

CHAPTER 1

WISHES AND NEEDS

To find out how we can advance our happiness, we must first identify what it is and how it comes about. We may begin this venture by observing how we experience happiness. When we think about our happiness, we tend to associate immediately its particularizations in our existence. We picture past and present conditions, or we imagine settings that we believe or hope to be capable of bringing us happiness in the future. Our awareness of past and present events and our ideas of future events of happiness correlate with a desire to rekindle that past, to hold on to present situations, or to engender particular conditions. These longings to be situated in past, present, or future circumstances and to experience their beneficial implications for our emotional state constitute our wishes. We wish to re-create, attain, or maintain particular circumstances so we can be happy. Our wishes define our happiness and guide our exploration for it. The fulfillment of a wish conveys happiness onto us. We are happy when we get what we want. Because our understanding of happiness is so intricately intertwined with the substance of our wishes, we have difficulties thinking rationally about it or our wishes. Our wishes appear to be phenomena in our mind that precede our rational thoughts. They appear to be emotional incidents, urges that appear to exist independently of what we think about them. We may apply rational considerations to help in their definition and advancement. But even if we find rational reasons why we should not give in to particular wishes, they still tend to persist. The only way we appear to be able to reformulate our wishes is if we perceive that they or other wishes may suffer from their pursuit and we form new, more advanced wishes. In that formulation, our wishes seem to take rational advice and emotionally reconcile. Yet, even then, the underlying desires may continue to agitate and may be difficult to discourage.

Most of our wishes do not materialize by mere willpower. They pose objectives that have to be carried out. This implementation takes place in movements that we can frequently describe in a sequence of changes, in related steps. Simple wishes may feature only one narrowly defined activity engendering their accomplishment. Wishes that are more complex necessitate multiple steps of activity and accomplishment that sequentially build on other steps to bring about the desired result. Many of our wishes require more than a singular chain of steps. They require the convergence or the interaction of two or more parallel sequences or single steps to produce a combined step. That combined step may serve the fulfillment of a wish alone or together with

other steps. All steps involved in building to the fulfillment of a wish are means in its accomplishment. We may describe these constructive means as subordinated steps in a strategy to reach its ulterior objective. Because each such means is a step toward an ulterior objective, the accomplishment of each means also forms an objective. When we consider subordinated steps helpful or necessary to reach a desired result, they become subsidiary objects of our desire. Each means to the ulterior objective of a wish is the subject of a subordinated wish. Our desire attaches to them because they enable the fulfillment of our ulterior wishes. Because subordinated objectives form auxiliary targets of our desire, their attainment instills us with increments of happiness as well. Yet even ulterior wishes tend to attend additional purposes. Consequently, ulterior and subordinated wishes appear to be similar in their functionalities and emotional effects. Our characterization of the subject of a wish as a means or as an objective depends on whether we focus on it as a target or as an instrument for another target.

Observing how wishes are positioned in our life as motivations for means and objectives gives us some information about their workings. But it does not inform us much about their nature, the source of their motivation, or even about the motivation we sense. The immediate, emotional, demanding character of our wishes causes us to focus our inquiries regarding happiness mostly on questions about the objects or events that can make us happy, on technical concerns of their fulfillment. We preoccupy ourselves with concerns of how we or others should behave or what we or they should possess or be able to effect to meet the claims of our wishes. Wishes strike us mostly as topical demands. This prompts us to deal with them in a disjointed manner. Their impulsive quality may instruct us to behave in manners that may not be to our advantage. Our mind is continually flooded by an abundance of wishes that might not be reconciled. Before we can improve our happiness, we must learn how they affect our happiness by themselves and in correlation with one another. To judge our wishes competently, we have to inquire deeper into them and ask where they originate, why we have them, and what they do to us. To find the answers to these questions, we might envisage our existence without the fulfillment of our wishes. Without the fulfillment of wishes, we would be without happiness, we would be unhappy. Because our wishes are instruments for our happiness, the enjoyment of our existence is negatively affected by a failure to fulfill our wishes. More than that, we find that if all our wishes would carry on unfulfilled, we could not exist. Thus, at least some of our wishes have to be of existential importance. But not all our wishes are existential in the manner that our existence

depends on each of them. Many subordinated wishes may fail without serious repercussions on our existence. If a wish fails, we may reapply the same strategy in hope for better circumstances. We may also formulate a different strategy that is set to avoid the repetition of a previous failure. We may engage several identical or disparate sequences of subordinated purposes simultaneously or successively to pursue the same objective. As long as some attempt succeeds in timely fulfilling an existential wish, a failure of subordinated wishes would not appear to be existential. The only exception would occur if parallel, repeat, or alternative tries would strain our resources or otherwise damage our future chances of fulfilling the same or other existential wishes.

