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Irrealia: F. Suárez's Concept of Being in the Formulation of Intentionality from F. Brentano to J. Patočka and Beyond

Introduction

Franz Brentano is considered a point of divergence of the different branches of European philosophies thanks to students Edmund Husserl, Sigmund Freud, Tomáš Masaryk, Rudolf Steiner, Alexius Meinong, Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Kazimierz Twardowski, and Christian von Ehrenfels. His contribution to the foundation of moral experience, elaborated in his famous book *Vom Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis* (transl. *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*), was endorsed by G.E. Moore, the founder of analytic philosophy.

However, Brentano makes use of two main sources, that is, on the one hand, Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy*, and on the other, Aristotle's writings as interpreted in the late Middle Ages. Undoubtedly, the key issue is the concept of being in the formulation of intentionality. It is no coincidence that Martin Heidegger, precisely thanks to Brentano's book *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (transl. *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*), focuses on the being in his famous book *Sein und Zeit* (transl. *Being and Time*).

Jan Patočka is widely regarded as an heir to both Husserl and Heidegger. Not only that, he acknowledges Masaryk's philosophy and makes

extensive use of the ancient philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus, advancing the idea of “care of the soul” as an emblem of European philosophy itself. Although the concept of “soul” is somewhat questioned today, as Patočka notes, and perhaps denied in the nihilistic approach embraced by Friedrich Nietzsche and his followers, Patočka contemplates the figure of Socrates as the propitious key to, and symbol of, an effort towards truth and right. Nevertheless, without paying tribute to Augustine of Hippo, one cannot arrive at the pre-mundane experience, so to say. The claim advanced is that in the light of Francisco Suárez’s concept of being as *aliquid in rerum natura*, that is, *irrealis*, the very experience of intentionality is of Augustinian provenance.

The Tricky Inheritance of the Moderns

In a famous statement on intentionality, Franz Brentano notes, “Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) *inexistence* of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent *objectivity*.”¹ Brentano immediately adds that there are at least two possible misconceptions. The first one lies in confusing the meaning of “inexistence” with that of “existence in the proper sense of the word.”² This fallacy, already attributed by him to Philo, leads in consequence to the “contradictory doctrine of the *logos* and Ideas.”³ If, as it were, the same question were applied to the Neoplatonists, according to Brentano, then there must be a reason for this. And indeed, Brentano provides it in what follows: “St. Augustine in his doctrine of the *verbum mentis* and its inner origin touches upon the same fact.”⁴ However, Brentano does not make this

¹ F. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, transl. A.C. Rancurello et al., New York, NY: Routledge 2009, p. 68. Emphasis mine.

² *Ibidem*, p. 67.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

point clearly enough and ends up confusing Augustine's position with Aristotle's, saying, "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul, he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect."⁵ The question of "the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object" and "its inner origin" as intended by Augustine will be discussed later.

The second misconception concerns objectivity thought of as "extra-mental" instead of immanent. Brentano notes that one must be careful not to mistake objects⁶ for things. The first is intrinsic, related to the inner experience as he "literally" translates it as "Ein-wohnung" (*in-existence*). Therefore, this must be the source experience, since truth is contained in perception, that is, in "Wahr-nehmung." Thus, the framework justifies in principle two activities, namely "Ein-sicht" and "Ein-fuellung," that is *insight* and *empathy*, respectively. In contrast to Kant, Brentano addresses the problem from the empirical point of view, as he explicitly states. In other words, within the interest in the sentience that he puts at the core of the research itself.

It must be said, however, that under the label "Scholastics of the Middle Ages," one must clearly distinguish between two bilateral positions, namely that of Thomas Aquinas and of Duns Scotus, and the third, that of Francisco Suárez as the link between these two. No doubt, all three agree with Augustine regarding "his doctrine of the *verbum mentis* and its inner origin." With Suárez, the "ontology" in the modern sense is initiated.

Brentano hints almost accidentally at the role of analogy in Aquinas' conception of being, referred to as "the mystery of the Trinity and the procession *ad intra* of the Word and the Spirit."⁷ Scotus' doctrine,

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ In the text, the term "object" does not refer to extra-mental reality, contrary to contemporary usage. See R. Descartes, *Medytacje o pierwszej filozofii*, transl. M. Ajdukiewicz et al., Kęty: Antyk 2001, p. 63.

