CHAPTER 41
SOLIDARITY AND DISCRIMINATION

We might discover more room for an expansion of our needs and pursuits by identifying emotionally with others and caring for them in the same way we care for our individual survival and thriving, and maybe more. Such an expansion of our needs is already programmed into us by empathy and our ultimate need to secure the survival and thriving of our species. We recognize apposite subjects for the pursuit of that need based on emotional identification with them. But the motivation for treating others with the same commitment to their needs as we afford ourselves seems to be influenced by more than empathic identification. It also may be based on the insight that if we do not acknowledge and support and protect the needs of others equally, we will suffer repercussions in our activities for our needs. We further make our treatment of others dependent on whether and how we view them to fit with our pursuits. Even our need for collective survival and thriving contains such additional criteria. In that utility assessment, we appear to be guided by notions of similarity and difference and whether these are beneficial, neutral, or detrimental for us. Such determinations may be multifaceted because we cannot draw valid conclusions about other individuals' value based on their similarity or difference alone.

Similarity can be constructive if it enables individuals to bundle their similar efforts for greater combined effect or to acknowledge the legitimate nature of one another's pursuits. Yet similarity among individuals would also motivate them to endeavor for the same means and might entangle them in competition. Differences in talent and in concepts of happiness can help us attain objectives with the help of others that we could not accomplish by coordinated similar efforts. Such idiosyncrasies may give rise to different approaches, diverging directions of exploration, and a large number of potential correlations among individuals. They may lead to a larger variety of available means through complementary contributions and exchanges. They might spread pursuits out and decrease competition by the pursuit and application of a wider array of means and strategies. Further, they may prompt a discussion of different ideas that could grant us broad-based insight into strategies we might apply individually or cooperatively to advance our happiness. Even if the use of insights is limited because ideas of happiness differ, we might apply observations of disparate needs and ways to clarify our own needs. Still, the diversity among individuals in their objectives and pursuits may cause high rates of interference and cause difficulties in arriving at beneficial or even neutral arrangements.

Achieving a cooperative arrangement beyond a mere exchange would require a certain commonality of objectives with others toward which we combine our pursuits. Such a commonality would appear to be existent in the phenomenon of common needs in all humans. Notwithstanding, although we share the same basis for our needs, different expressions of these needs in accordance with discrepancies in our traits continue to separate us. Lasting particularities in needs combine with other lasting particularities in perceptive, rational, and other capabilities and the environment to build individuals with unique mental and more obvious physical dispositions and conduct. We may have difficulties in understanding, approving, or condoning different preferences, lifestyles, and ways of securing fulfillment. We may perceive these as marks of lesser rights, competence, or worth of their bearers. We may deem their behavior disruptive, subversive, or threatening to our pursuit of happiness. We may regard that behavior and its bearers liable to be adjusted. We may view their differentiation as a license to disregard them, their objectives, and pursuits and to treat them competitively. Hence, differences among individuals may create problems in their ability to cooperate actively or even to coexist separately. Addressing these problems appears to be exceedingly difficult. We would have to be able to reconcile different opinions on what constitutes fulfillment and what are appropriate means for pursuit. While temporary differences regarding internal or external conditions might be reconcilable, the confinement of individuals in lasting references may cause a fundamental inability to understand or respect other individuals and may restrain a coordinated search for happiness. Our ingrained differences threaten to make us permanent strangers to one another.

To render cooperation and coexistence among individuals possible, we must focus on both the constructive commonalities and the complementarities of differences among humans. We must find ways to reconcile or contain our remaining differences and identities of objectives and manners of pursuit that might activate competitive or destructive impulses. A significant part of differences may arise from external circumstances that form dispositions or provide general conditions. Other differences stem from genetic predispositions. If we could adjust these causes to resemble one another, some of the interference among individuals might be neutralized. But we may realize that, absent the development of humans to become able and willing to take a range of positions and fulfill an assortment of tasks, such efforts might have to be balanced with preservation and support for particularities. Differences may be helpful or necessary in a complementary relationship to produce a variety of means not only for different but also com-

bined pursuits and to maximize their effectiveness and efficiency. Mutual benefits that can be drawn from the cooperation of differently enabled individuals may conglomerate with benefits that arise from their commonalities. The mutual benefits and dependence among individuals with dissimilar personalities and other conditions may incentivize them to cooperate in spite of problems their differences might induce. They may be prepared to compromise their idiosyncratic pursuits and respect the idiosyncratic pursuits of others to a certain extent as long as they expect and detect that the benefits from suppressing their idiosyncrasies or from condoning those of others exceed the detriments. The mutuality of benefits and the reduction in the expression of idiosyncrasies create commonality. Both may be encouraged by the shared interests of participants in common existential needs that necessitate or benefit from cooperation. We may further value the organizational prospects among similar individuals beyond basic commonalties.

Even if we rely on complementary contributions, we may try to access the advantages of homogeneous organization. We may want to benefit from the mutually reinforcing participation in joint enterprises with individuals who share the same goals. Commonalities, including in particularities, may make it easier to find ventures for cooperation. In addition, they facilitate mutual respect and comprehensive backing for rules and limits regarding mutual interference because individuals who share personalities and other circumstances would be subject to the same restrictions and privileges in the management of overlapping commonalities. A large fund of commonalities also provides a foundation that grants stability and repeatability to exchanges and consolidations of different contributions as well as to the reconciliation of idiosyncratic interferences. It may be essential for the cooperation by diverse interests because their complementarity may be confined to serendipitous coincidences that happen to intersect at one point or in a restricted segment of issues. Even where interests are more profoundly complementary, their coincidence is more likely to subside because of divergences in other pursuits and resulting noncomplementary differences. Even single serendipitous occurrences may fail because participants may have no basis to assume that they will obtain the desired benefit from a transaction. Unless they can be certain that their counterpart is committed to complementary behavior, they might not trust the apparent potential for benefit from a cooperative undertaking. To develop confidence that other participants adhere to the conditions of a bargain, the commitment to common purposes may be helpful. Such a commitment may be evidenced by the participants' separate or even more their common pursuit of similar values and principles expressed

in their wishes. Their confidence gains additional support if they may call on a larger shared environment of individuals with common purpose for evaluation and enforcement if irregularities arise in their relationship. But high rates of commonality among participants and their environment also create a setting in which overwhelming mutual benefits of commonalities and a credible threat of repercussions can prevent or assist to resolve violations without enforcement. Hence, there appear to be several advantages to pursuing happiness in correlation with individuals who display similar needs and manners of pursuit.