Existential wishes are not optional or interchangeable with other strategies because their fulfillment is necessary to secure our existence. An instinctive command urges us to pursue and satisfy them as objectives in themselves, as ultimate wishes. The compelling and general nature of these demands gives them the quality of needs. We may call needs that directly concentrate on the physical aspects of survival our survival needs. Some of these needs seem to be limited to our individual survival. Our individual survival is predicated on the suitable supply of oxygen, food, water, exercise, and sleep. We depend on controlled pressure, gravity, and radiation, including visible and invisible light and temperature. More generally, we require corporeal integrity and surroundings that assist and do not interfere with it. Beyond representing an ultimate wish on their own, all these needs seem to constitute or to support a principal need for individual survival for which they form necessary instruments. We may designate these needs and the principal need they attend individual survival needs. We can further differentiate needs that constitute or support a principal need to provide for the survival of our species. Among these are the needs to reproduce, to raise progeny, and to protect and support individuals we view as our kind. We may call these needs and the principal need they constitute our collective survival needs. These needs may appear selfless. Yet, through their pursuit, we are following a genuine individual interest that is founded in the desire to have our essence survive and proliferate. We may define this essence narrowly as our genetic or acquired particularities or more broadly on the basis of commonalities we share with other or even all humans. We traditionally identify the strength of our essence in others by how similar they are to us. Historically, our principal criteria to ascertain similarity have been behavior and appearance. We have been sensitive to distinctions despite prodigious evidence of commonality. We may place emphasis on discrepancies in geography, culture, religion, and group membership, obviously

physical traits including skin, hair, and eye color, facial features, build, strength, endurance, symmetry, and health, as well as mental features such as intelligence, personality, social attitude, experiences, or style. Any of these distinctions may make it difficult for us to confer protection and support onto other humans. An exclusion from our care may move in gradations depending on the perceived significance of distinguishing marks. We may discriminate against their carriers to a point where we deny all recognition to them as carriers of our essence. We may not only deny them our assistance. Once we regard them as relatively or absolutely beyond the purview of our need to protect or support them to secure collective survival, we may change our behavior toward them accordingly. We may feel free to actively damage them in the pursuit of our needs, including through their exploitation as resources or their exclusion or even elimination as obstacles or rivals.

Apart from needs that obviously serve survival, we can discern ultimate wishes whose fulfillment might not seem to be indispensable for our survival. Still, we sense an instinctive urge that demands their fulfillment with a vehemence that is similar to our survival needs. We may therefore recognize these wishes as needs yet distinguish them as collateral needs. Among these needs seem to be needs for companionship, social interaction, acceptance, giving and receiving love, and for treating other individuals as we treat us that we may also call our need for empathy. Additionally, they comprise needs for peace, justice, harmony, for the control and reliability of our circumstances, and for optimized comfort. They further incorporate our needs for self-determination, privacy, expression, self-realization, and self-respect. Accurately and succinctly describing these needs, if not even ascertaining their existence, seems to be difficult. It seems to be more complicated than determining the nature and scope of survival needs. Because survival needs focus on obviously physical conditions, fulfilling such needs has a plainly detectable utility in support of our own existence or the existence of others. What we require for survival appears to lend itself to scientific quantification and illumination. While collateral needs may involve overt physical requirements and mechanisms and various corresponding secondary effects, their essential concerns seem to express themselves on a nonphysical, mental level. Their deprivation and fulfillment have primary effects that defy attempts of isolation, qualification, and quantification. This complication may cause them to appear as nonessential for our individual and collective survival. We may acknowledge that their deprivation affects our wellbeing to some extent and that their fulfillment adds satisfaction to our existence. Nevertheless, we may believe that we should be able to survive individually and

collectively without fulfilling collateral needs. We may regard them as luxuries or even as nuisances that disturb our peace with overwrought demands. This may lead us to believe that we can do well or even better without satisfying them. We may consider them options that we can curb or reject without serious import. We are particularly prone to develop this attitude regarding collateral needs that we struggle or are unable to fulfill. We may discredit what resists us or what we cannot have. For the short term, our disregard of collateral needs may render our life simpler and seemingly without significant repercussions. Yet a long-term omission to fulfill any of these needs, and sometimes their brief deprivation, may have significant effects on our individual or collective existence. Depending on the duration and severity of the deprivation and our further condition, we may experience negative emotional consequences. These may range from temporary discomfort to a state of intense pain in which our existence has lost its appeal. They may precipitate other mental as well as overtly physiological deteriorations. These conditions may weaken our response to threats and opportunities that are relevant for our individual or collective survival.

The nonpursuit of collateral needs may particularly have negative effects because of their numerous correlations with social interaction. Some of them may be fulfilled unilaterally without the provision of means to others. Others may be fulfilled by the protection and support of others without an expectation of compensation activities. Assisting the needs of others may trigger collateral satisfaction in us. But many collateral needs require constructive contributions from others. More than that, they may require contributions by particular individuals. Our inability to fulfill such collateral needs alone compels us to obtain cooperation to satisfy them. Individuals whose cooperation we desire may decline or condition their participation. This affords them power over our happiness if we are not or less willing or able to satisfy such needs by correlating with other individuals. Our dependence on their cooperation may give rise to conflict if they deny, ration, or condition their contributions. Then again, there is a likelihood that other individuals might cooperate because they require assistance to satisfy their own collateral needs of this sort as well under similar conditions. Unless they are satisfied or committed to reaching satisfaction in a relationship that requires exclusivity, they might be interested in an exchange relationship. The social context of collateral needs is intensified because some derive essential means from the pursuit of collateral or survival needs by others. They require that others pursue needs in a direct exchange, by themselves, or in connection with third parties. These dependences may create close mechanisms of mutuality.

