application toward qualities and quantities of resources that serve future but also our preceding needs.

Still, even if we should manage to succeed in that undertaking, such management can only provide means for the fulfillment of needs to the extent they rely on nonemotional resources. Wealth alone cannot make us happy because it can only afford us complete means for certain pursuits that focus on nonemotional conditions of fulfillment. It may not even be able to provide us with capable means for the satisfaction of some needs that require nonemotional resources. More than that, we cannot rely on nonemotional achievements, including wealth for the fulfillment of needs that require emotional resources. Such a realization may not come easily particularly regarding wealth because it is powerful in so many instances. In our preoccupation with wealth, we may assume that we have not reached sufficient happiness because we have not managed to accumulate sufficient wealth yet or have not put it to proper use. A failure of obtaining happiness may hence cause us to focus even more on the accumulation of wealth or the building and shaping our nonemotional surroundings with it. We may not realize that the means we are missing are of a nature that cannot be compelled into existence through an application of wealth. That their pursuit might benefit from support by wealth or convertible nonemotional resources does not mean that their accomplishment can be bought. Our failure to recognize this and our inability to appreciate how such resources can benefit or damage the pursuit of needs that have emotional requirements may curb our ability to satisfy such needs.

Our realization that nonemotional wealth may not be convertible into emotional resources and our reorientation toward appropriate strategies are fraught with difficulties because we can point to multiple and often significant instances where conversions of nonemotional resources into emotional resources succeed. The sharing of wealth, including the capacity to generate wealth, may bestow us with critically satisfying emotional resources in satisfaction of cooperative needs. But some of our needs appear to require types of emotional resources that can only arise from responses by individuals to other attributes apart from wealth or the capacity to generate it. Such responses may interweave with considerations of our wealth and our capacity to generate wealth. Such elements may even figure prominently in the attraction of other individuals to us because they constitute important means in the production of some emotional resources that transfer to us. Still, we cannot generate the full contingent of emotional resources if these are the only attributes that attract others to us. Even if it were possible to generate any type of emotional resource in exchange for nonemotional resources, we may only find satisfaction for some of our needs if the emotional responses we prompt from others are not caused by our wealth or our capacity to generate wealth. We may call emotional resources we must generate through the reaction of other individuals to attributes other than wealth and our capacity to generate wealth pure resources and the responses we generate in others pure responses.

Our wealth or capacity to create wealth may interfere with the proper generation of pure resources in our relationships even if we become able to move beyond the misapprehension that our attributes of wealth can secure pure resources. Because other individuals focus on opportunities to achieve wealth to fulfill their needs, our possession of it or our capacity to generate it may impress their behavior for a variety of reasons. They may desire to obtain some of our wealth or partake in our generation of success. They may wish to rely on us for the satisfaction of their nonemotional requirements, either through exchange or outright. They may want our material support, protection, mentoring, or sponsorship. Such incentives may influence and dominate their demeanor toward us. The awareness of our achievements by individuals who are missing such wealth or our capacity to achieve wealth may also evoke justified or unjustified resentment in others and a demand that this imbalance be reconciled. Such adverse emotions carry a danger of interference with our endeavors to engage in positive emotional exchanges. That attitude tends to be comparatively clear. We may respond to such demands with resentment and refuse to give in to them to the extent we regard them to be unjustified. It may be far more dif-

difficult to discern appealing emotional attitudes or pretenses of such attitudes that are adulterated with the intent to access our wealth or capacity to generate wealth. Because we may not be certain in many cases whether such adulteration occurs, we may not be able to trust the appearance of pure responses and may therefore be unable to generate pure resources from them. We may fear that we misjudge approaches to profit from our wealth or capacity as advances by others to cater to our needs involving pure resources. Desires to obtain wealth can cause a display of intense dedication to those who possess these resources or a capacity to generate them. Even insincere displays are fueled by and put on an authentic semblance from such underlying emotions. They may occur largely indistinguishable in their attributes from pure emotions that do not care about the wealth or capacity to generate wealth of their subject or only care about it collaterally. Further, we may not be able to derive any pure resources from individuals with whom we share our wealth or productive capacity because we will not be able to distinguish a predictably enthusiastic attitude by others to qualify for transfers or the gratitude of recipients upon a transfer from emotional attraction that exists independent of our transfer. As a consequence, individuals who are wealthy or have overproportional capacity to generate wealth can never be sure that it is not their money, success, and power but other qualities that prompt their spouses, children, friends, business partners, employees, and members of the public to conform and cater to them. They can never be assured how much their wealth superimposes on their ability to bring forth social contacts, friendship, love, respect, agreement, appreciation, or tolerance by others. This insecurity may create massive deficits of emotional resources in them.