⁷ F. Brentano, *Psychology...*, p. 67.

on the other hand, makes no use of the *analogia entis* for truth; on the contrary, Scotus emphasizes “the uniqueness and simplicity of the concept of being.”⁸ Thus, voicing both, Suárez expresses the concept of being as *nominal* and *present participatory*, that is, *existential*. In Aquinas the concept of being or better still the “*ratio entis*” corresponding to the “*actus essendi*” belongs to God *per essentiam*, and in creatures *per participationem*. This makes the concept of being proper to God and secondary to humans. Combining with the Scotus’ doctrine Suárez arrives at the concept of being as “that which is” irrespective of the attribution created-increate, finite-infinite and so on.⁹ In other words, the concept of being could be stated as pre-mundane, that is *irrealis*. So, not by chance, while referring to the use of analogy, Suárez shifts the meaning of the Aquinas’ concept of analogy, that is, starting from what can be known better because it is closer to humans.

But in Suárez, even though the concept of “being” takes on a new meaning, that of the neutral, that is, of “*non-nihil = aliquid*,”¹⁰ which it is not suited to metaphysics without adding something, namely “attribution created-increate, finite-infinite and so on.” In this resides its universality. Put another way, it is the concept of *being as being* and not *being as such*.¹¹ Descartes was, no doubt, influenced by the doctrine of Suárez in thinking about the *matheis universalis* endorsed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The passage Descartes makes in *Meditations on First Philosophy*, as Jean-François Courtine points out, aims to demonstrate its own sources.¹² Indeed, Descartes leaves out the justification of the substance of cogitare, that is, the unity of the mind within the idea as the product of *insight*. By turning the question upside down, Descartes even uses it in his claim to prove the existence of God, the immortality of the

⁸ J.-F. Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, Paris: PUF 1990, p. 532.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 530.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 532.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 484-485.

soul, and the distinction between soul and body.¹³ It is precisely from Descartes that Brentano draws an “absolute” character of the “idea.”

But does the unity to which all cognition tends mean “*ratio entis*,” that is “*actus essendi*”? Or at least its imperfect realization? What does eventually make the experience genuine? Something – and *not-nothing* – has undoubtedly been left out in the shadows, perhaps as unreal, as allusion.

Plato's Leitmotiv and the Augustinian “Inward Turn”

In his lectures on *Plato and Europe* Jan Patočka points out that one must be careful not to confuse the phenomena of things, of *existens*, with the phenomena of being.¹⁴ This indeed creates a certain perplexity, which Patočka captures in the words: “What does being really mean? That things show themselves is obvious to everyone. This is common. But what is this being? At first glance, this is a mystery for everyone. Being is an abstract concept. How is it that the real, substantial phenomenon is to be the phenomenon of being, and not the phenomenon of things, existents surrounding us or that we are ourselves?”¹⁵ Above all else, when something happens that is worthy of being grasped and remembered, it is by virtue of the influence it exerts. To “have *sense* for what shows itself,” as Patočka emphasizes, “means that it does not leave us indifferent, that it does not leave us insensible.”¹⁶ In other words, it means being individually touched, personally affected. Undoubtedly, understanding is not about “mere individual things, but rather we understand the whole stamp of a thing, we have a sense for their internal, substantial stamp – the *sense for being*.”¹⁷

¹³ For Immanuel Kant, the Cartesian sources are echoed only from a great distance as the postulates of reason.

¹⁴ J. Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, transl. P. Lom, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2002, p. 131.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 132.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

“The *sense for being*” provides a confidence in reality and unity that calms down to a certain extent. One can dream about the future without the constraints of current events. However, as a law of development, a crisis occurs every now and then and reality – that is, what is believed to be real – collapses in an instant. In other words, it is a shock – a “living doubt,” as Charles S. Peirce describes it in contrast to Descartes’ methodological doubt – that comes from not realizing that in oneself, one hosts the feeling of collapse. The same goes for philosophy, which causes a crisis of significance as personal and shifts it to a new vision of the world. What was familiar until now becomes hostile, a fairy tale, a myth to be rejected. A departure from the past can be distinct, however, the myth can also have a positive side. Patočka makes this explicit, saying, “myth is insufficiently considered in rational philosophy and that it is necessary to consider also something like the truthfulness of myth. . . . myth is the dream of reason and . . . philosophy is related to myth as waking is to a dream.”¹⁸ Thus, the “truthfulness of the myth” is even more than a made-up moral.