Because both similarities and differences may impart positive as well as negative connotations, their arrangement to yield positive results may require complex considerations. We may consider that such considerations are mostly reserved to humans. We can observe mechanisms that arrange differences and similarities in many species. However, they appear to be largely directed by genetic programming. Individuals may apply cooperative, neutral, or competitive behavior based on their identification of similarities and distinctions with other individuals of the same species as a matter of such instinct. Some species are capable of including variations of these patterns or additional considerations of utility into their behavior. Humans appear to share and to further expand these capabilities and appear to be capable of more comprehensively founded judgments. They are able to consider a wider variety of criteria because of their mental capacities. These capacities seem to give them superior capability to ascertain whether differences and similarities are compatible, incompatible, or neutral to certain pursuits, to distinguish degrees in these correlations, and how to react to them properly. Humans and other relatively highly developed species advance other individuals because they recognize constructive similarity or complementary differences. Conversely, they exclude and take advantage of other individuals because of a finding of incompatible similarity or of conflicting differences. They behave neutral toward individuals who do not warrant either of those findings. Additionally, they might engage in competitive behavior toward other individuals of their species in spite of constructive similarities or complementary differences. They might prosecute competitive activities against counterparts with cooperative potential if cooperation has been declined or if they consider competitive strategies to be more advantageous. Beyond being motivated by the scarcity of resources, they may wish to utilize others or their resources without bestowing benefits in return. Where reciprocity does not bring sufficient benefit, there may be no reason to cooperate, to care about the existence and welfare of other individuals even if they offer constructive similarity or complementary difference.

Utilitarian considerations would be impressed by similarity or diversity solely to the extent these attend the fulfillment of our needs. They encourage us to consider other individuals either as resources, as neutral, or as detractants from our happiness. We would endeavor to create circumstances that maximize the benefit we extract from others by any means possible. We would be free to use cooperation and competition according to our assessment of effectiveness and efficiency. If other individuals follow the same type of considerations and activity, the resulting interaction may reflect the entire range of available competitive and cooperative strategies. This would lead to relational structures and processes in which participants would be under pressure to perform cooperatively to the sufficient benefit of others to avoid competitive action. But the insecurity of such an approach may discourage them from attempting cooperation and have them focus on offensive and defensive competition. Then again, participants in a society that is exclusively regulated by utility might eventually realize that offensive and defensive strategies create instability and strife that limit the success of competitive strategies. They might overwhelmingly understand that they would find more success in voluntary exchanges of contributions instead of trying to exclude or exploit others against their will or by manipulation. By reasoning alone, humans might come to the conclusion that they can benefit from protecting and supporting mutuality, cooperative counterparts, and a system that enables cooperation.

Some genetic instincts appear to favor cooperation over competition with other individuals as well. Humans and other highly developed species are programmed to recognize assisting qualities in other individuals concerning their pursuits and to pursue interests cooperatively with them. Individuals are disposed to organize in a society with other individuals for such purposes. Acquired traits may reinforce and add detail to such genetic directions. The source by which we are motivated to cooperate appears to be the instinctive equivalent of rational insight. Natural selection seems to favor genetic and acquired modulations that exhibit cooperative tendencies in particular areas of conduct over those displaying competitive behavior. That may not be obvious because competitive forces might win in competitive confrontations with cooperative forces. Yet, to succeed, competitive forces must become cooperative among one another and with their victims, thereby causing their conceptual and actual defeat. Competitive ways also expose them to the typical problems of competition that weaken them and render them prone to fail. Ultimately, cooperative forces will unavoidably prevail because they do not carry the encumbrances of competition and because of their effectiveness and efficiency advantages.

One instinctive mechanism that conditions us to cooperate is emotional identification. Empathy with others is based on our recognition of commonalities with them. It precludes us from engaging in acts that might harm other humans, and it encourages us to engage in acts that advance them. In that direction, it might appear to be coextensive or merge with our need for collective survival and thriving. But it appears that our need for collective survival and thriving would also exist if we had no empathy. The interest we pursue with our need for collective survival and thriving is only partly that we avoid the pain of others or partake in their happiness by emotional transfer. Our objectives are mostly the continuing and prospering of our shared essence through them. Their pain and pleasure are indicators of how well the objectives are being met. Empathy appears to be independent of these objectives. It is a comprehensive mechanism by which pain and pleasure that other humans feel with regard to any need for which we share emotional capacity transfer to us. Regardless of the fulfillment status of our needs, we feel a transferred status of the needs of others regarding our needs. This transfer affects our fulfillment state similar to how we sense fear of deprivation or anticipation of fulfillment. The sourcing in others may make our assistance to eliminate their pain or bring them pleasure appear to be selfless. Nevertheless, even if we are purely directed in our protection and support of others by empathy, we try to escape from the pain that we sense about their suffering or to increase our pleasure through their happiness. In benefiting others, we are still guided by the motivation to fulfill our needs. That assessment applies even clearer with regard to our need to advance collective survival and thriving because of its explicit objective. We succeed in the fulfillment of this need by securing the fulfillment of other humans' needs. Thus, our empathic desires and our need for collective survival and thriving represent selfish motivations. Our instinctive compulsions to cooperate also benefit more obviously selfish objectives in needs that depend on or can benefit from mutual interaction. Here, the selfishness of our motivations to promote others is more transparent because we seek to benefit from their response. Promoting them might only appear like a genuine objective because mutuality may be initiated by instinct without demand and because offers of mutuality might be mistaken for an act regarding our need for collective survival and thriving or empathy. All actions to assist others are then geared to assist ourselves.