Regardless of how firm the dependence of collateral needs that necessitate cooperation from others is, they are vulnerable to disturbances. But such settings may also often possess some resilience against disfunction. The desire to fulfill collateral needs through the cooperation by others may prompt individuals to make advances even if their intended cooperation partners do not currently reciprocate. Together with the protection or provision of means without an expectation of return, this advance may hold the potential of constraining deficiencies of mutuality and of aiding to repair them. Only, such investments may cease if benefactors comprehend that recipients hinder, damage, or jeopardize the pursuit or fulfillment of benefactors' needs to an extent that renders further investments unattractive. Such a determination may be hastened if benefactors have the opportunity to attain superior satisfaction of their collateral needs through other sources. The threat of benefit withdrawal incentivizes recipients to care for the collateral pursuits of their benefactors. The dependences of many collateral needs and the threats noncooperation produces encourage the establishment of social structures, processes, and conventions that protect the fulfillment of collateral needs through mutuality and the creation of a joint undertaking that covers all collateral needs. A failure to participate in the pursuit of collateral needs in conformance with such arrangements can have extensive adverse consequences for a violator.

The pursuit of collateral needs and the mechanisms of care they promote can provide essential or helpful assistance for individual and collective survival. They can organize and safeguard unilateral protection or provision of obviously physical means, their exchange, as well as multilateral cooperation in obviously physical pursuits as means for achieving collateral objectives. Our desire to secure the fulfillment of survival needs may independently motivate us to engage in such undertakings. The social structures and conventions created for the pursuit of collateral needs therefore regularly overlap with those designed to promote and secure the fulfillment of survival needs. This may lead to the commingling and interaction of pursuits and effects. Additionally, collateral and survival needs seem to be substantively connected in many cases. The failure to socially pursue collateral needs may then have significant repercussions on the capability of individuals to satisfy their survival needs, and the reverse is also true. Collective survival needs appear particularly susceptible to this interdependence because they intrinsically require cooperation or are directed toward cooperation. Their extensive correspondence with collateral needs may cause collective survival needs to be particularly affected by disturbances in the pursuit of collateral needs. Individuals who are frustrated in their

pursuit of collateral needs and suppress such pursuits to reduce their unhappiness may abstain from engaging in tasks necessary for collective survival because the manner of pursuit and the motivations of the underlying needs are narrowly intertwined with collateral needs. That might even happen if collateral frustration does not arise from participants in collective survival pursuits or individuals with the potential of pursuing collective survival needs. The resulting denial of cooperation may disrupt social interaction that is necessary to secure our species' survival by a mere failure to engage in such an interaction. But a frustration of collateral needs may also be vented by behavior that actively damages collective survival. This destructive demeanor, by itself or by the conflict it incites, may become so effective and so widespread that it devastates or eliminates parts or all of humanity. Short of that, collective survival mechanisms may become so weakened by nonfeasance or malfeasance that humanity or segments of it may decline or expire without any other causes or might be damaged by or succumb to external causes that otherwise could be repelled or survived.

A failure to satisfy collateral needs seems to have a lesser effect on individual survival needs. Frustrations of our collateral needs may weaken our resolve and our resilience to pursue our individual survival needs similar to how they might affect our collective survival needs. In extreme cases, such frustrations may make us lash out against other individuals or ourselves or to cease our pursuits of individual survival needs. However, those needs appear to be intrinsically much less dependent on cooperation by others. Our collateral needs seem less likely to directly affect our capacity to engage in overt physical pursuits to obtain overt physical means for our individual survival. Similarly, our failure to cater to the collateral needs of others may only insignificantly affect our ability to satisfy our overt physical pursuits. We may find sufficient counterparts in the pursuits of our individual survival needs who are willing to deal with us on a level purely concerned with obviously physical matters. It appears possible to create modes of interaction where disturbances caused by collateral pursuits would have only an attenuated effect on the pursuit of our individual survival needs, if any effect at all. Even where the pursuits of survival needs and of collateral needs overlap, the damage might be limited although we might have to sacrifice the benefits of collateral motivations for cooperative pursuits. It even seems possible to survive without any social interaction once we leave childhood disabilities and dependences behind.

Then again, that separation may be difficult to realize if we live in an interconnected world where we regularly rely on others for the fulfillment of individual survival needs. A large portion of our obvious-

ly physical dealings may not be directly subject to collateral aspects. Nevertheless, the frustration of collateral needs might affect the capability or the willingness of individuals on whose contributions we rely to provide necessary or helpful goods and services. It may further motivate individuals to interfere with necessary or helpful resources for the fulfillment of our individual survival needs or our state of fulfillment. Such actions may be taken because individuals may connect in their mind obviously physical and purportedly mental means and pursuits. A disturbance of our obviously physical pursuits may be targeted at us if those whose collateral needs are frustrated consider us responsible. But our obviously physical dependence on others could also expose us to repercussions if the actual or deemed source of collateral frustration is located anywhere in our supply chain or if it is situated beyond. Even slight effects might have substantial consequences in an interconnected system, and they might build on one another either by causing negative obviously physical interactions or other frustrations.