But insecurity about the generation of pure responses may also create substantial problems for the fulfillment of certain needs in individuals who interact with wealthier or more capacitated individuals. A positive reaction to the sharing of wealth or of a related capacity by others forms an essential part of mutuality. Prospectively, positive acts or attitudes toward potential benefactors may be necessary to demonstrate worthiness of receiving such benefits. It may be difficult to differentiate warranted behavior of reciprocating or anticipatory mutuality from manipulatory simulations. Even individuals who relate to individuals with higher degrees of wealth or capacities in pure responses might not be certain about the purity of their own motivations. If they can persuade themselves of such purity, they may still have difficulties convincing recipients of their affection or third parties that these are pure. They may also remain uncertain whether they receive pure emotions from individuals who share wealth or capacities with them.

Relationships that provide participants who possess disproportionate wealth or related capacities with pure resources may be possible despite these detractions. But such relationships have to overcome a great adversity of doubt. All relationships may suffer from insecurities about the purity of emotions. But uneven wealth or related capacities enhance these and the likelihood that they are justified. It seems difficult for all participants to overcome the insecurity whether their affection is mirrored or merely the subject of a purchase. Individuals who are not wealthy or possess no particular capacities to build wealth might find it easier to obtain fulfillment of needs that call for pure responses in relation with similarly situated individuals. Then again, this might interfere with their legitimate desires to improve their supply of other resources. Similarly, wealthy or so capacitated individuals might evade problems by selecting emotional relationships with one another. Only, such relationships could still be defined by wealth because of a fixation of participants on acquiring or keeping it. Further, both limitations might unacceptably limit individuals in establishing pure mutuality by potential or in actuality. More and less wealthy or capacitated individuals with pure designs and outlooks might therefore broaden the scope of their relationships to include individuals of the other type. Beyond that, limiting mutuality to pure resources may be neither feasible nor desirable for them or their matches because they may derive important emotional resources from an exchange of nonemotional resources as well. They may offer or demand comprehensive mutuality. This may thwart a clear discernment of pure contributions.

Parties in a relationship with imbalances of wealth or capacity may recognize that difficulty. They may rely on trust and vigilance to reach a position where they can infer pure motivations. But they may also settle for less ambitious relationships. Individuals seeking wealth might condition their provision of emotional resources or the dedication of their related attributes on the sharing of material wealth or capacities with them. Conversely, individuals may apply their wealth or capacities to evoke such provisions. Both sides might be truthful as to their emotions or shroud the bargain into pretenses of pure emotions to each other, to themselves, and to other parties to maintain an illusion of purity. Either way, the parties may obtain emotional or nonemotional resources from such a bargain that render the arrangement worthwhile for them. Nevertheless, doubt and frustration may remain. Such exchanges cannot wholly succeed because they lack the satisfaction that only impressions of pure responses can bring. They may not succeed addressing emotional requirements that exist apart from notions of wealth even if propositioned counterparts respond positively.

To escape the problems that an uneven state of wealth and capacity to create wealth may pose for a transfer of pure resources, underprivileged individuals might improve their wealth and capacity and overprivileged individuals might share their wealth and capacity. This may involve different struggles and impossibilities for either, and disparities in wealth and related capacity may remain. While underprivileged individuals may raise their effort, their capacities or external opportunities of growth may be inadequate. Sharing wealth and capacity may summon the very confusion of emotions that wealthy or capacitated individuals may be trying to avoid. Still, they may be more motivated to adjust if their numerical underrepresentation makes it more difficult for them to find pure emotional resources in other humans.