Although we may acknowledge a utilitarian aspect of our reactions to empathy, we may doubt the usefulness of empathy for our individual or collective survival and thriving. We may hence attempt to distinguish utilitarian attraction from empathic attraction. One differ-

ence seems to be that utilitarian attraction may be based on similar or complementary properties as our needs may require. We may develop utilitarian attraction to individuals who might or actually assist in the fulfillment of our needs. Although we may be instinctively attracted to the utility of means, much of the utilitarian attraction we feel seems to involve a higher level of rational reflection that determines their utility. Empathy may appear comparatively primitive in its mere requisite of indications of emotional similarity. We may mistrust its undifferentiated method to establish cooperation. We might claim that empathy does not hold any utility for us that utilitarian attraction, particularly our need for collective survival and thriving, would not already comprise. It appears to burden us with the emotions of others in multiplication of our set of emotions. We appear to be subjected to it not because sensing it or reacting to it advances our needs but because our recognition of similarity forces a transfer of emotions. This might lead us to suggest that empathy is a purposeless and possibly detrimental phenomenon. We may believe that the empathic transfer of pain from others burdens our emotional state excessively because it is indiscriminate. Our need for collective survival and thriving, on the other hand, only conditionally opens us to sense pain about the pain of others if its causes encroach on the objective of serving human survival and thriving. We may therefore consider it to be more apt compared to the undifferentiating transfer that empathy imposes. The benefit that empathy confers on us vicariously if others succeed may be hard to dismiss. Still, joyful empathy might strike us as relatively undramatic, keeping with a sense of normality while painful empathy seems to be more intense. We may claim that we would incur more pleasure through our need for collective survival and thriving because of its more focused purpose. The perceived imbalance of empathy may add to a perceived natural imbalance of a reality that seems to be dominated by pain. We might not be able to cope with this additional burden of pain, particularly because we are usually less capable to abate it than our own pain. Further, mingling the pain of others with our pain might confuse us and make us relent on the pursuit of our needs. We might also deem assistance to others a matter of discretion based on our needs, our individual reconciliation, and a reconciliation of our needs with others. Yet empathy seems to bypass that discretion and compel us indiscriminately to help others because we indiscriminately share their pain.

Such arguments must be weighed against benefits empathy can confer. Its support of mutuality and particularly of our need for collective survival and thriving may be greatly helpful in the pursuit and fulfillment of human needs before humans have achieved full awareness

of their needs and of the utility of cooperation. Further, after initially compelling us to engage in cooperation and demonstrating the superiority of cooperation over competition to our burgeoning mind, empathy appears to offer continuing assistance. It can stabilize mutuality against the irritations of faults and interferences after we have found individual and collective reconciliation and after a cooperative society has been established. It appears to form a critical general instinct that emboldens us in our commitment to a comprehensive cooperation. In this function, it seems to establish an effective counterweight to competitive impulses that might resurface. It also appears to be uniquely qualified to help counteract the urge of engaging in destruction upon frustration by its unconditional mandate of protecting and supporting other humans. Beyond that, it carries indicative properties concerning the wisdom of human activities or the effects of independent events that might be invaluable in making us review and if necessary correct our conduct. Empathy may then emerge as an agent that significantly assists in the establishment and the maintenance of cooperation.

The pervasive involvement of empathy and the more direct aspects of utilitarian attraction in our cooperative relationship with other humans suggest that they relate to motivations of the highest importance. They seem to shape the basic instinct of our tribal attitudes. We might designate the resulting tribal attitudes and their constituent attractions toward other individuals as love. Our tribal solidarity with other humans commands us to treat them as we would treat ourselves in their position and possibly to give their benefit preference over our own. Such an overriding motivation seems to expose us to significant risk not only as a direct consequence of our activities. Others to whom we extend our tribal care might not reciprocate. They might spurn us and take advantage of us by that failure to reciprocate while we expose ourselves to a potential inability of behaving defensively toward them. Our traits may declare misgivings about incurring this risk. They may counsel us against opening our pursuits to include others on emotional terms. They may pressure us to limit our exposure by restricting our tribal attitudes to occasions we have determined to be advantageous. They may also continue to incite motivations to make us act and react according to their offensive competitive impulses or according to their destructive impulses when they become impeded. Tribal attitudes and our competitive and destructive impulses may interact in a mode that transcends particular needs to govern our general attitude. Their combined direction establishes whether and to what extent we decide to include other humans into our protection and support or to pursue offensive competitive or other destructive strategies against them.

Tribal inclusion drives us to care for the survival and wellbeing of individuals we include. We would feel obligated to protect and support them. If our sense for mutuality, our need for collective survival and thriving, and our empathy are underdeveloped, we might reserve the most intense tribal inclusion to our family, our friends, and specific love interests. Utilitarian considerations may weaken in relation to individuals with whom we are less involved in our pursuits and reduce our tribal emotions to mere empathy. Even empathy may decline if we do not possess sufficient awareness of other individuals or do not have sufficient contact with them to personally confirm commonalities. We may further allow apparent dissimilarities to obstruct our recognition or appreciation of commonalities. With this attenuation of empathy, competitive impulses, including negative effects of our tribal instincts may turn against other humans. The negative tribal effects may be reinforced by utilitarian and empathic attraction toward individuals we include in our tribe. These positive effects may delineate tribal boundaries beyond which we are likely to apply competitive strategies.

