

CHAPTER 29

THE INDISPENSABILITY OF COOPERATION

Competitive objectives within a society often rest upon or can benefit from cooperative support. Such cooperation may also be used to project competitive power outside the boundaries of a society. Either way, cooperation may permit competitors to maximize competitive power. Beyond that, cooperative support appears to be necessary to maintain a competitive system at any level. Competitive forces may not possess the resources to ensure that victims of domestic or foreign competition tolerate their preclusion, endure their exploitation, or continue to produce. In addition, the administration and the use of resources once they are obtained may necessitate more involvement than competitors can exert by themselves or reliably compel victims to contribute. This shortfall may call for them to motivate some of their victims or independent parties to become agents that help to devise and apply their strategies. Such agency may be incentivized by their sharing of some of their power and rewards of domination. Even an ascension into the ruling class of a competitive domain might appear indicated to reward extraordinary service or reinforce the ruling class. On the other hand, establishing criteria by which ascension can be earned as a right endangers the continued profitability and power of its antecedent membership. Hence, ascension must remain discretionary and rare.

Competitors might find sufficient support by offering positions of relative privilege without sharing ultimate power. But maintaining such support without sharing too much power may require a difficult balancing. Ruling competitors have to provide sufficient privileges to supporters to ensure their loyalty. Yet they cannot attribute so much privilege to supporters that these become competitive threats. Even if rewards are carefully measured, a program that attributes privilege for service undermines the competitive purity of a competitive system. It replaces competition at least in part with a cooperative approach. This cooperative approach may strengthen the grip of the ruling class on its subjects. However, it also weakens its position because it has to cooperate with supporters in return for their cooperation. Its deputation of supporters to undertake its business unavoidably assigns positions of relative power to such supporters. While the scattering of that power among many individuals may create some safety for competitive rulers, a decentralization may endanger rulers' power as well. It may isolate them and render them dependent. As supporters build and maintain the authority of competitive rulers, they progressively become its source. Before long, supporters might try to assert that power against

competitive rulers and might demand a larger segment of the spoils or more governing influence or they might attempt to exercise the position they hold for their own benefit. This menace may cause competitive rulers to control their supporters tighter than subjects in general. Competitive support personnel is therefore regularly hierarchically organized. The hierarchic structure of competitive organization may assist to suppress adverse tendencies. But it may also provide the structure for them to become successful. Individuals close to the top may be able to depose or dominate competitive rulers, particularly if they organize cooperatively. They may be prone to undertake such an overthrow since they obviously partake in the rulers' competitive attitudes. Moreover, the cooperative organization of support down the chain of command may produce a basis for an overthrow. Supporters may each only contribute a small part and hold only an insignificant portion of power. Notwithstanding, together, they may be able to wield considerable and potentially decisive power. In either event, the cooperative mode instituted by shared governance presents a peril for competitive rulers. To counteract that peril, they may supervise and strictly discipline cooperation and emulate cooperative functions by hierarchic order. To limit the accrual and consolidation of power in leading agents, competitive rulers may disperse it, place themselves into the center of its exercise, and make agents' tenure temporary or discretionary.

Instead of or in addition to using a strictly organized hierarchy of agents, competitors may engage agents that operate or have the appearance of operating autonomously, at least in their immediate activities. Dominant competitors may support the endeavors of such subordinated competitors because this may allow them to delegate competitive activities in contact with victims. This agency of subordinated competitors distinguishes itself from an agency of direct supporters by the subordinated competitors' seeming independence that permits the dominant competitor to remain in the background. Weaker competitors may be voluntarily conscripted for such an arrangement because they expect to benefit from their association. They may also offer their services to forestall becoming competitive victims to a more thorough degree. They may purchase continuing existence, protection, support, and relative freedom by cooperating with competitive rulers. The deputation of competitors imparts the possibility of providing dominant competitors with several advantages. For one, costs of delegated competition may be apportioned to deputies because sustaining their system will serve their own interest. Assistance can be limited to closing remaining discrepancies in competitive capacity, possibly after or with the help of other deputies. Further, the use of deputies reduces risk in