Wealthy individuals may then be forced by internal and external pressure to transfer resources to meet the existential requirements of other humans. However, determining that the transfer of substantial portions of our wealth or capacity to generate wealth to others is in our interest requires a great measure of insight. In addition, it requires that we overcome defensive competitive reflexes that the proposition of such transfers triggers. Sacrificing the relative safety of our wealth may appear unjustifiable to us as long as we cannot be certain that it brings us greater benefits than we are surrendering. Measured against the practical capacities that wealth may engender, the benefits that we purportedly stand to gain in exchange may appear attenuated and indefinite. We may try to find a way to keep most of our wealth while somewhat satisfying needs that counsel us to share that wealth. We may confine our sharing to relatively small portions and a limited range of individuals, limited endeavors, sporadic incidences, or token gestures to assuage our concerns. Beyond that allowance, we may take a defensive position against internal and external propositions that we should share more. To justify that stance, we may attempt to intensify our views of individuals possessing less wealth or capacity to generate wealth as potentially or typically envious, lazy, greedy, untrue, predatory, and dangerous. We may habitually try to exclude destitute individuals from our care, handle them with cynical disdain, preemptively distance ourselves from them, and try to dissuade them from claiming participation in our wealth. We may become alienated from numerous individuals and groups, thus curbing our wealth concerning emotional resources. Our lack of effective alternatives to sharing may frighten us. Our inability may sway us to use our wealth to impose control and obtain hierarchic semblances of emotional transfers in a hope that these have effects similar to those of voluntary transfers. But this may reinforce our negative attitude toward others and further alienate them.

An imbalance of wealth or capacity then seems to inescapably lead to an unhappy state for wealthy individuals, even if they have acquired their wealth or capacity by noncompetitive means. The apparent legitimacy in the acquisition of their wealth or capacity may stand in the way of their distribution not only by legal and ethical standards. Frustrated and hostile demeanor by individuals who resist their cooperative needs may combine with their reaction to tolerance their position may engender in underprivileged individuals. That tolerance may continue in an environment where overproportional resources are obtained noncompetitively, or where underprivileged individuals are led to believe that these are so obtained, even though the submissiveness of such individuals based on hierarchic instincts should have receded. Hoping to benefit from wealthy or accordingly capacitated individuals or fearing the associated power, and because of the triggering of their hierarchic impulses by their relative difference in status, they may be reluctant to criticize or set boundaries for such individuals.

This permissiveness allows personality flaws of such individuals to become similarly unbound as those of competitive rulers. It magnifies defects they might already overproportionally exhibit because increased wealth and capacity to generate wealth permit enlarged command and influence of their circumstances. Further, their elevated independence and security decrease their incentive to restrain their impulses and allow them to be less considerate regarding the concerns of others. An imbalance of means allows them to exclude individuals in weaker positions from what they wish to secure for themselves and to exploit such individuals. Thus, even if wealth or the capacity to generate it were noncompetitively achieved, they make more freedom available to express competitive attitudes with impunity. Even without the preexistence of personality flaws, the submissive attitude of individuals with lower wealth or capacity to create it and their catering to the needs and wishes of wealthier and better capacitated individuals may move these to accept proffered competitive benefits. In addition, their preferential and deferential treatment may instill in them and in those who submit to them the idea that they are entitled to such treatment and that leading and governing those who defer to them is their right and even their obligation because of their attributes and because they are being prompted to do so. These factors may result in the competitive conversion of a cooperative environment. Because wealth and the capacity to create it translate into competitive power as well as the inclination to exercise and bow to such power, their uneven distribution may disturb a cooperative organization and give way to a competitive society with all its inherent flaws and deleterious consequences.



All participants in a cooperative system carry responsibility for preventing such a decomposition. It may be too much to ask that destitute individuals who are desperate for resources abstain from overly accommodating behavior toward their potential or actual benefactors. A more likely way to defuse the threat of competitive disintegration is that wealthy and individuals with superior capacities use their advantages to improve the capability of others, keep them from existential danger during that process, and provide permanent assistance to individuals who are permanently incapacitated. However, as wealthy or as better capacitated individuals, resisting our hierarchic tendencies and the empowerment of them by others requires a high degree of maturity and integrity. Our position of superior strength over those who seek assistance and their apparently voluntary abdication of authority to us might seduce us to descend into instinctive predatory or exclusionary behavior patterns. We might utilize the pretense of legitimate conditioning of our assistance to fulfill competitive objectives rather than to serve the objectives of effective and efficient aid according to the criteria of our enlightened needs. We might try to ease our conscience by giving in to negative tribal impulses and designating those we wish to abuse as temporarily or as permanently incapable or unwilling to fulfill reasonable conditions for assistance or as generally unworthy due to actual or imputed irrelevant differences. Although we might regard ourselves to be cooperative, we may give in to the same or similar biases that competitive individuals engage to justify competitive activities to themselves and others. We may fear that our assistance might be undeserved or competitively abused and might be alerted by actual occasions of this happening. Misinformation or a lack of information in combination with geographic, cultural, genetic, and social detachment and differentiation of potential beneficiaries may allow us to develop presumptions, generalizations, misconceptions, and willful pretenses that unjustifiably sanction us to refrain from assisting others.