Not all disturbances in our obviously physical concerns are coincidental. Individuals regularly mingle obviously physical and mental means for the pursuit of both collateral and survival needs. A separation may be concentrated in dealings with individuals on whom we do not rely for the supply of collateral means. Still, that appears to be unnatural. It may weaken obviously physical commitments and leave aspects of our collateral needs wanting. It may therefore be helpful and even necessary to generally harmonize obviously physical with mental pursuits. The artificial and unsustainable character of separating these pursuits becomes particularly clear when we consider our inability to separate obviously physical and mental aspects within the same need. Every need seems to have obviously physical aspects, if not in its objective then at least in its means. A minimum of obviously physical activity seems necessary in some respects to shape circumstances for the fulfillment of mental objectives, and supplementary obviously physical provisions and protections may be helpful in ameliorating fulfillment. Similarly, every need seems to have some mental aspect, if not in its means then at least in its objectives. At the end of our efforts in all our needs we expect a mental, emotional reward. Even if we acknowledge that every need possesses obviously physical and mental aspects, survival needs appear as physiologically originated needs. Our senses tell us that they correspond to functions of particular parts of our body in correlation with environmental factors. The origin of most collateral needs seems less clear, although we may feel that certain parts of our body are involved in them. Our difficulty to connect them directly to a substantive cause or the functionality of a body part may tempt us to

describe them as nonphysical. Yet closer inspection indicates that they must be physical phenomena as well. Our collateral needs connect to physical sensory impressions of physical objects and events in and beyond us. This connection implies a physical format of subsequent processing. Moreover, the presence or absence of certain facilities or conditions in our body determines whether we exhibit certain collateral needs and how these needs are expressed. We seem to draw a distinction between collateral and remaining needs based on a difference between sensory impressions that we connect with physical objects and events and sensory impressions that we connect to mental phenomena. This distinction seems to originate from our natural incapacity to direct our senses toward the physiological processes in our mind and not from a fundamentally different, nonphysical quality of our mind.

We may therefore remain with the classification of needs based on their relationship to individual or collective survival. Although that distinction seems to have immediate merit in grouping the principal functions of our survival needs, it is ultimately superficial as well. Our ability to pursue collective survival needs is founded on our individual survival, and our individual life would be negatively affected by an absence of collective survival needs, or individuals would not even exist. The distinction provides even less assistance in the area of collateral needs because most of these do not appear to distinguish in this way. Its import is further diminished by a variety of interchanges occurring among all types of needs. Effects of collateral needs on individual survival needs may bear on collective survival needs. Effects of collateral needs on collective survival needs may have an impact on our individual survival needs. Beyond effects by collateral needs on our individual and collective survival needs, we can also detect the reverse. Additional correlations can be found between individual and collective survival needs and between the individual and collective aspects of collateral needs. Finally, our undertakings for needs in each of these categories may have effects on the pursuit of other needs in that same category.

Accordingly, there does not appear to be any limit to the variety and spread of interchanges among all kinds of pursuits. Nevertheless, we may regard the ubiquitous presence of collateral needs combined with the resistance of most of them to immediate categorization and a definition that shows them to be in support of our individual or collective survival as particularly problematic. We may believe that they pose a threat of disturbances for the pursuit of our individual and collective survival needs that exceeds the level of a mere nuisance. Even if we concede that survival needs may as well influence one another in detrimental ways, we may view that to be a necessary tradeoff because

all of these needs are necessary to secure human survival. We may argue that the relationship of survival needs should not present a great problem because it has been perfected since the beginning of life. We may view many or all collateral needs as comparatively recent developments that cause particular volatility for the formation, spread, and expansion of disturbances. They do not appear to be as accessible to reason or clearly bound to the same purpose as survival needs. Their complex, surreptitious, and frequently interwoven character raises the risk that disturbances might arise and circulate without effective containment. Their negative effects may not be easily discerned because they might accumulate in small and diverse increments, develop over time, or become revolving and increasing causes for one another. This may make the arrest or the reversal of negative developments difficult. We might conclude that their troublesome potential makes them burdens from which we have to liberate ourselves. We may also be of the opinion that such hindrances are largely or entirely unnecessary. References to life forms that are successful in their individual and collective survival without any or most of our collateral needs or with simplified versions of them appear to support that view. Arguably, all positive motivations to secure human survival that are conferred by collateral needs can arise from survival needs as well. It might therefore seem that we could improve our happiness if we abolished or simplified our collateral needs because we would reduce our risk of failure.