a variety of ways. They might be able to exercise competitive strategies with more intensity and less compromise than dominant competitors might be able or willing to maintain directly. Deputies might be more effective and efficient because they may be better versed in precluding and exploiting targeted victims or because their competitive governance might meet with fewer objections from victims. If victims of delegated competition resist, their suppression might be generally left to deputies, thus sparing dominant competitors risks and costs related to direct confrontation. Even if dominant competitors had to become directly involved to rescue a delegate regime, they might be able to focus on innocuous aspects of support that permit their deputies to address aspects that are more controversial. If victims of delegated governance should succeed in their opposition, resulting losses and costs can be better contained by denying or severing involvement with losing deputies and establishing relations with their successors. This possibility of abandonment may also place additional pressure on current deputies to conform. Competitive delegation may further evoke fewer objections in the immediate setting of dominant competitors and permit them to conceal competitive activities to avoid objections. It may not only be preferred by them for the organization of a system that involves inward competition. It may be particularly desirable for forces who wish to project competitive practices beyond the confines of their system. Outwardly dominant competitors who are inwardly competitive as well may produce enhanced stability for their system by easing competitive pressure on domestic subjects for production or for assistance in the pursuit of outward competition and possibly by sharing receipts from delegated competition with them. Similarly, domestically cooperative systems that compete abroad may benefit by easing the pressure of cooperative engagement in production and outward competition and sharing receipts from delegated outward competition.

Besides cooperating with competitive representatives, competitive interests may cooperate on a more lateral level. That cooperation may happen within the same competitive system or span different systems, including those that only employ competitive strategies outside their boundaries. Within a society, competitive interests may associate for particular tasks, form a more enduring association or combination for particular competitive activities, or compose a comprehensive competitive class. Cooperation may happen among competitors of different or the same levels and with the same or differing degrees of inclusiveness. Similar cooperation may occur spanning several societies. However, intersystem cooperation may be restricted to or at least depend on approbation by ruling competitors. Cooperation among com-

petitors may be used for offensive or defensive purposes against third parties. They may coordinate or join in the conduct of their campaigns or organize a collective defense against repercussions from noncompetitive victims. Further, the threat of being subjugated by other competitors or the opportunity of subjugating other competitors incentivizes competitors to enter cooperative schemes with one another. Joint offensive and defensive purposes imply that participants agree not to turn offensively against one another. Even without common purposes toward the outside, the threat of intercompetitor aggression for competitive effectiveness and efficiency as well as for their existence recommends cooperation among competitors to thwart conflicts or their escalation beyond certain points, at least if they would be unprofitable. They may therefore enter into associations in which they commit to protect one another from one another's competitive overreaching.

Associations might continue to develop until blocks of competitive powers create an environment in which the competitive engagement of members or blocks against one another would not leave much expectation of profit. More than that, such an engagement would confront members and blocks with the prospect of mutual devastation. Such conditions may incentivize competitors to largely or entirely replace competition among them with cooperation in the form of coexistence or possibly active cooperation to mutually improve their position. At the basis of the willingness by competitors to condition or renounce their competitive approach toward one another stands a cost-benefit assessment. The additional resources to be gained from certain adversaries may not be worth the risk and cost that may be imparted by them. Competitors may conclude that momentarily or for more extended periods, competition among them could unnecessarily hurt or destabilize their position. Unless the outcome of a competitive contest and its costs appear predictable and favorable, these competitors may prefer the relative safety of their current positions. They may enter into agreements to not interfere, to limit interference with one another, or at least to bind their competitive activities toward one another to rules of competition. They might further protect and support one another against internal destabilization to attain or maintain stability in their relationship, prevent a contagion from other systems, or improve their internal position as an alternative to external strategies. In an ultimate calculation of cost, risk, and benefit, they might engage in joint structures and processes or even proceed to merge completely.