Outward tribal approaches may be motivated by fear. They may therefore take a defensive or preemptive stance. In addition, our drive to improve the fulfillment of our needs may have us consider the utility of resources outside the boundaries of our tribe. While some might be attainable from humans outside our tribe by offensive competition, we may find that they can be more effectively and efficiently obtained through cooperation. We may also find that some resources can only be gained through cooperation. We may realize that there is no inherently cogent reason to assume different modes of pursuit. Either way, the establishment of competitive and cooperative dependences on individuals past the traditional boundaries of our tribe for the provision of means may expand our tribal concepts. It may reflect a general intent of securing our interests in persons who benefit us or possess the potential of benefiting us recurrently. The protection and support of such individuals are justifiable merely on account of their utility in the production for our happiness. We may rationally acknowledge that we must give benefits to others as a condition to obtaining benefits from them and that the quality and quantity of the benefits we derive from them depends on how we handle them. Utilitarian attraction may already recommend the same activities or may be informed and shaped by our rational insights. It may also overrule rational assessments and issue conflicting instructions whether or to what extent to protect and support others. Yet both emotional and rational influences may motivate us to transcend a purely competitive approach. Although we may restrict activities of other individuals and take advantage of their pro-

duction, our protection and support of them display an aspect of cooperation that distinguishes itself from a competitive attitude. While such a relationship might be exclusively motivated by utilitarian considerations or emotions, it may serve as an initial stage of inclusion into our tribe. It gives rise to dynamics that work toward an inclusive attitude. As we intensify our dealings with other individuals because of their utilization, we cannot help being exposed to impressions of similarity. These impressions and the resulting identification with individuals with whom we are or we expect to be in a utilitarian relationship generate empathy. That empathy represents an additional cause to include others into our tribe and to protect and support them. Our tribal instinct may attach itself differently depending on the extent and on the type of utility of other individuals, their willingness to have us use them, and the range of commonalities they display. The attachment of tribal instinct may differ with our personality, our other mental facilities, our experiences, the state of our satisfaction, the availability of resources, as well as the qualities of others relating to such states. Positive features may be countermanded by criteria that indicate disparity or missing assistance for our pursuits. These criteria may be grounded on competitive attitudes or reactions or a lack of complementary dissimilarities or beneficial commonalities. Although empathy focuses on commonalties irrespective of utility, its judgments may be clouded by adversity that reflects on our utilitarian attraction. In consequence of these factors, the willingness to include others into our tribe, the intensity and scope of inclusion, and its stability may vary extensively.

Despite a tribal extension of our protection and support to other individuals, our relationship with them might continue to incorporate competitive aspects. The object of our commitment may not be a voluntary participant in generating means for us. To render such a relationship cooperative, the commitment to include others into a tribal mechanism has to be mutual. Achieving that is conditioned upon the free determination by every participant whether and how much to cooperate. To engender each other's voluntary protection and support, the participants have to pass each other's qualification requirements. The criteria of mutual qualification might not have to arise from currently existing relationships of protection and support. They might be based on gratitude for the past provision of benefits. They can also be forward-looking based on recognized potential. Once candidates to a cooperative relationship find sufficient assurances that they have benefited or will benefit from the protection and support of others, they may commit to protect and support these individuals in return. Such principles of mutuality seem to apply to any cooperative undertaking.

But a tribal form of organization intensifies the principle of mutuality because it is not only supported by the attraction to each other's contributions and possibly to the source of such contributions for purposes of a direct reciprocity in form of an exchange. It distinguishes itself by introducing an additional motivation for protection and support of other individuals that satisfies our needs in a more indirect manner.

This manner of pursuit and fulfillment is based on our mechanisms of empathy and our need for collective survival and thriving and its subordinated constituent needs. To subsist, a system founded upon empathy and the need for collective survival and thriving requires mutuality of protection and support as well. Yet its particular type of mutuality does not necessarily require the receipt of explicit benefits by benefactors in return. It permits the correlation of activities to spread among the entirety of participants. In such a system, the mutuality of benefits flowing to benefactors is implicit in the beneficial effect that the activities of benefactors and the consequences they engender have on beneficiaries. The awareness of benefiting particular humans or the survival and thriving of our species by protecting and supporting other individuals constitutes a part of and maybe all of the sought fulfillment of these motivations. Reciprocal actions by beneficiaries may not be required to convey a sufficiently valid impression of mutuality. The mutuality of benefit may be returned through constructive application of conferred benefits by beneficiaries. Nevertheless, such a protection and support of other individuals might only be sustainable if benefactors receive some protection and support as well, albeit possibly from other sources. Moreover, comprehensive care on the basis of empathy and our need for collective survival and thriving requires that beneficiaries engage in turn in behavior that benefits other individuals. That allows principles of mutuality to be practiced in a free form by which each member unconditionally seeks to benefit other members, resulting in an overall system of mutual support. This type of free-form mutuality may be reinforced by similar emotions of more proximate utilitarian attraction felt by members of the society generally because they stand to receive unconditional support and protection if they are willing to extend equivalent cooperation to other members. The receipt of unconditional benefits may trigger impulses and considerations of unconditional mutuality in beneficiaries toward other members and the society based on gratitude and an intent to provide contributions that perpetuate such conditions. The comprehensive mutuality in excess of specific reciprocities that empathy and our need for collective survival and thriving inspire qualify such an arrangement as a superior mechanism for the survival and thriving of its participants and our species.