The primary theme of the philosophy of Plato – as well as that of Democritus – is “the care of the soul,” as Patočka states.¹⁹ According to Patočka, the care of the soul consists of three aspects, namely “first, . . . the problematic of *being* that is in Plato is also the deepest and highest existent, of which all the rest is in some way a picture and reflection. The second thing is then the existence of man in the company of the community. . . . And then there is . . . the third thing, *the relation to one’s own* temporal and eternal *being* . . .”²⁰ The first two provide an ideal, a perfection, both as a high-level rationality and as a *polis* – a community guided by wisdom and reason, where the fate suffered by Socrates never occurs. Not surprisingly, the third aspect raises a special perplexity, too crucial to be left unexamined. Patočka explains, “Plato, as you know, always somehow tries to prove that the soul – meaning

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 133.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 135.

the peculiar movement of our comprehending being and upon its basis comprehension of existence around us, the existent source of all movement and all life – is essentially *alive* and as a result cannot perish.”²¹ However, in Plato the so-called immortality of the soul is proven “through the similarity of the soul to the ideas.”²² Although, in the end, Plato’s proofs for immortality come across as “short-winded,”²³ Plato’s great myths are all in the quest for the life worth living, which constitutes precisely the care of the soul. Nevertheless, Plato’s disclosure of the “peculiar movement of our comprehending *being*” is not misleading and can be seen as his true legacy.

The question of “the *relation to one’s own* temporal and eternal *being*” takes on special relevance due to Augustine’s conversion.²⁴ Costantino Esposito gets to the heart of this, stating, “. . . one of the most effective ontological definitions of the human being as *dilector mundi* is the one that Augustine discovers when he recalls the famous adolescent episode of the theft of pears. The attachment to the world, the love of the world is revealed as the inexplicable taste of self-destruction. Not only does dispersion in multiplicity lead to loss of self, but it implies the love of this very loss . . .”²⁵ Restlessness is indeed a sign of this loss, as Augustine sincerely confesses. However, he also realizes that “[t]he love of nothingness is the inverted form of the desire for *being*” and that “[d]etachment is a ‘perverse’ sign of relationship . . .”²⁶ Augustine’s breakthrough consists precisely in his later affirmation that anticipates that of Descartes, namely, “For if I am deceived, I am.”²⁷ At the same time, within Augustine’s *Confessiones*, the constitution of the self in

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 137.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ C. Esposito, “Vivere il mondo, vivere nel mondo. Agostino in Heidegger,” *Bollettino Filosofico* 2020, XXXV: 180-197. It is no coincidence that in his philosophical research the author of *Being and Time* draws from this source.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 185.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 186.

²⁷ Augustine of Hippo, *City of God*, transl. W. Babcock, ed. B. Ramsey, New York, NY: New City Press 2018, book XI: 26.

self-awareness, that is, in being conscious of the stamp of one's life before God is a reminder that the source experience is not to be overlooked. The case of inner struggle is a sign of this and simultaneously a promise, as Augustine himself uncovers.²⁸ However, the perspective is that of grace or in other words, of the impossibility of understanding before entrusting, that is, acting beyond and perhaps against reality.²⁹

Intentionality, Life and "Back to the *Things* Themselves!"

No doubt, Suárez's concept of being straddles the metaphysical conception of the Middle Ages and the ontological conception of the science of Galileo and Descartes. Suárez's concept of being means *aliquid in rerum natura*, which stands for: 1) the "given" and 2) the relationship, that is, the "in-between" *being* as *nominal* and *being* as *present participium* or *existential*. In this light, the "intentional (or mental) inexistence" that Brentano refers to is taken as the Cartesian idea also known as "res," that is, the means of apprehending. But this is a shortcut. In the context, the term "res" refers to Suárez's *rerum natura*. It can also be translated in the sense of the specific, which, however, does not mean Suárez's *aliquid*, that is "something."