Nevertheless, when we inspect our collateral needs, we can discern a constructive function of every need for us individually and as a species. Unilateral pursuits of collateral needs can protect and support the fulfillment of survival needs for others. Moreover, the pursuit and satisfaction of interactive collateral needs can generate incentives, organizational structures, and procedures for unilateral and for mutual protection and support that can not only fortify but also broaden and deepen our activities on behalf of our survival needs. The resulting effectiveness, efficiency, and resiliency may assist us to overcome adversities and provide a crucial edge in securing survival. The development of collateral needs and their relative advantages can be traced in related species of lesser advancement. Although the negative potential of collateral needs if they are not satisfied and the investments and forbearances that they demand compete with the benefits they can confer, they seem to benefit humanity and individual humans more than they detract. In any event, our collateral needs are ingrained in us as much as our survival needs. This compels us to manage their positive and negative potential. It invests us with an obligation to fulfill them that is paired with a threat if we fail or we go too far in their pursuit.

Their influence on our individual and collective existence prevents us from keeping them in a category of lesser importance. Collateral needs must be categorized as survival needs as well. In acknowledgment of this fact, we may refer to what we previously termed survival needs as basic survival needs. To signify the combined importance of basic survival needs and collateral needs, we refer to them as existential needs.

The pursuit of collateral needs may not only markedly increase our chances of survival in terms of a bare continuation of our existence. They also have the capacity and the tendency to render that existence more secure and less arduous. They assist us in forming a buffer of means and strategies that can improve our management of existential threats and challenges. Yet even our basic needs for individual and collective survival incorporate that aspect. We try to reach a level of existence that avails us and our kind of more than a minimum level of survival. We do not merely want to exist. We want to thrive as well. We want to increase and maximize the fulfillment of our needs. With this additional purpose of our existential needs, they present themselves as needs for individual and collective survival and thriving.

Now that we comprehend the basic classes and underlying purposes and effects of our needs, we can turn our attention to our experience of their function. The irresistible character of our needs coerces us to act upon their command. We pursue their impulses because we feel a longing to make them cease. We experience them as emotional discontent. The unpleasant character of the upheaval they cause motivates us to take action that appeases them by meeting their requirements. We may characterize needs by our refutation of their disturbance. We may describe them in terms of our struggle to escape unsettling, irritating, or more painful conditions. We may also brand them by the relief we sense in their resolution and by our attachment to the related objects and events. Defining our needs in positive and negative terms begins to contour our motivations, our underlying concerns and hopes, the extent of potential we seek to bridge. It becomes clear that we pursue the fulfillment of our needs for two related purposes. We try to avoid or escape from circumstances we perceive as painful and to reach or maintain a state of affairs we regard as pleasant. The relation of these two categories differentiates them as the beginning and end points for our drive to satisfy our needs. Our movement between them can be described as a sequence of steps by which we leave pain behind and approach pleasure. Our struggles for the fulfillment of our needs are marked by our movements in a spectrum from pain toward pleasure. We are happy when we avoid or escape from pain and obtain or maintain pleasure. Pain and pleasure are our basic motivations for

seeking happiness. It appears that the absence of pain and presence of pleasure represents our ideal of happiness. Conversely, the presence of pain and absence of pleasure seems to epitomize unhappiness. Thus, happiness can be equated with pleasure, and pain with unhappiness.

The ability to build strategies for the satisfaction of our needs occurs on several levels. In their most rudimentary experience of pain and pleasure, life forms react to the immediate sensory experiences of pain and pleasure without foresight or recollection of the same or the opposing type of sensory condition. The immediacy of pain and pleasure informs us whether we are in a state that damages or benefits us. If we could not foresee or recall pleasurable events in a condition of pain, pain would seem to be the sole motivator to improve our chances of survival and thriving. We could only react by fleeing or dismantling causes of pain. If we find ourselves in circumstances that create pleasure, these motivations cease. Pleasure does not seem to generate a motivation of its own in the immediacy of its sensation. We cannot develop a motivation to sustain conditions of fulfillment if we do not have a memory of pain. Once we are in a state of pleasure, its momentary impression motivates us to cease activities of pursuit until a painful state reemerges. Further, without its memory, pleasure cannot be a motivator in the formulation of our wishes in a state of deficiency. The rudimentary duality of repulsion from a state of pain resulting in activity and of satisfaction and rest in a state of pleasure serves organisms well as a simple guidance scheme. Even inactivity upon pleasure may have its merits because it creates efficiency by conserving energy and because it forestalls organisms from leaving or destroying a conducive situation. Still, an existence where we blindly run into pain and pleasure and react only in the moment does not provide the most effective or efficient direction. As important as information of pain and pleasure might be, it is of incomplete benefit. The efficiency of sensing pain and pleasure becomes vastly enhanced if we can avoid incidents that damage the fulfillment of our needs and if we can seek incidents that have positive effects. These adjuncts to pain and pleasure represent the ability to anticipate pain and pleasure. With respect to pain, we call its anticipation fear. The anticipation of pleasure is desire.