However, such altruistic motivations may be subjected to pressure by needs that carry more immediate orientations. Needs that focus primarily on our individual survival and thriving and the survival and thriving of those closest to us may overcome a more inclusive advancement of mutuality, empathy, and our need for collective survival and thriving. They may convince us to consider the expenditure of resources for the benefit of individuals outside their purview as a detraction and a waste. Unless we receive sufficient resources back to cover the requirements of our needs without loss, these needs may be in opposition to the support or protection of other individuals. They might not even tolerate such a foray for fear of failure. They may insist that we hold resources back and that we employ them toward a more narrowly defined class of beneficiaries or us. Such restrictions in our protection and support of a society make it less likely that other members will be able to meet all of their needs or to meet them to the same degree in exercise of mutuality. This may cause them to reserve more resources for themselves as well. The mutual reservation of resources is then likely to lead to a downward spiral of withholding resources from others. The risk that such a setting could arise increases as the scarcity of resources increases. When our resources become scarce, immediate demands on us grow, or we encounter exigent circumstances, we may tighten criteria of solidarity. If we perceive that our pursuits may suffer because of our assistance to others or that we might only be able to assist a limited number of demands, we may raise the criteria for determining who deserves our assistance or deserves it the most. In such situations, we may feel less allegiance to those individuals we can distinguish as being of less utility to us or less like us than others. We reduce the scope of our protection and support by increasing qualifying criteria of utility and empathy. Together with the pressure to achieve our requirements for resources in an environment of scarcity, the resulting exclusion from mutual protection and support may imperil cooperative behavior and give way to competitive strategies. In an environment with scarce resources, limited empathy, and limited utilitarian attraction, the risk of competitive deterioration seems pervasive.

To counter these damaging developments, cooperative societies often consider it necessary to supplement the internal mechanisms of empathy and of utilitarian attraction with external regulation and enforcement. This direction might be required to prevent members from deteriorating into competitive activities and to forestall the disintegration of constructive societal structures and processes. Members might therefore consent to a regime that prescribes and proscribes behavior. However, unless formal and informal rules manage to accurately stip-

ulate and enforce deportment as if it were motivated by empathy and utilitarian attraction, they will remain inadequate. They may be incapable of preventing members from reducing their mutual support and protection and defining parochial allegiances that discriminate against other members. To maintain a system with some cooperative features, rules may tolerate selective mutuality and leave room for exclusionary and possibly for predatory schemes and effects. Devising an order that could entirely prevent us from acting competitively may not be possible without divesting participants of their liberty. The supervisory and enforcement devices that would have to be developed and maintained to impose effective control might impart as much damaging potential for members' pursuits as the iniquities they are tasked to address. Accordingly, to be successful, a cooperative commonwealth must be able to rely on the will of its members to cooperate motivated by empathy and utilitarian attraction. It must further be able to trust that empathic considerations and the need for collective survival and thriving will be robust enough to supplant or supplement mutuality considerations if narrowly defined utility concerns should advocate the withdrawal of protection and support from one another as more advantageous.

It might appear unrealistic to hope for such a setting. The traditional prevalence of competitively dominated systems and the natural human competitive propensities from which they arise constitute formidable and persistent forces. On the other hand, we may acquire solace and hope from the survival of cooperative comportment in spite of all corrupting competitive misconduct. Both types of behavior seem to have instinctive foundations, but only cooperative comportment is indispensable to satisfy a number of our needs and to maximize the contentment of our needs overall. Our powers of rational insight and our emotional inclination to include other individuals into the care of our tribe may grant us confidence that it is possible to overcome competitive tendencies and effects among the members of a society. We may believe that, with sufficient effort to understand our needs and to explore the superior capacity of a commonwealth to protect and support them, we can fashion a reconciled system of interaction and coexistence capable of optimizing the satisfaction of its participants. We may further realize that there is no valid reason to confine such a system to members of traditionally delimited societies. The growing positive and negative mutual dependence of humans due to their development and rising proximity infuses them with utilitarian attraction to one another in proximate subjects of their pursuits. It may also be the facilitator of contact that enables emotional identification. It can assist us to lift traditional restraints that are attributable to deficiencies in interaction

as well as offensive and defensive competitive attitudes. Once humans master these deficiencies, their empathic attraction and the utilitarian attraction of their need for collective survival and thriving to all humans will become clearer. We may thus be hopeful that humanity will implement comprehensive cooperation among all its members.

Nevertheless, we may hold on to a competitive posture with regard to our nonhuman environment. We may justify that distinction with the different quality of humans compared to the rest of our environment. We may assert that merely a small part of the nonhuman resources we require can accrue to us as a matter of voluntary contributions. We may draw confirmation from the fact that most nonhuman sources do not possess the mental facilities that are required for the formation of voluntary exchanges or contributions to joint production enterprises. Even these facilities existed, we frequently must appropriate resources against the interests of nonhuman sources. Additionally, we must exclude parts of our nonhuman environment from intruding on our interests. This may lead us to conclude that competitive behavior toward our nonhuman environment is necessary. Yet, as humanity multiplies, develops, and asserts control of its surroundings, unbridled competitive strategies toward that environment become hard to justify. As we extend our reach and transform it by using greater diversities and amounts of the resources it offers and excluding larger and more diverse aspects of it, the requirement that we secure the availability of current and future resources for our pursuits becomes more important and possibly indispensable. Their decreasing availability in direct and indirect consequence of our uses and exclusions calls for an alteration of our behavior. It recommends to us to enter into a cooperative relationship with our nonhuman environment and with one another in its treatment. Our present and potential future dependence on known as well as possibly unknown resources may cause us to increase our protection of them against human and nonhuman interference and to actively support their continued presence or regeneration. For that purpose, we may have to expand our skills to detect and shape conditions that positively or negatively affect the availability of such resources.

