CHAPTER 24
THE DEMANDS OF COMPROMISE

The objective of maximizing our happiness requires us to manage the demands by all our needs for maximum effect. In the concert of all our needs, the best overall solution is a manner of pursuit that conveys to us the largest overall net gain of happiness. Our determination of the manners of pursuit that advance our overall happiness most is often not immediately obvious. Like in the optimization of our pursuits concerning single needs, we must engage in an effectiveness and efficiency assessment. Finding the best reconciled manner of pursuit among all our needs requires us to expand that assessment to all our needs.

Our council of traits must administrate this undertaking. Based on its capacity to carry out a comprehensive general assessment of the risks, damages, and benefits inherent in traits and its consideration of the circumstances in which we must implement our traits, the entirety of our traits it represents can issue highly competent guidance for any concerns regarding our happiness. We are already undertaking efforts to reconcile our emotional traits. Yet these efforts frequently arise in a less than fully considered manner. Even if traits already motivate automatic or deliberated care for other traits, if traits prompt other traits to accommodate them, and if the combination of these incentives and insights provides some direction, only our council of traits can yield a coherent result by systematically integrating such elements. Its functions are essential to unite the forays by our traits into a combined effort to protect, support, direct, suppress, modify, or eliminate traits in overall maximization of our happiness. Only its proceedings can correctly determine the pain of measures against the pain we suffer if we fail to take them and assess the relative merit of alternative pursuits.

The question arises then how we can build our council of traits to its proper functioning. The revelation of our traits might provide us with a capable starting point of a basic awareness and with the necessary stimulation to engage in a comprehensive management of traits. We may be able to rely on our traits to spontaneously involve one another in debates and negotiations once we have uncovered them. But we must fill this foundation and ambition with considerations that allow us to rationalize the interaction of our traits. To achieve the capacity of full consideration and appropriate attribution of our efforts, we must develop a thorough understanding of how our singular needs interact and how we would like them to interact. We must refer to the singular pursuits we have distilled for each emotional trait and inquire into the realities and developmental possibilities of their correlations.

Yet we may have difficulties viewing our traits as they are. Our explorations may have elicited how traits view themselves or how other traits view them. These may be biased opinions that may contradict the characteristics of traits. Apart from sporadic criticisms by unidentified traits, the bias might be mostly positive because we have probed our traits regarding their ideals. We may elicit information about the reality of our traits by invoking the procedures of our council of traits and prompting traits to speak about one another. These opinions will necessarily focus on how traits relate to one another. The entirety of these comments can give us valuable indications about opining traits by the ways in which they view other traits and about judged traits by the ways they are being viewed by other traits. Making proper use of such a review requires a disciplined approach that records the results for each trait. We must systematically question each trait on our list of traits how it views each other trait on the list. We may look for attributes and behavioral details similar to those we would apply in evaluating another individual's personality. Polling our traits regarding one another constitutes an essential basic inquiry about the correlation of our traits. This method attempts to illuminate and systematically expand the procedures by which our council of traits arrives at its decisions. We may deepen the resulting opinions by asking for their underlying reasons. The fact that traits may seem to have no or only cursory positions regarding other traits may reflect a lack of interaction of certain traits in our pursuits. But it may also be a sign that we have no or merely a superficial awareness of a mutual clearing mechanism that may occur at unconscious levels of our mind. It may further indicate that traits are intimidated by other traits or that the decisional mechanism of our council of traits is not fully developed in other respects.

Taking account of how traits react to one another may provoke similar resistance as efforts to identify our traits. After identifying our traits through the collection of impressions about them, it may constitute the most sensitive part of our investigation because it exposes to us whether a trait lives up to impressions we gathered and the ideals we inferred and whether it suppresses, contorts, or otherwise impedes the ambitions of other traits. While it might have been feasible to entertain an untruthful facade when we collected impressions and connected them into sequences, the judgment of traits on one another may remove any remaining pretentions. Much true information may have already been disclosed at this stage, and this may weaken the effectiveness and possibly the determination of traits to hide their deficiencies or damaging effects. Yet, even against their resistance, the unadulterated truth about their character is now bound to emerge. This