Agreements among competitive forces are not limited to forces that would carry out offensive competitive practices. They also benefit parties that reserve competitive engagements for defensive objectives.

While such agreements may become of particular importance in response to associations among offensive competitors, noncompetitively oriented parties may covenant to defensively assist one another to discourage any practice of competitive overreaching. All offensive use of competition could be effectively prevented if all or a large majority of parties agreed to defend one another against competitive attack. That such an agreement has not been universally entered may demonstrate that some parties may consider themselves unilaterally or with selected affiliations strong enough to discourage attacks or that they harbor offensive competitive designs that would be impeded by such a defensive network. Defensive alliances may be a logical response to the behavior of parties that share offensive intentions or reservations. They may also prevent that victims would be forced into participating in the activities of offensive competitors. Even if there should be no direct pressure to participate, defensively oriented parties might be tempted to voluntarily join offensively oriented parties under negotiated terms to avert a more damaging takeover. However, if all defensively oriented parties organized in a pact to defend one another, they might pose a momentous counterweight to discourage offensive competitors and offensively motivated associations from targeting any of these parties. Technological, economic, and other progressions are creating a world where offensive competitors may be greatly affected by conflict. Still, they may regard conditions possible in which the benefits of offensive competition outweigh the risks and costs of attacking or threatening others. Such activities can only be barred if defensive cooperative affiliations are so pervasive that they regularly render cost-benefit assessments of offensive strategies negative or at least indeterminate. Once defensively oriented associations achieve a sufficient weight, they may enter into stalemate relationships with offensively competitive powers that resemble relationships among these powers or their associations. Together, such impasses can produce a setting where cooperation remains the only way to improve conditions for the participants.

Beyond these types of cooperation with direct agents, subordinated competitors, and further offensive or defensive competitors, cooperation also appears to be a more fundamental condition of competition. Unless competitors win resources in an outright battle, cooperation appears to form an aspect of all relationships between competitors and victims. Competitors may pressure victims into surrendering resources or access to resources by asserting a threat of enforcement. While that transfer of resources or access to them is coerced, victims usually choose to capitulate when their cost-benefit calculations are or become negative or, at the latest, when resistance becomes hopeless.

Competitors usually condition the cessation or nonapplication of force upon victims' cooperation with their instructions. By cooperating, victims avoid the possibility of even greater damage than losing the resource at issue. Similarly, competitors derive benefit because victims' cooperation may decrease the risks and costs of strife and preserve the availability of resources for future takings. For that purpose, competitors may take or bar less than they could. Competitors may therefore cooperate with victims' desires to limit the damage from their competitive behavior. They may even offer cooperation motivated by the wish to persuade victims to cooperate with less or without compulsion to lower the risks and costs of competition and improve its benefits. Yet letting victims keep possession of or access to some resources that they would already have independently alone may not induce victims' voluntary cooperation. It may additionally necessitate that they obtain an impression of mutuality. Such an impression may arise if competitors grant at least some return benefits. They may provide goods and services that are targeted to make victims relent in their objections or to render them more effective and efficient. They might further invest in cooperative ventures in excess of these measures to disguise illegitimate profits, directly control cooperative ventures, or directly partake in their growth and earnings. Accordingly, competitive forces may engage in more active varieties of cooperation than merely permitting it. Even manipulating victims into believing that they are not being subjected to competition may be considered as a category of cooperation. While it is undertaken to lessen competitors' risk and cost exposure, it limits the threat to victims as well. Hence, although victims may never know the damage they have been spared, it accommodates them.