Fear and desire enrich the mechanism of our wishes beyond an immediate reflex to exposure. When we fear, we appear to be repulsed by future circumstances we imagine to cause pain. When we desire, we appear to be attracted to future circumstances we imagine to cause pleasure. We can presently sense a shadow of the pain or pleasure we expect from circumstances we anticipate. We might be under the impression that when we fear or desire we make future pain or pleasure

present. Yet, in fact, we are drawing on experiences of pain and pleasure and project them into the future. Together with the transposition of past factual circumstances, we transfer emotional impressions that were connected to the samples from which we draw. Fear and desire appear to require a higher-developed mental capacity because they involve recollection and projection of painful or pleasurable results. But fear and desire do not seem to be limited to individual learning about elements of painful and pleasurable events and the application of that knowledge to subsequent occurrences that bear similarity to elements of these former events. Even relatively basic life forms that cannot individually build anticipations from memories seem to possess modes of fear and desire. They may avoid painful situations before their painful impact comes to pass. They may further be able to seek pleasurable circumstances or to maintain such circumstances. In these life forms, fear or desire seem to be instilled by an automatic emotional response that is based on genetic development. Experiences of pain and pleasure may instigate or influence the formation of genetic material. They may install a genetic memory of past events or patterns of events and a program that executes at the sign of partial congruence of indicators with such genetic memory. Then again, developments that instill fear or desire might not be the result of experiences. Rather, they might be the result of variations whose development is inherently programmed in genetic mechanisms or is formed by environmental influences that are unrelated to causes of pain or pleasure. The motivating experiences of pain or pleasure that were selected by these mutations may make it appear as if the mutations were developed in reaction to painful or pleasurable experiences. Such a semblance may be intensified because coincidental mutations may overlay with experience-based mutations as well as projections arising from experiences during an individual's life. The combination of these factors may cause some individuals and species to react more appropriately to threats or to opportunities than others, favoring the survival of them and their reaction modes.

The developmental history of humans makes them continuing carriers for genetic sources of fear and of desire. These sources may be modulated or supplemented by experiences of individuals during their lifetime. However, the long-standing development of genetic foundations for fear and desire demands a presumption of validity similar to our sense of pain and pleasure. Our species might have survived with some genetically prompted motivations that were always or that have become deleterious to our survival or thriving. Only, considering the momentous challenges humankind has faced in its development, such detractors in large number or intensity should have caused our spe-

cies' demise. Although we may have wishes that might yet cause such a result, no existential needs seem to be intrinsically useless or detrimental. Rather, detriments induced by genetic motivations seem to be confined to issues that concern the context, direction, or manner of pursuits. As we develop, such motivations may require or benefit from adjustment to reflect varied challenges and opportunities. Experiences of pain and pleasure permit us to reinforce, contradict, or supplement genetic impulses. But experiential debate with genetic forces may only be partly effective because these are engraved in our essence. Our genetic motivations may attempt to condition us in spite of experiences. Particularly where contradicting or adjusting experiences are missing or lack strength, genetic motivations may move us to imagine causes that never applied or no longer apply or reactions that were never or are no longer optimized for individual or collective survival and thriving. They may prompt us to form wishes or may influence our wishes in unproductive or detrimental ways. On the other hand, inappropriate pursuits may also result from erroneous interpretations and reactions to experiences that we apply against better genetic judgment.

In their anticipatory context, fear and desire preserve the functions of immediate pain and pleasure differently. Fear forms an extension of past or present pain as anticipated pain. Although similar, that extension can be very useful for the satisfaction of our needs. It retains the same motivating quality of deterring us from and antagonizing us against situations with the potential of harming the fulfillment of our needs. Only now, we can react to harmful events in their nascent stages or can possibly prevent them. Nevertheless, in avoiding or fighting damaging developments, the character of our responses would generally remain the same. Desire, by contrast, exceeds the previously passive function of pleasure as a signal to cease fulfillment activity. Its anticipation of pleasurable events motivates representatives of life forms to pursue circumstances that may serve the fulfillment of their needs. Arguably, fear already incites activities that serve our needs by motivating us to avoid or curtail potentially painful circumstances. Similarly, pain already incites activities that serve our needs by motivating us to flee from or fight actually painful circumstances. Yet desire imparts an opportunity of qualitative departure from these activities. It instills the concept of wishes with a positive counterpart to pain and fear. The ability to instinctively sense and carry a pleasurable notion and to introduce it as an aim is significant. The resulting focus on the satisfaction of needs allows a more purposeful shaping of events compared to the negation of loathsome circumstances by fear and pain. The positive imagery of desired states provides wishes with positive objectives.

These objectives combine with situations of actual or anticipated deprivation to build a developmental motivation that gives our wishes direction and encourages the construction of a concentrated strategy of pursuit. We may call this structure arching between actual and anticipated pain as its starting position and anticipated and eventually actual pleasure as its completion point the pain-pleasure mechanism.