may cause us to reevaluate the impressions, wishes, and sequences we have previously derived for our traits. For this purpose, we would collect and review how each trait is viewed by each other trait. We may succeed in distinguishing illegitimate criticism in these collections by uncharacteristic deviances from the bulk of evaluations. When we detect an aberration, we might review the other evaluations by the trait issuing a deviating opinion to see whether we can detect a characteristic pattern of deviating opinions by such a trait. Such a pattern might give cause to reevaluate the nature of the issuing trait. Discrepancies of legitimate assessments with the information we previously collected and organized regarding a trait may indicate that a trait has been successful in deceiving us about its character. They may also indicate that corrective wishes by other traits already influenced our impressions of traits. Such influence may be particularly likely in our derivation of ideal sequences. In any event, we will now have to adjust what we previously derived according to credible criticism by other traits.

The true nature of our traits may be particularly reflected in the behavior of traits in amalgamated pursuits because they are compelled to assert their interests in these. Consolidated pursuits that we identified in the initial exploration of our traits may therefore permit us essential orientation. They may be models that we can adjust in optimization of fulfillment for the immediately involved and other affected traits. Even if we depart from them, we must take cognizance of them because they represent our current paradigms, errors, compulsions, or deterrent visions pertaining to the interaction of traits that we might have to change. Because we have previously analyzed such amalgamations into their participating traits, we are prepared to now investigate the dynamics of their components. We may consider how they act and react by recombining single traits in different constellations that build to the detected composites. We may also inquire into unprecedented consolidated pursuits. These may be difficult to understand because of our missing experiences. But our comprehension of traits as separate sequences allows us to gain some awareness how traits might interface even if their combination is new. In examining new combinations, we may quickly discover whether traits have a chance of interfacing and we may dismiss irrelevant combinations. Our investigation of existing and of new conglomerations constitutes a developmental phase in our comprehensive effort to comprehend the interactions of our traits. It provides us with sets of relationships among traits that we may overlay to construct a map that approaches or reflects the entirety of their interactions. To visualize these interactions, we may name composites by their characteristic combined dedications. We may lay them out as

clusters of participating traits that are positioned in proximity around the composite objective and marked by connecting lines to that objective. We may arrange these clusters to show the participation of traits in different clusters by partial overlap. But there are limits to this type of presentation. If the relations of traits are too complex to represent a trait once as a participant in multiple consolidated pursuits, we may give each trait a characteristic form or color to identify it as the same participant in multiple consolidations represented on our map.

The composites we derived from the collection of our impressions are likely to fall short of our ideals we have established for each trait. That may not only be due to the fact that consolidated pursuits endeavor to accommodate several traits and that environmental interferences, our state of fulfillment, as well as general and individual impossibility may shape the representation of traits in their composites. A composite may also diverge from the ideals of its participating traits because the behavior of participating traits may fall short of their ideals. Yet, even if the interaction of traits were defined by ideals, these ideals might not return an overall satisfactory arrangement. For these reasons, we can accept the composites we have derived only as initial guides but not as models of how our traits should interact to optimize our happiness. Incorporating the notions that we have refined by mutual polling into consolidated sets grants us indications how traits are likely to interact if extraneous barriers are absent. It gives us a starting point from which we may have to arrange and adjust our traits. Comparing the results to the ideals for each consolidated trait only shows us an undifferentiated discrepancy produced by autonomous and mutually induced deviations from ideals that we may find difficult to separate. Nor does it afford us indications how our traits may have to be arranged or adjusted to derive a set of ideals that is overall optimized. To derive such a system, we must consider the benefit, harm, and risk that the ideal pursuit of each need might cause for itself and all other needs. We might still use familiar combinations of traits to build ideal subsets because this allows us to review limited, likely interactions before we combine them to a comprehensive set of ideals. Only, we have to assemble these by examining each participating sequence in correlation with each other participating sequence to reliably construct ideal parts. We will also have to confirm in a subsequent comprehensive review that their combination equals an overall optimized result.

The abstraction of this undertaking may be a challenge to manage even if we employ familiar consolidated pursuits. But our difficulties will expand from there because the improvement of our happiness also requires that we devise practicable strategies to connect our reali-

ty to our amalgamated ideals. Even if we cannot meet our ideals, we must find an optimized solution in their direction that makes the best use of our means. To make competent choices, we must establish our possibilities. For that objective, we might expand sequences we previously derived for our traits by comprising all sequences that fulfill the same need in spite of possibly falling short of its ideal fulfillment.