Using cooperation under terms that adjust to manners in which victims produce might be considered a concession to victims' philosophies. But competitive powers may also try to align victims with their competitive philosophy. Although sanctioning and fostering competitive demeanor by victims may be entirely self-serving and damage victims' interests, it constitutes a cooperative concession by competitive rulers to victims' desires to exercise similar freedoms as their competitive rulers. A showing that there is a chance of rising to the profitable side of a competitive system's inequities gives victims hope that, with sufficient effort and luck, they might prevail. Even if victims are aware that they could lose to other competitors and that their status might not improve or might even deteriorate from competition, they might still be willing to engage competitively. Victims may therefore expand their cooperation from merely bearing their competitive subjection to dynamically cooperating by applying competitive methods within the

granted parameters. This cooperation may be essential for a competitive system because the potential of victims' rise in competitive status makes victims more amenable to accepting ruling competitive behavior against them. To achieve sufficient cover for rulers' activities, the potential for subjects to reap competitive advantages must be significant. But such strategies are only useful for protecting ruling competitors if the risks and costs they incur from victims' competitive practices are limited. Hence, the escalation of victims' competition must be cautiously controlled. Further, victims' possibilities of accumulation of wealth and power competitively have to be limited and their resources have to be confined to subject matters that do not materially interfere with the competitive activities reserved to the competitive rulers. Similar restrictions must be imposed on the cooperative accumulation of wealth and power that subsequently could be used competitively. To maintain the rulers' competitive edge, a competitive system must confine the potential of competition by nonruling competitors not merely against the ruling competitors but also against ruling competitors' victims. It must additionally control competition among nonruling competitors to foreclose their combination or consolidation and the emergence of combined challenges. Beyond the threat of competitive challenges, the opportunity to take advantage of nonruling competitors as competitive proxies that may allow competitive rulers to step back into more safety while providing them with competitive results counsels competitive rulers to assert control. They may install structures and procedures by which they can tax, limit, dominate, deputize, or take over competitive ventures. They may mask such measures as governance, intervention, and trusteeship on behalf of victims' interests.

Apart from directly material reasons, competitors may espouse other reasons for cooperation with their victims that are based on collateral needs. An obvious motivating factor is the coexistence of competitive rulers with victims in a society. Unless competitors manage to exist separate from a society beyond their competitive activities, they must pursue and satisfy their emotional requirements in the same environment in which they abuse victims. Because they cannot use their competitive mechanisms successfully in attaining emotional resources from others, they have to engage in cooperation to the extent of these needs. Yet obtaining such cooperation may pose a problem. The pursuit of other resources at the cost of victims carries a great risk of disaffecting them and destroying the transfer of emotional resources by them. The fear of such repercussions may cause competitors to retreat socially into their own domain of competitors, beneficiaries, and supporters. However, the impairment of competitors' endeavors by nega-

tive emotional responses from victims may not only affect needs that rely on emotional resources. In a social context, pursuits often inevitably touch upon each other in their means, settings, participants, and consequences. In addition, these pursuits are often interwoven in patterns of mutuality comprising emotional and nonemotional resources. The extension of emotional resources is often conditioned upon or influenced by a receipt of other resources. But the extension of other resources is also frequently predicated upon the nondisturbance of emotional states, or it is caused or influenced by the granting of emotional resources. Beyond that, a withholding or taking of emotional or other resources is often answered with protective, retributive, and corrective reactions that target the same as well as other types of resources.