Thus, rational considerations alone counsel us to extend cooperative demeanor beyond humans to our more extended environment and to only employ unmitigated competitive strategies where they are unavoidable because of our existential requirements. This may involve that we would still have to take a largely competitive approach toward nonhuman resources, but that we would continually act cooperatively toward them to make our exploitation of them sustainable. It may also mean that we maintain a reservation for excluded resources for even-

tual future use. Our preparedness to contribute to that sustainability and preservation may be slow to develop. We might not recognize the implications of individual activities or their correlations in forming effects. Even if we do, we may not practice sufficient discipline to ignore our competitive instincts and to act cooperatively toward our environment. We may have difficulties practicing self-control if we can secure advantages by competitive behavior and if we might be able to escape proximate or perhaps any repercussions. We may brush aside deferred negative outcomes because of our focus on immediate needs and benefits. We may be content to manage our pursuits in a way that permits us to continue unabated until the deterioration of resources forces us to address deleterious consequences for us or for others. We may not mind assignments of benefits overproportionally to us and detriments to others. While we may take care not to incur negative reactions from contemporaries that could hurt us, we may not mind burdening future generations. Even if we have resolved our direct competitive attitudes toward other humans, we may undertake to support our abuse against rational and emotional insights or indications. We may try to deny evidence that our conduct unnecessarily, gravely, and possibly irreversibly destroys resources. Where our progression of destruction becomes undeniable, we may propose that our abuse is necessary to sustain our existence, only transient until we find a solution, and that our technological evolution will bring timely relief. Even if we comprehend that humanity must find alternative solutions, we may assert that our protective and supportive behavior alone will not have a decisive positive impact or that our continued disregard alone will not have a decisive negative impact. We may decline to admit that such an attitude by all participants may prevent a resolution and further aggravate the problem. We may reject forgoing competitive techniques only to have their benefits picked up by others who continue to practice such strategies. We may lament the absence of a comprehensive coordination but may remain unwilling to decisively pursue such a coherence. Such subterfuges may inflict serious and possibly existential damage because they defer a response and render remediation less effective or efficient.

Despite the problems that subterfuges cause, they reveal a conditional understanding and readiness to engage in cooperative protection and support of our nonhuman environment. It might be possible to activate us if we are presented with irrefutable factual foundations that confirm the combined effects of competitive behavior against our nonhuman environment and inspire avenues for coordinated responses. However, even if we should summon sufficient rational insight regarding the errors of our competitive ways, we might still lack motiva-

tion to adjust them. Our competitive insolence toward our nonhuman environment may be so entrenched in our genetic and acquired traits that we may have difficulties to profoundly change our behavior by rational insight alone. To replace our ingrained competitive inclinations, we may have to expand our rational basis for cooperative inclinations with features that are rooted in empathy and intrinsically cooperative needs. Such an expansion seems to require some mental restructuring. Our collective reconciliation with humans is fundamentally advanced by needs that demand the extending of emotional resources by counterparts, including through their voluntary supplying of nonemotional resources, our bond with them as representatives of the species whose survival and thriving we strive to assure as our most important need, and empathy. These components seem to be mostly missing in our relationship with our nonhuman environment. Beyond the deficiency of voluntary activity, missing commonalities make it hard for us to identify with nonhuman aspects enough to expand utilitarian attraction by our need for collective survival and thriving. The residual intrinsically cooperative needs and empathy may present a slightly better basis for our emotional motivation of protection and support. Yet, even in such limits, missing similarity may largely prevent emotional cooperation.

As a result, we may sense no or few emotional requirements to care for or to promote nonhuman features of our environment unless we derive benefit in the remaining array of our needs that can benefit from our nonhuman environment. That array is mostly reduced to the acquisition of nonemotional resources from nonhuman features, with the exception of emotional resources we autonomously generate from fulfilling any type of need. There may be exceptions to such a mindset regarding animals in whose behavior we recognize or deem to recognize humanlike qualities that enable us to engage in relationships that we customarily reserve for humans. There may also be a more abstract sense of emotional benefit we may develop from our nonhuman environment by impressions of beauty and harmony. However, such relationships may overall be uncharacteristic for human attitudes toward nonhuman surroundings. Because of our inability to derive emotional resources from cooperating with such surroundings, our utilitarian attraction to their nonemotional resources may focus on the possession and control of such resources for as long as our utilitarian attraction is underdeveloped. We may neglect their protection and support beyond these immediately defined objectives. To the extent we cannot discern a requirement of cooperation to maintain or increase the utility of aspects of our nonhuman environment, we are likely to engage in willful competition toward them or disregard competitive effects on them.

While our tendency toward competitive discrimination against our nonhuman environment may be most pronounced with regard to nonliving aspects, it is also evident in our treatment of nonhuman life forms. Because differences with other life forms are greater than with humans, we may perceive less relatedness, less respect, and less compassion for them. We may therefore not be as committed in securing their survival and thriving. We may view most other life forms to be adequately remote from our nature to give ourselves permission to use them or resources they claim as our own without effective emotional boundaries. Our awareness that many living entities possess emotions may not move us much because utilitarian concerns that derive benefit from ignoring these may appear to overwhelmingly surmount their ranking. Even if we might feel faint empathy for them, it may not take much effort from other needs to overcome our reservations by imagining joys of fulfillment if we neglect empathy. We may regularly deem ourselves at liberty to ignore and neglect needs of other life forms, to exclude them from our support or care, and to exploit, abuse, displace, and annihilate them if we perceive that to be in our interest. The extensive dependence of our pursuits on nonhuman life forms may emotionally attract us to them. But this attraction may have its basis in our desire to have them available for our competitive pursuits. To advance that objective, we may assist them. Still, our sole purpose in this cooperation appears to be their eventual competitive exploitation.