It might be difficult to prepare for the great variety of circumstances we might face and to select the most appropriate means. The restriction in our search by its focus on the best solution may not assist us much because we might still have to consider many alternatives to identify that solution and because the availability and suitability of means might change. Learning about circumstances and how to adjust these to our combined ideals as much as we can are subjects of technical investigations. But scientific insights may not be available for us to arrive at a sufficient certainty in many of our pursuits. On the other hand, our investigation is assisted by the mandate that pursuits must correspond to the context of our traits. That context is fundamentally defined by the limited combinations among our emotional traits. We are not likely to have a very large number of traits. There is a workable number of common emotional traits and combinations among them. Specific genetic and acquired emotional traits may diverge extensively depending on the participating circumstances that created and shaped these traits. Modulations of common traits may appear only limited by the specifics of the causes that formed these differences. But the number of such traits influencing each of us individually does not appear to be very large although it may exceed the number of common traits. The attachment of specific traits to common traits reduces their combination possibilities. Further, since most of our pursuits are recurrent or continuing by type, the potential of new combinations appears low and possible selections may become generally familiar even as details change. Additional simplification may set in as a consequence of the diverging requirements of participating needs to satisfy their different functions. The pursuit of needs in ways acceptable to some participating needs may create unacceptable risk, damage, or lack of benefit for others. This may constrict our range of possibilities in a consolidated pursuit that satisfies all participating traits. Restrictions also flow from general and individual impossibilities in making the necessary quality or quantity of means available. Even if we could obtain sufficient implements for a large range of alternatives for some pursuits at the cost of others, the general scarcity of resources may impose restrictions on our choices. Together, these limitations appear to result in a reduced reference set of pursuits. However, significant complexities continue.

Some of these arise from priorities among our traits. The efforts by our council of traits to determine the best strategy of pursuit for all our traits are directed by the requirement that all of the participating traits must be advanced adequately and with an adequate stability to keep them from burdening our happiness with the pain or fear of nonfulfillment. If we must pursue all our participating needs to maximize happiness, any hierarchy among them might appear superfluous. Yet a list of priorities may remain necessary to make us understand the distinctions of care between our constructive and our detrimental needs or aspects of needs. This distinction has to continue because we support harmful traits or aspects only to the extent this prevents greater damage while we pursue constructive needs or aspects to meet their correlated ideals to the best of our abilities. Further, a list of priorities may remain useful in the event we might not possess the resources to adequately pursue all our needs or satisfy them to their highest standards. Although it may be recommended that we strive toward coverage for all participating traits, the reality of our capacity and environmental circumstances may not allow us the adequate pursuit of all of them during all times. We may have to continue attributing resources to our most vital needs so we can subsist and avoid irreversible damage to our existential capabilities until resources become available in excess of these requirements. Apart from such exigencies, we may fare better if we shift from following the priorities of a static list to a method of circulatory priority. We are aware that eventually all unfulfilled participating traits are likely to issue impulses in sufficient strength to let them rise to sufficient priority. This leads us to a plan that aims at timely fulfillment of all our needs irrespective of their position in our list of static priority or their current position on our list of circulatory priority. Under conditions that permit pursuits beyond the existential and preservational minimum, pursuing objectives in the order of their priority appears only appropriate if there is no way to advance all our needs in a meaningful manner. If we cannot adequately pursue all our needs, the same rationale that advocates their comprehensive pursuit suggests that we at least pursue as many of our needs as we can. An improved strategy then does not differ in its priorities but in its commitment to allocating our resources as evenly as our priorities allow.