With the forethought of fear and desire, our position becomes proactive instead of being reactive. We gain the opportunity to seek, select, produce, and shape objects and events we favor and to change, prevent, or evade objects and events we disfavor. This ability to generate or affect our future experiences forms a powerful tool in bridging the distance between deprivation and pleasure. Present and anticipated pain and present and anticipated pleasure all drive us toward the satisfaction of a need. Together with actual pain, anticipated pain repulses us from activities that incur, prolong, or deepen our immersion in circumstances that engender such sensations. The negativity of this experience motivates us to take action and terminate, avoid, or at least reduce exposure to a need. It urges us to fight and overcome or to flee and abstain from damaging circumstances and behavior. The motivations that pain and fear can create are vital for our pursuits because they assist us in rejecting and distancing ourselves from what hurts or threatens us. Yet, beyond these reactions, their motivations may only find an expression in incoherent, misdirected, or destructive behavior. Even an emphasis on obstacles that seem to counteract our departure from deprivation or on progress in the departure may be shortsighted. These concerns may not be sufficient to secure our survival and thriving. To make our departures more effective and efficient, we require a positive motivation that infuses direction and draws us toward the fulfillment of our requirements. Anticipatory pleasure sets a beacon toward which we strive. Even actual pleasure obtains essential functions through the capacity of recollection and anticipation. By rewarding us, it generates positive reinforcement for our anticipation and pursuit of pleasure. Its memory can function as reference point for anticipations, and it can contrast and therewith assist to define actual or anticipated pain. Particularly, a current experience of a pleasurable condition constitutes a necessary element for developing a fear of losing it.

Although notions of pain and pleasure, as well as their anticipatory aspects, stand diametrically opposed to each other, pain and fear push us toward happiness and combine with the pull of pleasure and desire. We regularly sense these opposites contemporaneously in the formulation of our wishes. When we aspire toward the fulfillment of a need, we feel the pain of a present deprivation and the anticipation of

pleasure. Our unmet desire intensifies our pain because it emphasizes the discrepancy of our current state. We further fear the experience of additional pain until we meet our desire and the uncertainty of obtaining satisfaction. By anticipating the pleasure of fulfillment, we also sense a positive emotion. We perceive an attraction to the anticipated pleasure to be generated by the fulfillment of a wish and to the anticipated relief of our pain and fear. If we presently enjoy the pleasure of fulfillment, that emotional condition and the desire to sustain its presence are paired with fear that the continuation of pleasure might fail, if we believe that to be possible. We fear that we might be exposed to the pain of deprivation and the pain of struggling to regain fulfillment. That fear enables desire to maintain the present fulfillment of a need, giving rise to a potent amalgamated motivation. In the resulting wish to maintain happiness, we sense the pleasure of fulfillment and anticipation of its persistence, but we also fear the pain of its absence.

We may then conclude that in both the state of deprivation and the state of fulfillment, our awareness encompasses pain and pleasure either as existing or as a potential. We inexorably feel the presence of one state and the anticipation of the other. In either state, we experience the contrast between what is and what is not and our emotional attraction or repulsion regarding these states. Thus, every wish is motivated by our perception of both pain and pleasure. To occur, a wish has to encompass a differential between the current and an imagined state. We are incapable perceiving a state as better unless we conceive of another state as worse. We cannot imagine the relief of fulfillment without the actual or deemed deprivation of a need. Every wish by its nature entails a movement from a position that is closer to pain to a position that is closer to pleasure. Our wishes are created by, exist in, and represent the discrepancy between these two points. The urgency of a wish is defined by the distance between the situations of pain and pleasure represented in a wish. It would appear that we are incessantly subjected to our wishes. At any time, we are in one of the two states that give rise to them. We are either repulsed by our present state and attracted to an anticipated state, or we are attracted to a present state and repulsed from an anticipated state. Our wishes preoccupy us with desired or feared change. This state of mind gives rise to a restless existence that immerses us in a never-ending succession of wishes.

Our wishes regularly occur in multiple contemporaneous pursuits of different and possibly the same needs. Although our principal needs for individual or collective survival and thriving are supported by subordinated existential needs, these principal needs do not necessarily impress us as leading motivators. Needs whose pursuit advances

them are incentivized by their own immediate concerns and rewards. The emotional objective of each need is its own satisfaction. For each need, we can distinguish a different kind of pain and pleasure, a specific quality of happiness and unhappiness. These differences describe needs and identify them to us as disparate. They share the same general pain-pleasure mechanism to indicate deprivation and fulfillment. We can therefore employ general concepts of happiness and unhappiness on them. Still, when we refer to our need to be happy, we are implicitly referring to happiness in different regions of our being. These variations are necessary to enable us to react appropriately toward different types of threats or deficiencies to our individual and collective existence. We could not function with a uniform concept of happiness because we would have no guidance which underlying factual necessities for survival and thriving must be addressed to create satisfaction. The differentiation of pain and pleasure for each type of requirement enables us to identify the functionalities that are in need of remediation or upkeep. Our pursuits are guided by their state and by their potential for change represented by circumstances for each need.