As our ability of exploring the workings of our nonhuman environment and of manipulating its objects, components, and basic elements grows more powerful, we may regard ourselves free to use that power to our benefit without any limit. The existence or status of our nonhuman environment may carry for us no independent legitimacy, no value of its own. We may deem its existence and thriving only relevant to the extent it can help us to fulfill our needs as a tool. Given the focus that our needs force us to take, that may not appear to be objectionable. However, without suitable circumspection, this focus threatens to become competitive because it is missing the supporting incentives that are issued by our inherently cooperative needs and by empathy. These motivations appear indispensable to secure human cooperation at this stage of human development. They may be even more required to impart and uphold cooperation in our relationship with our nonhuman environment because its dissimilarity liberates us instinctively to exert competition. As we use our environment more intensely and completely, the fallout of that abuse threatens us. We may not be able to afford giving in to our competitive instincts until our utilitarian, nonemotional attraction becomes strong enough to dissuade us.

Dissimilarity appears to pose a significant obstacle for the satisfaction of needs that demand the provision of emotional resources by counterparts because of a lack of voluntary activity and lack of translation. Even empathy and a need for collective survival and thriving appear to be largely out of place. Notwithstanding, there are indications that we do entertain a connection to our nonhuman environment that transcends narrowly defined utilitarian attachments. This becomes evident in our usage of anthropomorphic terms in describing properties and tendencies of our nonhuman surroundings. To the extent we can recognize similarities in other life forms, the extension of those terms may be genuinely warranted because we might be dealing with similar physical structures and processes. These similarities may deliver some basis for an emotional identification that may grow in its importance. Additional hope may be warranted because anthropomorphic attributions are not restricted to living aspects. We extend them to nonliving objects and processes. Although similarities in physical structures and processes seem to be rather obviously farfetched with respect to naturally occurring nonliving objects and events, we tend to attribute emotional attitudes to them. We tend to view their affinity, attraction, and repulsion, their willingness or reluctance to act, react, inhibit, or facilitate, and their stability or volatility as behavior displaying emotional characteristics. We tend to interpret aspects of nature to be aggressive or peaceable, hostile or friendly, capricious or dependable. We ascribe to them cooperative or competitive character depending on how they relate to the satisfaction of our needs or the perceived needs of other entities or aspects of nature. In drawing parallels to us and our needs, we seem to conclude that the natural tendencies of an object or event are expressions of its personality and constitute the pursuit of a need. We seem to surmise that such an object or event is dissatisfied when its propensities are unfulfilled and satisfied when they are fulfilled.

That may represent a reasonable hypothesis in trying to explain the demeanor of living entities, at least until we discover that they do not behave consistent with a pain-pleasure mechanism. But introducing the concept of happiness into the nonliving features of our environment seems implausible under that criterion because the underlying foundations that produce emotions appear to be missing. We may regard the attribution of personalities to nonliving phenomena as figurative speech or a product of childlike ignorance and imagination by our ancestors. While it might linger in our language, we may maintain that we have stopped to believe that nonliving objects and events have emotions. Hence, there does not appear to be a chance for emotional identification with them. This has given us apparent license to use our

nonliving environment without scruples. Even if we had strong cooperative bonds to humanity and our living environment and were interested in furthering our and their objectives, such a radical competitive attitude toward our nonliving environment may have devastating consequences. The unreconciled exclusion and exploitation of our nonliving environment may induce exhaustion and spoilage of resources we need. If we did not care for these resources, we and the subjects of our cooperative emotional bonds might have to first suffer from the consequences before we would start cooperating with our nonliving environment. This delay may cause possibly irreversible damage.

In the development of a cooperative relationship with our nonhuman environment, we are supported by its fundamental conditions. Utilitarian considerations may give us a semblance of emotional identification because we must accommodate the needs of living entities if we want to use them for or keep them from interfering with our purposes. Further, securing the fulfillment of our needs requires that we become aware of the natural tendencies of our nonliving environment and arrange our pursuits in correlation with them. Living entities may be open to some influence to make their requirements more compatible with effectiveness and efficiency management. Similarly, nonliving aspects can be adjusted to our needs. Yet both may resist adjustments that would interfere with characteristics essential to their nature. The complex systems that living entities are and build pose constraints for impositions. Our nonliving environment may seem to offer more flexibility, but that may be because we may use it at lesser levels of complexity. Still, while we might learn to contain, suppress, avoid, trigger, scale, and use its tendencies, we might be incapable of controlling its underlying substance or its behavior. Our living environment joins in these features when it is reduced to its nonliving components. The basis of living aspects in nonliving aspects suggests that they are essentially indistinguishable. Because of that fundamental identity, it might seem logical to apply similar considerations to nonliving and living aspects of our nonhuman environment. We might not acknowledge that allocation of nonliving substances into living entities requires or offers different conditions of interaction. That humans are constituted in the same fashion might not persuade us otherwise. We may deem them to be of a dissimilar quality due to advanced development and imaginary independent, intangible properties. We may consider most or all other living features of our environment to be sufficiently close to its nonliving foundations to segregate their treatment. If we did not already believe in such differences, we might invent them to justify variances between our attitude toward humans and our nonhuman environment.