To keep as many entries on our list of priorities as possible from falling into deprivation, we may have to reallocate as many resources from the pursuit of our higher priorities to allow the pursuit of lower priorities as possible without frustrating higher priorities. The reallocation of resources may require that we decrease the effectiveness and efficiency of our high-priority pursuits although we still maintain their

functionality. Neither our objective nor the effect of this undertaking should be to halt circulatory prioritization. Overlooked or unpredictable circumstances and natural oscillations between dissatisfaction and satisfaction would continue to inspire temporary changes of our priorities. They would impose on us a more immediate agenda and might prompt a temporary concentration in our efforts to address the most pressing needs in a timely fashion. Although the change of priorities is bound to continue, our goal as well as the effect of an equalizing approach is to prepare the circulation of priorities in the most effective and efficient manner. To be assisting in that undertaking, the pursuit we invest into each need would have to lie within its range of capable fulfillment. Further, to arrive at an overall optimized system of pursuit that advances our happiness the most, the pursuit of each need must be balanced with the pursuit of each other need that is influenced by its pursuit. In an effort to find the best solution for our overall happiness under less than ideal conditions, we will have to expand our investigation of what is best to such conditions. We have to consider the benefit, harm, and risk that the pursuit of a need might cause for all other needs at decreased qualitative levels of means and under conditions in which only a limited total of means is available for attribution among our needs. Concern for all participating traits may persuade us to retreat from a strategy that we deem best for a pursuit, even under considerations of ideal reconciliation. To increase overall benefit under conditions of scarcity, we may instead select a less beneficial strategy within a range of pursuits that can still provide fulfillment.

Although the complexity of our choices might be considerably reduced by the demands of our traits and by the internal and external circumstances of our pursuits, interactions of needs and circumstances may still be pervasive. We may also find that the effects of circumstances and the mechanisms by which pursuits influence one another and by which actions may influence the future fulfillment of the same need are not always obvious. Beneficial or detrimental reverberations may be felt in a variety of areas that at first appear remote. An understanding of interrelations may further be complicated because effects of a process may take time to mature into a noticeable phenomenon. One act or circumstantial factor by itself may have little or no measurable effect while the cumulative effect of repeated identical or similar acts or circumstances may have significant consequences. Different acts and circumstances may combine to produce material positive or negative effects. The same act or circumstance may have constructive and detrimental effects. These mechanisms make it often hard to ascertain whether or by how much an act or a circumstance advances or

damages our overall happiness. Acts or circumstances that could help us to better or best satisfy needs or detractants from their satisfaction may remain unknown. Thus, our predictions of effectiveness and efficiency regarding our pursuits may lack precision. Our ability to identify the ramifications of acts and circumstances is further encumbered because our pursuits do not occur in a static world. Even if we could at one time ascertain all possible correlations and implications of our activities and our circumstances, our activities and independent sources may change our needs and wishes that guide our activities as well as our circumstances. That may confront us with similar problems of detecting effects as with regard to our acts and circumstances in a stable environment. Only, the movement of internal and of external circumstances, likely in a variety of correlations, directions, and speeds, may significantly increase the complexity of deciding what is best for us.

Even without such variations, our task of quantitative resource management and of qualitative reconciliation among our needs must strike us as a formidable undertaking. The scaled investment of means does not necessarily translate into identically scaled effects. The availability of freed assets is only the most visible of multiple possible consequences. Even with regard to this aspect, we cannot expect that the reattribution of resources will have equal effects. To draw an inference about the influence of a particular pursuit on other needs and to determine what mixture of pursuits is best suited to advance our happiness, we have to engage in a sorting procedure that defines a hierarchy among acceptable pursuits for each need. We begin with its ideal pursuit and review what deductions and modifications it could stand before its lack of fulfillment would create more pain than pleasure. We revise this hierarchy according to cost and risk considerations. To find the best compromised correlation among our needs, we have to correlate the variety of acceptable as well as reasonably feasible pursuits for every need with the variety of such pursuits for each other need. We must then scale back from the most desirable results in various combinations until we see an available combination that maximizes overall happiness. The competent adjustment of our pursuits seems to require that we compare the benefits, risks, and costs of a multitude of alternatives. Such an undertaking may entail that we consider quite a number of combinations even after narrowing our choices by the participation of selected traits and surrounding conditions. The remaining variability threatens to make raising our happiness an even more difficult task than determining an ideal combined strategy. The overwhelming complexity of this strategy may have us question its practicability. Our deliberations might demand so much time and make us

so cautious that they obstruct finding or implementing capable pursuits. More than that, we may be unable to collect enough information to engage in competent planning. The enormity of our task may have us conclude that our happiness cannot be fully planned. In addition to the difficulty of establishing choices in stable conditions, the variety of changing factors may have us believe that we must adjust and harmonize our pursuits as conditions become apparent. Yet, as unavoidable as that may be, it also appears necessary to prepare ourselves as much as possible by a systematic approach. It is our only instrument against becoming subjected to the vagaries of circumstances and impulses.