Experiences of deprivation and satisfaction happen in a natural cycle for a large part of our needs, while other needs are not cyclical. Although some needs are initially experienced in their state of satisfaction, other needs may be initially experienced without any knowledge of their satisfaction. If they enter our awareness as an incident of pain without our prior experience of their satisfaction, we have at best a genetic urge to guide our actions. Our forays may be directed by automated instructions that point us toward means or strategies of fulfillment. Genetic instincts may be able to motivate our wishes entirely or partly. Although their instructions might be precise with regard to means, their ultimate objectives may remain indefinite in our mind as long as we possess no memory of satisfaction to which our mind could aspire. Before the initial satisfaction of a need, we do not know the ultimate conclusion for our wishes. Even genetic instructions regarding means may be nebulous or may not be triggered until we are exposed to them. We may be conditioned to search for them without much of previous a notion of them. All we might be able to formulate with certainty might be a negative wish to escape the state of pain or fear we experience. That negative wish may have us search for its counterpart of fulfillment and hence reinforce the search incentivized by positive generic imprints. Apart from that, we may learn from examples or instructions by others. We may imagine fulfillment to be similar to incidents we experienced concerning other needs. Notwithstanding, until the differential between pain and pleasure gains definition by experi-

encing it for a need, its emotional push and pull will not have been appropriately expressed. Even if we have access to technical information, we cannot be sure that sequences we formulate will cause fulfillment.

Correspondingly, if we have never experienced a need in its deprived state, we cannot formulate a fully formed wish of preserving its fulfillment. The continuous fulfillment of a need may prevent us from being aware of such a need's existence, even as a matter of genetic instinct because its actualization remains dormant as long as a need remains fulfilled. The pleasure of fulfillment does not provide an understanding of its absence. We must have a contrasting experience. Short of experiencing actual deprivation, we can draw on our experiences of pain from the deprivation of other needs. Our inquiries into potentials of loss may leave us with an understanding of the circumstances that maintain fulfillment of a need. We could impart fear regarding events that might deprive us of these circumstances by actual or by simulated endangerment. But such a fear would be indefinite and likely miss the motivating vigor of fear that is founded in a prior experience of loss.

The dichotomy between pain and pleasure may grant us an idea of the general mechanism at the foundation of our needs. Still, to understand the phenomenon of our needs fully, we have to give scrutiny to their sources. As we embark on that exploration, we are confronted by the question how we apply the term need. It appears to incorporate several aspects that we appear to combine in common usage. We can describe a need as a deficiency of means that we require to survive or thrive, thus describing the objective causes for a need. In addition, we use the term to describe our awareness of a deficiency. Finally, we use the term to describe our mental response in form of our motivation to neutralize the causes and our awareness of deficiencies. While we can distinguish among these three aspects of cause, awareness, and reaction, our usage of need commonly encompasses all these aspects. That may be so because these three aspects form parts of an automatic process in which they are naturally linked. Circumstances of actual and of potential deprivation involuntarily prompt our awareness of these circumstances, which involuntarily triggers the urge to address them. All our needs impress us as such involuntary phenomena. They appear to us as uncontrollable forces of nature that seem to originate, if not dictate, our demeanor. Our at times limited understanding of them, their causes, and the ways in which they impose on us can make our needs appear like strange and mysterious forces although they define us.

Because we come across our needs as involuntary sensory phenomena that trigger involuntary responses, we are describing them as forces that move us, as emotions. Most physiological mechanisms in-

volved in our needs are concentrated in our brain. It is largely the site that processes sensory information into emotional reactions. It generates pain, fear, pleasure, and desire from sensory impressions. It also correlates, categorizes, stores, and retrieves sensory impressions of objects and events that we consider to be associated with emotions and generates directives in response by its instinctive mechanisms. Even a number of sensory origins for needs, particularly concerning collateral needs, appear to be located there. Still, many origins for our needs are located in, perceived by, conveyed by, and possibly partly processed in other parts of our body. While we may call all these phenomena mental processes, we can distinguish perceptive facilities that detect, convert, and transport sensory signals from emotional facilities that process our awareness of and response to them. The quality of our emotional mind, our emotional intelligence, can be measured by how well it pairs sensory impressions with emotional cognizance and responses in assistance of our needs. In humanity's development, perceptive and emotional facilities initially encompassed the entirety of our mind.

Eventually, they were supplemented by discrete facilities of rational thought that we may call our rational mind. Although it seems to depend on the same perceptive mechanisms as our emotional mind and generates awareness, that awareness is only factual and remains detached from the emotional mechanisms of pain, fear, pleasure, and desire and instinctive reactions. Similar to our emotional mind, it relates, categorizes, stores, and retrieves sensory representations of objects and events, but it does so with a vastly expanded capacity. While emotional facilities are limited to processing the fact that certain objects and events or types of them are linked to emotions, rational facilities discern how they happen. Our rational mind processes sensory information of objects and events in a spatially or sequentially correlated manner, and catalogues them according to recognitions of order. The quality of our rational mind, our rational intelligence, can be calculated in four aspects. The first is how well we remember objects and events or connected rational activity in which we engaged. This is our capacity to recall. Another is how well we derive causality from observations. That is our capacity to understand. A third aspect is how well we keep the correlations of multiple aspects present in our mind, our capacity to associate. Finally, rational intelligence is measured by how well we conceptualize new objects or events as means for pursuits, our capacity to invent. These capacities assist similar, rudimentary capacities of our emotional mind and its aptitude to plan and implement the pursuit of our needs. The next chapter examines rational capacities in more detail and how they interact with our emotional capacities.