On the other hand, Husserl's slogan "back to the things themselves!" refers to it, meaning "things" as findings (*Vorfindlichkeiten*), that is, the sense purely given. But still, that is not Suárez's position in this regard. Indeed, Husserl goes by the *nominal* route, so to speak, that of perception, whereas Heidegger embraces the *existential* one. However, Heidegger also tends towards understanding due to the something he finds or is aware of, namely findings about oneself (*Befindlichkeit*). As far as findings go, Husserl can be accorded with the claims of Thomas Aqu-

²⁸ Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions*, transl. P. Constantine, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company 2020, book IX.

²⁹ In a sense, one cannot arrive at Suárez's position from Descartes' precisely because the former justifies the latter and not vice versa. Put differently still, believing in order to understand does not move in the horizon of idea.

nas, as Edith Stein³⁰ rightly recognizes; on the other hand, Heidegger points to the position of Duns Scotus, as he states in his own dissertation on *Gramatica Speculativa*.³¹ Both Husserl and Heidegger assume the ontology of language as it is known, even though differently.³²

For Husserl, the approach is one of reduction to achieve the pure *a priori*. This is at the same time a presupposition, namely, that there is something ultimately unitary and to be revealed. This, however, does not reconcile with the Is-Ought Problem of British empiricism, which lies at the heart of Husserl's research. Patočka clarifies this as follows: "Impressions are as if the ultimate building blocks (therein Husserl learns from British empiricism). Our intention animates them and bestows upon them a meaning distinct from impressions. Still, impressions are ultimate, Husserl did not go beyond them in any of his analyses of perception."³³ It can be said, however, that for Husserl, it is not the whole story in the perceptual way. That one needs to consult the prominent material on bodily intentionality of the recent research.³⁴

Patočka makes the point that for Heidegger, things are known primordially "not as objects but as *pragmata*."³⁵ Things are not given in a certain sense, present before an I (*Vorhandenheit*), but they are good for something, available (*Zuhandenheit*) "on the basis of the primordial open horizon of my life in which I grasp the possibilities it opens for me."³⁶ But even when "Heidegger is presenting the world of humans," it is "but a special world, a derivative one."³⁷ The unitary experience

³⁰ E. Stein, "Was is Philosophie? Ein Gespräch zwischen Edmund Husserl und Thomas von Aquino," in *Erkenntnis und Glaube*, ed. L. Gelber & M. Linssen, Freiburg: Herder 1993, pp. 19-48.

³¹ The work Heidegger refers to is now attributed to Thomas of Erfurt. A similar use of the work was made by Charles S. Peirce.

³² J. Patočka, *Body, Community, Language, World*, transl. E.V. Kohák, Chicago, IL: Open Court 2006, p. 125.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 126.

³⁴ J. Brudzińska, *Bi-Valenz der Erfahrung: Assoziation, Imaginäres und Trieb in der Genesis der Subjektivität bei Husserl und Freud*, Cham: Springer 2020.

³⁵ J. Patočka, *Body...*, p. 104.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 125.

or the source experience is not that. Thus, Patočka rightly hints at the following: “The question is whether these phenomena do not point to a deeper unity, which is the basis for that intentional act which perception reads off.”³⁸

From the beginning, intentionality as the Cartesian legacy is altered not only by the ideas of John Locke, as obvious, but also by other inventions of philosophers, for example the monads of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. However, all those and others agree with the claim of making the findings. Some achieve results by way of *insight* (*Einsicht*), others by way of heart (*Einfuehlung*), for example Blaise Pascal.

Not without reason, Brentano rendered intentionality with the word “Einwohnung,” which literally translates “in-existence” and innately evokes permanence and interior habitation, that is, life. Undoubtedly, the intentionality developed in the Middle Ages comes from the finding of the self in Augustine, of his “inward turn.” Thus, Augustine’s dictum “credo ut intelligam” leading to Suárez’s concept of being must be rendered today as “credo adjectum, ut intelligam”³⁹ to serve as a unitary concept of intentionality. Suárez helps to understand, that for the *being* in the metaphysical (or rather the ontological) sense, something has to be added (*ad-jectum*) by the subject (*sub-jectum*), which is allowed to stand – being understandable – and therefore to be accessible (*objectum*) and perhaps useful for something. Perhaps Patočka alludes to this by saying, “Being is an abstract concept.”⁴⁰ However, the adjective “abstract” does not render its intentional nature well, because of the ambivalence of the term “abstract.” *Irrealia*, as it were, are not fiction.