Such adverse positions and resulting deficiencies in the distribution of wealth and capacity are likely to enhance or initiate outrage in those who deem themselves unjustly restricted or abandoned. It also may radicalize the assertion of redistribution rights and give rise to competitive movements beyond. A difference of wealth may thus remain a dangerous and destructive force that tends to evoke or strengthen competitive tendencies in overprivileged and underprivileged individuals. Its effects invite the entire characteristic negative potential of competition from either division. The failure to resolve the imbalance of wealth and capacity to create wealth promises to cause significant repercussions on the ability of humanity to maximize happiness.

If wealth imbalances are to find constructive resolution for all sides, the divestment of assets has to be conducted in an orderly and fruitful manner that engenders and maximizes the mutuality of benefits for benefactors and beneficiaries. A resolution seems possible not only because wealthy individuals are pressured to share. Less wealthy and particularly destitute individuals are pressured by their situation to consent to conditions that predicate the award of resources to them on their constructive use and the disavowal of competition. The cooperative engagement of beneficiaries that arises from these conditions in return for cooperative transfers may form the beginnings of a closer and proliferating cooperative movement. The beginnings of such cooperation might be tentative. Continuing individual involvement and contact might be important to engender mutuality and responsibility by benefactors and beneficiaries. But it also threatens competitive, ineffective, inefficient, or disparate treatment that might weaken or disrupt assistance programs. The challenges of living up to the rights and obligations of involved parties to the best possible effect may require systematic activity. The two sides may begin that activity by agreeing on cooperative formalities. Individuals who lack resources would have to be subjected to procedures for establishing their destitute state and qualification under conditions that validate their initial and continued receipt of resources. Individuals with overproportional resources may have to be committed by their societies to share. They may have to be supervised to prevent them from concealing or wasting their resources on spurious pursuits or be compelled to produce resources at quantity and quality levels commensurate with their capacities. Moreover, the technical aspects of redistribution may call for systematic administration. Such governmental structures and processes may provide competitive interests with attractive subterfuges to victimize benefactors and beneficiaries. Yet, even in the absence of competitive intent, the effective and efficient arrangement of assistance may present difficult challenges. To curb competitive abuse or negligence in the treatment of benefactors and beneficiaries and ensure proper management of assistance and of interventions generally, these would have to be undertaken under binding criteria with transparency and accountability.

Competitively minded individuals from both sides might try to influence and abuse the structures and processes to control and guide the activities of the redistributive governance in their favor. Individuals with a relevant surplus may continue to reject responsibility for the fate of other individuals, or they might try to impose competitive conditions on recipients of resources. They might try to use their disproportional resources to sway governance in their favor and to turn that

governance into an enforcement instrument for their designs. Underprivileged individuals might take advantage of or otherwise abuse individuals with overproportional resources or the resources they grant to where they substantially weaken or destroy the capacity or the will of these to produce overproportional resources. Both sides might conceal offensive competitive intent behind arguments that their competitive posture is justified to defend against offensive competitive behavior by the other side. Their antagonistic stance would create a continuing potential for conflict. The mutual distrust it causes and the artificial and unstable semblance of constructive mutuality it entails might require stringent regulation and enforcement to keep the participants from dishonoring their obligations. However, the maintenance of such a system against the opposition from individuals with overproportional resources and against overreaching from individuals with underproportional resources would pose organizational requirements that may be difficult to implement. The behavior of members would have to be ceaselessly scrutinized for compliance with imposed standards. Maintaining a system of equitable sharing under circumstances of external compulsion and control may not be feasible, at least not under tolerable conditions. Even if such a system could be established, it could not fully succeed as long as participants maintain competitive motivations and lack cooperative insight. It is not only hampered by the deduction of resources its administration requires and an inferior effectiveness of compelled conduct. It is also inherently prevented from effecting true mutuality because it cannot compel the mutual provision of emotional resources. Its enforcement reach is limited to nonemotional resources. With such a limited scope, vital motivational elements for a functional system of mutuality remain missing. The attempt to supplant them by regulation and enforcement disenfranchises the parties in the pursuit of their cooperative needs, thus preventing the production of essential emotional requirements. Its ineffectivities and inefficiencies may raise opposition that combines with defenses against its imposition. By enforcing cooperation, such a system becomes comprehensively competitive. Although it is defensively oriented, its intrusive supervision, control, and compulsion make it difficult to distinguish from an offensive competitive system. Its practices may draw animosity and adjustment pressure from both sides that endanger its existence or impartiality. A different approach that emphasizes mutuality seems to be required.