These cooperative ground rules that seem to govern any social interchange and favor cooperation by members of a society are likely to prove irresistible for competitors who desire to attain emotional resources as members of the society in which they conduct their business. Further, they must be obeyed even if competitive rulers wish to increase or only maintain competitive profits. To obtain nonemotional resources without the costs and risks of coercion, and to maximize the quantity and the quality of their production, competitors will not only have to concede or distribute certain levels of nonemotional resources to victims. They carry the additional responsibility of stimulating the generation of emotional resources in victims that are directed toward them. Staying beneath offensive thresholds above which resources are denied poses a difficult challenge for competitors. It requires that they significantly curb competitive practices and conduct the remainder of them under circumstances that allow them sufficient cooperative cover. In addition to nonemotional mutuality and its pretenses, competitive rulers may endeavor to build a cooperative emotional connection with victims that compensates for the destabilizing effects of competitive activities. Yet simple balancing is not likely to succeed because of elaborate influences between emotional and nonemotional resources. Competitors are at continuing risk because they violate conditions of mutuality that form the legitimizing foundations for any society. Any practices past blatant exclusion and exploitation invariably draw competitors into requirements of cooperation. Once competitors commit to cooperative practices, they must integrate into a society to some extent. They lose some of their competitive influence to societal mechanisms that spring from the interdependence of human needs and pursuits. If they wish to be recognized as members of a society and operate within it, they must substantially submit to societal rules of mutuality and societal mechanisms that enforce these. The consequences of

impressions of even slight antisocial demeanor can be significant in a social environment that is based on notions of mutuality. Competitive activities against members may be answered not only by those directly affected. Other individuals may act in solidarity. This prospect causes members to live in apprehension of retribution for antisocial behavior and coerces them to comply. Social structures may then offer effective protection against competitive overreaching, including attempts from well-organized and dominant interests. These structures have the potential of matching offensive competitive determination with cooperative defensive organization. To still succeed, competitive powers must substantively cooperate with victims. Only then may they be able to cover their misdeeds by manipulating their victims into believing that they are not subjected to competitive strategies or to corrupt them to condone these in spite of their antisocial effects. However, both strategies pose dangerous potentials for derailing competitive rule.

All these complications that result from cooperation may draw its utility for competitive interests into doubt. While cooperative techniques may lend momentous support to competitive objectives, their use also generates a fundamental contradiction and it gives rise to the development potential for a formidable counterforce. Because cooperation is the conceptual antidote to competition, its infusion into competitive undertakings to keep a competitive system stable and profitable necessarily detracts from the power and wealth of competitive rulers and creates its own source of instability. The disadvantages of cooperation with victims may outweigh the advantages for some of the competitors, causing them to turn away from that strategy. They may try to forestall this threat by avoiding cooperative concessions and instead apply exploitation or exclusion without regard for victims. They may be set to unyieldingly discipline victims, eliminate resistance, and move on to other surroundings if necessary. Accordingly, one cannot assume that competitive forces will develop aspects of cooperative integration with their victims. Yet, even if competitive rulers could govern their victims by coercion alone, they exchange one reliance on cooperation with another. As a competitive system becomes more openly exclusionary and predatory, it necessitates heightened enforcement support from agents or other intermediaries. Hence, either way, competitors may not be able to achieve their objectives without obtaining and granting significant cooperative support. They may be unable to avoid the risk of cooperative compromises. Cooperation appears to be necessary to facilitate, increase, and maximize the benefits of competitive practices. The higher competitors aim, the more they will have to rely on cooperative practices and exposure to cooperative forces.

These cooperative forces stand to challenge competitive domination. The eventual demise of competitive mechanisms may be inevitable because they remain inferior to cooperative systems in producing and in administrating resources even if they use cooperative elements. As much as competitors might succeed in manipulating or coercing subjects into submission or support, any such mechanisms will eventually be tested. Foreign forces might interfere. Competitive rulers might act in ways that upset settled practices. Nonruling members of a society may develop in ways that challenge the system. Resources of the system may be damaged, threatened, or waning. The disproportionality of means that a competitive system attempts to institutionalize generates differences in the ability to cope that render the system predisposed for unsteadiness. A competitive system that maneuvers in an environment of scarcity has to contend with this inherent instability persistently and more obviously. Revelations of existential inequities may prompt underprivileged individuals to explore the causes and try to eliminate disproportional treatment. In systems with greater affluence, differences in the ability to cope may not be regularly as palpable. Yet, if resources decrease dramatically, preferences in access to them or their possession will likely show more clearly and a competitive system may reveal its noncooperative core. To manage such a crisis with relative safety, it must be temporary, competitive rulers must be wholly or relatively blameless for it, and their rule must be generally accepted. Further, competitive rulers must practice solidarity timely and sufficiently. Even if they fulfill all these conditions, they may be toppled because they may be unable to recover their preferential position after conditions improve. The populace may demand that temporary moderations in competitive impositions become permanent.