The issue emerges already in the problem with the Sophists – as Patočka⁴¹ accurately points out⁴² – which leads Plato into a quandary, namely: “Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 126.

³⁹ P. Janik, *Hermeneutika wypowiedzi*, Kraków: Ignatianum University Press 2021.

⁴⁰ J. Patočka, *Plato...*, p. 132.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 182-183.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

you wish to designate when you say 'being'? For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed."⁴³ Heidegger puts this quotation at the beginning of *Sein und Zeit*. Aristotle recognizes this in the *Topics*, before introducing the categories as the starting point of philosophy, with the words: "Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception."⁴⁴ The term "argument" stands for "reason," no doubt. In other words, it means eventually the "soul" of Plato's provenance.

However, approaching intentionality in the Cartesian framework, Brentano seeks to convince us of "this mental in-existence" already in Aristotle,⁴⁵ but he is only partly right, because Greek philosophy does not recognize any "I" in subjective experience. Patočka notes on the point: "In ancient philosophy there is no subjectivity, all this philosophy is in the third person. It does not know self-reflection, it does not know the 'I' ('I' is contained nowhere in a philosophical thesis). Being is always *that*."⁴⁶ Thus, Brentano apparently leaves aside a very important question of "in-existence," namely that relating to the "I."

What Are the Findings for? Intentionality Revised

Suárez's concept of being should not be confused with that of being as existence, that is, something accessible in any way. Incidentally, Suárez's concept of being is not the eclectic conception, as was thought until recently. On the contrary, its originality lies in contemplating the two opposite approaches to *being*, that is – by taking a shortcut – the *nominative* with that of the *present participle*, that is, *existential*. How-

⁴³ Plato, "Sophist," in *Complete Works*, transl. N.P. White, ed. J.M. Cooper, Indianapolis, IN.; Cambridge: Hackett 1997, p. 244a.

⁴⁴ Aristotle, "Topics," transl. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge, in *The complete works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press 1995, p. 105a.

⁴⁵ F. Brentano, *Psychology...*, p. 67.

⁴⁶ J. Patočka, *Body...*, p. 8.

ever, one must not forget that the Suárez's is a synthesis of the positions of Thomas Aquinas and of Duns Scotus. In other words, *being as nominative* does not exclude *participation*, indeed it presupposes it, but in the light of "in-existence," that is, of impossible, or *irrealis*. The same is true of Scotus' position on *participatory presence*, which also refers to the original "in-existence" and from it to *existence* as derived. A third way, as the *possibility of being*, considers it as the "most reasonable concurrence" – to be meant also as association or relation – between literally the "terms," that is the extreme expressions of *being* as such. Although Suárez also presupposes grace as the proper horizon of the "in-existence," he points to the *something* accessible to human reason through language and in particular in the *argument in contest*, or *law* that serve for the "context." On the other hand, it can be said that the "truthfulness of myth" in Patočka's approach is already the prerequisite of reasonableness in this regard.

Heidegger starts from Suárez's expression to elaborate "Dasein," that is, of the "present participium," so the approach to temporality is at the center of his investigation.⁴⁷ However, Heidegger's construction is "ambi-valent," as it is known. It is the consequence of rejecting the "context of what is worth," and "embracing nothingness." No doubt, Heidegger does not confuse "existence" with "in-existence." On the contrary, he grasps the true scope of "in-existence," that is, the designing of "Dasein," in understanding as a response to context, thus "being-in-the-world." However, what Heidegger leaves out – it is better seen in the perspective of Augustine's *Confessions*, highly appreciated by Heidegger – is the tie with life.⁴⁸ The very "ambi-valent" of the Heideggerian construction of *Dasein* is to be contrasted with "reasonableness," that is, Augustine's true finding. In this way, the term "ambi-valent" discloses the unveiling of conscience in the manner of Greek

⁴⁷ C. Esposito, "Al di sopra, 'Attraverso', 'Al di là'. Heidegger, Suárez, Tommaso nella storia della metafisica," *Giornale di Metafisica - Nuova Serie* 2010, XXXII, p. 585.