Beginning the development toward a true mutuality by sharing resources may be difficult. It goes against impulses in benefactors that urge them to secure their existence by holding on to their resources. They must overcome in many cases strong feelings that spurred them

to create and accumulate wealth and the capacity to create wealth in a competitive environment. As a consequence, their commitment to the sharing of resources may be tentative. It may also be minor compared to the deprivation of even critical existential needs. Impatient or radical demands for the sharing and equalization of resources may frighten them. They may fear that small grants will encourage demands for larger distributions. In spite of their posing conditions, they may have little or no assurance that their unilateral start will bring about the desired mutuality in beneficiaries. Beneficiaries may receive transfers of resources with a competitive attitude and without intent of mutuality. They may place emphasis on their rights while neglecting their obligations. Their dispositions and circumstances may not allow their development toward mutuality to take hold or to take hold quickly. The initial failure of beneficiaries to meet expectations may prompt sponsors to prematurely abandon a fledgling system of mutuality. Further, the threat of such failure may dissuade benefactors from initiating or expanding sharing. The resulting reserve in the inception and progression of sharing may frustrate possible participants on either side.

It may therefore be useful for them to express mutual expectations and to obtain a mutual commitment to fulfill these before transfers are effected. Benefactors and beneficiaries may enter into personal agreements whereby both sides constrain their competitive impulses, beneficiaries promise to comply with the conditions for assistance, and benefactors pledge their assistance if such conditions are met. But it will also be necessary to define realistic objectives for both benefactors and beneficiaries. Benefactors must take care to make meaningful transfers, not to exaggerate the conditions for their assistance, and not to overpromise. On the other hand, it will be necessary to gauge beneficiaries' potential, their opportunities, and their movement in realizing their potential and opportunities. Return promises may be lightly given by beneficiaries in need. The only mode to keep parties committed on a path toward mutuality is to adjust expectations to feasibility and hold them to such standards. Periodical evaluations of their situation and efforts by them and each other may be necessary. A failure by benefactors or by beneficiaries to exert best efforts in living up to their commitments may have to be eventually disciplined because their delinquency would injure those who act in reliance on mutuality as well as third parties. However, control and defensive competitive measures appear to be imperfect instruments to produce the voluntary behavior required for mutuality, even if they take place on an interpersonal level. They may only be able to create forced compliance and security at a considerable continuing cost. Because their compulsory character may

stunt or reverse the development of voluntary mutuality, they have to be reserved as ultimate remedies. A close personal contact of sponsors and beneficiaries seems to be necessary to develop, maintain, and adjust the foundations of mutuality for both sides. A personal knowledge of deprivation may be helpful to activate benefactors' impulses to assist. A resulting relationship can improve accountability and deter either side from engaging in competitive activities. Even if beneficiaries act in conformance with acceptable standards, personal knowledge of this may foster the continuing provision of resources. It is a vital link by which benefactors achieve satisfaction. Even if mutuality does not entail reciprocity but is satisfied by beneficiaries' wellbeing or by service to third parties, information about how allocations are used appears to be essential. Building and maintaining a personal relationship that includes full mutuality of all types of resources appear to require that the participants engage in personal contact. It may be particularly vital during the beginning phases when mutuality is tentative and can gain strength from immediate confirmation. Community settings may be particularly apt to keep individuals in contact and committed.

This appears to make communities that are sufficiently small to allow the establishment of comprehensive mutuality through personal relationships among their members ideal vehicles to begin mutuality that can eventually spread beyond their boundaries. They may further offer more stability and range in assistance because it is shared among members. As communities expand the production of resources among their members through mutuality, they become prepared to reach out to other communities and practice mutuality of resources with them. In time, communities may create a network of mutual assistance. This multilateral system might be able to vanquish competitive tendencies among groups. If suitable relationships among communities cannot be found or are slow to develop, individual relationships may be productive intermediaries to inaugurate mutuality. Even where communities act in this process, they must act through their members on an interpersonal level to make the best use of the potential of mutuality. Although such a strategy of expansionary mutuality progresses on a detailed, personal level, its systematic nature might eventually unite humanity in a cooperative integrality based on individual responsibility. Meeting the most urgent and subsequently other existential needs of humans comprehensively requires the ready exchange of information and coordination by all humans and their communities in their capacity as benefactors and beneficiaries. Information, travel, and allocation technology can fulfill these requirements. It can also facilitate personal relationships required to initiate, build, and maintain mutuality.