Much simplification seems to be infused by the requirement to fulfill all participating needs because it focuses our effectiveness and our efficiency considerations on that objective. This warrants that we examine this requirement closer. When we calculate effectiveness and efficiency, we do not render a value judgment. We only state the relationship of objective elements. In our pursuits, however, we make and must make value judgments that can apply effectiveness and efficiency calculations. These value judgments find expression in two aspects that correspond with our effectiveness and efficiency calculations. If a benefit is indispensable, we may incur any risk that is necessary to attain it. At the same time, we would not be prepared to expose its attainment to any risk that we can avoid. We may seek to minimize risk that we might not attain the valued benefit. But that would mean that we would do whatever it takes to secure that benefit. If necessary, we would incur any cost and any related risk to secure the benefit. The worth we ascribe to a benefit therefore translates into the ineffectiveness and inefficiency we are willing to condone to obtain it. As we become more flexible regarding the attainment of a benefit in terms of its frequency of occurrence, quantitative level, or quality, we may be able to incur higher risk that a pursuit of the benefit will fail or that it will fall short of the desired yield. Hence, we may be willing to condone higher ineffectiveness. This may allow us to consider and choose among a broader variety of means that may be obtainable at a lower cost or related risk, and we thus may permit higher inefficiency. With the reduced value we connect to a pursuit, we also decrease our valuation of its risk minimization and of the means involved in that pursuit. While effectiveness and efficiency calculations can show us how cost and risk relate to a benefit, our value judgment makes us select benefits and determine what relationships of these factors we are willing to incur. Our valuations may not be entirely expressed if we are not compelled to go to the limits of what we would tolerate to obtain benefits we desire. We might be adequately happy with lower benefits, or ben-

efits may be attainable at lower risk and cost than we would be willing to incur. Still, we might apply dissimilar valuations to resources, risks, and benefits. Highly effective and efficient means might be valued relatively low because of our flexibility and a broad selection of means. Processes with low efficiency might be highly valued because of inflexible demands and a scarcity of means that can fulfill them. Many valuation imbalances can be prevented or resolved by the fungibility of resources among our traits. To diminish the pain of deprived traits, our council of traits may divert fungible resources from the pursuit of other traits until it has attained a median fulfillment for all of them. This imposes pressure on all participating traits to select benefits and related risks that allow sufficient attribution of resources to other traits.

Still, we may have to further simplify sorting procedures among our pursuits if we are to succeed. That could be achieved if we begin with the minimum requirements for each need to fulfill its functions. Such an approach might also be the most realistic if we struggle to satisfy the entirety of our needs. It matches the practical requirements of an environment posing qualitative and quantitative limitations on our resources. If we are to move forward all our needs or at least as many of them as possible in an environment of relative scarcity, focusing on the minimum requirements of our needs appears plausible. Even if we are not constrained by scarcity, we may benefit from a systematic development of harmonious pursuits that begins with the simplest forms of pursuit. Ultimately, we would be interested in the fulfillment of our needs as closely as possible to a set of amalgamated ideals that represents overall optimization. But we may not discern yet what these reconciled ideals are. It seems that a range of better and best harmonized settings for fulfilling our needs can only be reliably established as a result of growing it systematically. We will have to begin with basic fulfillment patterns that try to cover all participating traits and then deliberately add features. Consequently, the formulation of minimum requirements must be our initial task in the larger challenge of devising a comprehensive strategy for the maximization of our happiness.