⁴⁸ R. Barbaras, "Life, Movement, and Desire," *Research in Phenomenology* 2008, 38, p. 16.

philosophy and ancient theatrical culture with the professed nihilism of the modern self.

Suárez's concept of being, that is, the "most reasonable concurrence," is also intended as "being-in-the-world." However, it is the "pre-mundane" position, indeed *irrealis*. As the unitary is not "ambi-valent," thus may provide a basis for striving toward life that has nothing to do with the Sisyphus effort.

Conclusion

Patočka's legacy is found in the struggle to reconcile the life-feeling with the modern construction of reality, which means "a radical *reconstruction* of the naive and natural world of common sense."⁴⁹ Patočka notes:

Descartes's struggle against "confused ideas" is not merely a fight against Aristotelianism; the historical opposition here conceals a deeper one – the conflict between the scientific world and the naive world. What had hitherto been deemed reality is real no longer; reality, at least in its ultimate root, is something else – above all it obeys mathematical laws, it is to be understood *sub specie* of a formal mathematical model. All concepts and principles contrary to this model must be – and progressively are – barred from the reflection on true reality.⁵⁰

Patočka's "sense for being" refers to the life-feeling; not to be understood in the Heideggerian sense of the voice of conscience, nor in the Schelerian sense of the *Ordo amoris*. In fact, both bear a sign of division; the first in the ambivalent *Dasein*, the second in the conception of the non-personal psyche⁵¹ or, put otherwise, in the unjustified claim of the

⁴⁹ J. Patočka, *The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem*, transl. E. Abrams, eds. I. Chvatík and L. Učník, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2016, p. 8. Emphasis mine.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ E. Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, transl. M. Sawicki, Washington, DC: ICS Publications 2000, p. 200.

“act” as it was humans,⁵² perhaps pretended to be that of Aquinas’ perspective of the “actus essendi” as some-how materially or non-formally given.⁵³ According to Patočka “the real, substantial phenomenon” is “the phenomenon of being,” which however, is “not the phenomenon of things, *existents* surrounding us or that we are ourselves . . .” Thus, this must be a unified experience as profoundly desired.

The feeling, or *sentire* is the very expression of Suárez’s approach. Nevertheless, it cannot be but *irreal*. Not in the sense of fiction, though; on the contrary, in resting on the always-beyond as the hope for and at the same time somehow experiencing of continuity of life.

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⁵² M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, transl. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson, New York, NY: Harper Perennial 2008, p. 73.

⁵³ M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus*.

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Abstract

Irrealia: F. Suárez's Concept of Being in the Formulation of Intentionality from F. Brentano to J. Patočka and Beyond

The language of phenomenology includes terms such as intentionality, phenomenon, insight, analysis, sense, not to mention the key term of Edmund Husserl's manifesto, "the things themselves" to return to. But what does the "things themselves" properly mean? How come the term is replaced by the "findings" over time? And what are the findings for? The investigation begins by looking at the tricky legacy of the modern turn, trying to clarify ties to past masters, including Francisco Suárez and Augustine of Hippo. The former, because his influence goes beyond René Descartes reaching undoubtedly Franz Brentano and his students, as well as Martin Heidegger. The latter, because Augustine gives a personal component to the Greek inheritance, marked by the "inward turn." However, it would not be possible to review the history of thought without the help offered by Jan Patočka's analyses. Patočka discloses the "care" of the Greek philosophers, Plato and Democritus among others, "for the soul"; we would say with Patočka for "being," whose sense "does not leave us indifferent" as the leitmotiv of Ancient Philosophy. Nevertheless, in his lectures on *Plato and Europe*, Patočka points out that you must be careful not to confuse the phenomena of things, of *existens*, with the phenomena of being. Finally, Patočka's legacy is found in the efforts to reconcile the life-feeling with the modern construction of reality, which means "a radical reconstruction of the naive and natural world of common sense." In some ways, intentionality is to be revised.

Keywords: intentionality, phenomenology, Being, care of the soul, irrealia, onward turn, things themselves, natural world, life-feeling

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