Difficulties in justifying such a differentiation may induce us to question its legitimacy. However, regardless of this differentiation, the conditions nature provides impose limits for our competitive activities and compel cooperation. They also engender emotional consequences for us that motivate us to cooperate. In our relationship with humans, our fear of defensive and offensive competitive acts by other humans may provide an effective emotional incentive to cooperate with them. That incentive seems to be increasingly missing as we develop and understand that nature proceeds by substances and principles and not by a mind that would be capable of forming a competitive intent. Yet our accommodation of natural tendencies may suggest an emotional basis for cooperation because it resembles how we must treat other humans if we want them to cooperate. The requirement by our nonhuman environment that we respect its properties if we want to profit from it or prevent it from intruding into our pursuits resembles a demand for respect that humans might make. This may cause us to view nonhuman nature and its particularizations as anthropomorphic entities. That attitude may grow as we increase our knowledge of and resulting interaction with them and become aware of sophistication in them that exceeds our capabilities. It also may grow in consequence of our nonemotional utilitarian considerations that cause us to protect or support nonhuman resources to the extent we consider our use of them to be endangered or capable of development. That we may give nonhuman resources on which we prey or circumstances that we disturb time and opportunity to regenerate or aggregate and may take care not to disturb aspects we might use later resembles demeanor we would display if we had empathy and were motivated by our intrinsically cooperative needs. Further, using the results of our protection and support implies a setting of mutuality even if that use is competitive. The more we engage such strategies to maximize our competitive benefit, the more it may resemble a comprehensive mutuality with nonhuman nature. The similarity of our experiences and behavior patterns regarding our nonhuman environment to the more comprehensive relationship that we entertain with humans may induce us to fill missing emotional aspects to match a comprehensive ideal. That may not be undertaken by way of our conscious decision. Rather, perceptive, rational, and behavioral matches may activate emotions without and even against our will.

Since emotional identification founded on such functional similarities and complementarities heavily relies on at least partial utilitarian attraction, it may not contribute much at the beginning to the development of cooperation with our nonhuman environment. But there appears to be an additional source that might assist us in that phase. It

arises from the independence of our nonhuman environment as well. The same features that might impress us by their resistance to our efforts and their sophistication additionally astonish us when they work in our favor. The existence and coincidence of substances, principles, and nonliving and living amalgamations of them that produced us and provided all resources that are already in the form of means or permit us to shape them into means typify us as beneficiaries. We have been given everything we are and can achieve. Our awareness of this grace may have fundamental emotional effects on us. The conferring of benefits by other humans on us without a negotiated return benefit is typically a sign of empathy or a sign of a more broadly defined caring according to their need for collective survival and thriving. We may infer similar intentions when we benefit from our nonhuman environment. This inference appears difficult to make because a voluntary provision of resources seems to be missing in situations where we must fight for the fulfillment of our needs. In our dealings with humans, we construe adversity to our pursuits as a lack of empathy on their part and their exclusion of us from their need for collective survival and thriving. We may have trouble interpreting the adversities posed by our nonhuman environment differently. Only as we consider our circumstances more intensely may we comprehend how fortunate we are to have our existence and the existence of our nonhuman environment and that many shortcomings we might bemoan are the result of human activity or inaction. Weighed against favorable conditions, adversities by our nonhuman environment might seem less significant even if they hurt us.

Apparently, the overwhelming majority of nonhuman resources we access or that spare us from their interference are not issued by an object or event that can form an intent to promote us. But that an intent to assist us may not exist or that we acquire nonhuman resources against the will of some of their purveyors or without them forming a will may not fundamentally change our attitude. We may perceive the coincidental presence and assistance of resources and our capacity to acquire them as an intended gift by an entity that created us and these resources. We may even appreciate adversities as ultimately constructive contributions to our happiness because they permit us to experience a meaningful advancement between deprivation and fulfillment. From a deeper understanding that we would be unhappy if everything were presented to us, we may consider the fact that we have to appropriate and shape many of our resources as an additional, indispensable blessing. This evokes sentiments of gratefulness toward the imagined entity we deem responsible for creating and shaping our world. It may also generate a strong reaction of emotional identification in us.

This reaction arises from the conclusion that the entity that created us and favors our existence must be similar to a parent. Due to that relation, this entity must bear some similarity to us, although it would obviously have to be much more advanced and different from us to possess the powers we deem to witness. That notion of similarity may be reinforced if we assume the reason for our favorable conditions to be empathy by the creating entity, because empathy originates from the recognition of commonalities. We may also presume that the creative entity is emotionally attracted to us as means for its pursuits. We may interpret our state of superior advancement over other aspects of creation as evidence of our leading function in the source's plan. We may even infer that it senses a need for survival and thriving through the world it created and particularly through us as intended beneficiaries and apparent instruments in the development of its creation. Together with the comprehensive character and existential importance of our gifts, these notions may activate a strong response of comprehensive mutuality in us that includes all emotional aspects involved in a parent-child relationship. In extension of our perception of a creative entity as a parent, we may regard the commonality of sourcing with our nonhuman environment from that parent as a sibling relationship. We may further consider that everything we perceive would have to be or have been a part of the entity by which it was created. These considerations may cause us to feel universal mutuality, empathy, and possibly a need to secure collective survival and thriving with regard to our entire environment no matter how remote its aspects might be to us.

Such impressions may give rise to a strong sense of tribal inclusion and of responsibility toward our nonhuman environment and its imaginary source until the development of our utility contemplations catches up and beyond. To the extent we continue competitive strategies, we may rationalize our demeanor as authorized. Yet that support is limited because we cannot engage in competitive demeanor against subjects we include in our tribe without incurring pain. This pressures us to curb or end our competitive strategies. But that may be difficult or impossible if we cannot locate adequate replacements for competitively derived resources. In addition, tribal inclusion of our nonhuman environment would require us to permit it shared access to resources we would otherwise claim for ourselves. Such accommodations seem to be in our interest because we derive benefits from them and would be unhappy if we performed differently. On the other hand, expanded tribal requirements may detract from the effectiveness or efficiency of our pursuits and tempt us to overcome tribal allegiances for the sake of utility. The next chapter probes this apparent contradiction.