To maximize the constructive effects of mutuality and to reach such a state dependably and with a minimum of damage, and without a violation of rights of any participants, it will be necessary to take an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary approach. Developments toward full mutuality may have to be given time, with only an exception for emergency existential assistance. They can only succeed as quickly as competitive attitudes of individuals transform toward cooperation. They can only move forward as fast as enlightened attitudes build the support and the protection of one another's needs into a system where members of that system become dedicated to serve one another and can be reasonably assured that their service will not be abused. In addition, deliberateness seems necessary to secure and preserve the capacity of benefactors to help. The transfer of resources to assist others in securing their minimum existential requirements, and subsequently beyond this level to meet their fundamental rights, would significantly change the means benefactors seek to obtain or that beneficiaries seek to obtain with transferred resources. Markets would also be changed with the improved offerings by beneficiaries. An unnecessarily sudden change of priorities might shock the economic system that is to provide resources and lead to its collapse. Yet, except for proper pacing as necessary, these alterations would not require that the principles of a free market system be reformed. Free market dynamics would remain important to allow advancement by the selection of products and to determine what quantities and qualities are needed. It might take extended and intense synchronization by mutuality to render the coordination of efforts that a free market system can achieve obsolete.

But after a system of mutuality has been fully established, traditional trade among participants will become unnecessary because they will be autonomously and socially committed to contribute in accordance with their capacity and their individually and collectively reconciled needs. They would form a society, and eventually a society of all humanity of absolute confidence in one another. In such a state, individuals are aware of their needs and the needs of all other individuals, recognize that the reconciliation of these needs optimizes the fulfillment of their and all other humans' needs, and act upon that insight. We may have already been acting under a similar principle toward selected individuals in selected contexts. Even if we lack deeper insight, we protect and support others to the extent this assists us in the pursuit of our needs. That principle is not likely to change. Only, we will have progressed to a comprehensive insight of our true needs and how consistently advancing the fulfillment of other individuals' needs can provide superior means to advance the fulfillment of our needs.

Once more proximate existential requirements have been satisfied for all humans, the mutuality gained in the process can extend to additional cooperative developments of resources. It can be applied to further develop and realize the potential of humanity to maximize individual and collective survival and thriving by aiming its mechanisms toward more advanced objectives and possibly new frontiers.

Still, the defeat of competitive interests and the coordination of pursuits through mutuality confront us with a new danger. Giving cooperative interests control over the production and the attribution of resources and associated concerns conveys enormous power to them. Although that power might be based on individual consent, it may become overwhelming. Unless coordination stays confined to legitimate common concerns, it may easily infringe on our ability to pursue happiness. In the struggle between competitive and cooperative interests, and as a result of efforts of coordinated planning and implementation, cooperative interests may be radicalized to where all manners of pursuit that are not cooperative may seem suspect and may be rejected or neglected. They may exaggerate the purpose of cooperation beyond its function as a convenient vehicle to jointly advance individual interests until these interests diverge. Our failure to participate in the maximization of overall happiness might be interpreted as a competitive act against other individuals. By insisting that all our activities obtain cooperative clearance, cooperative structures and procedures may interfere with our freedom to engage in the individual pursuit of our needs whenever we deem that to be more advantageous. A cooperative override may be legitimate if we determine to avail ourselves of the advantages of cooperation with full knowledge of sacrifices we may have to make in exchange for such advantages. In that case, we have or can be deemed to have agreed to incur disadvantages because we considered benefits of cooperation to be more advantageous. But we can also imagine cooperative situations where we never made that determination or where conditions change that make cooperative impositions overly burdensome. Because cooperative arrangements derive their legitimacy solely from their capacity to improve the fulfillment of participating individuals' needs, we must not permit them to assume power over us without our consent. Transgressions of this boundary by cooperative movements convert them into competitive enterprises. The fact that a majority or all other individuals in a cooperative enterprise advocate such an overreaching does not alter its illegitimacy. We must prevent the structures and processes that cooperation creates for agreed purposes from unduly interfering with our pursuits. The next chapter examines how cooperative and individual aspects can be reconciled.