Because not all challenges and exigent circumstances that test a system can be controlled, rulers and beneficiaries of such a system can never be entirely safe. The disparities and methods of competitive systems continue to be at risk of being uncovered, fought, corrected, and avenged by victims. The leading position of competitive rulers continues to be at risk of being toppled from within their implementation structure or even from within their own ranks. These inherent risks of competitive activity arouse an undercurrent of fear. To avoid the pain and fear of reprisals and of organizational instability, competitors may choose to operate by regimes that allow them to control dissent within their ranks and among their agents and ultimate victims. Only, ostentatious security measures draw attention and antagonism and may increase the risk of being deposed. Competitive rulers may therefore minimize direct interaction with victims and lead a surreptitious ex-

istence. They may even maintain defensive wariness and distance toward their supporters and one another for fear that others might turn against them. While such measures might help them to avoid some dangers, their clandestine existence and segregation also render them vulnerable because they do not permit them to maintain control and security measures that would arouse attention. Moreover, their anti-social behavior may weaken their influence and deprive them of necessary backing and means to meet challenges. That ability may be further imperiled because all shielding efforts only have a chance if the number of competitive rulers and their beneficiaries is kept very low. Because of its effect of exchanging some threats for others, the self-imposed seclusion of competitive rulers may defeat its purpose of solidifying the position of competitive rulers. Even if this strategy should succeed, its fearful isolation may constitute a punishment in itself.

In its extreme, competitive governance may be concentrated in one person. That would obviously eliminate the risk of conflict within the ruling class. Yet it would leave ruling interests more vulnerable. Depending on the range of a domain, a certain number of competitive rulers may be helpful or necessary to exercise control. Such a governance configuration will also be common if a competitive domain has not become consolidated under one ruler and where competitive rulers engage in cooperation. Either way, implementing agents are necessary in a substantially greater number. Maintaining a competitive rule might not be feasible without close presence, control, and social connections at least in the upper ranks of supporters. That support class, in turn, must interact with ultimate victims to maintain a competitive system. Although buffering by multiple levels of agents may leave the identity and the activities of ultimate rulers widely unfamiliar, keeping them totally secret might be impossible. The best strategy for competitive rulers might be to maintain a low profile and, in the event their involvement or their activities become apparent, to make these appear as normal and legitimate as possible. To institute such a scheme, they may select a way of life, profession, or governmental organization that defensibly places them in regular contact with each other and the upper levels of agents, possibly not even with their appearance as rulers. Under this disguise, they may dispel impressions of them as a competitively ruling caste. Not even agents might be fully informed of rulers' competitive agenda or even their status as competitive rulers beyond a cover. By additionally instituting structures and processes that legitimize, plan, guide, hide, and obfuscate competitive behavior by agents, competitive rulers can further reduce ostentatious security measures. Still, competitive practices taking place through an agency are bound

to instill some semblance of a profile in the awareness of subordinated agents and ultimate victims, although it might be attributed to agents and these might be mistakenly identified as competitive rulers. Such a profile positions actual rulers at risk to stand and fall with the system they rule even if they manage to maintain surreptitiousness and deniability. Moreover, their direct competitive practices toward agents will leave another, albeit smaller profile that may be hard to deny.