Our inquiries for this purpose are similar to the inquiries that we undertake to recognize the best approach of pursuit for each need. However, we now undertake effectiveness and efficiency explorations on the other side of the spectrum of acceptable pursuits. We contemplate circumstances that are the most distant from our ideals for fulfillment but can still fulfill the related need. We are interested in varieties that sufficiently safely meet our needs with the least demand on resources. This is likely to be the least objectionable manner of pursuit for other needs not only because it maximizes the feasibility of leaving

resources for them but also because it may generate the least interference with their pursuits. The lower level of objectives further makes it more likely that our proceedings will be more secure and dependable, more within our knowledge, skills, and means. After we have made an assessment of the minimum acceptable benefit for each need, we must address minimum effectiveness. We must determine whether the pursuit we judged to be sufficiently beneficial for a need carries risks that are unacceptable for that need. We then turn our attention to matters of efficiency. We must now verify our presumption that fulfillment at the low end of the spectrum of acceptable pursuits can maximize their efficiency. Because the minimum benefit and the high boundary of the related risk are fixed, we can concentrate on a simplified cost-benefit assessment. While the minimization of cost and related risks for the trait at issue is our primary objective at this point of our evaluation, activities related to these factors must not lower the benefit threshold or exceed the related risk ceiling. After we have evaluated each need under these criteria, we have to expand our investigation to consider positive and negative effects on the pursuit of other needs. We must weigh these effects together with the positive and negative effects for the trait at issue. We must also take into account how nonfulfillment of that trait and modified benefit, risk, or cost factors would influence our assessment. We may opt to forgo fulfillment of a need because it would come at an unacceptable cost to the pursuit of other needs or the same need in the future. Moreover, the relation of benefit, related risk, cost, and related risk may turn out to be overproportionally more favorable at higher benefit and related risk levels, and risks and costs may even be lowered. Even if our main concern is acceptable coverage for all participating traits, our evaluations may therefore have to consider a variety of variables at the lower end of acceptable pursuits. The harmonization of traits in this manner promises to decrease costs and risks and increase overall benefits compared to an unreconciled state. As a byproduct, our attribution of minimum resources to all traits may appease detrimental traits that we have to keep at minimum levels of fulfillment to forestall greater damage from their interference because they are not treated much differently than constructive traits.

Because we focus on the attribution of resources in this strategy, thrift might be easily mistaken to be its focus. But achieving its potential of efficiency with effectiveness obligations relegates thrift to a tertiary concern after benefits and risks. That is particularly so regarding basic survival needs whose nonfulfillment we cannot bear or cannot bear for long without endangering our existence, or with regard to other needs whose nonfulfillment would engender irreparable conse-

quences for our capacity to generate happiness. The considerations of noninterference, active protection, and support in which we engage in this strategy seem to be far more complex than the mere attribution of resources. The concepts of attribution of resources and considerations of how this attribution affects our needs might appear to be dissimilar from each other. Then again, their mutual occupation with the means of our pursuits can serve as the basis for combining them in our consideration. Limited resources and directions from our needs how they can find fulfillment command the means we can or have to use to pursue our needs. They inhibit or narrow our strategies. The effect is the same because the functionalities that resources provide form integral and indispensable parts of their definition. We require resource allocations that combine quantitative and qualitative features as means in the pursuit of particular needs. These allocations may not be possible or the quantitative and qualitative potential of otherwise available resources may be restricted or unexploited by our individual capabilities or by environmental conditions. Together, these internal and external limitations already define and confine the selection of our means before we consider the relation of our needs. The quantitative and qualitative requirements imposed by the demands of our needs on one another additionally preclude the acquisition or the use of applicable resources that are or could be made available and could be useful for the independent pursuit of needs. Regardless of whether we lack access to resources or are prevented from applying them, the affected resources are missing in our pursuits. This insight creates a common denominator of resources for our efforts to harmonize our needs at low or higher levels of expenditure. We may characterize the entirety of the relationship among our emotional traits as being defined by resources.

This common denominator permits us to devise a method that unites the demands of our needs and resources. However, it does not allow us to calculate requirements and supplies in a summary fashion. Quality distinctions remain. Further, needs accrue and are pursued in time, and resources may largely accrue and may be affected in time as well. We must match the resource demands of our needs and the production of resources as our pursuits proceed. That production occurs as a sequence in which steps are integrated into higher steps with varying degrees of effectiveness and efficiency that may depend on a variety of internal and external circumstances. To calculate resource requirements and availability and to make pursuits adjustable, they have to be separated into steps. These steps must then be combined into a comprehensive scheme that permits us to satisfy our needs as broadly and competently as possible. The next chapter describes this method.