The resulting continuing threat of instability characteristic to a competitive system imparts a heavy liability of never-ending vigilance and control efforts on its rulers. The more they make their happiness dependent on the taking and withholding of resources, the less secure they can be of their happiness. The chronic instability of their benefits may lead them to live in fear of changes that might negatively affect or end the competitive system or their rule. Enjoying their privileges may be challenging under such apprehension. Even if they can secure their reign, they must fear that future generations to whom they bequeath their rule will be subjected to a reversal of fortune and will experience retribution. Even if the stability of a competitive system could be indefinitely maintained with prudent administration, the incentive and skill to secure its survival may fade. Success may over time weaken the capabilities of the privileged to engage in control and stabilization efforts that are required to maintain a competitive system. Stability may also instill them with complacency that their competitive benefits are secure. A privileged class may degenerate as a result of its accomplishments in securing stable domination and fail to maintain the mechanisms that form the basis for its privilege. Consequently, the triumph of a disproportional system may jeopardize its existence as much as its inherent shortfalls or as interferences beyond these causes.

Even if competitive systems could be protected against inherent and extraneous recriminations, competitors may succumb to countervailing forces in their mind. A competitive approach necessarily leads to irreconcilable differences in a perpetrator's attitudes toward happiness. These arise because competition can only be successfully applied to a limited number of pursuits. Competitors have to select a cooperative or singular approach for the remainder of their pursuits. The differences between competitive and cooperative practices would require an individual who is engaging in competitive practices to radically differentiate depending on the needs or even aspects of needs being pursued. Assuming we could isolate our social correlations between pursuits that can benefit from competition and those that are damaged by competitive attitudes, this differentiation would also require a split of our behavior and mental attitudes into contradictory spheres. To pur-

sue some of our needs or aspects of needs, we would have to be ethical, loving, caring, supportive, accommodating, charitable, and altruistic in portions of our behavior. In other areas, we might see it necessary or advantageous to proceed by being mendacious, cold, egocentric, controlling, ruthless, forbidding, and predatory. This would force us to alternate back and forth between antithetical approaches. That may not appear to us as an unusual task. We may regularly experience different attitudes in us toward aspects of our environment depending on whether they can or do assist us or whether they present obstacles. However, this more fundamental split of our attitude tied to our needs is likely to cause problems because it divides our personality into incompatible parts. Balancing the resulting disharmony may be difficult because we may not be able to separate applications. We may pursue several approaches contemporaneously in which needs that represent these contradictory attitudes meet, or they may be blended in the pursuit of the same need. Even if we can keep these contradictory manners of pursuit separate, our incongruity may render individuals in relationships with us insecure and distrusting. Moreover, our competitive or cooperative side may engage in strategies that the other disapproves. Living with such a split personality that gives us contradictory instructions and that feels alienated from aspects of itself is bound to cause internal conflict and to leave us confused and discontented.

The dynamics of this split require a closer review. Unhappiness develops in us if we engage in the competitive abuse of others not only because of their reactions but also because of our emotional reaction. The reason for this effect is an involuntary compassion with other individuals. Compassion is most understandable when it occurs with regard to individuals with whom we have preexisting relationships. As a group member, we may care for other group members because of our tribal instinct and an emotional attachment that originates from their significance for satisfying our needs. Particularly our needs pertaining to collective survival and thriving establish an emotional bond to other humans because they are the subjects of these needs. That bond may attenuate regarding humans who are not part of the same group. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid caring about them to some degree because we observe that we are all members of the same group defined by our species. Our competitive treatment of others further stands to damage conditions that could fulfill any of our needs through mutuality apart from collective survival and thriving. Hence, our unhappiness when we treat others competitively arises in part because, by damaging them, we deprive ourselves of means for the fulfillment of our own needs. Our desire to preserve and build these means can be interpret-

ed as an emotional bond to other humans that we may call utilitarian attraction. In addition, we identify with other humans emotionally because we recognize that they share all essential attributes that actuate us to feel pain and pleasure. By imagining ourselves in their position, we empathize with their suffering and we share their joy. Through this emotional connection, we inevitably elevate our mood if we assist others and we punish ourselves for transgressions against them. By hurting them, we inflict emotional injury on us. Our awareness of this effect is reflected in our conscience. If its urgings should fail, it will demand that we make amends to heal the damage we have visited upon ourselves. Protective, corrective, or retributory impulses in victims or their associates against competitive infractions are then complemented by similar, separately caused impulses in competitive offenders.

Emotional identification and a resulting compassion with other individuals are not restricted to competitive offenders. They move in humans separate from the causation of particular emotions in others. The unhappiness we sense when we become aware of the suffering of others may induce us to recoil. Although empathy comprises transfers of pleasure as well, we might regard empathic rewards from assistance to others as optional to supplement our happiness. But the suffering in others seems more difficult to ignore. We may try to close our mind to retain our emotional balance. We might raise emotional barriers or avert or divert our attention to lessen our pain. It may take special circumstances that tie us to the suffering of others to make our exposure to their pain unavoidable. A causative connection to the suffering can create such circumstances. While our awareness of cause does not affect the pain we cause, it may leave us unguarded against sensing empathy. The pain we feel motivates us to take defensive action against its causes. Having ascertained ourselves as the cause for victims' suffering, our identification with them makes us aware that we have violated their rights. This might compel us to submit to our assertion of defenses on victims' behalf. The direct causation by competitive perpetrators may leave them particularly vulnerable to that reaction. Yet it may also occur in individuals who are less immediately involved but could still regard their behavior as a cause for the suffering of others. We feel guilty if we benefit from the competitive actions of others or become aware of competitive abuse and do nothing against it. In these cases, we may address defensive activities on behalf of victims toward direct causes as well as ourselves as contributing causes. Our desire to avoid contributing guilt may fuel our fight on behalf of victims. These collateral defensive mechanisms may impose pressure on competitors that may exceed the consequences of victims' defensive measures.

The combination of actual and feared external defensive reactions and of internal conflict and pressure against competitive behavior is bound to have a considerable negative effect on the happiness of competitors. Similar if not identical effects seem to apply to those who act on competitors' behalf. If we pursue paths that encroach upon the happiness of others, we sentence ourselves to a life that is encumbered by unhappiness. Competitive acts necessarily set external and internal developments in motion that result in their punishment. An environment where happiness is achieved at the cost of others not only damages the happiness of victims. It also fails to deliver on its promise of maximizing, improving, or even maintaining happiness for purported victors. Competitive perpetrators may suppress their conscience and fear of repercussions. They may be able to secure some and even all of their needs by competitive, compromised, or split strategies for some time. Still, in a competitive environment, no victory is final and conditions may turn. Defenses may rise, or competitors may lose the ability or the will to be in command or may fall victim to other competitors. As resources abate or competitors demand more resources, assistance or tolerance extended by others may decline. Our experiences, myths, and fantasies embody the archetypical risk, cost, and failure of competitive methods. Tales about abuse leading to its own destruction are more than fanciful fiction. They represent more than naive hopes for happy endings against better insight. They reflect the awareness or intuition that competitors and their beneficiaries will reap unhappiness. This prediction and its contributing insights counsel us that offensive competitive strategies cannot be helpful in pursuing our happiness.

Cooperative strategies in our relations with other humans seem to offer a better alternative. That is already indicated by substantial reliance of competitive strategies on cooperation to generate congeniality and resources on which they predate. The cooperative focus on harmony forms the antithesis to the discord and deleterious consequences entailed by a competitive approach. Cooperation further holds synergistic advantages that competitive manners of pursuit lack. It therefore appears that we must engage in cooperative practices if we want to advance our happiness. This insight may arrive most easily regarding needs that depend on emotional resources from others because we would be so clearly unsuccessful in trying to fulfill them with competitive strategies. Our requirements in these matters inform us of what we need to do to cooperate successfully. Yet competitive constrictions and disfigurements in the production of nonemotional resources may leave us without a conclusive notion of how their cooperative production can function. The next chapter begins to inspect these conditions.